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787 Test Flight Evacuated Due To Smoke - Part 2  
User currently offlinemoderators From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 513 posts, RR: 0
Posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 20 hours ago) and read 44478 times:
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This is a continuation thread from part 1, which can be found here: 787 Test Flight Evacuated Due To Smoke - Part 1

Please feel free to add your comments to the thread. Enjoy the website!


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255 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently onlineNYC777 From United States of America, joined Jun 2004, 5758 posts, RR: 47
Reply 1, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 44442 times:

Geoffrey Thomas is reporting that Boeing is preparing to announce a 9 month delay for delivery of the first 787 to ANA.

According to Geoffrey Thomas of Air Transport World, Boeing is getting ready to announce another delivery delay of possibly up to 9 months. Geoffrey also cites QANTAS engineering insiders that there is a significant (he did not elaborate) problem.

As I mentioned, the FAA is really the determinant of when the 787 will return to flight and be certified. At the time of the fire, I estimate that Boeing had about two and half to three months of flight testing to be completed. If this still holds then it's possible that the 787s could return to flight testing in about 6 months with delivery about 3 months later. This puts a projected first delivery date to about mid to late third quarter of 2011. I'm going to go out on a limb and say that Boeing will announce a new first delivery date of mid fourth quarter 2011. They will need some time to digest the data from the flight testing that has been done; produce the required engineering changes and incorporate the changes into the 787s that have been built.

Despite another delay, I expect that Boeing will continue to produce 787s and get them ready for delivery. As had been mentioned in the past postings, Boeing has significant rework to do on the 787s that have been built. Another delay will give them some breathing room to get that rework done. They will have more rework to do after the test flight fleet returns to the air and other issues are revealed that would require changes to be made on the production 787s. The continued production of 787 that are undelivered presents Boeing with another problem: where to put park all those 787s. Already Boeing is squeezing them into spots near the Future of Flight Museum as well as the the apron in front of the Boeing assembly building and has set aside spots near the Everett ATC Tower to park even more 787s. But if there is another delay where can Boeing park all those new built 787s especially as they attempt to ramp up production next year? Mind you that the Boeing Everett ramp will be full of 777, 747-8, and 787s. There is the potential of additional stalls to the south of the Boeing plant, as well as the ATS Hangar which Boeing is renting currently. Boeing can possibly rent the ramp space in front of the ATS hangar. Boeing can also use building 40-23 which was used for the static testing of the 787 fuselage. That fuselage is due to be removed as is the test equipment that was installed for the static testing.

According to sources, Boeing is looking into increasing the 777 production rate to 8 to 10 per month from the current 5.5 per month. Boeing would utilize 40-23 for additional 777 assembly space. However, with the current issues in the 787 program, that space might be better served, in the short run, to store production 787 as well as an enclosed space to do rework on the 787s. Hopefully many of the questions will be answered in the next few days.

[Edited 2010-11-19 10:16:12]


That which does not kill me makes me stronger.
User currently offlinekeesje From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 2, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 43936 times:

Quoting NYC777 (Reply 1):
Geoffrey Thomas is reporting that Boeing is preparing to announce a 9 month delay for delivery of the first 787 to ANA.

Hamilton is less pessimistic & also says to have good sources; 4-6 months. Still they'll need a lot of parking space.

http://leehamnews.wordpress.com/2010.../our-787-forecast-4-6-month-delay/

[Edited 2010-11-19 13:57:32]

User currently offlineRheinbote From Germany, joined May 2006, 1968 posts, RR: 52
Reply 3, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 43721 times:

Quoting keesje (Reply 3):
Still they'll need a lot of parking space

Alenia was asked to deliver 45-52 shipsets in 2011   

source:
http://www.fiomtaranto.it/temporanei/ALENIA%20AERONAUTICA.doc


User currently offlineER757 From Cayman Islands, joined May 2005, 2525 posts, RR: 7
Reply 4, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 43593 times:

Quoting NYC777 (Reply 1):
he continued production of 787 that are undelivered presents Boeing with another problem: where to put park all those 787s.

I sem to recall that they were at one time planning to stash some in SAT. That was about three delays ago, so that plan may not be valid any longer.


User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30986 posts, RR: 86
Reply 5, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 13 hours ago) and read 43349 times:
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So if P100's issue was caused by FOD, why exactly does P100 need to be complete redesigned? And if P100 needs to be re-designed, does not by extension P200 need to be re-designed?

And if both need to re-designed, does this mean more of the electrical system needs to be re-designed?

And that neither P100 nor P200 have caught fire in some 2000 hours of flight tests, plus ground tests when they were energized, it seems to me that if you keep the FOD out, they should work as designed?

Or is the issue because the systems failed in a way that was NOT expected and said failure was a safety of flight issue? Boeing's statements don't seem to reflect such a scenario that I can see.


User currently offlinekanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 3551 posts, RR: 26
Reply 6, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 43156 times:
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Quoting Stitch (Reply 5):
Boeing's statements don't seem to reflect such a scenario that I can see



I don't think they know for sure yet... and if FOD is an issue, could it have been brought onboard during some maintenance...

I will bet both the vendor and Boeing labs are working overtime to get to the bottom... and we may only end up with a sign..."place no opened beverages here"


User currently offlineAesma From France, joined Nov 2009, 6654 posts, RR: 11
Reply 7, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 43025 times:

Well, FOD being the problem looks like "great" news, so if it isn't then it must mean that the plane didn't perform as designed.

Back to the question we were asking at the end of the previous thread, why did the cockpit go mostly black if only half the normal power was lost ?



New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
User currently offlinenomadd22 From United States of America, joined Feb 2008, 1864 posts, RR: 0
Reply 8, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 42959 times:

Quoting Aesma (Reply 7):
Back to the question we were asking at the end of the previous thread, why did the cockpit go mostly black if only half the normal power was lost ?


