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TK B738 Crash At Amsterdam - Part 10  
User currently offlinePanAm_DC10 From Australia, joined Aug 2000, 4097 posts, RR: 90
Posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 1 day 11 hours ago) and read 18455 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
COMMUNITY MANAGER

This is a new part in the ongoing series of threads which cover this topic. We ask that you continue the discussion in this new thread.

All previous threads are linked below for your reference.

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Thank you.


Ask the impossible to achieve the best possible
163 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlineStarlionblue From Greenland, joined Feb 2004, 16908 posts, RR: 67
Reply 1, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 1 day 8 hours ago) and read 18276 times:

Off topic but I think this may be an a.nut record for number of threads.


"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots."
User currently offlineTheredbaron From Mexico, joined Mar 2005, 2163 posts, RR: 8
Reply 2, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 1 day 7 hours ago) and read 18204 times:

Yes I agree, and probably one of the most informative in many ways, but I think that in someway pointless because we dont have the CVR transcription and we dont have a clue what distracted the crew so much that the let the AC go minus 40knots below Vref.

In the L1011 in the everglades the CVR made everything clear that the crew was distracted by a 1 dollar faulty landing gear warning light, and without it, that tragic crash would have been unsolvable or unexplainable.

I think the CVR in this crash is crucial to know what really happened and led to the crew to this fatal outcome.

Best Regards
TRB



The best seat in a Plane is the Jumpseat.
User currently offlineGonzalo From Chile, joined Aug 2005, 1953 posts, RR: 2
Reply 3, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 18023 times:



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 2):
I think the CVR in this crash is crucial to know what really happened and led to the crew to this fatal outcome.

I agree. IIRC the CVR ( and the DFDR too of course ) were in very good condition, so i hope we can hear something new in a few days or couple of weeks max. OTOH, if the CVR reveals something so dramatic to explain the lack of awareness of this crew regarding the speed, i will be very surprised.

Saludos.
G.



80 Knots...V1...Rotate...Gear Up...DC-3 / EMB-110 / Fairchild-227 / Ab318-19-20 / B732 / B763
User currently offlineTheredbaron From Mexico, joined Mar 2005, 2163 posts, RR: 8
Reply 4, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 1 day ago) and read 17718 times:

Gonzalo, the CVR will answer a lot of questions for sure...

I Think we will see as experience has told us that a very small problem distrated the crew, the lost situational awareness or did not check the basics that lead to this tragic event.

I have been in the Jumpseat a lot and I have seen it time and time again that a crew that has an impecable record make mistakes or misunderstands the AC.

Saludos

Best Regards
TRB



The best seat in a Plane is the Jumpseat.
User currently offlineGonzalo From Chile, joined Aug 2005, 1953 posts, RR: 2
Reply 5, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 23 hours ago) and read 17660 times:



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 4):
Gonzalo, the CVR will answer a lot of questions for sure...

I hope the same, believe me... And even more, if the CVR's information finally shows that the crew never was at fault, I'll be the first in acknowledge my mistake and apologize ( for my actual position about the speed-awareness ). For now we only can wait and see....

Saludos
G.



80 Knots...V1...Rotate...Gear Up...DC-3 / EMB-110 / Fairchild-227 / Ab318-19-20 / B732 / B763
User currently offlineBoeing747_600 From United States of America, joined Oct 1999, 1290 posts, RR: 0
Reply 6, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 23 hours ago) and read 17649 times:



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 2):
but I think that in someway pointless because we dont have the CVR transcription

One of the points mentioned in the Dutch preliminary report was that the captain was "coaching" the F/O through the Before-Landing checklist while the aircraft made an idle descent on final. While we obviously dont yet know the extent to which this was a factor, it seems plausible that coaching a pilot through something as procedural as a checklist, as opposed to merely carrying it out could have (even if it shouldn't have) distracted both pilots from monitoring the airspeed. That a third pair of eyes on the flight deck missed it as well, is utterly mind-boggling.

There was also some talk about TK pilots frowning upon the choice of AMS as a training airport. Their concerns may yet be borne out. This tragic accident may end up becoming the textbook example of just how critical situational awareness is, particularly during approach.


User currently offlineSpitfire From France, joined Feb 2001, 801 posts, RR: 7
Reply 7, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 22 hours ago) and read 17572 times:

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 6):
the captain was "coaching" the F/O through the Before-Landing checklist

I'm wondering what he was 'coaching' to someone who had already made that "Landing" check list hundred of times in the simulator....

