WorldTraveler From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 7692 times:
Bashing Delta or wishing for its demise has been one of the more popular pastimes of this board. It’s time to lay out a sound case for why DL will not only thrive but survive. For those of you who work for or are passengers of Delta, you have lots of reasons to have hope. For those of you who work for competitors, you have a formidable challenge on your hands. And for those of you who like to see Cinderella stories, one is being written before your very eyes.
First, DL has a pre-deregulation legacy of being one of best run airlines in the world. To be sure, DL hasn’t had the industry leadership since the US domestic airline industry was deregulated in 1978 that it did before but it still has done very well since deregulation. First, Delta has been given nothing in its 75 year history – quite a contrast to that of many of its legacy competitors. Delta never was given the choice industry routes and never had the access to the big cities in the US or overseas that seemed to provide unlimited opportunities for competitors like American, United, and Northwest. Delta has always fought very hard for what it has and in the process, outlived airlines like Eastern, Pan Am, and TWA that had been given much more to work with.
Delta’s profitable strategy was exactly what has now created so much difficulty for it: DL built a route system designed to blanket the US, particularly the eastern US, with access to more cities than any other airline. Because its home in the southeast US was full of many small cities, DL had to carry traffic through hubs. And DL’s home in Georgia was right next to Florida, one of the world’s top vacation destinations, providing a seemingly endless supply of passengers to fill its jets.
Make no mistake. Delta’s strategy of high frequency connecting service in the SE was very profitable. Until 2001. 9/11 in itself wasn’t the issue but rather the pulldown that was necessary by the legacy carriers to survive the terrorist attacks. And as the legacy carriers pulled down capacity, the low fare carriers took advantage of the opportunity to grow. And they did. Although low fare carriers had long existed, the tipping point was reached. Customers knew that low fares were available between most regions of the country, even if it meant traveling to an alternate airport. As such, the legacy carriers could no longer charge $2000 for roundtrip flights by business people. And Delta’s seemingly personal wealth stash began to vanish. DL’s strategy was very valid… but for a different era.
The regional jet played a role, too. Delta saw the opportunity to grow its network and deployed more regional jets through its partners than any other airline – and strengthened its already formidable domestic route network. But as other carriers began acquiring regional jets, no market was inaccessible to other carriers. Not only did LFCs put pressure on nonstop flights and in connecting markets subject to an LFC presence but regional jets meant that the few remaining premium connecting markets were “fair” game for all of the legacy carriers, including those in the SE where DL had long been able to command a significant revenue premium.
As with most companies that must rework its strategies in order to survive, Delta only got part of the formula right in its first attempts. Delta slowly began to pull down connecting capacity, starting with DFW where it never gained a significant share of the local market against American. Even though SLC and CVG are small cities, they have fared better in DL’s efforts to cut back capacity. CVG does have a strong business base even though it is small while SLC generates much more traffic than a city of its size normally does due to Utah’s attraction as a leisure and religious center. But the missing piece in DL’s turnaround plan – as is true in most companies – is that DL did not find new sources of revenue or deploy assets effectively into new markets.
That has changed. In a big way. DL’s strategy of providing lots of domestic capacity meant that it had an unusually high percentage of widebody aircraft in its fleet. When the L1011s were retired, DL made the decision to replace 300 seat domestic L1011s with 287 seat 767-400s, an aircraft that has substantial capabilities despite it being one of Boeing’s least popular models. The light bulbs finally went off in some Delta people’s heads that those 767-400s plus some of DLs 767-300ERs that were flying domestic routes could and should be redeployed to international routes. Because DL has nearly 30 767-300s and 400s that can be redeployed, the international growth prospects are enormous. Even after retiring the 15 767-200s, DL still has the world's largest fleet of 767s, a very capable and cost-efficient aircraft. So far, DL has announced plans to use only about 1/3 of the “newly discovered” international capabilities of its 767 fleet. And DL’s international growth capacity is even larger if it decides to start flying 757s on overseas routes, potentially providing the opportunity to develop secondary markets in the UK and far western Europe as well as from Boston deeper into Europe or from the US deeper into S. America. More significantly, by pulling substantial capacity out of its domestic network, Delta is not only improving its domestic revenue performance but will help many of its competitors that carry connecting passengers as well. However, DL’s huge fleet of regional jets will ensure that markets without nonstop service but could have an RJ flight will probably get one from one of DL’s partners and that DL will have abundant capacity to feed its international network.
