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Topic: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: PanAm_DC10
Posted 2009-03-11 02:04:55 and read 18771 times.

This is a new part in the ongoing series of threads which cover this topic. We ask that you continue the discussion in this new thread.

All previous threads are linked below for your reference.

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Thank you.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2009-03-11 05:23:38 and read 18592 times.

Off topic but I think this may be an a.nut record for number of threads.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Theredbaron
Posted 2009-03-11 05:59:30 and read 18520 times.

Yes I agree, and probably one of the most informative in many ways, but I think that in someway pointless because we dont have the CVR transcription and we dont have a clue what distracted the crew so much that the let the AC go minus 40knots below Vref.

In the L1011 in the everglades the CVR made everything clear that the crew was distracted by a 1 dollar faulty landing gear warning light, and without it, that tragic crash would have been unsolvable or unexplainable.

I think the CVR in this crash is crucial to know what really happened and led to the crew to this fatal outcome.

Best Regards
TRB

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-11 08:17:10 and read 18339 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 2):
I think the CVR in this crash is crucial to know what really happened and led to the crew to this fatal outcome.

I agree. IIRC the CVR ( and the DFDR too of course ) were in very good condition, so i hope we can hear something new in a few days or couple of weeks max. OTOH, if the CVR reveals something so dramatic to explain the lack of awareness of this crew regarding the speed, i will be very surprised.

Saludos.
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Theredbaron
Posted 2009-03-11 13:54:10 and read 18034 times.

Gonzalo, the CVR will answer a lot of questions for sure...

I Think we will see as experience has told us that a very small problem distrated the crew, the lost situational awareness or did not check the basics that lead to this tragic event.

I have been in the Jumpseat a lot and I have seen it time and time again that a crew that has an impecable record make mistakes or misunderstands the AC.

Saludos

Best Regards
TRB

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-11 14:28:46 and read 17976 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 4):
Gonzalo, the CVR will answer a lot of questions for sure...

I hope the same, believe me... And even more, if the CVR's information finally shows that the crew never was at fault, I'll be the first in acknowledge my mistake and apologize ( for my actual position about the speed-awareness ). For now we only can wait and see....

Saludos
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-11 14:31:43 and read 17965 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 2):
but I think that in someway pointless because we dont have the CVR transcription

One of the points mentioned in the Dutch preliminary report was that the captain was "coaching" the F/O through the Before-Landing checklist while the aircraft made an idle descent on final. While we obviously dont yet know the extent to which this was a factor, it seems plausible that coaching a pilot through something as procedural as a checklist, as opposed to merely carrying it out could have (even if it shouldn't have) distracted both pilots from monitoring the airspeed. That a third pair of eyes on the flight deck missed it as well, is utterly mind-boggling.

There was also some talk about TK pilots frowning upon the choice of AMS as a training airport. Their concerns may yet be borne out. This tragic accident may end up becoming the textbook example of just how critical situational awareness is, particularly during approach.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Spitfire
Posted 2009-03-11 15:06:11 and read 17888 times.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 6):
the captain was "coaching" the F/O through the Before-Landing checklist

I'm wondering what he was 'coaching' to someone who had already made that "Landing" check list hundred of times in the simulator....

The Landing check list :

- START SWITCHES ................ON
-RECALL.........................CHECKED
-SPEEDBRAKE..........ARMED,GREEN LIGHT
-LANDING GEAR........DOWN, 3 GREEN
-FLAPS.........., xxxx, GREEN LIGHT


Ok, we have to wait for the CVR transcription

[Edited 2009-03-11 15:07:25]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: PW100
Posted 2009-03-11 15:33:37 and read 17824 times.



Quoting FlightGlobal.com:

The throttles remained at idle for about 100s during which time the aircraft slowed to 40kt (75km/h) below reference speed and the aircraft descended through the glideslope. During this period the captain was "coaching" the first officer in conducting the before-landing checklist.

When would the crew be expected to have finished the before-landing checklist? Am I reading too much in this being an indication that they were a little late in their preperations, and that that could have taken up some of their concentration?

Thanks,
PW100

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-11 15:59:19 and read 17775 times.



Quoting Spitfire (Reply 7):
I'm wondering what he was 'coaching' to someone who had already made that "Landing" check list hundred of times in the simulator....

As you point out, the procedure should really require no coaching. However I wonder if either

(a) the Captain was doing a lot of editorialising and getting too much into details.

and/or

(b) The relatively inexperienced F/O who had only 25 hours of flight time on the 738 messed up some detail of the BLC causing the Capt to correct him.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 8):
When would the crew be expected to have finished the before-landing checklist?

In terms of timing and based on the entities in the before-landing checklist as Spitfire described them, if I had to hazard a guess, I'd say that timing-wise they were pretty much OK. Only the CVR can really clear it up, though.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: 757GB
Posted 2009-03-11 16:00:20 and read 17771 times.

Reading about the importance of the CVR and thinking of how much we have to interpret words and tones in other cases (the alleged high pitch in the Colgan CVR for example) triggered my curiosity. Have you heard or read anywhere if video cameras have ever been considered for recording cockpit activity? I know many would not like the idea so don't kill the messenger ok?
 duck 

I'm not advocating it, I simply wonder if anybody has proposed it.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-11 16:21:45 and read 17731 times.



Quoting 757GB (Reply 10):
Have you heard or read anywhere if video cameras have ever been considered for recording cockpit activity?

I believe the idea has been discussed by the FAA amongst other agencies. There may be some issues with implementation etc, that could be holding it up.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Smeg
Posted 2009-03-11 16:27:14 and read 17716 times.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 11):

I believe the idea has been discussed by the FAA amongst other agencies. There may be some issues with implementation etc, that could be holding it up.

I also believe that there are some moral issues that may prevent it. For example, if the CVR or ATC transmissions get leaked, it is one thing, but the chance of a video of a crews (remember that they are humans too!) last moments getting into the public domain may be deemed too "risky" when compared to the benefits of having a video in the cockpit.

(But I could be wrong!)

[Edited 2009-03-11 16:29:59]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: DingDong
Posted 2009-03-11 16:35:38 and read 17707 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 11):
I believe the idea has been discussed by the FAA amongst other agencies. There may be some issues with implementation etc, that could be holding it up.

It has been discussed in the past, but is an absolute non-starter with pilot unions, so it has not gone anywhere. Idea is permanently dead in the water. If I were a betting man, I'd bet that Pluto would likely be colonized a long time before this video proposal ever becomes reality here on Earth.

I'm not going to get into the story behind that particular (and somewhat messy) bit of politics; leaving it to someone else. Wink

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mir
Posted 2009-03-11 17:24:38 and read 17652 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 6):
There was also some talk about TK pilots frowning upon the choice of AMS as a training airport.

Perhaps, but apart from the fact that AMS tends to be IMC more than some of TK's other destinations, was there anything specifically unique to AMS that caused this accident? I'd tend to say no.

-Mir

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: 757GB
Posted 2009-03-11 17:48:37 and read 17623 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 11):
I believe the idea has been discussed by the FAA amongst other agencies. There may be some issues with implementation etc, that could be holding it up.



Quoting Smeg (Reply 12):

I also believe that there are some moral issues that may prevent it. For example, if the CVR or ATC transmissions get leaked, it is one thing, but the chance of a video of a crews (remember that they are humans too!) last moments getting into the public domain may be deemed too "risky" when compared to the benefits of having a video in the cockpit.

Instinctively I was thinking along the lines that pilots/unions would not like it. What you say about the "last moments" makes a lot of sense though. Thank you both for the information.

Regards,
GB

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-11 19:20:58 and read 17534 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 2):
Yes I agree, and probably one of the most informative in many ways, but I think that in someway pointless because we dont have the CVR transcription and we dont have a clue what distracted the crew so much that the let the AC go minus 40knots below Vref.

I think one thing we're going to need clarification on is truly how much time elapsed between being Vref-0kts to Vref-40kts. If it was truly in the realm of 10 seconds or so (as some have theorized), then the error is far more understandable. It isn't as if speed loss happened at a constant rate, one would think.

I wonder if this is going to change how new FOs are trained. Without speculating too much, it may very well be that the FO missed something early on, and then compounded the error when he let go of the throttles.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-11 19:57:07 and read 17486 times.



Quoting JFernandez (Reply 16):
I think one thing we're going to need clarification on is truly how much time elapsed between being Vref-0kts to Vref-40kts. If it was truly in the realm of 10 seconds or so (as some have theorized), then the error is far more understandable. It isn't as if speed loss happened at a constant rate, one would think.

Maybe you're right, but i have a problem with that theory of the speed falling so quickly in that short period of time. My problem ? They ended 40 knots under Vref, that's about 75 - 80 Kms/h...If they loose that speed in ten secs, don't you think the human body must feel it ? I mean, if you're seated in a car, even if you're blind and you're seated in a smooth Rolls Royce, you feel when the car go from 100 km/h to 30 km/h, you can "feel the inertia" produced by the deceleration. Anyway, i hope the CVR can help to understand what happened in that cockpit.

Saludos.
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-11 20:26:39 and read 17461 times.



Quoting Mir (Reply 14):
was there anything specifically unique to AMS that caused this accident? I'd tend to say no.

Nothing unique to AMS, but I seem to recall a quoted TK pilot as saying (off the record, so you have to take all of this with a pinch of salt) that AMS ATC was a bit more demanding in terms of late flight path changes during descent (or something to that effect - I cant for the life of me seem to track down the source) than at other airports. That was their stated concern. Personally I would have thoughtt that FRA, LHR, BRU or CDG could be just as, if not even less forgiving, but who knows? ...

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Vikkyvik
Posted 2009-03-11 22:17:00 and read 17377 times.



Quoting Gonzalo (Reply 17):
Maybe you're right, but i have a problem with that theory of the speed falling so quickly in that short period of time. My problem ? They ended 40 knots under Vref, that's about 75 - 80 Kms/h...If they loose that speed in ten secs, don't you think the human body must feel it ? I mean, if you're seated in a car, even if you're blind and you're seated in a smooth Rolls Royce, you feel when the car go from 100 km/h to 30 km/h, you can "feel the inertia" produced by the deceleration. Anyway, i hope the CVR can help to understand what happened in that cockpit.

I suppose you might feel it.

However (and this is just me musing), whilst the speed is decaying, the plane is also going to steeper and steeper pitch angles to maintain the glideslope. That'll push you backwards into your seatback more and more. That could, to a certain extent, offset the deceleration in forward speed (which would pull you away from your seatback).

Also, using your example, if you're blindfolded in a car, you will indeed feel the deceleration, but you'd probably be hard-pressed to actually say how much you decelerated (a.k.a. you probably couldn't tell that you slowed to 30 km/h, versus 10 or 50 km/h).

The human body and brain can get disoriented fairly easily at times (which is why you have instruments).

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Theredbaron
Posted 2009-03-11 22:44:36 and read 17355 times.

Even if they did not feel the loss of speed, the stick shaker would have prompted TOGA just by watching 80 knots on the indicated airspeed.

I am sure something distracted the crew, the training captain was way too much in "instructor" mode and not really flying so his reaction was late, and by the time they tried to gain speed it was too late.

BTW Vikkyvik your signature is hilarious!

Best regards TRB

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Qualitydr
Posted 2009-03-12 03:26:07 and read 17101 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 20):
I am sure something distracted the crew, the training captain was way too much in "instructor" mode (emphasis mine) and not really flying so his reaction was late, and by the time they tried to gain speed it was too late.

A distinct possibility, but without the CVR it's hard to be definitive. Clearly something got in the way of aviating...

QD

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: FVTu134
Posted 2009-03-12 03:26:40 and read 17102 times.

Well I am sure the investigation will clear things up in due time. I know it is fun to analyze and the collective knowledge here can help in all of that brainstorming. Having followed the first 1-4 threads or so I have see one thing that is regrettable.
We have some Turkish aircrew in this forum (such as pilotaydin) who have always been very respected contributors on this forum and while their close involvement and maybe personal connections to aircrew who sadly lost their lives may have made this all more difficult for them personally, I do remember the very factual and in my opinion valuable input they brought to these threads early on.
Sadly I haven't read anything from them lately, either by order of their employer, or by being frustrated by some of the comments that were made to them, some of which were far out of line in my personal opinion.
Anyway, just to make my point, I do hope that our respected aviation friends will at some point return here and continue to contribute as their respective knowledge is what contributes to make this place an interesting place to spend time. To them, I can only say that I too have lost fellow aircrew/aviators whom I knew (some ofthem very closely) and it is always bad to loose friends and colleagues. Knowing they were former Military pilots, I can only say that I am sure they lost their lives doing something that they loved intimately.

FVTu134

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Spitfire
Posted 2009-03-12 05:26:57 and read 16891 times.



Quoting PW100 (Reply 8):
When would the crew be expected to have finished the before-landing checklist?

The normal sequence for the Landing check list is:

PF ask for : -Gear down
- Flaps .... 40
- Landing check list

PNF put the gear down, arms the speed brakes , set the landing flaps and read the check list.

The PF answers the check list items ( after verification).

So the check list comes a few seconds (let's say 10seconds) after the gear has been set down .

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: TK787
Posted 2009-03-12 05:36:15 and read 16862 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 18):
Nothing unique to AMS, but I seem to recall a quoted TK pilot as saying (off the record, so you have to take all of this with a pinch of salt) that AMS ATC was a bit more demanding in terms of late flight path changes during descent (or something to that effect - I cant for the life of me seem to track down the source) than at other airports. That was their stated concern. Personally I would have thoughtt that FRA, LHR, BRU or CDG could be just as, if not even less forgiving, but who knows? ...

In one of earlier posts I included the above info. The source was an article written by Unal Basusta from the Turkish aviation site www.airkule.com. He was questioning why TK does training at AMS, but probably meant all busy European airports you mentioned as opposed to less busy destinations.
Also looking at Turkish sites today they have some info out from the CVR, saying the source is Dutch authorities. Anyone has any other credible sources, or are we getting more speculation from Turkish media again? Not a whole lot of info, they all say:
"Due to heavy traffic at AMS, the tower asked them to approach at a high angle (!), and the last words were from the FO Olgay Ozgur, telling the Pilot; "Power,power, more power"

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-12 06:01:28 and read 16782 times.



Quoting FVTu134 (Reply 22):
We have some Turkish aircrew in this forum (such as pilotaydin) who have always been very respected contributors on this forum and while their close involvement and maybe personal connections to aircrew who sadly lost their lives may have made this all more difficult for them personally, I do remember the very factual and in my opinion valuable input they brought to these threads early on.



Quoting FVTu134 (Reply 22):
I do hope that our respected aviation friends will at some point return here and continue to contribute as their respective knowledge is what contributes to make this place an interesting place to spend time.

Well said !!! They are great contributors to the forums.

Quoting TK787 (Reply 24):
Anyone has any other credible sources, or are we getting more speculation from Turkish media again?

My humble opinion : If you want reliable information, use only this site as source :

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/inde...eken/Neergestort-tijdens-nadering/

Saludos.
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Spitfire
Posted 2009-03-12 07:10:14 and read 17330 times.

Here is an answer I've written in another topic (about KLM RA failure). I think it could be interesting to have this also here :

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 34):
They did not realize that the AT went into idle, there were no aural warnings or other warnings that could have warned the pilots


Yes there was a warning, although not directly link to the A/T, BUT, when you are about to intercept an ILS at something like 2000 feet and you receive an oral warning signal stating:

" landing gear must go down "

(that's written in the Dutch Safety Board Report, as a transcription of the Voice Recorder)

It is NOT a normal call at this point during an approach !!

You should be aware that there is a problem somewhere.

If you decide to continue the approach , you should be monitoring at least twice as much your flight instruments and other indications.

You can also take over manualy as this has something to do with automation.

If you are in doubt you perform a go around and investigate while in a hoding.

[Edited 2009-03-12 07:12:13]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-12 08:10:39 and read 17232 times.



Quoting Spitfire (Reply 26):
" landing gear must go down "

(that's written in the Dutch Safety Board Report, as a transcription of the Voice Recorder)

It is NOT a normal call at this point during an approach !!

And yet according to the Dutch Safety Board's Report on First Findings, the crew's response to the Landing Gear Warning is described as:

"Provisional data indicates that this signal was not regarded to be a problem."

At this point, I'm starting to wonder if they even had altitude awareness!

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-12 08:53:24 and read 17054 times.



Quoting Spitfire (Reply 26):
Yes there was a warning, although not directly link to the A/T, BUT, when you are about to intercept an ILS at something like 2000 feet and you receive an oral warning signal stating:

" landing gear must go down "

(that's written in the Dutch Safety Board Report, as a transcription of the Voice Recorder)

It is NOT a normal call at this point during an approach !!

You should be aware that there is a problem somewhere.

Is it possible that the pilots presumed that this was a symptom of the LH RA's providing incorrect data?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Theredbaron
Posted 2009-03-12 10:20:45 and read 16919 times.

Maybe because this was training flight they were distracted and checking the equipment and made some mistakes.

If I remember correctly, there was this DC 10 flying over AZ years ago who lost an engine and a PAX was sucked out by decompression (broken window by fan debris), and after a lot of investigation it was discovered that the captain wanted to "know" how AP and AT with FMC worked together if they introduced manual changes in an engine power, the result was a catastrophic failure of number 2 engine.

Maybe they were expecting the automation to do something and when they realized that it did not it was too late.

BTW I concur PILOTAYDIN made some of the best comments on this very long thread, hope he comes back and proves us wrong or right, this is a very tragic accident and clarification by the final report would be great for the industry.
Best regards
TRB

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-12 13:37:09 and read 16594 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 29):
BTW I concur PILOTAYDIN made some of the best comments on this very long thread, hope he comes back

I sure hope so too, but even I noticed as a newbie on this forum that some guys are repeatedly posting very opinionated, harsh messages with no or little respect for others.

Real pilots don't do that.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-12 18:39:02 and read 16307 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 29):
BTW I concur PILOTAYDIN made some of the best comments on this very long thread

Loved his contributions before the accident, loved them afterwards. Hope to see him back around here soon. I sincerely hope he isn't in some way barred or restricted from posting here.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Wing
Posted 2009-03-13 01:25:12 and read 16091 times.

I couldnt write on this subject before since I am deeply effected from the accident.The pilots were my friends(safety pilot FO was my cousin's house mate) and I was together with them at the dispatch office while the flight dispatcher was briefing them for AMS we were briefed for our domestic departure at next desk. The captain was exchanging jokes with people around as always he was a very gentleman.

We were delayed due to fog at our destination as I watch them took off on a sunny istanbul morning after a week of rain and clouds.


As some information comes in to the pilots lounge as the menagement pilots who participate the investigation it surfaces that the accident is really dramatic and if there were few more feets below them they should have menaged to escape from it .

I can summarize this accident as "while you are sittinng to your chair someone pulls the chair behind you" as everything was routine as it was previous day.

It seems everything normal as they are vectored for the final approach course and handed to tower but before this stage they were requested to fly 250 kts and as they are cleared for the approach now they have to reduce speed to capture the Glide Slope form above and reduce speed at the same time.Now they found themselves in a rushed approach.Capt. gave VS command and set speed 142(which is Vref 5).With this command the airplane reduces thrust levers to IDLE and the crew drops the flaps as the related flap speed comes.