That's a mystery to me. I put in navigation gear all the time that has redundant power inputs. It's not rocket science to back up low power, critical instruments. It's also no great feat to cut off input power to a panel that that's on fire and not putting out anymore. Hopefully, I'm just another nitwit poster who doesn't know what he's talking about, but it's getting harder and harder to be surprised at dumb design decisions.
I have a sneaking suspicion that, once again, someone might have used redundancy to slack off on design margin or reliability. I hate that.
Then again, it still amazes me that something like a CVR can be restricted to 30 minutes when children's toys can record hundreds of hours of audio.



Andy Goetsch
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 79
Reply 9, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 8 hours ago) and read 42574 times:

Quoting Aesma (Reply 7):
Back to the question we were asking at the end of the previous thread, why did the cockpit go mostly black if only half the normal power was lost ?

I haven't seen any hard numbers in anything Boeing posted to quantify "mostly" or "half". But, based on normal airplane architecture (nothing unique to the 787), if you lose half the power without the APU running, you expect about half the systems to shut down, at least temporarily. I don't think any OEM has designed a synchronous power system for something like 30 years, so you can't have multiple generators on single bus. If some generators die, you need to switch buses around, which leads to transients and time. Given that the whole incident was apparently in the 30-90 second range, and avionics typically have boot times in that range, a transient power switch might be enough to darken some instruments for that brief period from event to landing.

Quoting nomadd22 (Reply 8):
I put in navigation gear all the time that has redundant power inputs. It's not rocket science to back up low power, critical instruments.

A lot of commercial aviation has fully redundant avionics, so they rarely go for fully redundant power supplies to fully redundant avionics except for safety-of-flight stuff like flight control computers or EEC's. I can't think of any non-redundant avionics that don't have at least dual power supplies. Fully redundant power means fully redundant wiring, which means weight...if you've got five displays and need zero to safely fly, running double power runs to all five displays is excess weight to protect against an event that's probably something like 1e-10 or less.

Quoting nomadd22 (Reply 8):
It's also no great feat to cut off input power to a panel that that's on fire and not putting out anymore.

Boeing's press release says the fire self-extinguished as soon as the fault cleared...that sounds like they did cut off input power and the fire went out.

Tom.


User currently offlineSV777 From Saudi Arabia, joined Apr 2010, 41 posts, RR: 0
Reply 10, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 6 hours ago) and read 42001 times:

I think the problem is not in FOD (if there was any) or P100 failure, the problem is in electrical system reaction after the failure:
1- L main bus is powered by P100 (every essential component power is branched from this one because it feeds captain's instruments and standby instruments, speaking about a typical twin engine airplane).
2- P100 failure led P200 to try and power back P100 assuming power source was bad, but the failure was not in power source rather was after the power source, in another word the L bus it self was shorted.
3- since every essential component was connected to L bus (actually branched from it to other essential buses) and L bus was sensed not powered, all other sources (P200 , APU, RAT) one after the other were trying to recover power on L main bus (just like humans when they try to fix one failed item and they forget that they still have 3 working systems) because it got the highest priority over other buses, but they get rejected and registered as failed power source because they were sensed shorted as well.
4- I think the only power source that managed to keep some essential components alive was battery bus which was powering DC instruments and static inverter was powering AC components because they are down stream the failed bus and that explains why only captain's PFD was functioning (as per some reports).

so any delay or redesign would be totally focused on sorting out P100, P200, APU and RAT behavior (reaction) in case one of their buses was shorted and not losing power source, it might be just a software change like in the case of B777 or it might need hardware change to address the reaction to such failure.

finally excuse my English and please correct me if I'm wrong.


User currently offlineDocLightning From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 19699 posts, RR: 58
Reply 11, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 41510 times:

So now we're at a four-year delay? Or are we just shy...

Wow.

I think Boeing is going to have a lot of trouble getting early orders on their next models.


User currently offlinemdword1959 From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 12, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 40617 times:

Quoting DocLightning (Reply 11):
So now we're at a four-year delay?

The 787 program won't be 4 years late until the first delivery is delayed to May 2012, which would then make the delay as long as the originally planned design-to-delivery cycle.


User currently offlinewolbo From Netherlands, joined Mar 2007, 488 posts, RR: 1
Reply 13, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 40587 times:

Looks more like it will be a 3 to 3.5 year delay so not quite as bad as 4 years but certainly nothing to cheer about.

User currently offlineRheinwaldner From Switzerland, joined Jan 2008, 2225 posts, RR: 5
Reply 14, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 40576 times:

How can FOD start a fire in a closed compartment? I can´t imagine how that happened....

User currently offlinekeesje From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 15, posted (3 years 10 months 3 days ago) and read 40301 times:

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 14):
How can FOD start a fire in a closed compartment? I can´t imagine how that happened....

E.g. a piece of metal landing on an electrical panel.

I wonder how that could cause a big delay.

I would not be surprised if the events, the cascading after the fault has become more of an issue.

http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/library/787emergency1020.jpg


User currently offlinesphealey From United States of America, joined May 2005, 377 posts, RR: 0
Reply 16, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 39720 times:

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 14):
How can FOD start a fire in a closed compartment? I can´t imagine how that happened....

IMHO the term "FOD" has now been expanded/extended so much as to be essentially meaningless. Originally it meant junk on runways that got sucked into air intakes; now it means any sort of object within 10 km of an airport that might somehow affect any airplane. Next I expect to hear that birdstrikes are going to be reclassified as "FOD".

To your original question, having seen the inside of a lot of industrial control panels I could easily imagine a small screwdriver, wrench, fastener, etc jammed into a hidden crevice gradually working its way out over many landing cycles. Then a moderate bump of turbulence on final approach and it falls out...

sPh


User currently offlinekmz From Germany, joined Feb 2008, 162 posts, RR: 2
Reply 17, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 39594 times:

does somebody have a schematic drawing of the B787 electrical system?

I heard that there are also electrical buses only for essential loads. are these also depending on the two electrical panels?

i would be really surprised if there was a real system design issue here which would consequently lead to a redesign. all parties involved have a lot of experience. but then again, maybe introducing an all electrical aircraft led to some new faulty logic.


