28thguy From United States of America, joined Feb 2006, 114 posts, RR: 0 Posted (3 years 1 week 4 days 9 hours ago) and read 19664 times:
The WSJ has a story in tomorrow's edition faulting the crew and Colgan Air for the crash of CO 3407. It notes that Captain Renslow had flunked numerous qualifications tests and check rides during his career at Colgan, and may also have lied on his employment application. He also had only 109 hours of experience on the Q400, "an unusually limited amount of time by industry standards". Co-pilot Rebecca Shaw had a "clean" record but had flown in on a red eye from Seattle to report to duty, and complained on the voice recorder about feeling congested and that she "probably should have called in sick".
In recent weeks, the top two training officials at Colgan Air have also resigned.
ACKattack From United States of America, joined Apr 2009, 56 posts, RR: 0 Reply 1, posted (3 years 1 week 4 days 8 hours ago) and read 19662 times:
This is quite a damning article and clearly brings into question some of the formal and possibly informal policies at Colgan.
It makes me wonder if their is an connection between this and the Colgan ferry flight (B1900D) that crashed off of Cape Cod (HYA) a few summers ago.
MSPNWA From United States of America, joined Apr 2009, 1312 posts, RR: 2 Reply 2, posted (3 years 1 week 4 days 8 hours ago) and read 19550 times:
I think we'll all have to take the middle position somewhere between Colgan and the media.
Take this sentence in the article for example: "Capt. Renslow had about 109 hours of experience flying the Q400 as a captain, an unusually limited amount of time by industry standards."
Well, since everybody starts at 0 hours at some point as a captain on a particular aircraft, I believe the wording is inappropriate and misleading. So instead of completing trusting either side at this point, I'm going to ask my contact - a former Pinnacle pilot - about what he thought of their training practices.
PA515 From New Zealand, joined Nov 2007, 554 posts, RR: 0 Reply 3, posted (3 years 1 week 4 days ago) and read 19229 times:
Quoting 28thguy (Thread starter): Co-pilot Rebecca Shaw had a "clean" record but had flown in on a red eye from Seattle to report to duty, and complained on the voice recorder about feeling congested and that she "probably should have called in sick".
How often does this happen?
Several years ago I had a conversation at Auckland airport with the wife of a Brussels based cargo pilot. He was returning to duty 'subload' and would arrive only a few hours before flying. When I queried the wisdom of him flying tired, she was unconcerned saying he would just get the co-pilot to do the flying.
Vfw614 From Germany, joined Dec 2001, 3340 posts, RR: 6 Reply 4, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 23 hours ago) and read 19132 times:
Quote: On Sunday, spokesman Joe Williams confirmed in an email that Capt. Renslow had five "unsatisfactory" training check rides in his career -- including two at Colgan -- but passed a subsequent series of training tests
Apparently the CPT became a commercial pilot in 2005 at the age of 43 and had flunked two checks since then (one each on the B1900 and the Saab 340), with three failed checks on GA aircraft before. Would that be regarded as (very) unusual or is it non-news?
TOLtommy From United States of America, joined Dec 2003, 3076 posts, RR: 5 Reply 6, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 22 hours ago) and read 18911 times:
Quoting 28thguy (Thread starter): Co-pilot Rebecca Shaw had a "clean" record but had flown in on a red eye from Seattle to report to duty
This is why I have a hard time when a pilot or union cites "fatigue" as a factor. Fatigue is an issue when the company makes you work, but if the same pilot chooses to commute to work on the redeye, its "personal choice".
As others have said, we do need to wait on the NTSB report, but so far I'm not impressed....
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 8, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 18783 times:
Quoting ACKattack (Reply 1): It makes me wonder if their is an connection between this and the Colgan ferry flight (B1900D) that crashed off of Cape Cod (HYA) a few summers ago.
While I agree that the article does give Colgan a black eye, all it appears to be doing is pushing Colgans fist into it's eye. However, your wondering about the HYA crash years ago, that Captain was a friend of mine. We did our instrument training together many years ago. I knew of no training deficiencies with him. That crash was due to a mis-rigged elevator trim cable and had nothing to do with training or pilot records.
ACKattack From United States of America, joined Apr 2009, 56 posts, RR: 0 Reply 10, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 18607 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 8): While I agree that the article does give Colgan a black eye, all it appears to be doing is pushing Colgans fist into it's eye. However, your wondering about the HYA crash years ago, that Captain was a friend of mine. We did our instrument training together many years ago. I knew of no training deficiencies with him. That crash was due to a mis-rigged elevator trim cable and had nothing to do with training or pilot records.
Logos From United States of America, joined Jan 2000, 759 posts, RR: 2 Reply 11, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 18507 times:
Quoting MSPNWA (Reply 2): I think we'll all have to take the middle position somewhere between Colgan and the media.
Take this sentence in the article for example: "Capt. Renslow had about 109 hours of experience flying the Q400 as a captain, an unusually limited amount of time by industry standards."
I agree the media often seizes on the wrong things in these reports, but I would be interested to know his total time in type. If it's around 115 hours, I'd be concerned.
While I agree it's prudent to wait for the NTSB report before passing final judgment, there is a lot in this article that gives one significant pause.
ItalianFlyer From United States of America, joined Nov 2007, 804 posts, RR: 0 Reply 12, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 20 hours ago) and read 18398 times:
I concur, lets wait and see what the NTSB found.
However, I predict this will set off another media round of "how safe are regional airlines" bullcaca within the coming weeks I can already see it in the USAToday.
Arrow From Canada, joined Jun 2002, 2490 posts, RR: 2 Reply 13, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 20 hours ago) and read 18270 times:
Quoting ItalianFlyer (Reply 12): However, I predict this will set off another media round of "how safe are regional airlines" bullcaca within the coming weeks  I can already see it in the USAToday.
Yes, and I wonder if this will be revived:
"The former head of the National Transportation Safety Board – the U.S. agency that's investigating last Thursday's crash of a Canadian-built commuter plane near Buffalo, N.Y. – says all similar twin-engine turboprops should be grounded, at least until the investigation is complete.
"I think the prudent thing to do ... is ground the aircraft," until the board investigation is finished, said Jim Hall, chair of the federal agency from 1994 through 2001."
He was commenting on the effectiveness of de-ice systems on turbo-props and the FAA's certification procedures, as I recall. It is looking like ice wasn't an issue in this case, but obviously the final NTSB report will have something to say about it.
Never let the facts get in the way of a good story.
SEPilot From United States of America, joined Dec 2006, 5899 posts, RR: 39 Reply 14, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 17735 times:
It seems at this point that the pilot was somewhat marginal in ability, and Colgan's training was somewhat inadequate. This is by no means unusual; when pilots are in short supply airlines have to make choices that in other times they would rather not in order to keep planes flying. 2005 was likely such a time; traffic was booming and airliners were buying all the airplanes they could get their hands on. Once a pilot is hired, it is very difficult to get rid of him unless he commits a major blunder. Unfortunately in this case the major blunder was fatal, not only to the pilot but to the rest of the crew, passengers, and one person on the ground.
The problem with making things foolproof is that fools are so doggone ingenious...Dan Keebler
Aviateur From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 1169 posts, RR: 13 Reply 15, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 17584 times:
As both a pilot and writer who regularly criticizes media coverage of aviation incidents, let me say this...
That was a really good piece by major media standards. The only part that jumped out at me was the line about the captain having only 109 hours in type. To be fair, he was a new captain on the type. You don't accrue hours spontaneously. In fact it is very common for airline pilots to upgrade into a type they have little or no prior experience in.
In any case, the crash wasn't caused by anything aircraft specific. It was caused by the captain's head-spinningly egregious reaction in response to the stall warning. He apparently pulled back not only against the stick shaker, but against the PUSHER. Earlier speculation that he was reacting to a perceived tailplane stall was giving him too much credit, it seems.
And I find it incredible that the captain had five -- FIVE! -- FAA checkride failures on his record, and was yet in the employ of an airline. None of us are perfect, and there are many good airline pilots with the occasional re-check on their records. But FIVE? That is pretty much unprecedented. And Colgan's comment that the captain had "failed to fully disclose that poor performance" sounds bogus to me. FAA records are scoured before any candidate is hired. If he successfully hid something, it's the carrier's fault for not doing an adequate background check.
What a terrible black mark this is for regional carriers... though to some extent, they had it coming. There is something very, very wrong in the cultures at these airlines. Between the lousy pay and the miserable working conditions and the often hostile managements under which their pilots work... It needs to change, or there will be more Colgans.
Here's a piece I did on this topic, if you are interested...
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 8040 posts, RR: 13 Reply 16, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 17380 times:
The more damning part of the article is:
Quote: The crew initially didn't notice the plane's speed had dropped dangerously low, sliding under 115 miles an hour, and risked going into a stall. The slowing speed set off an emergency system called a "stick-pusher," which pushes the control column down in order to send the aircraft into a temporary dive so it can regain speed and recover from a stall.
However, Capt. Renslow tried to force the plane to do the opposite. He yanked back on the controls while adding thrust. His effort was strong enough to manually override the stick-pusher. Within seconds, the plane lost lift, bucked violently and started to roll. It slammed into a house five miles from the runway.
Colgan's standard training program stops short of demonstrating the operation of the stick-pusher in flight simulators. Without such hands-on experience, safety investigators argue, pilots could be surprised and not react properly when the stick-pusher activates during an emergency. The FAA is required to sign off on all airline training manuals.
If I was a family member, I'd find this pretty devastating. It'd be very painful to lose someone to such incompetence.
The crew let the plane get slow, and then didn't know what to do when the stick pusher kicked in?
Sure, not training for it in the simulator is bad, but just reading the flight manual should have clued you in to what the stick pusher does.
Yanking the stick back when you are already slow is the textbook way to force a stall.
Anyone who has passed the PPL knows this.
Waiting for the pilot support group members to chime in in 3... 2... 1...
BAC111 From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 101 posts, RR: 0 Reply 17, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 16617 times:
The 109 hours experience item is interesting. Sully Sullenberger and Al Haynes both once had only 109 hours as Captain of a particular aircraft (actually, more than once as they moved up the fleet chain). It's inevitable. I'm curious what some of you commercial pilots out there would say should be done with such a raw Captain? Pair him/her with an unusually experienced FO? Have full faith in the airline's training program and FAA oversight? Seems to me there's no easy answer to this reality. You're going to have raw Captains all the time.
GothamSpotter From United States of America, joined Jan 2005, 558 posts, RR: 0 Reply 18, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 16563 times:
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 15): That was a really good piece by major media standards.
The author, Andy Pasztor, covers the aerospace beat for WSJ and almost always does a better job than most other outlets.
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 15): The only part that jumped out at me was the line about the captain having only 109 hours in type. To be fair, he was a new captain on the type. You don't accrue hours spontaneously. In fact it is very common for airline pilots to upgrade into a type they have little or no prior experience in.
Just because that's traditionally been the case does not necessarily mean that's the way it should be. I don't know if there's an alternative, but to me a person with thousands of hours of experience in a type should not have to defer to someone with barely any experience. The fact that he was an older man flying with a more experienced younger woman also brings up all sorts of sociological questions.
SEPilot From United States of America, joined Dec 2006, 5899 posts, RR: 39 Reply 20, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 16453 times:
Quoting BAC111 (Reply 17): Pair him/her with an unusually experienced FO?
I was under the impression that this was the standard procedure; in this case the F/O had about 700 hours in the Q400, which considering how long Colgan had been flying them probably counts as experienced.
The problem with making things foolproof is that fools are so doggone ingenious...Dan Keebler
RedFlyer From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 4075 posts, RR: 32 Reply 21, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 16436 times:
Quoting TOLtommy (Reply 6): but if the same pilot chooses to commute to work on the redeye, its "personal choice".
Taking a red eye in to work is no big deal as I'm sure a lot of pilots do that regularly. What I found interesting was that she spent the prior day skiing. That's an activity involving a lot of physical exertion at higher altitudes (read exhausting). And then she hopped on a red eye to get to work, which means insufficient rest prior to reporting for work.
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 15): There is something very, very wrong in the cultures at these airlines. Between the lousy pay and the miserable working conditions
Lousy pay and miserable working conditions will only attract applicants with fewer qualifications. It reflects the mindset of the airline industry as a whole. In an effort to maximize profits (or contain costs, as the case may be) they've created conditions that are conducive to lower pay scales.
Quoting Revelation (Reply 16): The crew let the plane get slow, and then didn't know what to do when the stick pusher kicked in?
Sounds eerily similar to the TK crash in Amsterdam a few months ago; although, in fairness the reasons for the crew's response in that crash seem to be of a different nature.
Haggis79 From Germany, joined Jun 2006, 1096 posts, RR: 1 Reply 22, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 16353 times:
Quoting TOLtommy (Reply 6): This is why I have a hard time when a pilot or union cites "fatigue" as a factor. Fatigue is an issue when the company makes you work, but if the same pilot chooses to commute to work on the redeye, its "personal choice".
well, we well may find out that fatigue was a factor in this one... as it was in that accident at LEX, IIRC.... I think the prudent answer would not be to call bogus on pilots warning of the effects of fatigue, but rather to prohibit pilots commuting to work on a redeye if they start flying immediately after arriving. Sure, it's personal choice, but that doesn't make it less dangerous...
Quoting MSPNWA (Reply 2):
Take this sentence in the article for example: "Capt. Renslow had about 109 hours of experience flying the Q400 as a captain, an unusually limited amount of time by industry standards."
Well, since everybody starts at 0 hours at some point as a captain on a particular aircraft, I believe the wording is inappropriate and misleading.
wouldn't an inexperienced pilot usually be paired with a co-pilot who is also qualified as a captain at least for his first flights where he is in command?
Caspian27 From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 305 posts, RR: 0 Reply 23, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 16269 times:
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 15): What a terrible black mark this is for regional carriers... though to some extent, they had it coming. There is something very, very wrong in the cultures at these airlines. Between the lousy pay and the miserable working conditions and the often hostile managements under which their pilots work... It needs to change, or there will be more Colgans.
Not every regional runs like Colgan. I think casting every regional in this light is a huge mistake.
Don't fall in to that major airline pilot "I'm better than the regional guys" attitude. Everyone I've flown with at the regional level has been professional, safe and darn good at what they do. Major airline pilots have crashed planes when the only thing wrong is a light bulb. So let's not rush to indict all regionals and their pilots too.
The ships hung in the sky in much the way that bricks don't
DingDong From United States of America, joined Jan 2007, 661 posts, RR: 0 Reply 24, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 16197 times:
109 hours on type as Captain? Non-issue for me. The busted checkrides does give me pause, but seeing as I don't know details about these, can't really comment further.
Ultimately, he pulled back on the yoke instead of pushing forward at a critical time.
Why? Did Colgan's training emphasize minimizing altitude loss? This would normally make sense in most situations, but not all. Under stress in a potential life-and-death situation without much time to troubleshoot, you'd revert back to whatever training instilled in you. So see why I'm wondering about the company training program's focus in this area...
What's telling here is that that not one, but two senior people overseeing the training program left on their own for reasons purportedly unrelated to 3407. 109 hours may be a red herring in the larger scheme of things.
