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Topic: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: moderators
Posted 2013-07-09 10:13:35 and read 53632 times.

Hello all,

Part 6 has become quite long. Subsequently part 7 is being created in order to make it easier for members to find new information and to continue the discussion of this unfortunate event

Part 5 can be found here OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 5 (by moderators Jul 7 2013 in Civil Aviation)

Regards,

The Moderator Crew

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: sankaps
Posted 2013-07-09 10:26:58 and read 53595 times.

Quoting Maverick623 (Reply 49):
"Everybody please ignore Avek00. He clearly has some kind of axe to grind with Asiana."

Fully agree with Maverick.


Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 251):
"The one with the broken tailbone is Lee, the cabin service manager, not this one. Lee describes this one as the one who carried a schoolboy out when he was frightened of jumping out. Another F/A is described as having tears streaming down her face as she ran back repeatedly for injured passengers and carried them piggyback to the escape slides. Lee herself helped free those pinned under escape slides that had inflated inside the cabin, by puncturing with one with a fire axe and finding a knife from a service cart for a F/O to puncture another. She was the last to leave the plane.Heroes all. "

Amazing stories. Hopefully helps dispel the notion that Asian carrier FAs overly focused on service and not sufficiently trained on safety. Service and safety are not mutually exclusive. These FAs are heroes!

Some quotes from a NYT article:

"Consider Lee Yoon-hye, the lead flight attendant on Asiana Flight 214. Ms. Lee, who had a broken tailbone, fought flames and helped usher people to the functioning emergency slides. She watched another flight attendant piggyback a young child through the smoke. “I was only thinking about rescuing the next passenger,” she said at a news conference on Sunday.

She was the last person to leave the wreckage of the plane".

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/bu...-air-safety-out-in-90-seconds.html

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cloudboy
Posted 2013-07-09 10:37:28 and read 53297 times.

Another non-pilot question here. We know low speed was a critical factor in this crash. Media reports make it sound like the aircraft was so slow that it was nearing stall speed - is that the case? We know it is well below normal landing speed, but the aircraft was not in, nor was it even near, stall speed, correct? If that is the case, from a pilots point of view, how much weight do they place on airspeed vs approach angle and rate of descent while landing?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Braniff747SP
Posted 2013-07-09 10:42:30 and read 53152 times.

Quoting cloudboy (Reply 2):
is that the case? We know it is well below normal landing speed, but the aircraft was not in, nor was it even near, stall speed, correct?

Apparently the stick shaker went, so that would point the airplane to being right above stall speeds.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: sassiciai
Posted 2013-07-09 10:45:48 and read 53120 times.

I'm trying to quote rc135x from the previous thread - in which he said the following:

All of this technical discussion about auto-this and auto-that and mode and stick shaker and engine spool up time and ILS OOS are irrelevant to the core issue: the airplane crashed because it stalled some 30 knots below approach speed because the pilots allowed that to happen. No capable pilot needs any of those items to perform a safe, routine landing. No matter if they had 10k+ hours in a 747 they are still pilots, and pilots, not on-board computers, still need to be able to land the airplane. If the crew was distracted or surprised by automated features not functioning properly then they have become too dependent or reliant on those features and forgotten the basics of flying.

Who cares if SFO approaches are challenging or the ILS was out? How many other pilots managed to land their airplanes at SFO without being 30+ knots below their approach speeds?

Before the flaming starts for my "premature conclusions about the pilots' actions" I have flown (or supervised or trained another pilot flying) multiple hundreds of heavy jet VFR approaches with no instrument backup using only the "captain's bars" on the runway for assessing the landing picture. No auto throttles or RNAV or auto land, just one hand on the throttles and one on the yoke. On every approach my limit was 5 knots slow before I directed an increase in airspeed or a go-around. 30+ knots slow? ZERO excuse. If the pilots could not fly the airplane (ANY airplane) without allowing that significant a drop in airspeed they should not be allowed to play with airplanes. Ultimately who cares why they got that slow (and there is no evidence to suggest mechanical problems). CRM? Cultural factors? Training in progress? What can we learn from this incident to prevent future occurrences? In ANY flight regime, normal or emergency, the first rule is to maintain aircraft control. The crew of this airplane failed to do that.



My point on this:
I have quite limited first-hand flying experience dating back to when I was carefree and unmarried (LOL!) and flew single-engined 2-seater C-152s out of Grimbergen (just next to BRU). Yes, the training of "one hand on the throttle, one on the yoke, and your eyes out the window/on airspeed" was drummed into me incessantly

How could you learn to fly an approach otherwise?

Choose your touchdown point, and with one on the throttle, and one on the yoke, manage your descent to that point, using all visual cues to add or reduce thrust! Thank good my plane didnt have any other dials, buttons, levers, or things to take care of, just getting it down on my target point was enough!

So I wonder about the crew here!

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cloudboy
Posted 2013-07-09 10:50:14 and read 52969 times.

Another question that I haven't seen answered yet. Where were the relief pilots at the time? We're they actually in the cockpit at the time, or were they upstairs in the rest cabin. If they were not in the cabin it makes no sense to criticize them for not noticing anything was wrong, and if so, I would like to hear their experience in having to evacuate from their little cave up there after the crash.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-09 10:51:44 and read 52983 times.

Quoting cloudboy (Reply 2):
Media reports make it sound like the aircraft was so slow that it was nearing stall speed - is that the case?

Not having the B777 manuals in front of me, not knowing within a few thousand pounds the weight of the aircraft at the time of the crash, not knowing the air temperature and dew point - I cannot say if the aircraft was at or below stall speed.

The stick shaker indicates it was approaching stall speed and if the NTSB numbers are correct - the plane may have stalled (one of the NTSB technical investigative tasks will be to see if the speed indicators were working correctly and accurately - if possible given the damage to the aircraft).

But it was NOT flying fast enough to maintain altitude. It was sinking and too slow to climb or maintain level flight by the time the stick shaker sounded.

The question of did the aircraft stall or not is not relevant in my opinion.

A stall did not make the aircraft pitch up just before impact. That was almost certainly pilot control input. Stalls don't pitch up that quick, though the right of center-line might have been from the aircraft falling off to the right due to low speed.

Since the aircraft could not avoid continuing to descend, the pilots were in a situation where they had almost no options.

Raising the nose sharply may have prevented the aircraft nose from hitting the embankment - with a much higher death toll. Raising the nose sharply may have made the tail strike happen - it might not have happened had the plane stayed relatively level. (It still would have been a very hard, very destructive landing).

Only a detailed NTSB energy analysis can determine that.

I do not find the sharp nose pull-up unusual. Those pilots had to see the embankment rushing toward them and pulling back is an instinctive reaction at that point.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: mayor
Posted 2013-07-09 10:57:51 and read 52835 times.

Excuse this old ramp rat for a stupid sounding question, but if the ILS was indeed, out, what difference would it make if the wx was severe/clear?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rbgso
Posted 2013-07-09 11:16:19 and read 52389 times.

Quoting sassiciai (Reply 4):
All of this technical discussion about auto-this and auto-that and mode and stick shaker and engine spool up time and ILS OOS are irrelevant to the core issue: the airplane crashed because it stalled some 30 knots below approach speed because the pilots allowed that to happen. No capable pilot needs any of those items to perform a safe, routine landing.

I agree 100%. There seem to be an over-reliance on automated flight controls, which is fine, but at the end of the day if you cannot manually land a plane in good weather something is wrong. So much time seems to be spent learning aircraft systems at the expense of basic stick/yoke and rudder skills.

Kudos to the cabin crew for outstanding work. Their training obviously kicked in quite quickly.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: KiwiRob
Posted 2013-07-09 11:27:33 and read 52178 times.

Somewhat disconcerting landing yesterday, you could see the wreck on the forward facing camera when my SK A340 landed at SFO, then looking out the window and seeing it on the runway as we landed.

It's amazing that only two people died, although it looks like only one may have died in the crash, it appears that the second was killed after being run over by an emergency services vehicle.

[Edited 2013-07-09 11:29:00]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 11:32:10 and read 52036 times.

Quoting sassiciai (Reply 4):
All of this technical discussion about auto-this and auto-that and mode and stick shaker and engine spool up time and ILS OOS are irrelevant to the core issue

(the above quote actually from rc135x)

I think everyone agrees that all the evidence points to the crew failing to monitor the approach in a professional manner. I'm tempted to say that if they couldn't land a plane with no (known) mx problems in that kind of weather they're in the wrong line of work. But the fact of the matter is they are in that line of work, and some of them have been for a long time. So all the stuff about automation, etc. that is so much part of normal commercial airliner operation these days and may have played a role in this accident is highly relevant.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: N328KF
Posted 2013-07-09 11:32:46 and read 52085 times.

This is not going to end well if they continue this behavior:

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mir
Posted 2013-07-09 11:42:10 and read 51784 times.

Quoting cloudboy (Reply 5):
Another question that I haven't seen answered yet. Where were the relief pilots at the time? We're they actually in the cockpit at the time, or were they upstairs in the rest cabin.

The NTSB hasn't said anything conclusive about that - they're waiting for the crew interviews.

-Mir

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-09 11:46:48 and read 51696 times.

Quoting N328KF (Reply 11):
if they continue this behavior

But we knew that was going to happen.

It happens in every accident involving a non-native english speaking flight crew - and many foreign airlines/ governments try to 'direct' the NTSB interviews.

US airlines and pilot's unions would also like to direct the interview, but our regulations/ laws prevent that. Though we all know the US pilots talk to their union and their airline before they talk to the NTSB.

The real problem in my opinion will be when the NTSB wants to go into the Asiana pilot training program, over every simulator session, through every training manual page, through every operations manual page, etc.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rampart
Posted 2013-07-09 11:50:22 and read 51615 times.

Toward the end of the previous thread, there was a long quoted eyewitness report from the United Airlines pilot, in the 747 on hold at the end of the runway. Nobody has commented on it, and there isn't a source for it. Anything?

-Rampart

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Norcal773
Posted 2013-07-09 11:55:44 and read 51493 times.

Quoting cloudboy (Reply 2):
Another non-pilot question here. We know low speed was a critical factor in this crash. Media reports make it sound like the aircraft was so slow that it was nearing stall speed - is that the case? We know it is well below normal landing speed, but the aircraft was not in, nor was it even near, stall speed, correct? If that is the case, from a pilots point of view, how much weight do they place on airspeed vs approach angle and rate of descent while landing?

Per NTSB Chairwoman yesterday, speed at impact was 106 Knots, well below the target speed of 137 KIAS. Lowest recorded speed per the FDR was 103KIAS so depending on what stall speed is on a 777, sounds to me like it did stall reason why the Stick shaker went off at 4 sec before impact. Hopefully that answers your question, the media just adds to the confusion really so I am staying away from it and getting my facts from the cute NTSB lady  

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: legacyins
Posted 2013-07-09 11:57:19 and read 51396 times.

Quoting N328KF (Reply 11):

I do not understand the langauge issues as there are members from the Korean Transportaion Safety Authority present during the interviews of the Flight crew.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rc135x
Posted 2013-07-09 11:58:27 and read 51341 times.

Quoting hivue (Reply 10):
So all the stuff about automation, etc. that is so much part of normal commercial airliner operation these days and may have played a role in this accident is highly relevant.

Yes indeed, and I acknowledge that. My point is simple: an increasing amount of conversation in this thread is focusing on highly technical aspects of control laws and automated features that might have a bearing on the crash as the *solution* to the problem. In short, if only the crew managed or utilized these automated features more appropriately then the crash may well not have occurred. In reality, I argue that if these analyses are on target, then these automated features *contributed* to the crash because of an increasingly institutionalized reliance on technology in lieu of basic airmanship.

How many crashes or incidents have been discussed in these forums that involve high-time crews who have mismanaged, misunderstood, misused, or blindly followed increasingly technical devices throughout multiple phases of flight?

If you are correct then the problem is insidious: we have converted an older generation and enabled a new generation of aircrew who are systems managers rather than pilots. I am no Luddite, but if a pilot thinks "TOGA" is anything other than something John Belushi wore in Animal House then s/he needs to reconsider if the airplanes of today and tomorrow need stick-and-rudder skills or someone with Microsoft Flight Simulator programming experience.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Norcal773
Posted 2013-07-09 11:58:37 and read 51371 times.

Quoting rampart (Reply 14):
Toward the end of the previous thread, there was a long quoted eyewitness report from the United Airlines pilot, in the 747 on hold at the end of the runway. Nobody has commented on it, and there isn't a source for it. Anything?

I copied it onto the thread and you're right, nobody has said anything on it. Here's the link to it from where I got it, a Curacao Newspaper- Don't ask me how they got it coz I have no idea, I got it off of Twitter.

http://www.curacaochronicle.com/avia...ay-as-the-asiana-b-777-approached/

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 12:00:33 and read 51278 times.

Quoting rampart (Reply 14):
Nobody has commented on it

I think it speaks for itself. If it's legit, the mental image of the two girls who were killed possible having fallen out onto the runway behind the plane but surviving long enough to get up and move around is heartbreaking.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: flymia
Posted 2013-07-09 12:06:20 and read 51139 times.

Quoting Mir (Reply 12):
Quoting cloudboy (Reply 5):Another question that I haven't seen answered yet. Where were the relief pilots at the time? We're they actually in the cockpit at the time, or were they upstairs in the rest cabin.
The NTSB hasn't said anything conclusive about that - they're waiting for the crew interviews.

That is true the NTSB has not said anything. I have no idea how Asiana works but I know at U.S. Airlines all four pilots would be in the cockpit for landing and takeoff. I would imagine this would be the case here. I would also assume the crew rest area is not a place someone is suppose to sit for takeoff and landing. But that I am not sure of.

Quoting Norcal773 (Reply 15):
Lowest recorded speed per the FDR was 103KIAS

103 KIAS in a 777. That is insane! How anyone lets a 777 get that slow is not comprehendible IMO.

Quoting N328KF (Reply 11):
This is not going to end well if they continue this behavior:

WSJ: Asiana crew interviews going slowly due to language issues, friction between NTSB/Airline mgmt complicates probe --Sources

The language issue its self is a concern. You hear it too often on ATC, especially with Asian Crews. They need to pick up on their English skills. Its it just not up to par IMO.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: DTW2HYD
Posted 2013-07-09 12:10:24 and read 51028 times.

Quoting N328KF (Reply 11):
This is not going to end well if they continue this behavior:

Lets hope this is just a knee-jerk response from OZ to yesterday's NTSB presser. Even ALPA didn't like the way NTSB released partial data points from CVR and FDR.

If OZ wants to maintain its reputation and operate in USA, they have to co-operate with investigators.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rampart
Posted 2013-07-09 12:10:35 and read 51001 times.

Quoting rampart (Reply 14):

Toward the end of the previous thread, there was a long quoted eyewitness report from the United Airlines pilot, in the 747 on hold at the end of the runway. Nobody has commented on it, and there isn't a source for it. Anything?

Sorry, just want to be more specific, it was reply 272 in Thread Part 6, posted by Norcal773.

OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 6 (by Moderators Jul 8 2013 in Civil Aviation)

[the specific reply is linked above]

Mentions the pilot seeing ejected (presumably) passengers 1500' from the final stop of the Asiana fuselage, and calling ATC to alert them of that. But what's the source??

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 12:12:48 and read 50985 times.

Quoting rc135x (Reply 17):
I argue that if these analyses are on target, then these automated features *contributed* to the crash because of an increasingly institutionalized reliance on technology in lieu of basic airmanship.

  

Quoting rampart (Reply 14):
Nobody has commented on it

One problem I see is that the supposed relief pilot calls both taxiways "F." (Of course, if both taxiways are actually F then that speaks in favor of it being legit.)

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: LTC8K6
Posted 2013-07-09 12:15:27 and read 50908 times.

Quoting hivue (Reply 19):

I think it speaks for itself. If it's legit, the mental image of the two girls who were killed possible having fallen out onto the runway behind the plane but surviving long enough to get up and move around is heartbreaking.

I have been hearing that the one fatality was near an evac slide, possibly hit by a rescue vehicle.

I only see 2 evac slides deployed, both forward of the left wing, well away from the rear end of the fuselage.

Seems unlikely that a person would have fallen out of the back of the fuselage, injured, and ended up somewhere forward of the left wing, to be struck by a vehicle.

Hopefully we will get clearer info soon.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-09 12:16:19 and read 52652 times.

Quoting rampart (Reply 14):
Toward the end of the previous thread, there was a long quoted eyewitness report from the United Airlines pilot, in the 747 on hold at the end of the runway. Nobody has commented on it, and there isn't a source for it. Anything?

There is a link farther up the thread - the original was posted on pprune

I think that was the original source.

I'm concerned about its truthfulness for several reasons.

One is the statement about confusion on the ATC radios after the crash. The only confusion I hear is the OZ pilots - and they were severly shaken and stirred in my opinion. Just being able to make radio calls for emergency equipment does speak well of their priorities and professionalism (even if the crash itself implies the opposite.)

Everyone else on the ATC tapes is very clear, very specific and very focused. The pilots on the incoming flights announcing their go arounds, the tower controller, etc. But he might have been listening to ground in addition to the tower frequency - and it may have been more 'frantic'.

I'm sure there were many questions and issues to get trucks positioned correctly. I would expect the ground ATC to order all aircraft to stop immediately and hold in position to allow emergency vehicles free access to all taxiways and runways. Some of those pilots would not have seen the crash, and be asking when they can resume taxi - and complaining about ATC delays messing with their schedule. (That would end quickly once the reality of the crash became clear to everyone.)

There was also likely a lot of "how soon can we get back to the terminal" talk.

The entire tone of the post is a 'me the hero' and discounting the action of other members of the flight and cabin crew. He had to take the cockpit microphone away from the Captain and describe the people walking away from the wreckage (and his description does not match what was said on the ATC tapes - though human memory is faulty.)

He is the one who had to inform and comfort the passengers, he is the one who had to tell the cabin crew what to do, etc.

I would expect such a description from a young hotshot full of himself newbie - not someone who is supposedly experienced and professional enough to be in that position.

But I could be wrong.

[Edited 2013-07-09 12:18:11]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rampart
Posted 2013-07-09 12:23:57 and read 52349 times.

Quoting Norcal773 (Reply 18):
I copied it onto the thread and you're right, nobody has said anything on it. Here's the link to it from where I got it, a Curacao Newspaper- Don't ask me how they got it coz I have no idea, I got it off of Twitter.

Thanks for that. And hmm. What United pilot e-mails the Curacao Chronicle?

Quote:
Curacao Chronicle does not report on international news except if it has anything to do with Curacao, but this e-mail is very interesting to share with our readers. This is from a United Airlines crew who witnessed the crash of Asiana B-777.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: atnight
Posted 2013-07-09 12:26:21 and read 55267 times.

I dont know if any here have seen this animation, sorry if it was posted before. However it is the best animation I've seen so far. It's In Korean so cannot tell you what they say, but its a great account of how the airplane crashed.

Asiana777sfo

Hope it helps. My sister sent me who has a friend that works at Korean Air, and as Korean, sent her this info.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AviationAddict
Posted 2013-07-09 12:29:59 and read 54919 times.

Quoting rampart (Reply 26):
What United pilot e-mails the Curacao Chronicle?

Probably one that doesn't want to work at United much longer. I agree with rfields5421's assessment, seems very immature. Even if it is true there are better ways to get the message out.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 12:30:46 and read 54607 times.

Quoting rampart (Reply 26):
What United pilot e-mails the Curacao Chronicle?

The newspaper doesn't say who emailed it, or even if it was emailed to them. They just say it's an email.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AT
Posted 2013-07-09 12:30:59 and read 54732 times.

This might sound like a silly idea, but given the digitally advanced world we now live in, would it be (a) possible, and (b) prudent to have all takeoffs and landings videographed?

The amateur video of the Asiana landing that made its way to CNN will, I'm sure be enormously useful to the investigative team. Video footage is also useful for future training purposes and can provide unbiased evidence in he said/she said cases.

This case relied on an amateur video. But how useful would it be to have high resolution video cameras filming landings and takeoffs at at least major airports? The recordings could be on a loop, much like cockpit voice recorders, so they continually write over themselves except in an accident.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AT
Posted 2013-07-09 12:34:14 and read 54429 times.

I am not a legal expert, but was wondering can a flight crew be individually held accountable for their errors? In the event that it is established beyond doubt that the Asiana accident was caused by one pilot's error, then could individual pilots be held accountable legally, either criminally or civilly?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aesma
Posted 2013-07-09 12:34:31 and read 54440 times.

Quoting rampart (Reply 14):
Toward the end of the previous thread, there was a long quoted eyewitness report from the United Airlines pilot, in the 747 on hold at the end of the runway. Nobody has commented on it, and there isn't a source for it. Anything?

-Rampart

It was already posted hours before and discussed then. Basically it doesn't give much info we don't know already and some believe it might be a fake.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: moose135
Posted 2013-07-09 12:40:07 and read 54136 times.

Quoting AT (Reply 30):
This might sound like a silly idea, but given the digitally advanced world we now live in, would it be (a) possible, and (b) prudent to have all takeoffs and landings videographed?

It might be neat to have, but honestly, given the cost of installing and maintaining several cameras at the end of each runway, networked into a central server, at every airport with commercial service, what would the value be? Yes, they would have provided a nice view of Saturday's SFO crash, but how many crashes are there to start with, then how many of them happen right at the end of a runway where the cameras might (assuming weather and available light) allow you to see what happened. And given the enhanced FDR and CVR data available, how much more would those videos add to the crash investigation?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aesma
Posted 2013-07-09 12:40:25 and read 54315 times.

Quoting AT (Reply 30):
This might sound like a silly idea, but given the digitally advanced world we now live in, would it be (a) possible, and (b) prudent to have all takeoffs and landings videographed?

The amateur video of the Asiana landing that made its way to CNN will, I'm sure be enormously useful to the investigative team. Video footage is also useful for future training purposes and can provide unbiased evidence in he said/she said cases.

This case relied on an amateur video. But how useful would it be to have high resolution video cameras filming landings and takeoffs at at least major airports? The recordings could be on a loop, much like cockpit voice recorders, so they continually write over themselves except in an accident.

The wreck is on an airport, the crew is alive, the recorders are fine. Those three are far more important that any video.

[Edited 2013-07-09 12:50:50]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-09 12:42:38 and read 54259 times.

Quoting AT (Reply 30):
This might sound like a silly idea

You are the sixth or seventh person I remember bringing this up on this series of threads - but given over a couple thousand posts - it would be easy to miss.

This is the first time since 1971 there has been an incident at SFO that a runway camera would have captured. It is only the second time in the entire history of the airport a runway camera would have captured an accident/ incident.

How many cameras do you need to cover the runway in better detail than the spotter? How much will it cost? Laying data cables would likely cost a lot more than the cameras.

Some have suggested that images from such a system could be sold to help pay for it. I guess that would put professional photographer aircraft spotters out of business.

Could such a system be designed and installed - certainly.

How many airports need to have such a system - 100 in the US, 200, 500, 2,000?

(I can think of two accidents at GA airports around Dallas where video would have been much more useful than this crash. Both have less than 250 movements per day.)

Is the cost worth the investment - I think not.

The video of this crash is dramatic, compelling - but I don't think it is vital to the investigation. Useful yes, but the investigation would not be hampered without the video.

It doesn't tell us anything about the approach that the FDR does not tell us.

Just the 'argument' over whether or not the aircraft tail struck the water for five seconds, two seconds or no seconds - shows how even video cannot be clearly deterministic.

[Edited 2013-07-09 12:47:42]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AeroWesty
Posted 2013-07-09 12:49:35 and read 53961 times.

Quoting atnight (Reply 27):
However it is the best animation I've seen so far. It's In Korean so cannot tell you what they say, but its a great account of how the airplane crashed.

Asiana777sfo

Wow, someone must have been up all night doing that animation. It even has the pirouette in at the end, like there is in the video released on Sunday.

Thanks for posting the link.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: SLCGuy
Posted 2013-07-09 12:50:37 and read 53835 times.

If the latest reports from the NTSB are correct that the airspeed was down to 103 kts (over 30kts below Vref!)! and the pilots only realized they might have a problem 7-8 seconds before impact scares the hell out of me! I mean no disrespect to Asiana or South Korea but I have serious concerns about their training and skills.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: ryu2
Posted 2013-07-09 12:51:42 and read 53898 times.

A good writeup in the WSJ about how United is helping in the response, in response to the discussion about whether they should have been.

http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2...lliance-helped-in-crash-aftermath/

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: sankaps
Posted 2013-07-09 12:58:58 and read 53362 times.

Quoting ryu2 (Reply 38):
A good writeup in the WSJ about how United is helping in the response, in response to the discussion about whether they should have been.

http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2...math/

A good, simple article that refutes a certain poster's hysterical rants very simply and effectively.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: DTW2HYD
Posted 2013-07-09 13:02:39 and read 53197 times.

Quoting AT (Reply 30):
This might sound like a silly idea, but given the digitally advanced world we now live in, would it be (a) possible, and (b) prudent to have all takeoffs and landings videographed?

So far we have seen only couple of amateur videos. NTSB/SFPD probably collecting video recordings from surrounding high-rise buildings/business/city surveillance cameras... They are not going to post on YouTube or call a Media outlet. Public will see those when authorities release. So no doubt investigators will have lot more footage than they need.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: N328KF
Posted 2013-07-09 13:03:22 and read 53196 times.

Quoting moose135 (Reply 33):
It might be neat to have, but honestly, given the cost of installing and maintaining several cameras at the end of each runway, networked into a central server, at every airport with commercial service, what would the value be?
Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 35):
How many cameras do you need to cover the runway in better detail than the spotter? How much will it cost? Laying data cables would likely cost a lot more than the cameras.

Being in the network field, let me just say -- if you're running cabling for other things (lights, whatever) then the networking cable required to pull this off is not that big of a deal. $0.63 per foot for fiber, and that's retail. The expensive part is the labor to do this, but it's no worse than burying the other electrical wire. You don't need a lot of cameras if they track the inbound aircraft.

Or, worst case, just have the cameras at the tower with good lenses.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: airtechy
Posted 2013-07-09 13:11:35 and read 53096 times.