At 1950 feet left RA senses -8 feet (which AMS airport elevation is -10)and command the A/T RETARD. as it was performing an Autoland.The crew was performing before landing checklists while the stick shaker started vibrating indicating 10 knots to stall speed.And thrust levers push to full thrust at the same time.

(At this point I want to make a clearification.
1- The airplane trims itself as the conditions changes such as flap extentions,gear down and speed changes.At this point the crew were reducing speed from -250 kts as ordered by ATC- to landing speed 142 kts and there was a continious deceleration on the airplane and the airplane kept itself to trim "NOSE UP" to compensate the speed loss.The thrust levers were at IDLE position (as it is supposed to be ) causing no suspicion to crew.

2- I personally checked in my last flights that after landing is down and flaps down to 40(Boeing) airplane bleeds off the speed very fast and AT system anticipates this around 10-20 kts before the selected approach speed and starts adding power to avoid speed drop below selected Vref.All pilots expect the AT to move forward while performing other checks and requirements that an rushed approach.In this case it didnt since the mulfunctioning RA ordered to keep it on IDLE.)

As the stickshaker activated pilots(I dont know who but probably the Captain)push the thrust levers forward and disconnected the Autopilot and as the full thrust kicked in already NOSE UP trimmed airplane responded more nose up with the acceleration (probably loosing the last 10 kts and stalling-my guess-)

At this point captain was struggling with the nose up trimmed and pitched up airplane to lower the nose so he needed both hands to push the yoke forward while the airplane is sinking rapidly.(MY guess even at this point the airplane was fully recoverable from my simulator experiences) BUT NEVER EXPECTED HAPPENED. The AT ordered thrust idle once again and reduced the thrust all the way back to idle.According to the CVR Safety copilot sitting in the jumpseat saw it and screamed POWER-POWER and captain pushed the levers once again .As the thrust started kicking in,the airplane touched ground with its tail.

AMS-FRA-CDG-LHR are the airports which in my opinion should be flown by new copilots after the end of line training .These airports are busy with lots of ATC restrictions and requests(which can sometimes require anticipation or otherwise you can end up with a high and fast airplane)



I tried to help yo understand what really happened in the last moments by getting my experience and clues together.The captain and the safety pilot were my friends and although he was new in THY the copilot flying was also an experienced military pilot.So I want everybody to understand that these people fought until the last second but the circumstances especially the second retardation of the ATs under that circumstances really didnt left much to do at that low altitude.I think I owed this to those people loughing and joking at the dipatch office,still have the scene infront of me.

I tried to add answer to these quoted questions between my lines I hope I could clearified them.

Quoting JFernandez (Reply 16):
I think one thing we're going to need clarification on is truly how much time elapsed between being Vref-0kts to Vref-40kts. If it was truly in the realm of 10 seconds or so (as some have theorized), then the error is far more understandable.



Quoting Mir (Reply 14):
Perhaps, but apart from the fact that AMS tends to be IMC more than some of TK's other destinations, was there anything specifically unique to AMS that caused this accident? I'd tend to say no.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 6):
There was also some talk about TK pilots frowning upon the choice of AMS as a training airport. Their concerns may yet be borne out.



Quoting Gonzalo (Reply 17):
Maybe you're right, but i have a problem with that theory of the speed falling so quickly in that short period of time. My problem ? They ended 40 knots under Vref, that's about 75 - 80 Kms/h...If they loose that speed in ten secs, don't you think the human body must feel it

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: FVTu134
Posted 2009-03-13 01:52:29 and read 16009 times.



Quoting Wing (Reply 32):
I tried to help yo understand what really happened in the last moments by getting my experience and clues together.The captain and the safety pilot were my friends and although he was new in THY the copilot flying was also an experienced military pilot.So I want everybody to understand that these people fought until the last second but the circumstances especially the second retardation of the ATs under that circumstances really didnt left much to do at that low altitude.I think I owed this to those people loughing and joking at the dipatch office,still have the scene infront of me.

You are almost apologetic for describing something which is very difficult to go through from a human level (yes I've been there as well). Don't do that. When friends or colleagues get taken away on moments that you least expect it it comes as a shock and you need time to reflect on that.
Your explenations are great for those here who do not understand the processes in the 738 cockpit. As always the investigations will show what happened. As usual the result will be that it is a confluence of events which caused the tragic events that followed. I do agree that it is probably premature to put all the blame on pilots or systems or whatever it may be and as people with an intrest in aviation and probably more knowledge then the average journalist we should resist the temptation of wild speculations till more facts come out. While eventually it may be shown that the crew could have reacted differently, it is easy to say so afterwards. Fact is that from what is known now, they did try to recover from a false indication (the RA) and were trying their best to recover the airplane which unfortunately, due to the minimum altitude they had left, was not sufficient.

Again, while for many people on here it is "another accident" to speculate on, do not forget that for some people here it touched some chords very close to home as you can understand from Wing's reflections. A bit more sympathy with his, and other TK crew would not be out of place...
Just my  twocents 

FVTu134

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: ExSR
Posted 2009-03-13 02:06:33 and read 15965 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 30):
I sure hope so too, but even I noticed as a newbie on this forum that some guys are repeatedly posting very opinionated, harsh messages with no or little respect for others.

Real pilots don't do that.

You are absolutely right. These guys only can´t stand it, when someone else knows something better than they do.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2009-03-13 02:52:51 and read 15878 times.

Wing, I am deeply moved by your post. Thank you for sharing your experiences and thoughts with us.


The term "pilot error" is bandied about perhaps too easily (I myself have been guilty of this). In most cases, even if the pilots do make an error, this does not mean they are incompetent. It means they are thrown into a difficult situation and act like fallible humans. In some cases, "are you kidding me?"-level incompetence is apparent, but I don't think so in this case. Things happened fast. The pilots did not have time to dissect the problem.

Should they have performed an autoland with the RA inop? Probably not. When I told a pilot acquaintance (who has not been following the threads) that one RA was inop his first comment was "no autoland then". So the question is, did they know it was inop and did they realize that this meant "no autoland".

The tragic thing here is that the aircraft was recoverable until almost the moment of impact, but since the pilots had little time to actually analyze the problem they did not see what was happening.

As SlamClick says, "If I die in an airplane I expect to die very busy". These pilots did just that, struggling to make it safely to the ground. Did they make errors? Probably. Should we judgle them harshly? Perhaps not. We can only hope that their sacrifice will make future flights safer.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Rheinwaldner
Posted 2009-03-13 03:01:12 and read 15844 times.



Quoting Wing (Reply 32):

A good insightful balanced post. Thank you! Do these information base on knowledge about the CVR's?

Quoting Wing (Reply 32):
nose so he needed both hands to push the yoke forward while the airplane is sinking rapidly.(MY guess even at this point the airplane was fully recoverable from my simulator experiences) BUT NEVER EXPECTED HAPPENED.

I wonder whether it really requires sometimes both hands to push the yoke (in case of a fully up-trimmed plane). If true how can some claim that one hand always needs to be on the yoke?

Quoting Wing (Reply 32):
The airplane trims itself as the conditions changes such as flap extentions,gear down and speed changes.At this point the crew were reducing speed from -250 kts as ordered by ATC- to landing speed 142 kts

That is what I said since several threads. During the largest part of that idle-phase also an A/T system in the correct mode would have cut the throttles down to idle. There was no 100 second timeframe during which the wrong A/T mode could easily have been detected.

Quoting Wing (Reply 32):
I personally checked in my last flights that after landing is down and flaps down to 40(Boeing) airplane bleeds off the speed very fast and AT system anticipates this around 10-20 kts before the selected approach speed

I consider the missing A/T reaction the first more obvious event to detect the wrong A/T mode. How long does it take from Vref + 10-20 kts down to the stick shaker? This time and the distraction that happened in this time were determining. Distraction can also mean concentration on something else.

If it turns out that the aircraft ultimatively was lost because of the persistence by the A/T to cut power to idle even after the manual input, my predicition is: You will never see a A/T system on a new plane again which has a retard-mode and does mantain that regime even after a manual overruling. A/P gets disconnected too if by manual input the pilot indicates another intention.

I am quite sure that system will be critizied, even by the official accident report.

If the A/T in Y1 will work the same I would be very surprised (of course the system architecture may have changed so much that you won't even find the same terms).

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: TK787
Posted 2009-03-13 04:22:31 and read 15673 times.

Wing,
Basin sagolsun. It is really nice to hear your voice here again, and thanks for sharing your opinions, always appreciated.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: DogBreath
Posted 2009-03-13 04:35:05 and read 15650 times.

A 737-800 with an amount of nose up trim and loads of thrust will more than likely require both hands on the yoke to control the pitch up forces for the average pilot. With underslung engines adding thrust will want to pitch the aircraft nose up.

In all my training on the -800 any reason for a missed approach or recovery from a loss of airspeed is to either press the TOGA button which commands either a reduced GA Thrust setting with a single press or full GA thrust with a second press of the TOGA button or to disengage the A/T and manually command an increased thrust. In the AMS crash when on approach in IMC pressing TOGA would have been the only method to be carried out as per the Boeing Flight Manual (and my Company's SOP's). By using TOGA, the A/T will command the thrust levers to GA thrust without the PF handling the thrust levers (however it is SOP for the PM to manually force the thrust levers forward as well and to trim GA thrust at the desired setting - along with the A/T servos) therefore leaving the PF to use both hands on the yoke (also SOP) to control the pitch and roll forces required. As has been written above if the Stick Shaker was activated then TOGA is the only course of action.

Whilst the investigation rolls along, it may be determined that the PF did attempt TOGA, but if not I don't understand his logic. If indeed there was another fault with the A/T preventing TOGA, I can't understand why they didn't disengage the A/T manually and use manual thrust to the forward limit.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-13 04:35:16 and read 15629 times.



Quoting Wing (Reply 32):
As the stickshaker activated pilots(I dont know who but probably the Captain)push the thrust levers forward and disconnected the Autopilot

This I would outline as the first cause. The AT wasn't disconnected too, so as you findings shows, that later commanded back to idle again. If the required power was available AND the AT wasn't still engaged, as you say too, maybe the first recovery attempt would have ended to be successful.

Your reconstruction of the events is very accurate. That makes some bright. Thanks for your post.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Severnaya
Posted 2009-03-13 05:02:01 and read 15571 times.



Quoting Wing (Reply 32):
At 1950 feet left RA senses -8 feet (which AMS airport elevation is -10)

Thanks for your post! I'm sorry for your loss.

One point, which confuses me, the RA measures the altitude above the terrain presently beneath the plane. This type of altimeter provides the distance between the plane and the ground directly below it. So comparing the -10 (-10 feet below sea level, the airport elevation of AMS) and -8 feet (below ground level, or on the ground as the RA is on the bottom of the fuselage) is comparing apples with oranges.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: DogBreath
Posted 2009-03-13 05:20:11 and read 15505 times.



Quoting Severnaya (Reply 40):
One point, which confuses me, the RA measures the altitude above the terrain presently beneath the plane. This type of altimeter provides the distance between the plane and the ground directly below it. So comparing the -10 (-10 feet below sea level, the airport elevation of AMS) and -8 feet (below ground level, or on the ground as the RA is on the bottom of the fuselage) is comparing apples with oranges.

Yep.

The fact that AMS is below Sea Level makes no difference to the LRRA, the same difference that on an approach to Mexico City, which has an elevation of roughly 6800 feet (don't quote me on that, it's been a long time since I've been there), makes no difference.
At a Decision Altitude of 200 feet above both runways the LRRA should indicate 200 feet, whereas the Barometric Altimeter will indicate 190 feet at AMS and 7000 feet at Mexico City (assuming the correct QNH is set).

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: BuyantUkhaa
Posted 2009-03-13 07:19:09 and read 15233 times.

The -8 foot apparently stands for the vertical distance between the sensor and the ground, so that when the plane is on the ground, and the sensor at 8 feet above the ground (or slightly less if gear struts are compressed), it will show the distance between plane (wheels) and ground to be zero.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-13 07:43:01 and read 15165 times.



Quoting Wing (Reply 32):
I tried to add answer to these quoted questions between my lines

Wing : First of all, i'm very sorry for your loss, and many thanks for your post. I hope you continue with the help in understanding what went wrong in AMS.

I have nothing but respect for every crew in the world, no matter they land safely or not, I'm always sure no one wants to crash their plane. However, I'll think the ultimate purpose of every investigation always must be the improvement of the safety standards for all the industry, and sometimes the results of the investigation shows pilots making mistakes. It's sad but is true. I honestly hope your friends don't fall in this "category".
Like i said earlier in this same forum :

Quoting Gonzalo (Reply 5):
if the CVR's information finally shows that the crew never was at fault, I'll be the first in acknowledge my mistake and apologize ( for my actual position about the speed-awareness ).

My hope is, once the investigation ends, we can find an answer to two questions : 1 .- the speed awareness of the crew , and 2 .- Why nobody keeps the hands in the throttles after the stick shaker, allowing the A/T to reduce power again. In short terms, why they weren't able to recover an aircraft when, apparently, they had the tools and ( although little ) the time to do.


Saludos
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Rheinwaldner
Posted 2009-03-13 08:37:28 and read 15072 times.



Quoting Gonzalo (Reply 43):
2 .- Why nobody keeps the hands in the throttles after the stick shaker, allowing the A/T to reduce power again.

My view about this:

Could the following be?

- PF is the FO.
- Stick shaker starts.
- FO pushes thrust levers
- Capt say "my plane"
- FO lets go the thrust levers
- Capt is forced to use both hands to push the yoke forward to counter the fully up-trimmed aircraft
- Throttles goes to idle again automatically

Would be a delicate CRM situation. A screwed transfer of the PF role. How would that be done in the schoolbook? Who would be responsible to set TOGA after the captain said "my plane"? To what degree are other crew member allowed to manipulate the throttle after the captain took control? Is it wrong to say "my plane" if the yoke forces require both hands to fly the plane? What if that condition is only recognized by the captain after he has claimed control?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-13 09:39:43 and read 14922 times.



Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 35):
Should they have performed an autoland with the RA inop? Probably not. When I told a pilot acquaintance (who has not been following the threads) that one RA was inop his first comment was "no autoland then". So the question is, did they know it was inop and did they realize that this meant "no autoland".

All indications are that they knew the LH LRRA was inop, but decided that it wasnt a factor and proceeded with both A/P and A/T engaged.

Quoting Wing (Reply 32):
The crew was performing before landing checklists while the stick shaker started vibrating indicating 10 knots to stall speed.

Wing. Thank you for your analysis and my sincere sympathies. It is never easy to have to dissect the performance of fallen comrades, but you did a very professional job. The question that baffles everyone here is how a speed bled down to Vref-40 could possibly have been missed by an experienced flight instructor, unless the airspeed dropped like a brick from Vref to Vref-40 in something like 2-3 seconds, which does not seem plausible.

On a related note, does TK have an explicit policy regarding A/T engagedment with LH LRRA inop?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-13 10:18:10 and read 14843 times.



Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 44):
My view about this:

Could the following be?

- PF is the FO.
- Stick shaker starts.
- FO pushes thrust levers
- Capt say "my plane"
- FO lets go the thrust levers
- Capt is forced to use both hands to push the yoke forward to counter the fully up-trimmed aircraft
- Throttles goes to idle again automatically

Would be a delicate CRM situation. A screwed transfer of the PF role. How would that be done in the schoolbook? Who would be responsible to set TOGA after the captain said "my plane"? To what degree are other crew member allowed to manipulate the throttle after the captain took control? Is it wrong to say "my plane" if the yoke forces require both hands to fly the plane? What if that condition is only recognized by the captain after he has claimed control?

That makes a lot of sense. It seems that the prevailing issue is that the pilots did know the full effects of the faulty LH RA, specifically:

- How it affected AT
- That letting go the thrust levers would retard the engines

What I *don't* know is whether or not this was something not known to everyone in the cabin, or if it was not known just to the "rookie" FO.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-13 10:53:09 and read 14742 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 27):
"Provisional data indicates that this signal was not regarded to be a problem."

At this point, I'm starting to wonder if they even had altitude awareness!

Is this a question or your opinion?

Thanks.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-13 11:47:02 and read 14658 times.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 47):
Is this a question or your opinion?

What difference does it make?! You're welcome to interpret it any way you want  

The bigger question at hand is how the crew missed so many signals that should have indicated that something was amiss. I had posted 4 questions earlier (Reply 126 in Part 9 of this thread). I'll post them again. I still havent found a satisfactory anwer to any of them that would constitute a mitigating factor in terms of eliminating pilot error as the primary cause.

FACT 1: The A/T was engaged during descent.
Q1) Why was the A/T engaged to begin with, when the LH RA was known to be faulty?

FACT 2: The Stall warning sounded @ ~ 490 ft RA
Q2) Why was the speed bleed down to stall not observed and corrected in time?

FACT 3: A Go-Around was never attempted
Q3) Why did the Captain not hit the TO/GA switch, at any point after he took control, knowing that the situation was dire?

FACT 4: After initially spooling up, the engines went back to idle for 6 seconds before a last ditch attempt at applying power.
Q4) Why was the A/T allowed to cut the throttles back to IDLE for 6 seconds AFTER the Captain took control ?

I'm not even asking for conclusions. That's the function of the official investigation underway. All I'm suggesting is that the 4 hitherto undisputed facts above beg at least plausible explanations for the questions that follow.

[Edited 2009-03-13 12:08:04]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Qualitydr
Posted 2009-03-13 12:34:18 and read 14486 times.



Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 36):
This time and the distraction that happened in this time were determining. Distraction can also mean concentration on something else.

Another way to say this is, "Divided Attention." Humans are notoriously bad at concurrent or parallel processing, in spite of pop culture's recent addiction to the term "multitasking." I don't know how an investigation team looks at this critical factor. Would be interesting to know (speaking as a former chemical industry accident investigator) ...

QD

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-13 12:50:50 and read 14443 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q1) Why was the A/T engaged to begin with, when the LH RA was known to be faulty?

The only logical assumption seems to be that the pilots didn't realize the LH RA's effect on the A/C's systems. Whether or not this is something they did know but forgot, or that no one knew is a good question.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q2) Why was the speed bleed down to stall not observed and corrected in time?

Good question. Also, how long a time would the bleed been noticeable? They had to bleed off about 110 kts, and ended up bleeding 150 kts. I'd still love to know how much time between Vref-0 and Vref-40 transpired.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q3) Why did the Captain not hit the TO/GA switch, at any point after he took control, knowing that the situation was dire?

I've read conflicting data on whether he hit TO/GA or not. Either way, if he did, he did it too late.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q4) Why was the A/T allowed to cut the throttles back to IDLE for 6 seconds AFTER the Captain took control ?

Because the FO let go, apparently.

Everything about this strikes me as coming down to a few factors:
- No one realizing the potential dangerous effect of a buggy LH RA (this may extend to maintenance and other pilots as well, since this happened before on this A/C)
- An overtrust in the A/C's automatic systems
- Distraction from coaching the FO

And the main one, to me:
- The pilots never realized that the aircraft was retarding the engines, both before and after the stick shaker activated. It has been hinted that a lot of warnings might have been supressed by the systems, which may have presumed the plane was making a normal landing flare, or even on the ground already.