Will be interesting to see where the NTSB leads this week's hearing starting tomorrow.
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 8040 posts, RR: 13 Reply 25, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 16152 times:
Quoting SEPilot (Reply 20): in this case the F/O had about 700 hours in the Q400, which considering how long Colgan had been flying them probably counts as experienced.
I wonder if she realized the mistake the captain made, or not.
SEPilot From United States of America, joined Dec 2006, 5899 posts, RR: 39 Reply 26, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 17421 times:
Quoting Revelation (Reply 25):
I wonder if she realized the mistake the captain made, or not.
I suspect any competent pilot would have, but there would have been no time to recover. Also, it would have come down to a wrestling match, and since the captain was a man and the F/O was a woman, it is likely that she wouldn't have been able to overpower him. The bigger question is why both of them allowed the speed to decay that far.
The problem with making things foolproof is that fools are so doggone ingenious...Dan Keebler
LoneStarMike From United States of America, joined Jul 2000, 3475 posts, RR: 44 Reply 27, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 17245 times:
Quoting SEPilot (Reply 26): The bigger question is why both of them allowed the speed to decay that far.
Quote: According to people who have reviewed the transcripts, the crew engaged in a prolonged chit-chat as the plane descended from cruise altitude and then prepared to land. That violates basic aviation rules, which prohibit discussions of non-flying matters during certain phases of flight.
Wasn't idle chit-chat a factor in the crash of DL 1141 at DFW back in 1988?
Silentbob From Vatican City, joined Aug 2006, 1479 posts, RR: 1 Reply 28, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 16904 times:
Quoting Logos (Reply 11): I agree the media often seizes on the wrong things in these reports, but I would be interested to know his total time in type. If it's around 115 hours, I'd be concerned.
If I recall he had started his transition to the Q400 about six weeks prior to the crash, that's not a lot of time to acquire more hours.
Quoting RedFlyer (Reply 21): Lousy pay and miserable working conditions will only attract applicants with fewer qualifications. It reflects the mindset of the airline industry as a whole. In an effort to maximize profits (or contain costs, as the case may be) they've created conditions that are conducive to lower pay scales.
When I heard about the crash my question was, "Colgan or Mesa?"
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 22): wouldn't an inexperienced pilot usually be paired with a co-pilot who is also qualified as a captain at least for his first flights where he is in command?
Yes, but only for a handful of flights and that number will vary by airline. At some point the captain is deemed to have learned the requisite skills for the aircraft in question.
Type-Rated From United States of America, joined Sep 1999, 3651 posts, RR: 23 Reply 29, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 16854 times:
Interestingly enough both pilots on UA 553 had previously failed proficiency checks and passed upon retaking them a number of times. And this was another stall type crash.
Fly North Central Airlines..The route of the Northliners!
Haggis79 From Germany, joined Jun 2006, 1096 posts, RR: 1 Reply 30, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 16662 times:
Quoting LoneStarMike (Reply 27): Wasn't idle chit-chat a factor in the crash of DL 1141 at DFW back in 1988?
I think it was in LEX, if I remember correctly....
Quoting Silentbob (Reply 29): Yes, but only for a handful of flights and that number will vary by airline. At some point the captain is deemed to have learned the requisite skills for the aircraft in question.
well, maybe in this case the number was too low....
Flighty From United States of America, joined Apr 2007, 6711 posts, RR: 3 Reply 31, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 16629 times:
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 15): What a terrible black mark this is for regional carriers... though to some extent, they had it coming
I would like to think Colgan is fit for Q400 operations. The facts of this episode so far, suggests they are not. Sorry.
It's wasn't exactly Chelsey Sullenberger in the cockpit that night. Sounds like the airline created a dangerous situation. You can't blame people (like an aspiring pilot) for being what they are, with the skill set they have. Everybody does the best they can. But not everybody belongs in charge. This reminds of the Pinnacle CRJ crash. If they don't understand flight basics, they are gonna drop out of the sky.
MSPNWA From United States of America, joined Apr 2009, 1312 posts, RR: 2 Reply 32, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 16516 times:
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 22): wouldn't an inexperienced pilot usually be paired with a co-pilot who is also qualified as a captain at least for his first flights where he is in command?
Now I'm not one to know if that's Colgan's procedure (seems possible to me), but I do know that if one pilot is inexperienced in the type, the pilot in the other seat usually isn't. And I believe FO Shaw was indeed quite experienced with the Q400, so that might be a reason for the pairing of the two.
So I really don't see experience being the primary problem. The red flags to me are the failed check rides and possible training inadequacy of Captain Renslow.
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 22): wouldn't an inexperienced pilot usually be paired with a co-pilot who is also qualified as a captain at least for his first flights where he is in command?
Yes this might have been the case for IOE(initatial operating experience) but not at 109hrs. However 700hrs in type is a pretty experienced first officer. I know at mesa the rule is no two crew members less than 80hrs. They were well within that so I don't know how much of an issure that would be.
If I had to give my opinion I think that the pilot probably never found himself in a truely scary situation until that day, and simply did not react like he's training would have suggested. I know I have been scared in an airplane, for example my first spin. And I can imagine not reacting properly. In my case there was a pilot with about 10,000hrs at the controls and we were in a spinable airplane practicing spins so no worries, but it is still a scary sensation. Unfortunately humans have quite the reaction when they are scared and it usually requires an immense amount of training to overcome that fear. That amount of training varies from person to person and we will probably never know about the pilot's level of fear in this case.
One mile of highway gets you one mile, one mile of runway gets you anywhere.
LoneStarMike From United States of America, joined Jul 2000, 3475 posts, RR: 44 Reply 34, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 16334 times:
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 31): Quoting LoneStarMike (Reply 27):
Wasn't idle chit-chat a factor in the crash of DL 1141 at DFW back in 1988?
I think it was in LEX, if I remember correctly....
After a quick search, idle chit-chat was also a factor in the DL 1141 crash.
Quote: Cited for blame in the report was "the Captain and First Officer's inadequate cockpit discipline which resulted in the flightcrew's attempting to takeoff without the wing flaps and slats properly configured," and listed as a contributing factor was the failure of the takeoff warning horn system.
Adam42185 From United States of America, joined Dec 2005, 389 posts, RR: 0 Reply 35, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 16270 times:
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 31): I think it was in LEX, if I remember correctly....
I think hes referring to a completely different accident, but I do remember the Comair flight in LEX that the NTSB said that conversation not pertinent to flight may have been a factor.
Falcon84 From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 36, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 16209 times:
Quoting Revelation (Reply 16): If I was a family member, I'd find this pretty devastating. It'd be very painful to lose someone to such incompetence.
That's if you take the story as gospel. I didn't know the WSJ was into concluding what happens in airplane crashes. I'll wait for the NTSB report to come out, instead of believing a newspaper, thiank you.
Haggis79 From Germany, joined Jun 2006, 1096 posts, RR: 1 Reply 37, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 15916 times:
Quoting LoneStarMike (Reply 36):
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 31):
Quoting LoneStarMike (Reply 27):
Wasn't idle chit-chat a factor in the crash of DL 1141 at DFW back in 1988?
I think it was in LEX, if I remember correctly....
After a quick search, idle chit-chat was also a factor in the DL 1141 crash.
I didn't want to express doubts on what you had said earlier, I just tried to add to it... sorry if that came over wrong!
Quoting Adam42185 (Reply 37): I think hes referring to a completely different accident, but I do remember the Comair flight in LEX that the NTSB said that conversation not pertinent to flight may have been a factor.
Yes, I was aware of that. Sorry if it did sound (or better "read") differently...
Toltommy From United States of America, joined Dec 2003, 3076 posts, RR: 5 Reply 38, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 15831 times:
Quoting Adam42185 (Reply 37): I think hes referring to a completely different accident, but I do remember the Comair flight in LEX that the NTSB said that conversation not pertinent to flight may have been a factor.
If I'm not mistaken, DL1141 brought us the Sterile Cockpit rule. If the Comair pilots chose to inore the rules, well....
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 22): I think the prudent answer would not be to call bogus on pilots warning of the effects of fatigue, but rather to prohibit pilots commuting to work on a redeye if they start flying immediately after arriving. Sure, it's personal choice, but that doesn't make it less dangerous...
Good point, well taken. But that will mean serious changes to commuter clauses in the union contracts. The same folks who complain about reduced rest and fatigue will not support telling their fellow pilots that they must have proper rest when commuting before their trip.
So we know that the FO chose to commute to work on a redeye after a day of strenuous exercise. What time was her report? How many legs did she fly before the fateful flight?
LoneStarMike From United States of America, joined Jul 2000, 3475 posts, RR: 44 Reply 39, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 13 hours ago) and read 15619 times:
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 39): I didn't want to express doubts on what you had said earlier, I just tried to add to it... sorry if that came over wrong!
OK. I misunderstood.
Quoting Toltommy (Reply 40): If I'm not mistaken, DL1141 brought us the Sterile Cockpit rule.
Here's another excerpt from airdisaster.com regarding DL 1141.
Quote: During the wait, a Flight Attendant entered the cockpit and started a casual conversation with the pilots. The Federal Aviation Administration requires a "sterile cockpit" between the time of pushback from the gate and the time that the aircraft passes through 10,000 feet. That is, the crew shall not engage in any conversation not directly related to the operation of the aircraft within that time period. The crew's conversation with the Flight Attendant, which involved such topics as the "gooney birds at Chicago Midway," different sorts of mixed drinks, and "the dating habits of our flight attendants," were clearly in violation of this policy.
That makes it sound like the rule was already in effect.
Quoting Toltommy (Reply 40): If the Comair pilots chose to inore the rules, well....
I guess we'll get a better idea once we are able to read the transcript of the CVR. (Is that something likely to be released tomorrow or will we have to wait awhile longer?)
FlyASAGuy2005 From United States of America, joined Sep 2007, 5497 posts, RR: 11 Reply 40, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 13 hours ago) and read 15423 times:
Quoting MSPNWA (Reply 2): Well, since everybody starts at 0 hours at some point as a captain on a particular aircraft, I believe the wording is inappropriate and misleading.
That's the only thing that really jumped out as "typical media drivel". Other than that, it was a pretty on-point article.
Quoting LoneStarMike (Reply 27): Wasn't idle chit-chat a factor in the crash of DL 1141 at DFW back in 1988?
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 31): I think it was in LEX, if I remember correctly....
Also with the Comair crash as noted.
Quoting Toltommy (Reply 40): If I'm not mistaken, DL1141 brought us the Sterile Cockpit rule. If the Comair pilots chose to inore the rules, well....
I will have to go back and read but I thought so too.
CAM2:"Lightning coming out of that one." CAM1: "What?"
Lincoln From United States of America, joined Nov 2004, 3887 posts, RR: 10 Reply 41, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 13 hours ago) and read 15324 times:
Wow... seems pretty damning. I have to admit that I'm not really sure what the "normal" for checkrides is but I would have thought that a failed checkride would result retraining if not termination after a series of failed checkrides.
Quoting GothamSpotter (Reply 18): The author, Andy Pasztor, covers the aerospace beat for WSJ and almost always does a better job than most other outlets.
If I remember corrctly my dad and step mom used to co-own a sailboat with the same Andy Pasztor... never met him personally but heard that he was a nice guy who knew his stuff.
Other not-so-personal personal connection was that I've met Sen. Colgan (who founded the airline) on the floor of the Senate Chamber in VA... Also a reasonably nice gentleman, had no clue that he had any connection to aviation until it was mentioned at a later meeting.
Lincoln
CO Is My Airline of Choice || Baggage Claim is an airline's last chance to disappoint a customer || Next flts in profile
LoneStarMike From United States of America, joined Jul 2000, 3475 posts, RR: 44 Reply 43, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 12 hours ago) and read 14773 times:
Quoting Toltommy (Reply 44): Wonder if "sterile cockpit" was a company rule that became a FAR following the DL accident.
Quoting LoneStarMike (Reply 41): The Federal Aviation Administration requires a "sterile cockpit" between the time of pushback from the gate and the time that the aircraft passes through 10,000 feet.
[SNIP]
The crew's conversation with the Flight Attendant, which involved such topics as the "gooney birds at Chicago Midway," different sorts of mixed drinks, and "the dating habits of our flight attendants," were clearly in violation of this policy.
My take on it was that it was a FAR before the accident.
edited to add: Sterile Cockpit became a FAR in 1981 according to this:
F9Animal From United States of America, joined Dec 2004, 4436 posts, RR: 34 Reply 44, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 12 hours ago) and read 14715 times:
Quoting 28thguy (Thread starter): The WSJ has a story in tomorrow's edition faulting the crew and Colgan Air for the crash of CO 3407. It notes that Captain Renslow had flunked numerous qualifications tests and check rides during his career at Colgan, and may also have lied on his employment application. He also had only 109 hours of experience on the Q400, "an unusually limited amount of time by industry standards". Co-pilot Rebecca Shaw had a "clean" record but had flown in on a red eye from Seattle to report to duty, and complained on the voice recorder about feeling congested and that she "probably should have called in sick".
In recent weeks, the top two training officials at Colgan Air have also resigned.
Oh come on! This is not breaking news, and nothing new to this industry. The Q400 is still a new airplane to Colgan, and I doubt Colgan could get a pilot with thousands of hours experience in the seat of their Q400's. And this is not just an issue with just Colgan. It is around the entire industry.
What is an unusually limited amount of time by industry standards? How many hours do you think the first CRJ pilots had in the type when it was introduced into the industry in the 1990's? How about just a new aircraft type period?
As for the pilot failing his check rides and so forth, was Colgan notified of this? Perhaps there is more to the story perhaps?
As far as Rebecca Shaw mentioning that she should have called in sick because she did not feel well.... Is another cheap shot to her ability. I have come to work many times not feeling good, but still fully capable of doing my job. I know most of you that read this have done the same many times.
And in closing. This crash was a terrible tragedy. When the results of the investigation are released, it would be good to see if lessons could be learned to prevent another similar crash from occuring in the future.
I'd have to look up the flight number, but I believe it was an Eastern Airlines crash at CLT in the late 1970s that resulted in the Sterile Cockpit rule being adopted.
BeechNut From Canada, joined Apr 2004, 692 posts, RR: 8 Reply 46, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 12 hours ago) and read 14652 times:
Quoting BAC111 (Reply 17): The 109 hours experience item is interesting. Sully Sullenberger and Al Haynes both once had only 109 hours as Captain of a particular aircraft (actually, more than once as they moved up the fleet chain). It's inevitable.
Yes but given the way airline seniority works it's highly unlikely that they would have ended up in the left seat with only 109 hours on type. You can bet that they had accumulated well over 1000 hours in the right hand seat first.
Yflyer From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 755 posts, RR: 1 Reply 47, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 12 hours ago) and read 14611 times:
Quoting Yflyer (Reply 47): I'd have to look up the flight number, but I believe it was an Eastern Airlines crash at CLT in the late 1970s that resulted in the Sterile Cockpit rule being adopted.
I can't seem to edit my last post, but I was thinking of Eastern flight 212, in 1974. I had the year slightly off.
