Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Kaiarahi
Posted 2013-02-07 07:12:26 and read 12610 times.

Form your own quote: "SAY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND INDUSTRY OFFICIALS BRIEFED ON THE MATTER". How on earth anyone could construe that to mean

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 85): the leaks about the fixes are coming from Boeing

is beyond me.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: cmf
Posted 2013-02-07 07:26:34 and read 12496 times.

Quoting par13del (Reply 86): Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 81): This seems to be the information being leaked out of Boeing which seems to preempt the NTSB announcement, I question the legality of these leaks. Yep, no one ever accused the government and its minions of keeping secrets, let's see if anyone at the NTSB is going to be charged for blabbing about the investigation, somehow I doubt it.

How is Boeing leaking information the fault of the government?

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 07:30:45 and read 12491 times.

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 81): Even if this were to be the cause of the meltdowns and this is certainly not proven at this point, it would still mean that Boeing had failed to adequately identify all possible failure modes and hence the fault tree was invalid.

That would require omniscience at Boeing and the various regulators.

Since that is not possible, we have Airworthiness Directives to update the fault tree.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: par13del
Posted 2013-02-07 07:51:58 and read 12353 times.

Quoting cmf (Reply 93): How is Boeing leaking information the fault of the government?

The usual "unamed sources" or "sources who choose to stay un-named because they are not authorized to speak" are government officials.
If there is a a problem with legality of leaks that is a government and not a Boeing problem, the mouth piece is usually not the source of the leaks.
If the leaks were directly from private individuals the government would be on them like "white on rice", only government sources are allowed to leak with impunity - usually -.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: flood
Posted 2013-02-07 08:03:53 and read 12276 times.

NTSB update live feed:
http://www.wltx.com/news/article/220...Gives-Update-on-Dreamliner-Safety-

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: flyingbird
Posted 2013-02-07 08:17:34 and read 12175 times.

The

Quoting KarelXWB (Reply 89): B-2727 is being prepared for its ferry flight. http://flightaware.com/live/flight/B.../KPAE

The Dreamliner will fly over Denver in a couple of minutes
http://fr24.com/BOE382

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ServantLeader
Posted 2013-02-07 10:33:18 and read 11578 times.

NTSB disputes Boeing's "single cell theory" and questions the assumptions made to certify the Li-ion batteries -- "interim report" is due out in 30 days. This all but puts to rest any hope of the current design being re-certified, even with the tweaking currently being floated by Boeing.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0...-of-boeing-dreamliner-battery.html

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 10:42:31 and read 11472 times.

Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 97): This all but puts to rest any hope of the current design being re-certified, even with the tweaking currently being floated by Boeing.

The NTSB has no authority over certification.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: sonomaflyer
Posted 2013-02-07 11:04:52 and read 11311 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 98): The NTSB has no authority over certification.

Quite true, that authority rests with the FAA. However, the notion the FAA would ignore NTSB's statements and concerns isn't realistic. Boeing may have to beef up separation of the cells further and possibly add some shielding between the cells to help protect against a thermal cascade between the cells. NTSB's remarks were based on the JL incident.

Further separation of the cells, shielding between cells and stepped up monitoring could be enough if the cause of the initial short is pinned down, identified and corrected.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: vegas005
Posted 2013-02-07 11:27:22 and read 11173 times.

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/02/07...ed-top-accident-investigator-says/

This woman seems unqualified to speak. Political science major with no engineering background...

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ServantLeader
Posted 2013-02-07 11:33:21 and read 11124 times.

Quoting vegas005 (Reply 100): This woman seems unqualified to speak. Political science major with no engineering background...

Completely irrelevant -- and besides, it's actually desirable to have a non-technical person weigh in as they can bring different different skill sets and perspectives to the table to keep the engineers honest.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 11:39:15 and read 11215 times.

Quoting sonomaflyer (Reply 99): Quite true, that authority rests with the FAA. However, the notion the FAA would ignore NTSB's statements and concerns isn't realistic.

I agree that the FAA would not outright ignore the NTSB. However, the NTSB's mandate favors safety above other considerations. A nice mandate in theory, but not so much in practice.

If Boeing can prove they have a containment system robust enough to allow the battery to consume itself without burning through or to allow the entire volume of electrolyte to escape the cells, but not the container, then the FAA might be satisfied to allow the battery to be used on revenue flights and lift the grounding of the 787 while further changes are investigated (and perhaps mandated at a later date).

[Edited 2013-02-07 12:18:21]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: PW100
Posted 2013-02-07 11:43:19 and read 11216 times.

Quoting vegas005 (Reply 100): This woman seems unqualified to speak. Political science major with no engineering background

????
If at all, she just gave a vital piece of information why the plane was grounded. We have been looking for this information for 8 threads now!

Quote: National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah Hersman said the board's investigation of last month's battery fire in a Japan Airlines 787 "Dreamliner" while it was parked in Boston shows the fire started with multiple short-circuits in one of the battery's eight cells. That created an uncontrolled chemical reaction known as "thermal runaway" and spread to the rest of the cells, she said. That's at odds with what Boeing told the Federal Aviation Administration when the agency was working to certify the innovative aircraft for flight, Hersman said. The manufacturer asserted its testing showed that any short circuiting could be contained within a single cell, preventing thermal runaway and fire, she said

Quote: Boeing's testing also showed the batteries were likely to cause smoke in only 1 in 10 million flight hours, she said. But the Boston fire was followed nine days later by a smoking battery in an All Nippon Airways plane that made an emergency landing in Japan. The 787, Boeing's newest and most technologically advanced plane, has recorded less than 100,000 flight hours, Hersman noted

There you have it. Vital assumptions (are rather "facts") in the safety calculations proved to be incorrect, for what ever reason, still TBD.

I hate to say it, but with this information FAA had no other choice than to ground, and reconsider it against certification standards - UNFORTUNTALY.

Rgds,
PW100

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: scbriml
Posted 2013-02-07 11:45:35 and read 11198 times.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 70): That's probably what's happening.

If it was that simple, why didn't it show up in thousands of test flights flown by Boeing?

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: vegas005
Posted 2013-02-07 12:01:27 and read 11106 times.

Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 101): Quoting vegas005 (Reply 100): This woman seems unqualified to speak. Political science major with no engineering background... Completely irrelevant -- and besides, it's actually desirable to have a non-technical person weigh in as they can bring different different skill sets and perspectives to the table to keep the engineers honest.

Irrelevant? We have enough talking heads in Washington, her resume is sparse to say the least. An obvious political appointment. Maybe she is just spewing what she is told, but I'll leave the facts to the smart guys with the pocket protectors.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Kaiarahi
Posted 2013-02-07 12:16:45 and read 11038 times.

Quoting vegas005 (Reply 105): An obvious political appointment

Yeah - first appointed by Bush, then reappointed by Obama - obviously a partisan appointment. BTW, all agency heads are "political" appointments.

Quoting vegas005 (Reply 105): her resume is sparse to say the least

Right - 5+ years as senior advisor to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

Quoting vegas005 (Reply 105): Maybe she is just spewing what she is told,

I didn't notice her spewing in the press conference.

Quoting vegas005 (Reply 105): I'll leave the facts to the smart guys with the pocket protectors.

I imagine she does, too. Agency heads manage and lead. Don't forget that the NTSB covers road, rail, marine and aviation.

[Edited 2013-02-07 12:57:39]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: par13del
Posted 2013-02-07 12:23:02 and read 10989 times.

Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 97): This all but puts to rest any hope of the current design being re-certified, even with the tweaking currently being floated by Boeing.

Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 97): NTSB disputes Boeing's "single cell theory" and questions the assumptions made to certify the Li-ion batteries --

The a/c was obviously certified without the blessing of the NTSB, I will do some research to see if the NTSB was involved when they had the panel short circuit issue, based on the dogma of the NTSB, one wonders how they did not investigate the entire electrical system - battery included - at that time, if they were involved.

Quoting sonomaflyer (Reply 99): However, the notion the FAA would ignore NTSB's statements and concerns isn't realistic.

The FAA ignores the NTSB when their safety requirements are not economical or detrimental to the industry, both organizations were designed to serve different purposes.
Let's leave it at that, as that can be the topic of an entire thread.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 12:34:54 and read 10880 times.

Quoting par13del (Reply 107): I will do some research to see if the NTSB was involved when they had the panel short circuit issue...

At the time of the incident, they were being advised of the issue, but had not sent any personnel because jurisdiction was "a gray area" due to the plane being in development and operating under an experimental certificate.

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/fl...flash-787-test-fleet-grounded.html

[Edited 2013-02-07 12:35:07]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: 7BOEING7
Posted 2013-02-07 12:47:02 and read 10766 times.

Yes, she is a political appointee and her next political appointment could be that of Sec of Transportation which if this issue is still ongoing would make things interesting as the FAA would then be under her control.

Actually I thought she did a good job on the presentation today, especially handling the questions. She sounded like she was well prepared.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: par13del
Posted 2013-02-07 12:47:29 and read 10766 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 108): At the time of the incident, they were being advised of the issue, but had not sent any personnel because jurisdiction was "a gray area" due to the plane being in development and operating under an experimental certificate.

Thanks my friend.
At the end of the process it will be interesting to see if they request a mandate to be more actively involved when "incidents" occur during testing of new products that fall under their investigative umbrella.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: RickNRoll
Posted 2013-02-07 12:48:51 and read 10779 times.

That quote sums it up.

Quote:
National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah Hersman said the board's investigation of last month's battery fire in a Japan Airlines 787 "Dreamliner" while it was parked in Boston shows the fire started with multiple short-circuits in one of the battery's eight cells. That created an uncontrolled chemical reaction known as "thermal runaway" and spread to the rest of the cells, she said.

That's at odds with what Boeing told the Federal Aviation Administration when the agency was working to certify the innovative aircraft for flight, Hersman said. The manufacturer asserted its testing showed that any short circuiting could be contained within a single cell, preventing thermal runaway and fire, she said
Quote:
Boeing's testing also showed the batteries were likely to cause smoke in only 1 in 10 million flight hours, she said. But the Boston fire was followed nine days later by a smoking battery in an All Nippon Airways plane that made an emergency landing in Japan.

The 787, Boeing's newest and most technologically advanced plane, has recorded less than 100,000 flight hours, Hersman noted.

The design of the battery does not meet the manufacturer's claims. If it had, it would still be flying.
The failure of one cell can bring down the rest of the battery. If that is the case, then this current design could not meet those specifications. It will need a major redesign. Each cell will need it's own containment system. Which will need testing and recertification. Which will be a lengthy process, since we are talking about a specification for a total battery failure of one in ten million hours.

The 'flying for 100,000 hours' claim doesn't count for much with the NTSB. They were told 10,000,000 hours, that's what they want.

The idea that this is 'just a bad batch' seems to be irrelevant to them. The fact that one cell can bring down the rest of the battery is what concerns them. That is a design issue, not a matter of one cell having a manufacturing fault.

Once again, Airbus will be going over all this very closely, to see how their battery design stacks up.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 12:58:17 and read 10711 times.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 111): The failure of one cell can bring down the rest of the battery. If that is the case, then this current design could not meet those specifications. It will need a major redesign. Each cell will need it's own containment system. Which will need testing and recertification. Which will be a lengthy process, since we are talking about a specification for a total battery failure of one in ten million hours.

The FAA could modify the special conditions to allow the current battery, flawed as it is, to continue to be used provided Boeing proves they have a containment system that can handle the entire battery burning or leaking. That would allow the 787 to return to service while a new battery architecture is designed that would then be mandated for use (installed on new-builds and retrofitted via AD on existing frames).