User currently offlineJoeCanuck From Canada, joined Dec 2005, 5465 posts, RR: 30
Reply 18, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 22 hours ago) and read 39522 times:

There are over 2000 hours in the flight test program, and presumably thousands more on the ground, in any number of failure scenarios. There really are no indications that the backups didn't back up. The fire self extinguished almost immediately after the source was removed. The P200 panel and RAT provided enough power to fly the plane and it landed without further incident.

In my mind, there is a lot of positives which can be taken from this incident.

I'm actually cautiously optimistic that the delays won't be too onerous. I think if there was a basic fault in the design of the electrics, it would have cropped up long before now...at least we can hope so.



What the...?
User currently offlineOyKIE From Norway, joined Jan 2006, 2751 posts, RR: 4
Reply 19, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 22 hours ago) and read 39275 times:

Quoting NYC777 (Reply 1):
According to sources, Boeing is looking into increasing the 777 production rate to 8 to 10 per month from the current 5.5 per month.

Do you know if Boeing is looking at the 767 line as well? For some customers the 777 might be too large. For missions less than 3000Nm the 767 is still very capable.



Dream no small dream; it lacks magic. Dream large, then go make that dream real - Donald Douglas
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 79
Reply 20, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 21 hours ago) and read 38941 times:

Quoting SV777 (Reply 10):
1- L main bus is powered by P100 (every essential component power is branched from this one because it feeds captain's instruments and standby instruments, speaking about a typical twin engine airplane).

Every essential component is *not* fed from the L main bus on any twin I know about. About half of them are...the other half are powered by the R main, for exactly the reason that you can't have a single point of failure.

The "main bus" is usually the high voltage AC bus anyway, and relatively few essentially components run directly on AC...most flight critical stuff runs on 28 VDC, which is an entirely different set of buses.

Quoting Rheinwaldner (Reply 14):
How can FOD start a fire in a closed compartment?

Drop a paperclip or staple on some live conductors and watch the arc.

Quoting kmz (Reply 17):
does somebody have a schematic drawing of the B787 electrical system?

Yes, lots of people...but I've never seen one made public.

Quoting kmz (Reply 17):
I heard that there are also electrical buses only for essential loads. are these also depending on the two electrical panels?

Most twin aircraft have, roughly:
L & R Main AC buses (take power from engines/APU/external power)
L & R Main DC buses (powered by transformer/rectifiers from the main AC buses)
Standby DC bus (essential equipment)
Hot battery bus (always powered if the battery is alive)

All buses have cross connects to allow bypassing a failed bus, and typically cross-connects to power the AC buses via inverters. Powering the standby bus typically would not require the AC buses to be live.

Tom.


User currently offlinekanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 3551 posts, RR: 26
Reply 21, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 19 hours ago) and read 38159 times:
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Quoting sphealey (Reply 16):
having seen the inside of a lot of industrial control panels I could easily imagine a small screwdriver, wrench, fastener, etc jammed into a hidden crevice gradually working its way out over many landing cycles. Then a moderate bump of turbulence on final approach and it falls out...


even a shaving from drilling a hole... however those panels should have drilled and painted before being stuffed... a dropped fastener or washer that shook loose would be all it took.


User currently offlinestarrion From United States of America, joined Jul 2003, 1126 posts, RR: 2
Reply 22, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 19 hours ago) and read 38052 times:

Quoting kanban (Reply 21):
Quoting sphealey (Reply 16):
having seen the inside of a lot of industrial control panels I could easily imagine a small screwdriver, wrench, fastener, etc jammed into a hidden crevice gradually working its way out over many landing cycles. Then a moderate bump of turbulence on final approach and it falls out...


even a shaving from drilling a hole... however those panels should have drilled and painted before being stuffed... a dropped fastener or washer that shook loose would be all it took.


If you consider how much rework these frames went through, FOD would be almost inevitable. It would be nice to think that they check every object in or out, but in a tight workspace that stuff can get dropped and not be recoverable.... there is probably a ton of that stuff in the first three birds.

No wonder Boeing doesn't want to sell them.



Knowledge Replaces Fear
User currently offlinesphealey From United States of America, joined May 2005, 377 posts, RR: 0
Reply 23, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 37848 times:

Quoting starrion (Reply 22):
If you consider how much rework these frames went through, FOD would be almost inevitable. It would be nice to think that they check every object in or out, but in a tight workspace that stuff can get dropped and not be recoverable.... there is probably a ton of that stuff in the first three birds.

I was thinking about the rework too. There's a description in _21st Century Jet_ about the amount of junk that fell out of the first 777 the first time it was moved on its wheels.

sPh


User currently offlinekanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 3551 posts, RR: 26
Reply 24, posted (3 years 10 months 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 37510 times:
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Quoting starrion (Reply 22):
there is probably a ton of that stuff in the first three birds.

Actually Boeing tries to control FOD very closely.. When I did process audits, we always looked at how FOD was handled and tool accountability.. as they moved to kitted jobs, there were no extra parts so if one got dropped, you went after it. . and some FOD is always missed. and it only takes one filing...

However we don't know this to be the cause yet, it has only been postulated that it could be as simple as this...


