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Lessons Learned: AF 447  
User currently offlinekaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 6 hours ago) and read 17344 times:

This thread is intended for reflection and discussion of lessons learned from AF447 and how they might be addressed. It is not intended as a rehash of what happened or to apportion blame, but to think about strategies for addressing the "whys".


Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
77 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlinedirtyfrankd From United States of America, joined Apr 2011, 189 posts, RR: 0
Reply 1, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 6 hours ago) and read 17275 times:

Well, it's still a little too soon to start commenting on the why's, still need an official conclusion from the BEA. In my opinion though, the problem plaguing AF is an overall lack of accountability. It seems like this incident highlights an opportunity for better training. We will be able to comment more once the BEA comes out with the final report.

User currently offlinekaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Reply 2, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 17197 times:

The first post is from Pihero (aka Contrail Designer) - I'm posting on his behalf, as his computer is afflicted by unreliable data(!). I'll try and post it in two parts, as a.net doesn't seem to like the whole post.

As always, many thanks to Pihero for the time and thought.

********
It’s now time to reflect back and try and determine what we, the flying community, can learn from the accident. It may well happen that the investigation will find that on the subject of contributing factors to the crash we were all wrong on the accepted state of airline safety and that there are some drastic changes to introduce.

- On the Tech side -

The Pitot Heads :

There is something that needs to be said again : all pitot probes fulfilled the requirements of two certification agencies : the FAA and the EASA. As a matter of fact, the ones equipping AF447 as all other models from same brand or another were built to more stringent requirements demanded by Airbus than the regulator required.

The initial problem came from a totally-outside-certification-envelope phenomenon : Icing can happen with an important amount of super-cooled water at temperatures well below -40°C (so much that the impact of water droplets turning into ice is heard on the CVR ).

We are not in the realm of our everyday physics course here and research should be started ASAP. In the mean time, we should seriously review the certification envelope of all Pitot sensors.

Cockpit Displays :

Instrument flying has, since its beginning, been about re-creating inside a pilot’s mind a picture of its position relative to its environment... and to these days, the mental process has involved a rather complex interpretation of one’s status in the air and above the ground.

Initially, what was needed was : a compass / a turn coordinator ( the ball and needle ) / an altimeter / an airspeed indicator / a stopwatch... Add to these a measurement of the engines output. The attitude indication came from a set of two inclinometers, basic alcohol bubble tubes as seen in the “Spirit of St Louis”, then the artificial horizon appeared, thanks to General Doolittle and Sperry and progressively, thanks mainly to the British, a clearer idea of one’s aircraft position on three axes relative to the ground could be obtained...

See the progress :
The DC-2 and the DC-7 :
The Comet and the VC-10 :
The Tristar and the A320 :
[Note - I'll try to attach the pictures later]

In these pictures, there is a trend : the gradual disappearance of the turn-and-slip indicator. It’s still there, but either confined to the sides of the pane, outside the normal scanning pattern or so small one generally doesn’t see it.
The main cause is the development of the yaw damper which took over from the pilot the need for rudder use for turn coordination, thus promoting generations of lazy-footed pilots ( PPP in French for *pilotes au pied paresseux*)

It was then that the separation of pilots into two categories really happened :
-The training for combat maneuvering created the fighter jock
-The training for standardized precision made the transport pilot.
This can go rather far as accurately flying routinely well defined trajectories ends up turning the average airline pilot into a * rate one turn, three degree slope guy*

That aspect wasn’t really a problem in the beginning when there were plenty of opportunities for flying manual/visual approaches, a situation which progressively changed as the skies became fuller, the aerodrome approaches busier and the necessities of all-weather operations increased the automation inside the cockpits : triple redundant systems...so much that flying a visual approach pattern with eyeballs and raw data is becoming rarer and rarer.

But the main point is that, just by casting a quick look at a PFD, one realizes that visual approaches were certainly not the priority of its designers. Please don’t take me wrong, as I know that this long work on precision instruments and cockpit integration and ergonomics are at the centre of the achieved safety level air transport enjoys...

