Print from Airliners.net discussion forum
http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/read.main/5477452/

Topic: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2012-05-30 07:01:17 and read 7841 times.

The BEA has announced the date for the release of the Final Report on AF 447 : 5th July 2012

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flig...f.447/pressrelease30may2012.en.php


Let's see how different is this compared with the Third Interim report, I guess the majority of the findings are already there.

Rgds.
G.

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: dirtyfrankd
Posted 2012-05-30 14:53:55 and read 7468 times.

Quoting Gonzalo (Thread starter):
The BEA has announced the date for the release of the Final Report on AF 447 : 5th July 2012

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flig...f.447/pressrelease30may2012.en.php


Let's see how different is this compared with the Third Interim report, I guess the majority of the findings are already there.

Rgds.
G.

Great to hear, I will eagerly be awaiting the final report, though I suspect not much will change from what we already know. On a side note, have the entire CVR and CDR transcripts been made public yet other than what was leaked to the press and has already been shared in various articles?

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: Independence76
Posted 2012-05-30 16:29:52 and read 7327 times.

Been waiting for 3 years to hear this. Glad to see answers inching closer and closer.

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: canoecarrier
Posted 2012-05-31 12:10:12 and read 6979 times.

Quoting Gonzalo (Thread starter):
The BEA has announced the date for the release of the Final Report on AF 447 : 5th July 2012

Good catch. I just looked today if they had announced a release date on the BEA website.

Quoting dirtyfrankd (Reply 1):
On a side note, have the entire CVR and CDR transcripts been made public yet other than what was leaked to the press and has already been shared in various articles?

The 3rd Interim Report released in late July of last year had a significant amount of information from the DFDR you can find that information here:

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf

No full transcript of the DCVR was released, only summary portions of the final minutes of the flight. It has been widely discussed here whether or not it would be valuable to include this information.

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: dougbr2006
Posted 2012-06-02 09:23:13 and read 6605 times.

According to Brazilian press the Brazilian authorities have already received the final report of which parts have been quoted in the press as follows.

The Portuguese and then translation in paragraphs.

Os pilotos do voo AF 447 não compreenderam a tempo que o avião perdeu a sustentação após um procedimento equivocado do copiloto mais novo e isso levou à queda do avião, que matou 228 pessoas em 1º de junho de 2009.

The pilots of flight 447 did not understand at the time that the plane had lost its lift after a wrong procedure by the least experienced copilot's and this led to the crash, which killed 228 people on 1 June 2009.

A disposição de informações no painel e o design da cabine da aeronave foram fatores que contribuíram para dificultar que a tripulação identificasse a ação errada do copiloto menos experiente – que estava com os comandos – e também que o avião estava caindo porque perdeu sustentação.

The provision of information on the panel and the design of the cockpit of the aircraft were factors that contributed to hinder the crew identified the incorrect action of the less experienced co-pilot - who was in command - and also that the plane was falling because it had lost lift.

Durante a passagem pela tempestade, a baixa temperatura externa congela os sensores pitot e bloqueia a medição de velocidade. Sem informações corretas, o Airbus sai do piloto-automático.

When passing through the storm, low external temperature froze the pitot sensors and stopped the speed measurement. Without accurate information, the Airbus dropped out of the autopilot.

O copiloto mais novo assume os comandos e, em uma atitude que não se sabe explicar, eleva o bico da aeronave, fazendo o alarme de estol (perda de sustentação) tocar duas vezes.

The least experienced copilot assumed command, and adopted an attitude that cannot be explained, raised the nose of the aircraft, causing the stall alarm (loss of lift) twice.

Com o procedimento de subida, o avião perde ainda mais velocidade e realmente começa a perder sustentação. O alarme de estol toca mais de 70 vezes – algumas delas por quase um minuto ininterrupto.

With a procedure to climb, the plane lost even more speed and really started to lose lift. The stall horn sounded more than 70 times - some for nearly a minute uninterrupted.

O copiloto mais novo, que está nos comandos, mantém sempre esta ação de subida, enquando o corrreto seria jogar o bico do avião para baixo, recuperando velocidade e sustentação e impedindo o acidente.

The youngest copilot, who is in command, kept the climbing action, while the correct action would be top put the nose of the plane down, sustaining and recovering speed and preventing an accident.

Nenhum dos pilotos havia recebido treinamento em caso de perda de sustentação de Airbus em alta altitude e sem informações confiáveis de velocidade. O copiloto mais experiente chega a dar, em alguns momentos, a ordem para que o colega tome a atitude correta, mas não se dá conta da ação equivocada de seu companheiro, e isso foi dificultado pela falta de informações sobre a real situação de estol no painel do Airbus.