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: AeroWesty
Posted 2013-02-07 13:27:16 and read 10514 times.

The video of today's NTSB press conference is now online at youtube, for those interested:

NTSB February 7, 2013 press conference video

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2013-02-07 14:25:55 and read 10235 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 102): If Boeing can prove they have a containment system robust enough to allow the battery to consume itself without burning through or to allow the entire volume of electrolyte to escape the cells, but not the container, then the FAA might be satisfied to allow the battery to be used on revenue flights and lift the grounding of the 787 while further changes are investigated (and perhaps mandated at a later date).

With one battery failure every 50,000 flight hours ??

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2013-02-07 14:34:06 and read 10160 times.

Quoting scbriml (Reply 104): If it was that simple, why didn't it show up in thousands of test flights flown by Boeing?

probably because of

Quoting cornutt (Reply 76): It could be that the aircraft, in some flight regime, excites a mode that was not anticipated when they did the shake tests on the battery.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: flyingcello
Posted 2013-02-07 14:49:01 and read 10070 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 112): The FAA could modify the special conditions to allow the current battery, flawed as it is, to continue to be used provided Boeing proves they have a containment system that can handle the entire battery burning or leaking. That would allow the 787 to return to service while a new battery architecture is designed that would then be mandated for use (installed on new-builds and retrofitted via AD on existing frames).

Agree...but how would this play with airlines and passengers? Passenger confidence would be dented, and airlines want not just safety but reliability. The airlines will not want to fly with a known issue, that could cause a diversion, even if safety is not in question. Or, are we assuming that a contained battery failure would no longer require a diversion, and that the flight would be allowed to continue to its destination?

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 14:51:13 and read 10086 times.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 114): With one battery failure every 50,000 flight hours?

Hasn't contributed to the loss of an airframe with the sub-standard containment system they have now, so one that actually works as advertised would be even better.

And again, the current battery would only be used until a more robust and stable one could be developed.

Quoting flyingcello (Reply 116): Agree...but how would this play with airlines and passengers?

I think it could play very well. Passengers would know that if the battery bursts into flames or spills it's guts, there would be no risk of damage to anything else.

NiCad, NiMH and Lead Acid are susceptible to their own issues. Replacing the Li-Ion battery pack with them will not ensure 100% safety. In a way, we'd be back where we were before December - assuming everything is okay.

[Edited 2013-02-07 14:55:48]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: flood
Posted 2013-02-07 15:15:07 and read 9971 times.

According to various news outlets the FAA has approved test flights - with restrictions:
http://leehamnews.wordpress.com/2013...7/faa-authorizes-787-test-flights/

Looks like testing will be performed by ZA005.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: RickNRoll
Posted 2013-02-07 15:20:47 and read 9925 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 117): NiCad, NiMH and Lead Acid are susceptible to their own issues. Replacing the Li-Ion battery pack with them will not ensure 100% safety. In a way, we'd be back where we were before December - assuming everything is okay.

They are, but Lead Acid and NiCad are known to be reasonably safe for aircraft, from extensive experience. I have no argument with improving technology, but the Li-Ion is proving to be more complex than was originally expected. This does happen with advancing and improving technology. Maybe Boeing tried to do too much with one aircraft. The other advances would already be difficult enough to manage, but Boeing seems to have them under control after the delays to EIS.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: N766UA
Posted 2013-02-07 15:40:02 and read 9792 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 117): Hasn't contributed to the loss of an airframe with the sub-standard containment system they have now, so one that actually works as advertised would be even better.

Who the HELL is going to fly on an airplane that catches fire?! "Oh, don't worry, it wont actually burn through anything!"

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: tugger
Posted 2013-02-07 15:42:42 and read 9749 times.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 114): With one battery failure every 50,000 flight hours ??

Statistically this can still be within the 1 in 10,000,000hrs allowance. So it doesn't mean that it will happen again in 50,000hrs.

Tugg

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: N766UA
Posted 2013-02-07 15:44:37 and read 9742 times.

Quoting tugger (Reply 121): Statistically this can still be within the 1 in 10,000,000hrs allowance. So it doesn't mean that it will happen again in 50,000hrs.

Considering it's happened several times already, I'd say it's safe to lowball it.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 15:49:45 and read 9781 times.

Quoting N766UA (Reply 120): Who the HELL is going to fly on an airplane that catches fire?!

Airplanes catch fire every day for various and sundry reasons.

During it's first year of service, a number of 777s experienced on-board fires.

And the day the NH 787 diverted to TAK because the flight crew smelled smoke, an A330 landed at NRT because the flight crew actually saw it.

And show a group of protective passengers a lithium-ion battery fire in a thick steel container and show them one in a plastic overhead bin and then ask which one they felt more comfortable with in flight.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: tugger
Posted 2013-02-07 15:50:54 and read 9739 times.

Quoting N766UA (Reply 122): Considering it's happened several times already, I'd say it's safe to lowball it.

Twice (that I know of). Statistically they could very well be outliers and certainly do not prove the actual failure rate. We still just do not know what the actual rate is.

Tugg

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: PITingres
Posted 2013-02-07 16:16:57 and read 9580 times.

Quoting par13del (Reply 107): The a/c was obviously certified without the blessing of the NTSB... The FAA ignores the NTSB when their safety requirements are not economical or detrimental to the industry, both organizations were designed to serve different purposes.

Since there seems to be ongoing confusion about who does what, perhaps a brief summary might be useful:

- The FAA is the certifying authority in the US. The NTSB has nothing to do with certification - zero, nil, nada, zilch.

- The NTSB's mandate is to review accidents and incidents that fall under their purview (1); discover and analyze the facts to arrive at a probable cause for the event; and make recommendations for improving safety in the future. The NTSB is explicitly not required to consider anything other than safety in their recommendations and reports.

- The NTSB has no power of enforcement. They write reports and make recommendations. They cannot write regulations, nor issue AD's.

- The FAA as the certifying authority has the enforcement power; they are the ones who issue Airworthiness Directives which much be adhered to.

- The FAA is explicitly allowed to ignore, partially implement, or wholly implement any given NTSB recommendation. If you read the NTSB Aircraft Accident Reports (many of which are fascinating reading, by the way), you'll find numerous examples of all three situations.

So, bottom line, it's the FAA who will say when the grounding is lifted, not the NTSB. The agencies obviously work together, and the FAA is not going to just blindly ignore what the NTSB has to say. On the other hand the FAA doesn't need to wait for the NTSB report, nor follow its recommendations if any, if there is compelling reason (in the FAA's judgment) to do otherwise.

(1) I'm not entirely sure what the NTSB's purview covers. I know that they don't look at every little incident, but I don't know what the rules are. The curious can find out more at the NTSB website.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: N766UA
Posted 2013-02-07 16:38:50 and read 9459 times.

Quoting tugger (Reply 124): We still just do not know what the actual rate is.

And to find out are you willing to risk hundreds of lives? These incidents may ultimately prove to be statistical outliers, but right now that battery in that airplane is a potential hazard 100% of the time.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ikramerica
Posted 2013-02-07 17:15:45 and read 9466 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 117): I think it could play very well. Passengers would know that if the battery bursts into flames or spills it's guts, there would be no risk of damage to anything else.

Which is how it was designed in the first place, right? It is a known failure mode that the battery could catch fire or spill it's guts, and it was placed in a location where it wouldn't cause damage. Now, the thought is that the containment wasn't as robust as it should be because the battery could burn longer than expected (though no sign it actually caused damage in flight), so it will need a more robust containment system going forward and/or a battery with better thermal isolation.

I also could see the FAA putting out an AD that says to remove the APU battery until containment can be tested and/or a new battery certified, and to test the main battery daily, replace on a shorter interval, and add a "sneeze guard" to prevent the blurping of innards that the NH flight experienced.

Then again, I've been saying this for weeks, because the actual events were not as dire as everyone has been saying, and there was a very obvious short term resolution unless it was shown that the electrical system was at fault (and that seemed unlikely with the failure of two completely different system batteries).

Quoting N766UA (Reply 120): Who the HELL is going to fly on an airplane that catches fire?! "Oh, don't worry, it wont actually burn through anything!"

ALL aircraft built have caught fire in some way. Be it an engine condition, a coffee maker, some wiring, whatever.

Yet each of those types continued to fly (many without even a full grounding) while the issue was sorted out.

Boeing is being held to a different standard here, and whether or not one agrees that it's about safety, it's still an unprecedented grounding considering only ONE flight was interrupted (and that flight did NOT have a fire), and nobody was killed.

Quoting N766UA (Reply 122): Considering it's happened several times already, I'd say it's safe to lowball it.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 114): With one battery failure every 50,000 flight hours ??

Good thing you guys aren't statisticians.

Two major earthquakes hit populated areas of California within a 5 year span (Loma Prieta and Northridge). That means that one will hit every 5 years? Funny, it's been 19+ since the last one...

edit: 19+ years.

Anyway, here is a wiki page about some major aircraft fires, but there have been MANY more.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categor...ncidents_caused_by_in-flight_fires

[Edited 2013-02-07 17:23:09]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: packsonflight
Posted 2013-02-07 17:43:40 and read 9359 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 123): Airplanes catch fire every day for various and sundry reasons. During it's first year of service, a number of 777s experienced on-board fires.

Are you really saying that fire on board an aircraft is ok? I believe that the FAA is not going to be happy with that, and same goes for the public. The battery containment system is there as last defense

Apparently we have three issues with the 787 battery system:

1. The containment system does not do its job (possibly it was only designed to contain single cell fire but not the whole battery)

2. Failure in single cell spreads out to the rest of the battery.

3. Battery fire are proven to be too frequent.

I would think that Boeing has to fix those three issues before the FAA clears the 787

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rcair1
Posted 2013-02-07 17:49:10 and read 9355 times.

Quoting N766UA (Reply 126): These incidents may ultimately prove to be statistical outliers, but right now that battery in that airplane is a potential hazard 100% of the time.

Where in the world did you get that - oh - "potential".

Well every pilot and passenger that boards an aircraft is a "potential" hazard 100% of the time. It means every person has the potential to be hazardous.

BTW - Failures in "people" have brought down far more aircraft than batteries.

Every laptop computer is a "potential hazard" 100% of the time. Every laptop has the potential to be hazardous.

Every carry-on had the potential to be hazardous - it might fall on you when being hefted up there - wait - that is the person that is the potential hazard.....

Even if you say every battery can fail - it has "potential" - that doesn't mean the failure will have a bad outcome.

Where am I? Oh - civ....

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: PITingres
Posted 2013-02-07 18:16:34 and read 9236 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 128): Are you really saying that fire on board an aircraft is ok?

Well, it depends on the fire, doesn't it? Are we really back to any fire means we're all gonna die? It's basic physics that if you have X amount of lithium, you can only get Y joules out of it even if you burn it in pure fluorine. As long as that thermal impulse is contained, and so far it's been contained both times successfully, the fire burns itself out and life goes on. Maybe the containment wasn't containing as well as the designers had planned, but it did work.

No, fire is not "ok", it's not supposed to happen, it should be prevented if possible and contained if not. However let's realize that hardly any onboard fires cause an accident, and a battery fire is less likely to cause one than most -- specifically because it WAS allowed for.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: packsonflight
Posted 2013-02-07 18:50:30 and read 9127 times.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 130): No, fire is not "ok", it's not supposed to happen, it should be prevented if possible and contained if not. However let's realize that hardly any onboard fires cause an accident, and a battery fire is less likely to cause one than most -- specifically because it WAS allowed for.

