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AF447 Disaster: A New Report On 07/29 - Part 2  
User currently offlineLipeGIG From Brazil, joined May 2005, 11438 posts, RR: 58
Posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 21 hours ago) and read 39142 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
FORUM MODERATOR

This is the continuation of

AF447 Disaster: A new report on Friday
AF447 Disaster: New Report On Friday (by sebolino Jul 25 2011 in Civil Aviation)

Please continue the discussion in here.

Enjoy the website

Felipe


New York + Rio de Janeiro = One of the best combinations !
306 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlinebellancacf From United States of America, joined May 2011, 152 posts, RR: 0
Reply 1, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 19 hours ago) and read 39009 times:

Perhaps this would be a good place to ask to be pointed to the spreadsheet referred in the previous thread, the one which correlates the known events. Sorry I have to ask --- I couldn't find the link anywhere.

User currently offlines5daw From Slovenia, joined May 2011, 253 posts, RR: 0
Reply 2, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 15 hours ago) and read 38574 times:

Two more questions on THS:
-does the airplane react differently to nose down command with THS at 0 or 10 degrees? Is the reaction perhaps quicker or not?
- if THS played no role, why is it in the Captains last words?


User currently offlineUALWN From Andorra, joined Jun 2009, 2792 posts, RR: 2
Reply 3, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 14 hours ago) and read 38497 times:

Quoting s5daw (Reply 2):
- if THS played no role, why is it in the Captains last words?

Is it? 2 h 14 min 26: "(Dix) degrés d’assiette (10 degres of pitch)" This probably refers to overall pitch, which indeed went through +10 deg a couple of seconds before, while the THS had been in +14 deg or so (not 10) for the last couple of minutes.



AT7/111/146/Avro/CRJ/CR9/EMB/ERJ/E75/F50/100/L15/DC9/D10/M8X/717/727/737/747/757/767/777/AB6/310/319/320/321/330/340/380
User currently offlineGBan From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 4, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 13 hours ago) and read 38190 times:

After any car or bus accident usually the first question in the investigation is the same: did the driver drink?

The reports do not mention anything about what the crew had been doing before the flight, as far as I'm aware. Does this mean that it is an established fact that they had been sleeping enough and not drinking, or does it mean that it is taken for granted that hey had been sleeping enough and not drinking?

Note: I'm not suggesting they were drunk. I'd just like to know how this aspect is treated in such an investigation.


User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 79
Reply 5, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 10 hours ago) and read 37677 times:

Quoting s5daw (Reply 2):
-does the airplane react differently to nose down command with THS at 0 or 10 degrees? Is the reaction perhaps quicker or not?

It should not react any differently. Nose-down command in an A330 is a command for normal acceleration and/or pitch rate...the flight control system will put in however much elevator is required to achieve the command. The only way the THS position would make a difference is if you saturated the elevator (i.e. it had to go to full deflection). Unless you make a really violent command from a very unusual attitude, you should never require full elevator authority in cruise configuration (you need more in landing configuration because of the pitch moment from the flaps).

Quoting GBan (Reply 4):
Note: I'm not suggesting they were drunk. I'd just like to know how this aspect is treated in such an investigation.

If the bodies of the flight crew are recovered, a toxicology analysis is a normal investigation step. An assessment of the crew's activities before the flight (e.g. sleep history) is also a normal investigation step.

Tom.


User currently offlinembj2000 From Germany, joined Dec 2005, 426 posts, RR: 0
Reply 6, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 9 hours ago) and read 37631 times:

Quoting GBan (Reply 4):
The reports do not mention anything about what the crew had been doing before the flight, as far as I'm aware. Does this mean that it is an established fact that they had been sleeping enough and not drinking, or does it mean that it is taken for granted that hey had been sleeping enough and not drinking?

Note: I'm not suggesting they were drunk. I'd just like to know how this aspect is treated in such an investigation.

Indeed, especially the captain seemed to be very quiet after returning to the cockpit, could it be that he took 1-2 glasses of ballantine's to fall asleep quickly... who knows just speculations...



Like most of life's problems, this one can be solved with bending -- Bender Unit 22
User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 41
Reply 7, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 9 hours ago) and read 37581 times:

I'm not sure there's a lot of evidence in the CVR transcripts alone to suggest any of the crew might have been sub-par due to drinking earlier, never mind during the flight.

User currently offlineGBan From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 8, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 9 hours ago) and read 37509 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 7):
I'm not sure there's a lot of evidence in the CVR transcripts alone to suggest any of the crew might have been sub-par due to drinking earlier, never mind during the flight.

I'm rather sure there is NO such evidence in the CVR transcripts. But no evidence they were in their best condition either...

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 5):
An assessment of the crew's activities before the flight (e.g. sleep history) is also a normal investigation step.

Thanks! I assume the results of this investigation will be part of the final report. If anything abnormal had been found it would probably have been included in the interim reports.


User currently offlinebellancacf From United States of America, joined May 2011, 152 posts, RR: 0
Reply 9, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 8 hours ago) and read 37317 times:

(I am not an aviation professional, so what follows are the remarks of an interested amateur observer.)

I believe that AF447 tells us much more than the state of the aircrew or the aircraft. All that I read in the transcripts and here in the posts by experienced professionals indicates that there were in the cockpit of AF447 three competent, seasoned, brave, and dedicated men.

It seems to me that what happened was that the aircraft somehow or other entered a configuration which people versed in aviation may have previously thought unlikely to the point of impossibility, that is, a flat, pancaking stall which felt like more or less level flight, but which in fact was a 45 degree descent generating extremely high drag.

Whether the pitot tube was blocked and whether the AOA vanes were reliable in this strange regime can be discussed; what seems clear is that the *altimeter* functioned.

Yet the altimeter's indications were noted but not assigned primary importance. Perhaps this is putting it too emotionally, but all the maneuvers to keep the wings level, to correct perceived ascents or descents taken as deviations from level flight, and so on, while the altimeter was unwinding amounted to, as the saying has it, "rearranging the deck chairs on the 'Titanic'".

What was needed was a direct measurement of lift being generated by the wings, and that is what was not available. This was not a failure of machine/man interface; even given a perfect interface, the machine did not have the information to communicate to the men. All those lives depended on lift, and nothing on that machine was measuring it.

Perhaps if the altimeter had had the company of another instrument or piece of information saying "WE HAVE INSUFFICIENT LIFT FOR LEVEL FLIGHT", the aircrew would have given full attention to the hideous loss of altitude, but the altimeter was alone, just another voice, perhaps not reliable --- although certainly consistent.

Perhaps if they had ignored everything *except* the altimeter, they would have said, we are level, we are falling, ergo we have lost lift, thus, nose over, re-establish airflow, and see where that puts us. But they didn't.

I apologize for yet another post. Somehow, this one accident stays in my thoughts, as though a part of me died out there.


User currently offlineMastropiero From Spain, joined Dec 2005, 125 posts, RR: 0
Reply 10, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 8 hours ago) and read 37231 times:

Quoting mbj2000 (Reply 6):
Indeed, especially the captain seemed to be very quiet after returning to the cockpit, could it be that he took 1-2 glasses of ballantine's to fall asleep quickly... who knows just speculations...

Would that be before or after smoking a joint or shooting heroin while listening London Calling loud, very loud on his ear speakers?  