But there is now a huge hole in that rosy picture : there is now a worrying trend of accidents or incidents in which the pilots experienced a total loss of SA – Situational Awareness :
-Air New Zealand A320 off the coast of Perpignan
-AF 447
-Colgan Air Dash-8
-Turkish Air 737 Amsterdam
-Ethiopian 737 off the coast of Beyrut
-Yemeni A310 off the coast of Comorro Islands
-Adam Air 737 in Java Sea
-Flash Air 737 Sharm-el-Sheikh
-Gulf Air A320 Bahrain
-Armavia A320 off the coast of Sotchi
Plus quite a few accidents in regional airlines : the Atlantic Beech is an example.

In all these accidents, outside their *normal* environment, these pilots were unable to see / understand / interpret their instruments, leading to the killer solution of reverting to seat-of-the-pants flying.

Tdscanuck wrote a statement that’s very true : “If the stall warning sounds, you have 2-3 seconds to respond appropriately or you’re now a test pilot”... but this also shows where our training completely falls apart as there are some ingrained mottos in our heads :
“Keep it simple, Stupid !
Stop. Think. Collect your wits.
Even if it’s burning, there’s no burning need to rush...”

These do not prepare for that sort of emergency.



Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
User currently offlineGrid From Kazakhstan, joined Apr 2010, 624 posts, RR: 0
Reply 3, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 17154 times:

I'm not sure whether I thought SA meant something else, what exactly was the reason the Turkish 737 airplane crashed outside Amsterdam?


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User currently offlinekaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Reply 4, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 17154 times:

Second part of Pihero's post.

********************

- The Need for Another Approach to Training -

Ab Initio:

There is in my opinion a definite need for a revision of the FTO programs, to include aerobatics, at least to the full G-positive figures but ideally to include inverted flying. Part of that training should also be about some serious identification and exit of wildly unusual attitudes.

It’s time to remind ourselves that the *deep stall* (for lack of a better word ) the AF447 crew were in resembles the top of a shallow hammerhead figure, for which the escape will be a steep bank followed by a yaw into the dive.
What will be the cost of that training? Forty hours times some 150 USD /hr = 6000 USD ?...
A ridiculous amount compared to the price of avionics... not to say anything about human lives.

Airline Training:

The above principle stands inside the airline. An emphasis to manual flying to the edges of the flight envelope should be required, especially in degraded laws (after all what’s the use of demonstrating the envelope protection of Normal Law if it’s only done to boost the confidence otf the trainee in his/her new plane... confidence that could lead to some drastically wrong mindsets about over-reliance in the FBW... when the chips are down and one is left with what amounts to a fast DC-3 at high altitude in degraded laws.

I don’t see any significant improvement in simulation tools : Will we see one simulator that would demonstrate an aircraft post-stall behaviour ? I doubt it , mainly because that sort of flight testing to obtain enough data is very risky, even for test pilots. Never the less, all I said above points toward an increase in sim hours that airline pilots will need in order to keep proficient.

And now the burning question of LHS training for F/Os : see Mandala499’s post # 235 following Kairahi’s #231 here AF447 Disaster: A New Report On 07/29 - Part 2 (by LipeGIG Aug 1 2011 in Civil Aviation) . The subject is difficult but there seem to be a few indications on possible ways :

- Until about 25 years ago, a type rating was as a matter of fact an LHS rating, proof that a pilot could perform as a PIC on an aircraft, with the knowledge of all systems and the way to operate them... After the type rating was obtained, there was a RHS special syllabus for F/Os.
With UTA, as a lot of captains were also TRE/IREs – therefore RHS-qualified, the game was that the first pilot to put his briefcase on the left seat would fly from that position (those were the days !).

- The need for fully qualified pilots on each position, for most airlines, means that to be perfectly logical with themselves, relief crews would not break the qualification structure of a normal flight deck crew : that every position should be occupied by a fully qualified pilot on that seat... and that means a double crew on long sectors : two captains and two F/Os, solution which poses two problems : one of command and one of costs...

Air France's post AF447 solution of the senior F/O taking the PNF duties, but also the command privileges, from the LHS is not satisfactory ; what we need is a left hand seat-qualified SFO. On this subject, I’d say damn the Union, whose pressure to keep a commander’s privilege on the LHS is now shown as totally moronic.


...(There are another two parts to follow : one on CRM and one on new flight deck equipment... I’ve left them for later as Kairahi has started a nice write-up and have some CRM questions)

Sorry for the long post.



Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
User currently offlinekaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Reply 5, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 17103 times:

Quoting dirtyfrankd (Reply 1):
In my opinion though, the problem plaguing AF is an overall lack of accountability.