The Landing check list :

- START SWITCHES ................ON
-RECALL.........................CHECKED
-SPEEDBRAKE..........ARMED,GREEN LIGHT
-LANDING GEAR........DOWN, 3 GREEN
-FLAPS.........., xxxx, GREEN LIGHT


Ok, we have to wait for the CVR transcription

[Edited 2009-03-11 15:07:25]


Sabena ... Never to be forgotten (12 years already , what a shame !! )
User currently offlinePW100 From Netherlands, joined Jan 2002, 2326 posts, RR: 12
Reply 8, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 22 hours ago) and read 17508 times:



Quoting FlightGlobal.com:

The throttles remained at idle for about 100s during which time the aircraft slowed to 40kt (75km/h) below reference speed and the aircraft descended through the glideslope. During this period the captain was "coaching" the first officer in conducting the before-landing checklist.

When would the crew be expected to have finished the before-landing checklist? Am I reading too much in this being an indication that they were a little late in their preperations, and that that could have taken up some of their concentration?

Thanks,
PW100



Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
User currently offlineBoeing747_600 From United States of America, joined Oct 1999, 1290 posts, RR: 0
Reply 9, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 21 hours ago) and read 17459 times:



Quoting Spitfire (Reply 7):
I'm wondering what he was 'coaching' to someone who had already made that "Landing" check list hundred of times in the simulator....

As you point out, the procedure should really require no coaching. However I wonder if either

(a) the Captain was doing a lot of editorialising and getting too much into details.

and/or

(b) The relatively inexperienced F/O who had only 25 hours of flight time on the 738 messed up some detail of the BLC causing the Capt to correct him.

Quoting PW100 (Reply 8):
When would the crew be expected to have finished the before-landing checklist?

In terms of timing and based on the entities in the before-landing checklist as Spitfire described them, if I had to hazard a guess, I'd say that timing-wise they were pretty much OK. Only the CVR can really clear it up, though.


User currently offline757GB From Uruguay, joined Feb 2009, 676 posts, RR: 1
Reply 10, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 21 hours ago) and read 17455 times:

Reading about the importance of the CVR and thinking of how much we have to interpret words and tones in other cases (the alleged high pitch in the Colgan CVR for example) triggered my curiosity. Have you heard or read anywhere if video cameras have ever been considered for recording cockpit activity? I know many would not like the idea so don't kill the messenger ok?
 duck 

I'm not advocating it, I simply wonder if anybody has proposed it.



God is The Alpha and The Omega. We come from God. We go towards God. What an Amazing Journey...
User currently offlineBoeing747_600 From United States of America, joined Oct 1999, 1290 posts, RR: 0
Reply 11, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 21 hours ago) and read 17415 times:



Quoting 757GB (Reply 10):
Have you heard or read anywhere if video cameras have ever been considered for recording cockpit activity?

I believe the idea has been discussed by the FAA amongst other agencies. There may be some issues with implementation etc, that could be holding it up.


User currently offlineSmeg From United Kingdom, joined Feb 2008, 159 posts, RR: 0
Reply 12, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 21 hours ago) and read 17400 times:

Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 11):

I believe the idea has been discussed by the FAA amongst other agencies. There may be some issues with implementation etc, that could be holding it up.

I also believe that there are some moral issues that may prevent it. For example, if the CVR or ATC transmissions get leaked, it is one thing, but the chance of a video of a crews (remember that they are humans too!) last moments getting into the public domain may be deemed too "risky" when compared to the benefits of having a video in the cockpit.

(But I could be wrong!)

[Edited 2009-03-11 16:29:59]

User currently offlineDingDong From United States of America, joined Jan 2007, 661 posts, RR: 0
Reply 13, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 21 hours ago) and read 17391 times:



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 11):
I believe the idea has been discussed by the FAA amongst other agencies. There may be some issues with implementation etc, that could be holding it up.

It has been discussed in the past, but is an absolute non-starter with pilot unions, so it has not gone anywhere. Idea is permanently dead in the water. If I were a betting man, I'd bet that Pluto would likely be colonized a long time before this video proposal ever becomes reality here on Earth.

I'm not going to get into the story behind that particular (and somewhat messy) bit of politics; leaving it to someone else. Wink



DingDong, honey, please answer the doorbell!
User currently onlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21129 posts, RR: 56
Reply 14, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 20 hours ago) and read 17336 times:



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 6):
There was also some talk about TK pilots frowning upon the choice of AMS as a training airport.

Perhaps, but apart from the fact that AMS tends to be IMC more than some of TK's other destinations, was there anything specifically unique to AMS that caused this accident? I'd tend to say no.

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offline757GB From Uruguay, joined Feb 2009, 676 posts, RR: 1
Reply 15, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 20 hours ago) and read 17307 times:



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 11):
I believe the idea has been discussed by the FAA amongst other agencies. There may be some issues with implementation etc, that could be holding it up.



Quoting Smeg (Reply 12):

I also believe that there are some moral issues that may prevent it. For example, if the CVR or ATC transmissions get leaked, it is one thing, but the chance of a video of a crews (remember that they are humans too!) last moments getting into the public domain may be deemed too "risky" when compared to the benefits of having a video in the cockpit.