I think it would be a good idea, not to mention it would be rather respectful to the crew, to keep the speculation related to the data we HAVE. I find this kind of "speculation" rather distasteful. In the absence of such evidence to back somehow this speculation, let´s keep on treating the crew as professionals. If the captain was very quiet, I´d much rather assume he would have his reasons, that he´d be trying frantically to understand the situation and asses it, for example.


Back on topic. Pihero described in Part 1 of this thread the kind of maneuvre necessary to get out of the situation they found themselves in. I understand that this kind of training is virtually impossible in a sim, due to lack of data to enable the sim to recreate that situation. However, this kind of training does exist, in military and in aerobatic flight.

Would it be a good idea to incorporate at least a theory part regarding this kind of maneuvres into the pilots´ training? We have seen that such a situation can arise, it is - hopefully- unlikely that it will happen again, however, if stuff were to hit the fan in such a way again, would it be useful for the pilots to have this kind of knowledge? Or would it be better perhaps to use time and resources into improving training as it exists now, focusing on preventing this situations rather than having to deal with them?


Disclaimer: this is out of curiosity, I know nothing about the training process pilots undergo. If what I just typed is a big pile of manure, please feel free to say so and correct me.


User currently offlineDelta2058 From United States of America, joined Jul 2009, 18 posts, RR: 0
Reply 11, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 7 hours ago) and read 37057 times:

Would someone familiar with the A330 tell me where the THS indicator is located? In one manual I saw pitch trim information on the Flight Control page of the ECAM. Is that where the THS indicator is?

Thanks.



Smooth seas do not make skilled sailors.
User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 31
Reply 12, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 7 hours ago) and read 37030 times:

Quoting GBan (Reply 4):
After any car or bus accident usually the first question in the investigation is the same: did the driver drink?

The testing of pilots involved in accidents for all manner of substances began long ago. The Captain's body was recovered and the reports have mentioned nothing about any impairment.

They even test for things like over the counter cold medicines - some of which can be a problem for flight crews.

Quoting mbj2000 (Reply 6):
especially the captain seemed to be very quiet after returning to the cockpit,

My impression from Pihero's description of the crew members and their 'personalities' from previous threads, is that the captain's behavior is right in line which his past experiences with the man.


User currently offlineSolarFlyer22 From US Minor Outlying Islands, joined Nov 2009, 1087 posts, RR: 3
Reply 13, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 7 hours ago) and read 36905 times:

Yeah, I was a little surprised the Captain did not take control. It would seem to me, in the absence of any alarms, bells etc. you would be able to feel the aircraft stalling. It's movements would be erratic and unstable and they clearly knew they were losing altitude. The co-pilot had 6000+ hours which is quite a lot so even without the captain there was a lot of experience there.

User currently offlinecanoecarrier From United States of America, joined Feb 2004, 2839 posts, RR: 12
Reply 14, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 6 hours ago) and read 36879 times:

Quoting Mastropiero (Reply 10):
Back on topic. Pihero described in Part 1 of this thread the kind of maneuvre necessary to get out of the situation they found themselves in. I understand that this kind of training is virtually impossible in a sim, due to lack of data to enable the sim to recreate that situation.

I guess the question I have, it has been said here before, there previously has not been data in order to recreate an event like this because large, transport category aircraft don't have ejection seats like military aircraft. The risk of losing an aircraft or airframe was too high to enter a stall.

The FDR continuously recorded the sequence of events, would there be sufficient data now to recreate a similar situation in the simulator? What data would be missing?

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 12):
The testing of pilots involved in accidents for all manner of substances began long ago. The Captain's body was recovered and the reports have mentioned nothing about any impairment.

Right, and to add to that, his body was found early in the Phase 1 search for the plane 2 years ago and was autopsied in Brazil. I believe they did toxicology tests, but the results of the autopsies aren't a large part of the earlier BEA reports.



The beatings will continue until morale improves
User currently offlinegiopan1975 From Greece, joined Jun 2009, 269 posts, RR: 0
Reply 15, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 6 hours ago) and read 36788 times:

Quoting SolarFlyer22 (Reply 13):
Yeah, I was a little surprised the Captain did not take control.

I believe this has already been answered. Captain did not swap seats with PF in order to save time and because he had a better sight of instruments by staying behind.

However, if captain indeed realized time was limited and every passing second critical, then he should have been aware of big rate of descend. He must also been aware of positive pitch. Then, how didnt it occur to him that they were stalling?


User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 31
Reply 16, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 6 hours ago) and read 36365 times:

Quoting canoecarrier (Reply 14):
would there be sufficient data now to recreate a similar situation in the simulator? What data would be missing?

Pihero says no - still insufficient data.

One problem with using the FDR data is that the physical modeling raw data does not exist to show what control surface movements would do. While the stall could probably be modeled, how any escape maneuvers attempted impacted the flight path would be just guess work of the programmers.

Though I do expect some simulator modeling based on aerodynamics theories to be done in the future. We are probably a couple years away from possibly being able to recreate the stall and test any escape maneuvers.


User currently offlinebellancacf From United States of America, joined May 2011, 152 posts, RR: 0
Reply 17, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 6 hours ago) and read 36302 times:

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 16):
One problem with using the FDR data is that the physical modeling raw data does not exist to show what control surface movements would do. While the stall could probably be modeled, how any escape maneuvers attempted impacted the flight path would be just guess work of the programmers.

One might look at the way that Rutan's SpaceShip recovers from its lengthy reentry stall. (Well, other than straightening the fuselage, but that's just Rutan's way of changing the tailplane incidence.   )


User currently offlineSolarFlyer22 From US Minor Outlying Islands, joined Nov 2009, 1087 posts, RR: 3
Reply 18, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 5 hours ago) and read 35761 times:

Quoting giopan1975 (Reply 15):
he should have been aware of big rate of descend. He must also been aware of positive pitch. Then, how didnt it occur to him that they were stalling?

That's an excellent point. I had not thought of that.


User currently offlineflashmeister From United States of America, joined Apr 2000, 2900 posts, RR: 6
Reply 19, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 5 hours ago) and read 35717 times:
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Quoting bellancacf (Reply 9):
Perhaps if the altimeter had had the company of another instrument or piece of information saying "WE HAVE INSUFFICIENT LIFT FOR LEVEL FLIGHT", the aircrew would have given full attention to the hideous loss of altitude, but the altimeter was alone, just another voice, perhaps not reliable --- although certainly consistent.

(Same disclaimer: I am an enthusiast, but not a pilot.)

I emphatically disagree with this observation, but it serves as a good example of a potentially troubling trend. Other pilots here and in other forums have noted that any of the three people on the AF447 flight deck had enough information to determine that they were in a stall: increasing pitch angle coupled with decreasing altitude, and at least some indication of stall buffet. Adding yet another computerized calculation of whether sufficient lift exists for level flight is yet another way that automation and calculation supplant vigilance and good airmanship.

Automation and indications for every potential condition do not necessarily make for safer airliners. What happens when they fail? One of the key takeaways from AF447 is that pilots need to be better prepared to see past the automation and understand the actual scenario facing them, especially in the case of technical failures. Increasing automation, in my view, isn't going to help.


User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 41
Reply 20, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 5 hours ago) and read 35612 times:

Quoting flashmeister (Reply 19):

That's more or less what I was thinking, though I'm no aviation professional, either.