I wouldn't be shocked if the pilots saw the LH RA malfunctioning, verified that the RH RA was normal, all other instrumentation was normal, and didn't notice anything different until the stick shaker went off, at which point the FO letting go of the throttles cost them the 6 seconds of thrust required. Maybe the FO was shy in hitting TO/GA?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-13 14:10:23 and read 14246 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q1) Why was the A/T engaged to begin with, when the LH RA was known to be faulty?

There are several answers to that question. From the logical point of view, if the system allows it but it shouldn't be done, this is a design problem.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q2) Why was the speed bleed down to stall not observed and corrected in time?

The a/c was on AP and AT, autoland configuration. If the systems are set and they allow this configuration, they should be trusted. After all, this is a CATIIIc capable a/c. These systems are capable to land the a/c without human intervention.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q3) Why did the Captain not hit the TO/GA switch, at any point after he took control, knowing that the situation was dire?

The FO and the Captain were probably in a shock to see the systems failed, they are in a close stall condition despite all the automation. They also felt the disgrace, guilty feeling and the company's pressure against GA and all the implications, interviews etc resulting that, added to the shame of being in a stall condition in favorable weather conditions, they probably though about getting out of this situation as quickly as possible without losing face without being forced to a GA in plain daylight.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q4) Why was the A/T allowed to cut the throttles back to IDLE for 6 seconds AFTER the Captain took control ?

We do not know for sure. But according to what is was said here it looks like a CRM problem. I will repeat one more time that there is only so much humans can do under certain conditions if systems fail and catch them in a bad time. Just look at the big picture, and don't judge only the human reaction but how a system should have been designed, so that humans can handle the safest and quickest procedure under emergency conditions. For sure Boeing should make a change or two to their systems after this accident.
If the AT is set, it should work. Period. If there is manual intervention, that means something failed in the system. So, why the system insists that it can work despite the intervention? If anything, it should be canceled automatically just like the AP, or the cruise control on the cars in layman's terms.

Here is a totally different explanation from an engineer point of view. If I was on the design team, I would blame the poor design.

If someone designs a device, and says "here, this system can land an airplane" then it should do it. Anything short of that is a design problem.

Well if you look at this from a pilot point of view, and especially if someone says: " Hey, I am a rookie, I could have done it differently, I could save the plane, I never trust the electronics, I have to hear the engines, feel the air in my hair!" well this is a different point of view.

There is more than one way of looking at the things, that's why discussions never end.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: DingDong
Posted 2009-03-13 14:26:19 and read 14205 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
They also felt the disgrace, guilty feeling and the company's pressure against GA and all the implications, interviews etc resulting that, added to the shame of being in a stall condition in favorable weather conditions, they probably though about getting out of this situation as quickly as possible without losing face without being forced to a GA in plain daylight.

Er, uh, executing a missed approach doesn't have a stigma attached to it, especially when needed. After all, if you go missed, you're making a judgement which essentially says you and your charges in the back may or may not live much longer if you don't do it.

Yes, there is airline pressure in routine operations (e.g. the not much liked FOQA program), but for truly safety-critical situations, there should be none. You do what it takes to avoid the company getting hit with a USD $1 billion-plus payout and a blizzard of absymal publicity from a bad crash, as well as honoring regulations and company SOPs (e.g. if the aircraft landing in front of you hasn't vacated the active runway in time).

The shame and interrogations you speak of frankly sounds bizarre.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Derik737
Posted 2009-03-13 14:28:30 and read 14201 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
The a/c was on AP and AT, autoland configuration.

So far we only know that CMD B was engaged (by the Boeing memo). That means Autoland was not being used at the time. (CMD A and CMD B technically need to be engaged for an Autoland).

The 737 AFM says:

For single channel operation during approach, the autopilot shall not remain engaged below 50 feet AGL.

If this had occured with dual channel operation, I believe that the difference in radio altitude would have caused the slave FCC to disengage (taking you back to single channel). If for some reason that logic is not correct or didn't happen, the A/T computer needs a flare discrete from the FCC's before retarding when in dual channel. It does not require the flare discrete when in single channel or when the A/P is off.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-13 14:37:39 and read 14186 times.

Quoting DingDong (Reply 52):
The shame and interrogations you speak of frankly sounds bizarre.

We should ask this to Turkish pilots. My sentence is based on the information from TALPA's memos and other sources (like user comments to some articles) prior to the crash, criticizing the company policies, procedures etc.

[Edited 2009-03-13 14:39:03]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Vikkyvik
Posted 2009-03-13 15:23:35 and read 14104 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
There are several answers to that question. From the logical point of view, if the system allows it but it shouldn't be done, this is a design problem.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
Here is a totally different explanation from an engineer point of view. If I was on the design team, I would blame the poor design.

I see what you're saying in a way, but let me offer some counterpoint.

Boeing allows a pilot to stall their aircraft, even though they could put in a stall-AOA protection. Is that a design problem?

To cover the other side, Airbus has stall protection on their FBW aircraft. But the pilot(s) still managed to crash that A320 at the air show in France. No stalling, but just a very low energy state. Is that a design problem?

I'm not saying those are necessarily applicable to the TK crash, but at a certain point, you have to decide what is feasible to incorporate into a design, and what you'll leave up to the operator. There's obviously no hard and fast answer to that question.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-13 15:30:54 and read 14105 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
They also felt the disgrace, guilty feeling and the company's pressure against GA and all the implications, interviews etc resulting that, added to the shame of being in a stall condition in favorable weather conditions, they probably though about getting out of this situation as quickly as possible without losing face without being forced to a GA in plain daylight.

Why a Go Around is a disgrace ??? Do you know for sure if Turkish Airlines management have a policy against Going Around ????

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 54):
My sentence is based on the information from TALPA's memos

Ah...., maybe that's the problem....

 duck 

Saludos.
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-13 15:31:34 and read 14127 times.



Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 35):
The term "pilot error" is bandied about perhaps too easily (I myself have been guilty of this). In most cases, even if the pilots do make an error, this does not mean they are incompetent. It means they are thrown into a difficult situation and act like fallible humans. In some cases, "are you kidding me?"-level incompetence is apparent, but I don't think so in this case. Things happened fast. The pilots did not have time to dissect the problem.

EXACTLY... when we say pilot error, it is not fair to stop the judgement at that. If it's pilot error, then the next question should be WHY did he/she err? Why do we need to ask that? Because if we're all trained properly, and someone did what he/she did, that means, we could have done the same given the same circumstances. Very rarely are pilot error being purely pilot error... most often, something caused the pilot to make the error...

Quoting DogBreath (Reply 38):
Whilst the investigation rolls along, it may be determined that the PF did attempt TOGA, but if not I don't understand his logic. If indeed there was another fault with the A/T preventing TOGA, I can't understand why they didn't disengage the A/T manually and use manual thrust to the forward limit.

There discussions about this amongst those transitioning from non A/T aircraft (732 without A/T, and with, as those I know who discussed this did not use A/T on approach regardless of the availability of A/T) to an A/T aircraft (and even FADEC A/T aircraft). Some of the guys transitioning that I know has had issues about pushing the throttles to G/A thrust instead of pressing the TOGA button. Some came up with frank explanations on how they feel when having to g/a... one is habit and intuition developed from non-a/t experience, another is they feel it is counter intuitive to press to/ga and then move the levers forward... another says they feel safer in pushing the the levers forward while pressing toga...

Well, the manual says press TOGA first for a reason... You initiate the automation to G/A so that if you need both hands somewhere else, or get distracted, you've told the automation to give you GA thrust. It is only after they get told that and have that ingrained in their heads did they finally forget their old habit... now, telling them "because the book says so" doesn't help all the time... coz the book says "this book does not replace common sense"... the problem is, people's ideas of common sense can be different.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
FACT 1: The A/T was engaged during descent.
Q1) Why was the A/T engaged to begin with, when the LH RA was known to be faulty?

was it foreseen that it was going to be a problem?

Quote:
FACT 2: The Stall warning sounded @ ~ 490 ft RA
Q2) Why was the speed bleed down to stall not observed and corrected in time?

U've seen how fast you can bleed off speed on a 737 with flaps 40? try it! (well, go on a full sim!) they were hot and high, they were waiting for the speed to bleed off to deploy the flaps, the eagerness stopped when they selected flaps 40, so now they go "OK, that's over, let's do the checklist"... There's significant differences between that, and actually being in a normal approach profile so to speak... the time it takes from 1 dot below "gear down flaps 15", to "flaps 40 landing checklist please" is way shorter than "OK, slowing down from 250kts, select Vref, monitor speed and flap deploy" (or however you want to call it) to "flaps 40 landing checklist please)...
On the latter, you are less sensitive to time perception from "flaps40, landing checklist please" with regards to the expectations to see or not see from the corner of your eye the throttles moving forward or hearing the engines power up slightly...

Quote:
FACT 3: A Go-Around was never attempted
Q3) Why did the Captain not hit the TO/GA switch, at any point after he took control, knowing that the situation was dire?

You mean a go-around according to the book was never attempted?
Again, back to my previous paragraph on transitioning... one thing the transitioning guys found out is that if they started the go-around wrongly (ie. not pressing the toga button), chances are, by the time they realize that they forgot and that thrust wasn't where it was supposed to be, they're adding workload to an already saturating workload (as erroneous go-arounds are normally caused by previous errors, not new situation requiring a change from a totally correct approach to a go around)... this slows down their reaction time to correct the situation significantly.

[quote[FACT 4: After initially spooling up, the engines went back to idle for 6 seconds before a last ditch attempt at applying power.
Q4) Why was the A/T allowed to cut the throttles back to IDLE for 6 seconds AFTER the Captain took control ?[/quote]
Again, see my answer to FACT3.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
They also felt the disgrace, guilty feeling and the company's pressure against GA and all the implications, interviews etc resulting that, added to the shame of being in a stall condition in favorable weather conditions, they probably though about getting out of this situation as quickly as possible without losing face without being forced to a GA in plain daylight.

Now now, we don't need to go down that road do we? Heck, I was surprised to find out that 2 years ago, a captain who was not afraid of go-arounds and always listened to his right hand seater, freeze up his brain and touched down at 195kts with flaps 5... but then people still say "scared of going around"...

If we make go-arounds a game for right hand seaters... the rules are simple... "the first person calling go-around does the go-around..." why, coz if you're on the right hand and PM, if you call the go-around, sometimes you're better off screaming "my control" rather than whacking the captain's head with manual saying "snap out of it skipp, this is dangerous, go-around!"... I don't know why, but my friends ears are more tuned to "my control" rather than "go-around"... "overly good CRM???" LOL, Just Kidding!

Mandala499

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-13 16:11:12 and read 14061 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
this is a design problem.

I have a hard time accepting it as a design problem when the operating instructions explicitly caution against A/T engagement when the LH LRRA is known to be inop. A separate issue is whether the RA should have sent a failure flag instead of continuing to communicate faulty data to the A/T, but this is not a substitute for following procedures.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
They also felt the disgrace, guilty feeling and the company's pressure against GA and all the implications, interviews etc resulting that, added to the shame of being in a stall condition in favorable weather conditions, they probably though about getting out of this situation as quickly as possible without losing face without being forced to a GA in plain daylight.

I'm sorry, but this is simply no reason to put the life of a single person leave alone over 100 lives in jeopardy. If true (and I dont personally believe it to be so), its almost tantamount to criminal negligence, in addition to a collosal error in judgement.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
We do not know for sure. But according to what is was said here it looks like a CRM problem. I will repeat one more time that there is only so much humans can do under certain conditions if systems fail and catch them in a bad time.

Thats why experienced pilots (even instructors with several thousand flying hours) routinely go through simulator exercises.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 57):
There's significant differences between that, and actually being in a normal approach profile so to speak... the time it takes from 1 dot below "gear down flaps 15", to "flaps 40 landing checklist please" is way shorter than "OK, slowing down from 250kts, select Vref, monitor speed and flap deploy" (or however you want to call it) to "flaps 40 landing checklist please)...
On the latter, you are less sensitive to time perception from "flaps40, landing checklist please" with regards to the expectations to see or not see from the corner of your eye the throttles moving forward or hearing the engines power up slightly...

This whole business of capturing the ILS fast and high is a red herring. It happens all the time. At DAL, planes are given a very late turn onto final quite often. Its also not an issue of perception - its a simple matter of monitoring airspeed - plain and simple, landing checklists notwithstanding. Finally, for your theory to absolve the pilots of the charge of not monitoring airspeed (as is required) the speed bleed from Vref+5 to Vref - 40 should have occurred in a matter of a few seconds. Thats just not plausible.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 57):
if they started the go-around wrongly (ie. not pressing the toga button),

Well, I didnt mean a G/A without hitting the TO/GA switch. I was specifically talking about hitting it, which if applied within a second or two of the stall warning would have almost certainly made this a non-incident.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-13 16:36:02 and read 14004 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 58):
I have a hard time accepting it as a design problem when the operating instructions explicitly caution against A/T engagement when the LH LRRA is known to be inop. A separate issue is whether the RA should have sent a failure flag instead of continuing to communicate faulty data to the A/T, but this is not a substitute for following procedures.

Do they state what the possible repercussions are? How is "cautioning against" different than other warnings?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-13 16:57:28 and read 13976 times.



Quoting JFernandez (Reply 59):
Do they state what the possible repercussions are? How is "cautioning against" different than other warnings?

I may have understated the case. I believe someone posted the advisory in question, in one of the earlier parts of this thread. It was quite explicit in stating that the Auto-Throttle should not be used when the LH LRRA was inop.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-13 17:30:13 and read 13942 times.



Quoting Vikkyvik (Reply 55):
Boeing allows a pilot to stall their aircraft, even though they could put in a stall-AOA protection. Is that a design problem?

No, because the a/c can be flown without AP and AT, and the stall-AOA protection (I believe you are talking about the stick shaker) is a warning system, it is not flying the a/c. I am talking about the systems that actually fly the a/c or land the a/c.

If a system is allowing the a/c to land with zero visibility, it should be foolproof.

Quoting Vikkyvik (Reply 55):
But the pilot(s) still managed to crash that A320 at the air show in France. No stalling, but just a very low energy state. Is that a design problem?

Yes, definitely, the problem was corrected after that.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-13 17:43:30 and read 13926 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 60):
I may have understated the case. I believe someone posted the advisory in question, in one of the earlier parts of this thread. It was quite explicit in stating that the Auto-Throttle should not be used when the LH LRRA was inop.

Advisories, cautions, etc etc are something, but we are talking about a system that lands the aircraft.

If it is dangerous, the electronics should not engage, period. If one can set the electronics, the systems take responsibility. To avoid that, the system should not engage, and force the pilot to manually control the a/c. Maybe, in some extent, the electronics should display the "advised" action on the computer, but let the pilot drive.

There is no such thing "I do the driving, you just sit and watch what I am doing. If I screw up, it is your fault!"

In a case where the automation takes control the pilot is monitoring, and should have secondary responsibility.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: BuyantUkhaa
Posted 2009-03-13 18:38:29 and read 13862 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
4 hitherto undisputed facts above

Fact 3 is most disputed, it seems TOGA was selected after the 6-second spool down. Too late, but to say that a go-around was never attempted is something I'd rather call "hitherto incorrect".

Some pics of wreckage removal that took place today, in this article:

http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/3...stel_zaterdag_verder__.html?p=15,2

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: YVRLTN
Posted 2009-03-13 20:13:24 and read 13742 times.



Quoting BuyantUkhaa (Reply 63):
it seems TOGA was selected after the 6-second spool down. Too late

A simple question. Is it SOP with most (all?) airlines to press TOGA as soon as stick shaker activates? (And figure out why it activated later when in a hold pattern?)

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-13 20:48:47 and read 13710 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 62):
There is no such thing "I do the driving, you just sit and watch what I am doing.

This is a fundamental misinterpretation of the role of automation and how it worked in the case of the TK flight. The intention of automation was NEVER to have the pilot sit back and merely look at a couple of CRTs. The moment the pilot senses that something was awry (and there were SEVERAL indications of this in the TK incident) he/she is obligated to over-ride the automation and seize control of the aircraft.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 62):
the pilot is monitoring, and should have secondary responsibility.

WHAT?!?!?! The pilot ALWAYS has PRIMARY responsibility for the operation of the aircraft regardless of whether of not A/P or A/T or both are engaged. This is one of the (if not THE) fundamental tenets of flying.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 62):
but we are talking about a system that lands the aircraft.

and shouldn't have in this case with a single channel selected and with A/T being engaged when it shouldn't have been.

Quoting BuyantUkhaa (Reply 63):
it seems TOGA was selected after the 6-second spool down.

Do you have this on authority?! And in any case, as I wrote in an earlier posting, by the time that six second window had elapsed, the situation was FUBAR.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-13 21:38:19 and read 13664 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 60):
I may have understated the case. I believe someone posted the advisory in question, in one of the earlier parts of this thread. It was quite explicit in stating that the Auto-Throttle should not be used when the LH LRRA was inop.

Right. The question would be what the pilots knew about this. They obviously acted as if the LH RA error (I keep wanting to call it "failure". Grrr.) wasn't an issue, for some reason.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-13 23:06:24 and read 13593 times.



Quoting JFernandez (Reply 66):
Right. The question would be what the pilots knew about this. They obviously acted as if the LH RA error (I keep wanting to call it "failure". Grrr.) wasn't an issue, for some reason.

Actually you are absolutely correct in calling it a failure as far as the instrumentation (malfunctioning LH RA) was concerned. The A/T was not designed to distinguish between erroneous input from a failed RA, and valid input from a functioning RA. So the error was transmitted to the throttles and from the throttles to the engines and so forth ...

Whether the pilots knew (or should have known about this) is a matter that I have neither the knowledge nor the competence to decide. I would hope that this is precisely the sort of scenario that every pilot ( from a new hire to an experienced instructor ) is subjected to at random on the simulator every couple of hundred hours or so. But that's just my $0.02

What is truly scary is that a seemingly innocuous component failure (LH RA) was allowed (by pilots that did not react properly) to bring an aircraft down. This begs the following question:

What other scenarios or combination of such scenarios are there that could throw a curve ball such that an experienced pilot paying a tad less attention than the situation calls for, would result in a similar or worse outcome?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-13 23:44:48 and read 13567 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 58):
Finally, for your theory to absolve the pilots of the charge of not monitoring airspeed

My my... absolving? It is as much absolving as you are blaming/pointing incompetence. No, it is not absolving, it is delving into possible reasons as to why some people still fall into the trap of not monitoring airspeed, and therefore we can prevent more of such mistakes! You don't do that by taking a high and mighty towering view and say this is wrong, that is wrong.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 65):
The moment the pilot senses that something was awry (and there were SEVERAL indications of this in the TK incident) he/she is obligated to over-ride the automation and seize control of the aircraft.

How awry does it have to be?

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 60):
I believe someone posted the advisory in question, in one of the earlier parts of this thread. It was quite explicit in stating that the Auto-Throttle should not be used when the LH LRRA was inop.

Can someone point it out again please... and was that advisory posted before or after this accident?