Instinctively I was thinking along the lines that pilots/unions would not like it. What you say about the "last moments" makes a lot of sense though. Thank you both for the information.

Regards,
GB



God is The Alpha and The Omega. We come from God. We go towards God. What an Amazing Journey...
User currently offlineJFernandez From United States of America, joined Feb 2004, 301 posts, RR: 0
Reply 16, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 18 hours ago) and read 17218 times:



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 2):
Yes I agree, and probably one of the most informative in many ways, but I think that in someway pointless because we dont have the CVR transcription and we dont have a clue what distracted the crew so much that the let the AC go minus 40knots below Vref.

I think one thing we're going to need clarification on is truly how much time elapsed between being Vref-0kts to Vref-40kts. If it was truly in the realm of 10 seconds or so (as some have theorized), then the error is far more understandable. It isn't as if speed loss happened at a constant rate, one would think.

I wonder if this is going to change how new FOs are trained. Without speculating too much, it may very well be that the FO missed something early on, and then compounded the error when he let go of the throttles.


User currently offlineGonzalo From Chile, joined Aug 2005, 1953 posts, RR: 2
Reply 17, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 18 hours ago) and read 17170 times:



Quoting JFernandez (Reply 16):
I think one thing we're going to need clarification on is truly how much time elapsed between being Vref-0kts to Vref-40kts. If it was truly in the realm of 10 seconds or so (as some have theorized), then the error is far more understandable. It isn't as if speed loss happened at a constant rate, one would think.

Maybe you're right, but i have a problem with that theory of the speed falling so quickly in that short period of time. My problem ? They ended 40 knots under Vref, that's about 75 - 80 Kms/h...If they loose that speed in ten secs, don't you think the human body must feel it ? I mean, if you're seated in a car, even if you're blind and you're seated in a smooth Rolls Royce, you feel when the car go from 100 km/h to 30 km/h, you can "feel the inertia" produced by the deceleration. Anyway, i hope the CVR can help to understand what happened in that cockpit.

Saludos.
G.



80 Knots...V1...Rotate...Gear Up...DC-3 / EMB-110 / Fairchild-227 / Ab318-19-20 / B732 / B763
User currently offlineBoeing747_600 From United States of America, joined Oct 1999, 1290 posts, RR: 0
Reply 18, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 17 hours ago) and read 17145 times:



Quoting Mir (Reply 14):
was there anything specifically unique to AMS that caused this accident? I'd tend to say no.

Nothing unique to AMS, but I seem to recall a quoted TK pilot as saying (off the record, so you have to take all of this with a pinch of salt) that AMS ATC was a bit more demanding in terms of late flight path changes during descent (or something to that effect - I cant for the life of me seem to track down the source) than at other airports. That was their stated concern. Personally I would have thoughtt that FRA, LHR, BRU or CDG could be just as, if not even less forgiving, but who knows? ...


User currently offlineVikkyvik From United States of America, joined Jul 2003, 9413 posts, RR: 27
Reply 19, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 15 hours ago) and read 17061 times:
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Quoting Gonzalo (Reply 17):
Maybe you're right, but i have a problem with that theory of the speed falling so quickly in that short period of time. My problem ? They ended 40 knots under Vref, that's about 75 - 80 Kms/h...If they loose that speed in ten secs, don't you think the human body must feel it ? I mean, if you're seated in a car, even if you're blind and you're seated in a smooth Rolls Royce, you feel when the car go from 100 km/h to 30 km/h, you can "feel the inertia" produced by the deceleration. Anyway, i hope the CVR can help to understand what happened in that cockpit.

I suppose you might feel it.

However (and this is just me musing), whilst the speed is decaying, the plane is also going to steeper and steeper pitch angles to maintain the glideslope. That'll push you backwards into your seatback more and more. That could, to a certain extent, offset the deceleration in forward speed (which would pull you away from your seatback).

Also, using your example, if you're blindfolded in a car, you will indeed feel the deceleration, but you'd probably be hard-pressed to actually say how much you decelerated (a.k.a. you probably couldn't tell that you slowed to 30 km/h, versus 10 or 50 km/h).

The human body and brain can get disoriented fairly easily at times (which is why you have instruments).



"Two and a Half Men" was filmed in front of a live ostrich.
User currently offlineTheredbaron From Mexico, joined Mar 2005, 2163 posts, RR: 8
Reply 20, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 15 hours ago) and read 17039 times:

Even if they did not feel the loss of speed, the stick shaker would have prompted TOGA just by watching 80 knots on the indicated airspeed.

I am sure something distracted the crew, the training captain was way too much in "instructor" mode and not really flying so his reaction was late, and by the time they tried to gain speed it was too late.