I suspect that while they were discussing the fact that they were falling so much, they knew they didn't have enough lift for level flight. The problem was that they didn't realise why. Had they trusted the attitude indicators and altimeters (easy for me to say now, of course), I think they would probably have realised why. Would the inclusion of another instrument have made things less confusing?


User currently offlinepylon101 From Russia, joined Feb 2008, 1569 posts, RR: 0
Reply 21, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 5 hours ago) and read 35498 times:

Quoting giopan1975 (Reply 15):
he should have been aware of big rate of descend. He must also been aware of positive pitch. Then, how didnt it occur to him that they were stalling?

This is The Question everyone here is fighting to get an answer to:
why 3 exprienced pilots did not recognize the stall while seeing
1) altimeter readings;
2) pitch and
3) thrust readings?

We know that in extreme situations people have a tunnel vision.
So they could ignore THS or AoA - and concentrate on main and reliable souces.
Which are baro altimeter, pitch and thrust.


User currently offlineflyAUA From Austria, joined May 2005, 4604 posts, RR: 55
Reply 22, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 4 hours ago) and read 35380 times:

I don't know if anybody posted today's Flight Global article yet, but at least I can't seem to find anything of that sort.

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...opilot-if-airspeed-unreliable.html

Quote:
Europe's safety authority is to order Airbus A330 and A340 operators to upgrade flight-control computer software to prevent autopilot engagement should airspeeds become unreliable.


...it then goes on to say...

Quote:
Autopilot and auto-thrust on the types will automatically disconnect, and the aircraft will revert to alternate law, in cases where significant differences emerge between the airspeed sources.



Not drinking, also isn't a solution!
User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 41
Reply 23, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 4 hours ago) and read 35139 times:

Quoting flyAUA (Reply 22):

Interesting, however, from what I've seen so far, I don't think there's any evidence that the crew of AF447 tried to re-engage the autopilot.

The software seems to have been developed already.


User currently offlineflyAUA From Austria, joined May 2005, 4604 posts, RR: 55
Reply 24, posted (3 years 1 month 3 weeks 4 hours ago) and read 35199 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 24):
Interesting, however, from what I've seen so far, I don't think there's any evidence that the crew of AF447 tried to re-engage the autopilot.

I am not quite sure. I don't recall reading any evidence of that sort either.

[Edited 2011-08-02 13:57:19 by srbmod]