It WAS allowed for, (but only every 10 million flight hours) but it failed. The big news is that the containment FAILED.
The BFD spent over an hour fighting the fire on board the aircraft, and possibly the FAA is really concerned what would have happened if the fire had really burned out at FL400 over the Pacific.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: RickNRoll
Posted 2013-02-07 19:09:43 and read 9034 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 129): Where in the world did you get that - oh - "potential". Well every pilot and passenger that boards an aircraft is a "potential" hazard 100% of the time. It means every person has the potential to be hazardous. BTW - Failures in "people" have brought down far more aircraft than batteries.Every laptop computer is a "potential hazard" 100% of the time. Every laptop has the potential to be hazardous.Every carry-on had the potential to be hazardous - it might fall on you when being hefted up there - wait - that is the person that is the potential hazard.....Even if you say every battery can fail - it has "potential" - that doesn't mean the failure will have a bad outcome.Where am I? Oh - civ....

You don't have to take the word of anyone on A.net in civ, the NTSB and FAA both agree the plane should be grounded. This is not done lightly, it's because they see there is a significant risk present. Hazards and risk have different levels, this one is seen to be significant enough to ground a commercial airplane for an as yet undetermined period of time, possibly for months.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Shenzhen
Posted 2013-02-07 19:11:37 and read 9026 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 131): It WAS allowed for, (but only every 10 million flight hours) but it failed. The big news is that the containment FAILED. The BFD spent over an hour fighting the fire on board the aircraft, and possibly the FAA is really concerned what would have happened if the fire had really burned out at FL400 over the Pacific.

Not to split hairs, but if we are talking flight hours, then there was only one event that created smoke during flight (with no fire). One data point???

I believe the fire department removed the battery from the JAL airplane (ground event) and extinguished on the ground (as the fire was within the battery casing). No raging airplane inferno.


Cheers

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: par13del
Posted 2013-02-07 19:16:40 and read 9016 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 131): The BFD spent over an hour fighting the fire on board the aircraft,

Interesting that we have not seen much on this aspect of the incident, exactly how does one fight a Lithium bat fire, everything we read is that it must be smothered, so it took these guys over an hour to smother something which was already contained in a box?

Anyway, we are beyond the fire and looking at what the FAA and NTSB will allow to get the a/c back in the air, as for the specifics of what actually caused it, I'm thinking that is much further down the road.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 19:16:40 and read 9045 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 128): Are you really saying that fire on board an aircraft is ok?

I'm saying that fire aboard an aircraft is a reality. And when it does happen, better it happens in an environment that was at least designed to deal with it then in an environment with no precautions taken whatsoever.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 128): I believe that the FAA is not going to be happy with that, and same goes for the public. The battery containment system is there as last defense.

The FAA was happy with it because the special conditions were written to deal with such an event and at least with the Ship's and APU batteries, there was a line of defense, period.

There is no line of defense for a large number of flammable items brought aboard by passengers and loaded aboard by the airlines.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: NAV20
Posted 2013-02-07 19:16:42 and read 9072 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 131): It WAS allowed for, (but only every 10 million flight hours) but it failed.

If I'm allowed some humour, packsonflight, the 787 has only had one fire 'in flight'; the Boston one occurred when the aeroplane was parked at the gate, and was dealt with by the airport firemen. So the aeroplane is still 'on target' for one per 10m. hours of 'flighttime'....... ?  

Seriously, though, the aeroplane is still grounded. Boeing has been working on possible solutions, and will shortly start exhaustively testing them in flight; and you can bet your boots that the authorities will not lift the service grounding until the modified batteries can be proved to be performing perfectly.

If you were in charge, what would you do instead? Cancel the whole 787 project out of hand?

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: par13del
Posted 2013-02-07 19:30:41 and read 9023 times.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 136): If you were in charge, what would you do instead? Cancel the whole 787 project out of hand?

If we want to be 100% safe on a 787 that's the way to go, if Boeing looses any money it serves them right for designing a crap plane, out-sourcing jobs, trying new unproven and unsafe technology like plastic and ....... 

Meanwhile in the real world, we wait for the interim fix and the final identification of the cause of the problem.
We also need the a/c back in service so that the real problem with the 787 - CRFP and all its issues - will come to fruition, that jury is waiting for a case to try.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-07 19:36:18 and read 9042 times.

Quoting par13del (Reply 137): If we want to be 100% safe on a 787 that's the way to go, if Boeing looses any money it serves them right for designing a crap plane, out-sourcing jobs, trying new unproven and unsafe technology like plastic and .......

Of course, we'd have to tell Airbus to stop production on the A350XWB immediately and close up the FAL since it also uses unproven and unsafe technologies (like plastic) and has outsourced jobs to many of the same suppliers Boeing uses.  

(And yes, I know you are jesting. As am I.)

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: packsonflight
Posted 2013-02-07 19:48:16 and read 8955 times.

Quoting Shenzhen (Reply 133): I believe the fire department removed the battery from the JAL airplane (ground event) and extinguished on the ground (as the fire was within the battery casing). No raging airplane inferno.

According to this logic: a failed hijack is not an actual hijack.

Quoting Shenzhen (Reply 133): Not to split hairs, but if we are talking flight hours, then there was only one event that created smoke during flight (with no fire). One data point???

This is splitting hairs...

Quoting Stitch (Reply 135): The FAA was happy with it because the special conditions were written to deal with such an event and at least with the Ship's and APU batteries, there was a line of defense, period.

That line of defense failed, period.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 136): If you were in charge, what would you do instead? Cancel the whole 787 project out of hand?

Ofcourse not, and in fact it is quite simple: The 787 has to comply with the special condition set for the battery system and that includes:

Failiure in one cell is not allowed to spread to the next

Battery fire are to be contained.

Battery fire much to frequent.

I belive that the FAA can not let the 787 in to the air before thease condition are met, and can not see any interim solution that discounts safety of the aircraft.

On top of that every certifying document that Boeing sends to the FAA regarding this battery issue will be subject to great scrutiny.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: WingedMigrator
Posted 2013-02-07 20:32:56 and read 8872 times.

Quoting Shenzhen (Reply 133): One data point???

No, a hundred thousand data points... actually 1.3 million, which is the number of hours on these batteries. Every hour without a failure is another clue about the underlying failure rate, in the sense that it bounds the failure rate with increasing confidence. One failure bumps up the estimated failure rate by quite a bit. Two failures... now you're quite confident you've got a problem.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: sweair
Posted 2013-02-07 20:43:16 and read 8853 times.

It will be fine once fixed and life will go on for all of us who don't hate the 787 and Boeing, the rest will keep bringing this up forever in their bitterness.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: RickNRoll
Posted 2013-02-07 20:44:06 and read 8866 times.

Quoting Shenzhen (Reply 133): Not to split hairs, but if we are talking flight hours, then there was only one event that created smoke during flight (with no fire). One data point???

One data point was all it took to ground the RR A380.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2013-02-07 21:08:17 and read 8808 times.

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 127): Two major earthquakes hit populated areas of California within a 5 year span (Loma Prieta and Northridge). That means that one will hit every 5 years? Funny, it's been 19+ since the last one...

Well, there's been earthquakes since the Northridge Earthquake. Twentynine Palms. There's earthquakes every day. Your example is stupid and out of place. The San Andreas Fault goes through sparsely populated areas. What is a major earthquake. A 6.9 in the middle of the city shakes the same way as a 8.5 on the San Andreas Fault. Besides the point here is planes. When a mechanic comes on here and tells us he replaces a battery every 3 years on the fleet he maintains and the 787 replaces them almost monthly then tell us what's the statistic on that ?

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: seahawk
Posted 2013-02-07 22:59:48 and read 8578 times.

Bad situation for Boeing. It is harldy worth the effort to redesign the containment for the current batteries, when you know you have to redesing the batteries as well. But that redesign will take time as it comes with a large batch of follow up design changes, from the containment to the rack in which the battery is installed. The NTSB statements do not point to an obvious short-cut to get the 787 in the air again.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: BrouAviation
Posted 2013-02-08 00:46:50 and read 8262 times.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 132): You don't have to take the word of anyone on A.net in civ, the NTSB and FAA both agree the plane should be grounded.

Rubbish. Imagine the faces of the people at FAA-HQ when airlines announced they refused to fly with the plane before issues were resolved. It's not like the FAA has been very pro-active in this matter. I dare to say that when ANA and JAL did not ground their entire fleet, the 787 would be flying revenue flights at this very moment.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 139): Battery fire are to be contained.

They were. That is, fire did not spread to the rest of the aircraft, nor did it do any harm. And to put in perspective, engine failures have to be contained as well. But we all know they aren't from time to time.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 139): Battery fire much to frequent.

By which standard? And with which deviation used? Do you have any clue about statistics?

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 142): One data point was all it took to ground the RR A380.

For inspections, yes. Modifications only followed afterwards. Which is what should happen as well with 787.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: PITingres
Posted 2013-02-08 03:07:50 and read 7826 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 131): The big news is that the containment FAILED.

Incorrect. It worked -- the damage to the surrounding EE bay was minimal, the fire burned itself out (and clearly would have done so even without any firefighting efforts), and no critical systems were put out of action.

I would not dispute that it should have worked even better, but the containment WORKED, by any rational definition of success vs failure.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rheinwaldner
Posted 2013-02-08 03:16:47 and read 7794 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 123):

You and some others are again in this downplaying mode. It is irrelevant for aircraft systems not intended to burn, how much other fires on an aircraft can happen. Simply irrelevant.

The same applies to the opinion, that the aircraft needs to be airborne for incidents to be counted. Really silly. As silly as asking the structure withholding 150% of the maximum load. But only inflight.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 125): - The FAA is explicitly allowed to ignore, partially implement, or wholly implement any given NTSB recommendation. If you read the NTSB Aircraft Accident Reports (many of which are fascinating reading, by the way), you'll find numerous examples of all three situations.

This is all correct, but in this case the public focus and the FAA's own failure to detect not passed certification requirements will prevent that the FAA will take any shortcut.

So they could ignore the NTSB recommendation. But it would kill them. At the latest at the next incident. So they won't. Because the current setup will continue to produce, what it has produces in reality by now: fires. If the root cause is not eliminated.

And they could also implement the recommendations only partially. But they won't. Because of the same reasons.

They know exactly, that this time their approval must be 100% bulletproof. They won't survive another burning battery in their current organization and responsibility form. Even not in 5 years. The stakes are high.

Everybody should understand that by now. All the NTSB, the FAA, Boeing, the public and even Airbus should be in an agreement, when the next battery fire would be acceptable: never again.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 136): Cancel the whole 787 project out of hand?

No, fix that dilletant technology that starts burning far too frequent. There is a bug. It can be found out. It can clearly be shown to be responsible for the failure. And it can be fixed.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: packsonflight
Posted 2013-02-08 03:56:55 and read 7650 times.

Quoting BrouAviation (Reply 145): fire did not spread to the rest of the aircraft, nor did it do any harm

Courtesy of the BFD

Quoting BrouAviation (Reply 145): Do you have any clue about statistics?

Statistics can be tweaked any way you like. I could just as well say that we have battery fire every 9 days in a fleet of 50 aircrafts, and according to that we can project battery fire once in every 21 hour in a fleet of 500 aircrafts.
The fact is I dont have to know nothing about statistics, I just apply common sense, and this is too frequent to pass the common sense test.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 146): I would not dispute that it should have worked even better, but the containment WORKED, by any rational definition of success vs failure.

this is from the NTSB press release on the 24.

"The investigation will include an evaluation of how a fault that resulted in a battery fire could have defeated the safeguards in place to guard against that,"

This is from the FAA press release from the 16.

"These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment."

Looks like that the containment did NOT WORK

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ltbewr
Posted 2013-02-08 04:34:16 and read 7538 times.

