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Airbus Clashes With Pilots Over AF447 Alarm  
User currently offlinejonathanxxxx From United States of America, joined Feb 2011, 673 posts, RR: 1
Posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 22769 times:

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...-with-pilots-over-af447-alarm.html
So it looks like Airbus is clashing with the pilots here over the cabin alarm... Thoughts?

82 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 1, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 4 days 3 hours ago) and read 22432 times:

Quoting jonathanxxxx (Thread starter):
So it looks like Airbus is clashing with the pilots here over the cabin alarm... Thoughts?

Airbus has lots of pilots...so it's not "Airbus vs. pilots", it's "pilots vs. pilots."

Tom.


User currently offlinePM From Germany, joined Feb 2005, 6871 posts, RR: 63
Reply 2, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 4 days 3 hours ago) and read 22393 times:

The BEA appears to agree with Airbus. I think AF is on thin ice here.

User currently offlineoldeuropean From Germany, joined May 2005, 2077 posts, RR: 4
Reply 3, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 20 hours ago) and read 21696 times:

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/le...irline-pilots-whove-forgotten.html

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/le...f447-and-the-obstacles-to-imp.html



Wer nichts weiss muss alles glauben
User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 42
Reply 4, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 21483 times:

This was discussed in the main thread. There is some debate about whether or not the stall warning should have airspeed as an input but I'll leave that to the pros. However, the "confusing" behaviour of the stall warning occurred some time after the crew had apparently not paid enough attention to a legitimate stall warning for 54 seconds during the initial climb after autopilot disconnect. I think the much bigger question is why their initial actions got them into a stall in the first place and why they didn't get out of it early, i.e. why they got into a situation where the stall warning could be confusing.

AF447 Disaster: New Report On Friday (by sebolino Jul 25 2011 in Civil Aviation)

AF447 Disaster: A New Report On 07/29 - Part 2 (by LipeGIG Aug 1 2011 in Civil Aviation)


User currently onlineN14AZ From Germany, joined Feb 2007, 2697 posts, RR: 25
Reply 5, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 21428 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 4):
I think the much bigger question is why their initial actions got them into a stall in the first place and why they didn't get out of it early

That's exactly what I thought as well. This is the part of this accident that I still don't understand.


User currently offlinelonghaul67 From Norway, joined Jan 2007, 248 posts, RR: 1
Reply 6, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 18 hours ago) and read 21165 times:

According to this article; http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...-went-virtually-unchallenged.html, the PF during the upset was the most senior co-pilot.

But from one of the previous threads; AF447 Disaster: New Report On Friday (by sebolino Jul 25 2011 in Civil Aviation), it was stated (by Pihero) that the PF from the disconnection of the A/P and well into the stall was the junior co-pilot.


User currently offlineRubberJungle From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 7, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 21051 times:

Quoting longhaul67 (Reply 6):
According to this article; http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...-went-virtually-unchallenged.html, the PF during the upset was the most senior co-pilot.

The article doesn't say that at all. It says the co-pilot was the flying pilot, while the relief pilot was in the captain's seat. The relief pilot was the second co-pilot, the more senior, while the PF was the junior.

[Edited 2011-08-13 04:59:37]

User currently offlineBoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1563 posts, RR: 3
Reply 8, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 20963 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 4):
This was discussed in the main thread. There is some debate about whether or not the stall warning should have airspeed as an input but I'll leave that to the pros. However, the "confusing" behaviour of the stall warning occurred some time after the crew had apparently not paid enough attention to a legitimate stall warning for 54 seconds during the initial climb after autopilot disconnect. I think the much bigger question is why their initial actions got them into a stall in the first place and why they didn't get out of it early, i.e. why they got into a situation where the stall warning could be confusing.

I think if you get a 54 sec stall warning and you are STILL dropping at 10,000 ft per minute you are probably still stalled whether the bells are going off or not there should be no confusion here. The fact that the AF pilots union clearly doesn't expect its members to be competent enough to detect a high altitude stall under these circumstances means that I still refuse to send my family on AF.



BV
User currently offlineiberiadc852 From Spain, joined May 2005, 270 posts, RR: 0
Reply 9, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 20883 times:

Quoting oldeuropean (Reply 3):
However, the "confusing" behaviour of the stall warning occurred some time after the crew had apparently not paid enough attention to a legitimate stall warning for 54 seconds during the initial climb after autopilot disconnect.