Not drinking, also isn't a solution!
25 giopan1975 : Is it for sure CVR text is fully published?
26 UALWN : Page 89 seems to indicate that this is it, other than words or sentences not relevant or not understood.
27 Post contains images rcair1 : Recreate the similar situation yes. Model how the aircraft responds to control inputs, I think not. I'm qualifying that statement because I'm not an
28 UALWN : Quite true. However, the accident rates before automation were not lower than they are now, quite the opposite. What I mean is that for every acciden
29 giopan1975 : Thanks Agree. However, from what we know so far (and we now know a lot), 447 crew made a double mistake: A. They got themselves into a not easily rec
30 rfields5421 : While that may be accurate, we have to look at the bigger picture. There is no doubt in my mind that some accidents have been recoverable situations,
31 Post contains images giopan1975 : Your post says it all Among other very interesting points it makes, It politely tells us of the amount of egopaths out there.
32 displane : This may be off topic... Wasn't there an Airbus 320(?) crash many years ago I believe in Europe, where the pilots attempted to climb but the computer
33 canoecarrier : Automation discussion aside, I think we both agree that training isn't intended to make pilots believe an emergency can't happen to them. It may be a
34 Post contains links and images mandala499 : Outside of the ECAM, It's on the pedestal, next to the trim wheels... & Have a look at: And looking at that, I can understand why they didn't rea
35 upsmd11 : I read this post and the others around it every day. From a passenger perspective, would someone in the back know the aircraft was in trouble? Were th
36 dfambro : Sadly, it looks to me that passengers would have noticed that something was not normal. They would definitely have sensed the pressure changes associ
37 Post contains links Pihero : As this is bound to come out eventually, let's really talk about initial training, especially of airline cadets. In the early 70's, youngsters traine
38 Pihero : Gerry, you're crazy ! I need some sleep, man ! But an unbelievable concentration of the major sosurces of info together. Never seen an equivalent work
39 canoecarrier : Thank you very much sir! Now I know Pihero won't get any sleep tonight.
40 par13del : As you stated, they got themselves into an impossible situation which folks may have said was impossible, I think the autopilot disengaging had somet
41 UALWN : And with good reason. Probably he's referring to the Mulhouse air-show accident. There was no fight between computer and pilot. The engines took thei
42 Post contains links rfields5421 : That was an early A-320 demonstration flight at Mulhouse-Habsheim Airport (ICAO code LFGB) on June 26, 2008. However you are incorrect about it being
43 par13del : My point exactly, two post both afirming the accuracy of the automation, everything that happened was a result of humans either not understanding the
44 notaxonrotax : Yep, the accident came from poor planning on the AF pilots´s side……….visually looking for the airstrip, spotting it late, subsequently coming
45 comorin : Instead of spewing out all these massages and alarms, why did the aircraft not say: "Dave, I think we have a problem with the Airspeed Indicator. Do y
46 bellancacf : Fascinating compilation of information in that spreadsheet!! 1. At 2:11:44, Comment column says "Stall entered 2:11:46." Something does start happenin
47 comorin : Great post - very vivid! As much as the pros here would like to understand why such a highly trained crew failed, to a lay person it does seem a FUBA
48 rcair1 : Very good point. On the other hand - so many things have changed during that time I'm not sure we can conclude anything. Dare I say it - 5 pilots str
49 spacecadet : Really? I'm reading #3 as fitting the situation exactly. And the text says "occurring either individually or in combination", so it does not require
50 bellancacf : My old copy of Millikan's "Aerodynamics of the Airplane" (Wiley, 1941, p. 61) says: "For many airfoils this state of affairs (adherence to perfect flu
51 tdscanuck : You can feel it when the flow first starts to separate...a fully developed stall, or a stall break, is considerably more benign. If they were already
52 canoecarrier : Absent the A vs. B talk that creeps into this discussion. Since the 787 and 748 are going through flight testing how close during certification to th
53 captainstefan : I know that when Sean D Tucker had to bail out of his stunt plane (in 2004 I believe), for the rest of that year he flew a Cirrus in a routine promot
54 SSTsomeday : Also: the stall warning. This scenario lacks the awareness and judgement skills of the human brain, which is more sophisticated to the extreme as com
55 Pihero : See Mandala499's spreadsheet and show us when the aft stop was reached without any further increase in pitch attitude. On the stall warning subject,
56 Post contains images mandala499 : The plots reveal another great misfortune for the crew. At the time of the A/P disconnect, the aircraft had been on a downward trajectory, reflected
57 Post contains images Pihero : Would be appreciated, in PDF or Excel. for some reason, I lost mine in the depths of my hard disk ! Why am I surprised id didn't happen earlier ? Ano
58 GBan : That brings me back to my position that GPS would provide valuable additional information from a completely independent source not relying on any por
59 David L : I don't think it's an issue at all. Airbus themselves released a report* expressing concern that the airlines are not encouraging enough "stick and r
60 BackSeater : FYI: the battle around BEA's report (not verbatim, just my recollection of what I just saw on several TV channels) The battle around the latest report
61 nomadd22 : It can. I use a three antenna GPS unit on ships that can provide very accurate pitch and roll data. Also rate of pitch, roll and turn. We're thinking
62 Kaiarahi : They had altitude, attitude (pitch), and vertical speed (subject to Mandala's comments). What they didn't have was reliable airspeed and AoA. So GPS
63 Post contains links sebolino : According to French media, the BEA has "hidden" some parts of its report to release them later. These parts are talking about the malfunction of the s
64 s5daw : But they didn't trust the VSI. GPS would confirm they wdre beyound any doubt descending (and also show very low ground speed)
65 Post contains images par13del : [ I think they may have redefined what those terms mean in relation to their a/c, but that's for another thread
66 tdscanuck : For most things you just go to initial buffet but there is a subset of stability & control and certification that requires you go into the fully
67 rfields5421 : Regarding adding a new VSI gauge to the panel as an alternate from a GPS source (They already have a second independent Altimeter source - the RA tho
68 zeke : If it had been any other aircraft, I think it would have been a smoking hole in the ground. The automation while complex, also saved the day, it allo
69 rfields5421 : Thank you. I've been asking that for quite a while. So what they see is a VSI stuck against the bottom stop - which could in my opinion allow them to
70 wingman : Hey guys, complete amateur inserting a question that may have already been asked. I only bring this up recalling a great documentary from many years a
71 zeke : As the IVSI is both inertial data and barometric data, the trend should be in the correct sense. If one looks at the result of the trend over time (i
72 David L : I think that's beside the point, which is that, contrary to any belief that Airbus don't like the idea of pilots acquiring flying skills and being ab
73 Rara : You still see the actual altimeter spinning through like crazy... both the movement action on the altimeter and the rapidly decreasing altitude give
74 bellancacf : Could I ask you to explain why it is impossible for the HS to have (helped) maintain(ed) the stable stall? Drawing the various angles on paper, there
75 frmrCapCadet : Centuries of ship handling have led to the practice that a captain does not do anything, he/she maintains situational awareness and orders the variou
76 bellancacf : Then, if one had access to the fine-grained altitude data, one would see the altitude vs. time curve not as a smooth line but as jagged or a stairste
77 BackSeater : Yes but that good data would be unfortunately displayed in combination with a number of measurements that seemed either faulty or at least suspicious
78 eisenbach : I heard from DC9, and later MD80 pilots, that when changing to the A320 they realised what workload they had before. They even said at the full fligh
79 Post contains images Pihero : A friend posted this to me as proof that some people went as far as full stalls on some of their equipment. Idon't really know how much of a Tristarlo
80 Post contains images mandala499 : VSI, under normal circumstances, would be taken from the IRS... which is unaffected by the ADR fault issue. The problem is, at 2:10:39, the PM goes t
81 dirtyfrankd : Pardon my rookieness, but can someone tell me what THS stands for?
82 Pihero : Trimmable horizontal stabilizer;
83 Post contains images zeke : Airbus has not changed much at all, this is from the Edition 5 (December 2007) of the Airbus "Safety First" magazine. I have included this article so