NBC has a piece about the "Korean Culture" issues and how they may relate to the accident. Judging by the authors name he may be Korean with some expertise.

http://www.nbcnews.com/business/kore...ffer-clues-asiana-crash-6C10578732

AT

edit: type

[Edited 2013-07-09 13:17:22]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AeroWesty
Posted 2013-07-09 13:11:40 and read 52913 times.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 35):
This is the first time since 1971 there has been an incident at SFO that a runway camera would have captured.

There's one other, one of Clay Lacy's Lears crashed on take-off in 1984, which closed SFO that night. I remember being able to see if from where I lived at the time in the Oakland-Piedmont hills. The report says it came down 10,000' feet from the approach end of 28L, so I'm guessing it was a couple of thousand feet off the end of the runway, given its length.

There was also a low cloud cover that night, so I don't know if cameras would have caught it all.

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19841008-0

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: tp1040
Posted 2013-07-09 13:25:54 and read 52112 times.

The ILS was out of operation and the effect , if any, on the events is not yet obvious.

Not really germane to the crash, is it common for it to out at a major airport for such a long time.???

I know there are different systems in place to safely land a plane, but the ILS being out of service makes it one less tool a pilot has to safely land a plane. Seems like an unnecessary risk and poor management by the FAA and the airport. As flier, I want all the resources available, up to date and working.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: wnbob
Posted 2013-07-09 13:48:28 and read 50935 times.

Quoting cloudboy (Reply 5):
All of this technical discussion about auto-this and auto-that and mode and stick shaker and engine spool up time and ILS OOS are irrelevant to the core issue

I too have an inkling that over-automatiion has played a critical part on this. After reading the 3 and 4 letters acronyms I came back with a headache, and pilots have to memorize these? and have instant (I hope) recall?

Compare to IT, everybody are now programmers, because they have made it so easy for everyone to do so, but if I ask them if they ever done assembly programming and know what their programs are doing to the hardware underneath, they have no clue.

I know at time I become complacent too and that's when it bites you. 10K of flight experience is not enough information, I want to know how many cycles, I want to know what challenging airports/conditions have this pilot encountered.

Air France 447 showed, once automation goes haywire, even so called experienced pilots can succumb. Scary.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: SLCGuy
Posted 2013-07-09 14:04:33 and read 50179 times.

Quoting wnbob (Reply 45):
Air France 447 showed, once automation goes haywire, even so called experienced pilots can succumb. Scary.

While a problem with the automation doesn't appear to be the problem in this case, the lack thereof (ILS) raises questions about the basic piloting skills of the crew, How can you not land a plane in perfect conditions visually? This combined with AF447 where the pilots relied on the automation and ignored the basic flight information that would tell even a student pilot the aircraft was stalling.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 14:11:37 and read 49986 times.

SIAP, but looks like ALPA is ticked at the NTSB for releasing information too soon, something a few here were saying was surprisingly nice about how the NTSB handled the first few days of this saga:

ALPA criticizes OZ crash investigation

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: D L X
Posted 2013-07-09 14:14:06 and read 49758 times.

Quoting hivue (Reply 19):
I think it speaks for itself. If it's legit, the mental image of the two girls who were killed possible having fallen out onto the runway behind the plane but surviving long enough to get up and move around is heartbreaking.

Do we know that the two people referred to in this email are the two girls that died? Reports said that many survivors had "road rash" that indicates they slid along the runway, thus having been ejected from the plane.

Quoting atnight (Reply 27):

I dont know if any here have seen this animation, sorry if it was posted before. However it is the best animation I've seen so far. It's In Korean so cannot tell you what they say, but its a great account of how the airplane crashed.

Asiana777sfo

And you know, that looks like the maneuvers seen in the amateur video.

Quoting AT (Reply 30):

This might sound like a silly idea, but given the digitally advanced world we now live in, would it be (a) possible, and (b) prudent to have all takeoffs and landings videographed?

If the goal is to capture crashes, that's more expense than it's worth considering how rare an occurrence that is. Hell, cameras on a loop would be much more valuable on city streets, capturing car wrecks so you can tell what happened, but I think it is pretty obvious that it would not be worth the expense there, even though car wrecks are pretty common.
Now, if a camera system were set up to aid in preventing runway incursions, that could be useful and cost effective at some of our busier airports.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: sankaps
Posted 2013-07-09 14:15:42 and read 49860 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 47):
ALPA criticizes OZ crash investigation

it says here that "Passengers also have reported that the plane was rolling from side to side during the approach, which in calm winds is another indication of stalling, said Hans Weber, president of TECOP International Inc and an aerospace consultant who has been an adviser to the FAA.

As soon as a plane goes below the minimum speed for a landing, there should be a vibration in the controls meant to warn pilots of a stall, he said.

"If they had commanded full throttle at that point," Weber said, "there's a good chance they would have made it." "

Raises the question: Did the stick-shaker activate too late?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: garpd
Posted 2013-07-09 14:17:05 and read 49946 times.

Quoting sassiciai (Reply 4):
All of this technical discussion about auto-this and auto-that and mode and stick shaker and engine spool up time and ILS OOS are irrelevant to the core issue: the airplane crashed because it stalled some 30 knots below approach speed because the pilots allowed that to happen. No capable pilot needs any of those items to perform a safe, routine landing. No matter if they had 10k+ hours in a 747 they are still pilots, and pilots, not on-board computers, still need to be able to land the airplane. If the crew was distracted or surprised by automated features not functioning properly then they have become too dependent or reliant on those features and forgotten the basics of flying.

   Absolutely spot on.

I'll repeat what I said in thread #6 in reference to the article when an LH pilot says visuals at SFO were going to result in this kind of accident:

He is a pompous and over pampered pilot who doesn't fly but monitors the automation. IMO.

Pilots have been flying visual approaches since the dawn of aviation and for the most part of it without all the sophisticated tools they have to hand today which can either aid a visual approach or take over completely in the correct conditions. In fact it the first landing technique drilled into new pilot's heads.

If anything, today's 'non precision' visual landing, with all the hyper accurate instruments, gps, etc at the Pilot's fingertips, is every bit as safe and able to achieve stability as the first auto lands with the BEA Tridents in the 60s.

This LH pilot is clearly far too accustomed to the computers doing it all for him and is not comfortable flying manually for anything more than 500 feet.


Article in question:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/...a-909956.html#ref=nl-international

[Edited 2013-07-09 14:18:56]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rj777
Posted 2013-07-09 14:18:18 and read 49561 times.

Standing by for the latest NTSB briefing.....

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: EA CO AS
Posted 2013-07-09 14:21:37 and read 49381 times.

Quoting hivue (Reply 29):
The newspaper doesn't say who emailed it, or even if it was emailed to them. They just say it's an email.

FWIW, I just received the complete e-mail from a UA retiree who knows the crewmember on UA885. I'm redacting the names though:

On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned. Captain REDACTED met us at the aircraft and gave us information he had and asked if we needed any assistance or hotel rooms for the evening. Captain REDACTED and F/O REDACTED went to hotels and I went to my home an hour away in the East Bay.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 14:22:16 and read 49073 times.

Quoting rj777 (Reply 51):
Standing by for the latest NTSB briefing.....

Congratulations. Based on that, I turned on my TV, and you successfully got me to watch Zimmerman trial coverage for the first time ever.

The NTSB better got on their horse here because I am not going to be able to handle this, even if it's on mute...   

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mir
Posted 2013-07-09 14:29:50 and read 48585 times.

Quoting DTW2HYD (Reply 21):
Even ALPA didn't like the way NTSB released partial data points from CVR and FDR.

And I can see why they might think that way.

Quoting tp1040 (Reply 44):
I know there are different systems in place to safely land a plane, but the ILS being out of service makes it one less tool a pilot has to safely land a plane. Seems like an unnecessary risk and poor management by the FAA and the airport. As flier, I want all the resources available, up to date and working.

Expect lots of cancellations and delays, then. Aviation is a 24-hour business, and in such businesses you occasionally have to make repairs or upgrades to equipment while things are still going on. That's nothing new - it's been going on for years, and there's no reason why it should have been a factor in this case.

-Mir

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: spacecadet
Posted 2013-07-09 14:31:24 and read 48437 times.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 35):
How many cameras do you need to cover the runway in better detail than the spotter? How much will it cost? Laying data cables would likely cost a lot more than the cameras.

Cost to cover every runway at hundreds of airports is definitely worth thinking about, but I strongly doubt it would be as much as you'd think. You can buy a professional-level camera and recording system today, yourself, with five cameras, a DVR and several thousand feet of cabling for a little more than $1,000. These systems aren't like radar or ILS equipment - I don't see why you would need to have some sort of NASA-designed custom system . Just something off the shelf, better quality than an iPhone from a mile away, and installed like these sorts of systems are already installed at facilities all over the world, including at airports themselves - just not on runways, for some reason.

I think it was the TACA landing accident where the surveillance footage from the airport terminal was cited as the first valuable piece of evidence by the investigators. They were able to calculate from the footage that the airplane was going three times faster on landing than A320's usually do. I'm sure they could have solved the accident without that footage but it helped point them in the right direction initially. With even a relatively cheap camera/DVR system set up on a runway, investigators could be pulling footage immediately as they wait for the FDR/CVR to be recovered. They could already have a pretty good idea of what caused an accident even before reading the FDR.

It's true that any accident's probably going to be solved eventually, cameras or no cameras. But if you're worried about the cost of the camera system, I don't see why you're not also worried about the cost of an inefficient investigation that drags on longer than it needs to. Any tool that can make investigations both faster and potentially more accurate is actually going to save money in the long run. And I don't know of any NTSB investigator that wouldn't be happy to have high quality video of any accident they're tasked with investigating.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cuban8
Posted 2013-07-09 14:35:43 and read 48248 times.

Quoting garpd (Reply 50):
Pilots have been flying visual approaches since the dawn of aviation and for the most part of it without all the sophisticated tools they have to hand today which can either aid a visual approach or take over completely in the correct conditions. In fact it the first landing technique drilled into new pilot's heads.

I personally think you got it a bit wrong. Yes, a visual is taught at a very early stage when flying. The problem is, it is not practiced enough once you fly commercially. I'm sure most pilots flying airlines today can barely remember when was the last time they flew an NDB approach manually (which is not very common practice once you left flightschool either). I don't blame these pilots for not being able to do a visual approach (any pilot can make mistakes). Where you should blame them is not taking any action when told there are low on speed. Just my 2 cents....

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rj777
Posted 2013-07-09 14:37:58 and read 48081 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 53):
Congratulations. Based on that, I turned on my TV, and you successfully got me to watch Zimmerman trial coverage for the first time ever.

The NTSB better got on their horse here because I am not going to be able to handle this, even if it's on mute...


Wasn't my intention, and believe me I'm as frustrated as you are.....

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 14:38:42 and read 48004 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 48):
Do we know that the two people referred to in this email are the two girls that died?

Actually, no. I don't know where I thought I saw that (my imagination, perhaps).

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: D L X
Posted 2013-07-09 14:39:09 and read 48181 times.

Question for pilots on go-arounds:

Is it true that you don't raise the nose on a go around until a positive rate of climb is established? Or at least not before the engines spool up? (I might be mixing jargon here.) I seem to recall reading something during the LionAir discussion about being configured to land, and expecting wheels to contact the runway, while in a go around scenario while the engines spool up.

It *appears* that the pilot here raised the nose before getting to the seawall, smacking the tail into it. (Possibly even smacking the tail into the water.) Would it be error to have raised the nose before the engines were providing go-around thrust?

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 55):
You can buy a professional-level camera and recording system today, yourself, with five cameras, a DVR and several thousand feet of cabling for a little more than $1,000.

Why in the world would anyone use cabling? Put the data storage in the camera unit itself and/or transmit the data wirelessly.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: garpd
Posted 2013-07-09 14:39:48 and read 48193 times.

Quoting cuban8 (Reply 56):
I personally think you got it a bit wrong. Yes, a visual is taught at a very early stage when flying. The problem is, it is not practiced enough once you fly commercially. I'm sure most pilots flying airlines today can barely remember when was the last time they flew an NDB approach manually (which is not very common practice once you left flightschool either). I don't blame these pilots for not being able to do a visual approach (any pilot can make mistakes). Where you should blame them is not taking any action when told there are low on speed. Just my 2 cents....

There in is exactly where the problem lies!

This should NOT be the case. It simply shouldn't.

St. Maarten is a visual approach. No ILS there. Yet pilots accomplish it all the time. So don't tell me visual flying is not practiced commercially.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: flyawa
Posted 2013-07-09 14:40:03 and read 48073 times.

The United email appears to be 1 hour in error of the correct zulu time of the incident at 1927z, not 1827z as stated, correct?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: dfambro
Posted 2013-07-09 14:40:08 and read 48003 times.

Quoting Mir (Reply 54):
there's no reason why it should have been a factor in this case

I know what you mean, but isn't it really a big factor in this case? If the ILS was functioning, this incident probably wouldn't have occurred, right? It's a link in the chain of events, a hole in the cheese.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AAexecplat
Posted 2013-07-09 14:40:46 and read 48082 times.

Quoting garpd (Reply 50):
I'll repeat what I said in thread #6 in reference to the article when an LH pilot says visuals at SFO were going to result in this kind of accident:

He is a pompous and over pampered pilot who doesn't fly but monitors the automation. IMO.

Pilots have been flying visual approaches since the dawn of aviation and for the most part of it without all the sophisticated tools they have to hand today which can either aid a visual approach or take over completely in the correct conditions. In fact it the first landing technique drilled into new pilot's heads.

If anything, today's 'non precision' visual landing, with all the hyper accurate instruments, gps, etc at the Pilot's fingertips, is every bit as safe and able to achieve stability as the first auto lands with the BEA Tridents in the 60s.

This LH pilot is clearly far too accustomed to the computers doing it all for him and is not comfortable flying manually for anything more than 500 feet.


Article in question:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/...a-909956.html#ref=nl-international

You did see that the article mentions that SFO has one of the very highest rates of GoArounds in their system, right? That would indicate that the problem with SFO is not limited to one pilot who is "not comfortable flying manually for
anything more than 500 feet."

I still believe that this was pilot error, but that doesn't mean that steps can't be taken to make SFO a safer airport to fly into...

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 14:41:50 and read 47941 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 59):
Why in the world would anyone use cabling? Put the data storage in the camera unit itself and/or transmit the data wirelessly.

Just a thought, but wireless signals aren't as reliable as a direct connection and if you use cable you can put the data storage unit somewhere easier to access than having to drive out to the camera itself, the best position for which may be in a place that is a pain to get to.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: n92r03
Posted 2013-07-09 14:42:23 and read 47977 times.

Quoting rampart (Reply 26):
Thanks for that. And hmm. What United pilot e-mails the Curacao Chronicle?

Amen, exactly. Methinks this is total rubbish.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: D L X
Posted 2013-07-09 14:43:10 and read 47927 times.

Quoting AAexecplat (Reply 63):
You did see that the article mentions that SFO has one of the very highest rates of GoArounds in their system, right?

Wouldn't that be mostly because of the layout of the runways and taxiways at SFO, not the stability of the incoming craft flying manual approaches?

I mean, it's not like it's DCA.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: bioyuki
Posted 2013-07-09 14:46:44 and read 47863 times.

Quoting EA CO AS (Reply 52):
Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

That is incredible. I can't imagine what it'd be like to be ejected from the fuselage close to impact and survive. Amazingly lucky.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: houstondallas
Posted 2013-07-09 14:49:33 and read 47615 times.

Quoting atnight (Reply 27):
I dont know if any here have seen this animation, sorry if it was posted before. However it is the best animation I've seen so far. It's In Korean so cannot tell you what they say, but its a great account of how the airplane crashed.

Asiana777sfo

Link doesn't seem to work for me. Can anyone else see it?

houston

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-09 14:49:51 and read 47909 times.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 49):
"If they had commanded full throttle at that point," Weber said, "there's a good chance they would have made it." "

Boy he makes himself sound like a real Microsoft Flight Simulator trained expert.

Two words - Bull Shoot

Quoting sankaps (Reply 49):
Raises the question: Did the stick-shaker activate too late?

The problem, if it could be called a problem, is the stick shaker / stall warning isn't really relevant to this crash. They are just indicators/ confirmation of the problem.

What is relevant is the low energy state of the aircraft and engines. The plane was in an energy position where it could not maintain level flight or climb. Period.

Had they tried to level out, to decrease the descent at 500 feet - the plane would have stalled and started to fall.

It might have been possible from 500 feet for the engines to spool up enough to maintain level flight. But the plane would have still sunk down to 200 maybe 250 feet AGL.

The stick shaker activated three seconds AFTER the pilots pushed the throttles forward (we don't know how far they pushed the throttles - I betting a drink it will be full throttle when we get the full FDR readout in three to six months). The lowest speed was four seconds after they pushed the throttles forward, one second after the stick shaker started.

Thus even though the engines were increasing thrust and the speed was starting to come back up - the plane was still too slow to stop descending and too low to avoid a very hard impact.

One earlier post on another segment of these threads said the specifications from idle to full power are six seconds. However getting the engines to full power will not solve a negative energy situation. It takes more time for the impact of full power to be applied to the airframe.

A light weight B777 at the end of a long flight should have enough power to pull it up at an amazing rate - but it still takes several seconds - more than seven - to generate that much sustained power and transfer the energy into forward motion and airflow over the wings.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 14:55:30 and read 47827 times.

NTSB briefing in progress.

Auto-throttles armed [EDIT: Corrected. Thanks for who pointed that out to me.]

Flight director on for right seat but not left seat.

Flaps 30.

Someone's cell phone is ringing incessantly.

Hersman explaining how safety evacuations are conducted during certifications.

Three of four flight crew interviews completed. Fourth in progress.

Three of four flight crew were in cockpit during landing.

PF hired in 1994. Did his training in Florida. Rated on the 737, 777, and A320. Was a training captain for A320 and was a line captain on A320s immediately prior to shifting to 777s.

PNF had 13k hours total flight time. ~3k hours in 777s. PIC time ~10k hours. Korean AF for 10 years. First trip as instructor pilot for 777.

Relief FO flew in Korean AF. F-16s and F-5s. ~3,000 total flight time.

Relief Captain not in cockpit during approach. His is the interview currently in-progress.

Crew member observations (Hermans indicates that this is just observation information; these things she's saying have yet to be corroborated by records or the CVR; all this stuff was just told to them during interviews)....

Approach asked for 180 kts until 5 miles out. Crew told NTSB that FO in the jumpseat could not see runway or PAPI from jumpseat. PF stated that they were "slightly high when they passed 4,000 feet." Nose was slightly up, according to FO. PF reported seeing 3-red on PAPI. Assumed auto-throttles were maintaining speed, which was set for 137 kts. Realized they had a lateral deviation and were low between 200 and 500 feet. By 250 feet, they realized that auto-throttles were NOT maintaining speed and PAPI showed 4-red. PNF had already pushed throttles forward when PF went to push them forward.

Sorry I wasn't keeping up with this. CNN cut out and I had to find a better feed.

Question about the flight crew and why relief captain wasn't in the cockpit. Hersman gave a very good answer explaining how the primary/relief crew system works and what the timing was on this particular flight as relayed by the crew in interviews.

Addressed a question regarding ALPA's criticism of NTSB in giving out too much information. Hersman responds by saying that NTSB "works for the traveling public" and is carrying out that duty. The amount of information NTSB has given out so far is in conformance with NTSB SOP regarding accidents for any mode of transportation.

ANOTHER cell-phone goes off...

Report asks question that there is a report that one of the deceased passengers unbuckled her seatbelt before landing; Hersman says they have no information on that as of now and that is why it is so critical to continue the investigation and get as much info as possible.

End of briefing.

Sorry I couldn't get more detail. I missed about 10 minutes trying to get a stream and then I hit the wrong button after an update and lost three or four lines of updates, so I had to re-do them from memory and try to keep track of what Hersman was saying at the same time.



[Edited 2013-07-09 15:00:04]

[Edited 2013-07-09 15:02:44]

[Edited 2013-07-09 15:04:52]

[Edited 2013-07-09 15:09:37]

[Edited 2013-07-09 15:13:14]

[Edited 2013-07-09 15:28:13]

[Edited 2013-07-09 15:30:23]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: flyingturtle
Posted 2013-07-09 14:58:47 and read 47617 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 59):

In a stall: First gain airspeed (lowering the nose is the fastest way to do that), increase thrust, then lift the nose.

In a go-around, without a stall situation: Lift the nose, maintain airspeed by increasing thrust.

A stall situation with such a low altitude... well... do what you can.

Advancing the throttles in a stall can lift the nose, which makes the stall worse (at least for the moment). This is true for twins with wing-mounted engines (the forward momentum by the engines acts below the center of gravity, and thus pushes the nose up).

Quoting D L X (Reply 59):
Is it true that you don't raise the nose on a go around until a positive rate of climb is established?

You would need a huge increase in speed until you begin to climb significantly without raising the nose.  
Quoting D L X (Reply 59):
It *appears* that the pilot here raised the nose before getting to the seawall, smacking the tail into it. (Possibly even smacking the tail into the water.) Would it be error to have raised the nose before the engines were providing go-around thrust?

In this case, the 777 was already stalled (oder very near to stalling). We assume that he raised the nose to get a tiny bit of altitude in order to avoid slamming into the seawall nose-first.

This situation was already so messed up that increasing thrust was the 2nd thing to do, the 1st one raising the nose.


David

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 15:00:40 and read 47316 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 70):
NTSB briefing in progress.

Thanks (for those of us who aren't able to watch).

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 15:00:56 and read 47516 times.

http://www.c-span.org/Events/NTSB-Br...a-Airline-Plane-Crash/10737440372/

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-09 15:00:57 and read 47334 times.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 55):
ut if you're worried about the cost of the camera system,

I'm not worried about the cost. I'm giving you reasons that it would likely not be cost effective.

Reasons airport operators, government agencies, etc - will say it is not feasible to implement.

While I think a camera system might be useful, I don't think any cost effective solution is going to be that valuable in accident investigations.

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 55):
They were able to calculate from the footage that the airplane was going three times faster on landing than A320's usually do.

Was the plane at over 400 knots at touchdown?

Or where was the speed 3X normal?

You are talking about the TACA at TGU/ MHTG in 2008?

What think I remember is that they were able to tell the plane was slowing down significantly less than normal, or that might have been the TAM aircraft at Sao Paulo CGH/ SBSP in 2007 that also went off the runway end and was partially captured on video.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: PW100
Posted 2013-07-09 15:05:37 and read 47459 times.

Initially, this crash initially seemed to me like the LHR 777, but right now, it is quite frightening how much this is looking like the TK 737 at AMS. Both were a little high for the majority of the approach, as well as fast. So they were trying to bleed off excess speed while still above the intended glide path, both with throttles at idle (either commanded by automation or manually). After bleeding off the excess speed, so from the point that he reference speed was reached, it took only a handful of seconds in slowing down dangerously and reaching the back-end of the performance curve, where drag increases heavily with lower speed. In AMS, the crew had only about 10 seconds once their speed dropped below their target bug speed. The throttle lever was pushed forward (just) in time, but the (flawed, semi-functional) automation took the throttles all the way back again, since the automation was thinking the aircraft was above or at the runway.

The problem in AMS was, that once the aircraft warned the crew (stall warning, stick shaker), it basically was already too late, given the energy state of the aircraft, the angle of attack (or better, back/dead-end of the performance envelope), and the very low altitude (=very low potential energy).


Quoting rbgso (Reply 8):
I agree 100%. There seem to be an over-reliance on automated flight controls, which is fine, but at the end of the day if you cannot manually land a plane in good weather something is wrong. So much time seems to be spent learning aircraft systems at the expense of basic stick/yoke and rudder skills.

I, respectfully, disagree. 100%.
I believe that this automation is saving 10 - 100 times more lives, than that it cost lives because of this over-reliance. It is my firm believe that if we would go back to the days of limited to no automation, with today’s traffic numbers, we would see a deadly airliner crash (like this one, or worse) on a monthly, or even weekly basis.



Comments that a crew who couldn’t fly a SFO approach in clear daylight should not enter a cockpit, is ignoring the plain fact that people make mistakes. People who don't make mistakes, don't make or do anything, let alone fly an airliner.

It is easy to say that hundred or thousands of flights/crews landed successfully, and those that didn't should not belong in the front office of a big twin. In my mind, that's the line of thinking that's most dangerous in our business. Why?
Because 1) there is no way in h*ll that anyone is able to identify, upfront (and not in hindsight), ALL of those "faulty crews" and prevent them from entering a cockpit; 2) even if anyone was, you would find that there are so many factors involved (human factors, dirty dozens etc) that influence the state of mindset and behaviours of these "faulty crews" on a particular moment, and that 3) those factors change from day to day, or even from hour to hour. It is impossible to do that (finding those faulty crews upfromt) by live monitoring of a persons qualification, ability, mindset, etc

Or in other words, do this virtual experiment - not meaning sim ride, but meaning a thought exercise:
Let a crew fly an fully visual manual SFO 28L approach (no ILS, no automation), and you will find that they will have no problem whatsoever doing just that. Let them do it a hundred times, and they will be a hundred times successful - some landings would be better than others, but they succeeeded all 100 times. Now let them do it a million times (remember virtual experiment, thought exercise), and you're pretty much guaranteed to see several, if not dozens of crashes. Now, repeat that same thought experiment with a 1000 different crews, and you will most likely see that every crew will crash more than once. Some crews will have dozens of crashes, some will have just a couple.

The point is, with today’s traffic numbers, and incredibly high safety level, you don't want to depend on human nature solely. This is why the automation is so important, because that is what the automation is extremely good at. And when it fails, we have back-up systems, and even more back-up systems for flight critical stuff.
This is not to say that the automation never fails. It will and it does fail from time to time, just an awfull less than human nature would fail though.

Quoting AT (Reply 30):
This might sound like a silly idea, but given the digitally advanced world we now live in, would it be (a) possible, and (b) prudent to have all takeoffs and landings videographed

I have heard this several times before, mostly on the news outlets. Quite frankly, I'm not sure how that's going to add any significant information that an experienced investigation team like the NTSB aren't able to retrieve or deduce from already available sources.
So the question then is, what use would such videograph/webcam system have other than to satisfy the vulture culture needs of the CNN's of this world . . . ?

I'll sit back now and get some rest . . .