One has to wonder that at times technical and engineering developments exceed our ability to regulate and do testing of them. We have seen numerous times where the technologies have been used, as with the 787, that in real life conditions do not match the results of even extensive testing. Any kind of electrical failure causing a thermal, smoke or 'fire' event is unacceptable on an aircraft. It may be that certain technologies are too risky to use on an aircraft until the testing can replicate real life circumstances which may take several more years.

It may be necessary to step back to previous generation battery technologies on the 787, even with the weight and technical penalties, to get this a/c back up in the air ASAP before further pride and economic damage occurs.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: N766UA
Posted 2013-02-08 05:00:48 and read 7432 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 129): Where in the world did you get that - oh - "potential".

Need I remind you that this potential is so great that it caused the airplane to be grounded worldwide? Such a thing hasn't happened since the introduction of the DC-10, you cannot pretend it's just paranoia somehow disproved by statistics.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: NAV20
Posted 2013-02-08 06:03:12 and read 7237 times.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 149): It may be that certain technologies are too risky to use on an aircraft until the testing can replicate real life circumstances which may take several more years.

Fair enough, ltbewr. But this battery type is already being used on smaller aeroplanes, and indeed Boeing's battery-maker has already supplied batteries of the same basic type which are in use on the Space Station (and don't appear to be giving any trouble  ).

My own 'gut feeling' (only a hunch, I've dealt with design faults in other fields but I'm no expert on batteries) is that the present battery design needs 're-visiting' but is not fundamentally flawed. Boeing are saying that they've found that the cells are too close together and are also liable to 'shift' - that is, get closer than planned to their 'neighbour' cells. The Space Station doesn't fly through turbulence or have to endure the odd 'heavy landing,' or cope with moisture for that matter - maybe a somewhat stronger structure, plus heating to keep the whole thing moisture-free, is required in equipment that does?

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 149): It may be necessary to step back to previous generation battery technologies on the 787, even with the weight and technical penalties, to get this a/c back up in the air ASAP before further pride and economic damage occurs.

Trouble is, as I understand it, that substituting a completely-new battery design would require a complete new 'design, test, and certify' programme that would occupy the best part of a year. Any such approach would also, in practical terms, virtually 'sink' the 787 in commercial terms - and the effects would also prejudice the development, testing, and production of the A350, which is also going to use the same lithium-ion battery type.

Boeing are currently proposing a short-term 'fix' which involves 'stabilising' the existing battery design by increasing the clearance between the battery cells, making sure that the cells cannot 'shift' and inadvertently get closer together (which, in their view, is the basic cause of the short-circuits), and also improving containment. Following up with a comprehensive re-design over the next year or so.

The FAA has done well in authorising test flights so quickly. One has to hope that, over the next few weeks, Boeing can prove that its temporary fixes have 'stabilised' the existing system and that no more glitches are occurring; allowing the 787 to re-enter passenger service while they move on to develop the permanent fix. Anything less will cause enormous disruption to the industry as a whole - including virtually all other manufacturers, including Airbus.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: RickNRoll
Posted 2013-02-08 06:15:31 and read 7284 times.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 149): One has to wonder that at times technical and engineering developments exceed our ability to regulate and do testing of them. We have seen numerous times where the technologies have been used, as with the 787, that in real life conditions do not match the results of even extensive testing. Any kind of electrical failure causing a thermal, smoke or 'fire' event is unacceptable on an aircraft. It may be that certain technologies are too risky to use on an aircraft until the testing can replicate real life circumstances which may take several more years.

I think they are quite manageable. Perhaps Boeing stretched a little too far with the batteries, along with everything else. The plane has many leading edge technologies that help it achieve it's targets, the battery could have been left conventional.

As for testing, I don't believe there are any conspiracies and fraud involved. One of the basic tenets of quality control is independent verification. By doing it's own testing, that basic principle has been broken, however, and this is the result. People will see what they want to see, not because they are criminal, or unprofessional, but human.

Lithium and other advanced batteries will be used on planes, but it's a matter of getting it right. That may take a little longer.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: par13del
Posted 2013-02-08 07:08:17 and read 7036 times.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 152): By doing it's own testing, that basic principle has been broken, however, and this is the result.

I think you mean by other people not doing their testing, Boeing designed their products and are obligated to test it, if the regulators choose to be lazy and not conduct their independent testing for their certification purposes the onus is on them, they certainely sit in on all other flight testing before the a/c goes into service and ensure that all their requirements are met, so why is battery testing any different? Indeed it should be simplier since all they had to do is utilize the resources they are using now, send them to the NTSB lab for testing.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-08 07:11:27 and read 7064 times.

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 147): You and some others are again in this downplaying mode. It is irrelevant for aircraft systems not intended to burn, how much other fires on an aircraft can happen. Simply irrelevant.

And you and some others are again in overplaying mode.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ContnlEliteCMH
Posted 2013-02-08 07:17:56 and read 6996 times.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 149): One has to wonder that at times technical and engineering developments exceed our ability to regulate and do testing of them.

No wonder is required. Technical and engineering developments have *always* exceeded testing and regulation. It is understandable if this is a source of discomfort, but this is not new; it has always been so.

In commercial aviation, airworthiness directives represent somebody's recently-gained understanding of a not-yet-realized behavior. That they are produced throughout an airliner's life shows that this learning is open-ended. It is unrealistic to think that regulation and testing will ever "catch up" to how technology behaves once in service.

Before you step onto a "proven" airplane like an A320, just think to yourself, "There are issues with this model and even this specific airframe, at this very moment, that are undetected and unremediated."

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ServantLeader
Posted 2013-02-08 07:20:30 and read 6994 times.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 146): Quoting packsonflight (Reply 131):The big news is that the containment FAILED. Incorrect. It worked -- the damage to the surrounding EE bay was minimal, the fire burned itself out (and clearly would have done so even without any firefighting efforts), and no critical systems were put out of action.

The containment did not work -- the ANA flight was forced into an emergency landing due to the smell of fire in the cockpit, from the article: "But soon after a “burning like smell” began to waft through the cabin and cockpit, said ANA during a hastily arranged press conference in Tokyo on Wednesday. It came from the front. It smelled like burning plastic,” said Mr. Kawamura, a 36-year-old aide to a Japanese politician."

http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2...-ana-dreamliner-emergency-landing/

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rcair1
Posted 2013-02-08 07:34:51 and read 6922 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 128): Battery fire are proven to be too frequent.

No - it has happened 2 times and that is more than expected - so one questions the probability function.
But it is not proof it would happen again in 10 years. 10 year flood do NOT happen every 10 years....

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 131): The BFD spent over an hour fighting the fire on board the aircraft,

That is incorrect. I think I recall fire was out 40 minutes after the alarm - or it could have been 40 minutes after arrival. In either case - much of that 40 minutes was spend checking the a/c for people (employees) and locating the source of the smoke (I can guarantee you that in a smoke call - it takes a file to 'find' the fire - if there is one and that evac is the first step). In addition - the containment system includes reconfiguration, by the aircraft, of airflow patterns designed to prevent smoke from entering the cabin. That part of the system is non-operable when the aircraft is parked on the ground. In the ANA case - I've still not seen any confirmation that smoke was seen in the cabin. Odor was smelled - but odor will not trigger the smoke detectors that cause the re-configuration of the airflow. The fact that there was smoke coming out the vent and NOT in the cabin indicates that the smoke containment WAS working.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ServantLeader
Posted 2013-02-08 07:47:00 and read 6873 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 157): Odor was smelled - but odor will not trigger the smoke detectors that cause the re-configuration of the airflow. The fact that there was smoke coming out the vent and NOT in the cabin indicates that the smoke containment WAS working.

We're not talking about burnt toast here, but toxic fumes that could sicken pilots, crew, and passengers -- the 787 will not fly again until Boeing can either guarantee no more Li-ion thermal runaways or go to a new battery system that doesn't have this problem.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: seahawk
Posted 2013-02-08 07:50:50 and read 6854 times.

I think the main concern of the NTSB must be a combination of both events in one event. Meaning a battery that spills the electrolytes and then catches fire. How likely this is, is something i can not asses.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: 7BOEING7
Posted 2013-02-08 08:17:48 and read 6788 times.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewa...oblems-get-worse/?partner=yahootix

Boeing tells customers to expect delays (duh) and AB consider switching back to Ni-Cad.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rcair1
Posted 2013-02-08 08:56:12 and read 6558 times.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 132): You don't have to take the word of anyone on A.net in civ, the NTSB and FAA both agree the plane should be grounded.

I was referring to the absurdness of some of the statements made here - not the FAA actions to ground the aircraft.

Quoting par13del (Reply 134): Interesting that we have not seen much on this aspect of the incident,

It was discussed at length in early threads. I would refer you back there. Note - this is a Li-ion battery fire, not a Lithium battery fire. They are different. Rechargeable Li-Ion batteries have little metallic Li in them and can be attached with conventional class A extinguishers. Li batteries (non-rechargeable) are class D fires. Some of my early posts were incorrect in that regard - so you will have to read carefully.

Quoting par13del (Reply 137): If we want to be 100% safe on a 787 that's the way to go,

And we should ground every aircraft. None of them are 100% safe. Park the cars too.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 139): According to this logic: a failed hijack is not an actual hijack

Not to be pedantic - but a filed hijack is NOT a hijack. It is an attempted hijack. A failed murder is not a murder - it is an attempted murder - that is what is charged and prosecuted. And so on....

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 139): That line of defense failed, period.

No it did not - period. In neither case did the fire escape the containment. In the ANA case - there was no fire fighting action taken. In the JAL case - the battery was removed and opened - then the fire put out.

Again - the issue here is not that the battery containment failed to contain the fire. It is that it happened more often than predicted/expected and that electrolyte did escape in the ANA case.

In fact, if you read the special condition - it does not require that smoke and electrolyte cannot escape. It says that any smoke or electrolyte that DOES escape CANNOT cause further critical damage that would lead to a degradation in flight safety from the current condition.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 139): Failure in one cell is not allowed to spread to the next

That is not in the special condition. That is a statement made in the context of this investigation that it was not expected to happen and did. It is a causal factor in the investigation and grounding, but it is not part of the special condition.
BTW - to those determined to assign a nonferrous "downplaying" motive to me - I agree with the grounding,

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 139): Battery fire are to be contained.

It was. The electrolyte was not. But AGAIN - the special condition did not require it. It is likely the special condition will be modified, but it DID NOT REQUIRE electrolyte to be contained.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 139): Battery fire much to frequent.

That is not part of the special condition. It is true - the fire happened more often that we expect and that is worth investigation.

Quoting BrouAviation (Reply 145): I dare to say that when ANA and JAL did not ground their entire fleet, the 787 would be flying revenue flights at this very moment.

I disagree - but we will never prove it either way. So who gives a rip.

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 147): You and some others are again in this downplaying mode.

No - some people are being factual, non-emotional and open.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): Courtesy of the BFD

There is no evidence that the fire would not have remained contained and self extinguished. The BFD did remove the battery, open it and extinguish it - but that does not mean it would not have performed as designed. We don't know. BFD put the fire out because fire departments do that - I'm a fireman - I know. BTW - in Japan, they did not.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): Statistics can be tweaked any way you like.

No - that is not true. We love to say lies, damn lies and statistics - but that is really a biased statement. Statistics applied with rigor are valid. People just don't understand them. They think that if a 100 year flood just happened, they have 100 yrs to the next one. They do not understand statistics.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): I could just as well say that we have battery fire every 9 days in a fleet of 50 aircrafts, and according to that we can project battery fire once in every 21 hour in a fleet of 500 aircrafts.