I was hoping that this thread would reflect on specific lessons-learned and strategies for addressing them (like Pihero's posts), rather than blanket generalizations with no solution offered.



Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4388 posts, RR: 76
Reply 6, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 17108 times:
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I disagree with the above post. (# 1)
The problem is not Air France, it's general, and probably, worryingly industry-wide.
First of all, when the final report is published, we won't see anything drastically different from what this summary gave, chances are the investigators will concentrate on human factor aspects and give us a better understanding of what happened.
So, I'm all for a new thread on what we can learn from this accident.
Air France bashing is, as a matter oif fact playing the ostrich, refusing to consider that there is a big hole in our safety culture, a hole that has been growing for quite some time but which is just now showing its ugly nature.
It happened because we've given technical solutions to all the problems air safety posed, apart from the tremenduous importance of CRM.
I'd demonstrate that AF 447, along with quite a few other accidents -or mishaps - is a wake-up call, an alarm that's telling us that we should, as a whole group, go back to the human part of the cockpit interface.

[Edited 2011-08-16 08:46:24]


Contrail designer
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4388 posts, RR: 76
Reply 7, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 17050 times:
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Quoting Grid (Reply 3):
I'm not sure whether I thought SA meant something else, what exactly was the reason the Turkish 737 airplane crashed outside Amsterdam?

Quote from the investigation report : "The crew failed to recognise the airspeed decay and the pitch increase until the moment the stick shaker was activated. Subsequently the approach to stall recovery procedure was not executed properly, causing the aircraft to stall and crash. "

Can't be clearer.



Contrail designer
User currently offlineBaroque From Australia, joined Apr 2006, 15380 posts, RR: 59
Reply 8, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 16983 times:

Nothing to contribute except thanks for running a summary. We certainly need it after the prolonged tooing and froing. Although it was noticeable that selective reading helped a great deal. But, especially in Tech/Ops, there were some very useful technical aspects drawn out when those who know referred those who did not to a number of technical references that were extremely illuminating about what is and what is not known.

I could try a summary on a related topic. Lessons for a.net. But I might have "to leave the room" after I did that.


User currently offlinekaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Reply 9, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 16980 times:

Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 2):
there is now a worrying trend of accidents or incidents in which the pilots experienced a total loss of SA – Situational Awareness

   To which I would add, some of these (and many, many others) had issues around crew dynamics, leadership and interaction. I'm working on putting something together ....



Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
User currently offlinekaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Reply 10, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 4 hours ago) and read 16843 times:

Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 9):
some of these (and many, many others) had issues around crew dynamics, leadership and interaction
Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 4):
- The Need for Another Approach to Training -

Early thoughts, that I'm pursuing ....

Most training, and especially ab initio training, focuses very heavily on "technical" skills, with crew dynamics, interaction, CRM introduced much later.

I'm thinking whether there's a place to start right from ab initio training (most of us at some point had an instructor that we found difficult to learn from!). One technique that I found useful in ab initio instructing was to talk a student through a manoeuvre, have them practice it until they thought they were proficient, and then say "OK, you're now the instructor - you're going to talk me through flying it". There were some interesting moments as I followed the instructions! But it presented a great opportunity to discuss/demonstrate situational awareness when someone else is flying the plane, the need for total crew awareness, ensuring the other crew hear/interpret communications, and understanding how the plane is responding to another pilot's inputs, and how well they really understood how to execute the manoeuvre.

The "action" oriented students were interesting - at some point they almost invariably ended up losing it and saying something like "You're doing it wrong" rather than being able to give clear direction. Then we had the discussion about "what could you have done/said differently to make sure we were on the same page and the plane was doing what was wanted".

[Edited 2011-08-16 09:41:57]


Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
User currently offlineAerosol From Germany, joined Oct 2000, 556 posts, RR: 0
Reply 11, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 4 hours ago) and read 16686 times:

On the simplest level - do not underestimate the weather and do not limit your options....

User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4388 posts, RR: 76
Reply 12, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 3 hours ago) and read 16655 times:
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I certainly agree with that sort of training.
Problem is : Do we have the time to keep on teaching that way ?
I'd like to know all about cadet syllabi all over the world but my experience tells me that cadets join their respective airline with fewer than 200 hours of flight, including some twin engined (Beech King Airs seem to be the favourite) "experience".
Then, if chosen to integrate an airline, they'll go through an initial type-ratingt and will be released on the line after six months with some 350 to 400 hours... the maturation will come on the line.