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 58):
This whole business of capturing the ILS fast and high is a red herring. It happens all the time. At DAL, planes are given a very late turn onto final quite often. Its also not an issue of perception - its a simple matter of monitoring airspeed - plain and simple, landing checklists notwithstanding.

Of course it happens a lot (to say that it happens all the time is misleading)... A high and fast approach have caused mishaps... Again, remember this was a training flight. This is a case of not picking up a mistake during line training with dire consequences. The F/O may not have had previous exposure to a high-workload fast situation. What I want to know is why wasn't that picked up? How can we tell the signs of if next time it happens so we can prevent the mishap... and why wasn't it picked up that when they did the checklist, no one saw what the plane was doing...

There is a difference between being turned to final quite late, and a 4000ft @ 250knots on the ILS trying to slow down is another matter... The last time I remember a mishap happened with that situation the pilot landed at flap 5 and overran the runway (well he was above the slope and chased it and became saturated)... The increased workloads do different things to people. Some can't cope, people has flunked out of LOFT because of it...

There is ample information that we still need to form a better picture on what went on in the crew's head at the time... for us to sit here and say they should have done this and that is easy, VERY EASY... we don't need 10 parts on this topic for that... but to say "it won't happen to me" is utterly foolish before we imagine ourselves in their situation and instead of saying "now how would I do it", you say "now what mistakes can I do and what traps await me?" That's how safety and human factors safety develops...

As I said before, try and do that 4000@250KIAS on the ILS trying to slow down... was it doable (yes it is), can everyone do it (no)... training is training, to actually go through it is different.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 58):
Well, I didnt mean a G/A without hitting the TO/GA switch. I was specifically talking about hitting it, which if applied within a second or two of the stall warning would have almost certainly made this a non-incident.

Well, there would be a safety report nonetheless...

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-14 00:05:08 and read 13553 times.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
Again, remember this was a training flight

uhh Sorry! no it was NOT! It was a revenue earning scheduled passenger flight. That an F/O was flying under supervision does not in ANY way change that.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
My my... absolving? It is as much absolving as you are blaming/pointing incompetence

I was hypothesising about the potential of using your theory as a means of absolving the pilots of any/all responsibility. Whether you (or anyone else) were or weren't is of no particular interest to me.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
This is a case of not picking up a mistake during line training with dire consequences.

Wrong yet again. This is a case of an experienced instructor not adequately supervising a F/O under his command during a regular scheduled commercial flight.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
for us to sit here and say they should have done this and that is easy, VERY EASY...

Completely irrelevant. Neither you nor I have 15,000 hours of experience and are instructors on the B738. For him, this should have been a relatively minor hiccup.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
to say "it won't happen to me" is utterly foolish

See response above

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
was it doable (yes it is), can everyone do it (no)...

Once again, see response above.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
The moment the pilot senses that something was awry (and there were SEVERAL indications of this in the TK incident) he/she is obligated to over-ride the automation and seize control of the aircraft.

How awry does it have to be?

How about "as awry as it was on TK1951" ?!

[Edited 2009-03-14 00:06:31]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: DingDong
Posted 2009-03-14 00:16:12 and read 13544 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 69):
uhh Sorry! no it was NOT! It was a revenue earning scheduled passenger flight. That an F/O was flying under supervision does not in ANY way change that.

Wasn't this a LOFT training flight?

Reason why I ask is because if it was, LOFT is usually done as part of a revenue flight -- in which case, both of you would be correct.

But if it was NOT LOFT training being done, then I would have to agree with you.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JoeCanuck
Posted 2009-03-14 00:20:13 and read 13546 times.

To me, the bottom line is that pilots are in the cockpit for EXACTLY this kind of issue; to recognize a problem and take control of the plane.

If nothing ever went wrong with the machines, we wouldn't need pilots anymore.

An instrument, which happened to control the throttles, failed. The flight instruments, controls and engines were all working perfectly.

It is terrible and tragic that the aircraft crashed and people died...especially since it didn't have to happen.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-14 00:40:38 and read 13512 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 69):
I was hypothesising about the potential of using your theory as a means of absolving the pilots of any/all responsibility. Whether you (or anyone else) were or weren't is of no particular interest to me.

Oh dear, I guess we're not talking about safety then, we're talking about legal liability... sorry, I must have been in the wrong forum...  Smile

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 69):
Wrong yet again. This is a case of an experienced instructor not adequately supervising a F/O under his command during a regular scheduled commercial flight.

Well what's the difference between that and not picking up the mistake?

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 69):
For him, this should have been a relatively minor hiccup.

So, I guess you've concluded this is an inexcusable pilot error... so let's stop the investigation... Someone has made the adequate conclusion. And I guess you've concluded that if you were put in a similar situation, it would definitely can never ever ever happen to you?

Dear airline crew manager, please employ this infallible 100% trainable person... he's proven himself...  Smile

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: PlanesNTrains
Posted 2009-03-14 01:10:49 and read 13489 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
Q1) Why was the A/T engaged to begin with, when the LH RA was known to be faulty?

There are several answers to that question. From the logical point of view, if the system allows it but it shouldn't be done, this is a design problem.

If the LH RA actually FAILS - that is, stops working - then I agree that the A/T should disengage. Indeed, that may be the way the system works. However, in this case the LH RA didn't FAIL, it displayed an INCORRECT reading. Why? I don't know. Nonetheless, it was actually functioning, but displaying an incorrect altitude. Therefore, the A/T would not know to disengage because there was no apparent reason to.

I do agree that there should be some way to link the several different instruments providing altitude information so that if the LH RA is inaccurrate like in this case, then there would be an opportunity for the system to disengage based on the others being in agreement. However, that to me means nothing in hindsight, and the system as designed performed its role. That would seem like a logical outcome to desire.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
If the AT is set, it should work. Period. If there is manual intervention, that means something failed in the system. So, why the system insists that it can work despite the intervention? If anything, it should be canceled automatically just like the AP, or the cruise control on the cars in layman's terms.

If the AT is set, and if it works, there should be an ability for a pilot to intervene for reasons that do not constitute "something failing in the system." In other words, just because a pilot manually adjusts the throttles shouldn't mean explicitly that something is wrong and that the system should disengage. To the contrary, it would seem logical that the system remain engaged until disengaged, and that the pilot be allowed to make manual adjustments as desired without having to disengage and then reengage the AT each time he/she does so.

Again, this is how the system is designed, and the pilots would know this. As someone else said previously, just because this particular crew had a tragic outcome doesn't necessarily mean that the system is inherently faulty. It may not be the system that you would choose, and there may be better systems out there, but neither of those make this system "bad".

If you are going to fly the plane, you are hopefully going to be trained on how it works. I'm sure that different manufacturers have all sorts of different approaches to similar needs, and even within manufacturers they may evolve between families of aircraft. I am quite certain that there are better systems than others, but ultimately if you are going to fly that aircraft, you will be trained on it. I guess I just figured that was part of the job, and that is how everyone does it.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
Again, remember this was a training flight. This is a case of not picking up a mistake during line training with dire consequences. The F/O may not have had previous exposure to a high-workload fast situation. What I want to know is why wasn't that picked up? How can we tell the signs of if next time it happens so we can prevent the mishap... and why wasn't it picked up that when they did the checklist, no one saw what the plane was doing...

Again, I just ponder if part of the big picture of this crash was that, because the F/O was "training", the captain perhaps "allowed" the F/O to have some latitude in handling the hot and high approach, knowing in his mind that he would intervene if needed. Obviously, partially due to the AT issues, it got out of hand. I am not a pilot, so I'm not sure how accurate that might be, but it just seems logical from a human point of view that this could be a contributing factor to the final result.

-Dave

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Wouwout
Posted 2009-03-14 02:09:15 and read 13496 times.

I'm a bit suprised that nobody has picked up the news that KLM has had 17 radio altimeter problems (similar to TK1951's) over the last year. A Dutch news station has received secret information from KLM. Officially KLM will not deny or confirm. You know what that means   .

Therefor: do we have a serious technical issue in the 737 (sorry no specific type was specified)?

[Edited 2009-03-14 02:15:22]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-14 02:39:36 and read 13393 times.



Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 73):
If the LH RA actually FAILS

As long as I may understand by what Ive been reading in several posts by some authoritative posters, the RA has a resident diagnostic which may return a failure, but this wasn't the case. That was a genuine reading (I repeat I base this information on what I did read here). Mistaken, wrong, but consisting of good data, which tells the airplane was at 8 feet below ground level. If that comes up to be correct, most likely the circuitry of the RA has a sensor (or more than one) to tell the whole instrument is working and none of those raised a flag to tell it wasn't, so the reading was good, I guess some red flag would have come out otherwise, and hopefully the AT would have been disconnected (just my reasonable guess).

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Wouwout
Posted 2009-03-14 03:24:13 and read 13375 times.



Quoting Wouwout (Reply 74):
I'm a bit suprised that nobody has picked up the news that KLM has had 17 radio altimeter problems (similar to TK1951's) over the last year.

To be more accurate: these radio altimeter faults were in KLM's 737 fleet.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: MD11Engineer
Posted 2009-03-14 04:03:34 and read 13310 times.



Quoting Spitfire (Reply 26):
" landing gear must go down "

(that's written in the Dutch Safety Board Report, as a transcription of the Voice Recorder)

The EGPWS warning would be "Too low Landing gear"

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 35):
Should they have performed an autoland with the RA inop? Probably not. When I told a pilot acquaintance (who has not been following the threads) that one RA was inop his first comment was "no autoland then". So the question is, did they know it was inop and did they realize that this meant "no autoland".



Quoting BuyantUkhaa (Reply 42):
The -8 foot apparently stands for the vertical distance between the sensor and the ground, so that when the plane is on the ground, and the sensor at 8 feet above the ground (or slightly less if gear struts are compressed), it will show the distance between plane (wheels) and ground to be zero.

The RA systems are calibrated that they would show 0 when, with fully extended
Struts, the MLG wheels touch ground in a normal landing flare attitude. When the plane is on ground on all wheels and struts compressed, the RAs show -4 and -2 respectevely (due to the different positions of the antennas on the lower fuselage for both systems).


Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 48):
FACT 1: The A/T was engaged during descent.
Q1) Why was the A/T engaged to begin with, when the LH RA was known to be faulty?

Did they know that the system was inop? The selftest functions of the RA transceivers basically only tests if there is a fault in they stem, which would set it totally inoperable. The system can't recognise false data input. One typical fault on installation of an RA system which could produce faulty data without inoping the system would be a dozy electrician, who shortens the factory made antenna coax cables. The RA transceivers have been calibrated with the coax cables in the factory and the logic automatically subtracts the additional altitude caused by the length of the coax cables from the measured altitude. Shortening an antenna cable would therefore make the RA read too low. Therefore the excess length of the cables has to be coiled up and secured inside the aircraft.
The diffence though wouldn't be that big, only a few feet.
And if they did a single channel landing with A/P B, I'm quite sure that the normal
cross databus talk between the two FCCs comparing the data inputs into the FCCs wouldn't take place.
I don't know if #1 radio altimeter was on the HIL. It is quite possible that previously pilots reprted wrong altitude outputs, but the tech on ground did the BITE checks as per FIM and found everything satisfactory and therefore closed the snag. Intermittent faults, which only appear in flight, are very hard to find.

Jan

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: TK787
Posted 2009-03-14 06:15:17 and read 13140 times.



Quoting Wouwout (Reply 76):
To be more accurate: these radio altimeter faults were in KLM's 737 fleet.

Already discussed here:
http://www.airliners.net/aviation-fo...general_aviation/read.main/4346375

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: MD11Engineer
Posted 2009-03-14 07:08:48 and read 13079 times.



Quoting Wouwout (Reply 76):
Quoting Wouwout (Reply 74):
I'm a bit suprised that nobody has picked up the news that KLM has had 17 radio altimeter problems (similar to TK1951's) over the last year.

To be more accurate: these radio altimeter faults were in KLM's 737 fleet.

Most of these faults were probably caused by water (condensation) getting into the antenna connectors. This fault will shorten out the respective antenna and cause the RA tranceiver to generate a prominent "FAIL" flag on the respective primary flight display, not a false altitude indication.
The B737NG RAs are quite prone to this fault.

Jan

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Spitfire
Posted 2009-03-14 07:16:08 and read 13081 times.



Quoting MD11Engineer (Reply 77):
Quoting Spitfire (Reply 26):
" landing gear must go down "

(that's written in the Dutch Safety Board Report, as a transcription of the Voice Recorder)

The EGPWS warning would be "Too low Landing gear"

After reviewing my B733 Operations manuals I must you are right.

The exact aural alert is : "TOO LOW GEAR" .

This warning comes below 500ft RA and speed <190 kts, if the gear is not down .

As I don't have the 800 series manuals, I just transcript the Dutch Safety Board sentences . I didn't want to speculate about a possibly "new" phraseology used on the latest B737 NG series.

But this does not change something to the fact that there was a "strange" warning around 2000 feet.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Spitfire
Posted 2009-03-14 07:35:39 and read 13015 times.



Quoting Spitfire (Reply 80):
This warning comes below 500ft RA and speed <190 kts, if the gear is not down .

BTW, this indicates that around 2000 ft roughly, when intercepting the glide slope , their IAS was at or below 190 kts.... not that much for a "hot approach".... (Flaps 15, speed 180 maybe...).

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-14 07:38:08 and read 12996 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
Can someone point it out again please... and was that advisory posted before or after this accident?

Sorry i have to copy/paste, don't know how you quote from different threads.

This is part of the Reply Nº 60 in the Part 8 of the thread :


Copied directly and literally from the KLM Minimum Equipment List for the 737-800/900:

------
Radio Altimeter Systems

One may be inoperative deactivated provided approach minimums or operating procedures do not require its use.

Operations:

With radio altimeter(s) inoperative, do not use the associated autopilot or autothrottle for approach and landing.
-----



Saludos
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: OldAeroGuy
Posted 2009-03-14 08:07:24 and read 12975 times.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 61):
If a system is allowing the a/c to land with zero visibility, it should be foolproof.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 62):
There is no such thing "I do the driving, you just sit and watch what I am doing. If I screw up, it is your fault!"

You don't understand how autoland systems function and are certified. When in autoland mode, the duty of the pilots is to monitor the landing to ensure that the autoland system is performing correctly. If the pilots detect an anomoly, ie airspeed below the commanded value, they are required to intervene and correct the situation.

There is never a presumption that failures will not occur, only that if there is a failure the pilots monitoring the approach will be able to correct the circumstances of the failure. Depending on the phase of the approach, this may mean a go-around is required.

In this case, the airplane was not in a full autoland configuration since both autpilots were not engaged. It doesn't really matter since the primary pilot function of monitoring airspeed remains the same regardless of the landing condition.

To aid the pilots in detecting low airspeed, the 737-800 has a speed tape displayed to the left of the Attitude Direction Indicator. The speed tape displays a trend vector that shows where the airspeed will be in a few seconds if action is not taken immediately. If present airspeed is at or below the commanded airspeed as displayed on the speed tape and the speed trend arrow is pointing to even lower airspeeds, the question is why the pilots did not react to this cue.

[Edited 2009-03-14 08:24:22]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Spitfire
Posted 2009-03-14 08:27:12 and read 12924 times.



Quoting OldAeroGuy (Reply 83):

Plus the black and red part of the speed tape indicating speeds below stall speed

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Ciaran
Posted 2009-03-14 08:56:36 and read 12879 times.



Quoting Spitfire (Reply 80):

"But this does not change something to the fact there was a "strange" warning at 2000 feet."

Yet why did the Dutch investigation board press release relate this warning to the crew as an RA problem? like it was standard or at least thats the way it came across in the reading.

Just witnessed a few hours ago FR 738 doing a GA (Dublin) for no obvious reason, the weather was good, not to much traffic, I guess this incident has all you 738 drivers spooked.

Link to a Honeywell patent for RA in-flight test procedure,


http://www.freepatentsonline.com/6812885.html

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Spitfire
Posted 2009-03-14 09:04:02 and read 12859 times.

Quoting Ciaran (Reply 85):
Yet why did the Dutch investigation board press release relate this warning to the crew as an RA problem

Because of the RA reading -8 feet (faulty), so "below 500 feet", with gear not down and speed <190 kts, that triggered this aural warning.

[Edited 2009-03-14 09:04:47]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: DogBreath
Posted 2009-03-14 09:42:31 and read 12789 times.



Quoting Ciaran (Reply 85):
Just witnessed a few hours ago FR 738 doing a GA (Dublin) for no obvious reason, the weather was good, not to much traffic, I guess this incident has all you 738 drivers spooked.

Why do you say that? That's complete and utter rubbish.

There are a great number of reason for a crew to execute a missed approach, an ATC instruction, runway incursion, bird activity, checklist not completed by certain 'gates', speed too high/low, Windshear alert, GPWS alert, some tosser shining a laser at the aircraft, etc, etc.

Spooked yeah right!  laughing 

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-14 11:02:27 and read 12682 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
Can someone point it out again please... and was that advisory posted before or after this accident?

Thread 8 had extracts from 2 different flight ops manuals that clearly stated not to use A/T with the RA inop.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 72):
Oh dear, I guess we're not talking about safety then, we're talking about legal liability... sorry, I must have been in the wrong forum... Smile

Mandala: This is airliners.net. Sadly today legal is just as big a deal as safety.

Quoting Wouwout (Reply 74):
I'm a bit suprised that nobody has picked up the news that KLM has had 17 radio altimeter problems (similar to TK1951's) over the last year. A Dutch news station has received secret information from KLM. Officially KLM will not deny or confirm. You know what that means .

Therefor: do we have a serious technical issue in the 737 (sorry no specific type was specified)?

There was an *entire thread* on that subject. To say no-one picked up on it just because you didn't see it, is a bit much. Also please note that RAs go wonky *all the time*. They don't like rain. See here:

http://www.airliners.net/aviation-fo...ead.main/4346375/?threadid=4346375

Quoting MD11Engineer (Reply 77):

Did they know that the system was inop?

The accident board findings show that all in the cockpit were aware of the erroneous readings.

Quoting Spitfire (Reply 80):

But this does not change something to the fact that there was a "strange" warning around 2000 feet.

That to me was the single biggest indication they had of something amiss. Someone should have asked themselves 'why is the plane calling for gear at 1,950'.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-14 11:34:51 and read 12633 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 67):
The A/T was not designed to distinguish between erroneous input from a failed RA, and valid input from a functioning RA.

Precisely, I am talking about the design issues here.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 68):
My my... absolving? It is as much absolving as you are blaming/pointing incompetence. No, it is not absolving, it is delving into possible reasons as to why some people still fall into the trap of not monitoring airspeed, and therefore we can prevent more of such mistakes! You don't do that by taking a high and mighty towering view and say this is wrong, that is wrong.

Thanks for saying that for me, I agree.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 72):
So, I guess you've concluded this is an inexcusable pilot error... so let's stop the investigation... Someone has made the adequate conclusion. And I guess you've concluded that if you were put in a similar situation, it would definitely can never ever ever happen to you?

Dear airline crew manager, please employ this infallible 100% trainable person... he's proven himself...

Thanks again, I concur.

Boeing747_600 you are not listening and discussing here, but imposing your thoughts.
I will retire from this discussion with you.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 67):
But that's just my $0.02

Thanks, keep the change.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-14 11:46:28 and read 12607 times.



Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 73):
However, in this case the LH RA didn't FAIL, it displayed an INCORRECT reading.

---------copy&paste----------
msg 114 in part 8 says:

Please do not think only hardware failure, where the electronics fail and stop sending information.
There is programming failure where the code does not perform the intended function.
And there is logical failure where a particular case was not thought of.

In this case the sensor may completely failed (hw) or sent the wrong info (hw? sw? logic?) AND the main program interpreting the data FAILED to show the correct result. (sw? logic?)

There was enough hardware on board of this a/c for the program to decide about the right solution, it failed.

Just an example, going from 1950 feet to -8 in one step is impossible and unusable even in a mountainous area, -8 means front landing gear crashed, who needs an altimeter reading after that?
------ end of copy&paste -------

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-14 11:51:58 and read 12593 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 90):
There was enough hardware on board of this a/c for the program to decide about the right solution, it failed.

Just an example, going from 1950 feet to -8 in one step is impossible and unusable even in a mountainous area, -8 means front landing gear crashed, who needs an altimeter reading after that?

Correct. If how most likely happened the cpt took over controls of the airplane, just too much happened in too much short slice of time to evaluate with the necessary cool calm that the AT had to be disconnected. The terrain was too close and he (possibly) tried his best, pretty successfully, to save anyone life. Unfortunately, not his one and everyone in the cockpit too.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-14 11:57:23 and read 12608 times.



Quoting OldAeroGuy (Reply 83):
You don't understand how autoland systems function and are certified.

Sorry OldAeroGuy, I do design systems and fly airplanes.
What I am discussing here is "how it could be done, possibly" rather than "how to work around the current implementation".

There is always room to improve, and because things are done one way doesn't mean that it is the best way.

About this particular accident: Based on the information I hear and read, I wouldn't be surprised if Boeing comes with drastic system updates, not just advisories in the manuals.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-14 12:19:16 and read 12577 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 54):
We should ask this to Turkish pilots. My sentence is based on the information from TALPA's memos and other sources (like user comments to some articles) prior to the crash, criticizing the company policies, procedures etc.

I found an article today, about this subject:
"...the pilots claimed that under the new management, pilots were regularly asked to exceed safe numbers of flying hours. Demands to do so, they claimed, came directly from the new senior executives. They complained as well of personnel shortages..."

http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/46726,...pawn-in-the-nations-power-struggle

I remember reading specifically about go-around procedures at TK and reporting (in form of an interrogation of pilots who perform a GA) in an article. I will post it here if I find it.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Theredbaron
Posted 2009-03-14 12:46:13 and read 12518 times.

A lot of fellow A-neters here are still doing circular debate for argument sake.

Just off the cuff I am thinking:

If radio altimeters fail so much and are very dangerous and cunfusing (and pilots are stupid or unproffesional) we shuold be having 2 crashes a week, that is not the case, so I think that no matter how much spin you want to put on Boeing systems, They are the best compromise between safety,ease of use and technology availiable for the $$$$.

Yes they can change the way warnings and Altimeters works, heck for all I care they could pirate the whole Airbus enchilada, and guess what? there have been half a dozen airbus crashes on approach, so niether system can prevent human error, system errors or A COMBINATION OF THE TWO.

I have said it 3 times now, whithout the CVR we are just speculating on the probable causes, we dont have the whole info, cmplete data or whatever.

I think pilot error due to distraction or CRM is the most probable cause, but maybe they did not hear the gear warning, because they had radio chatter or laughed or someone sneezed, heck meybe even farted WE DONT KNOW.

Alse we know they tried to avoid disaster and trying to portray careless or unprofesional airmanship is unfair since WE all know that doing that will most probably KILL YOU.

The worst accident ever in Teneriffe was very long chain of events that lead to an uncomprensible accident, I bet this is similar, no single action will be the main culprit, but a long chain of small details that combined ended in this sad tragedy I WILL WAIT till we have the CVR transcript, since I think we are kicking an empty bucket.

Best Regards
TRB

BTW

Wing, I understand your points and your close point of view, I thank you for your input and perspective. Mayy the sadness of this event heal soon.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-14 13:09:33 and read 12501 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 94):
whithout the CVR we are just speculating on the probable causes,

Sorry : we know what the cause was, that already came out : an erroneous altitude reading. We can't tell how it's been handled by the crew , if even. Just that.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Ciaran
Posted 2009-03-14 13:20:02 and read 12473 times.



Quoting Spitfire (Reply 80):

But this does not change something to the fact that there was a "strange" warning around 2000 feet.


Spitfire, excuse me for using your quote to make a point,
The "strange" in your statement is the operative sentiment that I am sure the crew/ captain felt on hearing the aural warning at that height and I am sure that this sentiment quickly changed to shock and horror when the aircraft performed an uncommanded roll out or again they could have interpreted as wake vortex, I would suggest that there is a strong possibility that the crew didn’t have time to analyse and make the connection that this was caused by RA error if this had happened before a precedence would have prepared them for such anomaly and I don’t think that the press release from the Dutch safety board says explicitly only assumes that they should have made the connection.


Dogbreath
Lighten up, I was merely making the point that GAs are quiet common and happen all the time for a myriad of reasons and are not if you read the earlier replies on the subject of Gas a cultural/ procedural “faux pas”

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-14 13:34:25 and read 12443 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 95):
Sorry : we know what the cause was, that already came out : an erroneous altitude reading. We can't tell how it's been handled by the crew , if even. Just that.

That is *not* the cause. That is one possible contributing factor. Statements like that are just as bad as the ones where it's the pilots, it's the pilots that so many of use have been taken to task for.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Theredbaron
Posted 2009-03-14 13:55:56 and read 12387 times.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 97):
That is *not* the cause. That is one possible contributing factor. Statements like that are just as bad as the ones where it's the pilots, it's the pilots that so many of use have been taken to task for.

^ could not write it better myself...my exact thought on this.

Best Regards
TRB

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-14 14:26:08 and read 12334 times.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 97):
That is *not* the cause. That is one possible contributing factor.

Strange, in this case everything indicated that the airplane behavior changed after the faulty RA reading until fatal consequences, but maybe you're talking about another crash ?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: OldAeroGuy
Posted 2009-03-14 14:35:22 and read 12326 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 92):
Quoting OldAeroGuy (Reply 83):
You don't understand how autoland systems function and are certified.

Sorry OldAeroGuy, I do design systems and fly airplanes.
What I am discussing here is "how it could be done, possibly" rather than "how to work around the current implementation".

Fine, but do you design and certify autoland systems on airplanes?

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 62):
There is no such thing "I do the driving, you just sit and watch what I am doing. If I screw up, it is your fault!"

In a case where the automation takes control the pilot is monitoring, and should have secondary responsibility.

If you are really advocating that the pilots have less than the primary responsibility, then what you are really talking about is a pilotless airplane. If the pilot only has a secondary responsibility, then why is a pilot needed at all? We don't have any commercial airplanes flying today that are certified under this set of rules.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Sbkom
Posted 2009-03-14 15:51:27 and read 12274 times.

Dear OldAeroGuy,

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
Here is a totally different explanation from an engineer point of view.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
There is more than one way of looking at the things, that's why discussions never end.

In the original posting where I talked about electronics, I specified the point of view. When you do cut&paste the discussion may deviate from the original context.

Quoting OldAeroGuy (Reply 100):
Fine, but do you design and certify autoland systems on airplanes?

I don't know if anyone should design AND certify any system at the same time  Smile . I don't.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JoeCanuck
Posted 2009-03-14 15:59:11 and read 12256 times.

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 95):
Sorry : we know what the cause was, that already came out : an erroneous altitude reading. We can't tell how it's been handled by the crew , if even. Just that.

That is only true if the radio altimeter prevented the flight instruments, flight controls, engine controls and engines from working...which it didn't.

One instrument failed The rest of the plane was working perfectly.

[Edited 2009-03-14 16:00:36]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-14 16:15:39 and read 12235 times.



Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 102):
That is only true if the radio altimeter prevented the flight instruments, flight controls, engine controls and engines from working...which it didn't.

One instrument failed The rest of the plane was working perfectly.

No that wasn't. The AT system failed to keep the airplane in flight with the necessary speed and let that drop down indefinitely thus giving an unrecoverable stall. You can legitimate as long as you want that it did what it was commanded for based on the input, but the input was wrong.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2009-03-14 16:18:54 and read 12237 times.



Quoting Ciaran (Reply 85):
Just witnessed a few hours ago FR 738 doing a GA (Dublin) for no obvious reason, the weather was good, not to much traffic, I guess this incident has all you 738 drivers spooked.

Just because the reason was not obvious to you, doesn't mean there isn't one. All sorts of things can lead to a go around. Going around is the safe option if there is an issue. In most cases, it does not in any way indicate the pilots screwing up.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JoeCanuck
Posted 2009-03-14 16:34:06 and read 12220 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 103):

No that wasn't. The AT system failed to keep the airplane in flight with the necessary speed and let that drop down indefinitely thus giving an unrecoverable stall. You can legitimate as long as you want that it did what it was commanded for based on the input, but the input was wrong.

The AT system did not fail to keep the airplane in flight. Nothing prevented the pilots from flying the aircraft...nothing. Nothing prevented the pilots from monitoring the instruments and recognizing they were too slow. The aircraft was perfectly airworthy.

Pilots are in the cockpit to fly the plane...to be the ultimate control...to recognize when the machine is broken and take over...and in this case, it wasn't even broken. At any point, the crew could have taken control but they didn't until it was too late.

The important question is why the pilots didn't recognize the plane was too slow until the stick shaker activated.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-14 16:57:35 and read 12185 times.



Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 105):
The AT system did not fail to keep the airplane in flight.

The airplane stalled, which means that wasn't speeding enough. The AT system was engaged to keep that speed which would have been allowing the ariplane to fly. The AT failed based on false inputs and the airplane was no more kept in flight. End of the story.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 105):
Nothing prevented the pilots from flying the aircraft...nothing. Nothing prevented the pilots from monitoring the instruments and recognizing they were too slow.

I don't think, as now, nobody can confirm or exclude the crew were totally incapacitated. This could still be one hell of a valid reason.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: PlanesNTrains
Posted 2009-03-14 17:41:30 and read 12143 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 90):
Quoting PlanesNTrains (Reply 73):
However, in this case the LH RA didn't FAIL, it displayed an INCORRECT reading.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 90):
There was enough hardware on board of this a/c for the program to decide about the right solution, it failed.

That is why there are two (and in this case, three) sets of eyes who are responsible for responding to these situations. They received a notification of the change in status of the LH RA IIRC, and acknowledged it according to the CVR. So yes, there was "enough hardware on board..." but there were also "more than enough eyes on board...".

If you think I am saying the system was flawless, think again. But I do believe that the purpose of having [two] qualified individuals in the cockpit is to deal with just such a scenario as this. I don't expect them to be perfect, or not to make mistakes. I do expect that the aircraft is going to have malfunctions from time to time. Their primary role, IMHO, should be dealing with those situations as they arise.

-Dave

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JoeCanuck
Posted 2009-03-14 17:45:23 and read 12147 times.

If the crew was incapacitated, I will change my mind about the accident. In fact, there are many possibilities which may lead me to change my mind.

So far, though, the information which has been released leads me to only one conclusion; the pilots didn't fly a perfectly working aircraft.

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 106):
The airplane stalled, which means that wasn't speeding enough. The AT system was engaged to keep that speed which would have been allowing the ariplane to fly. The AT failed based on false inputs and the airplane was no more kept in flight. End of the story.

Then what is the job of the pilots? Are they in the cockpit to merely have the best view of the flight? Do you really expect any mechanical/electronic device to work 100% of the time? If you do, then you seek the impossible.

I do not expect a machine to be in control...I expect the pilots to be in control. I expect the pilots to safely land an airplane in perfect working order.

The information which has been released so far tells me that the pilots had all the information they needed to fly the airplane to a successful conclusion. They are in the cockpit exactly because sometimes, things go wrong. In this case, it was a completely unnecessary instrument which controlled the throttles which could have been over ridden very simply.

If the machine would have prevented them from flying the plane, that's a different story. What did prevent them from flying the plane is the real cause of the accident...and it wasn't the auto throttle.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-14 18:04:47 and read 12120 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 106):
The airplane stalled, which means that wasn't speeding enough. The AT system was engaged to keep that speed which would have been allowing the ariplane to fly. The AT failed based on false inputs and the airplane was no more kept in flight. End of the story.

You are missing the difference between contributing factors and causal factors here.
The RA issue and the associated A/T response to its erroneous readings were contributing factors, the causal factor is, ( for reasons still unknown for us at this stage of the investigation ), the failure of the crew to override the wrong actions taken by this automation devices. In every cockpit, no matter how modern and automatized is, there is only ONE person with the authority to allow or override the automation, the PILOT. I don't want to say "end of the story" like you did, because maybe the three members of the crew had valid reasons for their actions. I'm expecting, with great interest, the CVR transcript and the next Report of the DSB before say, for one side or the other, end of the story.

Saludos.
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-14 18:38:26 and read 12094 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 67):
Actually you are absolutely correct in calling it a failure as far as the instrumentation (malfunctioning LH RA) was concerned. The A/T was not designed to distinguish between erroneous input from a failed RA, and valid input from a functioning RA. So the error was transmitted to the throttles and from the throttles to the engines and so forth ...

If the LH RA "failed", that would be better! If it fails, either you have to disengage A/T, or it goes off the (fully functional) RH RA.

Giving an erroneous altitude creates so many problems.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 67):
What is truly scary is that a seemingly innocuous component failure (LH RA) was allowed (by pilots that did not react properly) to bring an aircraft down. This begs the following question:



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 95):
Sorry : we know what the cause was, that already came out : an erroneous altitude reading. We can't tell how it's been handled by the crew , if even. Just that.

It's an old adage that airplace accidents result from multiple errors. In this case, that's true. *All* of the following mistakes had to happen for this crash to occur:

1. LH RA gives incorrect reading
2. Previous LH RA errors not reported/not followed up on (possibly due to being a regular occurence)
3. Effects of LH RA not fully understood/realized by pilots
4. Coming in high and hot to intercept glideslope
5. Flight being a training flight
6. Poor FO understanding of situation, failing to hit TO/GA and releasing throttles

5 of these 6 happen, no problem. You need all 6 to take place for this tragedy to happen.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-14 20:06:00 and read 12026 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 72):
So, I guess you've concluded this is an inexcusable pilot error...

Yes.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 72):
And I guess you've concluded that if you were put in a similar situation, it would definitely can never ever ever happen to you?

Sorry, but this is a throughly ridiculous and sophomoric exegesis of what I've posted earlier  Smile

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 89):
Boeing747_600 you are not listening and discussing here, but imposing your thoughts.
I will retire from this discussion with you.

Thank you for exercising your prerogative. Since you couldn't answer a single question I posed in reply 48, I'm not surprised  Smile

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 101):
Quoting OldAeroGuy (Reply 100):
Fine, but do you design and certify autoland systems on airplanes?

I don't know if anyone should design AND certify any system at the same time . I don't.

Well if you ever do either, do let us know, and I'll start following John Madden's example  Smile There's no way in hell, I'd want ANY pilot under the illusion that his role is secondary (your words, reply 62) during ANY phase of the flight.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JoeCanuck
Posted 2009-03-14 23:12:59 and read 11924 times.



Quoting JFernandez (Reply 110):

1. LH RA gives incorrect reading
2. Previous LH RA errors not reported/not followed up on (possibly due to being a regular occurence)
3. Effects of LH RA not fully understood/realized by pilots
4. Coming in high and hot to intercept glideslope
5. Flight being a training flight
6. Poor FO understanding of situation, failing to hit TO/GA and releasing throttles

5 of these 6 happen, no problem. You need all 6 to take place for this tragedy to happen.

and the most important one; nobody was monitoring the flight instruments for the last 2 minutes of the flight.

They didn't need to understand the connection between the failed RA and the auto throttles...they just needed to fly the approach doing a standard instrument scan so they would be able to recognize that the angle of attack was rising, the throttles were not advancing and the speed was dropping.

If they had been properly focused, they would have noticed and had plenty of time to correct.

Perhaps it seems like I'm being harsh to the memories of the tragically killed crew. Well, I am being harsh...because I'm bloody angry about it. I don't know what was going on in that cockpit to distract the crew but it couldn't possibly be as important as flying the plane.

Maybe something serious did happen in the cockpit and there was nothing the crew could do to save the plane and passengers. So far, it doesn't look like it. The preliminary report shows that the RA failure was acknowledged but dismissed as not important. Regardless of knowing the connection to the auto throttles, a failure of any sort should make the crew more vigilant, not less.

It is a tragedy that the accident happened and people died. It's made more tragic by the fact that it could have been prevented.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-14 23:43:55 and read 11900 times.



Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 112):
and the most important one; nobody was monitoring the flight instruments for the last 2 minutes of the flight.

This is still not *entirely* clear. The 100 seconds has been talked about a lot, but the pilots were clearly intentionally decreasing speed to get to Vref. *Some* of those 100 seconds the speed loss was entirely normal. The important question, however, is how much. I've heard a pretty convincing argument in one of the earlier parts of this thread that puts it around 10-11 seconds.

I agree, however, that this was another error made. The magnitue of the error increases depending on how much time the plane spent below Vref before Stick Shaker went off.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-15 00:55:38 and read 11852 times.



Quoting JFernandez (Reply 113):
but the pilots were clearly intentionally decreasing speed to get to Vref.

They were by all indications comfortable with the A/T's programmed instructions to do so based on the prevailing logic. That's not the same as intentionally decreasing airspeed to get to Vref.

Quoting JFernandez (Reply 113):
The important question, however, is how much. I've heard a pretty convincing argument in one of the earlier parts of this thread that puts it around 10-11 seconds.

So what?!?! Its OK to take your eyes off the airspeed indicator for over a period of 10 seconds on final?!?! Seriously, anyone comfortable with this sort of perverse "logic" should NEVER be allowed near the controls of any airplane, be it a Cessna 150 or an Airbus 380.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-15 01:19:45 and read 11833 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 72):
And I guess you've concluded that if you were put in a similar situation, it would definitely can never ever ever happen to you?

Mandala499, you and I apparently have different interpretations of the concept of professionalism.

if you are willing to accept that it is somehow OK in the cosmic scheme of things, for an experienced B738 instructor to let an aircraft under his command drop down to stalling speed on final, because Hey!, the A/T was engaged, then I hope you sleep well at night  Smile

I hold myself and everyone I regard as a peer, and above, to a much higher standard. If you choose to interpret this as me stepping on a high soapbox, Fine go ahead! I really couldn't care less  Smile

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Iakobos
Posted 2009-03-15 02:41:03 and read 11772 times.



Quoting MD11Engineer (Reply 77):
The RA transceivers have been calibrated with the coax cables in the factory and the logic automatically subtracts the additional altitude caused by the length of the coax cables from the measured altitude. Shortening an antenna cable would therefore make the RA read too low.

From what I was teached at school, and unless RA's technology and relevant standards have changed, the reading derives from a frequency discrimination, not a time difference.
Cable length is irrelevant as far as altitude is concerned, frequencies at both ends of cables remain constant.
Cable length is a factor on the transmit side, in order to ensure best power transmission between transmitter and antenna (lowest Standing Wave Ratio).