25 rwessel : I've been wondering about the 787's electrical architecture for a while. And while actual information has been frustratingly sparse, what I've heard
26 tdscanuck : Given that it's all direct drive, you're going to have some fixed phase difference between them, but I'm not aware of any aircraft that enforces a me
27 EstorilM : Has anyone posted the pictures of the fried electrical panel that Seattle Times is hosting? I've lost track of the thread over the past few days and d
28 Aesma : Seattle Times hosting a picture ? They said they didn't want to because it would help Boeing's competition. So, the P200 can't power more than one scr
29 Post contains images keesje : Found this somewhere and posted it the first post: I'm not an avionics specialist but it seem to me the forward EE bay (cockpit etc.) is powered by th
30 Daysleeper : If it does indeed turn out to be FOD left from construction then I think there needs to be an immediate and indepth investigation to how this can happ
31 robffm2 : Why are there two EE bays? Any advantages/disadvantages over having only one? And looking at the picture it seems that the 787 uses quite a lot of en
32 rwessel : Obviously some slop due to mechanical tolerances is inevitable, but beyond that it's just a matter of physically arranging the drives and generators
33 Post contains links tdscanuck : I haven't found them anywhere online yet. Assuming the P200 is the mirror of the P100, and that the posted stuff about the power system is right, nei
34 nomadd22 : Once again, my experience is with ships and comms suites, but one of the main advantages of having a 28VDC busses powering critical gear is that any
35 tdscanuck : All the twins I'm aware of have multiple 28 VDC buses, and not all of them are powered by the battery. I think it's the magnitude of the power demand
36 kanban : first Boeing QA do not inspect for FOD except in special cases (fuel cells)... and many jobs are self inspected. However everyone looks for FOD, ever
37 Daysleeper : As I stated, it would be expected that some FOD would be found on the aircraft, perhaps a little more than usual given it's a test frame. What is not
38 okie : Yes it does thanks tds The pics that were on line at the Seattle Tattler were pulled down that were showing the damage. While they were quite informa
39 Aesma : Isn't that playing on words ? That rectifier is powered by P100 or P200 or both, isn't it ? I'm not going into the details of the architecture, I'm j
40 okie : Assuming here but it appears that the APU's 2 alternators are going to power 2 of the 4 main buses. Apparently from what little information we have i
41 tdscanuck : It's a scaling problem...suppose that people clean up their work completely FOD-free 99.99999% of the time. Given the the number of maintenance jobs
42 kanban : a single burr/filing from a drilled hole would be very small, and probably melted by the short circuit it caused.. however there would be traces left
43 nomadd22 : I've actually seen the army do that. They started out with a 24VDC radio that had a 120VAC power supply. The source for the 120VAC was an inverter ru
44 Post contains links keesje : As I suggested in reply 15 the problem is not the fire caused by a piece of metal (left behind tool) but the chain of reactions following the fire. ht
45 NYC777 : In terms of production reate..only if they win the anker competition, otherwise no, they're going to maintain the same rate unless they have a huge i
46 okie : There was not anything to scale the pictures to but from what Okie could guess there was at least 8" x 16" section of the backplane of the P100 panel
47 Post contains links kanban : Reports now indicate a tool was left in the panel http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Boeing...sed-by-rb-1023996511.html?x=0&.v=1 "In an article on Mond
48 rwessel : IMO, that assumption is a bit of a leap. While a rectifier on each generator is pretty much a requirement if they're not synchronized otherwise, I do
49 okie : I would say that since the pics of the P100 had several 3 phase contactors that could be seen that would indicate that would be a source alternator p
50 JoeCanuck : I am very interested in the exact series of events which unfolded between the short circuit and the landing. It seems to me that the backup systems wo
51 kanban : reports are now saying it was a tool... probably not a spanner. I don't know that anyone can design a panel that precludes FOD and the damage caused.
52 nomadd22 : Aren't they required to do a tool count after work like that? Or have a supervisor sign off the job? The details should be interesting. There should b
53 okie : I think you are missing the point here, it was not the tool (FOD). The problem was how the aircraft/electrical system designed to deal with a problem
54 Post contains links nomadd22 : http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1...by-stray-tool-la-tribune-says.html " French newspaper La Tribune is blaming the electrical fire on Boeing’s 7
55 Aesma : The fleet is grounded. There is no reason to ground the fleet if a forgotten tool is the problem, by now all test planes would have been inspected. H
56 Gordomatic : Exactly Wouldn't this be more of a procedural issue that there wasn't a sweep for items How did the aircraft not deal with the problem correctly? I t
57 tdscanuck : Yes. The ISFD used on most Boeing's now is a fully self-contained unit with its own battery, accelerometers, etc. Bus bars are often fully exposed. C
58 GBan : Only Boeing knows until they release that information. Yes, but that does not mean that all systems worked as expected!
59 JoeCanuck : But they did work pretty darned well. They were only 1000 feet above the ground leaving precious little time for backups to get working. Any loss of
60 Stitch : ZA002 arrived pretty much as an empty shell, so I think it is safe to say all installation and outfitting work were performed by Boeing personnel at
61 Aesma : Maybe you or Gordomatic can then explain why the fleet is still grounded, if all systems worked as intended ?
62 kanban : there are two different scenarios here.. production and flight test.... In production, they have been working on kitting all parts and tools in "shad
63 JoeCanuck : I have no idea. There could be plenty of reasons. I suspect that since they had a fire they are making damned sure they know every aspect of the caus
64 Gordomatic : I don’t know – I would expect only Boeing to know that. I’m not saying anything else could or couldn’t be wrong. One would imagine Boeing wou
65 vam : Back-up systems indeed worked, but it's not clear if they worked exactly as designed. The pilots indeed did not lose control of the aircraft at any t
66 kanban : with all the rampant spectulation, and conspiracy theories... what if they are looking at intentional sabotage? However I reiterate from my post above
67 tdscanuck : Well, they've flown three times since the incident so they're not exactly grounded...not at full test capacity, by any means, but obviously the FAA i
68 okie : Not trying to be facetious here but: Loss of pressurization, cabin full of smoke possibly fire, loss of instruments and systems. We have a 30 minute
69 PITingres : I wonder if part of the difficulty in evaluating the event is that it did happen so close to the ground and landing. If the plane had been at 35,000
70 JoeCanuck : I think it makes much more sense to say nothing until you are absolutely sure of the situation than prematurely announce something and be proven wron