Contrail designer
User currently offlineGrid From Kazakhstan, joined Apr 2010, 624 posts, RR: 0
Reply 13, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 3 hours ago) and read 16573 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 7):
Quote from the investigation report : "The crew failed to recognise the airspeed decay and the pitch increase until the moment the stick shaker was activated. Subsequently the approach to stall recovery procedure was not executed properly, causing the aircraft to stall and crash. "

Can't be clearer.

Ah I see. No, it can't be clearer. Thanks for being petty and adding that superfluous comment at the end of your post.



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User currently offlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21497 posts, RR: 56
Reply 14, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 2 hours ago) and read 16370 times:

Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 2):
In these pictures, there is a trend : the gradual disappearance of the turn-and-slip indicator. It’s still there, but either confined to the sides of the pane, outside the normal scanning pattern or so small one generally doesn’t see it.
The main cause is the development of the yaw damper which took over from the pilot the need for rudder use for turn coordination, thus promoting generations of lazy-footed pilots ( PPP in French for *pilotes au pied paresseux*)

I'd have to disagree with this - the turn-and-slip indicator has disappeared, but the inclinometer (also referred to as the skid ball) is still there, front and center, in every EFIS setup that I've seen, normally right under the angle-of-bank pointer. And I take a look at it regularly, even with both engines running and yaw damper on.

I'll divide my lessons into technical improvements and training improvements:

The technical improvements:

1) In today's era of dirt-cheap data storage and digital recording devices, there is no excuse for recording only the information displayed on the left-side displays. We will never know what the PF of this flight was looking at as he was flying the plane, and that's a great loss.

2) Angle-of-attack indicators should be a part of the EFIS setup (or have their own separate instrument). While I don't think it would have prevented this accident due to what I believe to be a reluctance of the crew to trust their air data instruments, such data is important enough that it might prevent future similar, but not identical, accidents. And since the data is there anyway, putting it up on the screen should be a relatively low cost solution.

Training improvements:

There's really only one here that I can think of: unreliable indications are not trained nearly as much as they should be, IMO. I've gone through two type rating courses, and I have never seen a procedure for how to deal with unreliable indications other than going to reversion mode (and that's really not even practiced in the sim, as it's such a simple procedure - basically flipping a switch and pressing a button or two). But that assumes that it's a malfunction of one of the aircraft's multiple redundant systems rather than an external event that affects all of the layers of redundancy, as happened to AF447 (or if all the layers of redundancy failed, which is a scenario even less likely, but still one that puts the crew in the position of flying the airplane without air data information). I believe that such a procedure exists for the Airbus, and I believe it should be trained (and that it should at least in part be a memory item - as was seen in this accident, things can get out of hand rather quickly).

The typical mantra for dealing with abnormal situations is "fly the airplane, do the checklist." And since flying the airplane is a fairly simple procedure and can be done with the autopilot in most abnormal scenarios, it's generally not given much emphasis. But this is an abnormal scenario where flying the airplane is probably the more involved task than running through the checklist, and it needs to be trained - much time is spent during a type rating on the special techniques needed to fly the airplane with an engine failed, why not spend some time on the special techniques necessary to fly the airplane with no air data indications? It shouldn't require that much extra sim time - all it really involves is knowing where to find the proper numbers and a bit of experience following them.

Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 2):
Stop. Think. Collect your wits.

This would have actually done a great deal of good, I think, if applied immediately after the air data failures. If the plane is flying fine the way it is, there's really not a need to change anything. Sudden action isn't called for in that scenario - just wings level, establish a standard cruise attitude, count slowly to ten, and then start figuring out what you need to do next.

Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 4):
- Until about 25 years ago, a type rating was as a matter of fact an LHS rating, proof that a pilot could perform as a PIC on an aircraft, with the knowledge of all systems and the way to operate them... After the type rating was obtained, there was a RHS special syllabus for F/Os.
With UTA, as a lot of captains were also TRE/IREs – therefore RHS-qualified, the game was that the first pilot to put his briefcase on the left seat would fly from that position (those were the days !).