None of the pilots had received training in case of loss of lift of the Airbus at high altitude and speed without reliable information. The more experienced co-pilot gave, at times, orders for his colleague to take the right attitude, but is not aware of the incorrect actions of his companion, and this was hampered by a lack of information about the real situation of the stall on the panel of the Airbus

Ao ser chamado pelo copiloto mais experiente, o comandante retorna à cabine cerca de 3 minutos após a queda do piloto automático. Ele não entende o que ocorre e não toma nenhuma atitude. Menos de 1 minuto depois, o Airbus choca-se com a água.

When called upon by the more experienced co-pilot, the captain returns to the cabin about 3 minutes after the disconnect of the autopilot. He does not understand what is happening and does not take any action. Less than 1 minute later, the Airbus collides with water.

Looks like a relatively simple recovery was hampered by lack of training, inexperience of the flight crew and a total lack of communicatiuon between them. All those people that died for these reason is shameful.

God rest there souls and lets hope that the families can get closure after these facts are formally relaesed.

[Edited 2012-06-02 09:26:45]

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2012-06-04 19:11:14 and read 5989 times.

Quoting dougbr2006 (Reply 4):
Looks like a relatively simple recovery was hampered by lack of training, inexperience of the flight crew and a total lack of communicatiuon between them. All those people that died for these reason is shameful.

well, we know that by now. According to that article, Airbus will have to do changes to the information system.

Quote:
The more experienced co-pilot gave, at times, orders for his colleague to take the right attitude, but is not aware of the incorrect actions of his companion, and this was hampered by a lack of information about the real situation of the stall on the panel of the Airbus.
Quote:
The provision of information on the panel and the design of the cockpit of the aircraft were factors that contributed to hinder the crew identified the incorrect action of the less experienced co-pilot - who was in command - and also that the plane was falling because it had lost lift.

What is that going to be?

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: varig md-11
Posted 2012-06-05 00:17:17 and read 5844 times.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 5):
Looks like a relatively simple recovery was hampered by lack of training, inexperience of the flight crew and a total lack of communicatiuon between them. All those people that died for these reason is shameful.

I don't know if the recovery was that simple but what is really shocking is the disorganization in the cockpit with the captain just watching and saying 2-3 words...
Also when you read the "dialogue" extracted from the voice recorder between the 2 pilots, it is a French which is very basic with no precise technical word whatsoever, it sounds like 2 truck drivers saying "do this, do that, turn left, no no, turn right".

To their credit, they were not trained for high altitude stall recovery since it's not supposed to happen: is it going to be covered in training now?

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 5):
What is that going to be?

The joysticks act completely independantly and don't mimic each other contrarily to traditionnal B commands.
Will A redesign the joysticks so that they are motorized and able to mimic each other?

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: Gonzalo
Posted 2012-06-05 04:55:47 and read 5590 times.

Quoting varig md-11 (Reply 6):
To their credit, they were not trained for high altitude stall recovery since it's not supposed to happen: is it going to be covered in training now?

I'm only guessing here, but I think they should cover this scenario in the training process, maybe not in the sim but at least explaining the physics involved in a very detailed way to give to the newer pilots the knowledge about how to deal with something like this. And they should do something about the CRM also.

G.

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: varig md-11
Posted 2012-06-05 05:09:59 and read 5555 times.

Quoting Gonzalo (Reply 7):
but I think they should cover this scenario in the training process, maybe not in the sim but at least explaining the physics involved in a very detailed way to give to the newer pilots the knowledge about how to deal with something like this

I agree with you. Apparently it didn't cross their minds that TOGA power at high altitude is useless since the air is so thin.
I am not casting a stone at them (RIP). Just they weren't explained and trained accordingly.
Maybe an old captain should have known, that's why I am so surprised by the lack of action of the just awakened captain (maybe that's the reason too, confusion after being woken up in a hurry)

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: David L
Posted 2012-06-05 07:13:15 and read 5384 times.

Quoting varig md-11 (Reply 6):
The joysticks act completely independantly and don't mimic each other contrarily to traditionnal B commands.
Will A redesign the joysticks so that they are motorized and able to mimic each other?

I seriously fail to see why. As has been mentioned countless times before, linked yokes didn't help in several previous accidents involving inappropriate control inputs during a stall on other types. There were far more fundamental issues at play on the flight deck of AF447.