Delta also struggled for much of its existence about whether it was a first tier or second tier airline. I consider American and United as 1st tier airlines because their route systems are built around the US and world’s largest cities. Delta and Northwest, on the other hand, historically have built their route systems around smaller cities and both US and global regions. But DL and NW have owned the regions from which they fly…until everyone showed up with regional jets. Delta particularly has had a large presence in key business centers such as New York and Los Angeles but has regionalized its presence from those cities, serving primarily Florida from New York and east coast cities (its hubs and Florida) from LA.
You will see Delta becoming much more of a 1st tier carrier than it has been in the past.
Delta’s strategy shift is one of the most significant at any airline and even among other industries. Delta still has one of the most expansive domestic route networks of any airline and can make money carrying domestic connecting passengers – but they will pay much higher fares. And that huge domestic route network is well-suited to carrying passengers to the far corners of the world. Most of Delta’s current and expansionary international routes are to/from places where there is limited service by other US carriers (such as to smaller cities in continental Europe or Africa) or in O&Ds where other carriers cannot connect the hundreds of small markets that are part of every international destination. Eastern Europe is growing at rates as fast as economies in Asia and yet no other US airline serves Eastern Europe nor does any Eastern European country have a particularly strong local airline; the Eastern European market is for Delta to take away from the big three European carriers that carry most Eastern European passengers to and from the US via their western European hubs. To be sure, however, DL is also asserting itself in key local international markets such as from New York to Latin America. And Latin America represents a considerable growth opportunity for Delta. Although it has operated Latin American flights almost exclusively from ATL, Delta has become the 2nd largest airline to deep S. America and will likely surpass CO this year as being the largest airline to all of S. America. ATL is very well positioned geographically to develop new Latin markets which are already served from Miami and Houston. And DL’s growth prospects are very significant when they begin to develop JFK as a Latin American gateway. LAX and Florida also hold the potential for significant Latin growth prospects.
After years of struggling to find its role in the deregulated environment, DL now knows what they should be and do...not just what they should not do. That is key in recognizing that DL's turnaround plan is sound and geared for success.
It is not surprising that the template for Delta’s network turnaround has come in no small measure from Continental, an airline that spent decades and two bankruptcies trying to find itself after deregulation. Today, CO acts much more like a 1st tier airline than DL or NW although it has very little market share outside of its hubs. CO has used its assets extraordinarily well, possible both by having a major hub on one of the coasts but also because of NYC’s location relative to western Europe and Latin America which dovetails nicely with CO’s narrowbody capabilities. EWR became CO’s primary new source of revenue in the same way that DL is growing revenue through its international expansion. Further, two of CO’s former top network leaders are now doing the same job at Delta. It seems particularly ironic that the people who jeer Delta today are the same ones who rightfully laud Continental as running an extraordinarily good airline. And they do. DL will best CO at its game in just one trip through bankruptcy.
However, Delta has an even greater chance of success than CO because it has a much larger fleet of international capable aircraft, has a nationwide route system, and has multiple hubs which are capable of supporting international traffic (ie. despite the domestic cutbacks, CVG has more int’l air service than any similar sized city in population or wealth and it’s all provided by Delta and continues to do well despite the domestic cutbacks). Delta has many opportunities ahead of it but for the 1st time in perhaps 25 years, Delta has a vision of what it can be and the resources to make it happen. And while Delta has almost limitless growth potential over the next few years, its domestic competitors have very little growth capacity available to them. Because it still has a very large fleet of regional jets of all types, Delta is in very good shape to become an extraordinarily strong international airline while giving up very little of its domestic network through aircraft downsizing. Just as CO did in the 90s, Delta will possess a strong ability to grow relative to its domestic and international competitors given the cost advantage that Delta will have.
No US airline has developed and maintained the dense worldwide route systems that characterize British Airways, Air France, and Lufthansa. Based on the route announcements and rumors we have seen and heard over the past few months, Delta could very well have the most expansive international route network of any US airline. There will still clearly still be holes in their network but Delta should be able to fill those holes from a position of strength in the not too distant future.
However, a strong network isn’t the only ingredient necessary for a successful airline. Airlines end up in bankruptcy because of damaged finances. To their credit, American Airlines is the only legacy airline that has managed to avoid bankruptcy throughout its history and they have done that by responding to the threats that challenged their business and their balance sheet. However, bankruptcy is not all bad and CO again stands an example of a company that successfully used bankruptcy not only as an opportunity to develop a new strategy but also to clean up the damage from years of losses that resulted from those flawed strategies. To be sure, CO is still a highly leveraged airline and extraordinarily leveraged when compared with other industries but it is generating the revenues necessary to service its debt.