LoneStarMike From United States of America, joined Jul 2000, 3475 posts, RR: 44 Reply 48, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 12 hours ago) and read 14620 times:
Quoting Yflyer (Reply 47): I'd have to look up the flight number, but I believe it was an Eastern Airlines crash at CLT in the late 1970s that resulted in the Sterile Cockpit rule being adopted.
Okie From United States of America, joined Jul 2003, 2067 posts, RR: 4 Reply 49, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 14441 times:
Stall training is an early on experience for all GA pilots. Most good pilots practice stalls from time to time and especially when switching types. The idea of pushing forward on the stick is foreign to some. The main purpose of stall training is to identify the planes behavior before the stall as well as recovery. Stick pusher, alarms, bell or lights are just aids for the pilot.
Taking a Q400 or any large aircraft out for a few stalls is an expensive proposition. Therefore we have Simulators. The article suggests that Colgan does not practice stalls or stall recovery during their training on Sims. That does not look good for Colgan
We know that the stall warning was set for icing conditions which was +20kts over stall conditions of a clean airframe. For all intents and purposes there was as much as a 20kt buffer depending on how much ice you want to assume was on the airframe and plenty of margin for recovery.
We know what happened after the stall warning and stick pusher. The real question is how the pilots got so far behind the airframe in the first place. It is almost as though they never added +20 to their approach speeds and were surprised when they got stall warning. Still sounding like training issues.
Adam42185 From United States of America, joined Dec 2005, 389 posts, RR: 0 Reply 50, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 14167 times:
Quoting Okie (Reply 51): Taking a Q400 or any large aircraft out for a few stalls is an expensive proposition. Therefore we have Simulators. The article suggests that Colgan does not practice stalls or stall recovery during their training on Sims. That does not look good for Colgan
This seems ridiculous to me. How could you NOT practice stalls in a sim? Thats just asking for trouble!
NIKV69 From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 51, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 13901 times:
Quoting Contrails (Reply 5): I'll wait on the official NTSB report before drawing any conclusions, but it raises some troubling questions just the same.
I don't think it will change much from what we already know. That this crash was due to many errors made by the crew and that it was their actions that led to the stall and that the captain was not properly taught to respond to the emergency he caused.
Aviateur From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 1169 posts, RR: 13 Reply 52, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 13599 times:
Quoting Caspian27 (Reply 23): Don't fall in to that major airline pilot "I'm better than the regional guys" attitude. Everyone I've flown with at the regional level has been professional, safe and darn good at what they do. Major airline pilots have crashed planes when the only thing wrong is a light bulb. So let's not rush to indict all regionals and their pilots too.
I am not indicting all regionals and their pilots. I never implied such a thing.
And I have, in my articles, reminded people that major airline crews have committed their fair share of shameful and fatal errors.
For what it's worth, I flew regionals for seven years, starting when I was 24, at which time you needed a minimum of 1,500 hours and an ATP just to apply.
Eventually I was fortunate enough to move on -- first to a cargo carrier, and then, at age 36, to a major.
- PS
[Edited 2009-05-11 19:25:48]
Patrick Smith is an airline pilot, air travel columnist and author
" The Journal’s report said Colgan had not provided Renslow with hands-on flight-simulator training for a stick-pusher emergency.
Colgan, in rebuttal, issued a statement saying that Renslow had received classroom instruction for such an emergency. The company also emphasized that the Federal Aviation Administration does not require pilots to receive a stick-pusher demonstration in a flight simulator. "
So Colgan DOES admit that he didn't get sim training, just classroom training. The FAA doesn't require it, apparently, but I think that doing the bare minimum is stupid when it comes to training pilots.
Okie From United States of America, joined Jul 2003, 2067 posts, RR: 4 Reply 54, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 13489 times:
Quoting DingDong (Reply 24): Why? Did Colgan's training emphasize minimizing altitude loss? This would normally make sense in most situations, but not all. Under stress in a potential life-and-death situation without much time to troubleshoot, you'd revert back to whatever training instilled in you. So see why I'm wondering about the company training program's focus in this area...
According to the article Colgan training never got close to the stick shaker in the Sim. They may have discussed recovery but never practiced recovery.
To add to the mix FAA signed off on the training program.
Expect FAA to reanalyze their approvals for training programs.
Aviateur From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 1169 posts, RR: 13 Reply 55, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 13542 times:
Quoting Adam42185 (Reply 56): " The Journal’s report said Colgan had not provided Renslow with hands-on flight-simulator training for a stick-pusher emergency.
Training for a stick-pusher emergency?
Here's a question: What do you do when you are in an automobile driving towards a brick wall at 50 miles-per-hour? Hit the brake, or hit the accelerator?
Do we really need formalized training for that?
PS
Patrick Smith is an airline pilot, air travel columnist and author
LTBEWR From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 11684 posts, RR: 8 Reply 56, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 13368 times:
Like a number of accidents involving aircraft, there may be in play several factors that came together. Captain with limited type experience, modest overall flying experience and perhaps very limited expeience in icing conditions. We know this flight was late on departure adding stress and fatague. An aircraft with potentaily higher risks in icining condidions. Possible unnessary conversations at a critical time in flight. Possibly more severe than known weather than understood. Possible mechanical flaws that still need to be investigated and will take much more time.
Only the NSTB in their full report can see which of these speculated factors were involved here, but in the meantime it gives us plenty to talk about and possibly explain it.
Adam42185 From United States of America, joined Dec 2005, 389 posts, RR: 0 Reply 57, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 13265 times:
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 58):
Here's a question: What do you do when you are in an automobile driving towards a brick wall at 50 miles-per-hour? Hit the brake, or hit the accelerator?
Do we really need formalized training for that?
I see your point in that obviously you hit the brake... however, in this case, the pilot did not respond in the proper manner. Had he been exposed to the stick pusher scenario in a sim perhaps he would have responded differently...?
Haggis79 From Germany, joined Jun 2006, 1096 posts, RR: 1 Reply 58, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 13266 times:
Quoting Adam42185 (Reply 56): I think that doing the bare minimum is stupid when it comes to training pilots.
well, given the ongoing push to make everything in aviation even cheaper and cheaper, I would not be suprised if all of the regionals and even most of the major carriers would not do any more than the bare minimum required....
TTailSteve From United States of America, joined May 2006, 87 posts, RR: 0 Reply 59, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 12993 times:
Most folks have already convicted both pilots which is very unfair. I would very much like to read the CVRs. Its very possible the Capt and/ or the FO suspected a tailplane stall in which case pulling back on the yoke would have been the correct recovery technique. I would expect both pilots to be familiar with what a tailplane stall is and the procedure for recovering from it--so its entirely possible in this case one or both was sure this was a tailplane stall.
I find it very hard to think any pilot would not instinctively recover from a perceived stall--again key word--perceived stall. When I learned to fly on my 2nd hour in a Cessna 152 I was learning and practicing stall recovery. So again, I think both pilots deserve the benefit of doubt at this point they were dealing with a tailplane stall.
Pellegrine From United States of America, joined Mar 2007, 1625 posts, RR: 9 Reply 60, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 8 hours ago) and read 12933 times:
If I were a family member of a dead loved one due to this ineptness and stupidity I'd be consulting various attorneys. I'd want at least USD 10 million. Settle with me and you won't experience the wrath of my money-hungry lawyer. Quite serious.
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 61, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 8 hours ago) and read 12938 times:
Quoting Adam42185 (Reply 56): Colgan, in rebuttal, issued a statement saying that Renslow had received classroom instruction for such an emergency. The company also emphasized that the Federal Aviation Administration does not require pilots to receive a stick-pusher demonstration in a flight simulator. "
This is industry standard. The stall practiced in the simulator is an approach to stall as is required. This is when speed is slowed to the shaker, an impending stall, and a recovery is initiated.
My question is why was a recovery not initiated upon stick shaker activation? How long was the shaker going prior to Renslow pulling back?
Luv2cattlecall From United States of America, joined Sep 2007, 1648 posts, RR: 2 Reply 62, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 8 hours ago) and read 12911 times:
Quoting PROSA (Reply 7): In recent weeks, Colgan's top two training officials resigned; Mr. Williams has said their decisions were voluntary and not connected to the accident.
If you believe that, I have a bridge to sell you.
What's not to believe? They simply wanted to go join Skybus's first CEO in helping him write that book he was working on....you know, the one that he quit his job 3 weeks before bankruptcy for?
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 15):
And I find it incredible that the captain had five -- FIVE! -- FAA checkride failures on his record, and was yet in the employ of an airline. None of us are perfect, and there are many good airline pilots with the occasional re-check on their records. But FIVE? That is pretty much unprecedented. And Colgan's comment that the captain had "failed to fully disclose that poor performance" sounds bogus to me. FAA records are scoured before any candidate is hired. If he successfully hid something, it's the carrier's fault for not doing an adequate background check.
That's what I was thinking... I remember getting a call about a loong ago neighbor of mine, asking some rather deep questions. A few weeks later, I heard from him - turned out that jetBlue was just checking up on his background info before they hired him as a pilot..
Quoting Flighty (Reply 32):
It's wasn't exactly Chelsey Sullenberger in the cockpit that night. Sounds like the airline created a dangerous situation. You can't blame people (like an aspiring pilot) for being what they are, with the skill set they have. Everybody does the best they can. But not everybody belongs in charge. This reminds of the Pinnacle CRJ crash. If they don't understand flight basics, they are gonna drop out of the sky.
Yes, yes you can. If you aren't fully confident in your ability to do your job correctly, especially when failure to do your job would likely result in many deaths, you are being grossly irresponsible by not stepping down.
Quoting LoneStarMike (Reply 41): he Federal Aviation Administration requires a "sterile cockpit" between the time of pushback from the gate and the time that the aircraft passes through 10,000 feet. That is, the crew shall not engage in any conversation not directly related to the operation of the aircraft within that time period.
Wow, didn't realize that sterile cockpit applied from pushback! What happens if you're stuck on the ground taxing for several hours though?
Quoting Adam42185 (Reply 56):
Colgan, in rebuttal, issued a statement saying that Renslow had received classroom instruction for such an emergency. The company also emphasized that the Federal Aviation Administration does not require pilots to receive a stick-pusher demonstration in a flight simulator. "
When you have to breaststroke to your connecting flight...it's a crash!
Wjcandee From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 4315 posts, RR: 19 Reply 63, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 8 hours ago) and read 12831 times:
This investigation has leaked like a seive, and plenty of previous stuff has turned out to be wrong.
That said, there isn't anything really new in these articles, and as usual they do a bad job of offering perspective.
First, lets talk about hours. The captain had lots of hours in Colgan's other turboprops. He was qualified as a captain. He transitioned to a new aircraft, a type recently acquired by the airline. The f/o had lots of experience in type, relative to the time it had been on property, but relatively-fewer hours total. Obviously, when bringing in a new type, your captains will have little experience in it, comparatively-speaking. What is important is that they be qualified, in terms of hours and temperment and airmanship, to be captains. I don't think there's anything remarkable about the first two with this guy. So it's a dumb focus for the article.
As to airmanship...different subject. Stall training, to some extent, starts on your first orientation ride on your very first training aircraft. This guy knew what a stall was and what the proper response to a *wing* stall was: add power and lower the nose. Is there something unique about the human factors in a Q400 vs a Beech 1900 vs a Saab 340 that makes time in type important when evaluating whether the aircraft is telling you that it is entering a stall? Is the stick shaker not obvious? By the time you get the pusher, you usually have missed a lot of cues. Were the cues on the Q400 so different that time in type is relevant? I have to think not.
This brings us to violation of the sterile cockpit rule. Yawn. Unless the chit-chat is definitely related to missing the cues, it's maybe a violation but isn't a *factor*. That DL flight in Dallas where they were flirting with the flight attendant and forgot to extend the flaps...yeah...the chit chat was a factor. Otherwise, it sounds like a lawyer trying to say they were "sloppy" or some other jury pitch that really isn't relevant to finding out what went wrong.
Busted check rides. Well...I have to assume that the ones with the FAA when the guy was flying general aviation may mean that he wasn't sufficiently serious when a baby pilot, but don't say much about his abilities or seriousness as a professional aviator. I know plenty of folks who didn't do too well in the first semester of law school who graduated near the top of our class. Their early experience doesn't mean that they are presently lacking as lawyers, or judges, or law professors.
It seems more from the article that investigators are looking backwards for the cause of what to them seems to be a moment of truly crappy airmanship. I don't know if it was or wasn't, but let's assume for a second that it was. MAYBE you can look backwards to his training and history, and maybe that's instructive on why he did what he did, but maybe it isn't. You don't really know how a person gets to that one moment when he makes the wrong move, and I don't know that any amount of training or records scrutiny is going to give you any ability to predict outcomes. It's like looking at a mass murderer's actions (a similarly unusual event) and saying that you can work backwards to childhood experiences and see a link. Yet similar folks with the same childhood experiences don't ever have issues. In other words, you can find a link looking backwards, perhaps, but you can't use the information about background predictively. Should one pink slip really terminate a person's career? And what about folks who screw up in "that moment" who have no issues that one can point to? It's an important inquiry, I suppose, but it isn't anywhere as simple as they're making it sound.
But then again, I have this feeling that much of this article came straight from some lawyer's talking points, which are designed to do something other than find the truth.
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 64, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days 7 hours ago) and read 12797 times:
Quoting Wjcandee (Reply 69):
It seems more from the article that investigators are looking backwards for the cause of what to them seems to be a moment of truly crappy airmanship. I don't know if it was or wasn't, but let's assume for a second that it was. MAYBE you can look backwards to his training and history, and maybe that's instructive on why he did what he did, but maybe it isn't. You don't really know how a person gets to that one moment when he makes the wrong move, and I don't know that any amount of training or records scrutiny is going to give you any ability to predict outcomes. It's like looking at a mass murderer's actions (a similarly unusual event) and saying that you can work backwards to childhood experiences and see a link. Yet similar folks with the same childhood experiences don't ever have issues. In other words, you can find a link looking backwards, perhaps, but you can't use the information about background predictively. Should one pink slip really terminate a person's career? And what about folks who screw up in "that moment" who have no issues that one can point to? It's an important inquiry, I suppose, but it isn't anywhere as simple as they're making it sound.
Very good post. I really can't say it better myself.
Zrb2 From United States of America, joined May 2000, 893 posts, RR: 0 Reply 65, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days ago) and read 12610 times:
Now a NY newspaper comes out with this story about flirtatious behavior on the CVR.
I realize it's the NY Post but wow, they have really thrown this pilot under the bus. I'm interested to hear what comes out of these hearings that start today.
Knowing what we now know about the pilot's training and experience (or lack of)...in the Q400 , on auto pilot, in icy conditions...would any of those people still have boarded the plane that night? I think that's what we need to ask ourselves. If the answer is no, then some FAA regulations need to be put in to place to make sure this never happens again.
DingDong From United States of America, joined Jan 2007, 661 posts, RR: 0 Reply 66, posted (3 years 1 week 3 days ago) and read 12512 times:
Quoting Zrb2 (Reply 71): Now a NY newspaper comes out with this story about flirtatious behavior on the CVR. I realize it's the NY Post but wow, they have really thrown this pilot under the bus. I'm interested to hear what comes out of these hearings that start today.