Rgds,
PW100

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mir
Posted 2013-07-09 15:09:56 and read 47011 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 59):
Question for pilots on go-arounds:

Is it true that you don't raise the nose on a go around until a positive rate of climb is established? Or at least not before the engines spool up? (I might be mixing jargon here.)

No, the nose comes up simultaneously with the application of thrust. However, keep in mind that that procedure is based on the plane being at or about Vref - if you're much slower than that you're talking more about a stall recovery than a go-around, and for that you do delay raising the nose until you've got some speed back.

Quoting dfambro (Reply 62):
If the ILS was functioning, this incident probably wouldn't have occurred, right? It's a link in the chain of events, a hole in the cheese.

It is, and in a perfect world we'd like everything to be working all the time, but that's just not practical. That's why lots of other layers are built into the system. You could point to a lot of things and say that if things had gone differently,

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 70):
Auto-throttles on.

Correction: armed, but not necessarily on. They were talking about switch positions.

NTSB reports three in the cockpit for the landing, one in the cabin. PF was in left seat (was on IOE, about halfway through, and has a rating for the 777), PM in right sight (he was PIC, first flight as an instructor pilot), relief FO in jumpseat (had been to SFO several times before, but never as PF, just as PM), relief CA in cabin.

-Mir

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: D L X
Posted 2013-07-09 15:10:23 and read 46414 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 64):
Just a thought, but wireless signals aren't as reliable as a direct connection and if you use cable you can put the data storage unit somewhere easier to access than having to drive out to the camera itself, the best position for which may be in a place that is a pain to get to.

You don't need to transmit the data in the cameras the same way you don't need to transmit the data on a CVR/FDR. Go get the data when you need it, which is maybe once every 40 years at SFO.

Quoting flyingturtle (Reply 71):
A stall situation with such a low altitude... well... do what you can.

So, stalling at 50' is just about the worst thing that can happen, I suppose?

Was lifting the nose a "last ditch effort" to avoid nose first into the sea wall, then?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 15:10:55 and read 46384 times.

Quoting hivue (Reply 72):
Thanks (for those of us who aren't able to watch).

No prob. I am trying to keep the original post updated rather than making a bunch of them.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-09 15:10:58 and read 46463 times.

Let me say one other thing about cameras.

I would be surprised if some security camera at SFO did not capture some images of the crash. Likely less complete or as good a definition as the spotter video.

And we won't see anything about it until we see an NTSB interim report.

Even if there was a complete full HD view of this crash recorded by an airport camera focused on the approach and runway - we would not see the images/ video until the NTSB released it as an appendix to their report.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 15:12:31 and read 46484 times.

Quoting Mir (Reply 76):
Correction: armed, but not necessarily on. They were talking about switch positions

My bad. I am trying to type this all out as she's saying it and I tripped on that one.

And now freakin' Wolfie is breaking in to hear himself talk, talking over Hersman...   

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aesma
Posted 2013-07-09 15:13:31 and read 46384 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 59):
Is it true that you don't raise the nose on a go around until a positive rate of climb is established? Or at least not before the engines spool up? (I might be mixing jargon here.) I seem to recall reading something during the LionAir discussion about being configured to land, and expecting wheels to contact the runway, while in a go around scenario while the engines spool up.

I think it's not about the attitude but about the gear, you don't retract it while you're still descending, since it might be needed to bounce off the runway.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 15:14:04 and read 46269 times.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 75):
I believe that this automation is saving 10 - 100 times more lives, than that it cost lives because of this over-reliance

True, but you can marginalize the pilots only so far before they're just in the way. There was a thread recently on the possibility of pilotless airliners in the future. My position was that if the day ever comes when humans become predominantly a hazard in the cockpit, that is when you will see pilotless airliners.

[Edited 2013-07-09 15:14:43]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 15:18:36 and read 46146 times.

If you want to watch a stream, here it is. I had to find one after CNN cut out.

Stream of NTSB briefing

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Norcal773
Posted 2013-07-09 15:25:54 and read 45899 times.

Jesus- These idiots on CNN are re-enacting the landing with some type of High wing small airplane! WTF!

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: boacvc10
Posted 2013-07-09 15:29:01 and read 45600 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 83):
If you want to watch a stream, here it is. I had to find one after CNN cut out.

Stream of NTSB briefing

I'm impressed with the candor and deep knowhow of the Chairperson in this briefing.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: mikeology
Posted 2013-07-09 15:29:19 and read 45556 times.

Quoting garpd (Reply 60):
There in is exactly where the problem lies!

This should NOT be the case. It simply shouldn't.

St. Maarten is a visual approach. No ILS there. Yet pilots accomplish it all the time. So don't tell me visual flying is not practiced commercially.

Exactly. I know there are many threads so forigve me if this has been discussed but since the glide slope indicator was down as of what? First week of June. That means pilots making hundreds of flights a day using only visual with no problems whatsoever for about an entire month.

Seems like a big deal imo that is was never concern before

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: by738
Posted 2013-07-09 15:30:11 and read 45431 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 83):

If you want to watch a stream

Its done

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: nm2582
Posted 2013-07-09 15:30:56 and read 45533 times.

Quoting garpd (Reply 50):
Raises the question: Did the stick-shaker activate too late?

Disclaimer: I am not a pilot, nor am I someone experienced in the industry. Just an aviation enthusiast.

It's my understanding that the stick shaker activates as you near the threshold of a stall (i.e. it's a warning of an imminent stall if conditions are not changed). Based on my understanding, the stick shaker activated exactly as designed, upon the threshold of a stall.

At the point the stick shaker activated in THIS flight, the flight was already doomed. They had no altitude, they had no airspeed, and the only source of energy was several seconds away from producing any usable thrust (and then many more seconds away from rescuing them from the situation they apparently flew themselves into).

So, (theoretically) it worked as designed, but was too late to be of any practical use to the crew.

My next comment goes against my better judgement - I'm not a fan of never-ending automation (especially when there is a question of whether or not it erodes classic "stick and rudder" skills) nor layers upon layers of safety designed to protect the pilots from themselves; but I accept that automation is here to stay and has saved many lives.. My comment is:

Would there be any benefit to altering the stick shaker logic, such that it uses some kind of "look ahead" algorithm? If you take current airspeed, attitude, and configuration (flap setting, power setting, gear up/down, etc.) you can predict many seconds into the future when the aircraft would be on the threshold of stall. You also know the current power setting and how long the engine takes to spool up from the present power setting; so you can determine how much warning is needed to accommodate the engine spool up time. Essentially, the logic would be: "if engine spool-up time plus some safety factor is greater than the time to stall in current config, then activate the stick shaker".

This idea is predicated upon my assumption that stick shaker logic is fine at altitude (if you encounter the shaker at 15,000 ft, ease up on the stick, gain some speed, and you're fine) but perhaps not quite enough warning on final.

I'm not proposing this as a solution to the problem (clearly (if the information being presented is true) there were very core problems on the flight deck); but it seems like an interesting thought to me.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 15:33:06 and read 45281 times.

Quoting by738 (Reply 87):
Its done

Yeah, just finished, unless the stream I was watching was so behind that it ended before I posted that. My post above:

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 70):

has a brief and incomplete recap of what was said, for anyone who is interested.

Quoting boacvc10 (Reply 85):

I'm impressed with the candor and deep knowhow of the Chairperson in this briefing.

I didn't get to see any of the other briefings so far, so I was only going off what other people had said until now. After seeing her in action, I have to agree with others. She came off very well and was very thorough. There were some dumb questions but she did a great job of explaining things clearly, even if it still flew over some peoples' heads. I liked how she would take a step back after taking a question and give a good, clear, brief explanation of some systems, like she did with the primary/relief crew idea.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AeroWesty
Posted 2013-07-09 15:34:25 and read 45259 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 83):
If you want to watch a stream, here it is.

The NTSBgov channel on YouTube will have the press conference uploaded soon in the 'Recent uploads' section:

http://www.youtube.com/user/NTSBgov

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: ABpositive
Posted 2013-07-09 15:36:39 and read 45061 times.

Quoting AT (Reply 30):
This case relied on an amateur video. But how useful would it be to have high resolution video cameras filming landings and takeoffs at at least major airports? The recordings could be on a loop, much like cockpit voice recorders, so they continually write over themselves except in an accident.

Why not place the camera in the cockpit and store data in the VDR box. This way there is audio and video evidence for investigators and cameras are small enough now to be placed in cockpits unobtrusively.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: n92r03
Posted 2013-07-09 15:40:17 and read 45075 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 89):
I liked how she would take a step back after taking a question and give a good, clear, brief explanation of some systems, like she did with the primary/relief crew idea.

Agreed 100%.

Did I hear her say that two FA's were ejected out of the damaged rear section? Is that correct?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rc135x
Posted 2013-07-09 15:42:51 and read 44853 times.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 75):
I believe that this automation is saving 10 - 100 times more lives, than that it cost lives because of this over-reliance. It is my firm believe that if we would go back to the days of limited to no automation, with today’s traffic numbers, we would see a deadly airliner crash (like this one, or worse) on a monthly, or even weekly basis.

I believe most posters (including me) agree that many automated functions improve safety and enhance operational effectiveness.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 75):
Now, repeat that same thought experiment with a 1000 different crews, and you will most likely see that every crew will crash more than once. Some crews will have dozens of crashes, some will have just a couple.

Now let's apply this thought exercise: Take a crew with exclusive experience relying on fully automated approach and landing where they function as systems monitors. Now turn off the equipment and make them land visually and manually. In this cohort (compared to the one you posit) what do you think their accident rate would be? Exactly.

This exercise is not about the statistical law of averages, it is about addressing the increasing dependence of aircrews on automation at the expense of basic flying skills.

There is a time and place for automation and efficiency. Autothrottles are wonderful during cruise as they make small power changes based on OAT, fuel loads, etc. I do not believe they are appropriate during final approach. I appreciate that other experienced pilots may disagree with my assessment, and I will gladly buy a round as we debate the merits of each perspective. I am adamant, however, in arguing that automation should support, not supplant, pilot judgement and skill.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cjg225
Posted 2013-07-09 15:44:24 and read 44812 times.

Quoting n92r03 (Reply 92):
Did I hear her say that two FA's were ejected out of the damaged rear section? Is that correct?

Yes, I thought I heard her say that, but I wasn't sure because I was typing part of an update the moment.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: discoverCSG
Posted 2013-07-09 15:45:49 and read 44815 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 77):
So, stalling at 50' is just about the worst thing that can happen, I suppose?

Well, when was the last time we had 7 threads about the airliner that stalled at 5000' and recovered?

To put it another way: Yes.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rc135x
Posted 2013-07-09 15:49:35 and read 44581 times.

Quoting ABpositive (Reply 91):
Why not place the camera in the cockpit and store data in the VDR box. This way there is audio and video evidence for investigators and cameras are small enough now to be placed in cockpits unobtrusively.

I believe (and others with pilot union experience or regulatory knowledge may wish to weigh in here) this has been proposed more than once but rejected by pilot unions for a variety of reasons beyond the scope of the current topic.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: frmrcapcadet
Posted 2013-07-09 15:51:27 and read 44554 times.

I think the spotter video will provide an accurate, perhaps up to the hundredth of a second, time line for what happened during the crash, smoke and dust will cloud a lot of this. I would be surprised if all of that information is available from other sources.

Res monitor cameras, if such a camera were recording on a 2 hour (2 day or whatever) loop, they likely would need to be checked only once a week to see if they were working.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 16:10:27 and read 43799 times.



Quoting rampart (Reply 14):
Toward the end of the previous thread, there was a long quoted eyewitness report from the United Airlines pilot, in the 747 on hold at the end of the runway. Nobody has commented on it, and there isn't a source for it. Anything?

I had commented on the first posting of the same report, and my impression of it was that it sounded somewhat fishy. Why would an easily identified United employee post something like that publically even while the NTSB investigation was still going on? For what?

And then not even share any actually new evidence which wasn't known anway?

Sounds fake, even if it doesn't absolutely need to be – it just appears more like a fabrication by somebody else.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 49):
As soon as a plane goes below the minimum speed for a landing, there should be a vibration in the controls meant to warn pilots of a stall, he said.

"If they had commanded full throttle at that point," Weber said, "there's a good chance they would have made it." "

Raises the question: Did the stick-shaker activate too late?
Vref is not automatically equal to the stall speed which the stick shaker is all about.

Vref from what I know should take into account the entire landing scenario including the option of a quick go-around (which should require some speed reserve for pitching up and thus converting this reserve into a bit of climb already while the engines are still fully spooling up to TOGA thrust).

From my point of view the stick shaker warned when the only short-term escape would have been pitching down while allowing the engines to spin up (because the pitch-up speed reserve was completely consumed already), but the stick shaker didn't know or care that there was no altitude left for pitching down.

If I see that correctly, this could be a model example of why Vref must be substantially above stall velocity to preserve your options on approach.

Quoting flyingturtle (Reply 71):
In this case, the 777 was already stalled (oder very near to stalling). We assume that he raised the nose to get a tiny bit of altitude in order to avoid slamming into the seawall nose-first.

There is another way to look at it: While that was probably the primary intent, even while stalling and not gaining much if any altitude, the pitch-up still greatly increased the forward drag and should again have reduced the already insufficient forward speed to a point where the subsequent damage in the crash may have been reduced significantly relative to fully maintaining the remaining forward speed.

That the aircraft came to rest so close to the threshold is remarkable – and it indicates that the pitch-up and resulting stall may still have saved lives by quickly shedding a lot of kinetic energy in the turbulent airflow of the stalled wing, even while the engines were trying to accelerate against it.


Another point regarding the evacuation:

From the reports the cabin crew does indeed seem to have earned high praise for proving that they were very much more spring-loaded rescue specialists than just low-grade beverage servers. This deserves to be remembered.

Related to this: I have not heard of the pilots participating in the rescue efforts. I'm fully aware that one of the pilots was himself in need of assistance which his colleagues probably provided and all of them were also likely traumatized to some extent. I certainly would not insinuate any post-crash mishandling of the situation on their part without actual evidence. But are there any reports about the pilots after the fact? I didn't catch the beginning of the NTSB press conference, so I may have missed statements towards that.

C-SPAN now has the recording of the NTSB press conference online (together with yesterday's):
http://www.c-span.org/Events/NTSB-Br...a-Airline-Plane-Crash/10737440372/

[Edited 2013-07-09 16:14:27]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: fpetrutiu
Posted 2013-07-09 16:12:41 and read 43802 times.

Quoting discoverCSG (Reply 95):

Well, when was the last time we had 7 threads about the airliner that stalled at 5000' and recovered?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlMdMTy8JLg

here is a recreation:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqmrRFeYzBI

This was Tarom ROT381 attempting to land at Paris Orly airport in 1994.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: kanban
Posted 2013-07-09 16:13:52 and read 43615 times.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 79):
Let me say one other thing about cameras.

It's kind of a knee jerk reaction... consider all the flights in and out of all the airports and how frequently would the data be needed.. seldom.. Then someone will want cameras in the cockpit, others watching the FA's.. it never ends.

then General Av will complain they are being monitored as some government personal freedom violation. Actually when they has been an incident, camera footage or not, they seem to get to the bottom if it..

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: flyingturtle
Posted 2013-07-09 16:17:50 and read 43563 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 77):

So, stalling at 50' is just about the worst thing that can happen, I suppose?

Was lifting the nose a "last ditch effort" to avoid nose first into the sea wall, then?

I think stalling at 50' or less should be survivable by most of the passengers... but don't ask me about their (spinal) injuries. Worse would be a stall at 200 or 300 ft. Too little height to recover, and too high to pancake on the ground.

Here, the seawall was the problem IMHO, and to avoid slamming nose-first into the seawall was their instinctive priority in this situation. I'm sure we'd talk about a wholly different picture if they didn't "land" so "long".


Regards, David

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 16:19:10 and read 43711 times.

Quoting boacvc10 (Reply 85):
I'm impressed with the candor and deep knowhow of the Chairperson in this briefing.

Indeed. She is very guarded against misinterpretation and is extremely deliberate, cautious but still quite open about the actual state of the investigation.

She is doing a highly competent job in an extremely difficult position. Excellent.

Quoting nm2582 (Reply 88):
Would there be any benefit to altering the stick shaker logic, such that it uses some kind of "look ahead" algorithm?

If I understand that correctly, the low-energy warning in the Airbus models attempts something like that (separate from the hard protection which would engage close to where the stick shaker goes off in a Boeing).

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: matt
Posted 2013-07-09 16:19:24 and read 43761 times.

Quoting cjg225 (Reply 94):
Yes, I thought I heard her say that, but I wasn't sure because I was typing part of an update the moment.

That's simply incredible! Does anyone know where, on that specific 777-200, the jumps seats are located in the vicinity of doors 4L and 4R? How many rear- and forward facing?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 16:25:21 and read 43269 times.

Quoting flyingturtle (Reply 101):
Here, the seawall was the problem IMHO, and to avoid slamming nose-first into the seawall was their instinctive priority in this situation. I'm sure we'd talk about a wholly different picture if they didn't "land" so "long".

I think beyond the low-speed causation the acceleration tracks on the FDR will be highly interesting for the actual crash:
• How much forward speed did the pitch-up and probable stall remove?
• How much altitude did the pitch-up still gain even so (if any)?
• How much forward energy did the MLG and tail impacts on the sea wall dissipate?
• How violent were the multiple contacts to the ground in the forward and aft cabin?
• What were the g-loads incurred by each of the events?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: n92r03
Posted 2013-07-09 16:32:28 and read 42959 times.

Quoting matt (Reply 103):
Does anyone know where, on that specific 777-200, the jumps seats are located in the vicinity of doors 4L and 4R? How many rear- and forward facing?

No, and OZ's website seatmap is incorrect for this 772. We can assume the jump seats are behind the last row of pax seats, which puts them much closer to the damaged pressure bulkhead and hole. Unreal that someone can be ejected and live.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: zanl188
Posted 2013-07-09 16:34:55 and read 43109 times.

New NTSB B-roll...

Looks like a good bit of the nose gear is still in the gear bay... and the door to the forward cargo pit was able to be opened!
I'd expect the door frame to be distorted after the pounding this airplane took....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqSSrU9L9ok

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: CODC10
Posted 2013-07-09 16:37:11 and read 43069 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 98):

That's not a fabrication, it was written by one of the flight crew on UAL885 on 06JUL and posted to a private, internal UAL message board in which identities are verified and posts are made under real names. Unfortunately, this was duplicated almost in its entirety and shared throughout the web via email, which explains how the Curaçao Chronicle may have obtained it. The version posted was not totally scrubbed, either, as an internal ID appears on the first line of the email.

I would take that analysis as accurate, personally.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: boacvc10
Posted 2013-07-09 16:53:43 and read 42163 times.

Quoting zanl188 (Reply 106):
Looks like a good bit of the nose gear is still in the gear bay... and the door to the forward cargo pit was able to be opened!

Has the other engine been located as yet?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: cptkrell
Posted 2013-07-09 16:54:45 and read 42150 times.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 79):

Mixed emotions about cameras focusing on a/c ops at airports, cost being my only question. But if tens of thousands of cameras currently record people running through a red light, or ripping off an ATM, would not such cameras be of some importance for an aircraft crash investigation? I dunno. A mishap like this is of course a real but rare tragedy. Wonder what the associated costs would be comparitiively, say, as cameras for entering and exiting the restrooms in the same airport? I'm getting ready to opine, that although very infrequently needed, it could be a positive implimentation.

That said, thanxs Starlionblue (Rep 245) for updating (correcting my misinformation posted about the FA (Ms. Lee?) in the posted photo. They are ALL heroes; weren't even thinking about being heroes, but they are.

Can't let this go... although everybody else did...aaexeplot's Rep 278 (Previous Topic Part) about having 10 years of experience in professionally insuring media releases being accurate, grammatically and spelling correct falls dramaitically after reading three (at least three; I stopped counting) big time spelling errors, and the last statement was...well.

BTW, I watched Brian Williams a while back (don't get me wrong...I didn't have my channel "clicker" here in the compuiter room) who stated that the wreckage would probably remain at the crash site for the remainder of the week. After watching Brian Williams for more than a few minutes, I usually have an uncontrollable desire to take a shower because he is so smarmy, but if the report is true that will answer a couple of previous questions. best regards...jack

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: fpetrutiu
Posted 2013-07-09 16:55:33 and read 42127 times.

Quoting boacvc10 (Reply 108):

Has the other engine been located as yet?

It came to rest in between the runways about 500 ft from the 2 o'clock position from the nose of the aircraft.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: prebennorholm
Posted 2013-07-09 16:59:11 and read 42059 times.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 75):
Initially, this crash initially seemed to me like the LHR 777, but right now, it is quite frightening how much this is looking like the TK 737 at AMS.


Agree. There are striking similarities to the TK 737 accident.

But there are also differences. The TK plane had one radio altimeter MEL'ed. The crew was unaware that the faulty altimeter reading was fed to the autopilot. The OZ crew was flying a perfectly good plane.

But there is one more similarity: Both flights were training flights with the instructor as PNF. In both cases the PNF didn't do their job - they didn't watch the speed. Way too late did they realize that they bled off their Vref down to (near) stalling speed.

It raises the question, at least for me: Is it too much to combine the two jobs, instructor and PNF? Too much workload when things go abnormal?

Were both instructors fully occupied monitoring the performance of their pupils, while forgetting their job as PNF?

Would it be better to have the instructor in the jump seat and a "full time" experinced PNF in the front seat? At least during take-off and landing?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-09 17:02:06 and read 41865 times.

Quoting nm2582 (Reply 88):
At the point the stick shaker activated in THIS flight, the flight was already doomed. They had no altitude, they had no airspeed, and the only source of energy was several seconds away from producing any usable thrust (and then many more seconds away from rescuing them from the situation they apparently flew themselves into).

The stick-shaker is partially intended as a last resort, idiot-proof stall recognition/warning system.

The issue in play here is the severe airspeed decay that put them in that position, and the question is why it was allowed to occur.

Beyond the fact that there are two different sources of airspeed information on the Primary Flight Display (the vertical bar shows trend, the box shows the live readout), there are other signs of low airspeed. Even though the 777 is FBW, based on my understanding there is adequate "feel" in the controls. Sluggish control response and labored inputs are usually a sure sign of airspeed decay approaching the stall envelope.

For those reasons and more, the stick-shaker functions as I described above - the last resort face-slap to wake up. There are certainly situations, such as takeoff scenarios, where stall may be quickly approached via aggressive AoA, and in those cases I guess the stick-shaker is a more immediate recognition tool. But based on what we know so far, this accident is really a question of who was minding the store, or not, and why.

[Edited 2013-07-09 17:04:40]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Viscount724
Posted 2013-07-09 17:07:45 and read 41860 times.

Quoting boacvc10 (Reply 108):
Has the other engine been located as yet?

Photos of the other engine were published very soon after the accident.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 17:10:11 and read 41535 times.

Quoting CODC10 (Reply 107):
That's not a fabrication, it was written by one of the flight crew on UAL885 on 06JUL and posted to a private, internal UAL message board in which identities are verified and posts are made under real names.

Okay, that sounds like plausible validation. Having it leaked from an internal board instead of it being publicized directly also sounds like a more plausible context.

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 111):
The OZ crew was flying a perfectly good plane.

Could be, but we don't actually know that yet. The NTSB will have a lot of validation work before them prior to them being able to make that conclusion.

Without any technical issues being an excuse for lack of monitoring, of course, if that was in fact the case.

[Edited 2013-07-09 17:10:53]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: moose135
Posted 2013-07-09 17:16:52 and read 41266 times.

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 111):
It raises the question, at least for me: Is it too much to combine the two jobs, instructor and PNF? Too much workload when things go abnormal?

Were both instructors fully occupied monitoring the performance of their pupils, while forgetting their job as PNF?

Well, you pretty much want the IP in the other seat with full access to the controls when you have someone who hasn't been fully checked out yet in the other seat. And part of the IP's job of "monitoring the performance of their pupils" consists of watching what the airplane is doing - airspeed, altitude, attitude, configuration, and the like.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-09 17:22:23 and read 41044 times.

Quoting nm2582 (Reply 88):
Would there be any benefit to altering the stick shaker logic, such that it uses some kind of "look ahead" algorithm? If you take current airspeed, attitude, and configuration (flap setting, power setting, gear up/down, etc.) you can predict many seconds into the future when the aircraft would be on the threshold of stall. You also know the current power setting and how long the engine takes to spool up from the present power setting; so you can determine how much warning is needed to accommodate the engine spool up time. Essentially, the logic would be: "if engine spool-up time plus some safety factor is greater than the time to stall in current config, then activate the stick shaker".

This idea is predicated upon my assumption that stick shaker logic is fine at altitude (if you encounter the shaker at 15,000 ft, ease up on the stick, gain some speed, and you're fine) but perhaps not quite enough warning on final.

In theory, sure. However I think the number of false alarms you get would be large. The positional precision required is very high if nothing else, and GPS is not quite as magical as most people think. There can be errors.

You also risk confusing pilots.

IMHO, pilots have plenty of tools to warn them already. If those tools aren't giving them a hint, they are not going to listen to one more warning. Look at what happened to AF447. Plenty of information available that would have helped the crew, but they consistently discarded it since it did not support their hypothesis.

Quoting ABpositive (Reply 91):
Why not place the camera in the cockpit and store data in the VDR box. This way there is audio and video evidence for investigators and cameras are small enough now to be placed in cockpits unobtrusively.

The DFDR and CVR already give lots of info. This would seem quite intrusive. Given that airlines already use data to nail pilots who don't perform, what could they do with this? At least that's what pilot reaction to this sort of plan has been to date.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 81):
I think it's not about the attitude but about the gear, you don't retract it while you're still descending, since it might be needed to bounce off the runway.

Typical procedure would be to initiate a go-around and ask for gear up and the first notch of flaps. The pilot monitoring would retract the gear, but importantly ensure first that rate of climb was positive in case the plane sinks so much it hits the runway.