Wrong. First - we did not have a battery fire 'every 9 days in a fleet of 50 aircraft'. We had 2 battery fires within 9 days in a fleet that had been flying (and growing) for a year.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): The fact is I dont have to know nothing about statistics, I just apply common sense,

Common sense is a poor method on this kind of factor. It is often wrong - which is why engineers don't rely on it. Much like "conventional wisdom".

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): this is from the NTSB press release on the 24.

NTSB has nothing to do with the special condition. That is an FAA condition and I doubt they consulted the NTSB when they issued it.

But - read the quote

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): "The investigation will include an evaluation of how a fault that resulted in a battery fire could have defeated the safeguards in place to guard against that,"

The NTSB says they will investigate how the fault "could have defeated" - not "did defeat" - not "defeated" - but could have been defeated.

That is the whole issue here - there is concern that in a future event, the containment may not work. The danger in that case is such that we need to investigate and fix it.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): could result in damage

The key word here is COULD. No did - could.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): Looks like that the containment did NOT WORK

Wrong. Show me evidence where the FIRE escaped before the BFD intervened in BOS. In Japan, the fire dept did not take action. The fire did not escape - it was contained. You can argue that if the BFD had not intervened - the fire might have - but show me the evidence that even suggests that.
Regarding smoke - the requirement is smoke must not enter the cabin in flight. In BOS - it did - but only because the a/c was sitting on the ground with the systems that eject smoke turned off. In the ANA case - smoke did not enter the cabin. Smell did - but not smoke. It is not a requirement that we are protected from smells. In fact, evidence is that the smoke evacuation did work - there are 'streaks' on the outside of the a/c that indicate smoke (and electrolyte) were being vented as designed. So the system was demonstrably working - smoke was present in the front EE bay - that smoke did not get into the cabin.
Regarding electrolyte. The requirement is not that electrolyte is contained, but that ejected electrolyte does not cause further damage that degrades safety further. In fact, the ejected electrolyte DID NOT cause damage that degrades safety.
The concern is that it COULD HAVE caused damage - so we are investigation.

The point is that this investigation is about potential damage - not actual damage. FAA/NTSB (and to be fair - Boeing) is concerned that the it could cause damage.

Hence the grounding and investigation, and likely changes.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 149): One has to wonder that at times technical and engineering developments exceed our ability to regulate and do testing of them.

Nope - I don't wonder. As an engineer who spend many years in QA - I know. We can NEVER test in reliability. We design in reliability and try to verify that design. In cases where that design fails, we may to go a 100% test screen temporarily till we can change the design.
Any company that relies on testing as the basis for quality is foolish.

Quoting N766UA (Reply 150): Need I remind you that this potential is so great that it caused the airplane to be grounded worldwide?

No- I think I know that. And I don't disagree with it.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 152): I think they are quite manageable. Perhaps Boeing stretched a little too far with the batteries, along with everything else. The plane has many leading edge technologies that help it achieve it's targets, the battery could have been left conventional.

I agree with the manageable and 'leading edge' comment. I'm not sure I agree with the stretched too far comments. It is very easy to be arm-chair quarterbacks and sit back and say "those guys, they shuuda known..." BTW - I'm not directing that statement at you RnR - I mostly agree with you in this post.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 152): As for testing, I don't believe there are any conspiracies and fraud involved. One of the basic tenets of quality control is independent verification. By doing it's own testing, that basic principle has been broken, however, and this is the result. People will see what they want to see, not because they are criminal, or unprofessional, but human.

Independent verification does not necessarily mean "outside the company." There are lots of companies where the QA engineers and the design engineers go at it very hard. Independent verification really means honest, complete and factual testing - without an assumption about quality.
In some cases - we do enforce complete "indpendence" - as in - the 2 redundant computers have code to do that same thing that are written by 2 different (groups) of people - maybe in a different language. The reason we do that is to reject common mode failures. If somebody screws up - and doesn't catch it - it is unlikely that somebody else using different tools, different method and in a different place, will screw up the same way.

Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 156): The containment did not work -- the ANA flight was forced into an emergency landing due to the smell of fire in the cockpit, from the article:

There was NEVER ANY REQUIREMENT THAT THE AIRCRAFT PROTECT PEOPLE FROM SMELLS.
The containment did not fail
- No smoke in the cabin
- No loss of any control/system. In fact, no damage other than some stains.
- Fire went out by itself

The issue is would the containment always work?

Back to the basics.
In a nutshell.
- We had 2 failures in a 9 day period - that is higher than expected. So investigation.
- There was no in-flight failure that would have caused damage or danger.
- The emergency landing by ANA was appropriate - but there is no evidence that the aircraft could not have remained in flight.
- The system did not behave as expected (contained to 1 cell, too high a frequency)
- The electrolyte escape was concerning - could it cause damage or fire to spread? (not that it did - but could it?).

What we are investigating
- While the containment did achieve the goals. - we are worried that the margin is not there.
- Until we are comfortable with that margin - we are not putting the traveling public on the plane.
- The frequency of failure is higher than expected.
- The type of failure (spread to multiple cells) is not as designed.
- The electrolyte escape - while allowed - is concerning because it is flammable.
- Once we are comfortable that the design is working as envisioned, or has been modified to increase margin - we fly.

One last point
- In reference to the comments that Boeing may be changing the battery to have more cell spacing - to prevent cascade from cell to cell.

You do realize this does not reduce the probability of a fire in a cell. It reduces the fuel load. So - still a fire, still contained, just less to burn. It is not a fundamental change in design objective.

- BG

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rcair1
Posted 2013-02-08 09:06:40 and read 6501 times.

Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 158): We're not talking about burnt toast here, but toxic fumes that could sicken pilots, crew, and passengers -- the 787 will not fly again until Boeing can either guarantee no more Li-ion thermal runaways or go to a new battery system that doesn't have this problem.

Again - back to the data. NFPA sponsored test (June 2011) (1)

Gases measured from test fires under different conditions.

CO 15.1% 6.4% 8.4% 6.5% 9.1%
CO2 61.4% 75.8% 68.0% 66.0% 58.4%
CH4 7.4% 1.9% 1.2% 2.0% 2.4%
C2H4 8.7% 8.8% 15.5% 19.0% 15.7%
C2H6 1.9% 1.1% 0.3% 1.5% 1.4%

While toxicity studies are identified as a gap - the toxicity of extinguishing agents is of higher concern.

None of these gases, released at this level from a battery, pose any toxicity hazard when diluted in a a/c cabin full of air. It is likely that if you were in the EE bay - it may get pretty nasty - but not assured. The dilution is significant.

It is not burned toast, but it is not cyanide.

(1) http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/pdf...ch/rflithiumionbatterieshazard.pdf - pp 86

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Kaiarahi
Posted 2013-02-08 09:51:23 and read 6298 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161):

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 162):

Thank you!

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: mjoelnir
Posted 2013-02-08 10:20:01 and read 6195 times.

I think the guys talking about that the containment worked and/or there was no danger of further damage, should take a step back and look at what the electrolyte of a lithium-ion battery is.

The main danger is that the electrolyte is flammable and as a vapour can, in the right air fuel mix, explode like jet A in a near empty tank.

I found two organic solvents used for the electrolytes in these batteries, there may be more.

1. Ethylene carbonate, flammable:
flash point 150°C, boiling point 260°C, autoignition 465°C
Explosion Limits, Lower:3.60 vol % Upper: 16.10 vol %
As in any fire, wear a self-contained breathing apparatus in pressure-demand, MSHA/NIOSH (approved or equivalent), and full protective gear. During a fire, irritating and highly toxic gases may be generated by thermal decomposition or combustion.

2. Dimethyl carbonate, flammable:

flash point 33°C, boiling point 127°C, autoignition 445°C
Flammable liquid, insoluble in water. SMALL FIRE: Use DRY chemical powder. LARGE FIRE: Use water spray or fog. Cool
containing vessels with water jet in order to prevent pressure build-up, autoignition or explosion.
Special Remarks on Explosion Hazards: Vapours may form explosive mixtures with air

The above information comes from two different types of material hazard sheets.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-08 10:49:00 and read 6119 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 164): I think the guys talking about that the containment worked and/or there was no danger of further damage, should take a step back and look at what the electrolyte of a lithium-ion battery is.

People with direct knowledge and experience with the Yuasa batteries used on the 787 have stated that the electrolyte is in a paste-like form. They also note that when exposed to high temperatures (like in a fire or a thermal runaway event), the material retains a very high viscosity - and looking at the outside of the Ship's Battery on the NH, there is indeed a thick, viscous material coating the outside.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 164): The main danger is that the electrolyte is flammable and as a vapour can, in the right air fuel mix, explode like jet A in a near empty tank.

The bays where the batteries are stored have air circulation present so that should help reduce the chance of vapors reaching a concentration where it can easily combust. And the crew can increase the amount of circulation significantly by opening the outflow valve, which should reduce the chance even more - perhaps even eliminate it.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: mjoelnir
Posted 2013-02-08 11:09:22 and read 5968 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 165): People with direct knowledge and experience with the Yuasa batteries used on the 787 have stated that the electrolyte is in a paste-like form. They also note that when exposed to high temperatures (like in a fire or a thermal runaway event), the material retains a very high viscosity - and looking at the outside of the Ship's Battery on the NH, there is indeed a thick, viscous material coating the outside.

I think the paste is a misunderstanding, the electrolyte has to be a liquid at working temperature for the battery. but let that be.
A paste at what temperature?
Take heavy fuel oil, it is not possible to pump it cold it will not run, but heat it up to 80°C and you can use it like diesel in a ship engine.
Heat it more so it boils and you get an vapour and it explodes in the right fuel air mix.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 165): The bays where the batteries are stored have air circulation present so that should help reduce the chance of vapours reaching a concentration where it can easily combust. And the crew can increase the amount of circulation significantly by opening the outflow valve, which should reduce the chance even more - perhaps even eliminate it.

Do you want to put your trust on that?

[Edited 2013-02-08 11:10:17]

[Edited 2013-02-08 11:10:55]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2013-02-08 11:16:56 and read 5925 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 157): Quoting packsonflight (Reply 131): The BFD spent over an hour fighting the fire on board the aircraft, That is incorrect. I think I recall fire was out 40 minutes after the alarm - or it could have been 40 minutes after arrival. In either case - much of that 40 minutes was spend checking the a/c for people (employees) and locating the source of the smoke (I can guarantee you that in a smoke call - it takes a file to 'find' the fire - if there is one and that evac is the first step). In addition - the containment system includes reconfiguration, by the aircraft, of airflow patterns designed to prevent smoke from entering the cabin. That part of the system is non-operable when the aircraft is parked on the ground.

The mechanic so flames emanating from the battery. So a quick word to the FD is all it takes to locate the battery.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): You and some others are again in this downplaying mode. No - some people are being factual, non-emotional and open.

Some people are desperate.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): Wrong. First - we did not have a battery fire 'every 9 days in a fleet of 50 aircraft'. We had 2 battery fires within 9 days in a fleet that had been flying (and growing) for a year.

two fires in 100,000 flight hours like the NTSB stated

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): NTSB has nothing to do with the special condition. That is an FAA condition and I doubt they consulted the NTSB when they issued it.

They will now.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: JHwk
Posted 2013-02-08 11:26:24 and read 5874 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 162): While toxicity studies are identified as a gap - the toxicity of extinguishing agents is of higher concern.

Thanks, I was wondering about the impact beyond "smell."