As you yourself put it so well: it's the NY Post. They've got to sell papers -- they're not a charity. This is the easiest, cheapest, and quickest way to do it.
Notice that they carefully put forth that interesting comment without offering details or any real supporting evidence? Not saying it didn't happen -- might have had. But if it did, there's honestly no way for me to independently judge the likelihood of this if the NTSB doesn't release transcripts showing this.
Truthfully, for one thing, I honestly find it hard to imagine anyone hitting on a colleague feeling miserable with a head cold. Humans will be humans, but when sitting in seats 0A/0B, it's a job with responsibilities. A captain would also be more keenly attuned to the idea of potential legal exposure for his employer -- read: sexual harassment lawsuits in which it's shown the workplace was rife with that kind of behavior and left uncorrected.
Well, guess we'll find out more starting in about 20 minutes. (The NTSB opens its three days of hearing on 3407 at 9am Eastern -- some 23 minutes from now.)
Sxf24 From United States of America, joined Aug 2007, 1149 posts, RR: 0 Reply 67, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 12486 times:
Quoting TTailSteve (Reply 65): So again, I think both pilots deserve the benefit of doubt at this point they were dealing with a tailplane stall.
The Q400 is not susceptable to an ice-induced tail-plane stall, which is what's speculated the flight crew was responding to. If Colgan/Pinnacle had a sufficient training program, the crew may have known this and responded differently.
While the flight crew appears to have acted in poor judgement, the culpability appears to rest with Colgan/Pinnacle. Of course, one could also speculate the FAA and CO have responsibility for overseeing the safety of Colgan...
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 8040 posts, RR: 13 Reply 69, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 20 hours ago) and read 12179 times:
Quoting Okie (Reply 51): The real question is how the pilots got so far behind the airframe in the first place. It is almost as though they never added +20 to their approach speeds and were surprised when they got stall warning. Still sounding like training issues.
From the transcript, there sure was a lot of chit-chat in the cockpit. Also it sounds like they descended as early as possible because the FO had sinus congestion and wanted to get to low altitude as soon as possible. Of course, that's where all the ice is, sigh.
Quoting Adam42185 (Reply 56): " The Journal’s report said Colgan had not provided Renslow with hands-on flight-simulator training for a stick-pusher emergency.
Colgan, in rebuttal, issued a statement saying that Renslow had received classroom instruction for such an emergency. The company also emphasized that the Federal Aviation Administration does not require pilots to receive a stick-pusher demonstration in a flight simulator. "
So Colgan DOES admit that he didn't get sim training, just classroom training. The FAA doesn't require it, apparently, but I think that doing the bare minimum is stupid when it comes to training pilots.
Personally, I don't see why a sim is needed, but perhaps one outcome of this accident will be that it will become mandatory. Personally, I think the pilots should be capable of reading the POH and understanding the stall behavior of the aircraft.
Quoting Sxf24 (Reply 73): The Q400 is not susceptable to an ice-induced tail-plane stall, which is what's speculated the flight crew was responding to. If Colgan/Pinnacle had a sufficient training program, the crew may have known this and responded differently.
Or if the pilots spent enough time reading the manuals. I'm not sure why the blame falls to the airline on this one.
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 70, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 20 hours ago) and read 12125 times:
Quoting Revelation (Reply 75): Or if the pilots spent enough time reading the manuals. I'm not sure why the blame falls to the airline on this one.
Given that the airline is the one that gets sued when something like this accident happens, it seems like it would behoove them NOT to rely on pilots reading the manuals but rather to take some affirmative action to ensure that pilots understand the behavior of the aircraft.
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 8040 posts, RR: 13 Reply 71, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 20 hours ago) and read 12085 times:
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 76):
Given that the airline is the one that gets sued when something like this accident happens, it seems like it would behoove them NOT to rely on pilots reading the manuals but rather to take some affirmative action to ensure that pilots understand the behavior of the aircraft.
It seems they did, via classroom training vs. simulator training. Literally, the jury will decide if that was enough or not.
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 73, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 20 hours ago) and read 12065 times:
Quoting Revelation (Reply 77): It seems they did, via classroom training vs. simulator training.
I'm not an airline pilot, but I do know that-- both inside and outside of flying-- people usually learn better by doing. Given the availability of simulators-- a safe way for pilots to practice dangerous situations-- a jury could easily conclude that 9L should have offered simulator training. How hard would it have been for them to do it?
FrmrCAPCADET From United States of America, joined May 2008, 1374 posts, RR: 1 Reply 74, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 20 hours ago) and read 12075 times:
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 75, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 20 hours ago) and read 11959 times:
Quoting Revelation (Reply 75): Or if the pilots spent enough time reading the manuals. I'm not sure why the blame falls to the airline on this one.
Why don't we just get rid of simulators all together. After all, pilots could read the FCOM (not POH) and get everything they need!
Obviously, you know very little about synthetic training devices and what they can do and just how helpful they really are. Having a poor training syllabus is a waste of time and resources. Even a demo on a stick pusher could have had a different outcome on this event.
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 76, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 19 hours ago) and read 11833 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 81): Even a demo on a stick pusher could have had a different outcome on this event.
Agreed.
At the same time, though, I feel like a line has to be drawn somewhere, doesn't it? It's not possible to simulate everything that could possibly happen during a flight (my guess is that landing a 320 in the Hudson was not in US' 320 sim syllabus). What's the best way to draw that line?
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 77, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 19 hours ago) and read 11745 times:
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 82): It's not possible to simulate everything that could possibly happen during a flight (my guess is that landing a 320 in the Hudson was not in US' 320 sim syllabus). What's the best way to draw that line?
Agreed, but there are some big things the crews need to see. For example, on the 320 there is a dual engine flameout, on the 744 we do a loss of all engines in the sim. Most likely never see it, but it is one once.
In addition, during recurrent training, that's when those types of things should be covered. From what I've read, it doesn't sound as if that was done.
Interesting read of the CVR. At 22.16.37.1 the FO on CAM-2 announces she put the flaps up! If that's true, watch out for the lawsuits!
N62NA From United States of America, joined Aug 2003, 3039 posts, RR: 3 Reply 78, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 19 hours ago) and read 11590 times:
Hmmm. I've been trying to get to the NTSB website for the past hour but it appears to be down. Perhaps all the a.net fans have overloaded their server!
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 79, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 19 hours ago) and read 11598 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 83): Agreed, but there are some big things the crews need to see. For example, on the 320 there is a dual engine flameout, on the 744 we do a loss of all engines in the sim. Most likely never see it, but it is one once.
I guess, then, I'm wondering whether you (or the other professionals here) think that the stick pusher is a "big thing the crews need to see."
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 8040 posts, RR: 13 Reply 80, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 19 hours ago) and read 11578 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 81): Obviously, you know very little about synthetic training devices and what they can do and just how helpful they really are. Having a poor training syllabus is a waste of time and resources. Even a demo on a stick pusher could have had a different outcome on this event.
Sure, and if every line in the manual was trained in the sim, many other incidents could be avoided as well.
So, are you saying it's not reasonable to expect a pilot to react correctly to the stick puller without having it demo'd in the sim first?
Zrb2 From United States of America, joined May 2000, 893 posts, RR: 0 Reply 81, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 11597 times:
sorry if i offend anyone- but just reading through the CVR without seeing any media interpretations i see a lot of faults here even as a "non aviator". clearly they just could not cope with the circumstances that came upon them. I realize training, fatigue, weather, etc. all played a factor... It seems most frightening that they did not have the experience or know-how to correct what does not sound like a catastrophic event?!? (until he pulled the stick back). Colgan sends two pilots into winter time in Buffalo and both seem like they would rather be flying in Texas, Arizona or Florida. I'm sure those are great flying spots for all pilots but its awful to think that neither had what it took to cope with winter time factors in the Q400 aircraft.
PA515 From New Zealand, joined Nov 2007, 554 posts, RR: 0 Reply 82, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 11505 times:
Quoting N62NA (Reply 84): Hmmm. I've been trying to get to the NTSB website for the past hour but it appears to be down. Perhaps all the a.net fans have overloaded their server!
Had the same problem but was able to download it from the foxnews website.
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 83, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 11540 times:
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 85): I guess, then, I'm wondering whether you (or the other professionals here) think that the stick pusher is a "big thing the crews need to see."
Quoting Revelation (Reply 86): So, are you saying it's not reasonable to expect a pilot to react correctly to the stick puller without having it demo'd in the sim first?
Well, considering I have almost 23, 000 hours and I have never been exposed to a stick pusher, yes I do consider it a big deal. To be honest, I have only seen stick shakers and I assume the concept of a stick pusher is to get the nose down to reduce the AOA, but I sure would like to see it in operation. I don't necessairly have to go through the drill, but it would be nice to see.
Spacecadet From United States of America, joined Sep 2001, 2901 posts, RR: 16 Reply 84, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 11466 times:
Quoting Zrb2 (Reply 74): Here is the full CVR transcript. I read it and actually started to feel sick knowing what was about to happen to those people.
I felt the same - it's always kind of disturbing reading crash CVR transcripts the first time, but there usually isn't such foreshadowing of what's to come. I mean they were not only talking about icing, they were talking about being *afraid* of icing. In some ways it was not a very pilot-like conversation. The F/O was only 24 and she sounds 24 on the CVR. The captain comes off as sounding like he's at that stage where he has just enough experience to be cocky about it but not enough to really be wise.
Quoting Revelation (Reply 75): From the transcript, there sure was a lot of chit-chat in the cockpit.
Yeah, it didn't seem like a very sterile cockpit environment. That said, at least they were talking ops for the most part, so it's not like their minds were on things completely other than flying. And I didn't read closely enough to know if they were chit-chatting below 10,000 feet.
I'm tired of being a wanna-be league bowler. I wanna be a league bowler!
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 8040 posts, RR: 13 Reply 85, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 11443 times:
Quoting Spacecadet (Reply 90): Yeah, it didn't seem like a very sterile cockpit environment. That said, at least they were talking ops for the most part, so it's not like their minds were on things completely other than flying.
Most of the conversations were about career vs. lifestyle choices. I don't see where he was hitting on her as suggested by the nypost.com article.
A318 From Bahamas, joined Jan 2008, 208 posts, RR: 0 Reply 86, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 11443 times:
Reading that transcript really hit home. I was very close with both flight attendants working that flight. It's crazy to read the announcements they made on board... So sad.
Dragon6172 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 1142 posts, RR: 0 Reply 87, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 11408 times:
Quoting Zrb2 (Reply 87): sorry if i offend anyone- but just reading through the CVR without seeing any media interpretations i see a lot of faults here even as a "non aviator". clearly they just could not cope with the circumstances that came upon them. I realize training, fatigue, weather, etc. all played a factor... It seems most frightening that they did not have the experience or know-how to correct what does not sound like a catastrophic event?!? (until he pulled the stick back). Colgan sends two pilots into winter time in Buffalo and both seem like they would rather be flying in Texas, Arizona or Florida. I'm sure those are great flying spots for all pilots but its awful to think that neither had what it took to cope with winter time factors in the Q400 aircraft.
The CVR says little about what they did to cope. Engine power increases, the flaps were put up, and there was talk retracting the gear. What part of that makes you think they could not cope? The CVR does not say anything about him pulling the stick back (which has been debated on this thread as being the wrong action), so you must have gotten that from media. The fact that both enjoyed flying in fair weather has nothing to do with their abilities to handle winter flying. The vast majority of pilots prefer nice weather!! Plus, weather probably played a minor roll, if any at all, in the accident.
Zrb2 From United States of America, joined May 2000, 893 posts, RR: 0 Reply 88, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 17 hours ago) and read 11224 times:
Quoting Dragon6172 (Reply 93): What part of that makes you think they could not cope?
The part that leads me to believe they could not cope is when the airplane crashed into that house and everyone died.
No one has shown evidence of a mechanical defect as of now. As i said, i'm not trying to offend the professionals on here. My family knew someone on that plane. Hindsight is always 20/20 but in reading the CVR, would you have let them fly you to BUF in the Q400 if you knew about their flying histories in advance?
YYZYYT From Canada, joined Apr 2005, 764 posts, RR: 0 Reply 89, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 17 hours ago) and read 11204 times:
Quoting BAC111 (Reply 17): The 109 hours experience item is interesting. Sully Sullenberger and Al Haynes both once had only 109 hours as Captain of a particular aircraft (actually, more than once as they moved up the fleet chain). It's inevitable. I'm curious what some of you commercial pilots out there would say should be done with such a raw Captain? Pair him/her with an unusually experienced FO? Have full faith in the airline's training program and FAA oversight? Seems to me there's no easy answer to this reality. You're going to have raw Captains all the time.
Maybe it's just me, but isn't it the case that a newly promoted captain will (should?) have lots of hours as an FO... so that they may be new to command and some of the decision making, but at least their flying skills should be there already.
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 58): Training for a stick-pusher emergency?
Here's a question: What do you do when you are in an automobile driving towards a brick wall at 50 miles-per-hour? Hit the brake, or hit the accelerator?
Do we really need formalized training for that?
But hitting the brake is intuitive.
I'd use a different analogy - what do you do when on a jet-ski and you see a boat coming head-on toward you? Hit the throttle or throttle back?
I've heard (never been one of the things myself) that throttling back can be a disasterous response, as the steering mechanism requires thrust. So, you do the counter-intuitive thing, maintian throttle or throttle up as you power your way through a turn.
Or what do you do when you fish tail in a rear wheel drive car? You do NOT hit the brake. Also counter-intuitive.
Just like pointing the nose down is said to be.
Not taking a shot, but the contrary. Don't sell yourself short, given the amount of training and skill that professional pilots develop.
ULMFlyer From Brazil, joined Sep 2006, 470 posts, RR: 1 Reply 90, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 10875 times:
Quoting Aviateur (Reply 55): For what it's worth, I flew regionals for seven years, starting when I was 24, at which time you needed a minimum of 1,500 hours and an ATP just to apply.
I know total time does not necessarily correlate with stick and rudder skills, but I found it noteworthy (though not relevant to the accident) that the captain was hired with 625 h TT 250 h of which were multi-engine turbine. I know you've discussed this in the past, Patrick, and I know how hard (maybe impossible) it would be to statistically quantify how less safe, if at all, (definitely not unsafe), this makes flying. But I expect the media to pick up on that, especially after Sully's comments about experience.
Quoting Wjcandee (Reply 69): This brings us to violation of the sterile cockpit rule. Yawn.
That was my initial reaction as well. However, when you factor in that they were flying in bad weather, in moderate icing, and with both expressing a previous or current discomfort with icing conditions, one would expect a lot less chatter.
I suppose the question is whether violating the sterile cockpit rule led to a breakdown in their instrument scanning. We've had 2 recent accidents which would have been prevented by a simple glance at the ASI. And in this case you can't even say that they were expecting the A/T to kick in and keep the airspeed up. If this keeps happening, soon the NTSB will be recommending the installation of HUDs in all new Part 121/125 aircraft.
The fact is that a perfectly flyable airplane was lost with all POB due to poor airmanship. I can't imagine how upset I'd be, had I lost a loved one in this tragedy.
