Sponsor Message:
Civil Aviation Forum
My Starred Topics | Profile | New Topic | Forum Index | Help | Search 
Report On AF Crash At YYZ Released  
User currently offlineAyqzbr From Canada, joined Mar 2007, 60 posts, RR: 0
Posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 4 hours ago) and read 11791 times:

Canada's Transportation Safety Board has released its report into the AF crash at YYZ in August 2005.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servl...cereport1212/BNStory/National/home

To me two of the significant items relate to improving procedures for landing in storms and "that passenger safety briefings include clear directions to leave all carry-on baggage behind during evacuations".

75 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlineBennett123 From United Kingdom, joined Aug 2004, 7477 posts, RR: 3
Reply 1, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 4 hours ago) and read 11770 times:

Surely they would calculate landing distance in advance!.

User currently offlineDtwclipper From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 2, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 4 hours ago) and read 11745 times:

Wasn't an A.net member on board? I thought I remembered reading that here?

User currently offlineSpartanmjf From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 494 posts, RR: 0
Reply 3, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 3 hours ago) and read 11690 times:

Carryon baggage issues notwithstanding, that cabin crew did nothing short of miraculous work in getting those passengers out of that aircraft safely, and they should be commended for that great work! Clearly, the training they received for cabin evacuation worked.


"Nuts to the man in 21D!"
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4392 posts, RR: 76
Reply 4, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 3 hours ago) and read 11652 times:
Support Airliners.net - become a First Class Member!

This is the full official TSB report :
AF340Toronto accident report

Long and deatailed, as usual...Need time.

Regards



Contrail designer
User currently offlineFlySSC From United States of America, joined Aug 2003, 7403 posts, RR: 57
Reply 5, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 3 hours ago) and read 11603 times:



Quoting Ayqzbr (Thread starter):
passenger safety briefings include clear directions to leave all carry-on baggage behind during evacuations".

This is already the case.
This is common sense to everybody ... and very easy to write... But when, as a F/A, you have to organize an unprepared evacuation, it's another story.
If you don't want passengers to take their carry-on in an emergency evacuation, don't allow them to have carry on on board ! this is the only solution, otherwise don't expect from then to follow what you will say during such a stressful situation.


User currently offlineYYZYYT From Canada, joined Apr 2005, 947 posts, RR: 0
Reply 6, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 3 hours ago) and read 11593 times:



Quoting Pihero (Reply 4):
This is the full official TSB report :
AF340Toronto accident report

Long and deatailed, as usual...Need time.

Regards

definitely will tkae time to read - but I am very interested in your thoughts, Pihero.


User currently onlineGrahamHill From France, joined Mar 2007, 2809 posts, RR: 2
Reply 7, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 3 hours ago) and read 11416 times:

"Idle reverse was selected 12.8 seconds after main gear touchdown, and full reverse was selected 16.4 seconds after main gear touchdown."

That's insane!  eyepopping 



"A learned fool is more foolish than an ignorant one" - Moliere
User currently offlineScbriml From United Kingdom, joined Jul 2003, 12399 posts, RR: 46
Reply 8, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days 1 hour ago) and read 11177 times:
Support Airliners.net - become a First Class Member!



Quoting FlySSC (Reply 5):
If you don't want passengers to take their carry-on in an emergency evacuation, don't allow them to have carry on on board ! this is the only solution, otherwise don't expect from then to follow what you will say during such a stressful situation.

I'm sorry, but nothing I take on a plane is valuable enough to me that I will risk my life to take it off with me (apart from my wife).

No damned fool had better be trying to get their carry-on out in front of me when I'm trying to get off a burning plane. box 



Time flies like an arrow, but fruit flies like a banana!
User currently offlineRavel From Finland, joined Feb 2006, 137 posts, RR: 0
Reply 9, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days ago) and read 11113 times:

Too bad I can't get Globe and Mail videos to show... Tried many different browsers.

User currently offlineThreepoint From Canada, joined Oct 2005, 2129 posts, RR: 9
Reply 10, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days ago) and read 11050 times:

Quoting Spartanmjf (Reply 3):
that cabin crew did nothing short of miraculous work in getting those passengers out of that aircraft safely, and they should be commended for that great work!