84 Post contains images mandala499 : Thanks Zeke, I will need to check the current documents of an operator... one of their guys said they've now gone straight to the memory items on iden
85 javibi : Not at cruise level That would be the "memory items", if any, at the level they were at. See also Zeke's posts. I agree with your view; the question
86 s5daw : He thought they were flying at " crazy fast speed" and even deployed (or wanted to) speed brakes.
87 zeke : Practically if I was in the cruise, I would tend to use the thrust and pitch attitude at the time the unreliable airspeed event occurred, if they wer
88 Post contains links and images mandala499 : There was nothing to indicate "crazy fast speed" in the first minute after
89 Post contains images moose135 : That's the part that I don't understand about this whole thing. As you said, we'll have to wait for the final report to see if they give any reasonin
90 UALWN : I don't think so: "Je te mets en en A T T (*)..." indeed translates to "I'm setting you on on A T T". Note however the (*), which indicates a word or
91 javibi : I guess I did not express myself properly; what I mean is that if I were to take some action from memory (before reading the appropiate procedure) in
92 Aesma : I did not get an answer about the translation (and more importantly meaning, as I understand my native language fine, but here we only have short sent
93 GIOPAN1975 : So, are you basically validating your attached document's directions? Being at cruise by definition means that the safety of the flight is not endang
94 canoecarrier : It's interesting recalling the description of events on the Northwest A330 loss of airspeed incident 2 years ago. I went back and looked for a report
95 displane : Thanks for the clarification. I was going to write I thought it was much earlier than 2008, but I guess it was a typo because the crash was 1988. I r
96 Pihero : Sorry, i've been quite busy outside A.net. Yes, it's the tone we'd use that's between a polite suggestion and a full blown imperative order. That's w
97 ComeAndGo : the BEA interim report in english is now available at their website
98 Post contains links moose135 : Here's the direct link to the English version: http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf
99 rfields5421 : Oops Part of the issue was a misunderstanding of the circumstances. The video looks terrible - why did the pilots not try to avoid the trees? Many pe
100 jfernandez : "Malfunction" seems a very strong word. From the report... "the stall warning was triggered continuously for 54 seconds" - Page 78 Doesn't feel like
101 bellancacf : P. 44 of the new English language report: "Thus, the stall warning was triggered at 2 h 10 min 51 at an angle of attack corresponding to the theoretic
102 tdscanuck : Then the training and experience are wrong. You can't meet the decompression descent requirements in a modern airliner without descending faster than
103 GIOPAN1975 : From a first reading, the report underlines their preoccupation with climbing to 36000ft or 37000ft in order to get out of the clouds. Turbulence must
104 slinky09 : Thank you, fascinating and dreadful. Also full of interesting snippets, like: - the cockpit door stayed open for some time on several occasions - fin
105 Post contains links AirlineCritic : Not sure about that. I think we have the full CVR... and the lack of things said is significant. For instance, as I browse through http://www.globals
106 zeke : That is my view. The pitch attitude change due to the turn is so minor, we are only talking about a very minor angle of bank, the maximum achieved wa
107 GIOPAN1975 : I wouldnt be so sure. Page 87 in the report, right column heading is "Extracts from the CVR transcript". Could imply it is only some extracts and not
108 Post contains links breiz : Here we go again. The BEA decided not to elaborate on the stall alarm at this point of their reporting. The pilots unions, AF and the famillies jump o
109 airtechy : My only problem with this stems from the fact that all electronic designs have tolerances as nothing can be designed exactly. In the case of the stal
110 Post contains images Pihero : Let's face it. We know the *hows* of this invetigation but not the *whys*. This battle around the stall warning system is the sure proof that economi
111 breiz : Thanks for your reply Pihero. I am under the impression that the BEA has done quite a professional job. And that they continue by not jumping on conc
112 InsideMan : fully agree. The issue with the stall warnings is the last glimmer of hope to pin this on Airbus. While I agree, that it can be confusing that the sta
113 wingman : Maybe this is a discussion for a different thread but I find that argument between cables and FBW pretty fascinating. Thanks for the responses from TD
114 tdscanuck : I'd like Zeke et. al. to weight in, but I'm 99% sure that Airbus has pitch compensation in roll up to normal bank angles, so there should have been n
115 Pihero : *Somewhat* is the word... And then there are a lot of situations when that LH statement is patently false : any ski / slide situation, turns where on
116 AirbusA370 : In most cases, it is better to improve training than to fiddle around with a warning logic which will add confusion and might behave problematic unde
117 InsideMan : which is why I said I wouldn't know how to change it (nor does the BEA at this point I suppose). Anyway, we can agree, that there at least 3 distinct
118 AirbusA370 : Agree, to make it totally idiot proof you could play at state 3) a voice that shouts "Please check if you are falling out of the sky, doh!". But norma
119 fotoflyer71 : Thanks to all the experts that have put so much effort into keeping this thread as educational as possible - very much appreciated. A few questions fo
120 SSTsomeday : I believe I read from another source that the stall warning, as now designed on the type, actually will cease working if inputs are unreliable, and w
121 ikramerica : I was reading all 400+ comments on this and had come to the conclusion that while the pilots made fatal mistakes, one thing that may have hindered the
122 upsmd11 : When would it be possible that BEA or some other source would release a CGI of the flight path and the movements of the aircraft as I"ve seen in other
123 rfields5421 : There is one very inaccurate FlightSim type one out that I've seen - it was done without full FDR data available in the recently released report.. I'
124 InsideMan : well, to be fair, the stall warning was continuously on for >50 seconds. The nose down inputs the PF made were cautious at best, while his nose up
125 Post contains images mandala499 : Perhaps, "je te mets en A T T 3"... because both the FO ADR selector and ATT/HDG selector are put on "FO on 3" Correct. Hence Airbus recommends maint
126 slinky09 : I wonder this too, yet the stall warning seems genuine throughout, and all I wonder is why did the crew never refer to it (assuming the BEA transcrip
127 canoecarrier : There's a point where the Captain says something to the effect of "it's not possible". In addition to instruments indicating that they were losing al
128 ikramerica : I have to admit, I didn't see the complete timeline that showed a nonstop 54 seconds as the big file it wouldn't open on my phone. Was going by what
129 GIOPAN1975 : Great, thanks! So, can I draw the conclusion that manually flying an Airbus is not that easy at all after all? The flight path during final minutes r
130 AirCalSNA : If the problem was the pilots panicking, then the nature of the warnings was irrelevant, IMO. Whether it was a "stall" warning or a "possible stall"
131 Pihero : What I like in this site is that one only needs to ask, et voilà ! there it is. And in a free supplement one has Mandala499's inimitable style. QED
132 Post contains images ikramerica : Then why didn't they focus on the stall? Which is more important to solve? Stalling and falling out of the sky, or trying to get your indicators work
133 slinky09 : Oh troll off somewhere with your agenda. Nuff said. I work in a profession where the first response to an inciident is - take your situational awaren
134 pylon101 : I am wondering what would be a safe airspeed margin at level 350 for AF447? I am not sure it is a correct question. Still there should be something...
135 GIOPAN1975 : 2 h 10 min 51 Stall warning sounds 6 seconds later PF sets thrust to TOGA, PNF and Captain are constantly concerned with keeping wings level and lower
136 Post contains images mandala499 : The quote that you quoted, was not mine... The cabin pressure ACARS were from the impact. Don't worry about it! Scary isn't it? The only reliable way
137 CALTECH : But they were already PULLing UP. Would any pilot push down when a GPWS blares "PULL UP !"
138 Post contains links and images GIOPAN1975 : Brilliant What do u think of that view? http://www.tourismandaviation.com/ne..._s_Take_on_the_Air_France_Disaster I have chosen this paragraph which
139 canoecarrier : I could be wrong but that may be more a factor of the plane telling them they were about to fly into terrain. It wasn't much after that they hit the
140 GIOPAN1975 : Which (apparently simple/basic) cause in 447 case is failure to practise basic/simple airmanship skills. Then why not focus training on dealing with
141 mandala499 : I'm no psych person, but I've encountered 2 subtypes of this... genuinely overconfident, and "mild overconfidence covered by a shell" (I dunno how el