Again, Delta will have an advantage in its financial restructuring when compared with other airlines. Delta entered bankruptcy with the highest amount of unsecured debt of any US airline: $4 billion; its previously strong finances allowed it to offer unsecured debt that others could not. Ironically, Delta tried to renegotiate much of its unsecured debt in the 18 months prior to its bankruptcy filing, but without success. Most of those debt holders will end up with pennies on the dollar but with a stake in the reorganized Delta Air Lines. Put in another perspective, those unsecured debt holders in a sense supported Delta through several years of losses post 9/11.
By being near the back of the pack of airlines that have filed for bankruptcy in this business cycle, Delta has learned a lot. It has learned that it will not accept debt-only exit bankruptcy financing as one airline has done; replacing the debt that one came into bankruptcy with new debt doesn’t do much to provide a platform for success. Delta has also learned that a business needs capital to grow – necessary to keep costs down as the LFCs are good at doing but as they develop new business opportunities. DL’s route development over the next several years will be worthless if it cannot obtain the ultra long haul aircraft necessary to convert many of these new far flung markets into nonstop routes which will be necessary to build premium revenue. Further, DL still needs a cost efficient 100 seat airplane and it is very doubtful that Boeing, as Delta’s exclusive airframe supplier, will cede not only Delta’s business in that segment but also that of the entire industry to a Brazilian company. Boeing has no choice but to build a plane that meets Delta’s needs. Boeing will build it and Delta will fly it. Delta will have the finances necessary to build its business. Even in bankruptcy, Delta is upgrading its cabin interiors and airport facilities. Failing to invest in the business for any period of time is tantamount to deciding that you will not be a class leading competitor in your industry. Most importantly, DL is laying the framework to be a profitable airline which will ensure that it has the financial resources to remain a viable company. Having the lowest costs among the legacy carriers will serve as a huge advantage for Delta, just as it has in the past when Delta was one of the most efficient and lowest cost producers. It is not lost on DL’s leaders today that DL’s losses began to mount when it lost its cost advantage. Bankruptcy has been a powerful wakeup call for Delta. It has reenergized Delta as it has not been energized in decades and required it to develop the strategies and plans necessary to survive and thrive in the current airline environment.
People make up the final wing on which the retooled Delta will fly. Long recognized before deregulation as being one of the best companies in the world to work for, Delta has allowed its relationship with its employees to be badly damaged and has done little to improve it. Even though Delta employees have historically been well paid when compared with their peers, Delta employees were not happy. Delta has cut pay over multiple occasions rather than doing it once in a large enough measure to ensure success. While many people would like to think otherwise, high pay is not in and of itself a key to happiness at work. Continental employees have considered their airline one of the best to work for and yet they haven’t made industry leading salaries in a very long time. They do, however, share in their company’s success and are given considerable credit for their efforts at running their airline. You will see Delta moving from a patriarchal institution to one which is much more entrepreneurial in nature and in which employees are encouraged to see Delta’s goals as their own – exactly as it was for decades before deregulation. Delta succeeded because its employees understood what it took for the company to survive and made Delta succeed, to their mutual benefit. A confrontational work environment epitomized by salary cuts is never successful and that is the environment Delta has had for the better part of the past 15 years. As Delta people become competitively compensated, the confrontation and takebacks will come to an end and Delta people can share in their company’s hope in the future.
Delta has not forgotten how to run a profitable airline. It has taken longer than many of us would have liked for them to find a new way but they have obviously found it and are executing to make it win. Just you watch and see.
AirCanada014 From Canada, joined Oct 2005, 1513 posts, RR: 0
Reply 4, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 7592 times:
I don't want to be rude or anything, I do have respect for the airline Delta, but why do we have to concentrate on DL. There's seem to be more topic on DL than any other airlines. I know that I have a choice to read it or not but just seeing so many topics about DL. Isn't it time to think about something else beside DL. Not much topic regarding NW. I guess you all prefer DL more than NW.
Nonrevman From United States of America, joined Nov 2001, 1302 posts, RR: 1
Reply 5, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 7585 times:
Is this a thesis?