Sorry if this is stupid, as I am far from expert here, but....how could someone give credit a stall warning while is climbing during 54 sec?.

At the beginning of that event, speed was 275 kt. Assuming the data was correct, wasn't it already an abnormal speed for that stage of flight?. Shouldn't the focus be put even before that stall warning?

In the same way, I haven't found much emphasis nor information about the AT disengage. Was there an explanation for that?



variety is the spice of life; that's what made the "old times" so good
User currently offlineNavigator From Sweden, joined Jul 2001, 1182 posts, RR: 14
Reply 10, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 20827 times:

Quoting jonathanxxxx (Thread starter):
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...-with-pilots-over-af447-alarm.html
So it looks like Airbus is clashing with the pilots here over the cabin alarm... Thoughts?

I do not really understand Air France position here. What has happened seems pretty clear to everyone except Air France. Can you rely on an airline handling safety issues like this? Sweeping stuff under the carpet and suggesting everything is OK ignoring facts coming out of the investigation? I think Air France would be better off if they told media and others how they will deal with the issues at hand and maybe improve pilot training.



747-400/747-200/L1011/DC-10/DC-9/DC-8/MD-80/MD90/A340/A330/A300/A310/A321/A320/A319/767/757/737/727/HS-121/CV990/CV440/S
User currently offlinepar13del From Bahamas, joined Dec 2005, 7075 posts, RR: 8
Reply 11, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 20513 times:

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 8):
The fact that the AF pilots union clearly doesn't expect its members to be competent enough to detect a high altitude stall under these circumstances means that I still refuse to send my family on AF.
Quoting Navigator (Reply 10):
I do not really understand Air France position here. What has happened seems pretty clear to everyone except Air France. Can you rely on an airline handling safety issues like this?

So we heading towards an AF boycott or some kind of online peitition somewhere by someone to get AF to get their act together?
AF is supposed to be one of those legacy carriers held in high regard, or is it just a union problem? Investigation is not yet over so let's give them a bit more time.


User currently offlineRubberJungle From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 12, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 20411 times:

Quoting iberiadc852 (Reply 9):
Sorry if this is stupid, as I am far from expert here, but....how could someone give credit a stall warning while is climbing during 54 sec??

Because the climb bleeds airspeed and the pitch increases the angle of attack, both of which bring the wing closer to a stall condition. The stall warning begins sounding on the approach to stall, to give pilots time to avoid the actual stall.

Quoting iberiadc852 (Reply 9):
At the beginning of that event, speed was 275 kt. Assuming the data was correct, wasn't it already an abnormal speed for that stage of flight? Shouldn't the focus be put even before that stall warning?

You have to remember that indicated airspeed and true airspeed, while similar at sea level, aren't the same at high altitude.


User currently offlineQazar From Canada, joined May 2006, 326 posts, RR: 0
Reply 13, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 20227 times:

Right after this accident occurred 2 years ago, on one of the on-going threads on A.net, someone had mentioned that Air France had brought in Delta to revamp their entire safety procedures... Could anyone confirm this?

(Apparently Air France had undertaken these steps after AF447 which had followed 10 years of several very high profile plane crashes including Concorde and the A340 crash landing in Toronto)...


User currently offlineB777LRF From Luxembourg, joined Nov 2008, 1308 posts, RR: 3
Reply 14, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 20142 times:

AF have always had an institutional aversion to looking facts in the eye when they show they're not perfect, and even more so when it comes to accepting negative critique. That has been the case during every single accident investigation involving AF metal - shoot the messenger, shift blame and deny culpability seems to be their preferred modus operandi. Not really something conducive to a healthy safety culture, and it is therefore of little surprise AF is the lease safe major in Europe, although it must be said that "least safe" is a relative term; in the grand scheme of things it's still a safe airiine.

Just one that has a hard time taking lessons, especially from outsiders.

This latest move by the AF union only goes to show how deeply rooted this aversion to critique is, in one of the most desperate, and far fetched, grasping of straws possibly imaginable. You're dropping at 10K a minute, the horn's been blaring at you for almost a minute, your attitude is around where it would be at the end of a rotation, but certainly not where it should be when you're doing 160 kts way up in the flight levels, you've got the engines going full chat and still the beast is dropping like a rock, as indicated on several instruments ....... but let's blame an intermittent horn. Or a faulty pitot tube. Or the FBW system. Anything but the 3 guys up front who, and it pains me to say this, failed their first duty to fly the damn kite. Figuring out why that happened will require a lot of critical introspective analysis, which is the exact quality AF have always been lacking.