However, CO (to pick the easiest one) is toxic at levels "as low as" 667ppm. So, if we use the 15.1% CO content, you need to dilute the air at a ratio of ~230:1 to be safe. My chemistry is a little too rusty to try and estimate what the mass of CO that you would expect from a 30kg battery to provide vs the mass of air in the passenger compartment, but it seems on the order of magnitude safe as long as some of the air is exhausted.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-08 11:27:29 and read 5916 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 166): Do you want to put your trust on that?

Absolutely.

Especially since it evidently did work in keeping actual visual smoke particles from entering the flight deck and the passenger cabin while the NH plane was in flight.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2013-02-08 11:28:59 and read 5912 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 166): I think the paste is a misunderstanding, the electrolyte has to be a liquid at working temperature for the battery. but let that be.

On this battery the electrolyte is a paste. It's a Yuasa invention used also on the NiMH batteries.

Quote: Positive electrode development was done by Dr. Masahiko Oshitani from GS Yuasa Company, who was the first to develop high-energy paste electrode technology. The association of this high-energy electrode with high-energy hybrid alloys for the negative electrode led to the new environmentally friendly high-energy NiMH cell.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nickel–metal_hydride_battery

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: mjoelnir
Posted 2013-02-08 11:43:23 and read 5846 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 169): Absolutely. Especially since it evidently did work in keeping actual visual smoke particles from entering the flight deck and the passenger cabin while the NH plane was in flight.

Dear Stich,

It was working once.

Air planes were flying for years without inert gas in there tanks, they did not explode for years.

You have a big battery with several litres of organic solvent. The battery heats up the solvent boils and vents, and you are sure that you will not reach a local concentration somewhere in the e-bay to make a explosive mixture.

As I say trust.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-08 11:51:15 and read 5804 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 171): Air planes were flying for years without inert gas in there tanks, they did not explode for years.

And if fuel tanks were actively vented as the fuel level drew down, perhaps they wouldn't have exploded.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 171): As I say trust.

As part of the testing and certification regimen, Boeing filled the bays with smoke. They then opened the outflow valves. The smoke exited the bay and did not enter the flight deck or the passenger cabin.

That was proof enough for me to trust it worked before JA804A and JA804A is even more proof enough for me to trust that it works.

If that level of proof is insufficient for you to trust the system, fair enough.

I flew aboard the 787 before BOS, I flew aboard the 787 after BOS, and I'd fly the 787 today if they'd let me. The only reason I tend to not book the 787 is because current operators don't offer a First Class cabin.   

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: PITingres
Posted 2013-02-08 12:06:46 and read 5705 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): "These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment." Looks like that the containment did NOT WORK

Come, now. This is nonsense. The fire did not spread, it was contained to the box, damage outside the box was minimal. That is what containment means. It DID work.

The NTSB quote that you are significantly misunderstanding speaks to the fact that the containment shouldn't HAVE to work this frequently. They also state, and I don't disagree, that the containment did allow enough gunk and heat to escape that it may fail to contain IN THE FUTURE. That's what the "could result" phrase means in English. The quoted statement has no applicability to the facts in the two actual events.

I trust that you are perhaps not a native English speaker and may have missed the future tense implicit in their statement. I can't think of any other explanation short of rabble-rousing.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rcair1
Posted 2013-02-08 12:18:20 and read 5685 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 166): I think the paste is a misunderstanding, the electrolyte has to be a liquid at working temperature for the battery. but let that be.

No it does not - ions and electrons do not care about the liquid/paste form. There have been plenty of batteries that use a paste electrolyte.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 166): Do you want to put your trust on that?

Yes - see below.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 167): Some people are desperate.

That is a scientific and factually based argument.   
Why would I be desperate? I don't own an iota of Boeing stock. I've never worked for Boeing and I'm sure I never will. I have no horse in that game. I'm not even a frequent flyer any more. While I'd love to fly on the 787, I'm not likely too.
As for my a.net involvement - I'm on the support crew - but that is a volunteer position (one I applied for and am proud to have been chosen for, but reflects my interests).
I post here because I'm trying to share knowledge and opinion (2 different things) with people who have a like interest - yes - even you.
In this case my interest and knowledge is based on the fact that I'm an Engineer (EE - Ph.D - which means I've done basic science and research) with lots of experience in QA, Design and testing. I'm a Firefighter/Fire chief with a bit of knowledge there.
Both of those areas are relevant.
I'm also a certified AKC and CKC earthdog judge - but that is NOT relevant so you don't hear me talking about how to get your dog to work the rats.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 167): two fires in 100,000 flight hours like the NTSB stated

What was stated was that we had 2 fires in 9 days in a fleet of 50 a/c - so that we could expect a fire every 21 hours in a fleet of 500. What the poster did was the math.
9 days * 24 hours = 216 hours.
500 a/c is 10 times 50 a/c - so
Expect a fire every 216/10 = 21.6 hours.
That is not how it works and you know it Come and Go.
At best, you could say 2 fires in 100,000 flight hours, so expect 1 per 50,000 hours. If you had 500 aircraft, you could expect 1 fire every 100 hours in 1 of those planes (not in all of them, 1 of them).
That is not a totally unreasonable analysis, though very difficult to support, but THAT is why the FAA grounded the a/c and is investigating.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 167): They will now.

Uh - Ok.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 171): You have a big battery with several litres of organic solvent. The battery heats up the solvent boils and vents, and you are sure that you will not reach a local concentration somewhere in the e-bay to make a explosive mixture. As I say trust.

To get a fire you need a concentration below the UFL and above the LFL, and you need an ignition source. Now - I would stipulate that it would be possible to have this in a localized area - even with venting flow. But it would be a small "eddy" or something. A fire there would be a flash fire in a small area. It would not extend pas the limits of the area with the flammable mixture. It would likely be unconstrained - so no explosive damage. It would be very unlikely to ignite something else in a compartment full of essentially fire proof material.

But lets play it out
- Venting battery - some gas manages to get into an eddy area within flammable limits.
- Somehow there is a spark or ignition source in that eddy area.
- Some flammable electrolyte gets vented and happens to be collocated with the eddy area.
- Flammable electrolyte burns.

Pretty long odds - but it is that kind of scenerio that has the FAA worried - so ground and investigate - which is by the way, what we are doing. What's the deal!

As for trusting - we do this all the time.
There are 3 ways to deal with flammable gas environments.
1) Vent them to stay too lean.
2) seal them to stay too rich (this is your car's gas tank).
3) Inert them - which is really the same as 2 (yes- too rich - too much flammable gas in relation to oxidizer).

Your example of the explosion in the center tank of a 747 then leading to innerting is a good one. The system 'before' was actually quite safe. It was almost always to rich. We had thousands of aircraft flying decades with no problem. BUT - it was possible - and once we understood that - we improved the system.

In the case here - we recognized a potential problem before the catastrophic event and area taking actions to make it safer. It will probably impact future aircraft as well as the 787.

So - again - what would you have us do? Run around hysterically - or analyze, evaluate and improve while keeping people safe.

Sorry - the skin is wearing thin again - may have to check out for a few days.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rheinwaldner
Posted 2013-02-08 12:21:05 and read 5680 times.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 151): is that the present battery design needs 're-visiting' but is not fundamentally flawed.

IMO it is fundamentally flawed. Because of the large cells.

Large cells batteries are something new and research has not yet brought them to the same safety level. Read this document to get an understanding, what challenges exist to just bring them to a comparable safety level. There is more than one reference in this text, that these large cells pose risks, that cannot be adressed to the same safety level as with smaller cells:
http://www.electrochem.org/dl/interface/sum/sum12/sum12_p061_065.pdf

I mean, these cells are so large, that different temperatures start developping within one single cell. That means that having the cell as the smallest element, that must meet certain requirements (e.g. maintain a safe temperature) is too short sighted. Because there could intra-cell temperature hot-spots, that might not be detected by the temperature sensing system.

We can say, that these large cells are optimized for something else than safety and even work against it. They might be useful in other, ground-based applications. But not airborne IMO. Long before we have a solution, that would result in an acceptable safety with large cells, the same solution would offer rock-solid lithium-ion batteries using smaller cells (though they explicitely say that what was appropriate for the smaller cells is no longer valid for larger cells).

As there is not yet real-world evidence how good the large cells work over a long time (because they don't exist in masses since many years and because research is still busy clarifying the basics), I think that this design decision was too "progressive". Small lithium-ion cells on the other hand are in use since a long time and in vast numbers. And they proved themselves in low-tech, not really regulated consumer electronics.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 154): And you and some others are again in overplaying mode.

I am in sync with real world events including a grounding where after one month the root cause will probably not be found.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): Courtesy of the BFD There is no evidence that the fire would not have remained contained and self extinguished.

But there is a far too high probability.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): The NTSB says they will investigate how the fault "could have defeated" - not "did defeat" - not "defeated" - but could have been defeated.

Because they cannot make undone something of the past but aim to prevent something in the future.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): Quoting packsonflight (Reply 148): could result in damage The key word here is COULD. No did - could.

Maybe the next time.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): We can NEVER test in reliability.

Nobody said that.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): - The type of failure (spread to multiple cells) is not as designed.

To be honest this design does not prevent that. That is obvious if you look at these cells in one box.

This design relies on the assumption that no cell ever has a thermal runaway. Because if there is one, nothing will prevent the other cells to become impaired too. Note: there is also no special FAA requirements, that cells even need to be isolated. The requirement is more profound and simply demands no cell to ever develop unsafe temperatures. This was broken. Two times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 165): People with direct knowledge and experience with the Yuasa batteries used on the 787 have stated that the electrolyte is in a paste-like form.

A burning paste is certainly not better than a more liquid burning electrolyte.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: mjoelnir
Posted 2013-02-08 12:27:21 and read 5662 times.

Dear Stich, you would be the guy who in a well ventilated garage would look with a lighter if there is still petrol in the near empty can.

That the smoke was vented does not say anything about a possible of a local accumulation of explosive vapour.

I think that is the reason for the hurry of the FAA grounding the B 787.
I think that you and several others still do not understand how serious this two incidents were, especially the second one.

Apart from the above, I am sure that Boeing will find a solution to this problem.
I think that it will include a containment venting the vapours to the outside.
And if they have to use a different type of battery I am sure it will not take a year.
(How long did take it Cessna to exchange the battery, I know it is a far smaller plane, but Boeing has also more engineers).

I hope we will in the future both fly on the Boeing 787, I have not done it yet as the airlines I am using had not got there's.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-08 12:42:52 and read 5676 times.

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 175): A burning paste is certainly not better than a more liquid burning electrolyte.

It might very well be to the FAA since it's harder for a paste to be "sprayed about the bay" than a liquid and that is one of the items the FAA is worried about.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: mjoelnir
Posted 2013-02-08 13:48:37 and read 5435 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 174): To get a fire you need a concentration below the UFL and above the LFL, and you need an ignition source. Now - I would stipulate that it would be possible to have this in a localized area - even with venting flow. But it would be a small "eddy" or something. A fire there would be a flash fire in a small area. It would not extend pas the limits of the area with the flammable mixture. It would likely be unconstrained - so no explosive damage. It would be very unlikely to ignite something else in a compartment full of essentially fire proof material. But lets play it out - Venting battery - some gas manages to get into an eddy area within flammable limits. - Somehow there is a spark or ignition source in that eddy area. - Some flammable electrolyte gets vented and happens to be collocated with the eddy area. - Flammable electrolyte burns. Pretty long odds - but it is that kind of scenerio that has the FAA worried - so ground and investigate - which is by the way, what we are doing. What's the deal! As for trusting - we do this all the time. There are 3 ways to deal with flammable gas environments. 1) Vent them to stay too lean. 2) seal them to stay too rich (this is your car's gas tank). 3) Inert them - which is really the same as 2 (yes- too rich - too much flammable gas in relation to oxidizer). Your example of the explosion in the center tank of a 747 then leading to innerting is a good one. The system 'before' was actually quite safe. It was almost always to rich. We had thousands of aircraft flying decades with no problem. BUT - it was possible - and once we understood that - we improved the system. In the case here - we recognized a potential problem before the catastrophic event and area taking actions to make it safer. It will probably impact future aircraft as well as the 787. So - again - what would you have us do? Run around hysterically - or analyze, evaluate and improve while keeping people safe. Sorry - the skin is wearing thin again - may have to check out for a few days.