Haggis79 From Germany, joined Jun 2006, 1096 posts, RR: 1 Reply 91, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 10848 times:
Quoting ULMFlyer (Reply 96): However, when you factor in that they were flying in bad weather, in moderate icing, and with both expressing a previous or current discomfort with icing conditions, one would expect a lot less chatter.
well, or the chatter happened exactly because they were feeling discomfort.... if so, than it'd have been a very human reaction.
Dragon6172 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 1142 posts, RR: 0 Reply 92, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 10825 times:
Quoting Zrb2 (Reply 94): The part that leads me to believe they could not cope is when the airplane crashed into that house and everyone died.
Quoting Zrb2 (Reply 94): Hindsight is always 20/20 but in reading the CVR, would you have let them fly you to BUF in the Q400 if you knew about their flying histories in advance?
Yes I would, because there is really nothing damning in the transcript about their histories. There was some extra chatter below 10000 feet, but that may or may not have had any effect on the outcome. Just because the pilots talked about how they liked the flying in nicer weather, less crowded airspace, and another aircraft, does not mean they should have been kept from flying this flight.
Maybe I just do not understand what your point is, but I don't see what in the CVR leads you to believe they could not cope. Obviously I know that they could not cope... because the plane crashed, but nothing in the CVR brought me to that conclusion.
NIKV69 From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 93, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 10755 times:
Quoting Wjcandee (Reply 69): This brings us to violation of the sterile cockpit rule. Yawn. Unless the chit-chat is definitely related to missing the cues, it's maybe a violation but isn't a *factor*. That DL flight in Dallas where they were flirting with the flight attendant and forgot to extend the flaps...yeah...the chit chat was a factor. Otherwise, it sounds like a lawyer trying to say they were "sloppy" or some other jury pitch that really isn't relevant to finding out what went wrong.
Are you kidding? In some cases this may be true but when you are flying into icing conditions on approach I don't want the people flying me to be talking about anything but the checklist and paying attention to what they are doing. In a million flights it may not make a difference but it just takes one and damn how did we learn it in this case now did we?
Wjcandee From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 4315 posts, RR: 19 Reply 94, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 13 hours ago) and read 10552 times:
Quoting YYZYYT (Reply 95): Maybe it's just me, but isn't it the case that a newly promoted captain will (should?) have lots of hours as an FO.
He DID have lots of hours as an f/o and as a captain -- just in a different aircraft.
Wjcandee From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 4315 posts, RR: 19 Reply 96, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 13 hours ago) and read 10461 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 83): At 22.16.37.1 the FO on CAM-2 announces she put the flaps up!
That's going to end up being a contributing cause.
Fact is, the CVR is pretty useless otherwise unless paired with the FDR, which I'd like to see.
I reread what they talked about below 10000, which was pretty minimal, and hard to connect with any lack of observations. It does appear that the captain was timely and correctly briefing and communicating regarding what he was doing, and on and off 1 being announced, etc.; relatively by the book, with conversation basically about ops, as has been noted.
I was interested in some of the things that the f/o asked about that seemed pretty basic, but who knows why people say what they say -- she could have been using questions and uncertainty as a communication method (e.g. the point about RVR, and let the CPT say it's fine).
I also noted the mode that she had him in (pitch hold) and thought that the communications about those issues could have been a little more clear.
If they bled off approach speed without realizing that they were approaching a stall, I'd like to see the correlation of that with the CVR to see where it happened (and why -- a/p mode have something to do with it?)
Fundamentally, however, and I don't know why it hasn't been in the media, I'm intrigued by her decision to raise flaps. I can understand why she may have thought to do it, but I am intrigued that the captain didn't overrule that. The shaker was audible, plainly, and it wasn't his response to the pusher that jumps out at me as much as his response to the whole (very short) accident sequence.
Power goes to close to idle at 22:16:02 at 183 kts IAS
Gear is selected down at 22:16:05
Flaps 15 selected at 22:16: 26 at 134 kts IAS
Shaker activates at 22:16:27 at 131 kts IAS
So, she was close to idle for ~ 24 seconds. In the meantime, gear was selected down and she bled 50 knots of airspeed. Nobody thought about increasing power or noticed either the red low speed cue on the speed tape or the NU trim commanded by the A/P. Just sad. Colgan and CO will pay through their noses.
Haggis79 From Germany, joined Jun 2006, 1096 posts, RR: 1 Reply 98, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 12 hours ago) and read 10354 times:
Quoting ULMFlyer (Reply 103): So, she was close to idle for ~ 24 seconds. In the meantime, gear was selected down and she bled 50 knots of airspeed. Nobody thought about increasing power or noticed either the red low speed cue on the speed tape or the NU trim commanded by the A/P. Just sad.
I'm not familiar with the A/P of the Dash-8.... but is it possible they thought they had autothrottle enabled when in fact they didn't?
DualQual From United States of America, joined Mar 2006, 552 posts, RR: 1 Reply 99, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 12 hours ago) and read 10348 times:
Quoting BeechNut (Reply 48):
Yes but given the way airline seniority works it's highly unlikely that they would have ended up in the left seat with only 109 hours on type. You can bet that they had accumulated well over 1000 hours in the right hand seat first.
There is no requirement to be in the right seat of an aircraft before checking out as a Captain. Additionally on new types if everyone had to check out in the right seat who would be in the left? Everyone has to start somewhere. That is where the training standards come in. The airline (and FAA approved) training is supposed to be building on the air sense that each of us has developed. In my thousands of hours I learned the basics and still practice the basics at re-current training every year. When I was hired I already knew the basics. The airline just taught me how to apply that knowledge in a specific aircraft type.
Preferential? Bid System: When you always drop the P all you are left with is BS
ULMFlyer From Brazil, joined Sep 2006, 470 posts, RR: 1 Reply 100, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 12 hours ago) and read 10339 times:
Quoting Haggis79 (Reply 104): I'm not familiar with the A/P of the Dash-8.... but is it possible they thought they had autothrottle enabled when in fact they didn't?
No, sir. Simply because the Q400, despite having FADEC, has no autothrottle.
LoneStarMike From United States of America, joined Jul 2000, 3475 posts, RR: 44 Reply 101, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 11 hours ago) and read 10217 times:
Quoting NIKV69 (Reply 99): Quoting Wjcandee (Reply 69):
This brings us to violation of the sterile cockpit rule. Yawn. Unless the chit-chat is definitely related to missing the cues, it's maybe a violation but isn't a *factor*. That DL flight in Dallas where they were flirting with the flight attendant and forgot to extend the flaps...yeah...the chit chat was a factor. Otherwise, it sounds like a lawyer trying to say they were "sloppy" or some other jury pitch that really isn't relevant to finding out what went wrong.
Are you kidding? In some cases this may be true but when you are flying into icing conditions on approach I don't want the people flying me to be talking about anything but the checklist and paying attention to what they are doing.
FWIW, remember the night of the crash when the ATC tapes surfaced and everyone was listening? This was maybe an hour or two after the crash. I remember reading a thread on a pilot forum, and several posters over there were commenting that there was something just not right in the FO's voice during readbacks.
Quote: If you listen to the readback of the approach clearance, something sounds off in her voice. Anyone else notice that?
Quote: Yes, I heard it. Don't know if it was really anything or not. Did they not check in with tower? Is that tape more than approach?
Quote: Sounded like she was laughing. Very erie.
Quote: Sounded to me like she had just heard a joke and was fighting off a laugh.
Quote: Something in the read backs did sound off, I thought it was just me though at first...
A couple of other posters said they thought she sounded distracted.
Was the idle chatter a factor in the crash? Who knows? But the fact that they violated the rule to begin with shows a lack of cockpit discipline, IMO.
Okie From United States of America, joined Jul 2003, 2067 posts, RR: 4 Reply 102, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 10 hours ago) and read 10061 times:
Quoting ULMFlyer (Reply 103): So, she was close to idle for ~ 24 seconds. In the meantime, gear was selected down and she bled 50 knots of airspeed. Nobody thought about increasing power or noticed either the red low speed cue on the speed tape or the NU trim commanded by the A/P. Just sad
It has been my experience that once you start "dirtying" the airframe additional power is required at some point as you bleed off speed. I could not speak for a Q400 but I doubt it is so slippery that you drop the gear and flaps and it still glides to touchdown.
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 83): Interesting read of the CVR. At 22.16.37.1 the FO on CAM-2 announces she put the flaps up!
That only makes sense if you take into consideration that was the last thing the F/O did before the upset was flaps 15 and not aware of what was going on with the airplane. The old I moved this lever/switch here something happened, I will move it back it will unhappen.
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 103, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 10 hours ago) and read 10025 times:
Quoting Zrb2 (Reply 94): Hindsight is always 20/20 but in reading the CVR, would you have let them fly you to BUF in the Q400 if you knew about their flying histories in advance?
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 83): Interesting read of the CVR. At 22.16.37.1 the FO on CAM-2 announces she put the flaps up! If that's true, watch out for the lawsuits!
This concerns me greatly. The Capt called for flaps 15 and was slowing to the approach speed based upon having flaps 15. The approach speed was calculated for flaps 15 as being 138. The data shows that the shaker activated at 134, so he was a little slower than the target of 138 but if the flaps were at 15 there is no logical reason for the airplane to stall at 134. So why did she retract the flaps uncommanded? This question should start steering us down a path.
With regard to the sterile cockpit discussion. Whether people realize it or not this is the most violated rule out there. It is largely unpractical and in my opinion should be rewritten into something more useable and frankly more enforceable. The way it is written now leads to it being blown off, sometimes when it really should not be. If reworked into a rule that works, I think we will see much better compliance and better safety. This being said, I really don't think that it is a causal factor here.
F9Animal From United States of America, joined Dec 2004, 4436 posts, RR: 34 Reply 104, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 10 hours ago) and read 9971 times:
After reading the transcript, I just can't imagine the last seconds. This part of the transcript sent chills up my spine.
22:12:05.0
HOT-2 I've never seen icing conditions. I've never deiced. I've never seen any—
I've never experienced any of that. I don't want to have to experience that
and make those kinds of calls. you know I'dve freaked out. I'dve have like
seen this much ice and thought oh my gosh we were going to crash.
Spacecadet From United States of America, joined Sep 2001, 2901 posts, RR: 16 Reply 105, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 9 hours ago) and read 9848 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 109): The data shows that the shaker activated at 134, so he was a little slower than the target of 138 but if the flaps were at 15 there is no logical reason for the airplane to stall at 134.
Well, yes, there is a possibly logical reason: the wings were covered with ice.
I guess we don't know that yet for a fact, and it probably wasn't the root cause of the accident, but it could have been a contributing factor in that it could have done exactly what you're saying - it raised the stall speed of the aircraft. That's generally one of the really bad things that icing does.
Someone else said the stall warning would have been set for +20kts for icing conditions, but 134 doesn't sound like +20 on the standard flaps 15 approach speed for the Q400. Unless I'm missing something?
To me it sounds like a combination of training and poor cockpit discipline/distractions, with icing a contributing factor.
Still looks on that video (not that this is definitive) like he made things a whole lot worse by pulling up on the stick so hard and leaving it there.
I'm tired of being a wanna-be league bowler. I wanna be a league bowler!
Boeing12345 From United States of America, joined Oct 2007, 99 posts, RR: 0 Reply 106, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 9 hours ago) and read 9793 times:
Quoting TTailSteve (Reply 65): I find it very hard to think any pilot would not instinctively recover from a perceived stall--again key word--perceived stall. When I learned to fly on my 2nd hour in a Cessna 152 I was learning and practicing stall recovery. So again, I think both pilots deserve the benefit of doubt at this point they were dealing with a tailplane stall.
I believe that it has been discussed that the idea of a tailplane stall would not activate the shaker/pusher. Wing stall would activate the pusher/shaker.
Alias1024 From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 2501 posts, RR: 2 Reply 107, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 9 hours ago) and read 9805 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 109): This concerns me greatly. The Capt called for flaps 15 and was slowing to the approach speed based upon having flaps 15. The approach speed was calculated for flaps 15 as being 138. The data shows that the shaker activated at 134, so he was a little slower than the target of 138 but if the flaps were at 15 there is no logical reason for the airplane to stall at 134.
He called for flaps 15 a little late given how rapidly the aircraft was decelerating. There's a couple seconds delay before the FO moves the handle, then there's the time for the flaps to actually extend. Getting the shaker seems reasonable until the flaps actually extend to the 15 degree position. Then of course the power was left at idle even a few seconds after that, contributing to the continued airspeed decay.
Quoting 727forever (Reply 109): So why did she retract the flaps uncommanded?
One thing that struck me as odd was that there were ZERO callouts from the captain during the stall recovery. I don't fly for Colgan, but I'm willing to bet that there should be callouts from the PF during that maneuver. This may have led to confusion for the FO as she tried to figure out what the captain wanted her to do, knowing what the book says he should be asking for. Notice she prompted the captain on whether he wanted the gear up or not. I'm guessing she was trying her best to help the captain out, but between fatigue and illness made a poor decision.
It is a mistake to think you can solve any major problems with just potatoes.
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 108, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 9 hours ago) and read 9763 times:
Quoting Spacecadet (Reply 111): Someone else said the stall warning would have been set for +20kts for icing conditions, but 134 doesn't sound like +20 on the standard flaps 15 approach speed for the Q400. Unless I'm missing something?
The 138 approach speed that I quoted was from an article that I read some time back. This speed was with the icing correction made, so the non-icing speed would have been 118 knots approach for flaps 15. Having ice on the wings can increase the stall speed, but the clean stall speed should be in the 95-100 knot range without ice. The flaps 15 stall speed would be less than that. The airplane would have to have had an incredible amount of ice to raise the stall speed by 30 knots. This is possible, however why weren't other aircraft reporting severe icing as well?
Quoting F9Animal (Reply 110): 22:12:05.0
HOT-2 I've never seen icing conditions. I've never deiced. I've never seen any—
I've never experienced any of that. I don't want to have to experience that
and make those kinds of calls. you know I'dve freaked out. I'dve have like
seen this much ice and thought oh my gosh we were going to crash.
Very troubling. This tells you what was on her mind. It also says that she was not Captain material and might not ever be. Even sadder is that with 700 hrs in that airplane, she would be coming close to holding B1900 Captain if things in the industry were moving at the pace they were 2 years ago. This accident is going to unclothe many of the uglies being hidden in the industry for the last 10 years.
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 109, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 9 hours ago) and read 9743 times:
Quoting Alias1024 (Reply 113): . This may have led to confusion for the FO as she tried to figure out what the captain wanted her to do, knowing what the book says he should be asking for. Notice she prompted the captain on whether he wanted the gear up or not. I'm guessing she was trying her best to help the captain out, but between fatigue and illness made a poor decision.
It certainly sounds as though he was rather pre-occupied trying to figure out what was going on and what to do about it. From all of that talk about ice just a few minutes earlier it does have the speculatory appearence that they both thought they had a tail stall from ice. He pulled back and she retracted flaps. It is possible for two people of low experience to convince themselves of a problem that doesn't exist when both are fatigued. For that matter, even people of great experience can convince themselves of a problem that doesn't exist when under stress and fatigued.