Just because you're sitting in the right seat doesn't mean you can't know all the systems and the way to operate them (which I agree should be the standard, and all crewmembers should be trained to the same level in that regard). There are very few things that can only be done from the left seat - the only one that really jumps out at me is taxiing.

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offlinekaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Reply 15, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 2 hours ago) and read 16334 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 12):
I certainly agree with that sort of training.
Problem is : Do we have the time to keep on teaching that way ?

Or can we afford not to? In my experience, most ab initio instructors have no training in how to train - they're simply proficient pilots, who may or may not be able to really convey "airmanship" through effective knowledge and skills transfer. My experience is also that the "habits" (good and bad) learned in ab initio training persist throughout a pilot's career.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 12):
they'll go through an initial type-ratingt and will be released on the line after six months with some 350 to 400 hours... the maturation will come on the line.

Is there any coaching / mentorship program at AF, or are they just supposed to suck it up from whomever they're flying with (not singling out AF, just your experience)? Do captains have any training on flying with and transferring skills and knowledge to cadets?

These are basic questions that I would ask within any knowledge-worker organization?



Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
User currently offlinePart147 From Ireland, joined Dec 2008, 478 posts, RR: 0
Reply 16, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 2 hours ago) and read 16293 times:

Quoting Grid (Reply 13):
Ah I see. No, it can't be clearer. Thanks for being petty and adding that comment at the end of your post.

Pihero's comment is perfectly clear, concise and timely to myself and, I'm sure, to many who have been reading this and all the other 447 threads - However your 'tone' is out of sync with the rest of this thread and is IMO (in your own words) superfluous.



It's better to ask a stupid question during training, rather than make a REALLY stupid mistake later on!
User currently offlinePart147 From Ireland, joined Dec 2008, 478 posts, RR: 0
Reply 17, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 2 hours ago) and read 16216 times:

The points about possible training deficiencies are a very important aspect that I think will be highlighted in the final report.

We'll have to wait and see ...

I've been involved in teaching mechanics, ATC, pilots and engineering 'management' over the last almost 20 years - and I can (but I don't like to) sum up the single biggest problem students have when going though training, initially and subsequently ... it's my signature below ...

[Edited 2011-08-16 12:13:19]


It's better to ask a stupid question during training, rather than make a REALLY stupid mistake later on!
User currently offlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21497 posts, RR: 56
Reply 18, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 1 hour ago) and read 16204 times:

Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 15):
In my experience, most ab initio instructors have no training in how to train - they're simply proficient pilots, who may or may not be able to really convey "airmanship" through effective knowledge and skills transfer.

This goes into the deeper question of what the right job for a newly trained pilot is. In the US, at least, it's usually flight instruction, as that's the only thing they're qualified to do. It does seem a bit backwards that you'd be asking people who barely have any experience themselves to be training others, but is there a better alternative? I would tend to think that putting them in a situation with a more experienced captain in order for them to build that experience would be a better way to go, but I'm not entirely convinced.

Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 15):
My experience is also that the "habits" (good and bad) learned in ab initio training persist throughout a pilot's career.

This is certainly true - primacy is a big thing.

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offlineInsideMan From Vatican City, joined Aug 2011, 213 posts, RR: 0
Reply 19, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 1 hour ago) and read 16189 times:

Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 4):
It’s time to remind ourselves that the *deep stall* (for lack of a better word ) the AF447 crew were in resembles the top of a shallow hammerhead figure, for which the escape will be a steep bank followed by a yaw into the dive.

while this certainly would have broken the stall, wouldn't simple nose down inputs have done the same? Eventually the AoA would have gone down enough to generate lift again, don't you think?


User currently offlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21497 posts, RR: 56
Reply 20, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days 1 hour ago) and read 16103 times:

Quoting InsideMan (Reply 19):
while this certainly would have broken the stall, wouldn't simple nose down inputs have done the same? Eventually the AoA would have gone down enough to generate lift again, don't you think?

I'm not an expert on deep stalls, but I believe one of the characteristics of deep stalls is that the horizontal stabilizers (and thus the elevators) become caught in the disturbed airflow off the wings, and thus become ineffective. So nose down inputs might not have worked. Rolling the airplane into a steep bank would help the nose come down, and would allow the rudder (which would still be effective) to yaw the airplane into a further nose-down attitude from which recovery would be possible. Not exactly the most comfortable of maneuvers, and probably involves something approaching 0G for a few seconds, but a lot more comfortable than smacking into the ground at 10,000 feet per minute.