I think you are seriously underestimating the danger of a fuel air explosion. You do not need a lot of vapour.
Lets say you have out of the several litres solvent about 50 ml or gr of vapour mixed with the corresponding amount of air, you would need about half to one cubic meter, you would get a serious explosion.

Nobody should run around hysterically, but it would be nice for some to realize that this were dangerous situations.
And that the grounding is well grounded in reality.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: BlueShamu330s
Posted 2013-02-08 14:04:46 and read 5346 times.

As an aside, and perhaps indicative of what Boeing are telling operators, Thomson, with 3 Dreamliners on the FAL, are negotiating contingency plans to support their long haul network through until Q4 of this year.

That to me suggests we are atleast 6 months away from their new fleet taking to the skies operationally.

I believe 767 leases are being renegotiated and there is some involvement with HiFly and an A332.

Rgds

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: RickNRoll
Posted 2013-02-08 14:32:59 and read 5188 times.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 154): And you and some others are again in overplaying mode.

I suppose that is one of the unresolved debates here. Just how significant is this event. When QF32 occurred, there was no question it was a major issue, there was no question the plane had to be grounded immediately, and there the multiple redundant systems in the plane saved it from what would have been one of aviations worst crashes. it wasn't far from a total disaster. In that case, the issue was clearly the engine, and it didn't take long to work what what happened, even if it was not clear why. It was relatively easy to look inside the engine and inspect for oil leaks. RR had already identified this area as a potential weakness and had made improvements to newer engines to prevent such an event.

What is happening here that is different.? There was no imminent danger of a disaster. The cause is not clear, even now. It is not possible to inspect the interior of the cells to look for signs of shorts easily. The NTSB and FAA both agree that there is a potential for a disaster. Boeing is not sure what it can do to fix the problem, although it looks like it has some ideas. This uncertainty is part of the problem. It could be this, or it could be that. However, they can't just say, "It's this, we fixed,. and you can easily check it". So, it's not QF32, but it's not clear what it is, either. The NTSB and FAA don't like the idea of the contents that have escaped, or that heat that has escaped, and believe that there is a real potential for serious damage to be caused while in flight.

It is also the longest grounding of a mainline plane, and, because of the uncertainty of the issue, there is no predicting when it will be flying again. It's ghoulish I guess, for those involved, but it does make it newsworthy and interesting for us consumers of news and events out here.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2013-02-08 15:11:27 and read 5014 times.

I deleted my post
 

[Edited 2013-02-08 15:16:51]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Stitch
Posted 2013-02-08 15:13:52 and read 5081 times.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 180): I suppose that is one of the unresolved debates here. Just how significant is this event.

Ain't that the truth.  

Just because I do not believe the 787 is a death trap should not be considered as a statement that I believe nothing is wrong with the 787.

[Edited 2013-02-08 15:17:37]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: par13del
Posted 2013-02-08 15:46:01 and read 4876 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 176): Apart from the above, I am sure that Boeing will find a solution to this problem. I think that it will include a containment venting the vapours to the outside.

Now I'm confused, I thought that was already in place,. not only do they allow venting but they also allow the crew to increase air circulation within the bay, or are you talking about someplace else.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: mjoelnir
Posted 2013-02-08 15:55:08 and read 4853 times.

Quoting par13del (Reply 183): Now I'm confused, I thought that was already in place,. not only do they allow venting but they also allow the crew to increase air circulation within the bay, or are you talking about someplace else.

The "containment" is now venting inside the e-bay.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: Kaiarahi
Posted 2013-02-08 16:04:23 and read 4801 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 184): The "containment" is now venting inside the e-bay.

Which vents outside.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: BEG2IAH
Posted 2013-02-08 16:21:08 and read 4751 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 184): The "containment" is now venting inside the e-bay.

So many people explained multiple times what containment meant and you send this? Would you mind explaining what your definition of containment might be and I would appreciate a link to the source. Thank you.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: mjoelnir
Posted 2013-02-08 16:22:06 and read 4755 times.

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 185): Which vents outside.

Does really nobody understands what it means to went flammable, possible explosive vapour INSIDE a plane?

Is the the e-bay ex proofed? All apart from that the battery can supply the fire all by itself?

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: par13del
Posted 2013-02-08 16:30:47 and read 4726 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 187): Does really nobody understands what it means to went flammable, possible explosive vapour INSIDE a plane?

Ok now I think I understand you, essentially you want a pipe attached to the battery which leads out-side the a/c, so in the event of any issue, the "matter" is vented directly out-side of the a/c without getting into the bay where the battery is actually installed. How strong such a pipe must be and how to ensure that everything flows down the pipe is for the designers.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: BEG2IAH
Posted 2013-02-08 16:33:37 and read 4718 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 187): Does really nobody understands what it means to went flammable, possible explosive vapour INSIDE a plane?

You got an extremely detailed and technical response in post 174 but somehow you do not acknowledge it. While some people take these questions very seriously, spend time documenting their responses, and while they are extremely patient, others have nothing better to do than recycle questions that were answered multiple times.

This thread became a complete troll fest and should probably be locked.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: packsonflight
Posted 2013-02-08 16:37:59 and read 4736 times.

Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 160): No it did not - period. In neither case did the fire escape the containment. In the ANA case - there was no fire fighting action taken. In the JAL case - the battery was removed and opened - then the fire put out.

From the WSJ article:

"Possible changes include an enhanced covering—dubbed by some as "a containment box"—with the goal of keeping flames or chemicals inside the battery in case of overheating or other problems"

I guess they would not be modifying the containment if it worked as advertised.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 157): That is not part of the special condition. It is true - the fire happened more often that we expect and that is worth investigation.

It is just worth investigation? I would think it is un acceptable.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 161): Wrong. Show me evidence where the FIRE escaped before the BFD intervened in BOS. In Japan, the fire dept did not take action. The fire did not escape - it was contained.

There are no evidence of anything that did not happen, makes sense, and again luckily the Boston fire dep had this under control and I guess we have to wait for the NTSB report to see what went down there.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: PITingres
Posted 2013-02-08 16:50:53 and read 4678 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 187): Does really nobody understands what it means to went flammable, possible explosive vapour INSIDE a plane?

It's in turn vented to the outside; there is positive airflow through the bay. Do you understand *that*? I don't know the specific volatility and flammability of the electrolyte, but I don't think we are talking about ether here. Since electrolyte leakage was explicitly expected and allowed for by the design condition, I have to believe that some analysis of leakage flammability was done.

The EE bay itself is not particularly fragile. It's not like a bunch of circuit boards hanging out in space off of a backplane.

I gather that one of the things being looked at is a more direct venting to the outside. I'm sure that we're talking about taking serious consequence probabilities from 10e-8 to 10e-9 with a change like that, but if it's not too hard to do it would certainly be a reasonable change.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: mjoelnir
Posted 2013-02-08 17:03:20 and read 4659 times.

I can as well call the person posting this endless talk about the containment worked trolls.

Number one Boston:

Both the mechanic reporting the fire and the fire department reported flames before the battery box was touched.
That means flames outside the containment. At least the vapours were burning off before they could accumulate.

Number two:

The Battery is overheating organic solvent is boiling off producing flammable vapour.
When did the venting of the e-bay to the outside start removing the vapours?
Is there no possibility of a local accumulation of vapour?
Is the e-bay ex proofed?
(every area, even in the open, were you expect flammable vapour must have x-proofed electrics,
I have sold enough of that stuff)
Are you sure that you have no accumulation of flammable vapour near the battery if it decides to burn?

I have both been in a voluntary fire brigade for several years and I have once sold equipment for fuel depots.

I tell you once again, you are not taken this seriously.

(last post on this thread)

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: NAV20
Posted 2013-02-08 17:15:33 and read 4621 times.

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 175): As there is not yet real-world evidence how good the large cells work over a long time (because they don't exist in masses since many years and because research is still busy clarifying the basics), I think that this design decision was too "progressive". Small lithium-ion cells on the other hand are in use since a long time and in vast numbers. And they proved themselves in low-tech, not really regulated consumer electronics.

Thanks, rheinwaldner - does begin to look as if the 'big cell' batteries currently in use will eventually have to go. By coincidence I'd found this press story just before I read your post:-

"Late today the FAA announced they will allow limited test flights by Boeing to collect data about the battery and electrical systems during flight. The test flights will be flown over unpopulated areas with just the Boeing crew on board the aircraft. Like today’s flight, pilots will carefully monitor the batteries and will be required to land immediately in the case of a battery malfunction. One of Boeing’s 787 flight-test work horses, ZA005, will be used for the flights.

"Boeing, along with investigators in the United States and Japan, have focused on the lithium-ion battery from the start. And today’s announcement that the problem appears to have started with a short circuit within a cell is exactly what battery expert Dr. K.M. Abraham suggested was the problem when we spoke with him last month. The lithium-ion cells within the 787 batteries use a graphite-coated copper anode and a lithium cobalt oxide-coated aluminum cathode. The anode and cathode are separated by a very thin polyethylene film known as the separator.

"The separator is roughly the same thickness as cellophane and behaves in a similar way. There doesn’t need to be a tear or a hole to create a short circuit that can cause thermal runaway. The material is very thin – typically around 25 microns, according to Abraham – and small irregularities in the thickness can be enough to lead to problems. A section of the separator that is just 20 microns thick might be enough."

http://www.wired.com/autopia/2013/02/ntsb-787-dreamliner/

I believe that 25 microns equates to what us older guys used to call a 'thou' - one thousandth of an inch? Doesn't exactly fill me with confidence.......

My guess is that Boeing's possible 'temporary fix' will certainly include more robust separations between cells than what currently appears to be virtually a 'plastic shopping bags' approach?  

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: PITingres
Posted 2013-02-08 17:21:40 and read 4587 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 190): I guess they would not be modifying the containment if it worked as advertised.

Not necessarily. The containment worked, twice. And, to be clear, by "worked" I do NOT mean "did not allow anything to escape", I mean "prevented significant damage to nearby critical systems". The latter statement was the certification requirement, and by that measure, the containment worked, twice. Indeed, judging from the photos, it worked reasonably well as opposed to just barely, at least from a thermal containment standpoint. The JAL event, which was almost certainly exacerbated by NOT being in flight and therefore not having a positive venting, had some reported fire in the bay itself (electrolyte flare-up, maybe?) and still there was a minimum of scorching and no reported, significant structure or circuitry damage outside the battery itself. *That* is what I mean by "it worked".

I think it's fair to say that a) while it worked twice, it let enough "stuff" into the ee bay that there is reasonable cause for alarm that it might not work EVERY time; and b) the containment is apparently being called on to do its job more frequently than planned, meaning that (a) is something that has to be taken seriously for overall safety of flight.

So, it worked, but can be improved. "Can be improved" is not the same as "OMG it failed and they escaped a flaming death by a hairsbreadth", which is what some people here seem to be implying if not outright claiming. That is not downplaying, that is simply sticking to the facts.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 192): I tell you once again, you are not taken this seriously.