142 Post contains images InsideMan : see answer here: The PF put the A/C in a stall in the first place because of his nose up inputs and he did nothing to get the A/C out of it. really?
143 Pihero : There is a warning and there is what one does of that warning. There is a stall that we train for and that we see just about on every sim session and
144 Post contains images mandala499 : Well, if you say, "the most probable cause is" blablabla "by/of the PF", then I would say yes. But I am more interested in understanding why he ended
145 GIOPAN1975 : How and where is it "well established"? In the Report? Great analysis! Allow me to disagree...I am neither a psych and certainly not an aviation pro,
146 Post contains links Pihero : As an illustration of what is being discussed, I - finally ! - managed to find a copy of Airplane upset recovery a test pilot point of view by William
147 AirlineCritic : It is team work. Maybe the PF was confused. It should have been the job of the PNF and the captain to perceive the real situation and either inform t
148 par13del : Earlier today I started asking a question, glad I let it wait until after work where more post were added. My question is somewhat simply in relation
149 Post contains links InsideMan : what you are looking for is an answer to his reactions after the A/C was already fully stalled. That we may never understand. Yet for him to get the
150 InsideMan : correct, that did not help either, but after PF says "I have no longer control of the airplane at all" PNF says "control to the left" and is immediat
151 GIOPAN1975 : So where in that link is it established that a deep stall is always recoverable? In my opinion The CVR is giving some hints (judging only from crew's
152 InsideMan : It's not. A deep stall probably isn't, but this wasn't a deep stall. HS couldn't have been in the shadow of the wings. Doing his best to lower the no
153 GIOPAN1975 : Pushing to max is not part of the stall approaching recovery procedure (Page 60 of the Report).
154 s5daw : The question is if PNF knew PF ignored the order. If he didn't - would he if the cokpit had yokes, not sticks?
155 InsideMan : correct, but this is not what you said. You said the PF was doing his best to lower the nose and that did not happen. PNF probably did not know and n
156 GIOPAN1975 : I said PF was probably doing his best to lower the nose from some point on.... Please do not put words other than said in other peoples' mouths. It i
157 InsideMan : show me from where in the Report do you gather this?
158 airtechy : Pihero. My only point having designed electronics for 40 years is that any electronic protection will have to avoid the absolute limits whether it be
159 GIOPAN1975 : Avoiding a stall approach does not necessarily mean PF should push all the way down and continously have negative pitch. 447 PF indeed managed to kee
160 InsideMan : this is what the BEA recommends and what has already happened don't put words I my mouth, I know that. What I am saying is that your statement: is wr
161 Post contains images David L : This keeps coming up. The PNF and Captain kept telling the PF that he was "going up" and that he needed to "go down". Had the aircraft been fitted wi
162 airtechy : Although this accident was clearly a case of pilot error, I still think some thought needs to be given to whether the autopilot gives up in the case o
163 GIOPAN1975 : Maybe a better way of puting this is that they needed less nose up inputs.
164 Kaiarahi : You must be reading the report upside down.
165 rfields5421 : That is one of the BEA recommendations. Also Pihero has already pointed out several times how the pilot training pipeline no longer includes aerobati
166 garpd : I don't know about anyone else, but reading the new transcript by Mandala has left me with a bit pale faced with horror. Those poor, poor pilots were
167 Pihero : What I resent is someone who could think that"had these idiots been more intelligent and disregarded the stall warning, they would have escaped the m
168 Baroque : Can we put this to bed? They should not have stalled, but they did and did not seem to realise the extent of their stall until far, far too late. But
169 par13del : Personally I believe the big issue with that is how one formulates the proposition without some thinking that the underlying premise is that the auto
170 David L : I'll leave it for the experts to say whether or not a neutral stick position would have been sufficient. If not then I'd say more nose-down input was
171 garpd : I think the problem is, we're far too reliant on those systems. And when they break down or go belly up, we get lost. I see it all the time with peop
172 par13del : That is a human element not automation, as the issue is human, company's provides training, pilots are slow to learn, items / procedures not included
173 David L : Are you saying automation and airmanship are mutually exclusive?
174 Baroque : In some ways it is a pity that it is illogical to have a system that when in trouble goes to alternate law, but if the "law" finds the responses unsa
175 par13del : Depending on your definition of airmanship, yes, must you have good airmanship to land an a/c, depends on how the a/c is landed, does the autopilot b
176 Post contains images mandala499 : I think this topic is beginning to go around in circles again... but then, that's probably because I can't separate this topic from the other ones in
177 par13del : Thanks. I only mentioned the AP because I was using that as the barometer / yard stick which initially said the speeds were invalid. Your response do
178 mandala499 : Nope... the aircraft was still in ALTN2 Law, which meant, A/P would not engage... regardless of the parameters... Hope this helps... Mandala499
179 Post contains images InsideMan : Thank you! That was the quote I was too lazy to search
180 Post contains images par13del : It does, creates more questions but I'll research those outside of this thread as they are more specific to the LAWS, and no I won't be looking throu
181 AirlineCritic : Again, I think the main responsibility lies with pilots in this case. But the aircraft contributed in a number of ways, too. Starting from the loss o
182 airtechy : Unless I'm missing something the FBW system and the autopilot are two separate systems. The FBW systems can never give up as they are replicating the
183 litz : You know ... in his testimony before Congress, Capt. Sullenberger made an almost identical remark ... - litz
184 Post contains links and images mandala499 : I am very much aware that the FBW and the autopilot are two separate things. What I mentioned in reply 176 is the FBW system, and if the autopilot di
185 airtechy : Mandala499..Thanks much for the references and the info. I fully appreciate that you have a total understanding of the FBW system and I hope I didn't
186 Post contains images RVV2011 : After reading all this...I am now afraid of flying. Ignorance was bliss
187 Post contains links and images canoecarrier : I'd like to thank you and others for providing quite a bit of professional opinion/observations/knowledge in this and other threads on this since I'v
188 AirlineCritic : In another thread, someone pointed to the accident report for N274US, a 727 flying JFK-BUF on a repositioning flight. Eerily similar to AF447... pitot
189 Post contains links mandala499 : Well, it's better to read the whole FBW system than the individual function because of the interlinkages between the functions. Perhaps a look into t
190 JamBrain : What is most concerning to me is the key recommendation from that crash I.e in the absence of reliable airspeed, "fly to a correct attitude for the f
191 fotoflyer71 : Hello DavidL - I think this is along the same lines I was flirting with earlier - I am wondering (all else being equal) what the difference would hav
192 Post contains images Pihero : glad you saw it. Mentioned it in my post # 321 on the previous thread. Copy cat superstall murders... down to the over pitch and subsequent initial c
193 Post contains images Baroque : They have indeed been beavering away. And usefully too it appears. Well here is one issue one might dispute with you after M499's splendid contributi
194 javibi : It appears to me that we are jumping into conclusions about the PF's personality with not enough information (unless some of you knew him personally)
195 fotoflyer71 : Well said!
196 Post contains images mandala499 : If we split the "overconfident" type into 2 subsets, the relaxed superficially overconfident sub-type is the hardest one to filter out... and these t
197 Pihero : Very good post, and one I generally agree with. But let's face it : This crew never functioned as a crew is designed to. The authority never exercise
198 par13del : Even if a consolidated group of pilots and engineers is not put together, I know that such groups will be created, sure you as pilots have already st
199 Aircellist : I so much second that! ... And I also have a possibly supid question, again about the stall warning. It has been said that the stall warning goes off
200 bellancacf : This thread is now as complex as the report itself, so please pardon me if I cover old ground. I take my hat off to pilots, who have to have the most
201 Post contains images mandala499 : And then when you have a radar altimeter fault? A much simpler solution is to get the AoA out of the IRS in the event of an ADR problem... The IRS al