71 tdscanuck : In which case, you *expect* to have smoke in the cabin from an EE bay fire. The cabin sidewalls and ventillation are an integral part of smoke contai
72 okie : They had 4 working starter/generators at the time. As far as reconfiguring the buses, I am guessing of course but from what I can extrapolate the fai
73 dynamicsguy : I can't comment on the electrical side of this, but for the control surfaces and flaps we have to design for and consider a tool or other object caus
74 Post contains links jreuschl : Fire caused by.. a tool? We could hope it is this simple... http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Boeing...-fire-caused-by-rb-1023996511.html
75 ER757 : Could be something to that. Let's face it, I'm sure when the crew became aware of a fire on board, their first thought wasn't, "Hey, let's fly around
76 Speedbird128 : Ask emirates... they did it to a new A380...
77 Post contains images PITingres : I hope we'll find out soon whether that is true or not. My own personal guess is that the other (P200) panel could not be put online *in the time ava
78 2175301 : I'll buy this. In my field (nuclear power plants); given a loss of AC power, power is restored to critical equipment from the diesels in an orderly a
79 Post contains links mdword1959 : FLIGHTBLOGGER: Boeing close to releasing 787 schedule impact after electronics fire http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/fl...r-end-to-787-fire-in.html#c
80 Post contains links jreuschl : http://www.king5.com/news/business/K...-Cause-of-787-Fire--110439234.html Apparently it was a foreign object, or something loose, that caused the shor
81 Post contains links keesje : Boeing Co. will have to redesign part of the 787 Dreamliner’s electrical system after an onboard fire two weeks ago halted flight tests, three peopl
82 Stitch : As I noted in the other thread, if this is a software fix, cannot the fleet fly in the interim once the bays are confirmed clear of foreign objects? T
83 Post contains links Lumberton : Aviation Week's Guy Norris has posted this update. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs...=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest
84 frmrCapCadet : A positive spin on all of this is that Boeing just had an unscheduled major test of a near catastrophic failure. The plane came through OK, but R and
85 Post contains links tdscanuck : Boeing just released their official results: http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1536 Not a lot of information other than confirming a
86 okie : Okie looked over the pics when they were posted for a while and there was tremendous arc fault damage. I suspect there will be software changes galor
87 NYC777 : My estimation for the 787 delay is three months max. This puts first delivery around mid- May...exactly three years behind schedule.
88 Stitch : By that argument, should not all the hours already logged be "null and void"? I mean if the worst-case scenario folks are right, the system failed to
89 ikramerica : Arc Faults are a b1tch. I'm in the process of retrofitting AFCI breakers into my home. Hooked up the final one this evening, and... TRIP. Isolated tw
90 ikramerica : That's absurd. This is not how test programs are run. If it were, aircraft would never be certified because every issue that pops up would ground the
91 okie : This is a major issue and it appears the FAA is approaching it that way as well. Lets see: Fire and Smoke Loss of 4 of 5 Heads Down Displays Loss of
92 tdscanuck : Although very very bad, that's something that's designed and certified for. Which is all normal *temporary* response to loss of AC power. What's not
93 Revelation : Which contains: One must ask why such simulations weren't done earlier. Given the years of delays, clearly there was lots of unexpected time that cou
94 okie : The information that has been floating around is that the P100 failure commanded the RAT to deploy. When the RAT deployed it disabled the ability for
95 Stitch : Probably a great many. But that's hardly unique to the 787 program. I mean how many other aircraft families have suffered inflight emergencies due to
96 tdscanuck : Really? You're asking why they didn't stick a piece of FOD into a high-voltage AC bus before? There are a *huge* variety of failure modes (most of th
97 XT6Wagon : Theoretical failure and actual failure can be very different things. A theoretical short between two electrical systems would likely not include dama
98 747classic : I also have observed several photos of the damaged P100 panel of RC002 at the Seattle Times website. A burned out BTB (Bus Tie Breaker) and the corre
99 Stitch : Which sounds like something that might be fixable through software. Some outlets are now saying the fix could be completed within weeks, as opposed t
100 Post contains images kanban : when they return to testing, at your suggestion of looking at all possible failure modes, they will at 40,000 ft, blow in the pilots windshield, hit
101 Post contains links 747classic : I will refrase my reply : We have two scenarios : a) The very tight located BTB and control wiring (also routed to the P200 panel) was damaged by the
102 Revelation : Somehow you managed to miss my use of the word "simulations", even though my comments followed my quote of Farncher talking about such simulations. I
103 Scipio : Does that not depend on the FAA's definitions of "adequate" and "primary"?
104 BoeingVista : The P200 shouldn't have gone down at all in response to an issue with the P100. I think that the elephant in the room here is that functionality atte
105 Revelation : I suppose it does. The article goes on to say that the new FAA requirements for 787 are: If what Boeing has said is true, i.e. full controllability w
106 art : Just love the way you phrased that!
107 justloveplanes : Question: Do the spinning fans of an unpowered engine in flight act as Ram Air Turbines as well vis-a-vis the engine generators?
108 okie : The engines on a 787 only turn starter/generators if you are referring to applications say of a 747 where hydraulics can be provided by the unpowered
109 Post contains links JoeCanuck : I don't think these details have been confirmed. I don't know if Boeing has confirmed that the P200 panel and the APU's couldn't be put online if the
110 Stitch : It's possible the whole system tripped and the RAT deployed because it thought there was no power available. With landing imminent, there appears to h
111 JoeCanuck : I don't think the RAT deploying on a hair trigger is a bad thing...as long as it can be retracted if it is no longer needed. It is one less thing to w
112 okie : Though the fire, which happened while on approach to Laredo, Texas, and its root cause, revealed an Achillies heel in the 787's electrical system that
113 Stitch : I wonder if that will end up being the case. With all the re-work that has been done on ZA002, I'm not shocked that a piece of material ended up in t
114 justloveplanes : I don't see why the panels that are so critical can be designed to submersible standards. I.E. impossible to short via conductive material. Costly, bu
115 Post contains images kmz : i admit that i have problems understanding the basic build up of the electrical system and therefore don't understand some scenarios discussed here. m