Quoting cloudboy (Reply 2):
We know low speed was a critical factor in this crash. Media reports make it sound like the aircraft was so slow that it was nearing stall speed - is that the case? We know it is well below normal landing speed, but the aircraft was not in, nor was it even near, stall speed, correct? I

Vref, the reference speed to be used on final until crossing the threshold, is Vs0 (stall speed in landing configuration) times 1.3, at least in a low-wind situation with a clean runway. Given Vref as 137, stall speed was 105. They were at stall speed. Also, even just above stall speed the controls start to get very mushy and the plane feels sluggish due to low and disturbed airflow. If you pull up at these speeds, even if you don't get a clear stall, the plane will not change direction but just keep on going..

Quoting cloudboy (Reply 2):
If that is the case, from a pilots point of view, how much weight do they place on airspeed vs approach angle and rate of descent while landing?

That stuff is of paramount importance.

Quoting Braniff747SP (Reply 3):
Apparently the stick shaker went, so that would point the airplane to being right above stall speeds.

Indeed. The stick shaker will activate at least 5% above stall speed.

Quoting cloudboy (Reply 5):
Where were the relief pilots at the time? We're they actually in the cockpit at the time, or were they upstairs in the rest cabin.

If they weren't in the cockpit, they were probably in jump seats of pax seats. The crew rest might well not be certified for occupation during take-offs and landings.

Quoting moderators (Thread starter):
Amazing stories. Hopefully helps dispel the notion that Asian carrier FAs overly focused on service and not sufficiently trained on safety. Service and safety are not mutually exclusive. These FAs are heroes!


Quite right. I recall stories about SQ006 flight attendants running back into the burning plane to save pax, including Irene Ang, who died while doing so.

Quoting slider from thread 6
LH was saying that the steep glide slope was due to potential noise restrictions and it leads their locations for aborted landings.

The glide slope is a bog-standard 3 degrees.

Quoting frmcapcadet from thread 6
Also would the pilot at the last few seconds nosed up to avoid a head-on collision with the seawall? This would seem to be a desperate but correct move??A desperate and incorrect move. At such low speeds on the back of the drag curve all pulling up does is change the pitch angle without changing the flight path angle. The only way to extend the glide is to pitch forward since best glide speed (for longest glide) is faster.

Quoting frmcapcadet from thread 6
But this plane was sinking at a faster rate than SOP IIRC, so it what point should they have increased engine power, and how many seconds would it take to recover altitude?

There's a reason DH for a full ILS is 200 feet AGL. It takes a while for the engines to spool up as you say. However more importantly the go around procedure assumes the speed is around Vref. If the speed was 20 knots below you'd need way more height, I'm guessing a couple hundred feet.

Quoting zkojq from thread 6
they deserve every cent of their pay check. Probably a promotion too. And they did all this while wearing reasonably low skirts which I thought would be impossible to run/climb over stuff in (are these factors considered when the uniform is designed?).

Presumably. In any case skirts cannot be too restrictive in normal service either since F/As do a lot of squatting and bending over during meal service.

Quoting flyingturtle from thread 6
What are the advantages/disadvantages of having the autothrottle on during a visual approach?

Reducing workload? Can one simply aim for the touchdown point (while respecting a healthy sink rate, though), while the autothrottle just cares about the right airspeed?


Reduced workload indeed. Let the autothrottles worry about airspeed.

Quoting tp1040 (Reply 44):

The ILS was out of operation and the effect , if any, on the events is not yet obvious.

Not really germane to the crash, is it common for it to out at a major airport for such a long time.???

I know there are different systems in place to safely land a plane, but the ILS being out of service makes it one less tool a pilot has to safely land a plane. Seems like an unnecessary risk and poor management by the FAA and the airport. As flier, I want all the resources available, up to date and working.

It is not uncommon. It was only out on that one runway. Also, on a clear day the ILS should not be needed by a trained pilot. It doesn't really add to risk if it isn't there.

[Edited 2013-07-09 17:27:08]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Arabear
Posted 2013-07-09 17:36:58 and read 40845 times.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 75):
Let a crew fly an fully visual manual SFO 28L approach (no ILS, no automation), and you will find that they will have no problem whatsoever doing just that. Let them do it a hundred times, and they will be a hundred times successful - some landings would be better than others, but they succeeeded all 100 times. Now let them do it a million times (remember virtual experiment, thought exercise), and you're pretty much guaranteed to see several, if not dozens of crashes. Now, repeat that same thought experiment with a 1000 different crews, and you will most likely see that every crew will crash more than once. Some crews will have dozens of crashes, some will have just a couple.

As a statistician, I'm not sure I follow the probability logic here. I'm not sure I can follow the logic that 100% success in 100 trials necessarily leads to less than 100% success in 1MM trials -- unless you are assuming that crashes are probabilistically random (which they're not: this is not a flip of a coin or "roll" of a million-sided die). Indeed 100% success in 100 trials is equally good evidence that you might expect 100% success in all subsequent trials (or maybe you have a coin with two heads or two tails  

Maybe historical data on non-ILS landings and/or non-ILS airports, weighted for improvements like CRM and in other factors across time and controlling for non-contributory factors, is what is needed to make some sort of "crash rate per million due to no ILS."

It also feels as if the overall probability of an accident of any sort is assumed to be much higher than it actually is in this example.

For comparison, there are over 7,000,000 landings every year just in the USA (granted many with ILS) and there hasn't been a crash since 2009 (although crashes are now so rare in the developed world that they present a probability problem in and of themselves). In the past 5 years, there were 2 years with no hull losses in the US.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: B777fan
Posted 2013-07-09 17:44:29 and read 40456 times.

Quoting mayor (Reply 7):
Excuse this old ramp rat for a stupid sounding question, but if the ILS was indeed, out, what difference would it make if the wx was severe/clear?

Somebody has probably already responded, but the answer is NONE!

With three pilots in the cockpit, this is beyond belief. This is worse than the three pilots in the Air France cockpit mushing their plane into the ocean from 40,000 feet. At least in the Air France case, they initially had a real, if minor problem that they couldn't manage to solve.

(edited for number of pilots in the cockpit)

[Edited 2013-07-09 18:20:54]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Viscount724
Posted 2013-07-09 17:46:08 and read 40289 times.

Quoting B777fan (Reply 119):
With four pilots in the cockpit, this is beyond belief.

Three pilots were in the cockpit during the landing. The relief captain was in the passenger cabin.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 17:58:50 and read 39893 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 116):
The glide slope is a bog-standard 3 degrees.

For all runways in all directions and for all approach paths?


Further information from the NTSB press briefing:
http://www.c-span.org/Events/NTSB-Br...a-Airline-Plane-Crash/10737440372/


Further post-crash cockpit observations by the NTSB:

• autothrottle switches in the ARMED position

• Flight Director ON for the right seat

• Flight Director OFF for the left seat

• All 3 fire handles were EXTENDED (detached right engine had a fire due to a ruptured oil tank apparently spilling on hot surfaces - no statement yet whether any of the fire bottles were actually discharged; both engines and the APU detached from the fuselage)

• Flaps set to 30

• Speedbrake lever was DOWN


Preliminary information from pilot interviews according to the NTSB:

PF/FO/trainee: left seat (10 legs on the 777, about 30 hours on type; Rated on: 737, 747, A320 (captain and instructor), 777)

• PNF/PIC/instructor: right seat (3000h 777, 1000h PIC, prior 10y korean air force experience)

• both active pilots flew together for the first time

• Relief FO was in a cockpit jumpseat

• Relief captain was seated in the cabin


PNF recollection of events as reported by the NTSB:

• were somewhat high at 4000'

• set vertical speed mode 1500'/min

• realized at about 500' that they were low

• saw 3 red 1 white PAPI

• told PF to pull back

• had set speed at 137kn

• assumed that autothrottle maintained speed

• between 500' and 200' they had some lateral deviation

• trying to correct

• at 200': 4 red PAPI, airspeed in the hatched area on the speed tape

• recognized the autothrottle was not maintaining speed

• established go-around attitude

• went to push the throttles forward but the PF had already done that at this point

• after impact the aircraft "ballooned" and yawed left

• went into 360° spin

• FO received hospital treatment due to a cracked rib

• other pilots apparently not injured

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: aaexecplat
Posted 2013-07-09 17:59:23 and read 40110 times.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
From a United pilot friend.

Wow. Just wow.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: coronado
Posted 2013-07-09 18:01:04 and read 39877 times.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don't think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for.

I wonder if ''cheat'' sessions for pilots are still taking place in Asia. A bit disconcerting to say the least.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: katekebo
Posted 2013-07-09 18:12:19 and read 39485 times.

So if autothrottle was armed and the speed was set to 137 knots, any explanation to why did the autothrottle fail to maintain speed? Any pilots knowledgeable in 777 could shed some light on this issue?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mir
Posted 2013-07-09 18:13:33 and read 39377 times.

Quoting nm2582 (Reply 88):
Would there be any benefit to altering the stick shaker logic, such that it uses some kind of "look ahead" algorithm? If you take current airspeed, attitude, and configuration (flap setting, power setting, gear up/down, etc.) you can predict many seconds into the future when the aircraft would be on the threshold of stall. You also know the current power setting and how long the engine takes to spool up from the present power setting; so you can determine how much warning is needed to accommodate the engine spool up time. Essentially, the logic would be: "if engine spool-up time plus some safety factor is greater than the time to stall in current config, then activate the stick shaker".

The fly in that ointment is that you'd have no way to predict what the crew might do with the controls, and that's going to be a big part of how close you are to stall because it quickly changes the configuration of the airplane. If the crew is five seconds away from stall, but then pitches up and are almost immediately two seconds away from stall, it still might be too late once the warning is triggered.

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 111):
But there is one more similarity: Both flights were training flights with the instructor as PNF. In both cases the PNF didn't do their job - they didn't watch the speed. Way too late did they realize that they bled off their Vref down to (near) stalling speed.

It raises the question, at least for me: Is it too much to combine the two jobs, instructor and PNF? Too much workload when things go abnormal?

Were both instructors fully occupied monitoring the performance of their pupils, while forgetting their job as PNF?

I would think that an essential part of monitoring their pupils' performance would be monitoring how they're flying the plane.

-Mir

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 18:14:00 and read 39434 times.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
Subject: Low-down on Korean pilots

There's obviously some disgruntlement showing in this report, but even admitting for a certain amount of skew there might still be cause for another hard look at the safety culture there, also in combination with the new information from the NTSB briefing above.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
You just can't change 3000 years of culture.

At least not easily or quickly, and likely not at all if airline management isn't fully behind it.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: orbital
Posted 2013-07-09 18:14:35 and read 39534 times.

I have a couple of thoughts to offer.

The NTSB has not ruled out a malfunction of an aircraft system. In particular, the request for recent 777 approach data from the FAA, coupled with the rather precisely worded statement that "the auto-throttle was armed" indicates there is at least sufficient cause to analyze what the control system in question was actually doing, and why. I imagine there to be an army of engineers from the NTSB and all relevant manufacturers studying this closer than anyone has let on. It is also clear that the relevant pilots (the two at the front) fully believed the A/T was managing the speed, and they did actually recognize the equipment wasn't working, albeit too late.

Now it is up to the NTSB to determine if the pilots made a collective error as to the A/T usage was correct or not, or if there was a systemic failure of the control system that is yet unknown and certainly unexplained.

As to the caliber of Korean pilots, there any number of people who believe there is a cultural influence as to the cockpit management, or proficiency. There are legitimate questions to be asked as to underlying failures in the piloting. But I view most of the comments thus far as simply racist. The fact of the matter is that there is no ruling on this accident. The pilots did not recognize a failure of the A/T, due to user error or system error, for roughly a minute of the descent, but the evidence is conclusive that they DID recognize it. Just too late. And what is the point of cockpit automation? To reduce workload. Reducing workload inherently means looking away from a gauge for a few seconds.

Think about that. The Air France pilots had a lot more time to diagnose what was wrong, and never did (much worse conditions, granted).

When the NTSB squarely blames pilot error, then we can go into the training practices, deficient English, and hierarchical society factors that impact cockpit management. Until then, it is just garbage to even be posting emails from buddies stereotyping all korean pilots, as though it is relevant to this particular crash at this particular stage of the investigation. There are truths to the post I am referring to, I am sure. But those truths can't be applied to these pilots at this stage.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: tockeyhockey
Posted 2013-07-09 18:20:43 and read 39104 times.

the general consensus seems to be that over-reliance on automation was a contributing factor to this crash. i guess i agree. but i also wonder if there simply isn't an alternative to over-reliance on automation at this point in aviation history. you have thousands of jets in the sky at any moment across the world, and you have the highest demands for safety of any form of transport (or frankly, any activity) in human history. swimming is more dangerous than flying. walking is probably more dangerous than flying.

and why is that? because of incredibly high levels of automation in the cockpit. to say that all the pilots in the world should be stick and rudder experts above all else at this point is simply nostalgic nonsense, especially when managing the highly complex data systems in the cockpit is a job in and of itself.

i remember the pilots comments after the engine explosion on the qantas a380 a while back. he wasn't flying the plane after that. he was managing an incredibly complex system of warnings, beeps, and data processesing on a massive mainframe computer. but if he hadn't been adept at that task, he might have lost all souls.

that's just my two cents on the seemingly prevalent group-think that's going on here about a reliance on automation. it's not as bad a thing as people say it is. and furthermore, it's inevitable and necessary.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rlx01
Posted 2013-07-09 18:22:03 and read 39142 times.

Quoting aaexecplat (Reply 122):

Yeah, meanwhile, ICAO rates Korea as the country with the highest aviation safety standards, including its pilot training standards, in the world.

So... who do we believe? Or maybe we stop focusing on how these guys were Korean, since it's irrelevant.

No one's questioning the nationality of DHC-3 pilots.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 18:32:35 and read 38752 times.

Quoting orbital (Reply 127):
they did actually recognize the equipment wasn't working

There's no evidence so far of any equipment malfunction.

Quoting orbital (Reply 127):
the relevant pilots (the two at the front) fully believed the A/T was managing the speed

If they'd bothered to look at the airspeed indicator they would have lost their faith pretty quickly.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-09 18:35:05 and read 38555 times.

Quoting tockeyhockey (Reply 128):
i remember the pilots comments after the engine explosion on the qantas a380 a while back. he wasn't flying the plane after that.

IIRC significant airmanship was required for the actual landing.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: sunrisevalley
Posted 2013-07-09 18:36:02 and read 38545 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 48):
Reports said that many survivors had "road rash" that indicates they slid along the runway, thus having been ejected from the plane

Or being physically dragged to safety...

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: aaexecplat
Posted 2013-07-09 18:37:42 and read 38668 times.

Quoting rlx01 (Reply 129):
Yeah, meanwhile, ICAO rates Korea as the country with the highest aviation safety standards, including its pilot training standards, in the world.

So... who do we believe? Or maybe we stop focusing on how these guys were Korean, since it's irrelevant.

No one's questioning the nationality of DHC-3 pilots.

I don't care one lick about ICAO ratings. IF the story is indeed true that the UA pilot tells, then ask yourself if you want someone like the crew he failed to pilot a plane your family sits on.

I have high expectations from guys piloting panes seating hundreds of pax. Not being able to shoot VFR approaches in CAVOK is unacceptable to me. And IF true, would have me avoid OZ and KE for sure.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 18:40:10 and read 38382 times.

Quoting orbital (Reply 127):
The NTSB has not ruled out a malfunction of an aircraft system. In particular, the request for recent 777 approach data from the FAA, coupled with the rather precisely worded statement that "the auto-throttle was armed" indicates there is at least sufficient cause to analyze what the control system in question was actually doing, and why.

The point of interest appears to be exactly which modes and situations permit the autothrottle on the 777 to be armed but at the same time still not active!

Quoting orbital (Reply 127):
There are legitimate questions to be asked as to underlying failures in the piloting. But I view most of the comments thus far as simply racist.

I'd be cautious about that judgment. If the above quoted mail is actually based on factual experience and is not willfully distorted due to racist preoccupations of its original author, it may need looking into – but given that there had been an earlier suspension threat against the two korean airlines on grounds of a lacking safety culture, it seems highly likely that this suspension threat will be revisited in light of this investigation, and I doubt that it would be due to racist prejudices by the FAA or EASA.

Quoting orbital (Reply 127):
The fact of the matter is that there is no ruling on this accident.

Indeed: Not yet.

I need to point out that my post on the NTSB briefing above is a non-sanctioned partial transcript of advance information from the NTSB which is not validated by the other sources yet (such as the FDR and CVR).

And that we all are just speculating here, even with some of us having substantial background knowledge on the matters (which does not apply to myself – I'm just an interested civilian!).

Quoting orbital (Reply 127):
The pilots did not recognize a failure of the A/T, due to user error or system error, for roughly a minute of the descent, but the evidence is conclusive that they DID recognize it. Just too late. And what is the point of cockpit automation? To reduce workload. Reducing workload inherently means looking away from a gauge for a few seconds.

Not in every critical phase of flight – and final approach certainly is a highly critical one where attention must be prioritized very tightly.

Not that this is conclusive yet, but they might have had a fatal combination of mistaken assumptions about autothrottle behaviour very close to the ground on final approach and being too preoccupied with their lateral correction to realize their mistake in time.

Quoting orbital (Reply 127):
When the NTSB squarely blames pilot error, then we can go into the training practices, deficient English, and hierarchical society factors that impact cockpit management. Until then, it is just garbage to even be posting emails from buddies stereotyping all korean pilots, as though it is relevant to this particular crash at this particular stage of the investigation. There are truths to the post I am referring to, I am sure. But those truths can't be applied to these pilots at this stage.

The anger is palpable in that quoted mail, but the claims seem to be primarily based on verifiable or falsifiable(!) facts, not on racist stereotypes.

These claims can be tested. And it may be necessary to do just that.

Quoting tockeyhockey (Reply 128):
the general consensus seems to be that over-reliance on automation was a contributing factor to this crash.
Quoting tockeyhockey (Reply 128):
that's just my two cents on the seemingly prevalent group-think that's going on here about a reliance on automation. it's not as bad a thing as people say it is. and furthermore, it's inevitable and necessary.

There is a fine but crucial distinction:

The problem is not primarily an overreliance on automation, but a false reliance on automation.

Meaning that it is not a problem relying on automation which you understand correctly, including its capabilities, limitations and failure modes.

But it is a big problem relying on the automation supposedly doing things which it actually doesn't provide.

Anybody working with potentially dangerous automatic systems has a supreme responsibility to know as fully and as precisely as feasible what that automatic system can actually do, what it can't do, how it can fail and how one can cope with the expected failure scenarios.

Only having a fuzzy imagination about these matters is utterly inexcusable when the lives of people are at stake.

And at that point the manufacturers of such automatic systems come into play, because they must clearly and exhaustively document the behaviour of these systems, permitting full training of the operating personnel.

If one of the automatic systems fails or is mishandled which I've specified, designed or implemented, people may just be annoyed or inconvenienced. I have a pretty good understanding of how vastly more extensive and expensive my own work would have to be to satisfy aviation standards – and still from my own experience how difficult it can be to train people on the proper use of complex combinations of layered and interrelated automatic systems.

But this challenge needs to be met by those people being trained as well.

[Edited 2013-07-09 18:57:17]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Viscount724
Posted 2013-07-09 18:57:51 and read 37874 times.

Quoting rlx01 (Reply 129):
Quoting aaexecplat (Reply 122):

Yeah, meanwhile, ICAO rates Korea as the country with the highest aviation safety standards, including its pilot training standards, in the world.

So... who do we believe? Or maybe we stop focusing on how these guys were Korean, since it's irrelevant.

However, it's interesting that KE is the only carrier to have written off 5 747s in accidents, including the 742 shot down in 1983 after straying off course into Soviet airspace. Total of 515 fatalities in those accidents (one was non-fatal, a 744 landing accident at Seoul in 1998.)

Not sure, but KE may also be the only major carrier to have had 2 scheduled flights shot down. Also the 707 that went hundreds of miles off course between CDG and ANC in 1978 and was shot down when it strayed over Soviet territory. Fortunately it was able to make a successful forced landing on a frozen lake in northern Russia but 2 passengers were killed from the missile strike.

[Edited 2013-07-09 19:01:03]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-09 19:03:05 and read 37729 times.

Quoting katekebo (Reply 124):
So if autothrottle was armed and the speed was set to 137 knots, any explanation to why did the autothrottle fail to maintain speed? Any pilots knowledgeable in 777 could shed some light on this issue?

Based on readily available commentary from 777 pilots, there are some combinations of hold modes and MCP settings that will inhibit active autothrottle.

There is also this in the 777 FOM:

Note: During a descent in VNAV SPD, the autothrottle may activate in HOLD mode and will not support stall protection

Regardless, the fact remains the PFD is there for a reason.

[Edited 2013-07-09 19:04:13]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: quiet1
Posted 2013-07-09 19:12:31 and read 37214 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 98):
Related to this: I have not heard of the pilots participating in the rescue efforts. I'm fully aware that one of the pilots was himself in need of assistance which his colleagues probably provided and all of them were also likely traumatized to some extent. I certainly would not insinuate any post-crash mishandling of the situation on their part without actual evidence. But are there any reports about the pilots after the fact?

It appears at least two of the pilots were active in the evacuation. Quotes from an article about Cabin Director, Ms Lee's account of the crash and the evacuation:

"In the process, a slide on the right side of the plane inflated into the plane during the crash landing, and Lee and the captain helped a fellow flight attendant injured when buried under the slide."

"Although a fire ignited in the back of the plane, Lee and the captain contained the fire with fire extinguishers and evacuated the remaining passengers."

"After evacuating all the passengers, Lee along with the co-pilot and the injured flight attendant were the last to leave the plane."

source: http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_v...?artid=201307091648227&code=710100

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rlx01
Posted 2013-07-09 19:14:05 and read 37149 times.

Quoting Viscount724 (Reply 135):
However, it's interesting that KE is the only carrier to have written off 5 747s in accidents, including the 742 shot down in 1983 after straying off course into Soviet airspace. Total of 515 fatalities in those accidents (one was non-fatal, a 744 landing accident at Seoul in 1998.)

I believe the entire system was revamped after KE801. Which actually bares some similarities to OZ214.

I don't think you can really blame them for KE007.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 19:16:42 and read 36944 times.

Quoting quiet1 (Reply 137):
It appears at least two of the pilots were active in the evacuation.

Ah, good. That sounds pretty much as it should be.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: ltbewr
Posted 2013-07-09 19:24:40 and read 36744 times.

Quoting CODC10 (Reply 107):
Quoting Klaus (Reply 98):That's not a fabrication, it was written by one of the flight crew on UAL885 on 06JUL and posted to a private, internal UAL message board in which identities are verified and posts are made under real names. Unfortunately, this was duplicated almost in its entirety and shared throughout the web via email, which explains how the Curaçao Chronicle may have obtained it. The version posted was not totally scrubbed, either, as an internal ID appears on the first line of the email.I would take that analysis as accurate, personally.

One issue with this statement is if it came from a Pilot/FO and didn't go through UA corporate and legal clearance, then the author could face being fired or other discipline for violating corporate rules as to talking to the press as to your work without official ok from the employer. That means someone is lying who they are or is going to be in trouble.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 121):
• both active pilots flew together for the first time
Quoting Klaus (Reply 121):
• assumed that autothrottle maintained speed

To me these are red flags that stands out from the initial review comments. By having a mismatch of pilots, you raise issues of coordination, nuances of understanding of each other, possible errors. On the other point I highlighted, remember never assume, there should have been cross-checks to make sure the setting was right for such a critical component.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: 7BOEING7
Posted 2013-07-09 19:24:52 and read 36663 times.

Quoting tockeyhockey (Reply 128):
because of incredibly high levels of automation in the cockpit. to say that all the pilots in the world should be stick and rudder experts above all else at this point is simply nostalgic nonsense, especially when managing the highly complex data systems in the cockpit is a job in and of itself.



Automation doesn't cover everything and the day you want a good stick and rudder guy is the day the s**t hits the fan. It wasn't the automation that allowed Al Haynes and his crew to make a "landing" in an Iowa cornfield (without even a stick and rudder) or the Qantas crew to get their severely wounded A380 back on the ground safely. Flight crews with excellent "button pushing skills" but poor stick and rudder would have lost both those airplanes.

[Edited 2013-07-09 19:25:26]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: BEG2IAH
Posted 2013-07-09 19:28:27 and read 36740 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 134):
The anger is palpable in that quoted mail, but the claims seem to be primarily based on verifiable or falsifiable(!) facts, not on racist stereotypes.

I would strongly disagree. I studied with Korean, Chinese, Thai, and Japanese colleagues in a grad program here in the US. The below description is absolutely true and it applies to all Korean students I studied with. I shared my office with two of them and I can assure you that this UA captain is being politically correct. It's even worse.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can't change 3000 years of culture.

Another very worrisome practice that all of us noticed is a very high level of cheating and using older colleagues' notes and help. Then when exams came, we passed while they massively failed as they had hard time adjusting to modified exam questions they haven't seen earlier. They all went back home after graduating and not a single one stayed in the US.

I expect this will be a factor that contributed to the accident and I hope the NTSB gets a chance to talk to this UA captain.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: bristolflyer
Posted 2013-07-09 19:35:01 and read 36388 times.

I heard today that they could see 3 red Papi lights. Is that acceptable if all other parameters (ie speed) are as they should be? Or is 2 and 2 the only allowable showing?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aesma
Posted 2013-07-09 19:47:29 and read 35925 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 77):
You don't need to transmit the data in the cameras the same way you don't need to transmit the data on a CVR/FDR. Go get the data when you need it, which is maybe once every 40 years at SFO.

But then what if the plane crashes ON your camera ? Do you make it resistant like a black box ? And you also have to regularly check that it is working, manually. Whereas if you have a data cable both problems disappear.

I don't think it's a bad idea in itself, it could be implemented in a couple decades, you would install them at the same time you would do other major work (resurfacing the runway for example, or redoing the lighting, etc.). I'm pretty sure it would end up being more useful to track people entering airport property illegally or things like that, though.

Quoting fpetrutiu (Reply 99):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlMdMTy8JLg

here is a recreation:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqmrRFeYzBI

This was Tarom ROT381 attempting to land at Paris Orly airport in 1994.

Scary, I didn't know of this incident ! Here is the BEA report in English, fascinating read : http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1994/yr-a940924a/htm/yr-a940924a.htm

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: dirtyfrankd
Posted 2013-07-09 19:49:39 and read 36011 times.

http://www.liveatc.net/listen.php

This is an ATC recording of the KSFO Tower between ~11:00 am PST and 11:30 am PST on Saturday 7/6...OZ 214 crash took place at approximately 11:28 pm PST.