All the AF crew needed to do was communicate effectively and follow the correct UAS procedure (yes, 20/20 hindsight from the comfort of my home, I know). When the PNF kept urging the PF to "go down" because he was "going up", he should have been more explicit, e.g. "get the nose down", and he should have said why. Why would he keep telling the PF he was "going up" and needed to "go down" if he had no idea what the PF was doing with the side-stick? Why did he not get the nose down when he briefly took control? The problem was that he didn't know what was happening or what to do about it either.

Quoting varig md-11 (Reply 6):
Also when you read the "dialogue" extracted from the voice recorder between the 2 pilots, it is a French which is very basic with no precise technical word whatsoever, it sounds like 2 truck drivers saying "do this, do that, turn left, no no, turn right".

   That's my "armchair expert" view, as well.

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: CM
Posted 2012-06-05 07:52:53 and read 5298 times.

I talked with a colleague yesterday who has some insight into what is being considered for the final report.

Quoting dougbr2006 (Reply 4):
The provision of information on the panel and the design of the cockpit of the aircraft were factors that contributed

   He said the report absolutely will recommend a new level of decluttering for the displays. He said the information presented was confusing to the crew, given what the airplane "knew". Obviously, this is a recommendation which could affect multiple manufacturers, depending on what the details of the recommendations are.

Quoting varig md-11 (Reply 6):
The joysticks act completely independantly and don't mimic each other

   He also mentioned the report may include recommendations to backdrive sidesticks. Probably not current aircraft, but for future aircraft. He said including this item in the report has been heavily discussed by the BEA, but (like on a.net) there is not consensus on whether this was a contributing factor, or not. Obviously this kind of recommendation will be enormously controversial, and not necessarily solely for technical reasons.

Speculating is interesting, but it will be fascinating to read the final report on the 5th!

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: varig md-11
Posted 2012-06-05 09:49:49 and read 5116 times.

Quoting David L (Reply 9):
I seriously fail to see why. As has been mentioned countless times before, linked yokes didn't help in several previous accidents involving inappropriate control inputs during a stall on other types. There were far more fundamental issues at play on the flight deck of AF447.

I see what you mean but as you explain further, people on the flightdeck didn't communicate precisely enough.
Coordinated sticks could have been an additional help....though the basics would have been to make unequivocal sentences.

Quoting David L (Reply 9):
All the AF crew needed to do was communicate effectively and follow the correct UAS procedure (yes, 20/20 hindsight from the comfort of my home, I know). When the PNF kept urging the PF to "go down" because he was "going up", he should have been more explicit, e.g. "get the nose down", and he should have said why. Why would he keep telling the PF he was "going up" and needed to "go down" if he had no idea what the PF was doing with the side-stick? Why did he not get the nose down when he briefly took control? The problem was that he didn't know what was happening or what to do about it either.

  
I absolutely agree with you. I understood the same as you did and found it tragically appaling.

Quoting CM (Reply 10):
He said the report absolutely will recommend a new level of decluttering for the displays. He said the information presented was confusing to the crew, given what the airplane "knew". Obviously, this is a recommendation which could affect multiple manufacturers, depending on what the details of the recommendations are.

That's an issue indeed. "A" philosophy is that computer is presenting you the data "you need to see".
Right, and when the data presented is corrupted are the crew trained to get over it and find a way? it's not so obvious apparently.

Quoting CM (Reply 10):
He also mentioned the report may include recommendations to backdrive sidesticks. Probably not current aircraft, but for future aircraft. He said including this item in the report has been heavily discussed by the BEA, but (like on a.net) there is not consensus on whether this was a contributing factor, or not. Obviously this kind of recommendation will be enormously controversial, and not necessarily solely for technical reasons.

I regret to say this will probably not be in the report as it would cast a shadow on the entire "A" philosophy about flightdecks and on the entire family of planes using the present system

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: CM
Posted 2012-06-05 10:10:46 and read 5060 times.

Quoting varig md-11 (Reply 11):
I regret to say this will probably not be in the report as it would cast a shadow on the entire "A" philosophy about flightdecks and on the entire family of planes using the present system

I tend to be a bit pollyannaish about these things and as a result believe (hope) the BEA will say what needs to be said in their report. Incidentally, I'm making absolutely no claim to know what "needs to be said". If the final report doesn't mention backdriving sidesticks, I'd like to think it's because there is not a compelling reason to do so. I truly hate that we live in a world where there is always speculation that politics, nationalism, corporate economics (Airbus or Air France), or any other external influences will inevitably taint the the final report. There's been plenty of that in the past, but I'd love to believe we live in a world today where that's not going to happen. The BEA should certainly want to release a report that helps lift them above the reputation of their past investigations.

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: David L
Posted 2012-06-05 10:11:44 and read 5060 times.