I do think that international expansion will help as well as the buildup in SLC and JFK. It is about time something besides ATL got some attention. No, I am not bashing DL, I just think it is exceedingly dangerous to place all of one's eggs in one basket. A well balanced route structure in addition to expanding to cities that can provide profit are a big help indeed. Hopefully they will start making money soon, because many of the jets approaching the retirement age will need replacement.
OttoPylit From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 6, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 7552 times:
A very good outlook and a good read. But beware, as we have seen already, the doom and gloom crowd hate logic and reason.
And to help clarify just how fare DL can reach with its widebodies, DL has 105 763 and 764's, with options for 34 more, and the next 777 is scheduled for delivery early 2008. A pretty impressive fleet for expansion opportunities.
Totally irrelevant. How much of their current management was there before 1978? The only management that counts is the one in place now. They fix it or they file for Ch. 7
Quoting WorldTraveler (Thread starter): And while Delta has almost limitless growth potential over the next few years, its domestic competitors have very little growth capacity available to them.
Please explain why Delta has limitless growth potential while others do not.
Quoting WorldTraveler (Thread starter): Just as CO did in the 90s, Delta will possess a strong ability to grow relative to its domestic and international competitors given the cost advantage that Delta will have.
Cost advantages? UA, US, and NW have all been to bankruptcy court. Do you think their costs might be able to compete? Will Delta's costs be lower than say AirTran? Probably not.
Quoting WorldTraveler (Thread starter): Delta has not forgotten how to run a profitable airline. It has taken longer than many of us would have liked for them to find a new way but they have obviously found it and are executing to make it win.
What's obvious is that they are hemmoraging red ink. Now, their only idea for fixing it is to try and copy CO. But CO has a major hub at NYC, offering a great mix of O&D and connecting traffic for their international flights. Pulling out a CO route map and copying isn't going to work from JFK. Delta doesn't have the domestic feed, even with the recently announced expansion.
There isn't any real proof that the current management ever knew how to run a profitable airline. I don't think they forgot, I think they never had it figured out. Don't forget, this is the management that implemented Simplifares, capping their potential exploit their most loyal and profitable customers.
It is a mistake to think you can solve any major problems with just potatoes.
SLCUT2777 From United States of America, joined Dec 2005, 4125 posts, RR: 9
Reply 8, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 7495 times:
What reeally killed DL was Leo Mullin's tenure as CEO. His direction to acquire network carriers ASA and ComAir clearly contributed more than anything to Delta's downfall, and Grinstien and company are left to pick up the pieces. ASA was sold for not even half the price that was paid for them 7-8 years earlier. Real swell throw away of capitol Leo! While Grinstien was on the board during Mullin's tenure, he was more proactive as CEO of Burlington Northern/Santa Fe RR during that time after coming off a successful stint as CEO of Western Airlines. The thing people need to watch Grinstien for is that as a corporate attorney his trademark is merger anti-trust and he is the architect of two major mergers in the transportation industry. During the 1980's he was the architect of the DL/WA merger that was completed in 1987, and subequently during the early 1990's he again was successful in merging Burlington Northern Railraod with the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe RR System, this after the later was unsuccessful a few years earlier with a merger with Southern Pacific (later acquired by Union Pacific).
If Delta is to survive, I can only be certain that Grinstien, now well into his 70's, is looking at merger possabilities once he gets DL out of the restructuring process. Who will Delta merge with if they are to be the big dominant carrier you envision them to be? NWA, Continental? Late 2007-2008 will likely be when this happens. Stay tuned.
DELTA Air Lines; The Only Way To Fly from Salt Lake City; Let the Western Heritage always be with Delta!
Isitsafenow From United States of America, joined Feb 2004, 4984 posts, RR: 23
Reply 9, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 7485 times:
As Danny DeVito once said in a movie...."amen.....amen because you just heard
I like Delta....I use them number three in my most of my travels behind 1. my Buick, 2. NW 3. Delta......
I wish the widget well but their problems may be too deep and the timing too late......but we shall see what the pilots do...strike? then, its turn out the lights.
No strike? Lots of ground to cover to get back to making $$$$$$.
If two people agree on EVERYTHING, then one isn't necessary.
Incitatus From Brazil, joined Feb 2005, 4050 posts, RR: 13
Reply 11, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 7444 times:
While I appreciate the information provided, I don't currently share the optimism. Given that this was extra long, I'll dwell in a few parts only.