Key Messages:

@ 17mins 48secs - KSFO tower instructs UA 885 (744 which witnessed OZ 214 crash) to hold short of Rwy 28L

@ 18mins 35secs - OO 6263 radios KSFO tower requesting clearance to land Rwy 28R

@ 18mins 40secs - KSFO tower gives OO 6263 clearance to land on Rwy 28R but cautions wake turbulence from 757 that just landed on 28R and cautions "heavy 777" off to left hand side (not sure if referring to OZ 214)

@ 18mins 56secs - Unknown Heavy (cannot make out callsign) radios KSFO tower stating they are on final for Rwy 28L

@ 20mins 07secs - OZ 214 Heavy radios KSFO tower stating they are on 7 mile final for 28L

@ 21mins 13secs - KSFO tower gives OZ 214 Heavy clearance to land on Rwy 28L

@ 21mins 26secs - UA 885 radios KSFO tower stating they need a few more minutes (if you read the UA 885 F/O's e-mail that was published earlier in this thread...he states they were dealing with a HAZMAT cargo issue and a weight and balance issue at the time)

ACCIDENT SEEMS TO OCCUR SOMETIME BETWEEN 21mins 50secs and 22mins 00Ssecs...listen to the flurry of radio messages after that

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aesma
Posted 2013-07-09 19:52:29 and read 35707 times.

Quoting bristolflyer (Reply 143):
I heard today that they could see 3 red Papi lights. Is that acceptable if all other parameters (ie speed) are as they should be? Or is 2 and 2 the only allowable showing?

Well if you see that you have to act immediately to correct it, it's not horrible yet. In this case they went from three red to four red, says it all.

I know that in a small piston plane you will not abort your landing for that, but in a large transport at 500 feet when everything should have been stabilized, I'm guessing a go around at that point wouldn't have been superfluous.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aesma
Posted 2013-07-09 19:58:06 and read 35491 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 121):
• saw 3 red 1 white PAPI

• told PF to pull back

• had set speed at 137kn

• assumed that autothrottle maintained speed

Thanks for posting that, as I lack time to follow most links/watch videos.

I quoted the really crucial points/moments in my opinion.

It proves that all the talk here by some about automation and precisely the autothrottle were spot on, I didn't intervene myself on that subject since I really don't know much about how it works, just that many here rant that Boeing does it better with their moving throttles.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Locoflyer
Posted 2013-07-09 20:00:06 and read 35760 times.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):

Not wishing to cause offence, I spent almost 2 years on 747's with an Asian carrier and left after the 5th serious incident involving incompetence and lack of CRM that management refused to take seriously following my reports.

The incidents were ignored by the company and an investigation was not carried out.

Not wishing to come accross as racist (and I do not believe I am), I am convinced the issues stem from cultural issues that beset the majority of Asian educated/trained aviators.

Those of Asian decent who were born and raised in a western country do not have the same issues and in the most part display a far better attitude and mind set to flying and CRM.

In reference to hand flying an approach and landing, I can most definitely state that in my experience the airline I was with would have bent far more 747's if it wasn't for the operation of autoland, they just don't seem to get it.

This accident, on the basis of evidence provided at this time, clearly shows that positive CRM was not being displayed.

To me, the 3 important facts of:
1. the approach was not what I class as stable at any time
2. a missed approach was not called before (preferable in this case) or at minimums
3. the PNF/Trainer was not monitoring his trainee effectively and failed to take positive action when it was clear the aircraft was not on profile
are indicative of the root cause of the crash regardless of all the other speculation provided on this forum.

It is my professional opinion, unless the NTSB can provide evidence to the contrary, the responsibility for the crash clearly falls at the feet of the flight crew, and if you cannot land an aircraft in VMC without the assistance of electronic devices (A/T, ILS etc), you should not be piloting an aircraft.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: wjcandee
Posted 2013-07-09 20:10:40 and read 35146 times.

Quoting dirtyfrankd (Reply 145):
"heavy 777" off to left hand side (not sure if referring to OZ 214)

It was not. Listen to the tape carefully and you would know.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 20:16:22 and read 34802 times.

Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 141):
It wasn't the automation that allowed Al Haynes and his crew to make a "landing" in an Iowa cornfield (without even a stick and rudder)

Better automatic support might have helped saving additional lives if it had been available. As far as I remember the circumstances, they had major workload issues in their situation even with an additional pilot happening to be at hand, forcing them to improvise more than they might have needed to with additional useful system support. In a crash with multiple fatalities it is difficult to argue against well-designed technical improvements if those would have been available or even feasible back then.

None of that takes anything away from them managing to save many more lives than anybody could have realistically expected, and they have most likely fully earned every bit of admiration (no offense intended – it's just not my call to judge).

But I just don't believe that they wouldn't have given everything to get any additional help they could have had – human, automated or otherwise.

Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 141):
or the Qantas crew to get their severely wounded A380 back on the ground safely. Flight crews with excellent "button pushing skills" but poor stick and rudder would have lost both those airplanes.

That is pretty much directly wrong as far as I can tell.

Not entirely dissimilar to the Iowa crash landing, they were faced with a severely damaged aircraft but they had a multitude of automatic support systems which they triaged and utilized to the best of their combined capabilities to avoid even a single fatality. As far as I'm aware making it back all alive was very largely due to them having a very good understanding of the systems they had left and of how to use those to get through it all alive.

As far as I recall the sequence of events, traditional "stick and rudder" flying was not the primary reason why they survived, even though a good understanding of flying basics was still very important to get the damaged airplane down in (mostly) one piece. But the FADECs in the still operating engines and the Airbus FBW systems supported them even in that.

The two events can't be compared directly across the decades and different circumstances (the plane in the older event was much more severely crippled), but technological progress likely does play some role in how they differ.

I'm not a pilot but a (non-aviation) IT specialist, so my biases naturally differ from yours, but do you really argue for removal or neglect of automated systems whose introduction is at the very least very clearly correlated with a massive increase in overall aviation safety?

I wouldn't dream of dismissing the importance of fundamental flying skills, but I hope I've just misunderstood your argumentation as dismissing technical advances such as automated support systems summarily.

[Edited 2013-07-09 20:29:41]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: wjcandee
Posted 2013-07-09 20:19:30 and read 35137 times.

Ugh. Way too much drama over this. Look, guys, the Training Captain had, as an absolute responsibility, the obligation to monitor airspeed. Period. Done. Over.

He permitted a clearly-unstabilized approach to continue past minimums. Done. Over.

He didn't notice that they were low and slow until he looked at the PAPI. A guy that has 13,000 flight hours? Holy crap. This just means that he wasn't properly trained, or ignored his training and responsibilities.

An American training captain would/should be completely up the PF's butt, and nitpicking everything, from top of descent until they are inside the terminal. That he let the airspeed degrade to -- what -- 20 knots below Vref and only noticed it because he happened to notice the PAPI is...incredible.

This is either one absolute moron in the right seat, or this is a systemic problem with CRM and crew qualification at that airline.

PS Why the heck is the PF using autothrottle in VMC when he's trying to learn the aircraft?

What a contrast in mentality to the pilot in the first Space Shuttle mission, who landed the thing deadstick the whole way from atmosphere with autopilot OFF. Sigh.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: aaexecplat
Posted 2013-07-09 20:21:10 and read 35243 times.

Watch this video. Self explanatory, highly educational and highly entertaining.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZDjkIjuHGE

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-09 20:27:15 and read 34930 times.

Quoting aaexecplat (Reply 153):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZDjkIjuHGE

That's really good and I've watched it before. I love how he says (and I paraphrase): "If you can see the airport and the weather is good, what is the computer bringing to the equation?"



Paraphrased comment from an old SK Captain unrelated to this specific incident but still relevant:

When things go south, the old guys tend take over and hand fly. The young guys put their heads down and start frenetically punching buttons.

[Edited 2013-07-09 20:40:07]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mark2fly1034
Posted 2013-07-09 20:34:49 and read 34425 times.

I have been trying to read all the post but they go by so fast. Are there any links to the Auto throttle being on and what the pilots or NTSB might of said about it so far?

Thanks

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: NAV20
Posted 2013-07-09 20:39:23 and read 34329 times.

Quoting Locoflyer (Reply 148):
It is my professional opinion, unless the NTSB can provide evidence to the contrary, the responsibility for the crash clearly falls at the feet of the flight crew, and if you cannot land an aircraft in VMC without the assistance of electronic devices (A/T, ILS etc), you should not be piloting an aircraft.

Have to agree, on the basis of what we know so far. I watched the video of Ms. Hersman's briefing all the way through (she did an excellent job, by the way, IMO) and, as far as I can see, the crew appear to have left both the auto-thrust and the autopilot engaged all the way down. Apparently, some distance out, they found that they were a bit high, and therefore set a high descent rate (from memory, something like 1,500 ft. per minute), while setting the speed at the (correct) 137-knot figure.

For whatever reason, the auto-thrust did not maintain the set speed; and very possibly they left the descent rate at 1,500 feet all the way down. According to Ms. Hersman, the transcript suggests that in the last moments of the approach the pilots weren't talking about height but were mainly pre-occupied with lining up with the runway.

Really - though incredibly - it does look, on present evidence, as if none of the three pilots up front even looked at the ASI OR the rate-of-descent gauge, all the way down?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: TheRedBaron
Posted 2013-07-09 20:44:28 and read 34193 times.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
From a United pilot friend.

Subject: Low-down on Korean pilots

No wonder years ago they tried to ban them flying. But I guess the problem is the xplosive growth in Asia, so they need a lot of personnel and they hire them and make them captains ASAP, we learned and were shocked to see the Lion Air crash of months ago being led by the chief pilot!!! ( he was PNF, but he was the captain there!).

TRB

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-09 20:48:00 and read 34078 times.

Quoting TheRedBaron (Reply 157):
But I guess the problem is the xplosive growth in Asia, so they need a lot of personnel and they hire them and make them captains ASAP,

Yes and no. It depends more on the training and the personality than on the hours. I've seen 50 hour pilots with solid stick and rudder skills (and judgement for that matter) that far exceed those of many 500 hours pilots, or seemingly this 10000 hour pilot...

Good training and a flexible mind will get you far.

[Edited 2013-07-09 20:51:13]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 20:52:38 and read 33965 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 154):
Quoting aaexecplat (Reply 153):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZDjkIjuHGE

That's really good and I've watched it before. I love how he says (and I paraphrase): "If you can see the airport and the weather is good, what is the computer bringing to the equation?"

Paraphrased comment from an old SK Captain unrelated to this specific incident but still relevant:

When things go south, the old guys tend take over and hand fly. The young guys put their heads down and start frenetically punching buttons.

Careful – he's not actually saying exactly that!

His primary catchphrase is: "You've got to choose the appropriate level of automation for the task at hand!"

That is not the same as: "to hell with all that automation – who needs that anyway?"

It is in fact very much in line with what I've written about automation above: Know what it can do for you, but also know what it can't do for you, and know what to do then!

Excellent presentation overall so far, by the way – the man knows how to explain things.

[Edited 2013-07-09 20:56:23]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: BEG2IAH
Posted 2013-07-09 21:03:37 and read 33598 times.

Quoting aaexecplat (Reply 153):
Watch this video.

Thanks for sending this link. Amazing stuff.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: aaexecplat
Posted 2013-07-09 21:04:24 and read 33484 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 159):
Excellent presentation overall so far, by the way – the man knows how to explain things.

Yes. A great speaker and adept at making and keeping a connection with his audience. A rare skill to be this knowledgeable and able to impart the knowledge in a way that is engaging...

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 21:18:05 and read 32984 times.

Quoting aaexecplat (Reply 161):
Yes. A great speaker and adept at making and keeping a connection with his audience. A rare skill to be this knowledgeable and able to impart the knowledge in a way that is engaging...

Indeed!

But still easy to draw false conclusions out of context – and his context clearly is the background of pilots already having been drilled extensively (and successfully!) on the use of automatic systems.

He doesn't actually advocate abandoning automation, just fixing excesses of blind and inappropriate reliance on automation, and not just blindly operating systems, but actually understanding their respective levels of appropriate use – including when to abandon them.

If we provisionally(!) assume the probable cause of the current crash this way, the problem was not so much using the automatic systems but rather not understanding, watching and ultimately abandoning them appropriately.

[Edited 2013-07-09 21:19:25]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: airtechy
Posted 2013-07-09 21:19:21 and read 33030 times.

That was an excellent video presentation. I note that it was filmed in 1997. I wonder if American pilots are still taught this way.....or if other US airlines are for that matter. I'm just wondering if ideas have changed in the last 16 years. If anything, it seems we have moved even farther into "button pushing".

AT

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mir
Posted 2013-07-09 21:21:24 and read 32949 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 134):
The problem is not primarily an overreliance on automation, but a false reliance on automation.

It's both. If you're using the automation all the time, you're not maintaining the feel for actually flying the airplane, which can lead to problems when you do actually need to fly the airplane. Another example of overreliance on automation would be the case of a late runway change where you have the airport in sight but still try to modify the FMS for the new runway - even if you do it all perfectly, it's distracting you, and it can't give you anything that you don't already have. So why try and use it? Automation is regarded as a workload reducer, but that's a mistake - it can easily INCREASE your workload if you're trying to use too much of it for your phase of flight.

It's common for me to turn off the autopilot and flight director and use the Standard Human Eyeball for navigation because it's far easier and more efficient for me to just fly the airplane the way I want it to be flown than it would be to tell the airplane how I want it to fly and then have it do it automatically. It's not that I couldn't do it, but it would distract me from my job.

Here's something interesting to consider: we require that aircraft do an autoland once every month in order to remain certified to do autolands. Yet we don't require pilots to handfly an approach in VMC in order to remain certified to fly. That just seems kind of wrong to me.

Quoting bristolflyer (Reply 143):
I heard today that they could see 3 red Papi lights. Is that acceptable if all other parameters (ie speed) are as they should be? Or is 2 and 2 the only allowable showing?

My personal opinion: 3 red and 1 white isn't cause for alarm or a go-around, but it is a sign that you should start a gradual correction upward until you get back to 2 white and 2 red.

Quoting aaexecplat (Reply 153):
Watch this video. Self explanatory, highly educational and highly entertaining.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZDjkIjuHGE

Should be required viewing for anyone flying a technologically advanced aircraft.

-Mir

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 21:31:07 and read 32596 times.

Quoting Mir (Reply 164):
It's both. If you're using the automation all the time, you're not maintaining the feel for actually flying the airplane, which can lead to problems when you do actually need to fly the airplane. Another example of overreliance on automation would be the case of a late runway change where you have the airport in sight but still try to modify the FMS for the new runway - even if you do it all perfectly, it's distracting you, and it can't give you anything that you don't already have. So why try and use it? Automation is regarded as a workload reducer, but that's a mistake - it can easily INCREASE your workload if you're trying to use too much of it for your phase of flight.

But that is no contradiction to me – it just says that in certain cases the automatic system is not appropriate, as stated above and in the video.

In other cases it very much is appropriate, because it prevents you from tiring early on longer routes and thus helps you preventing routine mistakes if applied properly.

Quoting Mir (Reply 164):
Here's something interesting to consider: we require that aircraft do an autoland once every month in order to remain certified to do autolands. Yet we don't require pilots to handfly an approach in VMC in order to remain certified to fly. That just seems kind of wrong to me.

If that is indeed the case, I must certainly agree with you – an appropriate use of automation for me inherently requires being capable of safely handling situations where the automatic systems just can't help.

It is good to have the option of going up an abstraction level where appropriate, but also to recognize when to go down a level where appropriate. It would be wrong to teach only the former and not the latter.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: 7BOEING7
Posted 2013-07-09 21:42:45 and read 32258 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 150):
I'm not a pilot but a (non-aviation) IT specialist, so my biases naturally differ from yours, but do you really argue for removal or neglect of automated systems whose introduction is at the very least very clearly correlated with a massive increase in overall aviation safety?



No where did I say that, automation is great and probably saved more than a few lives but to jump in an airplane and figure you can just push a bunch of buttons and you'll safely get from A to B is ludicrous (for a few more years). Yes, there is a lot of automation that makes life easier on the pilots -- now that they don't have an FE to watch over them but the only thing that flies the airplane for them is the autopilot. If Al Haynes and crew had the most state of the art autopilot and autothrottle available today they'd still be in the same predicament they were in over 20 years ago.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: NAV20
Posted 2013-07-09 21:59:51 and read 31942 times.

Quoting Locoflyer (Reply 148):
3. the PNF/Trainer was not monitoring his trainee effectively and failed to take positive action when it was clear the aircraft was not on profile

Another thing Deborah Hersman revealed in her most recent briefing was that the PNF was on his first-ever instructional flight.........

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mir
Posted 2013-07-09 22:01:22 and read 31768 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 165):
But that is no contradiction to me – it just says that in certain cases the automatic system is not appropriate, as stated above and in the video.

When people talk about over-reliance on automation or "automation dependency", they're talking about the perceived need to use the automation to its fullest capabilities at all times, because it's more accurate and it's more efficient. That perception is false for a variety of reasons, some of which I and others have mentioned. That's why I disagreed with your comment that the problem isn't over-reliance. Apparently we were talking about the same thing.

But I still do maintain my first point about use of automation, even if appropriate, eroding skills. Let's say that you're on an ILS approach in VMC, using the automation to its fullest capability (autopilot and autothrottles on). There's nothing wrong with that - you're not letting the automation distract you from anything, and you're making sure that it isn't doing anything with the airplane that you don't want it to do. In other words, you're being an excellent automation aviator by not letting the automation get in the way of doing what you want the airplane to do. Yet you're passing up on an opportunity to practice your own handflying skills in a low-workload situation. Do that enough and those handflying skills will degrade. Institutionalize that practice (on the grounds of the aforementioned perception of automation being more efficient and accurate than humans), and you'll get crews that would like to practice their handflying but can't because it makes the other pilot feel uncomfortable or might be prohibited by SOP. And that's when you've got a real problem on your hands, because you end up in a scenario like this one where it makes the most sense not to try and use automation and just handfly the plane, and pilots aren't used to it.

-Mir

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: f14artist
Posted 2013-07-09 22:01:40 and read 31795 times.

I think Mach92 shares experience and opinion of someone who worked in Korea and I don't take it as racism as a Korean myself.

Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 142):
Another very worrisome practice that all of us noticed is a very high level of cheating and using older colleagues' notes and help. Then when exams came, we passed while they massively failed as they had hard time adjusting to modified exam questions they haven't seen earlier. They all went back home after graduating and not a single one stayed in the US.

Your comments on "all Koreans I studied with" might be just applicable to your graduate school experience or your perception with your specific major, although I think it's blown out of proportion. I am an Aggie as you might be and I know hundreds of Koreans who received graduate degrees which involve research (how do you cheat that?). Going back to Korea is common for many, since there's work visa issues and some just want to live in Korea. Please do not attempt to somehow generalize academic ability or moral values of Korean people based on few people you encountered and apply that to all Korean pilots. Maybe, it's beneficial to keep these kind of comments to yourself for the sake of this forum.

The issue at hand is OZ214 and we are discussing how this tragic accident could have happened.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: XJET
Posted 2013-07-09 22:17:16 and read 31629 times.

Quoting Mark2fly1034 (Reply 155):

I fly the 767, but I am told the 777 A/T works basically the same. The A/T arm switch is always armed during normal operations. Once the A/T is disengaged via the disconnect switches on the thrust levers, they will not be re-enaged until another mode is selected. I.e. during landing the pilot disconnects the A/T via normal disconnect switches, then subsequently engages Go Around mode... At that point the auto throttles engage and advance the thrust to calculated go around thrust.

In other words, the auto throttle switch being armed is normal. The way it looks is that the auto throttle was disengaged while in vertical speed mode and the pilot was hand flying with the auto throttles off. Thus, the auto throttles weren't engaged to ensure airspeed was maintained.

For the record, Boeing recommends having the auto throttles disengaged while hand flying (at least on the 767 and 747). It makes the flying experience more natural, etc. So flying with auto throttles off would have been normal, in my opinion.

Again, I am speaking from 767 experience and relying on information from those familiar with the 777 system. I in no way intend to judge the actions of the crew before more information is known. I only wish to add a little insight into the use of A/T and the arm switch.

Thoughts with the families, passengers, and crew.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rlx01
Posted 2013-07-09 22:45:57 and read 30523 times.

Quoting TheRedBaron (Reply 157):
No wonder years ago they tried to ban them flying. But I guess the problem is the xplosive growth in Asia, so they need a lot of personnel and they hire them and make them captains ASAP, we learned and were shocked to see the Lion Air crash of months ago being led by the chief pilot!!! ( he was PNF, but he was the captain there!).

"Asia" is a big place. This is getting a little bit out of hand. "Them"? Really?

You'd think on an inherently international forum like this, we'd be slightly shielded from racism.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: onetogo
Posted 2013-07-09 22:51:49 and read 30364 times.

I havent tracked this thread 100% yet but I'm shocked to not read of the comparisons to the Colgan 3407 crash. Remember that one, essentially power pulled back to descend, airspeed bled off, power not increased and plane stalled and then crashed. Granted that wasn't at the runway, but still a power/airspeed issue resulting in stall. Basically the same thing we are hearing happened to Asiana.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-09 22:58:33 and read 30156 times.

NOTE: Not saying this crash ultimately stems from cultural issues. This is just a general observation about culture and its effect on the cockpit environment.

Quoting rlx01 (Reply 171):
"Asia" is a big place. This is getting a little bit out of hand. "Them"? Really?

You'd think on an inherently international forum like this, we'd be slightly shielded from racism.

I agree one has to be careful but there is a line between racism and generalizations about a culture.

Asia is the largest and most populous continent, and thus generalizations are fraught with issues. When most Westerners say "Asia", they mean East Asia, that is Japan, Korea, the PRC, the ROC, the ROK, the DPRK, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and other neighboring countries. Even within this smaller sample of Asia, the cultural, ethnic and political diversity is larger than, I would say, all of Europe and both Americas put together. Cultures in, say, Japan and in Indonesia are so different it almost makes you think you are on different planets.

I tried to be careful in my post by saying "some of the many cultures of East Asia". I shall endeavor to be even more careful in the future.

Having said that, the fact remains that culture tends to have a very big impact on outlook and personality, which in turn has a big impact on cockpit dynamics and the ability to learn certain skills well (or not). We're not just talking anecdote either; for example Korean carriers have a history of CRM-induced accidents and incidents. This might of course be coincidence, but I doubt it. At the very least it should be investigated.

While we shouldn't generalize too much, we can't ignore the effects of culture. If we pretend it doesn't matter, how can we then address issues that ultimately stem from culture, as evidenced by multiple crashes?

[Edited 2013-07-09 23:21:23]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: tozairport
Posted 2013-07-09 22:58:57 and read 30181 times.

Quoting B777fan (Reply 119):
With three pilots in the cockpit, this is beyond belief. This is worse than the three pilots in the Air France cockpit mushing their plane into the ocean from 40,000 feet. At least in the Air France case, they initially had a real, if minor problem that they couldn't manage to solve.

I would respectfully disagree. This incident happened within a matter of seconds and the full results are far from yet known. The AF incident was one of the worst examples of primary airmanship ever known to modern aviation. How you can hold full back stick and think the airplane will fly forever is beyond belief. Reliance on automation and lack of proper stick and rudder flying skills has cost many lives, but none more than in AF 447.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: BEG2IAH
Posted 2013-07-09 23:02:05 and read 30107 times.

Quoting f14artist (Reply 169):
Your comments on "all Koreans I studied with" might be just applicable to your graduate school experience or your perception with your specific major, although I think it's blown out of proportion.

Fair point. I did talk specifically only about these guys I studied with and also knew more guys who started before my group did. I haven't found one exception. I heard very similar stories from my friends who got various engineering degrees. Hence my reaction.

Quoting f14artist (Reply 169):
I am an Aggie as you might be and I know hundreds of Koreans who received graduate degrees which involve research (how do you cheat that?).

True and yes I'm an Aggie too.   Two thirds of my group failed after the first year, lost their assistantships and mostly went back home, but some switched to other schools. More than half were guys from Korea. Not saying anything, just that they haven't survived the first year. Those who did (two of them) had their dissertation topics and data even before they started the program. It took them a while but they changed their ways and conformed to the US ways (started challenging professors, applied their knowledge instead of reproducing what they crammed, gave up simply memorizing...). This is why they succeeded in the end. They went back home and are doing a great job as far as I can tell.

Quoting f14artist (Reply 169):
Going back to Korea is common for many, since there's work visa issues and some just want to live in Korea.

True. I went through the work visa process myself and witnessed first hand what skills US employers need. Mechanical reproducing of the facts doesn't cut it.

Quoting f14artist (Reply 169):
Please do not attempt to somehow generalize academic ability or moral values of Korean people based on few people you encountered and apply that to all Korean pilots. Maybe, it's beneficial to keep these kind of comments to yourself for the sake of this forum.

Sorry if my writing sounded offending as that was not my intention. I'm only saying that these traits should be examined as they might have contributed to this accident. I can give you a laundry list what we, Eastern Europeans, are infamous for - being arrogant, know-it-all, etc... But the US grad schools break those traits easily and make you choose if you want to admit you have a long way to go before you become good in a certain field or you want to stick to your old habits and prejudice and fail. I chose the first approach.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 23:19:18 and read 29561 times.

Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 166):
No where did I say that, automation is great and probably saved more than a few lives but to jump in an airplane and figure you can just push a bunch of buttons and you'll safely get from A to B is ludicrous (for a few more years).

Such an extreme view would be obviously wrong.

Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 166):
If Al Haynes and crew had the most state of the art autopilot and autothrottle available today they'd still be in the same predicament they were in over 20 years ago.

Automation doesn't stop or start just there.

One of the primary problems the've had which made their situation massively worse was that the loss of their tail engine ripped open all three hydraulic systems which consequently bled out and became unusable on top of all the other damage, among other things robbing them of flaps, brakes and spoilers on landing, contributing to the severity of the crash.

As a direct consequence of their crash, a new automatic system was added to the DC-10: Automatic hydraulic isolation fuses.