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-15 03:12:37 and read 11733 times.



Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 108):

Then what is the job of the pilots? Are they in the cockpit to merely have the best view of the flight? Do you really expect any mechanical/electronic device to work 100% of the time? If you do, then you seek the impossible.

No, I don't, do you ? In this flight, the main cause (possible contributing very influencing factor, as you prefer) is been that the indicated RA did not fail : that gave a valid reading. No red flag was raised and no INOP label came up, the AT using it was not disconnected or switched to the other RA, as I would highly expect it to do. What came after, may have put the crew in total incapacitated conditions to recover the airplane, or let them miss to commit specific actions based on their training and experience (as it happened in quite some other crashes), does that make any difference to you ? That doesn't to me, and neither to them. What came out already is what was wrong in the airplane : the AT did rely on one RA only, whatever it said. In terms of systems architecture this is called "single point of failure" which, in the design, actually failed with catastrophic consequences, period.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-15 04:39:46 and read 11627 times.



Quoting Sbkom (Reply 89):
Thanks again, I concur.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 115):
Mandala499, you and I apparently have different interpretations of the concept of professionalism.

if you are willing to accept that it is somehow OK in the cosmic scheme of things, for an experienced B738 instructor to let an aircraft under his command drop down to stalling speed on final, because Hey!, the A/T was engaged, then I hope you sleep well at night

Professionals are HUMAN... No matter how perfect someone is... he/she is still human!
And... HUMANS MAKE ERRORS...
Now, it is in the interest of safety and the safety of professionals that we look into WHY the error was made! NOT just "oh he made an error... he's wrong".

And in an accident investigation, a professional investigator will also look into why and how the error happened and provide recommendations to prevent its repeat! That's his job!

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 115):
I hold myself and everyone I regard as a peer, and above, to a much higher standard.

I hold myself and everyone I regard as a peer, and above, to a much higher standard than your level of analysis and simplistic conclusions.

And yes, I do sleep very well at night thank you... knowing that people don't just stop at saying "it's an error", but goes further into "why" the error happened and what could be done to prevent it should the same situation occur.

But don't worry, U'll be well asleep before someone asks why... that's your choice buddy!

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: PW100
Posted 2009-03-15 06:07:11 and read 11514 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 117):
What came out already is what was wrong in the airplane : the AT did rely on one RA only, whatever it said. In terms of systems architecture this is called "single point of failure" which, in the design, actually failed with catastrophic consequences, period

Why feed the A/T system with multiple fail-safe devices, eliminating the "single point of failure" being fed into the A/T, when this very A/T system itself is a "single point of failure" item????

The B737-800 employs only one A/T system, and it can and will fail at some point. The 737 is not unique in this respect as most airliners have only one single channel A/T system. The reason airplanes are certified using only a single channel system can only be that it is considered to be a non-critical flight control system. IE. if it fails [and please understand that failure is defined here as "failure to perform its intended task - not necessairly outputting an error flag], airworthiness is not compromised as the crew are available to take over the most basic fundamental of flight: monitoring and/or controlling airspeed.

Off course cockpit crew also are only human, and can make mistakes. So aircraft have built-in safety devices/warning systems if the aircraft reaches the edges of airspeed envelope. In this case in hand, the low speed warning/stall/stick shaker. Now, apparently there is a combination of circumstances thinkable, where those safety devises kick in too late, possibly caused by retarding throttle after the crew first attempt for increase power. This is something the Dutch Saftey Board, the certifying agency [FAA] and indeed the whole industry will look at with very great interest.

So even if the crew did make mistakes [which at this stage of the investigation has not been estalished], apparently the certification standards still allow for some loopholes where safety devises and procedures can not cope with the situation in hand.

I have no doubt that some changes will be made to the B737 RA to A/T logic, as it seems pretty straight forward and low cost to improve this. But I would be very hesitant to consider this to be the primary cause of the crash.

A procedural change could also be that crew will be instructed to disconnect A/T system after stall warning, or use TOGA rather than manually increasing throttle, preventing a potential malfunctional single channel system [A/T] taking control of vital aircraft controls [power] at cuch a critical stage.

Regards,
PW100

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: MD11Engineer
Posted 2009-03-15 06:47:59 and read 11481 times.



Quoting Iakobos (Reply 116):
Quoting MD11Engineer (Reply 77):
The RA transceivers have been calibrated with the coax cables in the factory and the logic automatically subtracts the additional altitude caused by the length of the coax cables from the measured altitude. Shortening an antenna cable would therefore make the RA read too low.

From what I was teached at school, and unless RA's technology and relevant standards have changed, the reading derives from a frequency discrimination, not a time difference.
Cable length is irrelevant as far as altitude is concerned, frequencies at both ends of cables remain constant.
Cable length is a factor on the transmit side, in order to ensure best power transmission between transmitter and antenna (lowest Standing Wave Ratio).

You are correct in as far that modern RADIO altimeters are not RADAR altimeters. Unlkie the RADAR altimeters they don't use pulsed signals and measure the time between transmitting and receiving the pulse. Radio altimeters transmit continiously.
From what I understand of the RA system used, the signal varies with a ramped frequency. The box compares the frequency of the returned wave with the currently transmitted frequency and out of this calculates the elapsed time between transmission and reception. One half this time times speed of light is the distance between the box and the ground (which includes the antenna wires). Obviously you want to have a good standing wave ratio to get maximum performance.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mir
Posted 2009-03-15 08:09:11 and read 11365 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 57):
EXACTLY... when we say pilot error, it is not fair to stop the judgement at that. If it's pilot error, then the next question should be WHY did he/she err? Why do we need to ask that? Because if we're all trained properly, and someone did what he/she did, that means, we could have done the same given the same circumstances. Very rarely are pilot error being purely pilot error... most often, something caused the pilot to make the error...

 checkmark  Well said. It's pretty clear that the pilots let the airplane get too slow on approach, but how does that information help prevent future incidents like this? Tell pilots to continuously monitor their airspeed and glidepath? Sure, but that already happens. In order to figure out how to stop this from happening in the future, we need to know why the pilots let the airplane get too slow - I can all but guarantee that it wasn't intentional.

That's something that we'll need a CVR transcript to figure out.

Quoting Sbkom (Reply 51):
The FO and the Captain were probably in a shock to see the systems failed, they are in a close stall condition despite all the automation. They also felt the disgrace, guilty feeling and the company's pressure against GA and all the implications, interviews etc resulting that, added to the shame of being in a stall condition in favorable weather conditions, they probably though about getting out of this situation as quickly as possible without losing face without being forced to a GA in plain daylight.

If people feel that way, they shouldn't be flying.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 67):
would hope that this is precisely the sort of scenario that every pilot ( from a new hire to an experienced instructor ) is subjected to at random on the simulator every couple of hundred hours or so.

I'm sure it will be added to the list, just as a dual flameout was added to the list after US1549. But there are a whole lot of other accidents that had their contributing causes added to the list as well, and there just isn't enough time to test all of them every couple of hundred hours.

Quoting DingDong (Reply 70):
Wasn't this a LOFT training flight?

No. LOFT is only done in the simulator - a simulated regular flight, but with certain failures part of the way through that the crew must handle in a realistic way. Obviously, you can't fail certain things intentionally on a passenger-carrying flight.

Initial Operating Experience (IOE) is the term for what's done in the airplane with pax aboard, with a new FO alongside a training captain (or a new captain alongside a training captain acting as FO).

Quoting Spitfire (Reply 81):
BTW, this indicates that around 2000 ft roughly, when intercepting the glide slope , their IAS was at or below 190 kts.... not that much for a "hot approach".... (Flaps 15, speed 180 maybe...).

Which means that the speed reduction might have been pretty gradual. On the one hand, that would mean it would be harder to detect. But on the other hand, it would give the crew both more time to notice the problem, and then more time to correct it.

Quoting OldAeroGuy (Reply 83):
You don't understand how autoland systems function and are certified. When in autoland mode, the duty of the pilots is to monitor the landing to ensure that the autoland system is performing correctly. If the pilots detect an anomoly, ie airspeed below the commanded value, they are required to intervene and correct the situation.

 checkmark  The only reason autoland exists is that pilots cannot fly accurately enough by instruments toward the end of an ILS approach - the needles get too sensitive. The pilot is still a very involved part of the process - watching for any error, ready to intervene (and go around).

The HUDs on newer airplanes allow the pilots to see a graphical interpretation of the runway in front of them, and thus the pilots can handfly all the way down in CatIII conditions. Without a HUD, the autopilot has to do that job.

-Mir

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-15 08:20:36 and read 11377 times.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 119):
The reason airplanes are certified using only a single channel system can only be that it is considered to be a non-critical flight control system. IE. if it fails [and please understand that failure is defined here as "failure to perform its intended task - not necessarily outputting an error flag], airworthiness is not compromised as the crew are available to take over the most basic fundamental of flight: monitoring and/or controlling airspeed.

        

I can't agree more with you. I'm not "wishing" to blame the crew for this accident, all the opposite... But with the information we have until now from the DSB ( the only "valid" information IMHO ), they failed in the most critical task they had, KEEP the AIRCRAFT FLYING.
Only the CVR can change this, if the recordings shows they did the very best to avoid the accident but something made their actions useless ( we don't know what thing yet ).

Saludos.
G.

edited for spelling

[Edited 2009-03-15 08:31:25]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-15 09:55:56 and read 11231 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 117):
What came after, may have put the crew in total incapacitated conditions to recover the airplane,

They had 100 seconds after the RA failed to detect what transpired into a dangerous rate of speed bleed. The only time they were truly helpless was when they let the A/T pull the throttles back to idle for 6 seconds AFTER the stall warning and transfer of control from F/O to Capt.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 118):
HUMANS MAKE ERRORS...

Thank you for finally accepting that the source of this accident was due to a human error - the humans in this case being the pilots.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 118):
And in an accident investigation, a professional investigator will also look into why and how the error happened and provide recommendations to prevent its repeat! That's his job!

Excellent! That's precisely what I too am waiting for. I never had a problem with this aspect of the analysis.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-15 09:59:39 and read 11226 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 99):
Strange, in this case everything indicated that the airplane behavior changed after the faulty RA reading until fatal consequences, but maybe you're talking about another crash ?

Oh for Pete's sake! If you're going to take that view of it then the fact that the plane took off was the cause. The RA failing alone wouldn't have caused the issue. The investigation has revealed the crew was aware of the RA issue. The ops manuals for the aircraft say 'DO NOT USE THE A/T, A/P WITH RA INOP'.

It's like faulting your car because the cruise control malfunctions and you just let it keep accelerating into a while. Rubish line of logic. Sure the RA failure contributed, but it was not the cause. The RA malfunctioned and was *noticed* at 1950ft, which was PLENTY of time to do something constructive like abort the approach and try again under full manual. End of story!

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 106):
I don't think, as now, nobody can confirm or exclude the crew were totally incapacitated. This could still be one hell of a valid reason.

Complete and utter BS, and the inverstigators have said as much. Both the pilot and copilot were awake and capable through the entire incident. No you're just guessing about known issues because you would rather blame the plane than the flight crew.

If it's solely up to the plane to fly itself I say we fire *all* pilots and take our chances, make all the systems failsafe and get rid of all the pilors. This is the logical endpoint for all these people who say the pilots shouldn't be the primary control FYI. If you're purely secondary you can be removed, so becareful what you wish for.

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 117):
In this flight, the main cause

In accident investigation 'casual factor' has a very specific definition. What you keep describing is a 'contributing factor'. As I said above, applying your logic the casual factor is the plane even taking off, or TK buying738s or Boeing designing the 738, or actually, by logical extension, had the Wright brothers not farted around we wouldn't have this accident. You know what, using your logic that's the 'casual factor' for all accidents.. damn those Wright brothers!!!

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 118):
Professionals are HUMAN... No matter how perfect someone is... he/she is still human!
And... HUMANS MAKE ERRORS...
Now, it is in the interest of safety and the safety of professionals that we look into WHY the error was made! NOT just "oh he made an error... he's wrong".

Agreed. Everyone is prone to make mistakes and they unfortunately happen. In this case the mistakes cost lives. I know I'm personally not seeking to villify the flight crew as I'm sure they did not intentionally kill themselves and others. However, I'm not willing to absolve them of responsability either.

At the end of the day unless the crew is incapacitated or the plane isn't responding to their direct inputs and there are no external factors like windshear, etc. the crew is the final line of defence and where ultimate responsibility rests.

This is one of those sad cases where a mistake cost lives. It's not a nice fact, but it's also reality. For the record I also agree with you that we have to figure out why they missed it, and what mistakes were made that can be trained to avoid in the future, but I *think* what is causing a lot of animosity on these threads is that there are some posters (not necessarily yourself) who refuse to accept any accountability or responsibility for the flight crew in this incident.

If we could all agree (and I think anyone looking logically at the reported information so far *should* come to this conclusion) that the crew did have the opportunity at several points in time to save the flight and failed to act appropriately then we can move onto *why* they failed to react appropriately. Mistakes don't make them evil, it makes them human. Their mistakes don't lessen them as individuals or people (unless later evidence surfaces to show they were intentional negligent, which I just can't see being the case). However, their being human doesn't mean their mistakes aren't the reason they and others are sadly dead today as well.

My guess is the cockpit was busy with a pop quiz like environment with the captain and observing member of the flight crew distracting the F/O on final. I'd bet any amount of money there was *far* too much chatter in the cockpit during the last minute of the flight and that at the end of the day will be the 'real' mistake that was made. Still on the crew either way though sadly.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-15 12:42:02 and read 11027 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 111):
Sorry, but this is a throughly ridiculous and sophomoric exegesis of what I've posted earlier

Well call it sophomoric exegesis or "smart-ass-ness based on supposedly parts of what's been written", but your posts if I recall correctly has been summarized by:

Quoting Mandala499, reply 72]
So, I guess you've concluded this is an inexcusable pilot error...

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 111):
Yes.

[/quote
:

And your other posts and reactions to posts on pilot error and why the error was made doesn't seem to go any further than your conclusion of "simply inexcusable." You could be right, it could all turn out in the end that the pilots just said, "ah screw it!", but then, it could turn out that there's a lot of other factors...

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 114):
Its OK to take your eyes off the airspeed indicator for over a period of 10 seconds on final?

No it's not, they're trained not to... what we need to know is why no one monitored it... was there something else that made them not to? Was there something that consumed their attention away from the basic scan? If so, why did they let that happen...

Quoting Mir (Reply 121):
In order to figure out how to stop this from happening in the future, we need to know why the pilots let the airplane get too slow - I can all but guarantee that it wasn't intentional.

That's something that we'll need a CVR transcript to figure out.

Bingo!

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 123):
Excellent! That's precisely what I too am waiting for. I never had a problem with this aspect of the analysis.

But you've already preconcluded that it is an inexcusable pilot error as you said with:

Quoting Mandala499, reply 72]
So, I guess you've concluded this is an inexcusable pilot error...
[quote=Boeing747_600
(Reply 111):
Yes.


With that point of view, what would be the purpose for finding out the further details, in your view?

Then you also said:

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 123):
Thank you for finally accepting that the source of this accident was due to a human error - the humans in this case being the pilots.

Is safety not interested in finding out why the error was made? IF it turns out that in the end, they had been overwhelmed by it, and that the info they received and processed caused them to "shut down" or cease to be able to comprehend the situation and rectify it, and that in the eyes of the professional aviation world that the crew DID have a perfectly reasonable excuse for the error, would you still say it's an inexcusable error? So is it inexcusable to be human all the time?

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
However, I'm not willing to absolve them of responsability either.

Me neither. We need to know the "why" beforehand... rather than just say it's inexcusable and taint them... dead men can't talk...

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
This is one of those sad cases where a mistake cost lives. It's not a nice fact, but it's also reality. For the record I also agree with you that we have to figure out why they missed it, and what mistakes were made that can be trained to avoid in the future, but I *think* what is causing a lot of animosity on these threads is that there are some posters (not necessarily yourself) who refuse to accept any accountability or responsibility for the flight crew in this incident.

I guess it goes both ways, as there appear to be some posters who seem to refuse to accept that the crew made an error that was not foreseeable in its severity... Perhaps I'm just too adamant to impose my view that as it stands at the moment, it could go either way...

The crew is accountable for their actions... if they made mistakes, then it should be traced to the "why", and then determine whether their accountability stops at them, or goes beyond them (which doesn't necessarily absolve them).

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
If we could all agree (and I think anyone looking logically at the reported information so far *should* come to this conclusion) that the crew did have the opportunity at several points in time to save the flight and failed to act appropriately then we can move onto *why* they failed to react appropriately.

I thought that has been reasonably established...

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
My guess is the cockpit was busy with a pop quiz like environment with the captain and observing member of the flight crew distracting the F/O on final. I'd bet any amount of money there was *far* too much chatter in the cockpit during the last minute of the flight and that at the end of the day will be the 'real' mistake that was made. Still on the crew either way though sadly.

Am glad someone thought of this. This is something we need to find out before coming to the conclusion, as if that is the case, the implications on training or at least some training methods need to be looked at and rectified. This is why I'm interested, as there are some training regimes in some airlines that use this "pop quiz" in critical phases...

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-15 14:20:50 and read 11041 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 114):
They were by all indications comfortable with the A/T's programmed instructions to do so based on the prevailing logic. That's not the same as intentionally decreasing airspeed to get to Vref.

Well, you're always intentionally decreasing airspeed to get to Vref. But yes, the A/T probably seemed to be doing its job properly for some of those 100 seconds. Obviously, it wasn't.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 114):
So what?!?! Its OK to take your eyes off the airspeed indicator for over a period of 10 seconds on final?!?! Seriously, anyone comfortable with this sort of perverse "logic" should NEVER be allowed near the controls of any airplane, be it a Cessna 150 or an Airbus 380.

I'm not saying it is. What I'd like to know is both why they missed it, and if so, what else they were doing. It's tempting to put this all on the FO, but I'm going to try not to do that if I can.

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 123):
Thank you for finally accepting that the source of this accident was due to a human error - the humans in this case being the pilots.

The "source" was a faulty LH RA, as without it, the pilot error wouldn't have happened in the first place. However, it seems likely the "causal factor" will be pilot error, with the LH RA a "contributing factor".

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-15 15:07:27 and read 10979 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 125):

I thought that has been reasonably established...

You wouldn't know it during these threads. There are still those that insist the accident was solely due to the RA and that the pilots were heroes for not getting more folks killed, or some line of thinking that leads to 'the pilots aren't to fault at all'. Those posts are what have backs up so much on both sides of these threads.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 125):
This is something we need to find out before coming to the conclusion, as if that is the case, the implications on training or at least some training methods need to be looked at and rectified. This is why I'm interested, as there are some training regimes in some airlines that use this "pop quiz" in critical phases...

I thought it was pretty simple.. Sterile cockpit while not at cruise. I would bet large sums of money this wasn't observed.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-15 15:10:34 and read 10981 times.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 127):
I thought it was pretty simple.. Sterile cockpit while not at cruise. I would bet large sums of money this wasn't observed.