Delta is not Continental. Continental has a hub at Newark and had a solid following there before it went past 6 destinations in Europe. Delta will never have a similar operation at JFK. For Delta to effectively serve Europe, it needs two flights to every destination: one from JFK and one from ATL. Continental only needs one from Newark. Continental has an unbeatable competitive advantage - no other US airline can touch that.
Boston to Europe on Delta will not work any time soon, and that just comes to show the over-optimism of the entire posting. And in New York they have to fight for market share with Continental, American and JetBlue.
Expansion is not the same as success in airlines. Can most flights be consistently profitable? I am even more skeptical seeing that both Northwest and United have reduced frequencies across the Atlantic. They are willing to cede space to Delta, a symptom that the market is at best barely profitable. While placing long-haul planes in long-haul markets is a good move, Delta still has too many aircraft and their inability to figure that out will only make their adjustment longer and more painful.
BigGSFO From United States of America, joined Jun 2005, 2940 posts, RR: 6
Reply 12, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 7435 times:
Dang that was a novel.
Quoting Alias1024 (Reply 7): Quoting WorldTraveler (Thread starter):
And while Delta has almost limitless growth potential over the next few years, its domestic competitors have very little growth capacity available to them.
Please explain why Delta has limitless growth potential while others do not.
I agree with Alias. DL's growth potential is just as limited (or limiltess) than it's compeitors. AA has just as much opporuntiy, if not much more given their current route network, than DL to grow. UA and CO too. ATL, by far DL's most dominant market, is reaching critical mass and very soon will run out of profitable destinations which can be added. JFK has opportunities, but the New York marketplace is finite and competition fierce, and DL does not have the same metro dominance in NYC as they do in ATL. CVG are SLC are very limited markets.
Nonetheles I appreciate your zeal for DL. Although I am not a big fan of them, I do wish them the best and believe they will survive, which they must do first, before they can thrive.
Luv2fly From United States of America, joined May 2003, 12148 posts, RR: 49
Reply 13, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 7423 times:
Quoting WorldTraveler (Thread starter): First, Delta has been given nothing in its 75 year history – quite a contrast to that of many of its legacy competitors. Delta never was given the choice industry routes and never had the access to the big cities in the US or overseas that seemed to provide unlimited opportunities for competitors like American, United, and Northwest
Hate to burst your bubble here, AA and UA both bought LON from TW and PA respectively. DL bought the rest of PA and even sold parts of it off for profit, i.e. LGW from DTW to NW for Millions of dollars.
767-332ER From United States of America, joined Mar 2001, 2030 posts, RR: 10
Reply 14, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 7389 times:
Quoting Luv2fly (Reply 13): Hate to burst your bubble here, AA and UA both bought LON from TW and PA respectively. DL bought the rest of PA and even sold parts of it off for profit, i.e. LGW from DTW to NW for Millions of dollars.
Okay, one example but how would DTW-LGW work for DL?
Give me some more examples where DL's 'inheritance' from PA was as beneficial internationally as UA, AA and others. I wouldn't even necessarily consider DTW-LGW a "big opportunity."
Now, DL did inherit a number of rights to "secondary" European cities, such as JFK-FRA and the FRA mini-hub (only exploited by DL until the mid 1990's). Everything else served from the ATL megahub was created in its own by Delta. The only thing that was beneficial from the PA inheritance were the extra L1011-500's and the need to fill the international void left by PA's demise.
Twinjets...if one fails, work the other one twice as hard!!!
Luv2fly From United States of America, joined May 2003, 12148 posts, RR: 49
Reply 17, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 7378 times:
Quoting 767-332ER (Reply 14): Give me some more examples where DL's 'inheritance' from PA was as beneficial internationally as UA, AA and others. I wouldn't even necessarily consider DTW-LGW a "big opportunity."
For one DL did not pay the price tag that both AA and UA paid for the rights for LON, also the one route in question and I am going from memory was purchased from DL by NW for close to 14 million dollars, not a bad chunck of change if you ask me.
Also AA, UA, NW and CO all grew Europe one destination at a time.
SESGDL From United States of America, joined Jan 2001, 3489 posts, RR: 10
Reply 19, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 7343 times:
Quoting Incitatus (Reply 11): Delta is not Continental. Continental has a hub at Newark and had a solid following there before it went past 6 destinations in Europe. Delta will never have a similar operation at JFK. For Delta to effectively serve Europe, it needs two flights to every destination: one from JFK and one from ATL. Continental only needs one from Newark. Continental has an unbeatable competitive advantage - no other US airline can touch that.