They should be commended for their excellent work. But there was nothing miraculous about it.

Quoting FlySSC (Reply 5):
This is already the case.

Really? Very rarely do I ever hear anything about an evacuation except the position of the exit doors and the floor lighting. The carry-on rules just aren't mentioned, save for the stowing positions at takeoff and landing. You and I know why those rules are there, but 90% of your fellow passengers fail to make the connection.

Quoting FlySSC (Reply 5):
If you don't want passengers to take their carry-on in an emergency evacuation, don't allow them to have carry on on board ! this is the only solution, otherwise don't expect from then to follow what you will say during such a stressful situation.

Will never happen. But remember, most people are inherently sheep. In a confusing or terrifying situation, they will be led by a trained or simply assertive person.

Quoting Scbriml (Reply 8):
I'm sorry, but nothing I take on a plane is valuable enough to me that I will risk my life to take it off with me

Disappointingly, many passengers do not share that view. In many cases it's a conditioned response to 'grab your stuff and flee' rather than a conscious thought process.

Quoting Scbriml (Reply 8):
No damned fool had better be trying to get their carry-on out in front of me when I'm trying to get off a burning plane.

As desperate and tough as you may be, there will always be somebody in that circumstance more desperate and tough trying to get out just as fast as you. Example (from the TSB report): Two of the passengers incurred serious injuries-one when he jumped from the exit, a height of 10 to 12 feet, and the other when pushed out of the exit by other passengers.

[Edited 2007-12-12 11:52:09]


The nice thing about a mistake is the pleasure it gives others.
User currently offlineEddieho From Canada, joined Jan 2004, 229 posts, RR: 3
Reply 11, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days ago) and read 11055 times:

There are videos here: http://bst-tsb.gc.ca/en/media/video_database/air/a05h0002/index.asp

User currently offlineA346Dude From Canada, joined Nov 2004, 1282 posts, RR: 7
Reply 12, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 2 days ago) and read 10991 times:



Quoting GrahamHill (Reply 7):
"Idle reverse was selected 12.8 seconds after main gear touchdown, and full reverse was selected 16.4 seconds after main gear touchdown."

That's insane!

That stuck out for me too.

The report attributes this to the fact that around the time of touchdown, the aircraft entered an especially severe downpour which severely reduced visibility. The pilots were looking out the side windows just trying to determine their position relative to the runway, and were so focussed on staying on the runway they didn't have enough time or concentration to do anything else.



You know the gear is up and locked when it takes full throttle to taxi to the terminal.
User currently offlineLitz From United States of America, joined Dec 2003, 1757 posts, RR: 0
Reply 13, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 10842 times:
Support Airliners.net - become a First Class Member!



Quoting A346Dude (Reply 12):
The pilots were looking out the side windows just trying to determine their position relative to the runway, and were so focussed on staying on the runway they didn't have enough time or concentration to do anything else.

Which brings things full circle back to the other main glaring point : this should have been a go-around.

- litz


User currently offlineAF340 From Canada, joined Jul 2007, 2786 posts, RR: 4
Reply 14, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 10742 times:



Quoting Litz (Reply 13):
Which brings things full circle back to the other main glaring point : this should have been a go-around.

Absolutely! I remember that day and how bad the weather was. Hitting the tail end of a microburst, landing in the middle of the runway, then 12 seconds later deploying the thrust reversers and not doing a go-around. Sounds to me like a bit of a case of Get-thereitis.



AF340 wave 


User currently offlineThreepoint From Canada, joined Oct 2005, 2129 posts, RR: 9
Reply 15, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 10697 times:



Quoting AF340 (Reply 14):
Sounds to me like a bit of a case of Get-thereitis.

Not at all, the way I read the report. The aircrew considered various diversion airports at many stages of the incident flight and were under no pressures, implied or otherwise. The possible reasons for a delayed application of reverse thrust were also addressed.
My utter speculation is that the crew didn't even realize they were in peril of an overrun until they only had a couple thousand feet remaining on the runway, by which time the only option is to hang on for the ride. Attempting a go-around in that circumstance would likely have ended with a much worse outcome.