BTW Vikkyvik your signature is hilarious!

Best regards TRB



The best seat in a Plane is the Jumpseat.
User currently offlineQualitydr From United States of America, joined Sep 2007, 116 posts, RR: 0
Reply 21, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 10 hours ago) and read 16785 times:



Quoting Theredbaron (Reply 20):
I am sure something distracted the crew, the training captain was way too much in "instructor" mode (emphasis mine) and not really flying so his reaction was late, and by the time they tried to gain speed it was too late.

A distinct possibility, but without the CVR it's hard to be definitive. Clearly something got in the way of aviating...

QD



All you need in this life is ignorance and confidence; then success is sure. -- Mark Twain
User currently offlineFVTu134 From Russia, joined Aug 2005, 172 posts, RR: 1
Reply 22, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 10 hours ago) and read 16786 times:

Well I am sure the investigation will clear things up in due time. I know it is fun to analyze and the collective knowledge here can help in all of that brainstorming. Having followed the first 1-4 threads or so I have see one thing that is regrettable.
We have some Turkish aircrew in this forum (such as pilotaydin) who have always been very respected contributors on this forum and while their close involvement and maybe personal connections to aircrew who sadly lost their lives may have made this all more difficult for them personally, I do remember the very factual and in my opinion valuable input they brought to these threads early on.
Sadly I haven't read anything from them lately, either by order of their employer, or by being frustrated by some of the comments that were made to them, some of which were far out of line in my personal opinion.
Anyway, just to make my point, I do hope that our respected aviation friends will at some point return here and continue to contribute as their respective knowledge is what contributes to make this place an interesting place to spend time. To them, I can only say that I too have lost fellow aircrew/aviators whom I knew (some ofthem very closely) and it is always bad to loose friends and colleagues. Knowing they were former Military pilots, I can only say that I am sure they lost their lives doing something that they loved intimately.

FVTu134



who decided that a Horizon should be HORIZONtal???
User currently offlineSpitfire From France, joined Feb 2001, 801 posts, RR: 7
Reply 23, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 8 hours ago) and read 16575 times:



Quoting PW100 (Reply 8):
When would the crew be expected to have finished the before-landing checklist?

The normal sequence for the Landing check list is:

PF ask for : -Gear down
- Flaps .... 40
- Landing check list

PNF put the gear down, arms the speed brakes , set the landing flaps and read the check list.

The PF answers the check list items ( after verification).

So the check list comes a few seconds (let's say 10seconds) after the gear has been set down .



Sabena ... Never to be forgotten (12 years already , what a shame !! )
User currently offlineTK787 From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 4304 posts, RR: 12
Reply 24, posted (5 years 1 month 2 weeks 8 hours ago) and read 16546 times:



Quoting Boeing747_600 (Reply 18):
Nothing unique to AMS, but I seem to recall a quoted TK pilot as saying (off the record, so you have to take all of this with a pinch of salt) that AMS ATC was a bit more demanding in terms of late flight path changes during descent (or something to that effect - I cant for the life of me seem to track down the source) than at other airports. That was their stated concern. Personally I would have thoughtt that FRA, LHR, BRU or CDG could be just as, if not even less forgiving, but who knows? ...

In one of earlier posts I included the above info. The source was an article written by Unal Basusta from the Turkish aviation site www.airkule.com. He was questioning why TK does training at AMS, but probably meant all busy European airports you mentioned as opposed to less busy destinations.
Also looking at Turkish sites today they have some info out from the CVR, saying the source is Dutch authorities. Anyone has any other credible sources, or are we getting more speculation from Turkish media again? Not a whole lot of info, they all say:
"Due to heavy traffic at AMS, the tower asked them to approach at a high angle (!), and the last words were from the FO Olgay Ozgur, telling the Pilot; "Power,power, more power"