If they've had had those in their aircraft already, their heroic efforts might have been able to save many more lives.

This is actually a prime example for automation!

I'd rather have them not needing to resort to quite as extreme skills at stick and rudder in exchange for additional survivors, and even with all the validated hero worship he and his colleagues enjoy for what they still achieved, I can't imagine that Al Haynes wouldn't have made that swap in a heartbeat if he would have had a choice.

Quoting Mir (Reply 168):
Apparently we were talking about the same thing.

In substance we're on the same page as far as I can see.

Quoting XJET (Reply 170):
In other words, the auto throttle switch being armed is normal. The way it looks is that the auto throttle was disengaged while in vertical speed mode and the pilot was hand flying with the auto throttles off. Thus, the auto throttles weren't engaged to ensure airspeed was maintained.

While the auto throttle switch is armed, when and how exactly is the function actually engaged or disengaged in addition to that? This is not really clear to me.

There seem to be at least three separate states:
• disarmed
• armed, but disengaged (when?)
• armed and engaged (when?)

[Edited 2013-07-10 00:11:51]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Unflug
Posted 2013-07-09 23:38:48 and read 29182 times.

Quoting garpd (Reply 50):
This LH pilot is clearly far too accustomed to the computers doing it all for him and is not comfortable flying manually for anything more than 500 feet.Article in question: http://www.spiegel.de/international/...ional

Did you bother to read the article? He talks about specifics of the SFO approach requirements, not about visual approaches being the problem...

[Edited 2013-07-09 23:41:06]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-09 23:51:48 and read 28841 times.

Quoting Unflug (Reply 177):
Did you bother to read the article? He talks about specifics of the SFO approach requirements, not about visual approaches being the problem...

If the article is correct, the approach requirements are sometimes more aggressive than under normal circumstances. That's why I had asked above whether all approaches were at the nominal 3% or if there were some approaches (maybe even just temporarily) where control actually requires a steeper descent.

I appreciate the partial response to this question above, but I'm still waiting for a complete answer, if anybody knows it.

[Edited 2013-07-09 23:59:46]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: SocalApproach
Posted 2013-07-09 23:57:36 and read 28765 times.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
From a United pilot friend.

Subject: Low-down on Korean pilots

This is some serious food for thought...

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250' after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800' after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real "flight time" or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it's the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

This brings alot into perspective. I too think how does this happen when a pilot has 12000 hours when maybe not even a quarter of that is spent actually flying but rather the computer doing all or most of the work which there is nothing wrong with that unless...

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

ha!   

On another note I am surprised OZ is still using the same flight number for the time being...

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: PHX787
Posted 2013-07-10 00:03:51 and read 28550 times.

I may be late (again) to the party but I've seen a lot of OZ-bashing in the last few threads.

OZ Is a really great airline. My buddy flies them quite a bit, and says their service is better than KE. While I believe that opinion is quite relative, as are the opinions of the OZ bashers, I believe his opinion is well-justified.


The issue with OZ appears to be luck. The Jeju 74F was a result of an in-flight cargo fire, and IIRC the 1993 crash was a result of malfunctioning equipment coupled with pilot error. Only three crashes, counting this one....the media seems to lump the cargo crash together with the other two (as have I) but I want to strongly caution forming opinions based off this.

No where (correct me if I am wrong, please!) have I seen OZ fined for maintenance related infractions, tarmac issues, and definitely I've never heard complaints from customers about customer service. OZ's fleet appears to be well-maintained, modernized, and comfortable to fly in.

So let's focus on the factors on this one crash, instead of OZ as a whole, unless it has something directly to do with the training of the Pilot Flying.

I now have a serious question.

The media reported that P.F. was operating a 772 for the first time into SFO, but flew the much larger 744 into SFO a few times before. How much different is the 772 to the 774?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: XJET
Posted 2013-07-10 00:10:35 and read 28398 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 176):

The auto throttles are engaged by selecting a mode on the glare shield panel.

On the 767 the modes are selected in this manner....

• autothrottle operates when THR, SPD, V NA V, FL CH, or GA switch pushed

• autothrottle operates when SPD switch pushed and pitch mode is ALT HOLD, V/S or G/S

All Boeing aircraft are very similar, so I would be surprised if the 777 was very different.

So going off the recent bullet points from the NTSB, if the selected pitch mode was V/S and the auto throttle had been disengaged, to renegade it while in Vertial Speed mode the SPD button would have to be pressed. Of course, Go Around or another mode would have also re-engaged the AT.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: NAV20
Posted 2013-07-10 00:12:59 and read 28492 times.

Quoting XJET (Reply 170):
For the record, Boeing recommends having the auto throttles disengaged while hand flying (at least on the 767 and 747). It makes the flying experience more natural, etc. So flying with auto throttles off would have been normal, in my opinion.

The very latest information from the NTSB (published today) strongly suggests that the pilot(s) thought they'd left the auto-throttle running, XJET - right in to the final approach. But that in fact it had quit at some stage, it wasn't running - but the PIC didn't realise that until the last few seconds of the approach:-

"National Transportation Safety Board chairman Deborah Hersman said the training captain who was instructing the pilot flying the Boeing 777 has told investigators he thought the auto throttle was programmed for a speed of 137 knots - the target speed the pilots had selected for how fast they wanted the plane to be flying when it crossed the runway threshold.

"Instead, investigators said the plane reached speeds as low as 103 knots and was in danger of stalling because it was losing lift before it hit the seawall.

"The pilot told investigators he realised the auto throttle, similar to a cruise control, was not engaged just seconds before they hit. Their last-second efforts to rev the plane back up and abort the landing failed, although numerous survivors report hearing the engines roar just before impact.

"Asked if the auto throttle was malfunctioning, Hersman said that is something investigators are looking into as they examine hundreds of parameters of data downloaded from the plane's flight data recorders."


http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/america...98/Asiana-Airlines-sorry-for-crash

I won't be surprised if that turns out to have been the root cause, the 'smoking gun'..........

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: zeke
Posted 2013-07-10 00:18:15 and read 28236 times.

Quoting mach92 (Reply 117):

From a United pilot friend.

Subject: Low-down on Korean pilots

I find these sort of comments rather offensive. Every pilot I know of talks and gets information from other pilots, it is how we learn. We share operating techniques, study material, port notes, and even talk about others we get trained by or fly with.

The FAA publishes all their exam questions, anyone can buy an iPad app or computer program that will help them pass the FAA written, it is possible to pass the FAA written just using this software to learn the questions, and never opening the actual regulations (and I suspect by not even operating an aircraft, just rote earning). Organisations like ALL ATPs do nothing but prep people for ATP check rides, with specific check pilots, on a specific aircraft, and specific routes. The inference that what is happening at OZ is unique to Korea is far from true, it is happening every day in the USA.

It is true that in legacy carriers in the USA it takes a long time to get a command, however a lot other smaller feeder airlines it is not uncommon to see very young captains of commercial jet liners. The FAA also now wants pilots to have 1500 hrs is commercially trained, or 750 hours if trained in the military for airline operations. Even in the USA they give their military pilots a leg up. The flight crew in this accident had a lot of experience, I would dare say a lot more than a lot of flights operating in the USA. Experience means nothing unless you are proficient and current, as a captain doing his initial line training on the 777, and the training captain new to the role, neither were proficient and current in their roles.

Yes airlines do dictate the profiles and conditions used in checks, this is normally due to the training matrix that is used on the recurrent program, certain items need to be done say every 6 months, others maybe every 2 years. The profiles make sure that every pilot therefore meets their airlines AOC requirements and covers all of the regulators items during the entire cycle. The profiles are provided to the regulator as proof that they will meet the required training profile for all pilots.

Boeing in this case is just a service provider, they should be doing exactly what the airlines tell them to do, it is the airline that holds the AOC and responsible for training, not Boeing.

Some airlines like Emirates use the same check profile, at the same airport (MEL) for every check. The checks is, and should be a box ticking exercise, the pilot should be able to do everything required (passengers expect this of them). The remainder of the simulator session is used then as training, where they would expose pilots to things that they would hopefully never see during line operations (like a diversion due to cargo smoke).

This guys approach in given new ways to to trigger an RTO is good, you want to see that in the simulator. The parts about the hold and radar vectors I think is setting someone up. For no good reason pilots put themselves under a lot of pressure for these checks, and they fail themselves. It is true that the instructors are not allowed to intervene in the test, they can however give an adequate briefing. A lot of times these sessions are very fake, as we do not have many of the normal cues that we would see online, for example during a flight a crew will have the chance during the cruise to pull the charts out and review the approach, often in these sort of test the simulator is positioned between approaches so they can get different types of approaches done during the session, people get out of sync with what they would normally do.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 121):
• Flight Director ON for the right seat

• Flight Director OFF for the left seat

This is a big no-no on the Airbus, either both flight directors on, or off. Having one on and one off can stop the autothrust from adding thrust, e.g. the FD maybe looking for a descent when the pilot pulls back, as it is expecting a descent, no thrust is added. If both FDs are off, the autothrust adds/removes thrust as required to maintain the desired speed. That is the procedure for a TCAS event.

Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 142):
Another very worrisome practice that all of us noticed is a very high level of cheating and using older colleagues' notes and help. Then when exams came, we passed while they massively failed as they had hard time adjusting to modified exam questions they haven't seen earlier. They all went back home after graduating and not a single one stayed in the US.

People use notes from other people, and text books all the time. Next time you sit an exam written in Korean you have not seen before, let me know how you go. Having new questions does not mean they did not understand the toipic any less, it could mean they did not understand the English used in the question.

Quoting wjcandee (Reply 152):
An American training captain would/should be completely up the PF's butt, and nitpicking everything, from top of descent until they are inside the terminal. That he let the airspeed degrade to -- what -- 20 knots below Vref and only noticed it because he happened to notice the PAPI is...incredible.

I do not believe that for a second. There are more proficient and less proficient pilots everywhere.

Quoting Mir (Reply 164):
My personal opinion: 3 red and 1 white isn't cause for alarm or a go-around, but it is a sign that you should start a gradual correction upward until you get back to 2 white and 2 red.

I agree, and we should also remember that the PAPI is next to useless close to the runway. I saw a video posted on the previous thread for a visual landing at SFO, I was not able to see the PAPI for 28L, only 28R.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 00:19:31 and read 28202 times.

Quoting XJET (Reply 181):
On the 767 the modes are selected in this manner....

• autothrottle operates when THR, SPD, V NA V, FL CH, or GA switch pushed

• autothrottle operates when SPD switch pushed and pitch mode is ALT HOLD, V/S or G/S

All Boeing aircraft are very similar, so I would be surprised if the 777 was very different.

Since the AT were apparently armed during the approach and they had selected vertical speed mode (according to the preliminary PIC/PNF interview, consistent with the observed final switch positions), that would mean that AT should have been engaged as well, at least initially, right? (It seems unclear whether they actually verified AT being active initially.)

If so, how could AT have become disengaged while still being armed from there? There would have had to be some mode transition causing that.

Or could they have forgotten to push the SPD switch after arming the AT plus VS?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 00:21:14 and read 28077 times.

There is no simple "solution" to automation dependency and unwillingness to fly manually, and I think it is going to get worse for airlines. The increased cost of flight training and the MPL license system means a larger proportion of new pilots who have never been alone in an airplane. Speaking from my own experience, being in scary situations in an airplane when by yourself (a situation pretty much any new pilot has faced at least once), is a tremendously useful experience, and having been through it boosts confidence immensely. The stark knowledge that only you can get yourself safely back to the ground makes you a better pilot.

Flexible thinking is very difficult to teach to a grown-up. Perhaps some sort of recurrent "stick and rudder" training for pilots would be very useful. This need not be very expensive. Put them in a Cessna 172 for a couple of days and train slow flight, stall recovery, crosswind landings, power-off one-eighties. Put them in a Decathlon and do some spins, for that matter.

A Cessna 172 is not a 777, but the immediacy of the flying sensation might well teach more about flying manually, the actual hand-eye-foot mechanics, than flying a 300-ton airliner.

Pilots need to get outside their comfort zone in order to know how to get back to it. I do my best not to spin or stall while flying, but I wouldn't like to be up there without knowing how to get myself out of those situations, and I do recurrent training to keep those skills honed.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 178):
If the article is correct, the approach requirements are sometimes more aggressive than under normal circumstances. That's why I had asked above whether all approaches were at the nominal 3% or if there were some approaches (maybe even just temporarily) where control actually requires a steeper descent.

They're all listed here http://airnav.com/airport/KSFO. Scroll down to Procedures. I only looked at the five ILS approaches. Four have a 3 degree glideslope and the fifth has a 2.95 degree glideslope.

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 180):

I may be late (again) to the party but I've seen a lot of OZ-bashing in the last few threads.

OZ Is a really great airline. My buddy flies them quite a bit, and says their service is better than KE. While I believe that opinion is quite relative, as are the opinions of the OZ bashers, I believe his opinion is well-justified.

That may be the case, but customer service has nothing to do with flying the plane, flight operations procedures, pilot training and so forth.

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 180):
OZ's fleet appears to be well-maintained, modernized, and comfortable to fly in.

Modern planes can be crashed just like less modern ones. The majority of accidents are caused by pilots, either directly or as a result of incorrect actions during a mechanical or environmental problem.

Comfort has little to do with safety.

[Edited 2013-07-10 00:27:39]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 00:23:42 and read 28044 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 173):
While we shouldn't generalize too much, we can't ignore the effects of culture. If we pretend it doesn't matter, how can we then address issues that ultimately stem from culture, as evidenced by multiple crashes?

I have been on this side of the world long enough as well to know that your points are spot-on re: reliance on facts and inability to deal with situations that are out of the box.

But I don't think those are really the cultural considerations that will ultimately be dealt with in this accident. I ask myself - what can cause an otherwise experienced crew to make a mistake of this magnitude? It's still too early in the investigation to launch into a full human factors discussion, but I think there is a real potential fatigue issue here.

This crew originated in PVG, stopped in ICN, and then continued the 10 hours to SFO. On balance, it's logical to say that kind of duty day is much more tiring than flying a single 14-15 hour leg from SYD or HKG. How frequently is OZ doing this to their crews? Knowing the usual communication flow in a Korean company, even if crews are fed up with this type of situation, they will not challenge management, nor will they bring such concerns to senior management. It's not a matter of ethical concern even - it is just not a cultural norm to challenge authority in such a way. So as many potential issues as there may be with CRM or training here, I expect to see other more incipient issues enter the picture.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 00:32:12 and read 27746 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 185):
They're all listed here http://airnav.com/airport/KSFO. Scroll down to Procedures. I only looked at the five ILS approaches. Four have a 3 degree glideslope and the fifth has a 2.95 degree glideslope.

Yes, thank you. But it has already been mentioned that actual radio glide slopes can sometimes deviate from the visual PAPI slope (with appropriate discrepancy announcement), so these nominal numbers may not be telling the entire story here either.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: NAV20
Posted 2013-07-10 00:44:06 and read 27496 times.

See Post 182 above, liquidair. Probably the PNF. But it doesn't really matter - on the face of it, neither of them appear to have checked the 'old-fashioned Air Speed Indicator' at any stage in the descent? Not until it was too late, anyway..........

[Edited 2013-07-10 00:50:00]

[Edited 2013-07-10 04:25:33 by SA7700]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: liquidair
Posted 2013-07-10 01:02:40 and read 27097 times.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 189):

i totally agree, the fact that the two up front missed airspeed is almost incredible.

but it just doesn't sound right to me- even though the pf was making his first sfo landing in a 777- I'm sure he wasn't blasé in attitude- if anything he would have been even more cautious. Being used to 747s, he would seriously know his stuff.

and whilst some people are questioning automation, I'd like to know- would the 747s this guy was used to be as automated as the 777?

I'm sceptical it was purely two pilot's error that happened that day.

i do, however, firmly believe that whoever pulled up actually saved the 300 people on board. The energy taken away through the tail must have been huge.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 01:07:01 and read 26982 times.

Quoting liquidair (Reply 190):
i do, however, firmly believe that whoever pulled up actually saved the 300 people on board. The energy taken away through the tail must have been huge.

I'd expect the wings to contribute more to that – and contrary to the tail being ripped off, the stalling wings didn't cause a massive g spike on at least the rear-cabin passengers. But we'll probably see those events commented on in the preliminary report with the FDR acceleration tracks.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: liquidair
Posted 2013-07-10 01:16:31 and read 26765 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 191):

how long were they stalled for? It seems almost as bad as their situation was, they really had the run of luck in the way the accident played out.

if they had hit the ground flat, what do you think the net outcome would have been? My guess, much worse.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 01:27:59 and read 26555 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 188):
Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 185):
They're all listed here http://airnav.com/airport/KSFO. Scroll down to Procedures. I only looked at the five ILS approaches. Four have a 3 degree glideslope and the fifth has a 2.95 degree glideslope.

Yes, thank you. But it has already been mentioned that actual radio glide slopes can sometimes deviate from the visual PAPI slope (with appropriate discrepancy announcement), so these nominal numbers may not be telling the entire story here either.

The VGSI (PAPI) angles are listed on the same site under Runway Information. They are all 3 degrees except 28L which is 2.85 degrees.

Quoting liquidair (Reply 190):
I'm sceptical it was purely two pilot's error that happened that day.

Pilots are the cause of most crashes, or at least the lack of prevention when the should be preventing. Pilots put perfectly good aircraft in the ground all the time.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 01:29:38 and read 26508 times.

Quoting liquidair (Reply 192):
how long were they stalled for?

Not long (if at all), but the wings have a huge area and should have dumped quite a bit of forward momentum into the air by drag, with a relatively minimal g-load on the cabin.

Quoting liquidair (Reply 192):
It seems almost as bad as their situation was, they really had the run of luck in the way the accident played out.

Quite plausibly.

Quoting liquidair (Reply 192):
if they had hit the ground flat, what do you think the net outcome would have been? My guess, much worse.

Indeed - even if they had made the runway above the sea wall, they would still have sheared off the MLG, but they would have had no aerodynamic drag braking and no tail crash (which will unfortunately have contributed to the injuries, as may have the MLG impact). They should have been quite a bit faster.

On the other hand, there could have been the (not very large) possibility of a relatively benign belly slide without the big impacts with the tail and after spinning high through the air.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: liquidair
Posted 2013-07-10 01:35:41 and read 26359 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 193):
Pilots are the cause of most crashes, or at least the lack of prevention when the should be preventing. Pilots put perfectly good aircraft in the ground all the time.

that's very true, but in a situation where the one not flying is training - i struggle to believe neither checked airspeed.

added that they were, in fact, experienced pilots... There must be something which precipitated things.

a question for the pilots out there- how many of you ignore airspeed on final approach?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 01:36:43 and read 26339 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 193):
The VGSI (PAPI) angles are listed on the same site under Runway Information. They are all 3 degrees except 28L which is 2.85 degrees.

Yes, I was referring to those: They may not actually force the controllers to always actually stick to these slopes on every approach as far as I've read.

The Asiana flight of course had to stick to the PAPI slope for lack of radio guidance, but the infamous "slam dunk approach" does appear to exist, according to this older article:

http://www.uproar.org/cached/SFChron.8.6.98.html

Quote:
Ideally, arriving flights from the north or the Pacific fly south from Point
Reyes to the bay, where they take a sharp right turn onto SFO. Called the ?slam
dunk? approach, this is the quietest flight pattern.

Can anybody comment on this particular approach pattern?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: justloveplanes
Posted 2013-07-10 01:42:06 and read 26287 times.

Just to cut to the chase,

If the target airspeed was 137 knots entered somewhere, why can't a low airspeed alarm be generated? Is this because auto-throttle is not active (armed but not active). If the A/T was active, is a low airspeed alarm generated in advance of the VERY low speed alarm (stick shaker)?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: tcfc424
Posted 2013-07-10 02:08:23 and read 25769 times.

So there are a few questions and observations I have now.

1) Once again, I thing NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman is just amazing. Knowledgeable, clear, concise, objective...everything you want in someone leading an investigation of this magnitude. Obviously, she is not doing this alone, and that lends itself to her being a great leader...surround yourself with a good team. Major kudos to the entire NTSB team working this accident!

2) It does seem to me that CRM culture may have played a part in this accident. I will not say what my initial thoughts were after hearing the pilots survived, but I will say that I hope someone is watching them. Dishonor (as this may well prove to be) in any Asian culture, is not dealt with well.

3) It does seem to me that actual piloting skills...stick and throttle piloting...may be taking a back seat to automation, leading to a situation such as this. Before we had all this fancy automated stuff like ILS, pilots still flew...and now that seems to be the minority. Basic airmanship skills should be (almost) intrinsic to any pilot with an ATP certification.

4) There may have been an issue with the aircraft. I am not, nor do I claim to be, a pilot, and certainly do not have any knowledge about the systems of a 777-200 ER (or any other aircraft for that matter), however if the A/T was correctly configured (remains to be seen) then why did it not maintain 137 KIAS?

5) From the briefing today, and the corresponding injuries reported by SF General, it does seem that some pax were "ejected" from the aircraft during the crash. Based on the extensive damage to the rear of the aircraft, it seems possible. How anyone would survive that kind of trauma is truly beyond my realm of thought.

6) The coroner stated it may be 2-3 weeks before a conclusive cause of death can be ascertained...this to me seems odd. Chairman Hersman stated after a review of surveillance video, they were inconclusive as to whether or not an ARFF vehicle was to blame...and I will go further into this:
6a) A typical ARFF response includes several large vehicles specially designed for ARFF purposes. These are OSHKOSH trucks that typically seat only 1, the driver, who sits in the middle. These are very large vehicles, and have very specific purposes. One of the main purposes of this type vehicle is to approach the aircraft and penetrate the passenger compartment to quickly extinguish fires within the passenger compartment to aid in life safety and evacuation.
6b) In a response such as this, i.e. responding to an aircraft down with fire as opposed to an alert III where crews are positioned and have time to think the response through, tunnel vision is a very dangerous, and ever present possibility. You are responding to a plane on fire and know your job is to extinguish fire within the aircraft. You see the plane, fire, and people evacuating...as well as debris everywhere. Seconds count.
6c) It is interesting that the SFFD went to the NTSB and the coroner and advised they may be at fault for one of the fatalities...That means the driver may have known they could have hit a passenger, or it could be that after the smoke had cleared (literally) that the crew realized there was an issue.
6d) Even if (and I don't condone this, just stating as a hypothetical) the ARFF vehicle struck a passenger, how many lives may they have saved as a result of their quick response and attention to their duty? Don't get me wrong...I am not valuing one person's life over someone else's, I am just raising the possibility that their overall actions saved more than they lost. My fire chief always had a saying that I use to this day. "We will risk a lot to save a lot...we will risk nothing to save nothing" In this case, there were 307 lives in the balance.
6e) Final though on this...why would it take 3 weeks to decide if the passenger was killed by a fire truck or the crash itself? We aren't looking for toxicology reports...it would be fairly obvious the cause of death if it were caused by an Oshkosh. I truly find this response from the ME perplexing...and the only logical explanation I can come up with is bunt force trauma is blunt force trauma, whether it be imposed by a 777 or a P-19 (Oshkosh).

7) It has been reported that the fire began when oil leaked on the engine. I believe I explained that as a possible cause of the ensuing cabin fire...perhaps in Part 5? Let's keep the duty free flowing!

8) I think we can quash the idea that OZ is terrible at post-crash support and that as an alliance member, contracts exist that allow (or empower?) UA to step in and handle a lot of the issues (which they have).

Just my thoughts.

Mike

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: passedv1
Posted 2013-07-10 02:13:42 and read 25723 times.

This accident simply demonstrates what I have been saying... It's not just about total time, how you got your total time matters. I'm curious if I trained with the captain as him and I were in Florida training at about the same time. Here is the difference between an American at a Flight Safety or an Embry Riddle vs pilots from other countries with accelerated career paths in there countries (France, Greece, Italy, Korea, China, India etc.)

American in the 90's
FlightSafety-type professional pilot program (ratings through Commercial, CFMEII). 0-250 hours
Flight instructor 1-2 years 250-1200 hours (800-1,000 sorties, supervise 5,000ish landings, 500ish Instrument approaches)
Regional FO 1,200 - 3,000 hours (1,000 landings, hundreds of instrument Approaches)
Regional Captain 3,000-5,000 hours (another 1,000 landings, hundreds more instrument Approaches)
Major Airline NB FO 5,000-15,000 hours (hundreds more landings)
Major Airline WB FO 15,000-25,000 (hundreds more landings)
25,000+ hours, congratulations, you've arrived at your first leg as a 777 Captain.

Accelerated countries
FlightSafety-type professional pilot program (ratings through Commercial). 0-200hour
Turbine qualification course (Lear and/or King Air time) 200-210
RO on International WB 210-1,200 (Cruise only-don't get any stick time)
FO on NB1,200-4,000 (737 or A320)
WB FO 4,000-7,000
NB CA 7,000-10,000
WB CA 10,000+

The important thing to note is the percentage of time each flies in highly automated jets. It is also interesting to note where a 9,000 hour pilot is in the US vs this "seasoned" crews 9,000 hours.

You cannot learn stick and rudder skills in an airliner, especially if you have been almost exclusively in an environment that makes you turn all the automation on at 500'.

What experience gives you is a sixth sense of what is going on. When I was a brand new FO I was amazed that my IOE Captain in the t/p I was flying could be heads down adjusting the radio and then tell me "speeds getting low". I later learned as I slowly developed the ability also was he was able to tell our speed based on the amount of wind noise and the whine of the props.

With experience, flying becomes more like driving your own car than operating a sophisticated piece of machinery. When things go sideways you are quick to sense it and can quickly correct. How much concentration does it take you to pull out of your garage? How much concentration did it take when you were a teenager?

An experienced crew should have been able to tell they were slow without an airspeed indicator. High deck angle...low wind noise...high sink rate. This is basic flying 101.

This is yet another example of why me or my family will absolutely not be flying on many foreign carriers in Asia and Europe. I don't care how good the service is.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: UALWN
Posted 2013-07-10 02:14:01 and read 25817 times.

Quoting wnbob (Reply 45):
Air France 447 showed, once automation goes haywire, even so called experienced pilots can succumb. Scary.

Automation did not go haywire in AF447. The PF did.