The nice thing about a mistake is the pleasure it gives others.
User currently offlineLitz From United States of America, joined Dec 2003, 1757 posts, RR: 0
Reply 16, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 10563 times:
Support Airliners.net - become a First Class Member!



Quoting Threepoint (Reply 15):
My utter speculation is that the crew didn't even realize they were in peril of an overrun until they only had a couple thousand feet remaining on the runway, by which time the only option is to hang on for the ride. Attempting a go-around in that circumstance would likely have ended with a much worse outcome.

On this I agree ... once they'd gone past the point where TOGA would fail, there's no choice ...

If they'd made the attempt, theyd've gone off the end at a much, much faster speed and we'd likely have a planeful of casualties instead of a planeful of survivors.

What I found particularly telling was the sequence of pictures taken by someone on the ramp at the airport (incredibly enough, one of which shows AF358 on short final in the background) that show how fast the visibility went to absolute crap as the storm hit.

Awful, just awful weather.

- litz


User currently offlineContnlEliteCMH From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 1455 posts, RR: 44
Reply 17, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 10534 times:

The report says that even if...

... the airplane touched down at the proper speed, and
... the thrust reversers had deployed on time

then the airplane wouldn't have been able to stop on the runway given where it touched down. Of course, it might not have been going nearly so fast when it departed the runway.

From section 1.6.5: Stopping Performance

With full reverse thrust selected after touchdown in accordance with the AFM and the aircraft touching down at the recommended speed, the aircraft would have used 5574 feet (1699 m) of runway. As noted in Section 1.1.4, the touchdown point was 3800 feet down the 9000-foot runway.



Christianity. Islam. Hinduism. Anthropogenic Global Warming. All are matters of faith!
User currently offlineTaromA380 From Romania, joined Sep 2005, 334 posts, RR: 0
Reply 18, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 10481 times:

I didn't find the CVR transcript !?

User currently onlineGrahamHill From France, joined Mar 2007, 2809 posts, RR: 2
Reply 19, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 10428 times:

Air France published a press release concerning the Canadian report today. Among others:

Quote:
Air France declares that it agrees with the recommendations made in the TSB's final report, and in particular those concerning:

* the drawing up of clear standards to limit approaches and landings in stormy conditions;
* improved pilot training to ensure they take the right decision at the time of landing when weather conditions rapidly deteriorate;
* crews to establish the margin of error between landing distance available and landing distance required before conducting an approach into deteriorating weather;
* installation of a 300 m Runway Edge Safety Area (RESA) on all type 4 runways.

More here: http://corporate.airfrance.com/index...tnews[tt_news]=1667&L=1&no_cache=1



"A learned fool is more foolish than an ignorant one" - Moliere
User currently offlinePnwtraveler From Canada, joined Jun 2007, 2229 posts, RR: 12
Reply 20, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 10401 times:

Since KLM diverted just prior to AF landing that should have been a warning sign. It was a 747. Landing on that particular runway during that type of weather should not have happened. One of the two other longer runways that are parallel should only be used in my opinion.

User currently offlinePITrules From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 3136 posts, RR: 4
Reply 21, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 10399 times:

From the "Factual Information" section of the report:

"This runway was newly constructed and certified for use in October 2002. The entire surface consisted of HMA. The bearings for Runway 24L are 227ºT/237ºM. The runway is 9000 feet (2743 m) long by 200 feet (61 m) wide and is not grooved. "

"Cutting or forming grooves in existing or new pavement is a proven and effective technique for improving the drainage of some runways and providing skid resistance and preventing hydroplaning during wet weather. Test results demonstrated that, on similarly wetted grooved runways, the transverse runway grooves produced substantially greater aircraft braking friction levels than were shown by the wetted ungrooved surface data."


On first thought, I can't imagine how a newly designed and constructed runway was built without grooves. What an oversight. But then the report continues...

"In Canada, only four runways have been grooved. This reflects a policy to employ grooving only where an unusual drainage problem exists. As well, grooving allows accumulation of ice and snow in the grooves, which can lead to runway deterioration and the creation of foreign objects on the runway.

So the lack of grooving was an intentional tradeoff, one which would seem to have failed the AF flight.