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4388 posts, RR: 76
Reply 21, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days ago) and read 16004 times:
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Quoting Mir (Reply 14):
the turn-and-slip indicator has disappeared, but the inclinometer (also referred to as the skid ball) is still there, front and center, in every EFIS setup that I've seen, normally right under the angle-of-bank pointer. And I take a look at it regularly, even with both engines running and yaw damper on.

Thanks for your post, Mir .
In fact we don(t really disagree, the* ball* is now so small that it requires some effort to watch it.
I generally use it for two occasions : one engine out and trimming a slip out.

Quoting Mir (Reply 14):
Angle-of-attack indicators should be a part of the EFIS setup

W>e have to be really careful here as we don't certainly not want to destroy what has been achieved so far.
Our displays are now to the maximum achievable display of flight data : we run the risk of overdosing on information and very close to saturation. As a matter of fact, it may well be what eventually happened to AF 447 crew :an DI that was showing a lot of sky, an IVSI frozen at a ROD of 6000 ft / min, an ASI showing 60 kt and a blur of an altimeter.
Add to those a spurious stall warning and a GPWS alarm.
I am not against the inclusion of an AoA indicator but its use should be better taught.

Quoting Mir (Reply 14):
Quoting kaiarahi (Reply 2):
Stop. Think. Collect your wits.
Agreed. The initial cause is that rush into a procedure that quickly was proven wrong for their condition. I was talking of the stall escape manoeuvre that would have required spme determined pilotingt actions.

This would have actually done a great deal of good, I think, if applied immediately after the air data failures.
Quoting Mir (Reply 14):

Just because you're sitting in the right seat doesn't mean you can't know all the systems and the way to operate them

Just finding the right panels and switches requires an effort as the point of view has drastically changed. Just try this little test : with a colleague, go to the cockpit, sit on your normal seat and have your friend call for some switchings to be done. Then take the other seat and do the exercise again... I'd bet you won't be as at ease the second time 'round.

Quoting Mir (Reply 14):
There are very few things that can only be done from the left seat - the only one that really jumps out at me is taxiing.

For the past 28 years, I've been flying aircraft with tiller on both sides.



Contrail designer
User currently offlinekaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Reply 22, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days ago) and read 15940 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 21):
Just finding the right panels and switches requires an effort as the point of view has drastically changed. Just try this little test : with a colleague, go to the cockpit, sit on your normal seat and have your friend call for some switchings to be done. Then take the other seat and do the exercise again... I'd bet you won't be as at ease the second time 'round.

  
Not to mention throttles, trim etc on the pedestal, although I realize the Airbus operates with detentes. (Off topic, but on the C-130s I flew, it meant the 8 power/condition levers were the other way round).



Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
User currently offlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21497 posts, RR: 56
Reply 23, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days ago) and read 15901 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 21):
the* ball* is now so small that it requires some effort to watch it.

I find it's actually easier to watch - it is small, but it's more centrally placed, which I find matters more in the big scheme of things.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 21):
W>e have to be really careful here as we don't certainly not want to destroy what has been achieved so far.
Our displays are now to the maximum achievable display of flight data : we run the risk of overdosing on information

I agree when it comes to moving maps, but for PFD instruments I don't think we're there yet. And I do think there's room to add a small AoA indicator, such as seen below:

http://www.b737.org.uk/images/pfd_nd_nps.jpg

I will grant that I've found that I can deal with a fair amount of screen clutter (in fact, I like it that way during low-workload phases of flight), so my opinion might not be the norm. I also grant that if you glance at that screen it can seem pretty crowded, but if you've been watching the various changes that occur throughout the flight, and you can filter information based on what phase of flight you're in (for instance, I wouldn't care about the mach speed, the ref speed, or the AoA at that point in flight), you can add more information without over-cluttering the screen.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 21):
Just finding the right panels and switches requires an effort as the point of view has drastically changed. Just try this little test : with a colleague, go to the cockpit, sit on your normal seat and have your friend call for some switchings to be done. Then take the other seat and do the exercise again... I'd bet you won't be as at ease the second time 'round.