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 110, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 9 hours ago) and read 9697 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 115): For that matter, even people of great experience can convince themselves of a problem that doesn't exist when under stress and fatigued.
...which (again) begs the question of what the root cause of the poor airmanship was. If it was fatigue, all the training in the world wouldn't have made a bit of difference. Conversely, if it was a lack of training/experience, then a couple of pilots both coming off a nice restful week of vacation would have done the same thing.
My sense (and admittedly it's little more than a feeling) is that the true answer is somewhere in the middle, but I'm not sure that the fatigue issue is getting as much discussion as it should.
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 111, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 8 hours ago) and read 9583 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 114): Very troubling. This tells you what was on her mind. It also says that she was not Captain material and might not ever be. Even sadder is that with 700 hrs in that airplane, she would be coming close to holding B1900 Captain if things in the industry were moving at the pace they were 2 years ago. This accident is going to unclothe many of the uglies being hidden in the industry for the last 10 years.
I went back and read the official CVR transcript that the NTSB put out. After more context her statements aren't as troubling because she had earlier said that she wanted more experience before being a Captain. I applaud her for taking this position actually.
After going back and reading the entire CVR transcript, this crew was behaving quite normally. Their conversation was the same as I've heard thousands of times in the cockpit. In fact, I don't even think that their conversation was out of line below 10,000' on the descent. The ice discussion ended a minute and ten seconds prior to localizer intercept.
One thing that I did notice and perhaps a Q400 pilot could help with this is that they set their airspeed bugs prior to top of descent. The low bug, or Vapproach, was set at 118. Never again did they mention speed bugs or making any adjustment to the speed bugs for all of that ice accumulation. The question is what was the bug showing at the stall? If it was still showing 118 then the Captain had no reason to increase power, so he thought, because he was still well over the Vapp. This could explain why they both thought it was a tail stall despite the fact that a tail stall would not activate the shaker. The speed bugs set incorrectly could also explain why he called for flaps 15 so late as the corrections had not been made. So the question is, was there a Q400 specific call in there that would have reset the bugs that I am not aware of or was it simply overlooked???
DingDong From United States of America, joined Jan 2007, 661 posts, RR: 0 Reply 115, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 6 hours ago) and read 9401 times:
Quoting DingDong (Reply 24): Ultimately, he pulled back on the yoke instead of pushing forward at a critical time.
Why?
I still don't clearly know for sure, but what the NTSB released or discussed today was pretty interesting. Apologies; I've read through this long thread but may have overlooked if someone already mentioned it -- which is pretty likely.
The ill-fated 3407 crew had apparently seen the NASA tail stall video. They were explicitly told by Colgan personnel that this did not apply to them as the Q400 wasn't suspectible to tail stalls (and that's backed up by both FAA and Bombardier aerospace engineers).
However, the response to a tail stall would be basically what the 3407 captain did. They were never trained to respond that way, and had been explicitly told to disregard that video as far as Q400 ops went. But one still has to wonder if perhaps that factored into the captain's thinking process? Especially since there were radio chatter about icing (as well as flight deck conversation) a short time before.
I only wanted to point this out since it might offer an counterweight to the current line of thinking of 'push forward, not backwards upon stall entry, dummy!' being presented. I have no vested interests here, but wanted to explore various possibilities.
So far, we've seen the 'what happened', but not yet a completely clear (or for that matter, provable) chain or line of reasoning leading to the 'why?' part.
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 116, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 6 hours ago) and read 9436 times:
Quoting Okie (Reply 108): That only makes sense if you take into consideration that was the last thing the F/O did before the upset was flaps 15 and not aware of what was going on with the airplane. The old I moved this lever/switch here something happened, I will move it back it will unhappen
It doesn't make sense on several issues. First, the FO retracted the flaps on her own. It was uncommanded and she even announced it after the fact. That is a big deal. Secondly, in any stall recovery, the last thing you do is change your configuration! There was no rolling moment so the flaps would have been symmetrical. Why retract them. To me the FO's actions are the thing I have the most concern about. There was absolutely no CRM going on at that particular point in time. You had two people in the same cockpit going in two different directions.
Alias1024 From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 2501 posts, RR: 2 Reply 117, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 6 hours ago) and read 9352 times:
Although it can't be ruled out, I doubt that the captain was attempting to recover from what he perceived to be a tailplane stall.
I think this captain's reaction was more than likely caused by the way stalls are taught in airline training in the United States. We don't go to the pusher. It's an approach to stall, with recovery initiated at the first indication of impending stall. The focus is on minimal altitude loss while getting the aircraft flying again. This often leads to a need to at least hold back pressure, if not increase it as the recovery is initiated.
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 122): To me the FO's actions are the thing I have the most concern about. There was absolutely no CRM going on at that particular point in time. You had two people in the same cockpit going in two different directions.
This is what bothers me the most about this accident as well. The moment the shaker went off, all CRM seemed to go completely out the window.
It is a mistake to think you can solve any major problems with just potatoes.
PITrules From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 2328 posts, RR: 3 Reply 118, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 5 hours ago) and read 9311 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 53): I have often contended that the PTS standard for altitude loss following stall was a little tight for the ATP. I think that a pilot should aim for no altitude loss but every situation is different and there may be times where it would be better to loose more than 100' to save the airplane, such as an aircraft upset under power, e.g. severe wake turbulance after takeoff. Having the qualification standard be 100' does lead to over emphasis on altitude loss rather than returning the aircraft to a safe state
You made the most relevant point in this entire thread IMHO.
Having gone through numerous training events on several different aircraft at different airlines, one thing they all had in common regarding imminant stick shaker stall recoveries: minimize altitude loss and power out of the stall.
I believe this is negative training in the worst way. They are training us to ride the stick shaker to maintain altitude instead of lowering the nose. Maintaining altitude may indeed require pulling back on the yoke. I can honestly see why the Captain instinctively pulled back.
Riding the stick shaker never had the right "seat of the pants" feeling for me, and I would prefer to let the nose drop. Who cares about losing 300-400 feet? Prolonging a stick shaker activation - a line of defense - does not seem right to me.
Now of course if the airplane enters a stall at 150 feet on short final, or in a windshear situation, then of course you want to minimize altitude loss. This was not the case here, and I believe this isn't a Colgan problem, but an industry wide philosophy problem regarding imminant stall recoveries.
PITrules From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 2328 posts, RR: 3 Reply 119, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 5 hours ago) and read 9290 times:
Quoting Alias1024 (Reply 123): I think this captain's reaction was more than likely caused by the way stalls are taught in airline training in the United States. We don't go to the pusher. It's an approach to stall, with recovery initiated at the first indication of impending stall. The focus is on minimal altitude loss while getting the aircraft flying again. This often leads to a need to at least hold back pressure, if not increase it as the recovery is initiated.
Bingo; I think this accident will hopefully put a focus on this issue.
KAUSpilot From United States of America, joined Jan 2002, 1932 posts, RR: 44 Reply 120, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days 5 hours ago) and read 9331 times:
The reason for the whole accdient is simple:
Colgan is a bottom of the barrel ultra cheap operator even by regional standards. Everyone in the industry knows this. Continental got what they paid for.
Dragon6172 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 1142 posts, RR: 0 Reply 122, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days ago) and read 9100 times:
Quoting KPDX (Reply 101): Sorry if its been posted but I found this
Quoting F9Animal (Reply 110): After reading the transcript, I just can't imagine the last seconds. This part of the transcript sent chills up my spine.
22:12:05.0
HOT-2 I've never seen icing conditions. I've never deiced. I've never seen any—
I've never experienced any of that. I don't want to have to experience that
and make those kinds of calls. you know I'dve freaked out. I'dve have like
seen this much ice and thought oh my gosh we were going to crash.
I think a bit much is being made of this when taken out of context. She clearly says her co-workers are complaining about not being upgraded yet, but she is ok because she knows there is a lot she has not experienced. Most of her hours are flying in AZ with good weather, and she does not want to be a Capt and have to make calls about stuff that she has never experienced before. To me, that is a good call.
If you want to talk about something that is chilling in the CVR, its near the beginning when they are filling out the log. She writes it all in, including landing airport and he says:
"um I was told it was their little uh uh like superstition.
you don't put— you don't put it until you land there."
D L X From United States of America, joined May 1999, 10012 posts, RR: 54 Reply 123, posted (3 years 1 week 2 days ago) and read 9011 times:
Jerk of the Day: Charles "Chuck" Schumer, who on Morning Joe this morning (when they were already hysterical about the 24 year old woman flying the plane and reviewing the "i've never seen icing" transcript) saying that this was bound to happen because of the Bush FAA's cutbacks. HUH? If there was one thing that was great about the Bush years, it was the dramatic increase in aviation safety in this country. Other than the terror attacks, there were only 3 fatal accidents in the United States during his tenure. Best period in history.
Okie From United States of America, joined Jul 2003, 2067 posts, RR: 4 Reply 124, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 8900 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 122): It doesn't make sense on several issues. First, the FO retracted the flaps on her own. It was uncommanded and she even announced it after the fact. That is a big deal. Secondly, in any stall recovery, the last thing you do is change your configuration! There was no rolling moment so the flaps would have been symmetrical. Why retract them.
That was the point I was trying to make. Must not have came out that way. I was just trying to put some reason or thought process behind why the F/O retracted the flaps.
I might have bought a "request" to raise the gear
I would like to see the power settings on a normal landing. Somehow the power to only 3/4 throttle might indicate the pilot going through a proceedure that was practiced for a normal landing instead of flying the airplane for the conditions that were present.
Mir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 17843 posts, RR: 59 Reply 125, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 8724 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 109): The approach speed was calculated for flaps 15 as being 138. The data shows that the shaker activated at 134
A 4kt knot gap between approach speed and shaker activation seems pretty small to me. Is 138 what it really should have been?
Quoting Alias1024 (Reply 113): One thing that struck me as odd was that there were ZERO callouts from the captain during the stall recovery. I don't fly for Colgan, but I'm willing to bet that there should be callouts from the PF during that maneuver.
The captain was oddly quiet.
Quoting 727forever (Reply 117): After more context her statements aren't as troubling because she had earlier said that she wanted more experience before being a Captain. I applaud her for taking this position actually.
She was inexperienced, and she said she didn't feel ready for captain responsibility. That's a good thing in my book - I'd be very worried about someone who wanted to be captain for the sake of being captain, without actually being ready for it.
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 122): Secondly, in any stall recovery, the last thing you do is change your configuration!
True, but it is one of the things you do, at least in early training. Full power, pitch to break the stall, then partially raise the flaps to reduce drag (and raise them more once you get some speed back). It may be that the last time she saw an actual stall (not just an impending one) was when she was flying training aircraft, and with nothing else to reference since Colgan doesn't go to full stalls in training, reverted to what she thought was the correct course of action in that scenario.
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 122): To me the FO's actions are the thing I have the most concern about. There was absolutely no CRM going on at that particular point in time. You had two people in the same cockpit going in two different directions.
It's the job of the captain to keep CRM going. The FO putting the flaps up, though it may not have been the right thing to do, is understandable. The captain needs to be the leader in that scenario - tell the FO how she can assist him as he recovers the stall. But I didn't hear anything from him, and that's the thing I have most concern about (along with the policy of not going to full stall in training - and I know it's not just Colgan that has that policy).
-Mir
7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 126, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 8681 times:
Quoting Mir (Reply 131): It's the job of the captain to keep CRM going. The FO putting the flaps up, though it may not have been the right thing to do, is understandable.
It is not understandable! In the context of any 121 operation it is a very severe mistake! It will kill you!
I also disagree with your statement about CRM. It is incumbent on both (all) crew members to keep CRM going. That's why I am so concerned about the FO retracting the flaps without a command from the Capt. You just don't do that.
Quoting Mir (Reply 131): True, but it is one of the things you do, at least in early training.
Both crew members were beyond "early in training". I have never flown a turboprop aircraft, but in all the transport category aircraft I have flown, you don't change your configuration when doing a stall recovery. Look what happens to your stall speed. If you are doing a landing configuration stall and get the stick shaker, if you retract the flaps, I can guarantee you will be in a stall in an instant!!!!
D L X From United States of America, joined May 1999, 10012 posts, RR: 54 Reply 127, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 8630 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 132): If you are doing a landing configuration stall and get the stick shaker, if you retract the flaps, I can guarantee you will be in a stall in an instant!!!!
Two questions then for my curiousity:
1) Why does the plane let you do this?
2) Would extending the flaps further (assuming not already at full flaps) help you in a stall recovery?
BAC111 From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 101 posts, RR: 0 Reply 128, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 8584 times:
Quoting D L X (Reply 129): Jerk of the Day: Charles "Chuck" Schumer, who on Morning Joe this morning (when they were already hysterical about the 24 year old woman flying the plane and reviewing the "i've never seen icing" transcript) saying that this was bound to happen because of the Bush FAA's cutbacks. HUH? If there was one thing that was great about the Bush years, it was the dramatic increase in aviation safety in this country. Other than the terror attacks, there were only 3 fatal accidents in the United States during his tenure. Best period in history.
Well put, D L X. I was thinking the same thing in light of this country's recent safety record. Besides, what good does such a comment do? Does it console the families? Does it help morale in the industry? Of course not. It just helps Chuck continue to be Chuck...
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 129, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 8550 times:
Quoting D L X (Reply 133):
2) Would extending the flaps further (assuming not already at full flaps) help you in a stall recovery?
It would really depend on their position and the thrust available. On the 727, for instance, normal landing flaps are 30 degrees. However, you there is a 40 degrees flaps available and if you select them, you will lower the stall speed slightly but you will increase the drag and thus the thrust required. So, in that case, selecting the higher flap setting wouldn't be something you wanted to do.
That's why the "normal" recovery is one where you don't change the configuration.
Quoting D L X (Reply 133): 1) Why does the plane let you do this?
In what context? If you are asking why the flaps can be retracted while the stick shaker/pusher is activated it really boils down to certification standards. On some military aircraft the flaps/slats are a function of AOA and speed. As you slow to land, the flaps/slats automatically extend. However, I know of no commercial transport that has this feature. The transports are certified to land no-flap in case there is a flap asymmetry of split flap problem.
Silentbob From Vatican City, joined Aug 2006, 1479 posts, RR: 1 Reply 130, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 8489 times:
Quoting Dragon6172 (Reply 128): I think a bit much is being made of this when taken out of context. She clearly says her co-workers are complaining about not being upgraded yet, but she is ok because she knows there is a lot she has not experienced. Most of her hours are flying in AZ with good weather, and she does not want to be a Capt and have to make calls about stuff that she has never experienced before. To me, that is a good call.
I wish more low time FOs had that attitude. I've seen way too many that feel they are ready to sit in the left seat before they hit 1000 hours.
CYAsutomo From Japan, joined Feb 2008, 45 posts, RR: 0 Reply 131, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 8450 times:
Quoting F9Animal (Reply 46): As far as Rebecca Shaw mentioning that she should have called in sick because she did not feel well.... Is another cheap shot to her ability. I have come to work many times not feeling good, but still fully capable of doing my job. I know most of you that read this have done the same many times.