I am not dismissing all the other factors contributing to the accident, but I find it strange the Canadian gov't would admit the benefit of grooving under the "factual" section of the report, but not make a mention of it in the "Analysis", "Conclusions", and "Safety Actions" sections of the report.

But then I would not expect a government to admit one of it's policies (the lack of grooving at airports) to be a contributing factor in it's own report.

I have landed a tiny CRJ at that airport15 minutes after a rainshower. The runway was damp with the sun shining. But the tower reported the Braking Action "Poor". I could not believe the runway conditions upon landing, it was almost like landing on a sheet of ice because of the built up rubber deposits and lack of grooving.



FLYi
User currently offlineEddieho From Canada, joined Jan 2004, 229 posts, RR: 3
Reply 22, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 10394 times:

No they didnt post the transcripts

The analysis and conclusion read is very interesting

Here's some of the conclusions:

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2005/a05h0002/a05h0002_sec3.asp#3

------------------------


3.0 Conclusions
3.1 Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
The crew conducted an approach and landing in the midst of a severe and rapidly changing thunderstorm. There were no procedures within Air France related to distance required from thunderstorms during approaches and landing, nor were these required by regulations.


After the autopilot and autothrust systems were disengaged, the pilot flying (PF) increased the thrust in reaction to a decrease in the airspeed and a perception that the aircraft was sinking. The power increase contributed to an increase in aircraft energy and the aircraft deviated above the glide path.


At about 300 feet above ground level (agl), the surface wind began to shift from a headwind component to a 10-knot tailwind component, increasing the aircraft's groundspeed and effectively changing the flight path. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold about 40 feet above the normal threshold crossing height.


Approaching the threshold, the aircraft entered an intense downpour, and the forward visibility became severely reduced.


When the aircraft was near the threshold, the crew members became committed to the landing and believed their go-around option no longer existed.


The touchdown was long because the aircraft floated due to its excess speed over the threshold and because the intense rain and lightning made visual contact with the runway very difficult.


The aircraft touched down about 3800 feet from the threshold of Runway 24L, which left about 5100 feet of runway available to stop. The aircraft overran the end of Runway 24L at about 80 knots and was destroyed by fire when it entered the ravine.


Selection of the thrust reversers was delayed as was the subsequent application of full reverse thrust.


The pilot not flying (PNF) did not make the standard callouts concerning the spoilers and thrust reversers during the landing roll. This further contributed to the delay in the PF selecting the thrust reversers.


Because the runway was contaminated by water, the strength of the crosswind at touchdown exceeded the landing limits of the aircraft.


There were no landing distances indicated on the operational flight plan for a contaminated runway condition at the Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport (CYYZ).


Despite aviation routine weather reports (METARs) calling for thunderstorms at CYYZ at the expected time of landing, the crew did not calculate the landing distance required for Runway 24L. Consequently, they were not aware of the margin of error available for the landing runway nor that it was eliminated once the tailwind was experienced.


Although the area up to 150 m beyond the end of Runway 24L was compliant with Aerodrome Standards and Recommended Practices (TP 312E), the topography of the terrain beyond this point, along the extended runway centreline, contributed to aircraft damage and to the injuries to crew and passengers.


The downpour diluted the firefighting foam agent and reduced its efficiency in dousing the fuel-fed fire, which eventually destroyed most of the aircraft.

3.2 Findings as to Risk
In the absence of clear guidelines with respect to the conduct of approaches into convective weather, there is a greater likelihood that crews will continue to conduct approaches into such conditions, increasing the risk of an approach and landing accident.


A policy where only the captain can make the decision to conduct a missed approach can increase the likelihood that an unsafe condition will not be recognized early and, therefore, increase the time it might otherwise take to initiate a missed approach.


Although it could not be determined whether the use of the rain repellent system would have improved the forward visibility in the downpour, the crew did not have adequate information about the capabilities and operation of the rain repellent system and did not consider using it.


The information available to flight crews on initial approach in convective weather does not optimally assist them in developing a clear idea of the weather that may be encountered later in the approach.


During approaches in convective weather, crews may falsely rely on air traffic control (ATC) to provide them with suggestions and directions as to whether to land or not.