116 Bennett123 : So far, there seems to be not word on when they will fly again, let alone EIS. Is this correct. Surely it was not that long ago, that EIS was due to b
117 okie : A short due to a malfunction.......or......FOD, I do not think they really know the originating event. The major issue here is what happened after th
118 BoeingVista : Thats about the size of it, grounded by the FAA until further notice to all intents and purposes. The FOD argument is a bit thin too, Boeing state th
119 CMB56 : First comment about the RAT. Once deployed it cannot be retracted on any aircraft type I am familiar with. Does anyone know if there is smoke / fire d
120 Post contains links Revelation : In the QF32 threads it's been said that a false message stating that the RAT had deployed really concerned the pilots. Basically it made them think t
121 JoeCanuck : On the other hand, considering that the short happened only 3 minutes before a perfect landing, it couldn't have concerned them that much. Basically,
122 CMB56 : If 4 of the 5 primary cockpit displays were lost along with the HUDs and the autothrottles that is a significant load shed event. To me that indicates
123 Stitch : Boeing seems to be zeroing in on FOD. It appears to have been serious because the aircraft was on final approach and the flight crew had a limited re
124 Post contains links Revelation : I disagree. I have made a perfect landing while being greatly concerned about the state of my aircraft. Indeed that is what is being said, which cert
125 sabenapilot : Once a RAT is deployed, you can not retract it on any airliner I know off and I would be very surprised the 787 would be different on this issue for t
126 JoeCanuck : Of course they were concerned but my point is it didn't distract them enough so control of the aircraft was compromised.
127 keesje : You said it. I guess based on currently available info it can't be excluded. Would be a shocker for me though.. I guess the well trained pilots did w
128 Post contains images PW100 : Not sure what you mean here. You suggest that the issue was serious only because of limited response time available. So then the issue could easily h
129 okie : Looking at the #5 picture of the back of the panel there is a 12" x 15" hole vaporized along with whatever buss bars and/or cables that connect to th
130 Stitch : Boeing have publicly stated that if the incident had happened at cruise, ZA002 could have safelty reached an airport a good distance away from the po
131 BoeingVista : Stitch, stop it please. There is no telling how and when an electrical system compromised by fire will give out even a Boing press release does not h
132 Klaus : One of the problems is probably that the RAT has a fixed-pitch propeller which you would have to brake forcibly to a standstill while still exposed t
133 JoeCanuck : It depends what exactly has been compromised by the fire. There have been no indications that the P200 or APU could not have been brought online. It
134 Stitch : Look, I know the 787 is this forum's favorite whipping boy at the moment (the A380 should be enjoying a breather, but for the Trent 900 issue), but r
135 okie : Just a small 250kva ionized gas torch operating at about 4000deg F. consuming enough metal to make a 12' x 15" hole. No, the incident is just a serio
136 Post contains images Klaus : Come on - the Qantas incident thread is now in its 6th round. This partisanship is really a bit silly, and that's speaking to either "side" inasmuch
137 thediplomat : Thats because Boeing states that the aircraft could have, rather than a definitive would have safely landed. Perfectly chosen language by Boeing mana
138 BoeingVista : I understand this but on the other hand neither is there an assessment (in the public domain) of what throwing switches and buss bars in order to fix
139 JoeCanuck : Unless someone has information to the contrary, (for instance, that it could not have), then the language negates nothing. Could means it would have
140 dynamicsguy : Wow, let's get over the conspiracy theories. Much of what Boeing has said has been imprecise, but this statement in particular was pretty unequivocal
141 kanban : thank you.... I have never seen so many know-it-all's wasting pages looking for villains then to realize they are not even connected to the aircraft
142 zeke : Both HUDs should have been off for the remainder of the flight, they are lost whenever AC BUS L1 or AS BUS R1 are lost as well as some other secondar
143 sabenapilot : Smart design under the unexpected situation at hands maybe, but not forseen as SOP in the QRH or FCOM nevertheless as the situation should never aris
144 robffm2 : Thanks zeke and sabenapilot for your insight. That documentation is not ready at this point in time is surprising at least. While I agree that solvin
145 Klaus : Isn't that pretty much a standard fault scenario? In flight the APU will usually not be active and the mere presence of a RAT is a precaution against
146 747classic : I have not seen the QRH and/or FCTM of this aircraft, but after reading both statements, I get the impression that all electrical failure modes are d
147 Post contains links mdword1959 : If major redesign and rework will be required as a result of the Laredo incident one wonders why Boeing has commenced installing engines on "productio
148 scbriml : Presumably they have to be installed at some point? If installing the engines doesn't affect any rework that might be needed as a result of this inci
149 Rheinbote : Engines are expensive, so they are only installed on aircraft that are earmarked for flying soon. My take is that LN11 and LN23 are going to be used f
150 dynamicsguy : At the risk of drifting off-topic, LN9 was the airframe slated to joint flight testing, and it was being prepped for flight just before this incident
151 Rheinbote : I seem to remember new wing center box w/o doublers, NC5 wiring standard, and then some. But you are closer to the facts, I stand corrected about the
152 dynamicsguy : My recollection of the wiring was that earlier (LN7 and on) airframes would be brought up to that standard as well. There are certainly changes made
153 CMB56 : I believe that Boeing has to pay for the engines when they are installed on an aircraft. Until that time either GE or RR owns them. So if Boeing is pu
154 kanban : except for flight test a/c, I believe the customer pays when the engines are delivered...
155 zeke : No. Aircraft have certified limited battery capacity, if you decide to use that limited battery capacity to start the APU, you may run out of battery
156 dynamicsguy : Some change incorporation and post-flight test refurbishment is planned at San Antonio, so it would seem reasonable that these airplanes could be fer
157 Klaus : Sure, if the APU is started from the main battery, that may be an issue. None of that contradicts my statement, quite the opposite, in fact!
158 zeke : I got the impression you were suggesting that in the case of when the RAT is deployed, that the APU should be started automatically. I was disagreein
159 Klaus : No, that was a misunderstanding. I was getting at the need to anticipate relevant fault scenarios already in the system design phase so the systems a
160 Post contains images sabenapilot : You're welcome. Not only if it is started from the main batteries, but even if it is started from its own battery. Sure, in that case a (failed) APU
161 JoeCanuck : I think that may be a hasty conclusion. That the fire, (or some secondary effect of the fire), at least temporarily knocked out the P200 circuit isn'