202 Post contains images InsideMan : While I appreciate all the thoughts people put into what happened and why and try to come up with lots of new ideas to prevent this type of accident i
203 Aircellist : Mandala499, many thanks!
204 jfernandez : While I don't wish to be cruel or unprofessional, am I wrong in thinking that this accident was simply a case of the PF managing to turn a (relativel
205 Post contains links 474218 : According to http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/reco29juillet2011.en.pdf a angle of attack gage should be added to the flight station. Rather
206 comorin : That instrument would neither measure AoA nor Pitch correctly.
207 canoecarrier : One would hope so. At the point where the Captain left the cockpit he asked the junior copilot in the right seat if he had a commercial pilot license
208 dynamo12 : I find myself agreeing with some earlier posts. There were really two separate events here. One was the loss of the airspeed indication (to 60 kts?).
209 pliersinsight : The one question, in all of this mess, that is entirely relevant and completely unanswered. If you answer that, you solve the mystery.
210 AirlineCritic : The last two years have been an interesting ride. From a missing plane to a confirmed accident, the endless searches, trying to understand what happen
211 InsideMan : no, for a trained pilot this MUST be enough. You expect a pilot to react within 2s to a stall warning with the memorized procedure.
212 BackSeater : May be because the PF "distrusted" all his instruments, was flying by the seat of his pants in total darkness, leaning backwards in his seat with the
213 RubberJungle : It's not just AF447 - the matter of warning systems being ignored has persisted for years. How many times have accident reports mentioned failure to
214 Group51 : Warning, back seat non-pilot here. I share the fear and horror of some of the posters here. At the same time, I can see the BEA seems to have made rec
215 Post contains links and images mandala499 : No one ever said that the Airbus can't stall... it cannot stall when you are in NORMAL LAW... once the flight controls laws degrade, you can! Now, in
216 Post contains links RubberJungle : ABX DC-8 in 1996... www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1997/AAR9705.pdf
217 InsideMan : well, they deliberately stalled....
218 RubberJungle : Yes, but they also held the stick back, which was the real point.
219 frmrCapCadet : Mandala499 has a link to a Boeing directive regarding losing some instrumentation. I spent the time to read it all. Many of us non-experts really do n
220 474218 : Because "pitch and thrust" are so important Lockheed installed cable tension regulators into those systems on the L-1011. The tension regulators keep
221 InsideMan : yes, to deliberately stall. They also had significantly less time. The PF in AF447 pulled up when there was no apparent reason to do so (as far as we
222 RubberJungle : Yes, I'm very much aware they deliberately stalled. My point is that, having stalled, the pilot then kept back-pressure on the column. During the att
223 Jollo : Hi all, first post for me after following the AF447 threads for over 2 years ... I wish to share a few points that are, in my mind and up to this poin
224 ogre727 : very easy to follow and read... thanks
225 kaiarahi : Me voici. A.net just ate my entire post - I'll try to find time to reconstruct tomorrow.
226 canoecarrier : Well I hope you find time. Outside of a dozen posters here over the past 2 years, myself falling into the later the rest is noise. Go forth and type
227 Pihero : That's the reason that for longer posts, I type inWord,then copy. See you later this evening. RgDs
228 Post contains images Baroque : Agreed. You never know kaiarahi it may come back, sometimes two or three times.
229 Post contains images jollo : Why, thanks: I'll forward your kind commendation to my English teacher, misspellings notwithstanding (sorry about "trust"... I just wish it could be
230 InsideMan : well, your post pretty much sums it all up. From my point of view nothing much to discuss anymore. We will never know what went through the PF's head
231 kaiarahi : I'm still thinking, but for what it's worth ... I have more questions than answers. Example – many posters here have concluded that the FO/PNF was
232 dfambro : Whoa, is this true? I only ever fly as a passenger but I have ALWAYS assumed that both people up front could fly the plane equally well from either s
233 kaiarahi : It was true for AF training at the time. I believe Pihero said in an earlier thread that subsequent to AF447, FOs are being trained to also fly from
234 dfambro : Glad to hear that this training deficiency has been rectified. I wonder if it is widespread in the industry?
235 Post contains images mandala499 : Agree... nice analysis of the transcripts... (I've been taking a break from analyzing this apart from general commenting on the forum...) Chill! Gues
236 dfambro : If it's contributory to the accident (as posited above) then it ought to change, shouldn't it?
237 jox : Does anybody know when we can expect the next (maybe even the final?) report from BEA? I know it isn't to be expected in the near future, but are we t
238 ikramerica : Wasn't that obviously his point? That at any one time, if it's to believed that having 2 pilots is necessary, then both pilots should be able to fly
239 litz : Didn't I read in that report that the PNF (left seat) was captain rated on other aircraft (maybe the A340) ? If so, he certainly should have been fami
240 Post contains images mandala499 : Definitely. No, we're not asking them to be able to land from both seats... but at least fly/handle the plane at cruise alts and down to 10,000ft (or
241 par13del : Well as a right handed person who actually uses a joystick when flying my games, hopefully Airbus included a right hand joystick on the left seat, ca
242 Post contains links canoecarrier : Personally, I think this frustration manifests itself again at 2:11:37 when the PNF said “controls to the left”, took over priority and made a br
243 Post contains images mandala499 : Well, try getting a left handed joystick for your flying games It isn't as nightmare-ish as some people make it out to be. In the old days, they had
244 ikramerica : But the button was still in the wrong spot, unless you bought a "reversible" model that had a switch that allowed you to rotate it 90 degrees clockwi
245 Post contains images InsideMan : the one and only (and made for lefties and righties
246 ikramerica : Actually, I liked mine better. Don't know where to find a pic, but it had a button on top of the stick and a bigger base for easier holding (or stabi
247 Post contains links rfields5421 : The Airbus SideStick controllers do have a left and right orientation - for the position - not for left or right handed pilots. http://www.airliners.
248 GIOPAN1975 : Sidesticks on Airbuses instead of yokes, the reason they exist like that? Maybe Airbus design philosophy has been from the beginning that sidesticks w
249 Pihero : It's one of the bigggest CRM aspects of this investigation : There is no panic, maybe just some sense of impotence, and yet there is this refusal to
250 Post contains images kaiarahi : Go read the reports - very slowly, repeating every word out loud to yourself. This has been refuted time and time and time again. Do you have a memor
251 Pihero : 1/- Actually, a briefing was done, and rather thorough, by PF : it covered their situation, both in terms of position and performance. I would have p
252 N14AZ : It’s a pitty most of us will never know how they talked to each other since we have only the transcript and I doubt anything else will be published
253 Post contains images GIOPAN1975 : I am still quite young to have memory problems nor complex aged behaviour. If you refer to "a little to the left...", do you call this a deviation of
254 Pihero : The long and on-going work on precision instruments and cockpit integration and ergonomics is at the centre of the achieved safety level air transport
255 zeke : Airbus has built aircraft with both yokes and sidesticks. Huh ? Huh ? No No Yes That is the regulators and airlines pushing for that, not the manufac
256 kaiarahi : The captain had 1,093 A330 (+ 654 A340) hours, all as captain (i.e. left seat). The FO/PNF had 1,882 A330 (+ 2,597 A340) hours, all from the right se
257 travelavnut : Have you ever flown an Airbus? No, I guess not, people who have (PGNCS, Pihero, Zeke reply 155) have on multiple times stated that the above is simpl
258 Pihero : Do not try and read too much in a CVR transcript : it is certainly not ernough to allow you this sort of judgement. Let all this transcript come down
259 kaiarahi : He puzzles me the most. There's no evidence of team leadership from this: to this: to this: After he re-entered the cockpit, all of his comments were
260 kaiarahi : Read the reports. Take a look at the track plots issued by BEA.
261 par13del : I enounter the same issue at home - drive on the left - and in the US - drive on the right - what I have found made the biggest difference was the sw
262 SLCPilot : With all due respect, I disagree a little here. In a non- FBW aircraft, pulling full aft on the stick (or yoke) is never really trained. In the Airbu
263 travelavnut : But there have been accidents, like the Colgan crash, where the PNF could theoretically see the PF control inputs. But in those instances that didn't
264 rfields5421 : Yes, it was very similar to what other flights made that evening. About 1/2 of the flights did not alter their course at all. No flight altered their