25 Post contains links Gonzalo : Well said !!! They are great contributors to the forums. My humble opinion : If you want reliable information, use only this site as source : http://
26 Spitfire : Here is an answer I've written in another topic (about KLM RA failure). I think it could be interesting to have this also here : Quoting ComeAndGo (Re
27 Post contains links Boeing747_600 : And yet according to the Dutch Safety Board's Report on First Findings, the crew's response to the Landing Gear Warning is described as: "Provisional
28 JFernandez : Is it possible that the pilots presumed that this was a symptom of the LH RA's providing incorrect data?
29 Theredbaron : Maybe because this was training flight they were distracted and checking the equipment and made some mistakes. If I remember correctly, there was this
30 Sbkom : I sure hope so too, but even I noticed as a newbie on this forum that some guys are repeatedly posting very opinionated, harsh messages with no or li
31 JFernandez : Loved his contributions before the accident, loved them afterwards. Hope to see him back around here soon. I sincerely hope he isn't in some way barr
32 Wing : I couldnt write on this subject before since I am deeply effected from the accident.The pilots were my friends(safety pilot FO was my cousin's house m
33 FVTu134 : You are almost apologetic for describing something which is very difficult to go through from a human level (yes I've been there as well). Don't do t
34 ExSR : You are absolutely right. These guys only can´t stand it, when someone else knows something better than they do.
35 Starlionblue : Wing, I am deeply moved by your post. Thank you for sharing your experiences and thoughts with us. The term "pilot error" is bandied about perhaps too
36 Rheinwaldner : A good insightful balanced post. Thank you! Do these information base on knowledge about the CVR's? I wonder whether it really requires sometimes bot
37 TK787 : Wing, Basin sagolsun. It is really nice to hear your voice here again, and thanks for sharing your opinions, always appreciated.
38 DogBreath : A 737-800 with an amount of nose up trim and loads of thrust will more than likely require both hands on the yoke to control the pitch up forces for t
39 Max777geek : This I would outline as the first cause. The AT wasn't disconnected too, so as you findings shows, that later commanded back to idle again. If the re
40 Severnaya : Thanks for your post! I'm sorry for your loss. One point, which confuses me, the RA measures the altitude above the terrain presently beneath the pla
41 DogBreath : Yep. The fact that AMS is below Sea Level makes no difference to the LRRA, the same difference that on an approach to Mexico City, which has an eleva
42 BuyantUkhaa : The -8 foot apparently stands for the vertical distance between the sensor and the ground, so that when the plane is on the ground, and the sensor at
43 Gonzalo : Wing : First of all, i'm very sorry for your loss, and many thanks for your post. I hope you continue with the help in understanding what went wrong
44 Rheinwaldner : My view about this: Could the following be? - PF is the FO. - Stick shaker starts. - FO pushes thrust levers - Capt say "my plane" - FO lets go the t
45 Boeing747_600 : All indications are that they knew the LH LRRA was inop, but decided that it wasnt a factor and proceeded with both A/P and A/T engaged. Wing. Thank
46 JFernandez : That makes a lot of sense. It seems that the prevailing issue is that the pilots did know the full effects of the faulty LH RA, specifically: - How i
47 Sbkom : Is this a question or your opinion? Thanks.
48 Post contains images Boeing747_600 : What difference does it make?! You're welcome to interpret it any way you want   The bigger question at hand is how the crew missed so many signals
49 Qualitydr : Another way to say this is, "Divided Attention." Humans are notoriously bad at concurrent or parallel processing, in spite of pop culture's recent ad
50 JFernandez : The only logical assumption seems to be that the pilots didn't realize the LH RA's effect on the A/C's systems. Whether or not this is something they
51 Sbkom : There are several answers to that question. From the logical point of view, if the system allows it but it shouldn't be done, this is a design proble
52 DingDong : Er, uh, executing a missed approach doesn't have a stigma attached to it, especially when needed. After all, if you go missed, you're making a judgem
53 Derik737 : So far we only know that CMD B was engaged (by the Boeing memo). That means Autoland was not being used at the time. (CMD A and CMD B technically nee
54 Sbkom : We should ask this to Turkish pilots. My sentence is based on the information from TALPA's memos and other sources (like user comments to some articl
55 Vikkyvik : I see what you're saying in a way, but let me offer some counterpoint. Boeing allows a pilot to stall their aircraft, even though they could put in a
56 Gonzalo : Why a Go Around is a disgrace ??? Do you know for sure if Turkish Airlines management have a policy against Going Around ???? Ah...., maybe that's th
57 Mandala499 : EXACTLY... when we say pilot error, it is not fair to stop the judgement at that. If it's pilot error, then the next question should be WHY did he/sh
58 Boeing747_600 : I have a hard time accepting it as a design problem when the operating instructions explicitly caution against A/T engagement when the LH LRRA is kno
59 JFernandez : Do they state what the possible repercussions are? How is "cautioning against" different than other warnings?