From receips and radials over straight pipes to big fans - been there, done that, got the hearing defects to prove
User currently offlineB777LRF From Luxembourg, joined Nov 2008, 1308 posts, RR: 3
Reply 15, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 20099 times:

Quoting iberiadc852 (Reply 9):
At the beginning of that event, speed was 275 kt. Assuming the data was correct, wasn't it already an abnormal speed for that stage of flight?. Shouldn't the focus be put even before that stall warning?


You may be confusing IAS with TAS (indicated vs true airspeed).

In this case it's 275 knots indicated, which equates to roughly M.82 at the altitude they were at. Right where it should be in other words.



From receips and radials over straight pipes to big fans - been there, done that, got the hearing defects to prove
User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 16, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 20061 times:

The bone of contention seems to be the way the stall warning shuts off at low speeds, high AoA.

In AF447, for much of the time the PF was pulling back on the stick - no stall warning sounded. When he tried to push the nose down the stall warning would sound.

Also the stall warning sounds when the aircraft loses air speed data - not to indicate a stall but to indicate a problem with the air speed measurement.

Several folks have indicated that have a CONTINIOUS stall warning when the low speed, high AoA threshold was crossed would not allow a pilot to think pulling back on the stick to deepen the stall was taking the aircraft out of danger.

Quoting PM (Reply 2):
The BEA appears to agree with Airbus.

Not really. BEA recommended that AoA displays be added to the cockpit so that when the stall warning stops sounding - the pilots would have a visual display to show the aircraft was likely still in a stall.

Quote:
The crew never formally identified the stall situation. Information on angle of attack is not directly accessible to pilots. The angle of attack in cruise is close to the stall warning trigger angle of attack in a law other than normal law. Under these conditions, manual handling can bring the airplane to high angles of attack such as those encountered during the event. It is essential in order to ensure flight safety to reduce the angle of attack when a stall is imminent. Only a direct readout of the angle of attack could enable crews to rapidly identify the aerodynamic situation of the airplane and take the actions that may be required.

From BEA Interim Report #3 page 80

I doubt that would have changed anything in AF447 because the PF disorientation appears to be such that he was ignoring valid instrument readings - though we do not know for sure. The FDR did not record anything from his displays by design.


User currently offlineAeroVega From Netherlands, joined Nov 2007, 44 posts, RR: 0
Reply 17, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 19664 times:

If the AF pilots really think that the airplane is deficient, why are they still flying them?

User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12360 posts, RR: 25
Reply 18, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 19208 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 4):
I think the much bigger question is why their initial actions got them into a stall in the first place and why they didn't get out of it early
Quoting N14AZ (Reply 5):
Quoting David L (Reply 4):
I think the much bigger question is why their initial actions got them into a stall in the first place and why they didn't get out of it early

That's exactly what I thought as well. This is the part of this accident that I still don't understand.

Indeed not.

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...-altitude-stall-investigators.html starts with:

Quote:

Inquiries into the loss of Air France flight AF447 have yet to explain fully why the pilots failed to avert the Airbus A330's fatal stall, despite its onset being characterised by buffet and the activation of a stall warning.
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...t-went-virtually-unchallenged.html says:

Quote:

France's Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses has yet to explain fully the reason for the co-pilot's putting the Airbus A330 into a sudden climb, although it followed the disconnection of the autopilot and autothrust, and a slight loss of altitude of some 350ft.

But I found the following to be quite interesting:

Quote:

"Climbing to a higher level was a constant preoccupation for the crew," the BEA said. "The pilots clearly wanted to fly outside of the cloud layer, probably to limit turbulence."

Yet they knew they could not climb much more if at all:

Quote:

The aircraft had been cruising at 35,000ft, within a layer of turbulence, but was unable to climb above the rough air because of a poor temperature gradient. The aircraft's flight management system had calculated the recommended maximum altitude at 37,500ft.

The co-pilot, who was flying, had already mentioned this altitude limit to the captain, who was preparing to leave the cockpit for a rest break.