Some pilots have the impression that ATC will close the airport if weather conditions make landings unsafe; ATC has no such mandate.


Wind information from ground-based measuring systems (anemometers) is critical to the safe landing of aircraft. Redundancy of the system should prevent a single-point failure from causing a total loss of relevant wind information.


The emergency power for both the public address (PA) and EVAC alert systems are located in the avionics bay. A less vulnerable system and/or location would reduce the risk of these systems failing during a survivable crash.


Brace commands were not given by the cabin crew during this unexpected emergency condition. Although it could not be determined if some of the passengers were injured as a result, research shows that the risk of injury is reduced if passengers brace properly.


Safety information cards given to passengers travelling in the flight decks of Air France Airbus A340-313 aircraft do not include illustrations depicting emergency exit windows, descent ropes or the evacuation panel in the flight deck doors.


There are no clear visual cues to indicate that some dual-lane slides actually have two lanes. As a result, these slides were used mostly as single-lane slides. This likely slowed the evacuation, but this fact was not seen as a contributing factor to the injuries suffered by the passengers.


Although all passengers managed to evacuate, the evacuation was impeded because nearly 50 per cent of the passengers retrieved carry-on baggage.

3.3 Other Findings
There is no indication that the captain's medical condition or fatigue played a role in this occurrence.


The crew did not request long aerodrome forecast (TAF) information while en route. This did not affect the outcome of this occurrence because the CYYZ forecast did not change appreciably from information the flight crew members received before departure, and they received updated METARs for CYYZ and Niagara Falls International Airport (KIAG).


The possibility of a diversion required the flight crew to check the weather for various potential alternates and to complete fuel calculations. Although these activities consumed considerable time and energy, there is no indication that they were unusual for this type of operation or that they overtaxed the flight crew.


The decision to continue with the approach was consistent with normal industry practice, in that the crew could continue with the intent to land while maintaining the option to discontinue the approach if they assessed that the conditions were becoming unsafe.


There is no indication that more sophisticated ATC weather radar information, had it been available and communicated to the crew, would have altered their decision to continue to land.


It could not be determined why door L2 opened before the aircraft came to a stop.


There is no indication that the aircraft was struck by lightning.


There is no information to indicate that the aircraft encountered windshear during its approach and landing.


The flight crew seats are certified to a lower standard than the cabin seats, which may have been a factor in the injuries incurred by the captain.


User currently offlineMattRB From Canada, joined Apr 2005, 1624 posts, RR: 9
Reply 23, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 10301 times:



Quoting PITrules (Reply 21):
On first thought, I can't imagine how a newly designed and constructed runway was built without grooves. What an oversight.

Hardly an oversight. Given the weather conditions that we encounter up here, it's necessary to not groove the runways to ensure that they're not constantly in a state of repair.

Quoting PITrules (Reply 21):
So the lack of grooving was an intentional tradeoff, one which would seem to have failed the AF flight.

It didn't fail the AF flight at all. The aircraft ran off the runway, not skidded. Had the AF flight skidded off the runway, then yes, you could say that the runway not being grooved was a contributing factor.

Quoting PITrules (Reply 21):
But then I would not expect a government to admit one of it's policies (the lack of grooving at airports) to be a contributing factor in it's own report.

Why would it mention a policy that played no contributing factor whatsoever in the crash?

You should also note the wording of what you posted:

"Cutting or forming grooves in existing or new pavement is a proven and effective technique for improving the drainage of some runways and providing skid resistance and preventing hydroplaning during wet weather."

Grooving is not effective on all runways, only some.



Aviation is proof that given, the will, we have the capacity to achieve the impossible.
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4392 posts, RR: 76
Reply 24, posted (6 years 7 months 3 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 10301 times:
Support Airliners.net - become a First Class Member!

MODERATORS,
THERE ARE THREE THREADS ON THIS VERY SUBJECT.
COULD YOU MIX THEM INTO JUST ONE, PLEASE ?