162 Klaus : No question about it: The actual nature of the failure should determine the course of action there.
163 art : Apologies if someone has already raised this point: if the cause was FOD, would the foreign object not stll be there in the panel box after a fire? I
164 PITingres : An understanding of how electrical systems are set up leads to no such conclusion, particularly since it's likely that the 787 operates differently f
165 zeke : I have a copy of the 787 QRH/FCOM/FCTM here. What published procedure would they apply to "reset the electrical system manually" ? I take it you have
166 Post contains images Revelation : Zero G? The investigators prefer to work in a weightless environment? It must make it more difficult with their papers, pencils and laptops floating
167 kanban : this is one of those maybe maybe not situations... it all depends on size and material. if it was tools or large fastener yes. if it was an aluminum
168 Post contains images keesje : That is what I am wondering about from the start. I guess the power intensive electrical driven airco packs went off line when the fire occured. If s
169 PYGMALION : jeez Zeke, just because Boeing didnt give you copy of the latest QRH, FTCM doesnt mean a more in depth one doesn't exist and is being used in flight t
170 PITingres : The photos were of P100, were they not? There are other distribution panels in the system, P200 and P150, right? The photos did not show the physical
171 Post contains links Revelation : Seattle Times reports: And earlier they say: Which of course leaves open the possibility that it wasn't FOD.
172 okie : The implication has been that either the cross ties between the P100 to P200 panel was damaged or the control and sensing wiring was damaged. The sta
173 JoeCanuck : Nobody is disputing that but there is still nothing that has specifically said that the p200 panel couldn't have been brought back online. Certainly
174 PITingres : I still don't know what information you are using to draw the conclusion that P200 or its inputs were damaged. As far as I know, the symptoms may wel
175 Stitch : With thousands of hours of flight, ground and lab tests, you'd have thought if the panels were defectively designed we'd have seen this before ZA002'
176 Aesma : If I understood sabenapilot and zeke correctly (great contributions BTW), there was no procedure to do that, because it should be automatic (or the f
177 JoeCanuck : That may be, though that doesn't mean it couldn't be done. It could mean that they didn't know how to do it. Granted, the systems should have reacted
178 Revelation : Who knows? Maybe these "more electric" designs just need a heck of a lot more testing.... We may be on new ground here, which may be described by the
179 BoeingVista : But if true that would be SO much worse! FAA pilots left hanging without any procedures to "fix" a "total" electrical failure (except from RAT) after
180 vam : Actually (cited in the previous thread) one was FAA and the other a Boeing test pilot. While the later one has the responsibility and oversight of th
181 ikramerica : They were landing at the time. There was no time to fix it. They never lost control, and brought the plane in rather than abort landing in order to f
182 Revelation : And I salute them for that! I personally can't think of too many circumstances where the proper reaction to a burning aircraft is "let's get airborne
183 Post contains images zeke : I would be surprised if that were the case, especially considering the role that aircraft was performing, and the person flying it at the time. Fligh
184 Aesma : Presumably, they were already deployed before the fault.
185 HAWK21M : Any pics of the alleged Suspect tool?.
186 Post contains links PYGMALION : Boeing to fly ZA002 back to Seattle this afternoon. Wall Street Journal report here:
187 Revelation : There was no tool, and it's not even certain that it was FOD that caused the short circuit or arching. For more info, please read #171 and its associ
188 okie : no link but I take your word for it. Just wondering if ZA002 was returned to pre-incident condition or just repaired to the point it could be MEL'd a
189 Post contains links JoeCanuck : Here's another link; http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...by-fire-heads-back-to-seattle.html
190 okie : thanks JoeCanuck Interesting the statement "damage to the interior composite structure" Okie
191 Post contains images Stitch : Well Boeing has officially announced an "indeterminate delay to EIS". I'm about ready to just ignore the 787 until it's actually in service and I can
192 ikramerica : The one thing the 787 has going for it is that it will herald new routes never flown before, something the A380 has not done.
193 JoeCanuck : I must be a sucker for punishment and dang me for being a wide eyed optimist but I haven't lost all my enthusiasm for the 787. It will be a damned fi
194 bikerthai : Coupled with: "causing damage to the aircraft's composite primary structure. " I take that to mean they may have replaced some the frames. If these f
195 ER757 : Probably so - we've certainly seen that with the A380 - every time a flight was delayed a half hour it seems there was a thread started and a report
196 Aesma : Yes. I'm not saying there will be another delay, but clearly Boeing can't predict what happens during flight testing, so another problem might come u
197 BoeingVista : It is because 6 months will not be enough time to do all that on this failing program [yes it will eventually produce a worthy aircraft but the proje
198 Stitch : Exactly. With an extra three years Boeing and their suppliers can't get it right, so another six months is not going to make any difference. The goal,
199 JoeCanuck : I can't agree with this. Regardless of the goat rodeo that has become the 787 program as a whole, I really cannot believe that Boeing would allow a p
200 Stitch : They will test to the specifications the FAA (and other agencies) require to earn certification. But those specifications cannot cover every forseeab
201 kanban : They probably are, however there was a lot of test hardware on this a/p so the cause may not be related to any production issue... now the programing
202 JoeCanuck : I think that's common to most modern programs. Everybody should have learned from the Comet, DC-10, 747, and the list goes on. That's why the FAA has
203 tdscanuck : There's no such thing as "the whole 230VAC bus"...there are four 230VAC buses, each with independant generators (shown as L1, L2, R1, and R2 in your
204 kanban : could that be as simple as a 1/4 inch glob of hot metal hitting the skin... maybe a bubble, maybe a small hole... but not necessarily anything big or
205 Stitch : Well there are plenty of pictures of the exterior around P100 floating around the net and I don't see any char marks on that nice, white surface. I b
206 airtechy : Interesting. I wonder why the manufacturers have not moved to higher voltages for avionics primary power. The power cabling would certainly be smalle
207 art : And where has that approach got them? It has entirely sunk their credibility; it has made it very, very difficult for customers to make plans based o
208 mdword1959 : This could also play havoc with scheduling equipment and employees as well as be costly.
209 Post contains links Swallow : To their credit, they have been adept at managing the stock price. Rumors of delays occur after an earnings call, first via the bloggers, then the ma