When the relief pilot arrived to take the captain's place, the co-pilot also referred to the lack of margin available to take the aircraft up to 37,000ft, saying: "What we have is some [recommended maximum altitude that is] a little too low to get to three seven."

BEA states that the co-pilot mentioned that the A330 was "on the edge of the [turbulent] layer" and added that he would have preferred climbing to 36,000ft.

So it seems to me the pilot flying very well could have been fixated on climbing the aircraft above the turbulence, but it's astonishing that he continued to command pitch up when the stall warnings went off. He clearly knew the plane would not be able to climb well due to the unusually warm air at altitude, and it's pretty basic knowledge to know that the natural result of forcing a climb under these conditions would be a stall.

The article goes on to say:

Quote:

As the aircraft pitched up, its vertical climb rate increased to 5,200ft/min and then 6,900ft/min, while the pilots discussed the loss of airspeed information. Just 20s after the autopilot disconnection the relief pilot noticed the aircraft was climbing and cautioned his colleague, who responded: "Okay, okay, I'm going back down."

"According to the three [instrument displays] you're going up, so go back down," the relief pilot added, and reiterated this again seconds later, as the aircraft climbed above 37,000ft - the altitude which the crew had previously considered too high for cruise.

"Although the [recommended maximum flight level] had been a permanent preoccupation before the autopilot disconnection, neither of the two [pilots] made any reference to it," the BEA said.

While the co-pilot made nose-down inputs which helped reduce pitch and vertical climb rate, these nevertheless "still remained excessive" and the A330 continued to climb "without any intervention" from the relief pilot, it added: "At no time did either of the two [pilots] make any callouts on speed, pitch attitude, vertical speed or altitude."

Again, it's all very hard to understand.

The article in the thread starter says:

Quote:

Air France accelerated replacement of pitot probes, a programme which had started five days before the 1 June 2009 accident, following the crash.

It has introduced new simulator sessions focused on unreliable airspeed procedures, with a focus on high-altitude flight in alternate law and training in modified stall responses. The carrier has also amended its internal operational rules governing relief duty and put in place a new cockpit decision-making structure.

This seems to be the correct response to this tragedy.

And in doing these things, AF is tacitly admitting that it's training procedures and its in-cockpit decision making structure were inadequate.

In the face of all of this, it's quite unseemly for the pilot's union to bang on about confusing warnings. Unfortunately it seems the pilots were fixated on climbing the airplane, in spite of the fact that they knew the airplane would not climb well if at all. The pilots union should jump in when their members are being unjustly criticised, but that is not the case here.



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently offlineRuscoe From Australia, joined Aug 1999, 1546 posts, RR: 2
Reply 19, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 19172 times:

If you can put the detail aside for a moment, we still have a situation where three airline transport standard pilots were unable to recognise and recover from the stall.
This indicates to me, that it is not just straight forward pilot error, as some would like to believe, and that along with better pilot training, adjustments to the the amount, and the way information is displayed to the pilots, is a contributing factor.

Ruscoe


User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12360 posts, RR: 25
Reply 20, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 18786 times:

Quoting par13del (Reply 11):
So we heading towards an AF boycott or some kind of online peitition somewhere by someone to get AF to get their act together?

From my previous posting:

Quoting Revelation (Reply 18):
Air France accelerated replacement of pitot probes, a programme which had started five days before the 1 June 2009 accident, following the crash.

It has introduced new simulator sessions focused on unreliable airspeed procedures, with a focus on high-altitude flight in alternate law and training in modified stall responses. The carrier has also amended its internal operational rules governing relief duty and put in place a new cockpit decision-making structure.

It appears to me that AF is getting its act together.

Quoting B777LRF (Reply 14):
AF have always had an institutional aversion to looking facts in the eye when they show they're not perfect, and even more so when it comes to accepting negative critique.

That attitude is far from unique with AF these days. Other airlines, and airframe manufacturers and governmental bodies all act the same way: try to minimise the damage to you by blaming everyone else first, and only take blame if there is no other option.

Quoting B777LRF (Reply 14):
That has been the case during every single accident investigation involving AF metal - shoot the messenger, shift blame and deny culpability seems to be their preferred modus operandi.

I think as above that AF has gotten to the point where they cannot avoid blame, and are doing the right thing. They are following the BEA recommendations.