Contrail designer
25 PITrules : Grooving is not necessary to ensure they are not always in a state of repair? So it's OK to have a braking action of "poor" on a runway only damp (no
26 Lnglive1011yyz : Because it snows here 6 months out of the year. As you stated in your own argument I think, the report says that Grooving causes snow and ice buildup
27 BlueSkys : I was right by the airport when it ran off the runway. The weather at the time I would consider to be ZERO visibility. I could not see the end of my c
28 PITrules : OK, that's fine, but what does cold/snow/ice have to do with the Air France crash? The fact remains Air France didn't crash under those conditions. T
29 Threepoint : This seems to be a statement on the wrong variables. I think that "given where it (the plane) touched down" was a more contributing variable than the
30 A346Dude : It's called a compromise. You cannot have a runway that is optimal in both summer and winter unless you want to groove and de-groove it every 6 month
31 Post contains links MattRB : Go have a read: http://www.ceat.uiuc.edu/PUBLICATIONS/technotes/TN%2028%20Buttlar.pdf. Note the part in the beginning where it states "Despite their
32 MattRB : You forgot to mention the part in the report (the same one where they admit it improves braking action "substantially") where it says: Again, as I've
33 PITrules : One AGAIN, compared to other winter airports worldwide, Canadian airports are in the vast minority considering they are not grooved. And even if it i
34 Olympus69 : That is rubbish! The average first and last snowfall dates in Toronto are early to mid November thru early to mid April - 5 months. Days with snow an
35 PITrules : So YYZ deviated from worldwide standard due to cost. Yes, pilot judgement. Sometimes airport vehicles are also used. It already is, and has been for
36 MattRB : Please show the standards (that Canada is a signatory to) where it states that all runways are to be built with grooves. Enough standing water to pre
37 Post contains images Pnwtraveler : Yes sorry. KLM chose to divert before starting to approach YYZ. AF would have heard their discussion with ATC. I would guess the last few years it ha
38 MattRB : Asphalt & grooved.
39 Threepoint : What worldwide standard is that exactly? And one thing you should know about the GTAA (YYZ operators) is that they are certainly not shy of spending
40 PITrules : When the majority of the major airports in first world countries have grooved runways, would you not consider that a 'standard' that Canada does not
41 Tribird1011 : Not quite. Had AF landed successfully, KLM would have been the next aircraft to land on 24L. I remember hearing the liveatc archives where AF is hand
42 Post contains links RuudOnline : Indeed, the KLM diverted to KSYR due to low fuel emergency after the crash The atc tape: http://members.home.nl/ruuddevries/CYYZ-Toronto-Aug-02-05-160
43 QantasHeavy : Landing in and around thunderstorms is a bad idea. Surprised there is no policy for that. Yes I know a tower can't order someone not to land or someth
44 David L : That's what I keep coming back to. It's all very well saying with hindsight that AF358 should not have attempted a landing but you can't ignore the s
45 ContnlEliteCMH : To which statement do you refer? Mine, or the report's? If mine, you are overreaching considerably on what I wrote since I drew no conclusions about
46 BeechNut : The other point regarding a possible go-around: in the report, they state that the crew rejected the possibility of a go-around on the basis of an ac
47 BeechNut : I would also add, on the "get-thereitis" theme: the report indicates that the crew were examining options up to landing. One critical factor was the f
48 Olympus69 : I probably should have picked a different person to quote here, but I just wanted to point out the fact that it wasn't the airspeed that mattered as
49 Bennett123 : Do'nt the performance tables for the type take this into account.
50 Threepoint : I referred to the report's statements, not yours. No worries, I understood completely what you were writing. The report does mention AF's policy in r
51 Lnglive1011yyz : Perhaps I should have revisited that statement and indicated that I was being a bit sarcastic.. I've lived here all my life too, John, and I am well
52 BeechNut : That's correct. Their fuel situation would, in any case, not have allowed more than one approach before diverting to their alternate. Their initial c