60 Boeing747_600 : I may have understated the case. I believe someone posted the advisory in question, in one of the earlier parts of this thread. It was quite explicit
61 Sbkom : No, because the a/c can be flown without AP and AT, and the stall-AOA protection (I believe you are talking about the stick shaker) is a warning syst
62 Sbkom : Advisories, cautions, etc etc are something, but we are talking about a system that lands the aircraft. If it is dangerous, the electronics should no
63 Post contains links BuyantUkhaa : Fact 3 is most disputed, it seems TOGA was selected after the 6-second spool down. Too late, but to say that a go-around was never attempted is somet
64 YVRLTN : A simple question. Is it SOP with most (all?) airlines to press TOGA as soon as stick shaker activates? (And figure out why it activated later when i
65 Boeing747_600 : This is a fundamental misinterpretation of the role of automation and how it worked in the case of the TK flight. The intention of automation was NEV
66 JFernandez : Right. The question would be what the pilots knew about this. They obviously acted as if the LH RA error (I keep wanting to call it "failure". Grrr.)
67 Boeing747_600 : Actually you are absolutely correct in calling it a failure as far as the instrumentation (malfunctioning LH RA) was concerned. The A/T was not desig
68 Mandala499 : My my... absolving? It is as much absolving as you are blaming/pointing incompetence. No, it is not absolving, it is delving into possible reasons as
69 Boeing747_600 : uhh Sorry! no it was NOT! It was a revenue earning scheduled passenger flight. That an F/O was flying under supervision does not in ANY way change th
70 DingDong : Wasn't this a LOFT training flight? Reason why I ask is because if it was, LOFT is usually done as part of a revenue flight -- in which case, both of
71 JoeCanuck : To me, the bottom line is that pilots are in the cockpit for EXACTLY this kind of issue; to recognize a problem and take control of the plane. If noth
72 Mandala499 : Oh dear, I guess we're not talking about safety then, we're talking about legal liability... sorry, I must have been in the wrong forum... Well what'
73 PlanesNTrains : If the LH RA actually FAILS - that is, stops working - then I agree that the A/T should disengage. Indeed, that may be the way the system works. Howe
74 Post contains images Wouwout : I'm a bit suprised that nobody has picked up the news that KLM has had 17 radio altimeter problems (similar to TK1951's) over the last year. A Dutch n
75 Max777geek : As long as I may understand by what Ive been reading in several posts by some authoritative posters, the RA has a resident diagnostic which may retur
76 Wouwout : To be more accurate: these radio altimeter faults were in KLM's 737 fleet.
77 MD11Engineer : The EGPWS warning would be "Too low Landing gear" The RA systems are calibrated that they would show 0 when, with fully extended Struts, the MLG whee
78 Post contains links TK787 : Already discussed here: http://www.airliners.net/aviation-fo...general_aviation/read.main/4346375
79 MD11Engineer : Most of these faults were probably caused by water (condensation) getting into the antenna connectors. This fault will shorten out the respective ant
80 Spitfire : After reviewing my B733 Operations manuals I must you are right. The exact aural alert is : "TOO LOW GEAR" . This warning comes below 500ft RA and sp
81 Spitfire : BTW, this indicates that around 2000 ft roughly, when intercepting the glide slope , their IAS was at or below 190 kts.... not that much for a "hot a
82 Gonzalo : Sorry i have to copy/paste, don't know how you quote from different threads. This is part of the Reply Nº 60 in the Part 8 of the thread : Copied di
83 OldAeroGuy : You don't understand how autoland systems function and are certified. When in autoland mode, the duty of the pilots is to monitor the landing to ensu
84 Spitfire : Plus the black and red part of the speed tape indicating speeds below stall speed
85 Post contains links Ciaran : "But this does not change something to the fact there was a "strange" warning at 2000 feet." Yet why did the Dutch investigation board press release
86 Spitfire : Because of the RA reading -8 feet (faulty), so "below 500 feet", with gear not down and speed
87 DogBreath : Why do you say that? That's complete and utter rubbish. There are a great number of reason for a crew to execute a missed approach, an ATC instructio
88 Post contains links Osiris30 : Thread 8 had extracts from 2 different flight ops manuals that clearly stated not to use A/T with the RA inop. Mandala: This is airliners.net. Sadly
89 Sbkom : Precisely, I am talking about the design issues here. Thanks for saying that for me, I agree. Thanks again, I concur. Boeing747_600 you are not liste
90 Sbkom : ---------copy&paste---------- msg 114 in part 8 says: Please do not think only hardware failure, where the electronics fail and stop sending informat
91 Max777geek : Correct. If how most likely happened the cpt took over controls of the airplane, just too much happened in too much short slice of time to evaluate w
92 Sbkom : Sorry OldAeroGuy, I do design systems and fly airplanes. What I am discussing here is "how it could be done, possibly" rather than "how to work aroun
93 Post contains links Sbkom : I found an article today, about this subject: "...the pilots claimed that under the new management, pilots were regularly asked to exceed safe number
94 Theredbaron : A lot of fellow A-neters here are still doing circular debate for argument sake. Just off the cuff I am thinking: If radio altimeters fail so much and