Quoting B777LRF (Reply 14):
This latest move by the AF union only goes to show how deeply rooted this aversion to critique is, in one of the most desperate, and far fetched, grasping of straws possibly imaginable.

  

The union is making fools of themselves. There are times and places where unions should step in and protect its members. This is not one of those times or places.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 16):
The bone of contention seems to be the way the stall warning shuts off at low speeds, high AoA.

Yes, but this was happening long after the plane was already in deep trouble.

The key question is why didn't the pilot recognize the stall, especially given that he certainly should have known a stall would result if he kept trying to climb the aircraft into the warm air? They had already discussed the fact that the plane would not climb much higher.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 16):
Not really. BEA recommended that AoA displays be added to the cockpit so that when the stall warning stops sounding - the pilots would have a visual display to show the aircraft was likely still in a stall.

I agree it's an improvement so I agree it should go forward, but needing it is a sad indictment on how little basic airmanship these pilots had.

I'm a mere sailplane pilot. I know stall/spin accidents are one of the very few sure ways to get killed while flying. Stall recognition and recovery was beaten into my head by all of my instructors. I'm really at a loss to understand how all three of these pilots could not look at the 10,000 fpm descent and not realize they were in a deep stall and had to follow the recovery procedure, regardless of whatever alarm was or was not functioning.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 16):
I doubt that would have changed anything in AF447 because the PF disorientation appears to be such that he was ignoring valid instrument readings - though we do not know for sure. The FDR did not record anything from his displays by design.

Agreed.



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently offlinecosmofly From United States of America, joined May 2009, 649 posts, RR: 0
Reply 21, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 18184 times:

Quoting Revelation (Reply 20):
That attitude is far from unique with AF these days. Other airlines, and airframe manufacturers and governmental bodies all act the same way: try to minimise the damage to you by blaming everyone else first, and only take blame if there is no other option.

  

Sadly this is the world we have created. Lawyers and entitlements rule. It is becoming a culture that we must always find someone else to be liable and responsible for what we do.


User currently offlinepacksonflight From Iceland, joined Jan 2010, 379 posts, RR: 0
Reply 22, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 18053 times:

Quoting B777LRF (Reply 14):
AF is the lease safe major in Europe, although it must be said that "least safe" is a relative term; in the grand scheme of things it's still a safe airiine.

Your post is spot on! However I like to point out that AF has 4 or 5 total hull losses for the past 25 years and I think that is a lot, and way more than the European majors that they like to compere them selves to.


User currently offlineDLdiamondboy From United States of America, joined Oct 2010, 72 posts, RR: 0
Reply 23, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 18053 times:

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 8):
I think if you get a 54 sec stall warning and you are STILL dropping at 10,000 ft per minute you are probably still stalled whether the bells are going off or not there should be no confusion here. The fact that the AF pilots union clearly doesn't expect its members to be competent enough to detect a high altitude stall under these circumstances means that I still refuse to send my family on AF.



I agree with BoeingVista. Stall warning going off 20 times while you are falling out of the sky calling off your altitude as you plunge towards to ocean. How could you not think you were in a stall? the altimeter must have looked like a fan. They obviously had altitude data one wonders why they did not try stall recovery 101? Stick forward to point the nose down . I also thought that all aircraft have a data table based on altitude that indicates a safe nose up pitch and power setting such that the aircraft can fly safely above stall speed.


User currently offlineKC135TopBoom From United States of America, joined Jan 2005, 12128 posts, RR: 51
Reply 24, posted (2 years 11 months 3 weeks 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 17913 times:

My guess is the airplane was in moderate to sever turbulance at FL-350. They knew they had some type of airspeed malfunction, as well as other insturmentations (HSI, ADI, etc.). The crew may not have considered the stall warning as reliable, either, based on other information they were looking at. The turbulance can easily mask any buffet, high speed or low speed. Because they were still inside the weather, they did not have a reliable horizon to look at.

Does the A-330/-340 have an AoA indicator? If it does, does it only feed the indicators, and not the computer? We had two (pilot and co-pilot) in the KC-135 that was totally independent of other insturments, and had its own pitiot probes on each side of the aircraft. These pitiot probes only feed the respective AoA indicators, and was our best warning of an impending high speed or low speed stall.