Well, my job doesn't put people's lives in my hands, and even I don't go to work right after a red-eye following a day of strenuous exercise. If I were a pilot or a surgeon you can bet your a** I would never do something like that.
Would you want to have a brain operation done by a surgeon who had been skiing the prior day and then had no sleep that night?
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 132, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 8380 times:
Quoting CYAsutomo (Reply 140): Would you want to have a brain operation done by a surgeon who had been skiing the prior day and then had no sleep that night?
Certainly not.
The trouble is that no one in the industry really talks about this issue because it implicates a couple if valuable privileges of being a pilot:
1) Big chunks of time off (obviously, I realize that some pilots get this much more than others)
2) The ability to live just about anywhere
Pilots like these privileges. Airlines like these privileges because they have value, so they don't have to pay pilots as much. Maybe the flying public and the government need to take a stand against the current method of crew scheduling.
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 134, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 8055 times:
Quoting Okie (Reply 148): So the for some reason either the captain was going from recall or did not consider the +20kts for icing into the landing.
Just makes you wonder if either pilot was aware of the +20kts automatically added to stall warning if anti-ice was on.
I made note of this in an earlier statement as well. I never heard them make any further mention of speed bugs. So at 130 kias in his mind had no reason to add power as he was still slowing to 118 knots per the bug. Even with all of that ice, would the actual stall speed really have gone up to 130 kias though? That's a heck of a jump from the 100 knots that the NTSB already said would have been the Vso, especially with as they have said was fully functioning de-ice and anti-ice protection.
Aviators99 From United States of America, joined May 2008, 430 posts, RR: 0 Reply 135, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 8057 times:
Has there been any talk about why the speed got so low in the first place? If it was the GS problem on the ILS that has been previously referred to, I'm surprised that it's not being discussed as a contributing factor.
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 136, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 7841 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 154): Again, there is no realistic way to address it. It's unworkable at best and completely unenforceable.
I'm not sure about that. Certainly, when a pilot commutes, a record exists of that commute (just like a record exists of a revenue passenger's trip). So it seems like the FAA could enforce a rule that said, for instance, that commutes of more than 1500 miles require 12 hours of time at the base before a trip begins. Would those kind of rules solve the problem? That's a different question.
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 137, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 7768 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 156): Why would you need 12 hours when I can go on a trip and have less than that? It makes no sense.
Again, I'm not saying that should be the rule. I've never been an airline pilot, and those who have been probably have a far better sense for what rules might be sensible.
My point was simply that we can imagine commuting-based rules that can easily be enforced-- if that's a priority.
Lowrider From United States of America, joined Jun 2004, 3220 posts, RR: 12 Reply 138, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 7750 times:
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 153): There are really two groups that we might need to separate here:
There is a third group as well. Pilots who moved to their base at their own expense, then were displaced from that base through no fault of their own. This was my experience.
KAUSpilot From United States of America, joined Jan 2002, 1932 posts, RR: 44 Reply 139, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 7712 times:
If "everyone in the industry knows this" why is it in reply 126?
Probably because most of the people replying are not in the US regional industry and therefore have no real knowledge of its inner workings. I have many friends at colgan, and the place does not have good safety culture. They abuse the pilots beause they can, and they attract the type of pilots who will accept the abuse. They think "it's worth it because I'll get my command experience and be at Delta in no time!". Well, I guess that won't happen if you die in the process because your training was crap and you made the mistake of not calling in sick when you should've because you feared retribution for a legitament sick call.
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 140, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 7734 times:
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 157): Again, I'm not saying that should be the rule. I've never been an airline pilot, and those who have been probably have a far better sense for what rules might be sensible.
My point was simply that we can imagine commuting-based rules that can easily be enforced-- if that's a priority.
I am an airline pilot and I have commuted. I can assure you, the airlines don't want it. It would force them to increase staffing. The idea you have, while in principle is good, the reality is it just won't work.
You suggest a 12 hour in base, do you realize that is longer than a minimum layover during a trip? I can assure you, the minimum layover would automatically become 12 hours. I doubt if the airlines will allow that to happen.
My point is you can't imagine commuting rules to be introduced by the FAA. Please, let's get this thread back on track.
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 141, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 7658 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 160): I can assure you, the airlines don't want it. It would force them to increase staffing. The idea you have, while in principle is good, the reality is it just won't work.
I already mentioned that airlines would not like such policies, actually...
As I've said once, if these long commutes are a problem (and some at least apparently think that they are), the solution is going to have to come from the FAA.
Do you think that transcontinental commutes are problematic? And, if so, do we really have to just live with them?
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 142, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 7673 times:
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 153): I'd argue that these groups are equally unsafe--
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 157): My point was simply that we can imagine commuting-based rules that can easily be enforced-- if that's a priority.
What about me? I've lived where I was based three times in my career. The two times the airlines went out of business and the third time I was displaced due to downsizing. So I am based away from my home and in this market even if I wanted to move to NY, even if I could afford to move to NY (which I can't), even if I could sell my house (which I can't), am I unsafe? If the FAA or Airline is to enforce your rule, who is going to pay for this? If I must have 12 hours rest after the commute, that is something required by the company and therefore duty. Who pays for that because the company won't want to and honestly can't afford to? Granted, I don't live 1500 miles from my base but mileage is not what is important. It is actually more difficult for me to get to NY than it is from LAX, SFO, SEA, or LAS. I often have to leave the day before an international trip because I can't get to work.
What I am saying is that I agree that there is a problem. The airlines are exploiting the concept of allowing a pilot to live anywhere to cheaper wages. Crashpads in NYC go for $200-$250 a month. On $16,500/yr she couldn't have afforded a crashpad in NYC. The Captain on $55,000/yr could just barely afford a pad and a house somewhere more affordable if no kids but alas he did so he also could not afford a pad. So neither of them had a crashpad which would have aleviated some of this problem but even at those prices, pads in NYC often times are 20-30 pilots to a 3 bedroom apt or house with 5 beds to a room with hotbunks. Try getting any sleep in that environment.
The fact is, the airlines must start paying wages that actually compensate for the work being done. This requires that tickets prices must come up to pay these wages. If this means that low fare airlines can't play in this market so be it. Otherwise we will just have to accept the risk of fatigue in the cockpit.
Mcg From United States of America, joined Sep 2003, 489 posts, RR: 0 Reply 143, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 7633 times:
As a non-pilot what I don't understand is how the training program could not include simulator training on stall recovery and the stick pusher system. Stall recovery seems like a pretty basic flying skill and to be confronted with an activated stick pusher without adequate training would be overwhelming. I guess if you assume that a stall will never be encountered, then the related training is redundant.
PITrules From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 2328 posts, RR: 3 Reply 144, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 7593 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 146): Even in the sim, why would you go beyond stick shaker? There is no need for it
You have got to be kidding? I think 50 dead people might disagree about the "need for it."
In a perfect world, perhaps you are correct....why practice a stick pusher stall when one should recover at stick shaker.
But when you put it that way, why practice stick shaker when they should be trained to not even get to that point anyway? Why practice CFIT recovery when they should be trained to brief and understand their terrain surroundings. Why practice windshear recovery when they should be trained to avoid severe weather to begin with?
But the reality is those things are all trained for because history has shown that situational awareness can break down, leading to these scenarios. So we train how to handle it. Why should stalls be any different? It would only take 5 minutes in the sim to demonstrate and practice this a few times.
Also, it is entirely possible to go right through stick shaker to stick pusher if the stall is entered abruptly enough, perhaps with the help of ice on the airfoil?
Spacecadet From United States of America, joined Sep 2001, 2901 posts, RR: 16 Reply 145, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 7553 times:
Quoting Mcg (Reply 163): As a non-pilot what I don't understand is how the training program could not include simulator training on stall recovery and the stick pusher system. Stall recovery seems like a pretty basic flying skill and to be confronted with an activated stick pusher without adequate training would be overwhelming.
They were apparently *taught* how to react to the stick pusher/shaker, according to Colgan at least, but they just never had simulator practice on it. I guess the thinking being that these are not complicated systems, and if somebody tells you "if the stick shakes and then goes forward on its own, that means you're stalling", then it shouldn't take a rocket scientist to figure out how to react to that in the real world.
But obviously that's not the way people actually work in the real world. It's kind of like teaching someone to avoid a car accident by saying "if your brakes lock, that means you're pressing them too hard". Well yeah, but you're usually pressing them that hard for a reason, and taking your foot off the brake for even a fraction of a second to pump them is really, really counter-intuitive in a high-pressure, dangerous situation when survival mode kicks in and you're trying to stop the car as quickly as possible.
Someone in one article I read said something about developing muscle memory, which is one of the points of simulator training. You need to get to a point with something that's counter-intuitive (like pushing forward on a stick when you're descending without meaning to, as in a stall) where it now *is* intuitive, and your muscles just react in the way that they're supposed to. Obviously that didn't happen here.
I'm tired of being a wanna-be league bowler. I wanna be a league bowler!
D L X From United States of America, joined May 1999, 10012 posts, RR: 54 Reply 146, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 7460 times:
Quoting Spacecadet (Reply 165): Well yeah, but you're usually pressing them that hard for a reason, and taking your foot off the brake for even a fraction of a second to pump them is really, really counter-intuitive in a high-pressure, dangerous situation when survival mode kicks in and you're trying to stop the car as quickly as possible.
A little devils advocate:
1) have you ever pumped your brakes when your wheels lock up? Do you know how to? Do you think you would in the situation?
2) have you ever steered into the skid when you're side slipping on a road? Do you know how to? Do you think you would in the situation?
My guess is that you've never done either in a simulator, because almost none of us has been in a car simulator before. But we've been taught, and a lot of us when facing the situation remember it and do it. Could that not be the case with a stick pusher?
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 147, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 7467 times:
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 161): As I've said once, if these long commutes are a problem (and some at least apparently think that they are), the solution is going to have to come from the FAA.
Do you think that transcontinental commutes are problematic? And, if so, do we really have to just live with them?
But, the FAA doesn't have any jurisdiction. They mandate crew rest, and you must have the minimum crew rest. If you want to increase the minimum to 12 hours, then I agree. But, that will have a tremendous economic impact (read negative) on the airlines. Do we count duty time while on reserve as duty time, thus reducing the available duty day? If we are consistent with the crew rest issue, then we will have to do that. Again, another negative impact on the airlines. Problematic, yes, live with it, yes.
Quoting PITrules (Reply 164): You have got to be kidding? I think 50 dead people might disagree about the "need for it."
In a perfect world, perhaps you are correct....why practice a stick pusher stall when one should recover at stick shaker.
In reviewing your profile, I can't believe you even ask the question. When was the last time you did a approach to stall on a LPC/OPC? They aren't even required! I don't know anything about stick pushers, but no airplane I have flown has ever had a stick pusher. You recover at the first sign of a stall, either stick shaker or initial buffet.
Quoting PITrules (Reply 164): Why should stalls be any different? It would only take 5 minutes in the sim to demonstrate and practice this a few times.
And, We do! Again, I plead ignorance on the stick pusher issue, but we do practice takeoff, clean and approach to landing stall. In a turn, you will get the initial buffet before you get the stick shaker. We do educate crews into the recognition and the recovery of a stall. But, to take the stall past the stick shaker down to buffet is just a waste of time. If we properly teach avoidance and recognition, then we don't have to take it all the way. I really believe it becomes an issue of negative training to let it go that far. I can just hear the briefing now..."ok, now I know you won't let it go this far, but just sit there and don't do anything until we have a fully developed stall." It serves no purpose.
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 148, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 7458 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 162): What I am saying is that I agree that there is a problem. The airlines are exploiting the concept of allowing a pilot to live anywhere to cheaper wages.
I'm not sure it's all the airlines' fault. It takes two to set a market price: buyer and seller. If there weren't so many people chomping at the bit to be airline pilots, then airlines would have to pay more to recruit better pilots.
Ultimately, though, better pay (whatever the cause) isn't going to completely solve the problem. You'll still have pilots that, for whatever reason, choose to live a long way from base. My guess is that some of them will maintain the rest status quo unless this causes a threat to their certificates or their jobs.
PITrules From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 2328 posts, RR: 3 Reply 149, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 7344 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 167): In reviewing your profile, I can't believe you even ask the question.
Huh? You're the one who suggested not training beyond an initial buffet is adaquate.
Perhaps you quoted a tiny snippet of my entire point, which then put it out of context? I didn't seriously suggest not training for stalls; but drew an analogy as to how dumb it is not training for unexpected situations (such as a full stall).
Anyway, perhaps you truly believe training for an initial stall/recovery is adaquate, and on that we'll disagree. I see it as a weakness in the industry's training requirements. I don't see the harm in demonstrating an aircrafts full stall characteristics and recovery.
Haggis79 From Germany, joined Jun 2006, 1096 posts, RR: 1 Reply 150, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 7324 times:
Quoting D L X (Reply 166): 1) have you ever pumped your brakes when your wheels lock up? Do you know how to? Do you think you would in the situation?
no, yes in theory, and no
Quoting D L X (Reply 166): 2) have you ever steered into the skid when you're side slipping on a road? Do you know how to? Do you think you would in the situation?
yes, yes and yes - but that's because I trained is at a driver's safety training conducted by BMW and my local newspaper. If I hadn't the answer would most likely be "no, no and no"
Cubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 19516 posts, RR: 18 Reply 151, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 7327 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 167): But, the FAA doesn't have any jurisdiction. They mandate crew rest, and you must have the minimum crew rest.
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 152, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 7304 times:
Quoting PITrules (Reply 169): Huh? You're the one who suggested not training beyond an initial buffet is adaquate.
Perhaps you quoted a tiny snippet of my entire point, which then put it out of context? I didn't seriously suggest not training for stalls; but drew an analogy as to how dumb it is not training for unexpected situations (such as a full stall).
Anyway, perhaps you truly believe training for an initial stall/recovery is adaquate, and on that we'll disagree. I see it as a weakness in the industry's training requirements. I don't see the harm in demonstrating an aircrafts full stall characteristics and recovery.
No, I didn't quote anything out of context.
Let me rephrase what I said. We train for CFIT. We don't fly into the ground, but we react to the EGWPS. Flying into the ground would be negative training. Stall training is the same. What is accomplished by allowing the stall to fully develop?
We aren't talking about stall recognition for a PPL. We are talking about the training program for a 121 carrier. If a pilot doesn't know how to recognize a stall by then, he shouldn't even be within 100 feet of an aircraft. Perhaps that's where we differ.
In all my 121 training, both giving and receiving, I have never perceived any short comings in stall recognition and recovery. Again, I have never had anything to do with a stick pusher. It seems to me that's where the problem is. The stick pusher wasn't even demo'd in the sim. That is where one of the problem areas could be.
ULMFlyer From Brazil, joined Sep 2006, 470 posts, RR: 1 Reply 153, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 7283 times:
Quoting Spacecadet (Reply 165):
They were apparently *taught* how to react to the stick pusher/shaker, according to Colgan at least, but they just never had simulator practice on it.
I think this is only true of the pusher, but they do experience the shaker in the sim. This is the relevant quote in the WSJ:
Quote: Colgan's standard training program stops short of demonstrating the operation of the stick-pusher in flight simulators.