How does sterile cockpit impact any flights conducted for training purposes?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-15 15:39:27 and read 10939 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 123):
They had 100 seconds after the RA failed



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
The RA failing



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
the RA failure contributed



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
The RA malfunctioned

Well, I tought there was an evident difference in the two concepts "a valid reading of minus eight feet" and "a red flag stating the instrument is inoperative" but now I think I was wrong. They are perfectly the same thing, in your reading, and the fact that the latter would have been (hopefully) disconnected the AT not pushing back the levers to idle to keep the ariplane at the indicated airspeed, is a minor detail which you carefully avoided to take in consideration.

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
and was *noticed* at 1950ft



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
Both the pilot and copilot were awake and capable through the entire incident

Those last lines looks like your merely opinions, not facts, since I'll assume you didn't read the cvr transcript yet, nothing in the atc transcript indicated that, and you even weren't in the cockpit, or were you ?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-15 15:46:22 and read 10929 times.



Quoting JFernandez (Reply 128):
How does sterile cockpit impact any flights conducted for training purposes?

It *should* mean that training stops and work starts utside of that phase of flight. Training for the approach phase of flight should be *well* over and done with by the time you leave the sim. *minor* corrections are one thing but the training should never be such that it distracts from the flying. That's just assinine ("Ya, so ignore the plane and let's chat a bit..... yes I know we're on final, don't worry about it.... what?.... the ground?nah don't worry.... ") (note I'm not saying that is remotely what was said, it's just an attempt at a humorous example)

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-15 16:07:14 and read 10904 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 129):
Those last lines looks like your merely opinions, not facts, since I'll assume you didn't read the cvr transcript yet, nothing in the atc transcript indicated that, and you even weren't in the cockpit, or were you ?

Max: Unlke you, I don't post opinion as fact. Both were reported in this thread during a briefing by the investigators. Had you bothered to read first and spout off second I might not have to point this out to you.

You're also welcome to read:

http://www.bangaloreaviation.com/200...kish-airlines-amsterdam-crash.html

Quote:
Distracted pilots
In the right seat the co-pilot was receiving training in making a landing by automatic pilot. The investigators say that too much time was spent exchanging information between the instructor and the trainee, and not enough was spent checking the actual readings which would have alerted the crew to the problem in time to override the automatic pilot.



Ofcourse if you don't like that try:

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...rten/Persverklaring_4_maart_GB.pdf

Also:

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/un...urkish-airlines-crash-evidenc.html

There was also a briefing that was posted in one of these threads:

http://www.airliners.net/aviation-fo...eneral_aviation/read.main/4338748/ reply 4:

Quote:

* CVR: crew saw altimeter discrepancy;
* Crew did not see this discrepancy as problem, and lowered gear as gear warning was activated due to -8 ft radio alt;
* As a result, autothrottle went into retard mode at 1950 ft rather than 50 ft due to faulty radio altimeter read out;
* Aircraft slowed to stall speed;
* Aircraft flight controls [autothrottles] thought airplane was above runway and went into "flare mode";

* At 450 ft stall warning /stick shaher activated;
* power was increased immediately [!] [TOGA?], but power increase was too late to continue flight;


You have no excuse for your attitude as you have no excuse to be ignorant of the above information. I didn't need to be in the cockpit to have read up on what I post about.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-15 16:16:02 and read 10885 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 129):
Well, I tought there was an evident difference in the two concepts "a valid reading of minus eight feet" and "a red flag stating the instrument is inoperative" but now I think I was wrong. They are perfectly the same thing, in your reading, and the fact that the latter would have been (hopefully) disconnected the AT not pushing back the levers to idle to keep the ariplane at the indicated airspeed, is a minor detail which you carefully avoided to take in consideration.

If you want to get caught up in symantics then fine, you can have at. I won't debate casual language used on a website to discuss an issue. We all know that the RA was 'functioning' and giving and incorrect reading. This is a distinctly different state from failed (no reading). We also know that this is a relatively common problem due to the sensitivity to water. I'm not going to debate the choice of words used with you as it has *nothing* to do with the point you are trying so desparately to prove (even though I'm not even sure what that point would be as you seem intent on picking fights and focusing on minutia while you miss the bigger point).

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-15 16:28:44 and read 10876 times.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 130):
It *should* mean that training stops and work starts utside of that phase of flight. Training for the approach phase of flight should be *well* over and done with by the time you leave the sim. *minor* corrections are one thing but the training should never be such that it distracts from the flying. That's just assinine ("Ya, so ignore the plane and let's chat a bit..... yes I know we're on final, don't worry about it.... what?.... the ground?nah don't worry.... ") (note I'm not saying that is remotely what was said, it's just an attempt at a humorous example)

Right. I remember reading something (though I can't find it in the report you linked above) that there was a higher amount of coaching than usual. This was probably a contributing factor, though it would be interesting to hear why there was so much coaching.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-15 21:12:10 and read 10662 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 125):
Is safety not interested in finding out why the error was made?

I already said that I have no problem with that aspect of the investigation. I dont know what point you're trying to make here!

Quoting JFernandez (Reply 126):
The "source" was a faulty LH RA, as without it, the pilot error wouldn't have happened in the first place. However, it seems likely the "causal factor" will be pilot error, with the LH RA a "contributing factor".

Thanks. I mean to say cause instead of source.

I firmly believe that the cause of this accident was pilot error. I have absolutely no problem with a deep and thorough investigation into what it was that left them so distracted that they couldnt follow procedures. But nothing (repeat NOTHING) they find in terms of what caused the pilots to make their errors will absolve them of any blame for the accident. To believe otherewise is of course one's prerogative. I'm done arguing this point. Cheers!

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-15 23:22:32 and read 10587 times.



Quote:
Distracted pilots
In the right seat the co-pilot was receiving training in making a landing by automatic pilot. The investigators say that too much time was spent exchanging information between the instructor and the trainee, and not enough was spent checking the actual readings which would have alerted the crew to the problem in time to override the automatic pilot.

Thick fog and low cloud may also have played a part in their failure to realise their actual height.

I find that very interesting, but, it refered to the preliminary report which it said was:
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...rten/Persverklaring_4_maart_GB.pdf

However, reading through that pdf document (which i dunno if it was the actual preliminary findings document or not)... there is absolutely no reference to distractions in the flight deck...

However, I find this interesting:

Quote:
There was an extra first officer in the center of the cockpit

Hearing that I'm saying WHAT? Another first officer or another first officer under training?

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 130):
That's just assinine ("Ya, so ignore the plane and let's chat a bit..... yes I know we're on final, don't worry about it.... what?.... the ground?nah don't worry.... ") (note I'm not saying that is remotely what was said, it's just an attempt at a humorous example)

Sometimes that's needed to make the point be understood...

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 134):
I already said that I have no problem with that aspect of the investigation. I dont know what point you're trying to make here!

Blame first and find out why they made the error later?

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 134):
I have absolutely no problem with a deep and thorough investigation into what it was that left them so distracted that they couldnt follow procedures.

Am not arguing to absolve the crew, but dead men can't talk, I'd rather find out the reasons prior to damning a dead person. Now finding out the reasons why they got distracted does not in any way mean that the crew must be absolved of what they did!

Anyway, all that aside, I do wonder about There was an extra first officer in the center of the cockpit... what was that first officer doing there? Is he under training? If so, is the idea of putting 2 people under training in the flight deck wise on a revenue flight? If he was there to train the right hand seater, is such an idea wise? I mean where I am, anyone training/supervising a any flight crew member on duty (apart from the pilots themselves), need to be an instructor in possession of a command rating.

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 130):
It *should* mean that training stops and work starts utside of that phase of flight.

Not saying that this is what happened or not here but... If carriers still want to do that "pop quiz" or "stress quiz" on approach, as ridiculous as it sounds (coz I don't agree to that method), the least they should do is to slap on a limitation that such quizzes aren't to be done anywhere below VMC! If there are companies that do this method and does it in IMC, I'd sleep easier if their operating licenses are revoked... "verbal assistance" in monitoring one's approach is one thing, but any further than that is asking for trouble, coz then the question is... who's flying the plane?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: JFernandez
Posted 2009-03-16 00:19:15 and read 10536 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
Anyway, all that aside, I do wonder about There was an extra first officer in the center of the cockpit... what was that first officer doing there? Is he under training? If so, is the idea of putting 2 people under training in the flight deck wise on a revenue flight? If he was there to train the right hand seater, is such an idea wise? I mean where I am, anyone training/supervising a any flight crew member on duty (apart from the pilots themselves), need to be an instructor in possession of a command rating.

The FO in the 3rd seat was the "Regular" FO, and not at the controls. This person was a regular FO on the A/C.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
coz then the question is... who's flying the plane?

The FO in training was flying the plane, apparently, until 6 seconds after stick shaker, with the Captain took over.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Rheinwaldner
Posted 2009-03-16 01:20:15 and read 10482 times.



Quoting JFernandez (Reply 46):
What I *don't* know is whether or not this was something not known to everyone in the cabin, or if it was not known just to the "rookie" FO.

All indications are that not many of all the 737 pilots were aware about that fact before the crash.

Quoting MD11Engineer (Reply 77):
Quoting Spitfire (Reply 26):
" landing gear must go down "

(that's written in the Dutch Safety Board Report, as a transcription of the Voice Recorder)

The EGPWS warning would be "Too low Landing gear"

They knew that the R/A failed. Thus this warning was perfectly plausible. The link to the source was evident. Thus it did not help at all to detect the additional impact on the A/T but it rather masked it.

Quoting Spitfire (Reply 80):
But this does not change something to the fact that there was a "strange" warning around 2000 feet.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 88):
Quoting Spitfire (Reply 80):

But this does not change something to the fact that there was a "strange" warning around 2000 feet.

That to me was the single biggest indication they had of something amiss. Someone should have asked themselves 'why is the plane calling for gear at 1,950'.

As I said above. The warning was plausible. It can be dismissed as indication which helps to find out about the A/T anomaly.

Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 112):
and the most important one; nobody was monitoring the flight instruments for the last 2 minutes of the flight.

Only for a fraction of that time a clear indication of the screwed A/T mode became obvious (the very evident indication would be: speedtape, later stick shaker).

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 131):
Ofcourse if you don't like that try:

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...B.pdf

It does also state:
The Board’s investigation will now focus fully on the workings of the radio altimeters and the
connection to the automatic throttle (automatic steering system).

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-16 04:34:03 and read 10231 times.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 131):

* CVR: crew saw altimeter discrepancy;
* Crew did not see this discrepancy as problem, and lowered gear as gear warning was activated due to -8 ft radio alt;
* As a result, autothrottle went into retard mode at 1950 ft rather than 50 ft due to faulty radio altimeter read out;
* Aircraft slowed to stall speed;
* Aircraft flight controls [autothrottles] thought airplane was above runway and went into "flare mode";

* At 450 ft stall warning /stick shaher activated;
* power was increased immediately [!] [TOGA?], but power increase was too late to continue flight;

If that's your source, that doesn't seems to me it lists "pilots were distracted" as you sustain.

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 131):
You have no excuse for your attitude as you have no excuse to be ignorant of the above information.

Ignoring the fact that no official source reported anything even close to distractions in the cockpit doesn't looks like helping a lot.

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 131):
I didn't need to be in the cockpit to have read up on what I post about.

Fine, what do you base your knowledge on then ? facts or opinions ?

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 132):
We all know that the RA was 'functioning' and giving and incorrect reading. This is a distinctly different state from failed (no reading).

Strange, you talked so much of RA failure in your previous post.

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 132):
I'm not going to debate the choice of words used with you as it has *nothing* to do with the point you are trying so desparately to prove

You might debate of choice of words and it's a bit of bandwidth. For the AT in the crashlanded airplane, that wasn't matter of a choice of words, that was matter of how the AT operated consequently.

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 131):

Ofcourse if you don't like that try:

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...B.pdf



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
However, reading through that pdf document (which i dunno if it was the actual preliminary findings document or not)... there is absolutely no reference to distractions in the flight deck...

Now that somebody else too said that too, do you trust me more ?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-16 06:20:47 and read 10059 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
However, reading through that pdf document (which i dunno if it was the actual preliminary findings document or not)... there is absolutely no reference to distractions in the flight deck...

The article was a combination of reported things from the press briefing and the written report. Much more clarification was given in the media briefing. That's why the two need to be taken together, it provides more insight into what happened.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
Hearing that I'm saying WHAT? Another first officer or another first officer under training?

I believe the other 'FO' was 'supervising' the new FO who was PF. I'm still a bit fuzzy on everyone's official duties in the cockpit myself.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 137):
It does also state:
The Board’s investigation will now focus fully on the workings of the radio altimeters and the
connection to the automatic throttle (automatic steering system).

Yes it does. It wouldn't be much of an investigation if they didn't; "Oh, well, the pilots blew that one, investigation closed".

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 138):
If that's your source, that doesn't seems to me it lists "pilots were distracted" as you sustain.

Max: The plane crashed. That's my source for the pilots being distracted. You're the one who is claiming they couldn't do anything about the situation. The burden of proof is on you to backup what you're saying. Stop changing your argument around to attempt to confuse the issue.

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 129):
Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
and was *noticed* at 1950ft



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 124):
Both the pilot and copilot were awake and capable through the entire incident

Those last lines looks like your merely opinions, not facts, since I'll assume you didn't read the cvr transcript yet, nothing in the atc transcript indicated that, and you even weren't in the cockpit, or were you ?

That was my response. Please response to my argument and don't make a new one up for me.

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 138):
Now that somebody else too said that too, do you trust me more ?

It's not about 'trusting' you. See above. Numerous sources highlight distraction in the cockpit. The official 'preliminary' report is *very* brief as it needs to be for legal reasons.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-16 06:56:49 and read 9991 times.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 139):

Max: The plane crashed. That's my source for the pilots being distracted.

Looks as valid as mine (in your words) that it crashed because it took off.

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 139):
Numerous sources highlight distraction in the cockpit.

Numerous sources weren't in the cockpit, neither read the cvr transcript, as long as we know.

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 139):
The official 'preliminary' report is *very* brief as it needs to be for legal reasons.

Assuming the preliminary report appears evidently coming from a mere dump of the FDR data, looks reasonable that the CVR data will take more time to be processed, what's the legal reason in this ?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-16 07:08:27 and read 9955 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
Anyway, all that aside, I do wonder about There was an extra first officer in the center of the cockpit... what was that first officer doing there? Is he under training? If so, is the idea of putting 2 people under training in the flight deck wise on a revenue flight? If he was there to train the right hand seater, is such an idea wise? I mean where I am, anyone training/supervising a any flight crew member on duty (apart from the pilots themselves), need to be an instructor in possession of a command rating.

Hi, I guess you don't have the time to read the other 9 parts of the thread ( is understandable  Big grin ). The answers to your questions :
There were three crew members in the cockpit :
1.- The Captain, who was a type instructor for TK. ( Obviously he had the command rating ).
2.- The rookie F/O, who was the PF at the moment of the RA issue. All indicates he was making the approach under the supervision of the Captain.
3.- The "regular" F/O, who was in the jumpseat.

Saludos.
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-16 07:11:57 and read 9958 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 140):
Assuming the preliminary report appears evidently coming from a mere dump of the FDR data, looks reasonable that the CVR data will take more time to be processed, what's the legal reason in this ?

Max: If I'm not mistaken there is a higher chance of criminal charges in the EU court system. I remember this being discussed with the XL crash. Incidentally, I'm still waiting for you to provide something to back up your assumptions. I have provided you with a host of links and google will provide literally hundreds more.

As for:

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 140):
Numerous sources weren't in the cockpit, neither read the cvr transcript, as long as we know.

Those sources have spoken to people who have heard the CVR. If you want to disregard published reports based on interviews/discussions with the investigators, you are free to, but please don't pretend it's all made up. Furthermore there is even *less* evidence the pilots were in any way, shape or form incapable or prevented from doing their duties as you asserted earlier in this thread. After all you said:

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 106):
I don't think, as now, nobody can confirm or exclude the crew were totally incapacitated. This could still be one hell of a valid reason.

So I challenge you to provide the same level of 'proof' you are demanding from other people to back your assertions. Until such time I won't bother replying to your posts because it's becoming pretty evident you would rather have a pissing match than a discussion.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-16 08:47:29 and read 9764 times.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 142):

Max: If I'm not mistaken there is a higher chance of criminal charges in the EU court system.

Fine, and how could this be the legal reason to don't diffuse the CVR yet, in your vision ?

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 142):
Incidentally, I'm still waiting for you to provide something to back up your assumptions.

You said pilots were distracted and I replied nothing tells such. You replied with an extract from the preliminary report to confirm that and it wasn't told there. I understand you might be upset now, but please note my only assumption is been that, as now, nothing can confirm or exclude the pilots were incapacitated, what is not clear for you in the words "nothing can confirm or exclude" ?

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 142):
I have provided you with a host of links and google will provide literally hundreds more.

Oh, I am very sure. Unfortunately, that doesn't proof anything, if that was your aim.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Theredbaron
Posted 2009-03-16 09:24:43 and read 9725 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 143):


Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 142):

Max: If I'm not mistaken there is a higher chance of criminal charges in the EU court system.

Fine, and how could this be the legal reason to don't diffuse the CVR yet, in your vision ?

The CVR must be crucial in the investigation, and Boy if you are asking or wondering the LEGAL implications of the results of an airline accident, let me say to you that you really need to use google my friend.

Best Regards
TRB

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Osiris30
Posted 2009-03-16 09:41:25 and read 9700 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 144):
The CVR must be crucial in the investigation, and Boy if you are asking or wondering the LEGAL implications of the results of an airline accident, let me say to you that you really need to use google my friend.

Thank God someone other myself gets it, I was begining to wonder if I had gone mad.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
Not saying that this is what happened or not here but... If carriers still want to do that "pop quiz" or "stress quiz" on approach, as ridiculous as it sounds (coz I don't agree to that method), the least they should do is to slap on a limitation that such quizzes aren't to be done anywhere below VMC! If there are companies that do this method and does it in IMC, I'd sleep easier if their operating licenses are revoked... "verbal assistance" in monitoring one's approach is one thing, but any further than that is asking for trouble, coz then the question is... who's flying the plane?

Mandala: Sorry I missed this in my earlier reply. For what it's worth I'm fully in agreement with you. The focus should be on flying the plane on approach and departure. Both are periods of high pilot workload, high radio comm workload and generally the times when focus is most required by the flight crew.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-16 11:52:59 and read 9517 times.



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 144):

The CVR must be crucial in the investigation, and Boy if you are asking or wondering the LEGAL implications of the results of an airline accident, let me say to you that you really need to use google my friend.

For the record, I didn't say that.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Theredbaron
Posted 2009-03-16 13:20:44 and read 9402 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 143):
Fine, and how could this be the legal reason to don't diffuse the CVR yet, in your vision ?

Answer..Yes, even the wording of the report has $$$ implications.

Dang Lawyers.

Best Regards
TRB

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-16 13:54:34 and read 9353 times.



Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 139):
Yes it does. It wouldn't be much of an investigation if they didn't; "Oh, well, the pilots blew that one, investigation closed".

Oh well, some already concluded further investigation won't be much more than that...

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 72):

So, I guess you've concluded this is an inexcusable pilot error...

Quoting Boeing747_600,reply=111:

Yes.