210 ANZUS340 : Well I hope those working on the B787 are not becalmed by doom and gloom similar to that now permeating this and similar threads. I have 19 years in t
211 PITingres : Doing so has no real value when the length of a delay is truly unknown. Boeing has three choices: a) say "it will be done when it's done". b) take a
212 okie : The next logical step would be of course doubling the voltage 56Vdc, the main issue with that is most electrical codes NEC and IEC put a cut off on l
213 Post contains images bikerthai : I have the greatest regards to AOG teams. So, I had no qualms of expecting the impossible bikerthai
214 CALTECH : There is supposedly a E-Mail gouing around that a tool fell into the panel. This tool touched some contacts and caused all the damage. there will need
215 Rheinbote : If there's structural damage at all, the pictures would suggest stringers. But repairing that kind of damage would be unspectacular. What matters is
216 Post contains links and images pygmalion : The 787 power panels were designed and built by ECE Zodiac in France. They also make the panels for the A300, A330, A340, and the A380. They are alrea
217 b78710 : any pics of the RAT? anyone know whereabouts it is fitted?
218 kanban : I'd discount any e-mail circulating... those thing get a life of their own even when later information shows the initial assumption erroneous or inco
219 HAWK21M : What tool was this?.
220 Post contains links CALTECH : They probably worked fine, except for the hunk of metal tooling that prevented the panel from working correctly. Left inside the panel, then some bum
221 okie : Not quite, your speculative articles are from 11-22-10 Boeing released statement on 11-24-10 per spokesperson Lori Gunter that it was not a "tool" Ok
222 Post contains links CALTECH : Not my speculative articles. This is the buzz. The buzz could be wrong. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1...f-electrical-parts-after-fire.html "A
223 litz : There have been so many fastener changes on the early test airplanes, that it seems to me (being an armchair "stayed at a Holiday Inn Express" enginee
224 JoeCanuck : Boeing has already admitted that it was FOD of some kind, though they can't identify exactly what, which caused the original arcing.
225 Post contains images tdscanuck : Convenience of commonality, I suspect...the weight advantage isn't huge, the install base of 28VDC hardware is enormous. Not sure about amp-hour capa
226 Zeke : It is not my schematic, that diagram is from the 787 FCOM. That diagram, the overhead panel, and the electrical synoptic display all show a single 23
227 okie : Boeing stated that it could of been FOD, sort of like it is always the butler, this is a complex system and I can even come up with 15 or 20 reasons
228 justloveplanes : Why isn't the RAT redundant?
229 blrsea : Boeing "assumes" that there was a small tool which got burned in the fire and was unidentifiable. There was no traces of the tool found.
230 tdscanuck : No, they don't. The diagram shows four buses (L1, L2, R1, R2) that are all 235VAC (why they're all shaded the same colour in a box). The electrical s
231 Post contains links mdword1959 : Here's what Randy Tinseth said in his blog entry, "Likely cause of ZA002 incident determined" (Nov. 24): http://boeingblogs.com/randy/archive...ikely
232 slz396 : Zeke has listed all conditions for RAT deployment at least 100 posts ago already and demonstrated that the ONLY relevant condition for RAT deployment
233 tdscanuck : No. Another condition that could cause a RAT drop is being on a single generator. Which is *very* different than being on no generators at all, since
234 Post contains images Zeke : This is the electrical synoptic of a right engine start with the left engine and APU online. The electrical synoptic is the information available cre
235 tdscanuck : There is no connection *on the synoptic*. Physically, there are indeed connections between generators and individual buses. The synoptic correctly di
236 kanban : One of the problems with manuals and flight deck schematics is how complex do they need to be... while a system may require an EE degree to read the s
237 Revelation : It's not being said if the electrical system was "FAA certification ready" or not, but I can't see why not, and when I read the following: it says a
238 Post contains images slz396 : So, which button(s) on the overhead panel could the crew have pushed then to retract the RAT on their 'road to recovery', should the same have happen
239 dynamicsguy : Seriously, will you give it a rest and give some credit to people who actually work in the industry? The difference between architecture and componen
240 Post contains images slz396 : And just how many components need to be faulty before a set of faulty components can simply be called faulty architecture and the difference between
241 dynamicsguy : To take it to an extreme, every single component could be faulty without it being an architecture problem. I suggest you read what Tom wrote and unde
242 JoeCanuck : A design change to the P cabinets is still a design change and not a wholesale change to the aircraft. I'm curious as to exactly what urgent changes
243 Revelation : No, it is you that are playing games here. What Tom wrote is: So what he is saying is if the four seperate busses were absent (as others may have imp
244 tdscanuck : When I said "road to recovery" I was talking about the fixes to the design so they can go fly again, not what the flight crew would have done in flig
245 nomadd22 : The diagram I'd like to see is how the aircraft handles an unexpected load disconnect. A generator putting out more than 100kw can be pretty unhappy i
246 Aesma : The doc zeke pulled said the RAT has no limitations but is that true ? It has a fixed pitch, so if you design it for extreme situations (Gimli glider
247 tdscanuck : Why do you assume they don't? Given that these are flight test airplanes, I'd expect them to be instrumented out the wazoo even if the production sta
248 packsonflight : Is Boeing somewhere on record saying directly there was a foreign object? Or a foreign object damage? There is a big diffrenc betveen FO and FOD. Or
249 mdword1959 : Randy Tinseth used the term "foreign debris" in his blog entry. (See my reply #231)
250 Rheinbote : Interesting to see how the Boeing communications department succeeded in turning the discussion towards what the "most likely" root cause for the fire
251 Post contains images slz396 : I'd call that just a part of the architecture, also known as the concept, the idea, the intellectual design... Yes, and all those hard- and sofware c
252 packsonflight : You are spot on! The real story is not the fire. It is abot a single component failiure which lead to total power loss of L and R primary flight inst
253 Kaiarahi : Give it a rest buddy ... please!! Tom's use of the word "architecture" is exactly how it is understood when referring to electrical / IT systems. Not
254 nomadd22 : I didn't assume anything. It might be exactly how they determined it was something shorting out that spot and not an arc or an overheated contact or
255 Post contains links Moderators : This thread will be locked for further contributions. Please note that all posts added, after the thread lock, will be removed for housekeeping purpos
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