Perhaps, but you shouldn't be flipping switches quickly in an emergency or abnormal situation anyway - that's just inviting errors. Read checklist item, find appropriate switch, make sure it's the correct switch, confirm with the other pilot if necessary (for things like thrust levers and guarded switches), and then flip the switch. I worry far more about knowing the logic behind the switches and what sort of configurations you can expect to see in certain scenarios rather than the actual mechanics of flipping switches and pressing buttons. With today's aircraft having fairly well laid out panels, where all the controls for a certain system are together in one location, so long as you know where those controls are, you shouldn't have a problem doing what needs to be done in a reasonable amount of time.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 21):
For the past 28 years, I've been flying aircraft with tiller on both sides.

I don't doubt it. But it's no secret that there are many aircraft that have a tiller on the left side only, either by manufacturer design or by company preference.

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offlineInsideMan From Vatican City, joined Aug 2011, 213 posts, RR: 0
Reply 24, posted (2 years 11 months 1 week 4 days ago) and read 15833 times:

Quoting Mir (Reply 20):
I'm not an expert on deep stalls, but I believe one of the characteristics of deep stalls is that the horizontal stabilizers (and thus the elevators) become caught in the disturbed airflow off the wings

yes, but this was not a deep stall in the sense that the HS was in the "shadow" of the wings.