Many DL destinations are served to Europe strictly from JFK: TXL, VCE (ATL starting soon), NCE (ATL starting soon), ATH, BUD (soon), KBP (soon), IST, and for a while SVO. DL has long depended on O&D routes to Europe from JFK, while CO has to depend of heavy feed just to fill 757s to some destinations. Your info is wrong, DL is by no means trying to create a Continental-type operation.
AvConsultant From United States of America, joined Feb 2006, 1360 posts, RR: 2
Reply 20, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 7302 times:
Keep in mind DL has $29 Billion in debt held by 2 banks - GECAS and American Express. Their expectation on returns will be more agressive than an investment group. In order to pay off this debt, DL will not be profitable for awhile. DL needs to look at expansion into Asia. The loss of the China route might be crucial.
Travelin man From United States of America, joined Mar 2000, 3553 posts, RR: 0
Reply 21, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 7238 times:
Quoting WorldTraveler (Thread starter): Delta never was given the choice industry routes and never had the access to the big cities in the US or overseas that seemed to provide unlimited opportunities for competitors like American, United, and Northwest.
AA and UA both BOUGHT their LHR rights. They weren't given to them. If DL didn't outbid their competitors for those rights, then I guess it doesn't speak well for the "best managed" airline of the past 75 years.
Quoting WorldTraveler (Thread starter): Although it has operated Latin American flights almost exclusively from ATL, Delta has become the 2nd largest airline to deep S. America and will likely surpass CO this year as being the largest airline to all of S. America.
DL is larger than AA to South America? To be quite honest, I would be shocked to find out that is true. AA is huge to South America.
Quoting WorldTraveler (Thread starter): There will still clearly still be holes in their network but Delta should be able to fill those holes from a position of strength in the not too distant future.
How will they fill their holes in Asia or the South Pacific? The only thing mentioned is potentially serving SYD through HNL. They have NO aircraft that can go trans-Pacific. And, trans-Pacific is currently the biggest hole in their route structure. With no available aircraft capable of doing trans-Pacific, how will they fill that (huge) hole in the "not too distant future"?
I also notice you didn't mention their alliance as a reason for hope. Currently Skyteam is the weakest of the "Big 3" alliances. Without significant additions in Asia, Skyteam will continue to be a second-tier alliance, with financially shaky carriers (AF and KL excepted). Star and OneWorld help make AA and UA "tier 1" airlines. I don't think Skyteam provides DL with the same synergies.
I'm not bashing DL (I flew them here to ATL, where I'm on business). But painting such an overly-optimistic portrait of DL's future, while not acknowledging some obvious weaknesses, merely invites people to poke holes in your post.
I wish DL the best of luck, and I don't think they'll go Chapter 7 any time soon. But DL definitely has some hurdles to overcome.
Incitatus From Brazil, joined Feb 2005, 4050 posts, RR: 13
Reply 22, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 8 hours ago) and read 7171 times:
Quoting SESGDL (Reply 19): Your info is wrong, DL is by no means trying to create a Continental-type operation.
What's wrong is the suggestion of the original poster that DL can pull off the same kind of expansion. Wait... no, he said "Delta has an even greater chance of success than CO (...)". So apparently it's not going to be a Continental-type operation - it will leave CO's eating dust. Yes, dream on.
Travelin man From United States of America, joined Mar 2000, 3553 posts, RR: 0
Reply 24, posted (8 years 8 months 3 weeks 3 days 7 hours ago) and read 7067 times:
Quoting LawnDart (Reply 23): What, exactly, would you consider the ATL-NRT route? And what, exactly, does DL operate it with?
What I said was:
Quoting Travelin man (Reply 21): With no available aircraft capable of doing trans-Pacific, how will they fill that (huge) hole in the "not too distant future"?
DL's HUGE hole is Asia. They do not have AVAILABLE aircraft to fill that hole in the "not too distant future" per the original poster's assertion. No 777s are available for additional flying to Asia. The 767s cannot make it trans-Atlantic. So perhaps you can enlighten me on how they will fill that hole in the "not too distant future"???
Quoting LawnDart (Reply 23): How do you figure Skyteam as being the weakest of the "Big 3" (there are only 3, aren't there?) alliances? Passengers carried? Cities served?
Well, for one, the health of the carriers within the alliance. DL? AZ? NW? KL/AF are strong, but they are matched by the health of BA and LH. In addition, OneWorld and Star fly to more destinations, serve more countries, and have a bigger fleet than Skyteam.