Quoting SLCGuy (Reply 46):
This combined with AF447 where the pilots relied on the automation and ignored the basic flight information that would tell even a student pilot the aircraft was stalling.

The AF447 pilots did not rely on the automation. Actually, they totally disregarded the automated stall warnings.

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 111):
Were both instructors fully occupied monitoring the performance of their pupils, while forgetting their job as PNF?

There's something else. The instructor pilot may not want to interfere with the trainee until the last moment, giving the trainee a chance to discover his mistakes and recover himself from them. At the end, the instructor decides it's time to intervene, but it may be too late... I'm not saying this is what happened in this case, but that, in general, this might be a risk associated with having the PNF as an instructor pilot.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 02:18:09 and read 25565 times.

Quoting tcfc424 (Reply 198):
6e) Final though on this...why would it take 3 weeks to decide if the passenger was killed by a fire truck or the crash itself? We aren't looking for toxicology reports...it would be fairly obvious the cause of death if it were caused by an Oshkosh.

There may be evidence for both and since both events would have happened in close succession, it may be nontrivial to determine whether she was in fact still alive before being run over, particularly to the degree of certainty which would be needed.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: PHX787
Posted 2013-07-10 02:23:40 and read 25590 times.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 182):
The very latest information from the NTSB (published today) strongly suggests that the pilot(s) thought they'd left the auto-throttle running, XJET - right in to the final approach. But that in fact it had quit at some stage, it wasn't running - but the PIC didn't realise that until the last few seconds of the approach:-

If that indeed is the case, then it's definitely pilot error, but not directly at that one pilot with 43 hours; it's basically all 4 of them's responsibility to go through each relevant checklist before continuing further, am i right?


but again, just speculation based off of the current NTSB reporting. This investigation will take quite some time, I think.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: UALWN
Posted 2013-07-10 02:29:09 and read 25489 times.

Quoting passedv1 (Reply 199):
This is yet another example of why me or my family will absolutely not be flying on many foreign carriers in Asia and Europe.

Well, it's not like US pilots do not make mistakes. We could start a list of crashes of US-based airlines due to pilot error. Pilots who would have followed the more stringent path you described. We could start with those at AA: AA1572 in 1995, AA965 also in 1995, AA1420 in 1999, AA587 in 2001, AA331 in 2009...

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 02:31:10 and read 25664 times.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 197):
If the target airspeed was 137 knots entered somewhere, why can't a low airspeed alarm be generated? Is this because auto-throttle is not active (armed but not active). If the A/T was active, is a low airspeed alarm generated in advance of the VERY low speed alarm (stick shaker)?

Apart from the stick shaker, the stall horn and the stick pusher, there are also clear indications on the speedtape once you approach the stall speed. Besides, I assume Vref is also bugged on the speed tape.

On a side note, if I'd been in the jump seat you could have added my ladylike shrieks to the aural warnings.

Quoting tcfc424 (Reply 198):
6) The coroner stated it may be 2-3 weeks before a conclusive cause of death can be ascertained...this to me seems odd. Chairman Hersman stated after a review of surveillance video, they were inconclusive as to whether or not an ARFF vehicle was to blame...and I will go further into this:

I think this is a function of the real world not being CSI:Miami. This was a complex situation. Secondly, they want to be really sure. Thirdly, they don't want to overpromise.

[Edited 2013-07-10 02:34:12]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: tcfc424
Posted 2013-07-10 02:32:06 and read 25668 times.

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 202):

Truly, this seems to be a poster child for the NTSB and any accident investigation. It's never just 1 thing...its a cascade of small issues that in cooperation cause an accident. This is why they examine so many factors, and instead of "placing blame" issue "recommendations" to prevent future problems. In the end, I am guessing that there will be no less than 10 contributing factors that led to this accident.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 02:41:17 and read 25495 times.

Quoting passedv1 (Reply 199):
American in the 90's
FlightSafety-type professional pilot program (ratings through Commercial, CFMEII). 0-250 hours
Flight instructor 1-2 years 250-1200 hours (800-1,000 sorties, supervise 5,000ish landings, 500ish Instrument approaches)
Regional FO 1,200 - 3,000 hours (1,000 landings, hundreds of instrument Approaches)
Regional Captain 3,000-5,000 hours (another 1,000 landings, hundreds more instrument Approaches)
Major Airline NB FO 5,000-15,000 hours (hundreds more landings)
Major Airline WB FO 15,000-25,000 (hundreds more landings)
25,000+ hours, congratulations, you've arrived at your first leg as a 777 Captain.

Accelerated countries
FlightSafety-type professional pilot program (ratings through Commercial). 0-200hour
Turbine qualification course (Lear and/or King Air time) 200-210
RO on International WB 210-1,200 (Cruise only-don't get any stick time)
FO on NB1,200-4,000 (737 or A320)
WB FO 4,000-7,000
NB CA 7,000-10,000
WB CA 10,000+

I see your argument. However the United States has the great luxury of having a comparatively gigantic general aviation community plus a large amount of air travel with tons of airports. No way a country like Indonesia can support this sort of thing. The average income is just too low.

I do think experience of hand flying is a must, but I also think that you can make fewer hours work better by emphasizing stick and rudder skills, making instructional hours more scenario based, and changing the thinking around the usage of automation.

[Edited 2013-07-10 03:22:10]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: zeke
Posted 2013-07-10 02:46:22 and read 25433 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 206):

I don't, the US DoD have many very young men and women flying aircraft like the B52 without anywhere near those sort of hours. Hours mean nothing by themselves. That is pilots are required to have theory credits, plus experience, plus a skills test to gain a qualification. One without the other two means nothing.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AeroWesty
Posted 2013-07-10 02:56:28 and read 25123 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 196):
Quote:
Ideally, arriving flights from the north or the Pacific fly south from Point
Reyes to the bay, where they take a sharp right turn onto SFO. Called the ?slam
dunk? approach, this is the quietest flight pattern.

Can anybody comment on this particular approach pattern?

That would be landing on the 19s, which is what flights were doing in the first few hours once SFO was re-opened on Saturday. It would be contraflow to traffic taking off on the 1s, of course. It would certainly reduce noise for nearby communities, but I would think greatly hamper the number of takeoffs and landings SFO would be capable of handling. There's also the flights taking off from OAK across the bay to consider, which might have some bearing on flight paths available for landing on the 19s.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 03:01:32 and read 25151 times.

That stuff is just silly. Obviously Koreans can fly. Has anyone on the other side of the drink seen some of the fields and mountainous approaches in ROK these guys cut their teeth on as domestic drivers?

The question is not whether an entire nationality lacks airmanship - which is ridiculous. The question is why did this particular crew forget everything they knew about flying for a moment last Saturday?

Quoting passedv1 (Reply 199):
American in the 90's
FlightSafety-type professional pilot program (ratings through Commercial, CFMEII). 0-250 hours
Flight instructor 1-2 years 250-1200 hours (800-1,000 sorties, supervise 5,000ish landings, 500ish Instrument approaches)
Regional FO 1,200 - 3,000 hours (1,000 landings, hundreds of instrument Approaches)
Regional Captain 3,000-5,000 hours (another 1,000 landings, hundreds more instrument Approaches)
Major Airline NB FO 5,000-15,000 hours (hundreds more landings)
Major Airline WB FO 15,000-25,000 (hundreds more landings)
25,000+ hours, congratulations, you've arrived at your first leg as a 777 Captain.

Accelerated countries
FlightSafety-type professional pilot program (ratings through Commercial). 0-200hour
Turbine qualification course (Lear and/or King Air time) 200-210
RO on International WB 210-1,200 (Cruise only-don't get any stick time)
FO on NB1,200-4,000 (737 or A320)
WB FO 4,000-7,000
NB CA 7,000-10,000
WB CA 10,000+

It really is not that simple. Many countries can not support that kind of training infrastructure period. You have also thrown out a few notable countries that do employ ab initio programs with regularity that throw their cadets into jets and turboprops as a rule. Ya know, places like the UK, Germany, Hong Kong...are you telling me these people can't fly? This is a management issue as much as a quality of experience issue.

Quoting passedv1 (Reply 199):
What experience gives you is a sixth sense of what is going on. When I was a brand new FO I was amazed that my IOE Captain in the t/p I was flying could be heads down adjusting the radio and then tell me "speeds getting low". I later learned as I slowly developed the ability also was he was able to tell our speed based on the amount of wind noise and the whine of the props.

Nonetheless, North American pilots are not perfect either. NW 255? AA 965? AA 1420? WN 1455? HP 556? AA 331?

This kind of exceptionalist attitude is self-defeating. Aviators are a global community, and should be treated as such.

[Edited 2013-07-10 04:28:15 by SA7700]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: spink
Posted 2013-07-10 03:02:50 and read 24990 times.

2.85 degrees for 28L is the slope for the new CSPRs approach procedure that goes down to cat 1 minimums to mitigate weather related arrival rate delays.

[Edited 2013-07-10 04:18:12 by SA7700]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 03:23:36 and read 24567 times.

Quoting zeke (Reply 207):
Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 206):

I don't, the US DoD have many very young men and women flying aircraft like the B52 without anywhere near those sort of hours. Hours mean nothing by themselves. That is pilots are required to have theory credits, plus experience, plus a skills test to gain a qualification. One without the other two means nothing.

I think we are on the same page and have amended above to clarity. As I said:

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 206):
I also think that you can make fewer hours work better by emphasizing stick and rudder skills, making instructional hours more scenario based, and changing the thinking around the usage of automation.

I should have been clearer that I think the US model is not reproducible since it is a product of a bit of a special case.

As you say airlines and air forces all over the world have no problem making pilots safe without 10000 hours, or even 1000 or 500. As I said earlier I have seen 50 hour pilots with better skills and judgement than 500 hour pilots. It is the quality of the training, the quality of the tests and the culture of the airline that really counts.

[Edited 2013-07-10 03:24:53]

[Edited 2013-07-10 03:27:35]

[Edited 2013-07-10 03:27:52]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: justloveplanes
Posted 2013-07-10 03:37:32 and read 24219 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 204):
Apart from the stick shaker, the stall horn and the stick pusher, there are also clear indications on the speedtape once you approach the stall speed. Besides, I assume Vref is also bugged on the speed tape.

Forgiving my massive ignorance, but what is the speed tape? Is that like a speedometer? What does it look like on a 777? What does the Vref look like marked on that thing? Is it hard to miss and I guess normal procedure to eagle eye that on landing?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 03:42:34 and read 24156 times.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 208):
That would be landing on the 19s, which is what flights were doing in the first few hours once SFO was re-opened on Saturday. It would be contraflow to traffic taking off on the 1s, of course. It would certainly reduce noise for nearby communities, but I would think greatly hamper the number of takeoffs and landings SFO would be capable of handling. There's also the flights taking off from OAK across the bay to consider, which might have some bearing on flight paths available for landing on the 19s.

Actually no, the slam dunk approach he is referring to is the down the bay visual approach Transpacific and northerly arrivals often fly.

They come high over SF city and make a 180 degree turn before the Dumbarton bridge to line up for the 28s. Sometimes for 28L they'll be vectored in from the coastline and make the turn for the 28s over the mountains and Palo Alto. Often on these approaches you need to get down pretty quick - hence the nickname.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: garpd
Posted 2013-07-10 03:42:42 and read 24120 times.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 212):
Forgiving my massive ignorance, but what is the speed tape? Is that like a speedometer? What does it look like on a 777? What does the Vref look like marked on that thing? Is it hard to miss and I guess normal procedure to eagle eye that on landing?

The speed tape is the speed indication on the left hand side of the PFD (PRimary Flight Display)

http://www.meriweather.com/flightdeck/777/fwd/pfd.jpg

As you approach stall or over speed, the speed units are accompanied by a red "checker" type pattern as seen in the picture linked above.

[Edited 2013-07-10 03:54:38]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 03:47:31 and read 24054 times.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 212):
Forgiving my massive ignorance, but what is the speed tape? Is that like a speedometer? What does it look like on a 777?


The speed tape is the vertical bar on the left side of the Primary Flight Display. It gives trending information, meaning its movement up or down, and rate of movement, indicate whether airspeed is increasing or decreasing, and rate of change can be perceived at a glance.

The white box in the middle of the tape provides a relatively live numeric airspeed readout. So just in that one spot you have two invaluable sources of airspeed information. If you set a target airspeed, it will show in magenta at upper left, as you can see in the picture.

There are a couple of other things it can tell you, but there's no need to get that technical here.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 03:48:15 and read 24074 times.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 212):
Forgiving my massive ignorance, but what is the speed tape? Is that like a speedometer? What does it look like on a 777? What does the Vref look like marked on that thing? Is it hard to miss and I guess normal procedure to eagle eye that on landing?

On a PFD (Primary Flight Display) the "speed tape" is a speed display that looks like a vertical strip on the left side. So yes, like a speedometer to keep things simple. It is "bugged" with speeds like V1 and Vr on take-off, and Vref on approach. It also has indications on the low side for stall speed and on the high side for mach buffet. There is a large number showing the exact speed and a trend arrow showing a speed trend.

As you can see from the picture, the PFD has speed on the left (you can see Vref), attitude and slip indicator in the middle, directional "compass" on the bottom, altitude and vertical speed on the right. It shows autopilot and autothrottle modes on top. In this case "Speed" is active on the autothrottles, and localizer plus glideslope on the autopilot(s). The magenta cross in the middle is the flight director, which shows how the autoflight system wants you or the autopilot to pitch and bank. The circular indicator on top right that says 740 is the radar altimeter height.

The red squares on the low side of the speed tape show stall speed.

http://aerowinx.com/assets/pics/psxA54pfd01.jpg

Anyway pretty much all the information you really need for a visual approach apart from engine instruments and windows, right there in front of the noses of the pilots. One each.

[Edited 2013-07-10 03:48:51]

[Edited 2013-07-10 03:49:34]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: liquidair
Posted 2013-07-10 03:53:09 and read 23943 times.

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 209):

just to be clear, i was being sarcastic... I found that post to be offensive, derogatory and completely ignorant.

and whilst i agree that we have to ask why they forgot their training in that moment, I'm going to reiterate what i said before... They're not imbecilic monkeys in that cockpit, there must be more to it than meets the eye.

but tarnishing a whole culture like that is unacceptable.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AeroWesty
Posted 2013-07-10 04:07:17 and read 23497 times.

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 213):
Sometimes for 28L they'll be vectored in from the coastline and make the turn for the 28s over the mountains and Palo Alto.

But that's a left turn, not a right turn.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 04:28:05 and read 22902 times.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 217):
But that's a left turn, not a right turn.

Yep, and the right turn is this part - I just wasn't clear that this is usually for 28R:

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 212):
They come high over SF city and make a 180 degree turn before the Dumbarton bridge to line up for the 28s.
Quoting liquidair (Reply 216):
just to be clear, i was being sarcastic... I found that post to be offensive, derogatory and completely ignorant.

Sorry I was quoting your reaction to the same junk in full agreement.

Quoting liquidair (Reply 216):
They're not imbecilic monkeys in that cockpit, there must be more to it than meets the eye.

We're on the same page here - that's why I posted above that it will be interesting to see what NTSB finds about the management culture at OZ and how they seem to routinely give crew schedules like PVG-ICN-SFO.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: justloveplanes
Posted 2013-07-10 04:28:13 and read 22940 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 215):

Anyway pretty much all the information you really need for a visual approach apart from engine instruments and windows, right there in front of the noses of the pilots. One each.

Many thanks, terrifically informative.

So normally, keep the speed between the red marks, and the pitch and bank lined up to the flight director. Does the glideslope control need to be on for the flight director to provide meaningful information on a landing?

Is there a landing mode where the "altitude tape" on the right also provides a target (albeit dynamically updated on a landing descent)?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AeroWesty
Posted 2013-07-10 04:36:47 and read 22829 times.

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 217):

Yep, and the right turn is this part - I just wasn't clear that this is usually for 28R:

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 212):
They come high over SF city and make a 180 degree turn before the Dumbarton bridge to line up for the 28s

That's probably where I'm confused a bit, since in 40 years of flying into SFO I've never flown or seen flown a heading down the middle of the bay, turning right for a 180 onto 28R. We've either done this:

http://flightaware.com/live/flight/A...4/history/20130704/1435Z/KPDX/KSFO

Or on the very, very rare occasion flown down over the Central Valley and then made a right to enter the pattern of traffic coming in from the south and east.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mark2fly1034
Posted 2013-07-10 04:37:56 and read 22689 times.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 218):
altitude tape

I would have to say Yes that the GS would need to be captured for it to show on the Altitude side as a pink diamond and the FD. But we have to remember Glide slope was out of service. Now in the 777 I dont know if there is a way for them to "fake" a GS like the MD-11 I believe could. If you land on an RNAV app it will make an artificial GS that can be used.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 04:40:40 and read 22595 times.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 218):
So normally, keep the speed between the red marks, and the pitch and bank lined up to the flight director. Does the glideslope control need to be on for the flight director to provide meaningful information on a landing?

You want to much more precise than between the red marks for the speed on approach. Within a few knots in calm winds. You also need to keep vertical speed (on the far right) within fairly close margins under 1000 feet.

A pilot should be able to fly without the flight director. I'll let the big iron drivers tell you what the flight director does without a glideslope.

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 218):
Is there a landing mode where the "altitude tape" on the right also provides a target (albeit dynamically updated on a landing descent)?

You set a minimums altitude/height and it gets bugged on the altitude tape. You get an aural "minimums" call. The radio altimeter tells you your exact height above the ground. Barometric altimeters can be off by 75 feet either way, which is not precise enough for anything more than Cat I, and besides they can be set to the wrong pressure.

In the SFO accident case the radio altimeter would have been showing height over the water but there's only about 15 feet of difference compared to the runway.

[Edited 2013-07-10 04:57:11]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 04:41:05 and read 22606 times.

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 211):
They come high over SF city and make a 180 degree turn before the Dumbarton bridge to line up for the 28s. Sometimes for 28L they'll be vectored in from the coastline and make the turn for the 28s over the mountains and Palo Alto. Often on these approaches you need to get down pretty quick - hence the nickname.

Thanks. Does "pretty quick" mean a steeper than usual glide slope in this pattern? Or is it different before and after the turn?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: kgaiflyer
Posted 2013-07-10 04:56:38 and read 22040 times.

[Removed as a duplicate of an existing submission.]

[Edited 2013-07-10 04:57:46]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: bmacleod
Posted 2013-07-10 05:10:34 and read 21736 times.

This crash is showing parallels to KE 801 in 1997.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Flight_801

OK it was a 747 not a 777 but still noting flight crew fatigue and errors it still worth noting....

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 05:12:14 and read 21709 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 222):
Thanks. Does "pretty quick" mean a steeper than usual glide slope in this pattern? Or is it different before and after the turn?

Well they want you to cross the San Mateo Bridge at or above 1900 feet on the visuals to the 28s. But I have been on multiple arrivals into SFO where they kept us high over the city and then dumped us off for a quick descending 180-degree turn to the visual approach, riding the speedbrakes hard for a couple minutes.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 219):
That's probably where I'm confused a bit, since in 40 years of flying into SFO I've never flown or seen flown a heading down the middle of the bay, turning right for a 180 onto 28R. We've either done this:

Talking about this one:

http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1307/00375GOLDENGATE.PDF

http://www.flickr.com/photos/45706957@N04/8456161023/

In my experience it is usually when arriving in clear weather from a Transpacific track.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Mir
Posted 2013-07-10 05:40:31 and read 20792 times.

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 179):
OZ Is a really great airline. My buddy flies them quite a bit, and says their service is better than KE. While I believe that opinion is quite relative, as are the opinions of the OZ bashers, I believe his opinion is well-justified.

Keep in mind that inflight service has nothing to do with what's going on at the pointy end. I'm not saying there are definitely problems that are systemic in OZ, but you also can't rule it out on the ground that their service is good (which I'm sure it is). Because those two have very little to do with each other.

Quoting zeke (Reply 182):
The FAA publishes all their exam questions, anyone can buy an iPad app or computer program that will help them pass the FAA written, it is possible to pass the FAA written just using this software to learn the questions, and never opening the actual regulations (and I suspect by not even operating an aircraft, just rote earning).

   This was the method encouraged by the instructors at my school. I, on the other hand, spent maybe an hour total (per test) looking at questions for written tests, just to get a feel for how they were phrased and what sort of tricks were included. The actual substance of the test I learned from just learning the substance of the test in the course of my training (imagine that).

Quoting zeke (Reply 182):
This is a big no-no on the Airbus, either both flight directors on, or off. Having one on and one off can stop the autothrust from adding thrust, e.g. the FD maybe looking for a descent when the pilot pulls back, as it is expecting a descent, no thrust is added. If both FDs are off, the autothrust adds/removes thrust as required to maintain the desired speed. That is the procedure for a TCAS event.

Having one FD on and one FD off is a bit strange, but it should be noted that Airbus flight control laws are a different animal, and may not be (and I'll go out on a limb and say probably isn't) reflective of how a 777's system works. In the plane I fly (non-FBW), while it's not really great practice to keep one FD on and one FD off, doing so doesn't cause any problems so long as the autoflight system is always connected to the flying pilot's side.

I say this mostly in case someone reads your comment and tries to draw inappropriate conclusions.  

-Mir

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 05:41:25 and read 21195 times.

Here's two views of the down the bay version onto 28R...in the KE version they had to get down pretty quick.

http://youtu.be/LmZd_iIW8f0

http://youtu.be/9R_JmChHPQ4

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: brilondon
Posted 2013-07-10 05:48:24 and read 20744 times.

Quoting kanban (Reply 100):
It's kind of a knee jerk reaction... consider all the flights in and out of all the airports and how frequently would the data be needed.. seldom.. Then someone will want cameras in the cockpit, others watching the FA's.. it never ends.

then General Av will complain they are being monitored as some government personal freedom violation. Actually when they has been an incident, camera footage or not, they seem to get to the bottom if it..

I don't agree with it but I understand why some people would think that this would be a good idea. Unfortunately, this is just more for us A-Nutters to watch what is going on in the cockpit. If you are doing nothing wrong, why would you even have to worry about who is watching you? What "freedom" are you giving up? In the US, you already gave that up as you can be tracked, videoed and monitored pretty much from the time you leave your home to the time you return. Your so called freedom is an illusion and you as the general public have allowed it.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: nkops
Posted 2013-07-10 06:03:24 and read 20312 times.

I am kind of surprised that OZ is still using the same flight number, or is that just a US (country, not airline) thing to change after an accident?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: AeroWesty
Posted 2013-07-10 06:04:39 and read 20277 times.

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 227):
Here's two views of the down the bay version onto 28R...in the KE version they had to get down pretty quick.

Interesting stuff, thanks!   

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: qualitydr
Posted 2013-07-10 06:14:37 and read 19884 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 199):
There may be evidence for both and since both events would have happened in close succession, it may be nontrivial to determine whether she was in fact still alive before being run over, particularly to the degree of certainty which would be needed.

So my question is, what can be learned over the next 3 weeks that isn't already known about this death? I'm not a forensic pathologist, I really don't know what sort of things might be learned or deduced over time in a case like this.

Indeed, my problem is I've seen too many CSI and murder-mystery TV shows to really understand the process...

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: DTW2HYD
Posted 2013-07-10 06:14:46 and read 19923 times.

Having large pool of veteran Air Force pilots is definitely an advantage in some countries. But current generation fighter jets are aerodynamically unstable by design(without fly-by-wire). It is possible in distant future we will have only push button pilots, other than those fly vintage aircraft.

Experienced western pilots are making ton of money as instructors and pilots in Asia and Africa. Definitely there will be cultural clashes, one of the reason being if western airline industry is in excellent shape there is no need for these veterans to work in hot and humid places in totally different lifestyle and away from family. Post 117 e-mail is nothing but a "True story Bro" between friends.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 06:26:57 and read 19574 times.

Quoting Mir (Reply 226):
Quoting zeke (Reply 182):
The FAA publishes all their exam questions, anyone can buy an iPad app or computer program that will help them pass the FAA written, it is possible to pass the FAA written just using this software to learn the questions, and never opening the actual regulations (and I suspect by not even operating an aircraft, just rote earning).

   This was the method encouraged by the instructors at my school. I, on the other hand, spent maybe an hour total (per test) looking at questions for written tests, just to get a feel for how they were phrased and what sort of tricks were included. The actual substance of the test I learned from just learning the substance of the test in the course of my training (imagine that).

Having experience of exams on both sides of the pond, I will say that in the US you can "just" learn the material, then go on to pass the exam. On the former UK CAA and now EASA side, it won't work. The language on quite a few is atrocious and even instructors with years of experience are scratching their heads. You need to know the material, especially for exams like General Navigation that have a lot of calculation, but a large percentage of the exam questions are of the "if you haven't seen it before or something similar, you will have no idea what they are on about" type. You can handily pass Air Law, Meteorology and many of the others just through rote learning. I would say to be sure of passing you need to both know the material well and have spend a significant amount of time boning up on a question bank.

Then again, rote learning won't get you through a good oral exam or checkride. Which I guess is the point. And so we are back full circle to "what standards are actually required"?

Quoting nkops (Reply 229):

I am kind of surprised that OZ is still using the same flight number, or is that just a US (country, not airline) thing to change after an accident?

Some airlines retire the number. Some reassign it to another route. Others don't do anything. However I don't know that it typically happens at once. Just changing all the booking systems on such short notice would be quite a project I suppose.

[Edited 2013-07-10 06:27:57]

[Edited 2013-07-10 06:28:56]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-10 06:28:06 and read 19792 times.

Quoting dirtyfrankd (Reply 145):
cautions "heavy 777" off to left hand side (not sure if referring to OZ 214)

There was another B777 - ANA I think - which landed about 3 minutes ahead of the Asiana flight

Quoting Mir (Reply 163):
My personal opinion: 3 red and 1 white isn't cause for alarm or a go-around, but it is a sign that you should start a gradual correction upward until you get back to 2 white and 2 red.

Agree - however the action necessary at 3R/1W depends upon where he was in the descent. At 1,000 ft - gradual correction. At 200 ft - immediate action

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 184):
There is no simple "solution" to automation dependency and unwillingness to fly manually, and I think it is going to get worse for airlines.

I would also go a bit farther.