I most certainly am taking it seriously, enough to do my best to apply elementary physics and factual reports from the two events towards my conclusions, rather than handwaving and FUD.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: PITingres
Posted 2013-02-08 17:28:21 and read 4545 times.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 193): My guess is that Boeing's possible 'temporary fix' will certainly include more robust separations between cells than what currently appears to be virtually a 'plastic shopping bags' approach?

I think you are confusing the anode-cathode separator within the cell, with the inter-cell separation. The former is the one that is a few microns. The inter-cell separation isn't much, and I bet it gets increased, but it's surely at least a few tenths of an inch.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: 7BOEING7
Posted 2013-02-08 18:02:16 and read 4464 times.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 190): Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 160):No it did not - period. In neither case did the fire escape the containment. In the ANA case - there was no fire fighting action taken. In the JAL case - the battery was removed and opened - then the fire put out.

Not my quote nor is it a quote from the article that was linked in Reply160--please get it right next time.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2013-02-08 18:02:29 and read 4489 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 187): Does really nobody understands what it means to went flammable, possible explosive vapour INSIDE a plane?

The NTSB said the maximum temperatures of the electrolyte was 500 deg Fahrenheit which I think is around 220 deg Celsius. It did not get close to the flash point / Self Ignition point you mentioned earlier.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: 14ccKemiskt
Posted 2013-02-08 18:32:17 and read 4428 times.

Obviously, Airbus is now considering skipping Lithium batteries altogether:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...L5N0B8BRZ20130208?type=companyNews

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: packsonflight
Posted 2013-02-08 19:17:50 and read 4313 times.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 194): Not necessarily. The containment worked, twice. And, to be clear, by "worked" I do NOT mean "did not allow anything to escape", I mean "prevented significant damage to nearby critical systems".

On January 8. NTSB said this:

"The NTSB investigator on scene found that the auxiliary power unit battery had severe fire damage. Thermal damage to the surrounding structure and components is confined to the area immediately near the APU battery rack (within about 20 inches) in the aft electronics bay".

According to this we can assume that the containment worked, but on January 14. they include this comment:

"The airport emergency response group documented the airport rescue and firefighting efforts to extinguish the fire, which included interviews with first responders. Fire and rescue personnel were able to contain the fire using a clean agent (Halotron)",

It clearly says that the BFD contained the fire, but you want to give the built in containment measures credit for that.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: prebennorholm
Posted 2013-02-08 19:41:20 and read 4238 times.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 197): The NTSB said the maximum temperatures of the electrolyte was 500 deg Fahrenheit which I think is around 220 deg Celsius.

500 F = 260 C.

But that's irrelevant for two reasons:

1. The JL battery, which the NTSB investigates, did catch fire.

2. A Li-Ion thermal runaway has the potential to reach temperatures of 6-700 deg. C or roughly 1200 deg. F.

A Thermal runaway caused by for instance an internal short (as suspected by NTSB) may generate lower temperatures than maximum potential, depending on circumstances which are out of control as soon as the runaway has started (charge level, resistance in the short).

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: NAV20
Posted 2013-02-08 20:04:33 and read 4190 times.

Quoting PITingres (Reply 195): I think you are confusing the anode-cathode separator within the cell, with the inter-cell separation. The former is the one that is a few microns.

Just don't know enough about electricity, I guess, PITingres.   But I was working from this bit on Page Two of the story I posted:-

"The other issue associated with the battery design is that the unit is made up of a stack of tightly packed cells to generate the high energy density. Each cell consists of a layer of lithium, acting as the cathode, separated from an oxidizer, or anode, by a thin layer of ion-conductive polymer."

It appears, therefore, that half of each cell is the 'anode,' and the other the 'cathode'? And the only 'separation' is a bit of thin (and conductive?) plastic sheet? Seems to me to be just about asking for a short circuit if there are any weak points in the plastic?

Quoting PITingres (Reply 195): The inter-cell separation isn't much, and I bet it gets increased, but it's surely at least a few tenths of an inch.

Yes, you're right there - Boeing have already 'signalled' that the cells have been known to 'shift' quite a bit in certain circumstances, and they're already working on fastening them more securely.

PS - First test flight within hours.

http://seattletimes.com/html/busines...y/2020320276_787flighttestxml.html

[Edited 2013-02-08 20:25:26]

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: prebennorholm
Posted 2013-02-08 20:17:39 and read 4301 times.

Quoting 14ccKemiskt (Reply 198): Obviously, Airbus is now considering skipping Lithium batteries altogether: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...yNews

What is equally interesting in this Reuters article is what insurance people say.

The final outcome of this event will of course be dealt with by the OEM's and the regulators (FAA, EASA etc.), but it is not unlikely that the airlines for reasons of suspected reliability, PR, insurance costs etc. will simply demand Li-Ion-free planes.

The airlines can calculate. They know that NiCad power density is roughly 40% of Li-Ion, and that two 29 kg batteries converted to NiCad are heavier (2 x 29 / 40 x 100) - (2 x 29) = 87 kg.

Being able to load 87 kg fuel less - assuming the same payload - will shrink range by less than 10 miles. It is not the end of the world.

And BTW, any weight increase caused by improved Li-Ion containment we can subtract from the 87 kg penalty. It could easily reduce the penalty to much closer to zero.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: ComeAndGo
Posted 2013-02-08 21:02:56 and read 4235 times.

Quoting 14ccKemiskt (Reply 198): Obviously, Airbus is now considering skipping Lithium batteries altogether:

So airbus is going to go with the heavier solution while boeing will weather the storm, change the electrolyte in the battery and come up with a safe Li-Ion battery.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rcair1
Posted 2013-02-08 21:07:35 and read 4237 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 178): Nobody should run around hysterically, but it would be nice for some to realize that this were dangerous situations.

And who - exactly - is not realizing that. It is not me. You've seen me agree with the grounding multiple times.
I've said over and over again -and I said it in the post you quoted.
Why, exactly, do you think the a/c was grounded and people are working damn hard fixing it.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 174): In the case here - we recognized a potential problem before the catastrophic event and area taking actions to make it safer. It will probably impact future aircraft as well as the 787.

As I said.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 178): I think you are seriously underestimating the danger of a fuel air explosion. You do not need a lot of vapour.

And I think you are seriously over estimating it. I do know a little about this field. If this was a BLEVE situation - I would agree with you. (look it up) It is not. It is a gas pocket situation. A fire must be sustained by fuel. If there is not much fuel, there is not much fire. I think the probability of a meaningful amount of vapor at the right mixture in a compartment that is being overpressurized specifically to vent dangerous gasses - is low.
BUT - we ground the airplane investigation and fix. We do this to get smarter, make sure the plane is safe, and keep the public safe.

The FAA/NTSB and Boeing is DOING what you want done - why the heck are you people complaining?

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 175): But there is a far too high probability.

Which is why the 787 is grounded.

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 175): Because they cannot make undone something of the past but aim to prevent something in the future.

Which is why the 787 is grounded.

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 175): Maybe the next time.

Which is why the 787 is grounded.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 174): but it is that kind of scenerio that has the FAA worried - so ground and investigate - which is by the way, what we are doing. What's the deal!

So - what is your beef?

Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 175): A burning paste is certainly not better than a more liquid burning electrolyte.

Not necessarily true. As a fireman - in most cases I would prefer a burning paste to a burning liquid. It is more localized.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 176): Dear Stich, you would be the guy who in a well ventilated garage would look with a lighter if there is still petrol in the near empty can.

I must step in and defend Stich - he has never said anything that would warrant such a comment.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 176): That the smoke was vented does not say anything about a possible of a local accumulation of explosive vapour.

Yes it does. The same airflow that is venting the smoke will vent the flammable vapor.
But - it is not assured - as I said - so you ground the plane to keep people safe, investigate and make changes.

I think I need to step away for a few days. My skin is getting thin and my head is about to explode...
Better back off before I say something that causes the mods to boot me off the site.....

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: francoflier
Posted 2013-02-08 21:22:14 and read 4197 times.

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 203): So airbus is going to go with the heavier solution while boeing will weather the storm, change the electrolyte in the battery and come up with a safe Li-Ion battery.

They'd be crazy not to. Especially since the regulations regarding Li-ion batteries are bound to undergo major modifications. Why design a battery system which not even pass certification when you still have a chance to switch to a proven system?

Boeing is too far ahead to do that of course, their only course of action is to find a safe Li-ion technology now.

I wonder if this might cause the A350 some more delays.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: RottenRay
Posted 2013-02-08 22:13:19 and read 4156 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 204): Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 178):

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 204): Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 175):

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 204): Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 176): Dear Stich, you would be the guy who in a well ventilated garage would look with a lighter if there is still petrol in the near empty can.

Alright, MJOELNIR, you're right over the top. You have no idea whatsoever whom you are speaking about.

As for the rest of the idiots whose screen names appear as quotes in this post - and the hundred more whose screen names DESERVE to be listed in this post - you are all, well, idiots who are incapable of reading linked articles as well as incapable of reading the threads and posts preceeding.

This thread makes me feel shame for having forked over $25 US a few years ago to be a part of this site.

Next time your mother goes in for surgery, how about I speculate as freely and easily as you have been about the 787?

Has it not occurred to some of you that people earn a living building these aircraft?

No, it hasn't.

Probably shouldn't, either, as the shills and shit-sticks who have been fueling rumors here obviously need no form of support and are apparently wealthy through independent means.

Cheers!
R

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: sweair
Posted 2013-02-08 23:26:07 and read 3998 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 192): I can as well call the person posting this endless talk about the containment worked trolls.

Calling people with knowledge trolls says it all about you, you try to force your imagined event on what happened and wont accept insiders to correct you. A-net has certainly degraded as most insiders have quit posting. Just a sad development here!

All these threads should be locked as they just don´t add to any new insight.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: rheinwaldner
Posted 2013-02-09 04:36:26 and read 3411 times.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 204): And who - exactly - is not realizing that. It is not me.

Some other do.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 204): So - what is your beef?

None, we seem to be in an agreement about that (and other things too).

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 204): Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 175): A burning paste is certainly not better than a more liquid burning electrolyte. Not necessarily true. As a fireman - in most cases I would prefer a burning paste to a burning liquid. It is more localized.

I am a fireman too. The paste stays in higher concentration at one spot than some liquid. So the heat would be less dispersed. Anyway as the FAA demanded no cell to ever reach unsafe temperatures, this point is indeed not so relevant.

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 174): But lets play it out - Venting battery - some gas manages to get into an eddy area within flammable limits. - Somehow there is a spark or ignition source in that eddy area. - Some flammable electrolyte gets vented and happens to be collocated with the eddy area. - Flammable electrolyte burns. Pretty long odds - but it is that kind of scenerio that has the FAA worried - so ground and investigate - which is by the way, what we are doing. What's the deal! As for trusting - we do this all the time.

If I read that mjoelnir and you are not really in a disagreement. Even about the trust that is needed....

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: 777ER
Posted 2013-02-09 05:18:52 and read 3327 times.

These threads have now a good way to discuss issues with the B787 but have now become a thread where insults against other users are happening frequently.

As a result this thread is now being archived and a new one won't be opened. Any other new threads will be deleted.

Topic: RE: FAA Grounds 787, Part 8
Username: XT6Wagon
Posted 2013-02-09 10:40:25 and read 2817 times.

Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 187): Does really nobody understands what it means to went flammable, possible explosive vapour INSIDE a plane?

Dude, We build AIRCRAFT from flammable, possibly explosive materials. Aluminum is used as rocket fuel. Carbon.. Well what do you think Charcoal is? Both substances in a fine particulate will explode like a bomb.

So far that I know we only know that its "flammable" from the NTSB statements and have no hard facts that the substance released is in anyway an actual threat. Note that the actual regulations don't care about the release of flamable materials.