95 Max777geek : Sorry : we know what the cause was, that already came out : an erroneous altitude reading. We can't tell how it's been handled by the crew , if even.
96 Ciaran : But this does not change something to the fact that there was a "strange" warning around 2000 feet. Spitfire, excuse me for using your quote to make
97 Osiris30 : That is *not* the cause. That is one possible contributing factor. Statements like that are just as bad as the ones where it's the pilots, it's the p
98 Theredbaron : ^ could not write it better myself...my exact thought on this. Best Regards TRB
99 Max777geek : Strange, in this case everything indicated that the airplane behavior changed after the faulty RA reading until fatal consequences, but maybe you're
100 OldAeroGuy : Fine, but do you design and certify autoland systems on airplanes? If you are really advocating that the pilots have less than the primary responsibi
101 Sbkom : Dear OldAeroGuy, In the original posting where I talked about electronics, I specified the point of view. When you do cut&paste the discussion may dev
102 JoeCanuck : That is only true if the radio altimeter prevented the flight instruments, flight controls, engine controls and engines from working...which it didn'
103 Max777geek : No that wasn't. The AT system failed to keep the airplane in flight with the necessary speed and let that drop down indefinitely thus giving an unrec
104 Starlionblue : Just because the reason was not obvious to you, doesn't mean there isn't one. All sorts of things can lead to a go around. Going around is the safe o
105 JoeCanuck : The AT system did not fail to keep the airplane in flight. Nothing prevented the pilots from flying the aircraft...nothing. Nothing prevented the pil
106 Max777geek : The airplane stalled, which means that wasn't speeding enough. The AT system was engaged to keep that speed which would have been allowing the aripla
107 PlanesNTrains : That is why there are two (and in this case, three) sets of eyes who are responsible for responding to these situations. They received a notification
108 JoeCanuck : If the crew was incapacitated, I will change my mind about the accident. In fact, there are many possibilities which may lead me to change my mind. So
109 Gonzalo : You are missing the difference between contributing factors and causal factors here. The RA issue and the associated A/T response to its erroneous re
110 JFernandez : If the LH RA "failed", that would be better! If it fails, either you have to disengage A/T, or it goes off the (fully functional) RH RA. Giving an er
111 Post contains links Boeing747_600 : Yes. Sorry, but this is a throughly ridiculous and sophomoric exegesis of what I've posted earlier Thank you for exercising your prerogative. Since y
112 JoeCanuck : and the most important one; nobody was monitoring the flight instruments for the last 2 minutes of the flight. They didn't need to understand the con
113 JFernandez : This is still not *entirely* clear. The 100 seconds has been talked about a lot, but the pilots were clearly intentionally decreasing speed to get to
114 Boeing747_600 : They were by all indications comfortable with the A/T's programmed instructions to do so based on the prevailing logic. That's not the same as intent
115 Boeing747_600 : Mandala499, you and I apparently have different interpretations of the concept of professionalism. if you are willing to accept that it is somehow OK
116 Iakobos : From what I was teached at school, and unless RA's technology and relevant standards have changed, the reading derives from a frequency discriminatio
117 Max777geek : No, I don't, do you ? In this flight, the main cause (possible contributing very influencing factor, as you prefer) is been that the indicated RA did
118 Mandala499 : Professionals are HUMAN... No matter how perfect someone is... he/she is still human! And... HUMANS MAKE ERRORS... Now, it is in the interest of safe
119 PW100 : Why feed the A/T system with multiple fail-safe devices, eliminating the "single point of failure" being fed into the A/T, when this very A/T system
120 MD11Engineer : You are correct in as far that modern RADIO altimeters are not RADAR altimeters. Unlkie the RADAR altimeters they don't use pulsed signals and measur
121 Mir : Well said. It's pretty clear that the pilots let the airplane get too slow on approach, but how does that information help prevent future incidents l
122 Post contains images Gonzalo :          I can't agree more with you. I'm not "wishing" to blame the crew for this accident, all the opposite... But with the information we ha
123 Boeing747_600 : They had 100 seconds after the RA failed to detect what transpired into a dangerous rate of speed bleed. The only time they were truly helpless was w
124 Osiris30 : Oh for Pete's sake! If you're going to take that view of it then the fact that the plane took off was the cause. The RA failing alone wouldn't have c
125 Mandala499 : Well call it sophomoric exegesis or "smart-ass-ness based on supposedly parts of what's been written", but your posts if I recall correctly has been
126 JFernandez : Well, you're always intentionally decreasing airspeed to get to Vref. But yes, the A/T probably seemed to be doing its job properly for some of those
127 Osiris30 : You wouldn't know it during these threads. There are still those that insist the accident was solely due to the RA and that the pilots were heroes fo
128 JFernandez : How does sterile cockpit impact any flights conducted for training purposes?
129 Max777geek : Well, I tought there was an evident difference in the two concepts "a valid reading of minus eight feet" and "a red flag stating the instrument is in