I'm not so sure about an 'unwillingness' to fly manually. It is becoming a requirement to not fly manually more and more often by the airlines. In my impression, young pilots are never being ALLOWED to fly manually. The training programs focus on avoiding manual flying.

Yes, it is a reality that the automation in the aircraft can fly more efficiently in terms of fuel usage and time usage than a human can fly most of the time. In today's costs is everything world - the bean counters rule.

Until the accountants understand the need for manual flying skills - it will never change.

How about this - a modification to the flight hours records of pilots.

Total Flight Hours
Total Flight Hours in Type
Total Flight Hours under AP control
Total Flight Hours not under AP control
Total Landings under AP/ Autoland
Total Landings without AP/Autoland

Type training certification
80 hours in type
20 hours in type without AP
5 landings in type without AP/Autoland


I wish the NTSB, BEA, etc - had the authority, and the cojones, to put those accountants and cost control managers under the microscope and publicly expose their culpability in accidents.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rc135x
Posted 2013-07-10 06:43:51 and read 19067 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 150):
I'm not a pilot but a (non-aviation) IT specialist, so my biases naturally differ from yours,

Yes indeed---and with all courtesy and respect, that is an essential matter. You bring a certain technological "comfort" to the equation. Perhaps like my kids who have grown up with iPhones and iPads you find using technology a natural thing and see the use of automated systems as an appropriate support option for enhanced safety and operational efficiency. Conversely, my dad has 18k+ flying hours and won't use a smart phone. He's not stupid, he's not a technophobe, he's not just old and out of touch. He just wants to make a phone call, not post pictures to FB or find the nearest Starbucks. He doesn't like technology for the sake of technology and loves flying with his eyes out of the canopy. To him, useful, helpful, and elegant automation to *support* pilots has given way to pilots who are slaves to control laws and complicated technical processes and flight rules. In my own experience my colleagues with technical degrees tended to enjoy the increasing level of automation, whereas those of us "90-day-wonders" with history degrees tended to avoid seemingly needlessly complex hardware.

Quoting zeke (Reply 205):
I don't, the US DoD have many very young men and women flying aircraft like the B52 without anywhere near those sort of hours. Hours mean nothing by themselves. That is pilots are required to have theory credits, plus experience, plus a skills test to gain a qualification. One without the other two means nothing.

An excellent observation, and one for which the USAF has identified an appropriate solution (sequestration notwithstanding). For example, in the RC-135 community either pilot gets 1 T/O and 1 landing per 12-15 hour sortie. A great way to build flying time but a poor way to gain pilot expertise watching the autopilot fly (except for air refueling, which, given the state of drones these days may also reach an automated level....). To address this, pilots jump on a TC-135 trainer and spend 3 hours in the traffic pattern doing repeated instrument and visual approaches. A pilot can get 3 ILS and 5 VFR approaches and 8 touch-and-go landings during her turn in the seat. I appreciate that this may not be practicable for airlines, but it certainly does address the issue of flying hours versus flying experience.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 214):
Anyway pretty much all the information you really need for a visual approach apart from engine instruments and windows, right there in front of the noses of the pilots.

But where do pilots look to gather all this information? Heads down. Maybe HUDs will help. And truthfully, how much of this information do they really need for a visual approach and landing? Airspeed? VVI? Thanks for showing this, as it may help those without current flying experience appreciate the "information overload" available to pilots these days.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 06:50:46 and read 18835 times.

Quoting rc135x (Reply 235):
Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 214):
Anyway pretty much all the information you really need for a visual approach apart from engine instruments and windows, right there in front of the noses of the pilots.

But where do pilots look to gather all this information? Heads down.


That's fair, but I am quite capable of splitting my attention between the outside and the instruments on a visual approach thank you very much. 

Surely airline pilots can be expected to keep a basic instrument scan going while doing a visual approach?

[Edited 2013-07-10 06:56:45]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 07:00:58 and read 18556 times.

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 225):
Well they want you to cross the San Mateo Bridge at or above 1900 feet on the visuals to the 28s. But I have been on multiple arrivals into SFO where they kept us high over the city and then dumped us off for a quick descending 180-degree turn to the visual approach, riding the speedbrakes hard for a couple minutes.

That sounds much like the Spiegel article; So the steep descent was not actually a specially steep glide slope on final but rather a demand to somehow make a steeply descending curve right down to the regular glide slope intercept...?

Quoting qualitydr (Reply 231):
So my question is, what can be learned over the next 3 weeks that isn't already known about this death? I'm not a forensic pathologist, I really don't know what sort of things might be learned or deduced over time in a case like this.

I'd guess it's mostly about lab work, paperwork and making extra certain nothing is missed or incorrect so the entire investigation isn't tainted by an invalid ME report.

Quoting qualitydr (Reply 231):
Indeed, my problem is I've seen too many CSI and murder-mystery TV shows to really understand the process...

Yeah, they always seem to have plot-convenient rapid lab return times...!   

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rc135x
Posted 2013-07-10 07:07:46 and read 18305 times.

Quoting Starlionblue (Reply 236):
That's fair, but I am quite capable of splitting my attention between the outside and the instruments on a visual approach thank you very much. 

Surely airline pilots can be expected to keep a basic instrument scan going while doing a visual approach?

Touche!

My concern is about the next generation of pilots who don't *develop the habit* of instrument scan coupled with visual flying as you and countless other pilots have done. How do we instill that in pilots who fly one instrument approach (or visual approach backed up by the ILS) per leg after a 10-hour flight? Pilots who get their recurring training in a 3D simulator? Pilots who transition to turbine, multi-engine aircraft where the training syllabus is on instrument navigation and systems management?

Every F/O who flies with you will benefit from your example and what you teach them.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 07:18:53 and read 17954 times.

Quoting rc135x (Reply 238):
My concern is about the next generation of pilots who don't *develop the habit* of instrument scan coupled with visual flying as you and countless other pilots have done. How do we instill that in pilots who fly one instrument approach (or visual approach backed up by the ILS) per leg after a 10-hour flight? Pilots who get their recurring training in a 3D simulator? Pilots who transition to turbine, multi-engine aircraft where the training syllabus is on instrument navigation and systems management?

I understood. Just having some fun sorry!  

Your questions are very valid and this has been a concern with the FAA and EASA for years. One examiner I have encountered a few times (including two checkrides) does a lot of work for the FAA in this area.

Quoting rc135x (Reply 238):
Every F/O who flies with you will benefit from your example and what you teach them.

That's very kind of you but I'm not quite there yet in my career. Someday I hope! You have me mistaken for someone like Zeke or Pihero. 

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: polnebmit
Posted 2013-07-10 07:22:55 and read 17798 times.

Maybe this has been discussed... It seems that pretty much the last leg was flown manually. The PF would have needed to see that the PAPI lights were telling them they were too low. Additionally, don't they have an automated readout of their altitude as they are approaching. This along with the situational awareness of their altitude as they approached the first set of approach lights in the bay should tell them they are too low. Shouldn't they try to give themselves a buffer or "safety height margin" if by any chance they lose an engine etc and still make it to the runway? Is someone else supposed to read out the speed since the PF is concentrating on manually landing the aircraft, and not necessarily on glancing at his instruments?

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-10 07:27:43 and read 17676 times.

Quoting XJET (Reply 169):
I fly the 767, but I am told the 777 A/T works basically the same.
Quoting tcfc424 (Reply 196):
however if the A/T was correctly configured (remains to be seen) then why did it not maintain 137 KIAS?

See Aaron747, reply 136 above, for some possible explanations for the A/Th behavior.

[Edited 2013-07-10 07:34:26]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Starlionblue
Posted 2013-07-10 07:34:02 and read 17533 times.

Quoting polnebmit (Reply 240):
The PF would have needed to see that the PAPI lights were telling them they were too low.

A pilot should be able to fly a visual approach on a clear day without PAPI lights. Anyway they were there and the pilot should have seen them just fine.

Quoting polnebmit (Reply 240):
Additionally, don't they have an automated readout of their altitude as they are approaching.

Three barometric altimeters, two radio altimeters if I'm not mistaken and finally a voice calling out heights. If you're not aware of your altitude/height, you're not listening and not looking at your instruments. Oh, and let's not forget not looking out the windows!

Quoting polnebmit (Reply 240):
Shouldn't they try to give themselves a buffer or "safety height margin" if by any chance they lose an engine etc and still make it to the runway?

They do have such buffers, in at least three different aspects.

First of all, the touchdown zone is quite a ways down the runway. In this case, the threshold was also displaced, meaning the touchdown zone is even further along. At the threshold the nominal height is 50 feet, so that's your height margin.

Secondly, you are descending so the thrust used is very small compared to that available. Even if you lose an engine the other one has many times more than enough to keep you on glideslope, especially with a light aircraft after a long crossing.

Thirdly, if you lose an engine above a certain height, you go around on the remaining engine. The ability to maintain a certain climb gradient on one engine while going around is a certification requirement. In any case the plane would be light after the long trip so nowhere near as hard as climbing out after an engine failure on the take-off roll.

Quoting polnebmit (Reply 240):
Is someone else supposed to read out the speed since the PF is concentrating on manually landing the aircraft, and not necessarily on glancing at his instruments?

As I mentioned above, flying visually while scanning the instruments is a rather basic piloting skill. The PM should monitor the height as well. The automated voice will call out heights.

[Edited 2013-07-10 07:35:32]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Klaus
Posted 2013-07-10 07:46:18 and read 17092 times.

Quoting rc135x (Reply 235):
Yes indeed---and with all courtesy and respect, that is an essential matter. You bring a certain technological "comfort" to the equation.
Quoting rc135x (Reply 235):
To him, useful, helpful, and elegant automation to *support* pilots has given way to pilots who are slaves to control laws and complicated technical processes and flight rules.

This is not at all my own perspective on this.

If I'm comfortable with automation in my very different environment, this comfort is not simply one of being blindly numbed to problems by sheer familiarity.

Quite to the contrary my comfort with automation is highly selective – automatic mechanisms which I understand to be problematic, unreliable or outright unsafe (within my own envrionment) I simply refuse to use and step down to less automated solutions, or I create my own automated solution.

Of course no pilot should ever just make up his/her own procedures as they like, but my core points still apply, particularly in aviation where the stakes are extremely high:

• do not rest until you really understand what an automatic mechanism actually does for you, what it doesn't and what you can and must do when it breaks down (you don't necessarily have to understand its inner workings to every last detail for that)

• try to recognize and anticipate the lower-level actions the automatic system performs in doing its job, so when it fails or hits a design limitation (such as an inability to handle an unusual situation) you have a good understanding what it had been doing up to that point, because that is what it dumps into your lap once you're taking over

• if you feel confused about what the automation is doing, be sure you've got the knowledge and capabilities at hand to make the situation less confusing and safer by getting to a lower level of automation

I'm at least as opposed as you are to people being blind slaves of automatic systems they can neither understand nor actually replace with their own competence in a time of need.

System designers must build systems so that users / pilots actually can understand their essential behaviour, usage and limitations.

And users / pilots should / must learn this information so that appropriate trust in the automatic system leads to appropriate use, but also to appropriate decisions when not to use that system (see the above linked video presentation).

This can be really challenging to do really well, and what I see of aviation systems usability and implementation peculiarities doesn't always convince me from my own background and experience (even if I can sometimes imagine how they ended up that way despite misgivings).

I as a system designer am not an all-knowing deity (shocker!), and my aviation-centric colleagues aren't either (no offense!  ). We need users / pilots to understand what our systems can do, and what they can't do – and both of these parties in the aviation field have to try getting into corporate heads that automation just can't be a quick and simple panacea:

Judicious use of automation is actually yet another competence pilots need to learn and maintain, similar to the manual flying skills they need to have when judicious use of automation means not using it, just with a more abstract understanding of the entire systems environment.

Automation can't just be a tool to lower wages and to reduce training efforts. That would be a huge mistake with potentially fatal consequences.

I understand a lot about automatic systems, and I definitely want competent pilots both regarding systems usage and fundamental flying skills. I absolutely abhor the thought of flying on a plane controlled by blank-eyed button-pushing monkeys on a peanut salary.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-10 07:51:04 and read 16933 times.

Looking at some of the things related to this - I found that Chairman Hersman's term on the NTSB ends this year.

Before anyone starts conspiracy theories when she leaves - they need to know that she was planning to depart this year.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: D L X
Posted 2013-07-10 07:54:42 and read 16796 times.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 234):
How about this - a modification to the flight hours records of pilots.

Total Flight Hours
Total Flight Hours in Type
Total Flight Hours under AP control
Total Flight Hours not under AP control
Total Landings under AP/ Autoland
Total Landings without AP/Autoland

Type training certification
80 hours in type
20 hours in type without AP
5 landings in type without AP/Autoland

I think that could have the instant effect of encouraging pilots to only hand-fly the planes. As mentioned above by many, the automation has had a net positive effect on aviation safety. Perhaps if there would be any changes to rules, it would be that each pilot hand-fly a takeoff and a landing every month?

Quoting sunrisevalley (Reply 132):
Quoting D L X (Reply 48):
Reports said that many survivors had "road rash" that indicates they slid along the runway, thus having been ejected from the plane

Or being physically dragged to safety...

No, road rash is a term meaning that they slid along pavement (or some other rough surface). It's used to describe the injuries that say, motorcyclists get when they are in accidents and slide along the pavement.

You don't get road rash from being dragged by a person at slow speed.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Road_rash

Besides, this is corroborated by the many reports that people in UA 885 saw people on the runway having been ejected from the plane.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 144):
Quoting D L X (Reply 77):
You don't need to transmit the data in the cameras the same way you don't need to transmit the data on a CVR/FDR. Go get the data when you need it, which is maybe once every 40 years at SFO.

But then what if the plane crashes ON your camera ? Do you make it resistant like a black box ? And you also have to regularly check that it is working, manually. Whereas if you have a data cable both problems disappear.

I think that's splitting hairs. One, you don't have to have just a single camera. Two, you don't have to put the camera at the threshold of the runway where it might be hit. Three, the camera can be in a protective housing. Four, the camera could have its storage in the ground near the camera, thus not requiring cabling back to the terminal.

You get the point. These are fairly easy engineering problems to address.

With that said, I still don't think that cameras add much to modern accident investigation concerning accidents on airport grounds. The reason why people in the media are suggesting more cameras is because that's what THEY need. The media makes money off of the visual. The media doesn't really give two s--ts about reaching a conclusion on why this plane crashed. (I'd be willing to bet that the reporting on the NTSB's final conclusions a year or so from now will get nowhere near the press that the initial crash got.)

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 07:57:59 and read 16790 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 237):
That sounds much like the Spiegel article; So the steep descent was not actually a specially steep glide slope on final but rather a demand to somehow make a steeply descending curve right down to the regular glide slope intercept...?

Yes but this is a fairly standard ATC demand for SFO arrivals, especially to expedite international traffic coming in from a long flight. It's a high workload maneuver, but not at all unusual.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 230):
Interesting stuff, thanks!

I managed to dig out some pictures when I got home. The reason those approaches are so memorable is a. how great the view of the city is on the way in, and b. how quick they get you to come down, at least on the UA flights I used to take often.

http://sphotos-f.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/q83/s720x720/1002756_3312378865436_1992502097_n.jpg

http://sphotos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-prn1/q85/s720x720/945390_3312381185494_2053170926_n.jpg

http://sphotos-g.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash3/q86/s720x720/941235_3312384465576_1074666500_n.jpg

http://sphotos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/q80/s720x720/1005731_3312383865561_241931851_n.jpg

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-10 08:09:38 and read 16339 times.

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 246):
The reason those approaches are so memorable is a. how great the view of the city is on the way in

Only Kai-Tak compares to landing in SFO from a passenger visual perspective in my experience.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: Aaron747
Posted 2013-07-10 08:14:18 and read 16144 times.

^
Really? You should check out Seoul's Gimpo, Osaka's Itami, or Sydney sometime  

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: VS773ER
Posted 2013-07-10 08:16:08 and read 16106 times.

I can't keep up with the latest, is this new info?

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130710001027

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-10 08:17:57 and read 16074 times.

Been to Seoul and Osaka - an advantage of being old is to have seen some of the world's great old airports.

Would love to fly into Madeira some day. St Barts was nice because I could see out the front window.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: LTC8K6
Posted 2013-07-10 08:19:39 and read 16012 times.

Quoting VS773ER (Reply 249):
I can't keep up with the latest, is this new info?

I don't think the headline is warranted given what the NTSB has reported.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: keegd76
Posted 2013-07-10 08:25:25 and read 15922 times.

Quoting UALWN (Reply 198):
Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 111):
Were both instructors fully occupied monitoring the performance of their pupils, while forgetting their job as PNF?

There's something else. The instructor pilot may not want to interfere with the trainee until the last moment, giving the trainee a chance to discover his mistakes and recover himself from them. At the end, the instructor decides it's time to intervene, but it may be too late... I'm not saying this is what happened in this case, but that, in general, this might be a risk associated with having the PNF as an instructor pilot.

I could understand the instructor taking that approach in the simulator (and maybe on a flight where it's just the two of them). But on a plane carrying over 300 people?

That sounds extremely dangerous.

However, for the sake of argument, if that is an acceptable approach then the instructor should be stepping in 5 seconds after the time he [the instructor] would have acted if he'd been flying the plane.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: N328KF
Posted 2013-07-10 08:33:46 and read 15784 times.

Quoting D L X (Reply 77):
So, stalling at 50' is just about the worst thing that can happen, I suppose?
Quoting discoverCSG (Reply 95):
Well, when was the last time we had 7 threads about the airliner that stalled at 5000' and recovered?

AF447 is the worst thing that can happen. See:

Quoting UALWN (Reply 198):
Automation did not go haywire in AF447. The PF did.
Quoting UALWN (Reply 198):
The AF447 pilots did not rely on the automation. Actually, they totally disregarded the automated stall warnings.
Quoting Klaus (Reply 102):
Indeed. She is very guarded against misinterpretation and is extremely deliberate, cautious but still quite open about the actual state of the investigation.

She is doing a highly competent job in an extremely difficult position. Excellent.
Quoting boacvc10 (Reply 85):
I'm impressed with the candor and deep knowhow of the Chairperson in this briefing.

She has been criticized by ALPA, but it seems that she is not issuing conclusions, merely facts. ALPA probably just is not used to this sort of transparency, which is necessary in the more communicative environment that we now live in.

Quoting Aesma (Reply 144):
But then what if the plane crashes ON your camera ? Do you make it resistant like a black box ? And you also have to regularly check that it is working, manually. Whereas if you have a data cable both problems disappear.

If I were implementing security system connectivity (which I have done), I would in this place have both wired and directional wireless connectivity methods. Both can be achieved with COTS equipment with relatively low cost.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: hivue
Posted 2013-07-10 08:36:38 and read 15652 times.

Quoting LTC8K6 (Reply 251):
I don't think the headline is warranted given what the NTSB has reported.

  
I've seen other news reports implying that either the crew intentionally/accidentally disengaged the A/Th or the A/Th malfunctioned. They are leaving out the third possibility: that the A/Th functioned normally but that the crew did not completely understand how it was working.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: frmrcapcadet
Posted 2013-07-10 09:03:13 and read 14681 times.

res automation, hands on flying. Are there any small one or two piston engine planes which are almost entirely fly-by-wire? It could be interesting if the settings were available to duplicate the responses of a large commercial jet. An hour or two in such a plane even once a year could give a commercial pilot a lot of experience hands on experience. It obviously would not be the same, but trainers may find it a very useful tool.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: sankaps
Posted 2013-07-10 09:23:48 and read 14131 times.

Quoting hivue (Reply 254):
I've seen other news reports implying that either the crew intentionally/accidentally disengaged the A/Th or the A/Th malfunctioned. They are leaving out the third possibility: that the A/Th functioned normally but that the crew did not completely understand how it was working.

It seems clear the crew thought / expected the auto-throttle to maintain the aircraft's speed, but it didn't. I have not yet seen any discussion of the possibility the A/Th malfunctioned -- most of the speculation is around the crew arming it, but not actually turning it on. Coupled with not monitoring the airspeed themselves, depending solely on the A/Th to do it for them. An A/Th malfunction cannot be ruled out entirely at this stage though, until we have further info.

[Edited 2013-07-10 09:48:33]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: bmacleod
Posted 2013-07-10 09:48:40 and read 13189 times.

Quoting Aaron747 (Reply 248):
Really? You should check out Seoul's Gimpo, Osaka's Itami, or Sydney sometime

Referring to by the Ocean airports, don't forget BOS approach 15L and YVR's 26R approach.

First time I was landing in BOS I thought were going swimming!!! I suppose OZ 214 passengers had same feeling....

[Edited 2013-07-10 09:56:33]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rc135x
Posted 2013-07-10 09:55:34 and read 13028 times.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 243):
• if you feel confused about what the automation is doing, be sure you've got the knowledge and capabilities at hand to make the situation less confusing and safer by getting to a lower level of automation

Turns OFF the auto throttle = less confusing and safer.

Quoting Klaus (Reply 243):
System designers must build systems so that users / pilots actually can understand their essential behaviour, usage and limitations.

I am a pilot, not a systems operator or user. If systems help me manage air conditioning, electrics, or fuel consumption that's great. If I need to learn a complex system to make houses get bigger or smaller then I have ceased to be a pilot.

In this thread we have seen highly experienced heavy jet airline pilots explain the complexities of auto throttles and even amongst this august group there is uncertainty or confusion about how they work under certain conditions. In the analysis of this crash it is clear that at least the training pilot expected the auto throttles to behave in a specific way; likely the PF did too. Are these pilots, with plenty of prior experience, not sufficiently trained to use it or is it just too complex? And too complex from whose perspective? Yours as a systems designer or mine as a pilot?

Ultimately in this crash, irrespective of understanding auto throttle functionality, I want to know where the PF's hands were: one on the yoke, most likely, but where was the other? If it was on the throttles why didn't the PF (or eventually the training pilot) simply push the darn things forward? If it wasn't on the throttles then WHY NOT? Problem solved. Reliance on a *system* to do the job for him? This has nothing to do with systems mastery, rather it demonstrates an abdication of essential flying skills to systems designers sitting in an office somewhere wondering why the pilot didn't follow the auto throttle procedures set forth in the instruction manual.

Edit: corrected typographical error

[Edited 2013-07-10 10:06:32]

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: CF-CPI
Posted 2013-07-10 09:57:51 and read 12906 times.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 256):
It seems clear the crew thought / expected the auto-throttle to maintain the aircraft's speed, but it didn't. I have not yet seen any discussion of the possibility the A/Th malfunctioned -- most of the speculation is around the crew arming it, but not actually turning it on.

If a malfunction of the autothrottle system is ruled out, then the crash rests on
1) whether or not the cockpit crew thought (mistakenly) the autothrottle was was activated, but it was merely armed, or
2) they were confused about just what armed vs. activated implied.
I'm betting on 2), but don't have any insider info, just a gut feeling that we're having AF447 confused-about-aircraft-system moments here.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: rfields5421
Posted 2013-07-10 10:16:36 and read 12243 times.

Quoting rc135x (Reply 258):
If it was on the throttles why didn't the PF (or eventually the training pilot) simply push the darn things forward?

You answer is above in this thread in the summary of yesterday's NTSB briefing

Quoting Klaus (Reply 121):
• had set speed at 137kn

• assumed that autothrottle maintained speed

• between 500' and 200' they had some lateral deviation

• trying to correct

• at 200': 4 red PAPI, airspeed in the hatched area on the speed tape

• recognized the autothrottle was not maintaining speed

• established go-around attitude

• went to push the throttles forward but the PF had already done that at this point

They did push the throttles forward, but too late.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: bellancacf
Posted 2013-07-10 10:22:44 and read 12079 times.

Mental state: autothrottle = ON; situational awareness = OFF.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: polnebmit
Posted 2013-07-10 10:23:52 and read 12125 times.

Quoting bmacleod (Reply 257):
Referring to by the Ocean airports, don't forget BOS approach 15L and YVR's 26R approach.

First time I was landing in BOS I thought were going swimming!!! I suppose OZ 214 passengers had same feeling....

Or LGA Rwy 22 with the threshold at 7 feet above the water. Every person that lands via the Whitestone Expwy approach for the first time think they're landing in the soup.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: jollo
Posted 2013-07-10 10:35:29 and read 11864 times.

Have to agree with the majority here, we seem to be looking at 1) abuse (as in abnormal use, usage beyond appropriate conditions) of automation, causing 2) progressive loss of manual handling skills.

Automation is the principal cause for the impressive progress in aviation safety in the last few decades (with formal CRM training a close second); anyone calling for a return of the "good old ways" should take a look at accident rates from 30 years ago (pilots weren't any less skilled back then), multiply by number of flights today and tell me if the resulting death toll looks acceptable by modern peacetime standards. Automation is here to stay.

Still, pilots are there to 1) manage automation when available ("to manage" includes recognizing when automation is inappropriate) and 2) take over and hand-fly safely when automation is unavailable or not appropriate.

OZ214 crew did neither of the above:

* as system managers, they weren't aware of their system's status (A/T disengaged) and showed signs of sloppiness (one FD on, the other off); besides, is it even possible for A/T to be engaged in SPD mode without an engaged A/P in a 777?

* as pilots, they apparently never noticed their speeds being completely off for the whole final (for sure they didn't act on it until it was way too late) and they flew an unmistakably non-stabilized approach all the way into the ground

I cannot help finding the parallel to AF447 compelling: three high-time pilots on manual controls failing to notice/believe their situation is un-flyable (high pitch for AF447, low speed for OZ214). Ok, this case looks even more incredible, if possible: no transient, confusing UAS for them. Luckily, the final outcome is comparatively less tragic.

SOPs *mandating* A/P to be engaged at all times are a disgrace and a safety hazard. PICs should be given discretion to use low-workload situations as manual piloting opportunities. Besides, basic handling skills should be ticked for regularly during sim check rides.

My opionion, of course, not fact. My thoughts to those affected.

Topic: RE: OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 7
Username: moderators
Posted 2013-07-10 10:46:13 and read 11673 times.

This thread will be locked down as it has became quite long. All posts added after the thread lock will be removed for housekeeping purposes only.

Part 8 can be found here:

OZ 777 Crash At SFO Part 8 (by moderators Jul 10 2013 in Civil Aviation)


Thanks and regards,

The Moderators


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