Hence...

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 72):
so let's stop the investigation... Someone has made the adequate conclusion.

 Smile Smile Smile

Anyways, back to Biz...

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 139):
I believe the other 'FO' was 'supervising' the new FO who was PF. I'm still a bit fuzzy on everyone's official duties in the cockpit myself.

Is this company policy of having another f/o supervising the new f/o ? Dunno if it's normal elsewhere but not normal here...

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 143):
You said pilots were distracted and I replied nothing tells such. You replied with an extract from the preliminary report to confirm that and it wasn't told there.

If you bothered to read the parts where the reply wasn't directed at you, perhaps you would have seen this:

Quoting Osiris30 (Reply 139):
The article was a combination of reported things from the press briefing and the written report. Much more clarification was given in the media briefing. That's why the two need to be taken together, it provides more insight into what happened.

Although for me that's not satisfactory in terms of wanting to see whether the investigators said that or not (since it wasn't in the prelim findings), it's good enough to see what's his viewpoint and where he's coming from... it's a discussion after all  Smile

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 143):
I understand you might be upset now, but please note my only assumption is been that, as now, nothing can confirm or exclude the pilots were incapacitated, what is not clear for you in the words "nothing can confirm or exclude" ?

All he said was that he's willing to bet on cockpit distraction. But as to the pop quiz and all, am not seeing that anywhere apart from the article from one of the links posted. I believe although me and Osiris30 differ in the opinions, at least both of us are curious on answering the same questions as yours... What did incapacitate them from not being able to fulfill their first and foremost duty, FLY THE PLANE... was it distraction? Comms? Checklist? Quizzes???? or was there something else... like confusion for the F/O in seeing "RETARD" and not wondering what's going on since he knows he's not on the ground yet while the Capt was looking at "what the? -8? Retard?"...

Situational awareness doesn't depend on what's happening at the time, but also the after effects of what happened beforehand leading up to the "moment"... whether they caused it themselves, or not...

For the F/O PF a possible "never had 250kts onto an ILS this close and this high" stress, added with the Captain worrying about the F/O and the RA at the same time and instead of assisting, he did double work by performing a do before read the checklist while the F/O PF was doing the same while flying and monitoring... and well the F/O Obs, may have had his mind on the F/O instead of looking at telltale signs of impending doom (falling airspeed, which he may or may not have realized)... the F/O PF with the high subtle stress being distracted by comms? checklist? chat from the F/O Obs... and then... shaker... what the? Having the CVR would definitely answer some of our looming questions...

For myself, under stress, I've lost the "sense of deceleration" before... overloaded by monitoring a hot and high approach on a no-go around situation in an emergency after a near miss with another aircraft (yeah, double whammy... triple actually, emergency onto near miss onto "get me out of here" landing)... where both me and the pilot flying were literally saturated with our own tasks... literally blanking out stuff from our ears on what we don't want to hear... It was amazing to find out what we did wrong from the person sitting behind us, and what lucky saves we had... (otherwise I might not be alive today!)

That probably explains why I keep saying "if it's pilot error, WHY did they make or let themselves make the error"... When I do the error, I ask myself 3 questions... Did I make the error? Was I doing something wrong that caused me make the error? Did I allow complacency beforehand to lead to one or both of the other 2?... Sometimes the answer is very humbling! I remind myself this whenever I'm in a discussion on an accident by pilot error, so that I don't fall to the "armchair syndrome"...

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Boeing747_600
Posted 2009-03-16 15:09:34 and read 9264 times.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
Blame first and find out why they made the error later?

Your point would have made a modicum of sense if I had decided in the complete absence of facts or evidence, to assign blame to the pilots and then wait for an investigation to support my conclusion. This is far from the case here, unless you're in a state of denial. So sadly, your statement about my intentions is plain nonsense.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 135):
... Now finding out the reasons why they got distracted does not in any way mean that the crew must be absolved of what they did!

Which is precisely what I said! Go back and read my exact statement to this effect!!
I said the pilot error was the cause of this accident and that an investigation should also reveal what scenarios precipitated and exacerbated their errors, despite the fact that said scenarios would not absolve them of the responsibility for the accident.

You yourself said that "HUMANS MAKE ERRORS" (all caps yours btw   ) and that you wanted an investigation to find out what made them commit the error. By which you are ipso facto accepting the fact that the pilots were responsible for the crash!!! But yet, you seem to want to make a monumental distinction between your softer statement and my no-bones-about-it statement.

[Edited 2009-03-16 15:11:56]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: YVRLTN
Posted 2009-03-16 22:41:45 and read 8966 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 148):
For the F/O PF a possible "never had 250kts onto an ILS this close and this high" stress, added with the Captain worrying about the F/O and the RA at the same time and instead of assisting, he did double work by performing a do before read the checklist while the F/O PF was doing the same while flying and monitoring... and well the F/O Obs, may have had his mind on the F/O instead of looking at telltale signs of impending doom (falling airspeed, which he may or may not have realized)... the F/O PF with the high subtle stress being distracted by comms? checklist? chat from the F/O Obs... and then... shaker... what the? Having the CVR would definitely answer some of our looming questions...

But there were three pairs of eyes in that cockpit. Two pairs of experienced eyes. And no one saw the 'tell tale signs of impending doom' you mention until way too late. Surely if youre training someone, youre all the more vigiliant to make sure nothing is going wrong and triple checking more than usual????

Quoting YVRLTN (Reply 64):
Quoting BuyantUkhaa (Reply 63):
it seems TOGA was selected after the 6-second spool down. Too late

A simple question. Is it SOP with most (all?) airlines to press TOGA as soon as stick shaker activates? (And figure out why it activated later when in a hold pattern?)

Can someone please answer this question for me??

As far as I can tell as a simple spotter, 3 persons made errors by:
1) Not doing anything about gear wanting to come down at 1950' knowing the LH RA was malfunctioning and proceeding when the book says fly manually in this situation
2) Advancing throttles manually (and then letting go......) instead of pressing TOGA
3) No one noticed the airspeed

Unless you had a Helios type situation which maybe some here are alluding to (which I dont think there was based on an earlier post with some leaked transcript of them speaking until the last moments) there should have been no reason whatsoever for them to have gotten into this situation. If the pilots should not have been in this situation, what is it other than pilot error? Im an experienced freight forwarder. I think I know my job inside out. I occasionally forget something, due to a distracting phone call or stress, or wanting to get to the bar to watch the game. Often I get away with it. Sometimes I cause a delay or cost the company some money through my mistake. It happens to the most seasoned professionals. Just that fortunately my mistakes dont normally hold the destinies of 150 lives.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-17 02:53:49 and read 8926 times.



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 149):
I said the pilot error was the cause of this accident and that an investigation should also reveal what scenarios precipitated and exacerbated their errors, despite the fact that said scenarios would not absolve them of the responsibility for the accident.

Ahaaaa! Now I see it... thanks for that...  Smile Seemingly monumental difference but in fact, rather thin difference... apologies for being a total *yeah, pick the suitable word for it*

Quoting YVRLTN (Reply 150):
But there were three pairs of eyes in that cockpit. Two pairs of experienced eyes. And no one saw the 'tell tale signs of impending doom' you mention until way too late. Surely if youre training someone, youre all the more vigiliant to make sure nothing is going wrong and triple checking more than usual????

This is what's baffling... What went wrong that made 3 pairs not see it?
By the way, is it normal to see a first officer as the 3rd pair in a cockpit with an F/O in line training?

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-17 04:21:15 and read 8817 times.



Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 148):
Is this company policy of having another f/o supervising the new f/o ? Dunno if it's normal elsewhere but not normal here...

The crew of two was composed by the cpt and the jumpseat fo. The trainee fo was at the rightseat. The "regular crew" fo was in the jumpseat. This happens to this crew member even if there's a cpt on revenue training flight (sitting on left, while the regular (and instr.) cpt sits on the right) the fo will jumpseat.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 148):
I believe although me and Osiris30 differ in the opinions, at least both of us are curious on answering the same questions as yours... What did incapacitate them from not being able to fulfill their first and foremost duty, FLY THE PLANE... was it distraction? Comms? Checklist? Quizzes???? or was there something else... like confusion for the F/O in seeing "RETARD" and not wondering what's going on since he knows he's not on the ground yet while the Capt was looking at "what the? -8? Retard?"...

I barely bet on the distraction hypothesis. I guess they have been trapped in too many causes happening togheter, but the cvr will tell it all. Usually in this kind of mess everyone should take care of one part, maybe they haven't been that fast. Considering the low altitude and hurry for the landing, that is way reasonable. Aviate navigate comunicate, they didn't even aviate.

Quoting YVRLTN (Reply 150):
3) No one noticed the airspeed

This doesn't match with the fact the throttle levers have been pushed forward in the beginning of the airspeed drop.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: BuyantUkhaa
Posted 2009-03-17 05:09:28 and read 8734 times.

Many pictures here of the wreckage being transported to the hangar area of AMS:

http://frontpage.fok.nl/review/9209/...ge%5D-Wrakstukken-op-Schiphol.html

http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/3...oestel_onderweg_naar_opslag__.html

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Rheinwaldner
Posted 2009-03-17 05:33:21 and read 8686 times.



Quoting YVRLTN (Reply 150):
1) Not doing anything about gear wanting to come down at 1950' knowing the LH RA was malfunctioning and proceeding when the book says fly manually in this situation

Because it can be explained perfectly by the defective RA. The RA delivers by error -8 ft altitude, that fact is noticed and then the "gear down" callout comes. Normal reaction: "ah that's because of the altimeter sending the wrong altitude".
And the MEL is not a book which is consulted at that time (in that phase of the flight). Plus it can not be demanded from all the pilots to recall all the implications that are described in the MEL from memory.

Quoting YVRLTN (Reply 150):
2) Advancing throttles manually (and then letting go......) instead of pressing TOGA

It is a crew error not to terminate the A/T in whatever mode it was. Letting the throttle go could be because both hands were required to push the yoke forward to counter the fully up-trimmed condition. Reclaiming idle thrust by the A/T after manual thrust has been commanded during retard-mode seems to be a flawed system logic. The A/P would disconnect in comparing situations.

Quoting YVRLTN (Reply 150):
3) No one noticed the airspeed

This is a crew error.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-17 07:18:47 and read 8579 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 152):
This doesn't match with the fact the throttle levers have been pushed forward in the beginning of the airspeed drop.

What ?? Are you talking about the same crash ??? Nobody push the throttle levers *in the beginning of the airspeed drop*.... that was after the Stick Shaker, at the END of the airspeed drop.

Saludos,
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-17 07:45:07 and read 8534 times.

Quoting Gonzalo (Reply 155):

What ?? Are you talking about the same crash ??? Nobody push the throttle levers *in the beginning of the airspeed drop*.... that was after the Stick Shaker, at the END of the airspeed drop.

The airspeed drop ended when the airplane crashed, since it kept loosing speed up to 80knots, do you agree ? The levers were pushed before, then not held in position, so they came back and the speed kept decreasing while the airplane was still falling its unrecoverable stall. This puts the moment in which the levers were pushed, before the end of the airspeed drop, which continued after that.

http://www.airliners.net/aviation-fo..._aviation/read.main/4332762/1/#106

[Edited 2009-03-17 07:51:55]

You can see by yourself that in the first graph, speed increased right before 9.24.30 to keep decreasing right after. Where do you see the levers were pushed at the end of the airspeed drop in this case ?

[Edited 2009-03-17 07:57:16]

[Edited 2009-03-17 07:59:08]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2009-03-17 09:58:36 and read 8393 times.



Quoting Max777geek (Reply 156):
The airspeed drop ended when the airplane crashed

Oh !!! Thank you !!!! I didn't realize !!!!  Yeah sure

Do you really read YOUR post Max ?

My clarification was about the fact that your statement looks like some member of the crew pushed the throttles forward at some point between Vref and the point of activation of the stick shaker ( we all know such thing never happened ). It's pretty clear that they reacted pushing the throttles AFTER the stick shaker. Your post saying they reacted "at the beginning of the airspeed drop" can easily confuse the people who weren't capable of reading the previous 1.800 posts .

Saludos.
G.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Mandala499
Posted 2009-03-17 11:41:54 and read 8261 times.

Was the F/O there on the jumpseat on duty as Safety Copilot? (Not sure what U guys call it over there), but if so, then wouldn't it indicate that the F/O flying was on his early days on the line?

Quoting Max777geek (Reply 156):
You can see by yourself that in the first graph, speed increased right before 9.24.30 to keep decreasing right after. Where do you see the levers were pushed at the end of the airspeed drop in this case ?

Max, I went through the data thinking U might have found something... but... was quickly disappointed...
That timestamp 9.24.30 on that graph, the aircraft was at leaving a level flight portion at about 1800 ft altitude and began to chase the glideslope... it left level flight at about 2000m prior to impact, the rate of descent at about 1600m prior to impact was still -704fpm, but at 1300m prior to impact it was -1344fpm... ground speed speed went from 160kts to to 151kts then went up to 160kts again... this took place within 30 secs (from 2 mins to 1m30s prior to impact)...
Summary:
2300m (135secs to impact) 1815ft -64fpm 173.5kts...
2000m (120secs to impact) 1815ft -128fpm 159.0kts
1600m (105secs to impact) 1715ft -704fpm 150.8kts
1300m (90secs to impact) 1390ft -1344fpm 159.2kts
1000m (75secs to impact) 1065ft -1216fpm 147.6kts
725m (60secs to impact) 790ft -896fpm 145.4kts
475m (45secs to impact) 615ft -704fpm 129.1kts
260m (30 secs to impact) 440ft -640fpm 117.2 kts <-*1
100m (15 secs to impact) 265ft -576fpm 86.2kts <-*2
0m (impact) -10ft -4096fpm 83kts
Note: You may want to increase those distances by 300m or so... it's a bit fiddly due to the 15sec time intervals!
*1 = likely point of stick shaker
*2 = likely point of 1st g/a attempt. Unclear whether throttles were moving back to idle or not at this time, but they would have been in the stall anyways... *sigh*

The A/T appeared to work nicely up to 120secs to impact, there were instances of speed decrease and increase during the level flight... A/T is likely to have targeted 250Kts at 6 mins prior to impact... the next selection appears to have been 210kts to which the A/T responded correctly, it was only at 150secs to impact did the a/t retarded the throttles, possibly due to selection of lower speed, and the aircraft was at the intercept to final where GND track shows roughly 200deg until 120secs before impact, while speed began to reduce at 135 secs prior to impact... it is very likely that Speed selection was put to approach target speed at this time... and the speed fell through what's normal within 90secs... from 60 secs to impact the aircraft may have been trimming up to catch up with speed loss and chasing glideslope for at least 15 secs... after that, well, the data resolution in terms of timestamp isn't good enough!

Seems that until 45 secs to impact, they wouldn't have noticed that anything was wrong... 15 secs to stick shaker... and then another 15secs to the stall...
*sigh*

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-17 13:51:14 and read 8091 times.



Quoting Gonzalo (Reply 157):
Your post saying they reacted "at the beginning of the airspeed drop" can easily confuse the people who weren't capable of reading the previous 1.800 posts .

My post was about the graph I did quote, in which looks evident where the levers have been push forward and then released. This assumes that the equations : levers forward = speed increment, and levers idle = speed decrement are both true. There's a remote chance this can be denied by a further better detailed report. (i.e. compressor stall due to a not achieved trust request etc)

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 158):
Was the F/O there on the jumpseat on duty as Safety Copilot? (Not sure what U guys call it over there), but if so, then wouldn't it indicate that the F/O flying was on his early days on the line?

Im not sure there is a name for the "jumpseat FO" (as I stated in a previous post) neither Im sure he has some kind of duty with regards to the ongoing training. As long as I saw (to be taken with the famous grain of salt) the trainee sits at the commands, in this case the flying FO, yes, as you say, but nothing would indicate in any way that he was at "first days on the line", I guess he had completed his training as theory, in the simulator, several (possibly revenue) flights on the jumpseat, and I hope his first real flights at the commands weren't on revenue flights. I heard (second grain of salt) there are in place training programs that jumps from the simulator to revenue flights, but I didn't read this from anybody directly involved. If Im not wrong that was called in the article"zero flight time" : few hundreds of hours in the simulator and then on a revenue flights like this. I don't remember how serious was the source, but that might still be a complete BS. That wouldn't surprise me. But if you're wondering (if I may share) that the crash happened because the guy was at his first time at the commands, uh, I wouldn't say so.

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 158):
Max, I went through the data thinking U might have found something... but... was quickly disappointed...

Im sorry I based my assumption on the speed increase and decrease slightly after 9.24.30 in the "Speed" graph. Sorry this might have been confusing. But in your following lines I see something that doesn't sound quite right :

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 158):
That timestamp 9.24.30 on that graph, the aircraft was at leaving a level flight portion at about 1800 ft altitude and began to chase the glideslope...

standing to the last valid reading of the faulty RA, shouldn't the AT retard (and the landing gear aural warning) already happened ? Isn't that began at 1950 ?

Quoting Mandala499 (Reply 158):

The A/T appeared to work nicely up to 120secs to impact, there were instances of speed decrease and increase during the level flight... A/T is likely to have targeted 250Kts at 6 mins prior to impact... the next selection appears to have been 210kts to which the A/T responded correctly, it was only at 150secs to impact did the a/t retarded the throttles, possibly due to selection of lower speed, and the aircraft was at the intercept to final where GND track shows roughly 200deg until 120secs before impact, while speed began to reduce at 135 secs prior to impact... it is very likely that Speed selection was put to approach target speed at this time... and the speed fell through what's normal within 90secs... from 60 secs to impact the aircraft may have been trimming up to catch up with speed loss and chasing glideslope for at least 15 secs... after that, well, the data resolution in terms of timestamp isn't good enough!

By your very detailed summary and your analisys it seems you gave a pretty good report to what happened. By your words, it seems to me that the crew didn't differ quickly enough beetween the throttle at idle to let speed decrease normally and the fact they were in retard mode until was too late and they were too slow and too low. Training pilot at the command, aural warning for the landing gear, faulty altimeter compromising the AT trust request missing... Sounds like what happened a bit too long at the altitude they were left to recover.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Derik737
Posted 2009-03-17 14:23:58 and read 8050 times.



Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 154):
The A/P would disconnect in comparing situations.

Hmm, after a conversation I had today, I am not so sure anymore about that! I'm going to have to actually do a test I think on an aircraft to verify, but I think we'll hear some logic answers from Boeing in the near future.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Spitfire
Posted 2009-03-18 23:30:39 and read 7437 times.



Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 154):
The A/P would disconnect in comparing situations.

At least drop in CWS (Control Wheel Steering mode) I think.

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Doktor71
Posted 2009-03-21 15:39:16 and read 6697 times.

Does anyone know when new data from the investigation will be available?
I think it shouldn´t take long time for analyzing the CVR, or?

[Edited 2009-03-21 15:39:59]

Topic: RE: TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10
Username: Max777geek
Posted 2009-03-22 04:34:31 and read 6376 times.



Quoting Doktor71 (Reply 162):
I think it shouldn´t take long time for analyzing the CVR, or?

Or.

That's not just the physical time to write it down, and that's not just what they said in the cockpit that you're going to read in the report.


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