Annual passengers: 382.6 million
Countries served: 138
Airports served: 790
Annual passengers: 304.5 million
Countries served: 141
Airports served: 689
Annual passengers: 343.6 million
Countries served: 133
Airports served: 684
With the exception of passengers served, OneWorld and Star have Skyteam beat. And my real point was the huge hole Skyteam has to Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia. But yes, if you want to travel from North America to Europe, Skyteam is quite strong.
[Edited 2006-03-09 06:28:05]
: SkyTeam is the weakest of all the FF alliances and the shakiest at the moment. NW is a liquidation possability and CO is a possible defector. If NW go
: WOW what a bag of wind. Its pretty simple really, Delta has way too much debt, promised employees pensions that it can't afford and paid huge salaries
: Just my two cents, but with a fleet size 216 airframes smaller than Oneworld, Skyteam is actually pretty impressive compared to Oneworld in the fact
: Wrong - they still have several 777-200ERs that can be used Trans-Pacific. NRT, TLV are the only destinations that have to have them. JNB will use th
: Very true, only yesterday DL announced that eventually yhey want to become No 2 to South America.....behind, yep you guessed it AA!
: Okay I was really just going to read this thread and enjoy a pro Mother DL outlook for once.... But then someone had to go ahead and say something rid
: DL has 8 trans-Pacific capable planes to operate from its hubs. Unless this changes quickly (which most will agree will not happen in the next 2-3 yea
: There is no way that DL can overtake CO in the trans-Atlantic market. CO's terminal at EWR is so much more superior than what DL has at JFK. DL will h
: That's quite a very rosy outlook on DL's fate. Delta may survive, but I have to cast doubt that it will thrive. Reasons? 1. Bankruptcy and restructuri
: Love how yet another pro-Delta thread has turned into another bashfest. Sorry for you WorldTraveler that your attempt has been so drastically shot dow
: Travel Man was refering to SouthEast Asia not northern ASIA. DL and or NW doesn't fly to SIN, BKK, TPE and or HKG.
: And also some who do work in the industry & do know about airlines. While there is a lot in DLs favour they still lost USD300million in either Januar
: I doubt Delta will survive, I doubt an airline with the customer service policies and level of poor attitude that is prevelant at Delta can carry them
: And, on the flip side, if DL went Ch. 7, NW would have a hub setup in ATL even before the final DL plane landed.
: Perhaps you are right, but my money would be on American to bet em to the punch. safe
: Delta Still Playing Catch Up Yes, DL has a chance to survive and thrive. They need more than a few things to fall in place for it to happen, though. G
: As DL's application for the China route showed, their forecast was exceedingly optimistic, and they knew it. Their commitment for the first round of
: First, let me say that I think DL has a lot of great people working for it, and a lot of dedicated people who have dedicated their lives to making the
: Of the statistics you quoted in comparing the three allliances, Annual passengers is the most relevant measurement for "size". Cities/countries serve
: An ATL hub is vastly more important to a NW than to anyone else, including LCCs. While any airline might be tempted by the void and the large O&D at
: I admire your optimism, WorldTraveler. That type of attitude is really needed at a time like this for DL. Dont hang your head, like we did at EA....at
: Then what was that flight I was on 3 weeks ago from KIX to TPE? It sure looked like a red tail, and it said NWA on my ticket stub.
: If DL is to survive, which odds are still 3:1 against DL, it'll have to further streamline it's fleet, dump remaining MD-88s and -90s, and go all Boei
: Agreed. Up until about 1985 or 1985 Delta was considered a premium airline by most. Growing up in Florida it was often contemplated whether or not to
: Right and tell me which routes to 'LON' did AA and UA get....(Heathrow!!!). Of course if I were NW, I would pay a high price for the DTW-LGW route, c
: Pro Delta blather doesn't mean anything he said made any sense. You can wish for expansion, flying to all points in the world etc., leave all that as
51 Travelin man
: Sorry, I meant the 767 can't do trans-Pacific. Their 777s number what, 8 now? They've assigned them to NRT, TLV, and soon, JNB. That's at least 6 777
: Who claimed Delta's problems stemmed from having to deal with grumpy Unions - Delta has only one union to deal with, ALPA. With the exception of less
: Thanks Milesrich ... That, my friends, is a pretty good (or not so pretty) summary of the situation.