25 Pihero : Yes, agreed, but I was more thinking in terms of ease rather than speed. There are some procedures with switches one never touches and that's where t
26 kaiarahi : And I'm wondering if they are in fact qualified to do it. They may be proficient pilots, but that doesn't mean they have any instructional or trainin
27 Mir : Which is why logical grouping of switches is so important. And manufacturers have done very well in this regard - whoever came up with the idea of mi
28 Post contains images cuban8 : I don't want to be the boring person of this thread and I agree that out of every incident / accident there is something to be learned. In the mean t
29 Pihero : Mir, We're turning circles here. I know for a fact that operating the systems is different, depending on which side you're the most accustomed to. Fi
30 Pihero : Not really different from others, like on the list above, but this time the importance of the human factor has never been so high. As I said earlier,
31 ltbewr : One problem with many of these lessons is that it will take money for improved equipment, more training, or just giving pilots more leeway to not fly
32 Baroque : That is probably the saddest thing, a touch of masterly inactivity might not so much have saved the day as stopped it going pear shaped! Seconded. Su
33 Pihero : Mandala499 was the first to posit some sort of spatial disorientation and it is a probability that we should not dismiss. Which takes us to the *tunn
34 cuban8 : I agree with you that more training and more experience may reduce the amount of accidents in the world, but at the end "ltbewr" is right. It comes a
35 Rara : I for one am pretty sure of that. Four sim hours of high-altitude stall awareness, recognition and recovery should have tipped off at least one of th
36 jollo : I am reposting a question "lost" in the other thread "AF447 Disaster: A New Report On 07/29 - Part 2 ": what is the relevance of seat assignement in t
37 Navigator : I agree! This is a training issue and it is also about very basic training. Stall recovery is something even private pilots learn in one of their fir
38 kaiarahi : And the AF pilots certainly had that training, but it's largely irrelevant - this was not the kind of stall you see in ab initio training in a Cessna
39 rfields5421 : I'm sure airlines other than AF have looked at this crash, and looked at the data - let us hope they will implement the recommendations for more trai
40 tdscanuck : But they only got there by ignoring the initial stall warning. The proper training is how to properly respond to 1) loss of airspeed at altitude and
41 Post contains images keta : It's interesting to see how situational awareness plays a key role in some accidents. Indeed, it's a subject of extreme importance and cockpit instrum
42 cuban8 : Well that's not exactly what I wrote. You usually do not get the luxury of practicing only high-altitude stalls on a full four hour sim-session. That
43 kaiarahi : I agree. I just wanted to counter the often repeated assumption that what was happening here was comparable to what every PPL has experienced in a Ce
44 Pihero : You're dead wrong. read again the report. At least we should give it a damn good try. Do you know another industry where they've achieved this level
45 Pihero : First of all, ENAC has never been the Air France pilot school. It's a government-owned "grande Ecole" which teaches all sorts of aviation professiona
46 Pihero : The only difference, IMO is in the throttle response . The 340 responds a lot slower to throttle, but the difference seem to fade with altitude. They
47 Post contains images cuban8 : Very constructive comment I've read the report many times and if you read the communication in the cockpit retrieved from the CVR, you can see that t
48 Post contains links and images mandala499 : OMG, I took a day off or two and a new topic is made with close to 50 replies already? I'm going to be a bit harsh on this reply on some aspects... ma
49 Pihero : You know, your posts are a fascinating lesson on how people are quick to judge others 'action while refusing to see their own failings. To start, and
50 rfields5421 : The aircraft became uncontrollable because the wing failed structurally due to intense heat of the fire literally melting structural elements and the
51 Mir : How extensive is the syllabus? In the programs I've seen, most of the training is from the left seat, and then for a right-seat qualification only a
52 Post contains images mandala499 : It is indeed!!!!! HDG and FPV(vertical)... It's been a while since I had a good look at an e-jet PFD! I imagine it's not as easy tracking the magenta
53 Mir : Actually, I'm not so sure anymore. The green dot might be the FD in a very different presentation - I don't see a crosshair or single-cue, and unless
54 Post contains images Rara : I did not advocate that. AF447 so far seems like a unique case, so it's not really a pressing problem to address. But you asked, could four additiona
55 jollo : Thanks. So the PNF wasn't qualified to fly from the seat he was sitting into (left), and that might have contributed to his reluctance to take over:
56 mandala499 : It is HDG and FPV(vertical).The FD gives a diamond in magenta, what you do is maneuver so you put the magenta diamond in the bird. Shove an FPA on it
57 AirCalSNA : Today's "Ask the Pilot" column presents an interesting excerpt from an anonymous A330 captain who suggests that the A330 may have an engineering probl
58 InsideMan : yes, it's crazy but sadly true.... As for the rest of the "article" I doubt any serious Airbus Captain would express this opinion in this way. Do you
59 Post contains links AirCalSNA : Here you go. (I didn't want to attach it before because the Airliners.net censors seem to be so touchy.) I actually quoted the entire part of the art
60 mandala499 : I suggest that the so called "anonymous A330 captain" read the BEA report... especially on the FDR plots... and also understand the protection (or la
61 InsideMan : reading some more from Patrick Smith I get the feeling he is not nearly as knowlegable as he claims he is. I almost get the feeling he pulled the anon
62 AirCalSNA : I think he's a member here ... maybe he'll respond on his own behalf.
63 mandala499 : OK, this adds to the lessons learnt from AF447: 1. Some/many People (including those who publish or contribute to publication claiming to be knowledg
64 Post contains images InsideMan :
65 Pihero : all from a very good self ad : "... Ask the Pilot, a long-running feature on Salon, is the Web's most trenchant and insightful source for all things
66 tdscanuck : Does Airbus use any kind of unusual attitude PFD symbology? Some Boeing HUD's switch modes when the pitch/roll get outside certain values. The scales
67 cuban8 : Obviously, you're not reading all my posts and from your response, it seems like you are quick to judge others. In the same post you are accusing me
68 kaiarahi : Dude: 1. It's totally irrelevant to this thread 2. Do you really think that that 2 fire extinguisher bottles were activated (per the captain's instru
69 cuban8 : Agreed. My point of mentioning the AF4590 in the first place was to point out that even the most experienced and well trained pilots takes split-seco
70 tdscanuck : They were trading airspeed for altitude...you can get climb rates well in excess of 7,000 fpm if you don't care about maintaining airspeed. The reaso
71 Pihero : to cuban8 : Intellectual dishonesty starts when someone censors a text to fit his agenda. The whole exchange about the # 2 engine shut down for fire a
72 cuban8 : The same goes for you in both cases. You interpret / assume for instance that the AF447 pilots were not properly trained. I disagree with that statem
73 Post contains images cuban8 : Now that would be a shame. You already seem worried enough about all kinds of things.
74 Pihero : When you are ready to answer the questions that are posed to you, When you are ready to accept with honesty a fact that has been shown to you (in this
75 cuban8 : Pihero ease up a bit, this is just a forum sharing opinions. Nothing to get all excited about. I just used the Concorde crash as an example, I could h
76 Post contains images InsideMan : Please read the report. "The investigation brought to light weaknesses in the two copilots: the inappropriate inputs by the PF on the flight controls
77 tdscanuck : I certainly don't. I think they pulled a 7,000 fpm climb without realizing they were doing it. The PF demonstrated, for significant periods to time,
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