53 Pihero : I am amazed at how fast you all have read that report. I'm not even half-way through ! A few comments on some of the posts, though, because I don't wa
54 Post contains links StarAC17 : Hypothetically if they didn't have the fuel to make it to YOW and went around at YYZ couldn't they have diverted to YHM or YXU which can both handle a
55 Post contains links NAV20 : Reading the Report, the fundamental cause of the 'long landing' appears to have been a last-minute windshift (from crosswind to tailwind), causing a d
56 Post contains images David L : I didn't mean it's a mystery, I just meant that the experts would make a better job of commenting on it that I would.
57 BeechNut : My reasoning is fine. You are misreading me. I didn't say he had to divert. I said that they were at a point where they had to make critical decision
58 Drgmobile : I find it funny how all of these folks have focused primarily on the pilot's decision to land (as I did from reading the press release and skimming th
59 BeechNut : The media haven't a clue what they're talking about. Then again, so too many people on this board; I have heard a 9000 ft runway described as "short"
60 GQ : Read the entire report which, as a result of such a positive outcome, is very detailed and provides great insight into how events unfolded. Given the
61 TRVYYZ : YHM is too close. that is the problem, meaning YHM would also be having the same stormy weather.
62 BeechNut : In fact I believe it was, as it was a line that stretched from Buffalo to north of YYZ. Beech
63 Post contains images Olympus69 : Nothing wrong with sarcasm, but using exaggerated figures as the basis of whether or not a runway should be grooved is not helpful. Also not good for
64 Swissy : Actually I believe YHM was fine...... had a small down poor while YYZ got it very bad..... I recall many occasions were YYZ was backed up because of
65 ADXMatt : IMHO when you are in the WX you don't let doors close. As hindsight is 20/20 they should have diverted due to their fuel. Just because an airport "ca
66 Threepoint : Convective activity that produces weather phenomenon such as that on the day of the accident tends to be quite fast-moving and localized, which could
67 QantasHeavy : Amazing how we can get the ATC tapes on-line like that.. love how ATC conversations sound like an auction with everyone speaking quickly and everyone
68 StarAC17 : Had it skidded off like DL 191 there was the possibility of the plane running into the busiest stretch of highway not just in Canada but in North Ame
69 Davescj : Clearly so true. Nothing like good training to condition responses in an emergency. I don't know what AF has currently, but when I was in BA during t
70 Spacecadet : What's miraculous is that the airplane didn't end up in a worse situation, in which the exits were blocked, fire consumed the cabin instantly or the
71 Swissy : Sure , WS used to go to YOW if YHM (back in the days prior YYZ) was "closed" or close to the crews minimum.... or what ever the reason was for not la
72 Threepoint : I also wondered why the diversion airport was one in another country, rather than YHM, YXU, YUL or YOW for example. I'm sure whatever reasons justifi
73 Swissy : Believed or not but there are people out there they think they are food & drink servers..... Agree and IF GTAA would have done just 50% of a "hell of
74 Threepoint : From what I understand, the transport of the passengers to an appropriate shelter may have been slow in occurring, and received some criticism. As fa
75 Post contains images Swissy : In my opinion an understatement.... a 3rd party company working out of YYZ provided 100% better service than GTAA... That would be great. Are there a
Top Of Page
Forum Index

This topic is archived and can not be replied to any more.

Printer friendly format

Similar topics:More similar topics...
Report On SQ006 Crash At 0009 GMT posted Wed Nov 1 2000 01:29:04 by Air Taiwan
AF's B744 At YYZ posted Tue May 15 2007 02:54:32 by Aseem
What Happened To The AF 340 At YYZ CVR? posted Sat Oct 15 2005 05:31:41 by YYZatcboy
Update On MK Crash At Halifax posted Thu Dec 23 2004 02:39:25 by Okie
Update On Convair Crash At Cvg 8/13/04 posted Fri Nov 19 2004 17:31:27 by Hirisk
Delay On Rwy 23 At YYZ posted Sun Oct 7 2001 00:51:51 by Gmonney
Report On Fgita Crash In Tahiti posted Sun Apr 22 2001 20:42:37 by Rey777
Update #5 On SQ006 Crash At Taipei, Taiwan posted Wed Nov 1 2000 03:44:06 by Air Taiwan
Update On SQ006 Crash #2 At 0048 GMT posted Wed Nov 1 2000 01:55:14 by Air Taiwan
RTO On 15L At YYZ Recently? posted Thu Aug 2 2007 21:39:41 by DakotaSport