265 Post contains links 474218 : Even Airbus agrees: http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...ills-under-threat-says-airbus.html
266 canoecarrier : The PNF called out that they were in Alternate Law fairly early. I can't imagine any Airbus pilot not knowing that meant that they had begun to lose
267 kaiarahi : Did you read the article you cited? It's advocating that pilots need more stick time, not less.
268 flyglobal : Again this comes down to training, even more practice. I as a manager in car industries have to go to various test sites in the world with ours and a
269 474218 : No one said they need less stick time? The article backed up this statement.
270 zeke : That is not true, have a look at the QRH for those items you listed, e.g. full forward or back stick on a TCAS RA could kill passengers, most RAs can
271 jollo : I share the surprise: I thought at least Captains would have a "natural" right seat qualification, if anything from their days as FO, and that such a
272 GIOPAN1975 : I think you couldn't have put it better. When I describe pilots in a "more passive role" (be it Airbus or Boeing) I do not think that "passive" also
273 Post contains links jollo : I just noticed another thread, more focused on prevention measures, rather than accident dynamics: Lessons Learned: AF 447 You might want to move some
274 Post contains images GBan : ... and leave some of the participants here
275 rfields5421 : In many airlines across the world - the Captain will move from Captain of one aircraft to Captain of another, larger aircraft. With no right hand FO
276 par13del : Depending on pay and your circumstances in life, at times it is preferable to not be a captain, especially if it means moving up to larger a/c doing
277 ikramerica : But isn't this considered a long range flight at AF?
278 Pihero : The reason is called the *long haul bump*, for which a senior F/O on long haul will earn more money than someone of a similar seniority who elects to
279 par13del : Sure but the issue with time away from home would be whether a fresh crew is overnighted away from home base to operate the return flight, in which c
280 tommytoyz : Actually I think this is exactly what happened. The stick was held almost in the full aft and after a point, no increase in pitch resulted. Foe those
281 InsideMan : Now, while I am a strong advocate that they should have never ever even been close to a full stall in the first place I wonder what it would have take
282 travelavnut : Is this what Pihero actually said? My glider experience tells me that, that manouver would possible induce a spin, no?
283 David L : If they had any doubts they only needed to look. However, The Captain and PNF kept telling the PF that he was "going up" and needed to "go down". The
284 tdscanuck : "Easy" is a bit of a loaded term. The regulations require that you be able to continue safe flight and landing without unusual pilot skill in alterna
285 InsideMan : Thanks, sounds sensible.
286 mandala499 : 2.5G load protection is still there in ALTN2... the overspeed might be a problem though....
287 Post contains images eisenbach : I just have a picture from the A320 full flight sim flight deck - the co-pilot made the shot directly from his seat. You can see the side stick of th
288 tommytoyz : Yes, they told the PF to go down, more than once. But he didn't input the stick to do so. Or maybe he did: Suspected Tailplane Icing While the PF nev
289 ikramerica : One would assume so, but he never mentioned icing did he? Isn't it part of a pilot's job during a disruption to communicate with the other crew membe
290 dfambro : He did seem to suspect icing, as the nacelle and wing anti-ice were activated early in the incident. However, the BEA seems to have concluded that th
291 Post contains images David L : They didn't just keep telling him to go down, they kept telling him he was going up. They knew. The stick inputs are discussed and clearly shown in t
292 Pihero : Good catch but it's a bit worse than that : when he took over, he was immediately shut out by the younger PF with his priority switch. Or close... Ta
293 kaiarahi : How do you know what he was thinking? I don't see anything at all in the report to support this. Rather: Those exchanges indicate that the PF didn't
294 N14AZ : Sorry, I didn't dare to ask this since I first read the transcript but it's something I never understood: I thought they considered the speed indicat
295 Post contains links and images mandala499 : U asked for it now! :P No need to rotate 90deg clockwise or whatever. Program the buttons for the appropriate hand! LOL!!!!!!! Anyways... As stated b
296 Post contains images GIOPAN1975 : yeah but this is quite speculative, isnt it? What else could have caused that roll? Or is wing icing the only option? How about PF's sponatneous effo
297 kaiarahi : Thank you! I think this is crucial. Looking at it within the process/action/ideas/people communications paradigm, the PNF being "process" systems / n
298 David L : Indeed. Although that was one of the moments while reading the CVR that gave me quite a chill, I think it's a significant enough matter to leave comm
299 AirlineCritic : Have you heard the recordings? I do not think they have been given out publicly by the BEA, or did I miss something? Or are you referring to somethin
300 Post contains images mandala499 : No it isn't the only option. I'm only saying that it can... but, having a look at the ADR data presented in the FDR, it doesn't appear to be so. I ha
301 GIOPAN1975 : May be not disorientaded but confused and undecided...he does not seem to have fully understood what was going on, otherwise he would have been more
302 GIOPAN1975 : And a few more non-technical questions that come up to a non professional: Why did the captain ask about PF's license? Does this question sound normal
303 tommytoyz : Does this indicate the PF thought they were actually over speeding and hence his pull on the stick and deploying the airbrakes? The tug of war for co
304 mandala499 : This was the part mentioned in page 73? Well, if you have a look at page 48, it explains it: In-flight relief Captain Now coming back to: In the past
305 kaiarahi : You nailed it. I was just unpacking it.
306 Post contains links srbmod : Please continue the discussion here: AF447 Disaster: A New Report On 07/29 - Part 3 (by srbmod Aug 19 2011 in Civil Aviation) Any posts that appear af
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Arik Air Launches New York (JFK) On Nov 29 posted Wed Nov 11 2009 03:55:12 by AsoRock
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Arik Air Launches New York (JFK) On Nov 29 posted Wed Nov 11 2009 03:55:12 by AsoRock
Arik Air Launches New York (JFK) On Nov 29 posted Wed Nov 11 2009 03:55:12 by AsoRock
Arik Air Launches New York (JFK) On Nov 29 posted Wed Nov 11 2009 03:55:12 by AsoRock
New Theory On Hindenburg Disaster posted Wed Feb 11 2004 05:16:59 by Gr8slvrflt
Anything New To Report On DHL-UPS? posted Thu Jul 24 2008 04:26:22 by ChrisNH
Anything New To Report On DHL-UPS? posted Thu Jul 24 2008 04:26:22 by ChrisNH
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SIA Report On New Airline Based In Chiang Mai, TH posted Fri Oct 10 2003 16:55:08 by Singapore_Air
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New Theory On Hindenburg Disaster posted Wed Feb 11 2004 05:16:59 by Gr8slvrflt
New Theory On Hindenburg Disaster posted Wed Feb 11 2004 05:16:59 by Gr8slvrflt
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SIA Report On New Airline Based In Chiang Mai, TH posted Fri Oct 10 2003 16:55:08 by Singapore_Air
SIA Report On New Airline Based In Chiang Mai, TH posted Fri Oct 10 2003 16:55:08 by Singapore_Air
AF447 Disaster: New Report On Friday posted Mon Jul 25 2011 04:56:04 by sebolino
SIA Report On New Airline Based In Chiang Mai, TH posted Fri Oct 10 2003 16:55:08 by Singapore_Air
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USA Jet #231 Emergency At And On Nov. 29? posted Thu Dec 2 2010 15:04:33 by capitalflyer
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USA Jet #231 Emergency At And On Nov. 29? posted Thu Dec 2 2010 15:04:33 by capitalflyer
USA Jet #231 Emergency At And On Nov. 29? posted Thu Dec 2 2010 15:04:33 by capitalflyer
First United Aircraft In New Livery On The Way. posted Thu Nov 18 2010 16:26:52 by CALTECH
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First United Aircraft In New Livery On The Way. posted Thu Nov 18 2010 16:26:52 by CALTECH
Ntsb Report On Oct 2009 DL 767 Landing On Taxiway posted Wed Nov 17 2010 16:37:51 by DLdiamondboy
Ntsb Report On Oct 2009 DL 767 Landing On Taxiway posted Wed Nov 17 2010 16:37:51 by DLdiamondboy
Ntsb Report On Oct 2009 DL 767 Landing On Taxiway posted Wed Nov 17 2010 16:37:51 by DLdiamondboy
New Theory On Hindenburg Disaster posted Wed Feb 11 2004 05:16:59 by Gr8slvrflt
SIA Report On New Airline Based In Chiang Mai, TH posted Fri Oct 10 2003 16:55:08 by Singapore_Air
New Info On The Linate Disaster posted Mon Oct 29 2001 15:10:15 by CPH-R
AF447 Disaster: New Report On Friday posted Mon Jul 25 2011 04:56:04 by sebolino
USA Jet #231 Emergency At And On Nov. 29? posted Thu Dec 2 2010 15:04:33 by capitalflyer
First United Aircraft In New Livery On The Way. posted Thu Nov 18 2010 16:26:52 by CALTECH
Ntsb Report On Oct 2009 DL 767 Landing On Taxiway posted Wed Nov 17 2010 16:37:51 by DLdiamondboy