In other words, they were 'flying by the seat of their pants'. That is not a reliable situation in modern high speed high altitude airliners.

Even after the Capt. on AF-447 returned to the cockpit, is there any indication he gave instructions to the FP about what he should be doing? Or did the Capt. not make a comment to the FP, indicating he agreed with the actions based on all available information, reliable and unreliable?


25 Revelation : It was at night, so they would have been using the artificial horizon anyway, and I hadn't heard it of any issues with it. Altimiter and VSI just use
26 rfields5421 : I understand it is a option - about $100 K per aircraft. The Air France aircraft do not have that installed. The BEA recommendation is that it be a b
27 rfields5421 : The BEA Interim Report #3 describes several changes which AF has made to training and procedures after AF447. I don't know if they brought in anyone
28 iberiadc852 : Thanks, for the reply and the information. Anyway, 54 seconds, climbing, without paying attention to the stall warning, sounds like a good reason not
29 Post contains images zeke : One can stall an aircraft at any attitude, and at any airspeed. A stall occurs when the critical angle of attack is exceeded, the stall warning comes
30 tdscanuck : Without valid airspeed, the AT doesn't know what to do. It disengages by design, and the crew should be trained to know that. The only thing that wen
31 RubberJungle : No. The stall warning should be acted upon immediately, much like a terrain-awareness or collision-avoidance warning. The warning shuts off because,
32 Post contains links and images zeke : I am not sure if it is a 100k mod, but it has been a customer option for over 20 years with very few companies ( I cannot think of any) taking advant
33 rfields5421 : Also as was pointed out in the longer AF447 threads - a near identical crash has occured in the past - in a completely computer free B727. I'm sure t
34 iberiadc852 : Sorry, I wasn't too clear. I wasn't meaning what had to be done by the pilots, but if that situation could physically be maintained for so long in a
35 zeke : Of course, you can have continual stall warning is a climb, cruise, descent, or even in a turn. Even when an aircraft is stalled, it is still produci
36 ferpe : To give some perspective, 45° angle of attack is what you achieve in a Pugachev Cobra manouvre with a military fighter (you transit up to some 60-70
37 Post contains links and images Pihero : I only have had the experience od an AoA indicator with (ex-) Air Inter airplanes. This is the A330 View Large View MediumPhoto © Jacko and the A320
38 flyglobal : That seems to me the key driver from this. Let me give you another example from our car industry: We recently started producing manual shift cars in
39 AFGMEL : As usual, zeke has it. A decrease in airspeed or unreliable airspeed may be an indicator of a stall, but definitely not definitive. I'm just a low ti
40 Part147 : Respect to you Sir! ... beautifully summarised. I have read all the earlier 447 threads and avoided commenting because I had nothing to contribute or
41 N14AZ : Not trying to be nitpicking but the Captain came back just three minutes before impact, as we all know. Question: how binding is the REC MAX value fo
42 BrouAviation : I am really amazed by this. Every once in a while AWST and FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL post letters of readers from all parts of the aviation industry, scie
43 iberiadc852 : Thanks very much, it goes against the idea I had about stalls and stall warnings, but I cannot argue you about that. Regards.
44 cuban8 : My experience is that you usually respect the REC MAX value and try to be as close to the OPT value during flight. General procedures in my company i
45 Ruscoe : If you read the next paragraph of my post I think you'll find we agree on this. I don't agree with this. The Union has its legitimate right to stand
46 zeke : Most people will not climb above REC MAX it gives a 0.3g margin for the current weight and temperature, however you can if needed. Above REC MAX is a
47 Post contains links notaxonrotax : That is so sad………an aircraft lost because none of the crew is doing the very basic thing: to fly the aircraft! Another astonishing and avoidabl
48 David L : RFields5421 correctly reminded me that the general public (e.g. me) only became aware of frozen pitots at cruise, "pitch and power" and diagnosing er
49 Revelation : The systems can only do so much. IMHO the main issue here is the crew lost (or never really had) situational awareness. It's been explained above tha
50 Post contains links and images Revelation : I'd say pretty much every plane designed to fly under instruments has pitot heat (and several non-IMC planes do as well) so pitot icing issues should
51 Post contains images David L : Yeah, just trying to play devil's advocate. I was thinking about a flight that's been at cruise altitude for a while, where it was thought that pitot