And the FAA approves of this because, as Capts. PhilSquares and Aviateur say, once you train to recover from the shaker onset, there should be no need to train to recover from the pusher. And many planes do not have pushers.
PITrules From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 2328 posts, RR: 3 Reply 154, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 15 hours ago) and read 7208 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 172): What is accomplished by allowing the stall to fully develop?
How about an understanding of the aircraft's stall characteristics?
How about differentiating the differences in recovery techniques between a stick shaker and a full stall? As mentioned earlier in the thread, minimum altitude loss is emphasized in recovery from stick shaker. This will often require some back pressure to be maintained on the yoke to power out of the stick shaker. The same technique (holding back pressure) may not be appropriate when a stick pusher is activated (or in a full stall situation for those without stick pushers).
Don't you think it is possible for there to be situations where a standard recovery from a stick shaker will not prevent a full stall? How about a major CG shift resulting from a cargo shift on a cargo plane? Or negative effects of airfoil ice?
What is the harm in demonstrating both stick shaker and stick pusher (or full stall) in the sim? I don't see any.
Using the CFIT analogy again, we train different CFIT profiles. A caution ("terrain ahead"), and a warning ("pull up"). The recovery techniques for both are different. If the caution is reacted to for a given rising elevation, then the warning should be able to be avoided. Based on your logic regarding stalls, there would be no need to train for the warnings. But we both know that is nonsense.
How often have you been in the sim and the instructor said "OK, now we are going to do CFIT recoveries. I know you're not an idiot, and you would ask ATC when you see terrain pop up on your EGPWS display. But we need to see this, so don't say anything. Just let your display turn from black to green to yellow to red without taking action. When you get the aural warning, then recover"
That is negative training as well, but in the big picture well worth it, don't you think?
Alias1024 From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 2501 posts, RR: 2 Reply 155, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 15 hours ago) and read 7130 times:
If the shaker is going off and the controls suddenly snatch forward to lower the nose, there shouldn't be any doubt in a pilot's mind as to what is going on. Stick shaker = really close to a stall and the pitch better be reduced to avoid stalling. I don't need a sim session to understand this.
The issue of not training in the sim for a stick pusher seems totally overblown in my opinion.
It is a mistake to think you can solve any major problems with just potatoes.
PhilSquares From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR: Reply 156, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 15 hours ago) and read 7154 times:
Quoting PITrules (Reply 174): How about an understanding of the aircraft's stall characteristics?
Are we talking about a 121 environment? You realize the stall is only demonstrated in the initial certification of the aircraft? How would we set up a training program of the TRIs when the characteristics aren't widely disseminated. Again, for a 121 operation, I think it's wsay too much.
And what aircraft are you flying? In all my 121 flying I can count on one hand and have 5 fingers left over, the amount of times I have used wing heat! The airfoils are designed to shed ice and aren't susceptible. It's not like a GA aircraft where the airfoil is susceptible to icing. We do cold weather ops as a recurrent exercise in the sim. Ins't that enough? Your suggestions about a shift in CG are way beyond what is required by the FAA. How long is the upgrade/transition training period? With unlimited time and resources it's possible, but let's put things into the reality we deal with.
Quoting PITrules (Reply 174): That is negative training as well, but in the big picture well worth it, don't you think?
To be honest, NO! Let's do something like get a clearance below the MOCA and see what happens. Or how about a clearance that is similar to the Tigers accident in KUL. That's not negative training, but just doing the exercise to fill the squares is a waste of time and negative training.
Quoting PITrules (Reply 174): What is the harm in demonstrating both stick shaker and stick pusher (or full stall) in the sim? I don't see any.
Why the switch to demo vs. training. First you are advocating training all the way down to a stall, now it's just a demo. If you are on the 75/76, you know there is no stick pusher and the stick shaker is the only thing you have. Again, we're not teaching the recovery per se, but the recognition of the impending stall. Even with initial buffet, you still have a long way to go before you get into a fully developed stall.
FrmrCAPCADET From United States of America, joined May 2008, 1374 posts, RR: 1 Reply 157, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 14 hours ago) and read 7087 times:
Quoting D L X (Reply 166): 1) have you ever pumped your brakes when your wheels lock up? Do you know how to? Do you think you would in the situation?
2) have you ever steered into the skid when you're side slipping on a road? Do you know how to? Do you think you would in the situation?
Many of us make a point when we get a new vehicle and it snows for the first time taking advantage of the first safe place to push the car/truck to its limits (at slower speeds) to see how it reacts.
Res stall training in a simulator: So it shouldn't have to be taken to a full stall? Well, we just had an instance where it may have helped. Simulator time is comparatively cheap - and humane. I am sure anyone on this site could come up with a situation where a plane could go from near stall to a full one. Particularly in airports without all the bells and whistles.
Buffet: the airline business...has eaten up capital...like..no other (business)
727forever From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 756 posts, RR: 5 Reply 158, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 14 hours ago) and read 7052 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 176): And what aircraft are you flying? In all my 121 flying I can count on one hand and have 5 fingers left over, the amount of times I have used wing heat! The airfoils are designed to shed ice and aren't susceptible. It's not like a GA aircraft where the airfoil is susceptible to icing. We do cold weather ops as a recurrent exercise in the sim. Ins't that enough? Your suggestions about a shift in CG are way beyond what is required by the FAA. How long is the upgrade/transition training period? With unlimited time and resources it's possible, but let's put things into the reality we deal with.
Phil, I know you flew the 727 & 747 and I absolutely believe that you never used wing anit-ice. It just wasn't a problem on these wings. However, the smaller wings do need it. The CRJ wing is a magnet to ice.
I think training to a full stall should be part of the training program. However, there a couple things stopping this from happening. First, cost. Part 121 N & O training already requires so much that there just isn't time in the typical 2 day recurrent or 40 hour initial curriculum to fit additional training in without a revision to N&O. AQP could help this but data does not support a high enough problem with full stalls needing to be trained when compared to other critical items needing training.
The second major factor that is stopping training of full stalls is simulator fidelity. In 2005 a company, I think it was called Iridium or something like this, was given an FAA grant to airplane unusual attitude recovery in a Lear 25 and an aerobatic version of a Bonanza. What was found with their research on flight dynamics outside of the normal envelope was that there no simulation available to the civil sector that could duplicate what a transport category airplane would do when leaving the normal flight envelope. This would lead to negative training if full stalls were trained in the simulator unless somehow the simulation devices could somehow replicate what a large airplane will do once it leaves the normal envelope. My understanding is that most new airplanes with a super critical wing have very aggresive stall characteristics that may not be replicated.
PITrules From United States of America, joined Jun 2000, 2328 posts, RR: 3 Reply 159, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 14 hours ago) and read 7040 times:
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 176): Are we talking about a 121 environment? You realize the stall is only demonstrated in the initial certification of the aircraft? How would we set up a training program of the TRIs when the characteristics aren't widely disseminated. Again, for a 121 operation, I think it's wsay too much.
I assumed the simulators are programmed to have these characteristics. If my assumption is incorrect, then I stand corrected. We now do full upset recoveries in the sim, as a result of the USAir 427 accident. I don't think it is a stretch for a sim to be able to replicate a full stall when it is used for upset training/recovery. Perhaps I'm wrong.
But even if sims don't have the proper fidelity, I would think they would still be useful to train the proper procedures, such as not pulling back on the yoke trying to override the stick pusher like this crew attempted.
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 176): And what aircraft are you flying? In all my 121 flying I can count on one hand and have 5 fingers left over, the amount of times I have used wing heat! The airfoils are designed to shed ice and aren't susceptible. It's not like a GA aircraft where the airfoil is susceptible to icing
But its not about what aircraft I'm flying. If we are only discussing one aircraft type (which I didn't think we were), it should be the Q400. I've never flown it, but unless you have, I don't know how you can make the statement "the airfoils are designed to shed ice and aren't susceptible". I really don't think that's the case, and there have been numerous accidents that show turboprops are indeed susceptible to icing, and icing has been demonstrated to change a turboprop's stall characteristics.
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 176): Why the switch to demo vs. training. First you are advocating training all the way down to a stall, now it's just a demo. If you are on the 75/76, you know there is no stick pusher and the stick shaker is the only thing you have. Again, we're not teaching the recovery per se, but the recognition of the impending stall. Even with initial buffet, you still have a long way to go before you get into a fully developed stall.
Again, I am not trying to limit the discussion to my current aircraft. Yes, there is no stick pusher on the 75/76. I've flown CRJs in the past, which do have a stick pusher. So not all aircraft have a stick pusher; in that case I would still argue full stall training is a good thing.
As far as the demo vs training thing...now you are just arguing semantics. Isn't a maneuver being demonstrated in the sim still part of training? Having it first demonstrated by an instructor, followed by student a performance of the maneuver, or having the student perform the maneuver followed by instructor critique, then followed by more student performance until proficient......I don't really care...I'd just like to see it added to the curriculum! Â
BTW, lets say one is only trained to recognize the stick shaker, and one day is assigned an aircraft with its stick shaker MEL'd?
Yet another reason more comprehensive stall training isn't a bad thing.
FlyASAGuy2005 From United States of America, joined Sep 2007, 5497 posts, RR: 11 Reply 160, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 12 hours ago) and read 6753 times:
Quoting Okie (Reply 51): The real question is how the pilots got so far behind the airframe in the first place.
Very good question indeed. From reading the CVR and combing the through little info they have available from the FDR and animation, it seems like they let the airplane fly them rather than the other way around. One of the first and basic things I learned in my PPL course. Of course, I do not want to come off as though i'm over-simplifying things as I was not there and have pretty much zero knowledge of turbo-props or large a/c for that matter.
Quoting YYZYYT (Reply 95): Maybe it's just me, but isn't it the case that a newly promoted captain will (should?) have lots of hours as an FO... so that they may be new to command and some of the decision making, but at least their flying skills should be there already.
Not all the time. There are many cases where an FO will come off of one type and go straight to the left seat on another. I saw that a lot with ASA and their ATRs.
Quoting KAUSpilot (Reply 126): The reason for the whole accdient is simple:
Colgan is a bottom of the barrel ultra cheap operator even by regional standards. Everyone in the industry knows this. Continental got what they paid for.
Quite the statement for someone with such a high level of respect on this forum.
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 132): I also disagree with your statement about CRM. It is incumbent on both (all) crew members to keep CRM going.
Very ture. That's the whole point of CRM is teamwork to get the job done right but in the end, the Captain is who's ultimately in charge and it seems to me that he didn't do a very good job of keeping things together.
Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 172): We aren't talking about stall recognition for a PPL. We are talking about the training program for a 121 carrier. If a pilot doesn't know how to recognize a stall by then, he shouldn't even be within 100 feet of an aircraft. Perhaps that's where we differ.
Agreed. Again, I wasn't there but the whole issue of having to do an actual stall recovery in the sim seems a bit out of how large operators do business and the type of experience and knowledge their employees SHOULD have. I passed this thread along to a good freind of mine that runs the training department at a large regional airline just to see what he thought...
CAM2:"Lightning coming out of that one." CAM1: "What?"
KBUF From United States of America, joined Apr 2005, 409 posts, RR: 0 Reply 161, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 8 hours ago) and read 6439 times:
Quoting Alias1024 (Reply 175): The issue of not training in the sim for a stick pusher seems totally overblown in my opinion.
I have to politely disagree with that. Capt. Renslow had no idea what to do when the plane stalled, and as a result, pushed up on the controls instead of pulling back. Had he been properly trained to deal with such an occurence (and IMO, he should have been, since he was based in EWR), we wouldn't even be talking about this.
"Starting today, the Buffalo Sabres' reason for existence will be to win a Stanley Cup."-Terry Pegula, February 22, 2011
Alias1024 From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 2501 posts, RR: 2 Reply 162, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 6 hours ago) and read 6287 times:
Quoting KBUF (Reply 182): Capt. Renslow had no idea what to do when the plane stalled, and as a result, pushed up on the controls instead of pulling back.
First, you've got that backwards. He pulled back.
Second, if the recovery procedure had been flown correctly once the shaker started, then the plane never stalls at all. How do we know that stick pusher training in the sim would have helped? Capt. Renslow had plenty of approach to stall training just a couple of months prior when he transitioned into the Q400, but still didn't get it right when the stick shaker activated.
Third, the recovery from a full stall would be the same as it was in his private pilot training. Reduce the angle of attack. No airline pilot needs a simulator lesson to understand this, as you won't get a private pilot certificate if you don't understand it.
I believe this was a combination of fatigue and surprise, leading to some almost inexplicable actions by both the Captain and First Officer. I don't think a sim on the stick pusher system would have made the tiniest difference.
Quoting KBUF (Reply 182): Had he been properly trained to deal with such an occurence (and IMO, he should have been, since he was based in EWR), we wouldn't even be talking about this.
What does being based at EWR have to do with anything? Does being based at Newark make pilots dumber?
It is a mistake to think you can solve any major problems with just potatoes.
Scrubbsywg From Canada, joined Mar 2007, 1468 posts, RR: 0 Reply 163, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 6110 times:
Quoting 727forever (Reply 149): I made note of this in an earlier statement as well. I never heard them make any further mention of speed bugs. So at 130 kias in his mind had no reason to add power as he was still slowing to 118 knots per the bug. Even with all of that ice, would the actual stall speed really have gone up to 130 kias though? That's a heck of a jump from the 100 knots that the NTSB already said would have been the Vso, especially with as they have said was fully functioning de-ice and anti-ice protection.
can someone clear some questions/assumptions i have up?
1) Stall speeds are calculated based on conditions, plane, etc. by the pilots and input into the plane's computer
2)Plane has no way of 'knowing' the stall speeds are correct
3)Plane has no way of actually detecting it is in a stall
4)If pilots determine icing is probable, plane is put into a 'ice mode' where it activates anti icing devices
5)when put into 'ice mode' plane will add 20 knots to calculated stall speeds
6)if speed approaches stall speed(corrected with the 20 knots) first a stick shaker activates, and if speed continues to decrease, plane actually begins pushing stick to try and get the airplane to gain speed
With these assumptions, is it possible that the ultimate irony in this particular crash that the plane may not have been entering a stall and the corrections made by the pilots actually were trying to overcome a problem that may not have occurred yet?
Quoting Okie (Reply 108): :
The old I moved this lever/switch here something happened, I will move it back it will unhappen.
i think this may be an interesting thought. human nature in a lot of cases makes people undo things they just did when they feel it did something bad.
Multimark From Canada, joined Jul 2006, 680 posts, RR: 0 Reply 164, posted (3 years 1 week 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 6125 times:
I hadn't realized US regional pay was so bad! CTV compared Colgan wages with the only Canadian Q400 operator, Porter (all 1st year):
Colgan Pilot $33k, 1st Officer $21k
Porter Pilot $75k, 1st Officer $43k
(all shown in Cdn dollars)
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I can already see it in the USAToday.
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I guess we'll get a better idea once we are able to read the transcript of the CVR. (Is that something likely to be released tomorrow or will we have to wait awhile longer?)
They've got to sell papers -- they're not a charity. This is the easiest, cheapest, and quickest way to do it.
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