130 Osiris30 : It *should* mean that training stops and work starts utside of that phase of flight. Training for the approach phase of flight should be *well* over
131 Post contains links Osiris30 : Max: Unlke you, I don't post opinion as fact. Both were reported in this thread during a briefing by the investigators. Had you bothered to read firs
132 Osiris30 : If you want to get caught up in symantics then fine, you can have at. I won't debate casual language used on a website to discuss an issue. We all kn
133 JFernandez : Right. I remember reading something (though I can't find it in the report you linked above) that there was a higher amount of coaching than usual. Th
134 Boeing747_600 : I already said that I have no problem with that aspect of the investigation. I dont know what point you're trying to make here! Thanks. I mean to say
135 Post contains links Mandala499 : I find that very interesting, but, it refered to the preliminary report which it said was: http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...rten/Persverklaring
136 JFernandez : The FO in the 3rd seat was the "Regular" FO, and not at the controls. This person was a regular FO on the A/C. The FO in training was flying the plan
137 Rheinwaldner : All indications are that not many of all the 737 pilots were aware about that fact before the crash. They knew that the R/A failed. Thus this warning
138 Max777geek : If that's your source, that doesn't seems to me it lists "pilots were distracted" as you sustain. Ignoring the fact that no official source reported
139 Osiris30 : The article was a combination of reported things from the press briefing and the written report. Much more clarification was given in the media brief
140 Max777geek : Looks as valid as mine (in your words) that it crashed because it took off. Numerous sources weren't in the cockpit, neither read the cvr transcript,
141 Gonzalo : Hi, I guess you don't have the time to read the other 9 parts of the thread ( is understandable ). The answers to your questions : There were three c
142 Osiris30 : Max: If I'm not mistaken there is a higher chance of criminal charges in the EU court system. I remember this being discussed with the XL crash. Inci
143 Max777geek : Fine, and how could this be the legal reason to don't diffuse the CVR yet, in your vision ? You said pilots were distracted and I replied nothing tel
144 Theredbaron : The CVR must be crucial in the investigation, and Boy if you are asking or wondering the LEGAL implications of the results of an airline accident, le
145 Osiris30 : Thank God someone other myself gets it, I was begining to wonder if I had gone mad. Mandala: Sorry I missed this in my earlier reply. For what it's w
146 Max777geek : For the record, I didn't say that.
147 Theredbaron : Answer..Yes, even the wording of the report has $$$ implications. Dang Lawyers. Best Regards TRB
148 Mandala499 : Oh well, some already concluded further investigation won't be much more than that... Hence... Anyways, back to Biz... Is this company policy of havi
149 Post contains images Boeing747_600 : Your point would have made a modicum of sense if I had decided in the complete absence of facts or evidence, to assign blame to the pilots and then w
150 YVRLTN : But there were three pairs of eyes in that cockpit. Two pairs of experienced eyes. And no one saw the 'tell tale signs of impending doom' you mention
151 Mandala499 : Ahaaaa! Now I see it... thanks for that... Seemingly monumental difference but in fact, rather thin difference... apologies for being a total *yeah,
152 Max777geek : The crew of two was composed by the cpt and the jumpseat fo. The trainee fo was at the rightseat. The "regular crew" fo was in the jumpseat. This hap
153 Post contains links BuyantUkhaa : Many pictures here of the wreckage being transported to the hangar area of AMS: http://frontpage.fok.nl/review/9209/...ge%5D-Wrakstukken-op-Schiphol.h
154 Rheinwaldner : Because it can be explained perfectly by the defective RA. The RA delivers by error -8 ft altitude, that fact is noticed and then the "gear down" cal
155 Gonzalo : What ?? Are you talking about the same crash ??? Nobody push the throttle levers *in the beginning of the airspeed drop*.... that was after the Stick
156 Post contains links Max777geek : The airspeed drop ended when the airplane crashed, since it kept loosing speed up to 80knots, do you agree ? The levers were pushed before, then not
157 Gonzalo : Oh !!! Thank you !!!! I didn't realize !!!! Do you really read YOUR post Max ? My clarification was about the fact that your statement looks like som
158 Mandala499 : Was the F/O there on the jumpseat on duty as Safety Copilot? (Not sure what U guys call it over there), but if so, then wouldn't it indicate that the
159 Max777geek : My post was about the graph I did quote, in which looks evident where the levers have been push forward and then released. This assumes that the equa
160 Derik737 : Hmm, after a conversation I had today, I am not so sure anymore about that! I'm going to have to actually do a test I think on an aircraft to verify,
161 Spitfire : At least drop in CWS (Control Wheel Steering mode) I think.
162 Doktor71 : Does anyone know when new data from the investigation will be available? I think it shouldn´t take long time for analyzing the CVR, or?[Edited 2009-0
163 Max777geek : Or. That's not just the physical time to write it down, and that's not just what they said in the cockpit that you're going to read in the report.
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