52 garpd : And that there, IMO, is the key to this accident. I'm not a qualified pilot, but I have been around them and on here long enough to know that 10,000
53 Ruscoe : Yes but they did not recognise it. The probability of 3 ATPL pilots not recognising a stall, or not being able to recover from it, is so low as to ma
54 BrouAviation : Three pilots failing at once should not primarily be seen as individuals with human shortcomings, but as products from a certain training and CRM sys
55 PolymerPlane : One thing I am wondering. Could tactile feedback have made a difference? With the crews overwhelmed with visual and aural cues, a tactile feedback mig
56 par13del : Is there a disconnect between what seems to be the perceived result of this tragedy and current day to day operations? The proper operation of the equ
57 tdscanuck : It's not as simple as 3 pilots, presented with the same data, all reached the same incorrect conclusion. The PF did not react as if they were in a st
58 N14AZ : Talking about numbers I think it would be even more interesting to know how many flight crews had to face such a situation (disengagement of the AP b
59 rfields5421 : The instruments did not show a 10,000 FPM descent. They don't go that high. The descent rate tape was stuck at the max 6,000 FPM like it was broken.
60 Post contains images ferpe : I would suggest it is not (and I have flown stalls up to 70° AOA head up and inverted), if you give hard aileron while in a deep stall you start to
61 BrouAviation : A failure rate of 1 to 10 is far from acceptable, don't you think?
62 tdscanuck : Lots of people have survived high altitude fully developed stalls in aircraft larger than this. You have to do, literally, dozens of them during cert
63 eisenbach : As in the other treats said - even the Boeing FBW aircrafts like the 777 would not provide tactile feedback in this situation, because of the unrelia
64 Revelation : And PF responded to loss of airspeed indication by trying to climb the airplane when he knew the aircraft was already near the upper edge of the flig
65 Ruscoe : If we just confine ourselves for a moment to the stall warning. If I understand the basics correctly, the stall warning does not work under 60kts. Thi
66 frmrCapCadet : When in the sort of stall this aircraft experience, what sort of altitude in needed to recover? When the Captain came into the cockpit was recovery st
67 tdscanuck : Because the AoA sensors don't work with the airspeed that low, and without AoA sensors you can't do the stall warning. It's relatively easy to get be
68 PolymerPlane : it does give you stick shaker doesn't it?
69 rfields5421 : On the previous thread - the FAA on documents were quoted - the type of stall necessary for certification is NOT at all similar to what this crew exp
70 Revelation : Unless of course you already know that this can happen and you factor that into your decision making process. Again, the reason we have humans in the
71 RubberJungle : Although you have to remember that a large proportion of the 40°-plus angle-of-attack was due to the descent of the aircraft, not the pitch typical
72 tommytoyz : Most of what is being discussed here deals with the already deep stalled phase of flight. Interesting to me, would be to understand, why they got into
73 Post contains links tommytoyz : The aircraft was not stalled for 1 minute after the autopilot disengaged. Why did the flying pilot keep pulling back on the stick for so long? The eng
74 eisenbach : I don't know the 777 philosophy - this question is for the experts here: Would the stall-warning/shaker at a 777 also stop below e.g. 60kt ?
75 mandala499 : It is only useful to discuss the stall warning not working under 60kts if you agree that: - 54secs of continuous stall warning prior to the stall sho
76 notaxonrotax : Welcome to my R.M list!! It´s good to see some down to earth common sense in threads like these!! Please, this whole "blame the Airbus design-attitu
77 Rheinwaldner : IMO you can do because at airspeed that low a stall is obvious. AoA simply can be ignored. If not on ground and airspeed say below 80 the stall warni
78 tdscanuck : 1) The FAA documents quoted on the prior thread were actually the definition of stall ID, not the type of stall required. 2) The type of stall done f
79 tommytoyz : I have a theory that not all 3 pilots missed everything. Just the one. The pilot flying said he was going to descend, when told he was too high - but
80 par13del : Without going through all the past threads, get a copy of the report, both PNF and the Capt. when he returned monitored instruments and told PF that
81 tommytoyz : The PF pulled back on the stick when the autopilot disengaged and after a while the stall warning sounded. PF was told he was too high and he said he
82 tdscanuck : How would that have helped in this situation? The PF ignored the attitude indicator, the altimeter, the vertical speed indicator, the stall warning,
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