Quoting varig md-11 (Reply 11):
Coordinated sticks could have been an additional help

I don't deny that they might possibly have been a help but there were plenty of other basic clues that they didn't use, e.g. the high nose-up attitude on the two PFDs and the standby coupled with the falling altitude, the multiple and extended stall warnings, the unreliable airspeed indication that wasn't followed up by the procedure for unreliable airspeed... All this on top of the fact that the PNF does seem to have had an idea of what the PF was doing but apparently didn't have enough conviction to convince the PF of the urgency to get the nose down.

A redesign of flight controls that have worked as well as others for almost a quarter of a century because one crew forgot to fly the aircraft seems over the top to me.

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: airmagnac
Posted 2012-06-05 12:11:27 and read 4871 times.

Quoting varig md-11 (Reply 11):
I regret to say this will probably not be in the report as it would cast a shadow on the entire "A" philosophy about flightdecks and on the entire family of planes using the present system

That's one way to put it.
I think a less "accusing" way of looking at it is that redesigning flight (and possibly engine, then ?) controls to include link and/or backdrive would come at a huuuuge cost. Not only for Airbus, but also for the many other manufacturers using non-linked sidesticks. A recommendation for such an action can only be credible and taken seriously if there are strong, demonstrated arguments to back it.
It's not so much "protecting X or Y's interests" than simply being reasonable. You cannot build societies such as we have today, with so many complex machines/buildings/vehicles/... by spending tens billions of dollars on a whim.

For the case at hand, there simply is no clear argument for backdriven controls. It's been discussed before, but basically
- Similar accidents have happened with backdriven controls
- An overwhelming number of flights with non-backdriven controls went perfectly well in the last 25 years.

So the argument boils down to a question of subjective preference.
But "I think linked and/or backdriven controls are better because that's how airplanes used to be built" is not good enough to justify a redesign

And in any case, I want to believe that BEA investigators (and their counterparts in other agencies) are normal human beings with a conscience and compassion, and not a bunch of sold-out ba***rds ready to sell their souls and sacrifice people so that a corporation can save money. Simply because said corporation "is from the same country" (whatever that means these days, especially for Airbus !).

Topic: RE: Superjet Disappears Off Radar In Indonesia Part 2
Username: liquidair
Posted 2012-06-06 03:09:04 and read 4582 times.

I'm looking forward to reading the report. Finally put this one to rest... Although I believe there will always be some unanswered questions.

I still think, despite the lack of evidence, that the crew acted like they were disorientated to almost question if there was any toxic hampering at play...

Between the language they used, the actions they took and did not take I wonder if perhaps, and I have no evidence or scientific basis to say this, but I wonder if somehow there was an issue with the air (or anything else which ends up in the blood stream) which dulled their senses and cognitive abilities.

I may sound silly, maybe I am. I just don't want to believe that three pilots, well trained from an internationally important European carrier, can fly 228 into the sea because they decided to ignore 70 stall warnings, whilst watching the altimeter unwind, barely uttering a word to each other.

Maybe I'm just delusional.

[Edited 2012-06-06 03:44:36]

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: abba
Posted 2012-06-06 10:21:20 and read 4294 times.

Quoting liquidair (Reply 15):
I still think, despite the lack of evidence, that the crew acted like they were disorientated to almost question if there was any toxic hampering at play...



As far as I remember from the analysis of the true experts here on a-net (I do not count myself amongst them) the main problem seems to be that rather than using the pitch and power settings for unreliable airspeed at altitude the procedure for unreliable airspeed at take off were used.

I have asked (out of my naivety) - but have got no reply - whether the system could not be programed rather simply to tell the crew what to do when it realised that the airspeed was not reliable. Writing something like: "Airspeed unreliable: set pitch x and power y to maintain level flight". Then crashes due to forgetting memory items like this would not happen again.

Topic: RE: BEA Final Report Of AF447 : 5th July 2012
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2012-06-06 12:14:39 and read 4161 times.

Quoting abba (Reply 16):
As far as I remember from the analysis of the true experts here on a-net (I do not count myself amongst them) the main problem seems to be that rather than using the pitch and power settings for unreliable airspeed at altitude the procedure for unreliable airspeed at take off were used.

The two previews unreliable airspeed accidents happened at take-off. There's a good chance that this airline trained their pilots for unreliable airspeed at take-off only.

But then, why didn't the copilot do something about the pilots mistake ? Was it because he was a wimp, he didn't know better or maybe the information presented wasn't clear.


The messages in this discussion express the views of the author of the message, not necessarily the views of Airliners.net or any entity associated with Airliners.net.

Copyright © Lundgren Aerospace. All rights reserved.
http://www.airliners.net/