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Popular Mechanics: AF447 Article  
User currently offlineholzmann From United States of America, joined Jan 2011, 221 posts, RR: 0
Posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 27252 times:

Two years after the Airbus 330 plunged into the Atlantic Ocean, Air France 447's flight-data recorders finally turned up. The revelations from the pilot transcript paint a surprising picture of chaos in the cockpit, and confusion between the pilots that led to the crash.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/tech...ened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877

174 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlinePu From Sweden, joined Dec 2011, 699 posts, RR: 14
Reply 1, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 13 hours ago) and read 27024 times:

But neither Bonin nor Roberts has ever received training in how to deal with an unreliable airspeed indicator at cruise altitude, or in flying the airplane by hand under such conditions....and the reason may be that they believe it is impossible for them to stall the airplane.

Frightening stuff. The passenger experience must have been utterly terrifying.

Of course in the transcript it seems so clear, they only had to drop the nose and recover from the stall, a lesson from early pilot training....and we've seen so many inexperienced pilots like this try pulling back on the yoke/stick instead of letting it nose over to gain speed. But certainly other things were going on, partly human factors, partly equipment factors, that kept the pilots from realising what was going on. I'd put this at about 90% human error contributed with about 10% from software and hardware features that just served to reinforece their lack of situational awareness.


Pu


User currently offlineGrid From Kazakhstan, joined Apr 2010, 624 posts, RR: 0
Reply 2, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 13 hours ago) and read 26903 times:

It says the plane was climbing at a rate of 7000 feet per second. In normal situations, when pilots are increasing altitude when already at cruising speed, what would the climb rate be?


ATR72 E120 E140 E170 E190 Q200 717 727 737 747 757 767 777 A319 A320 A321 A330 A340 MD11 MD82 MD83 MD88 MD90
User currently offlineplanespotting From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 3527 posts, RR: 5
Reply 3, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 13 hours ago) and read 26895 times:

That is a chilling article, especially the summary of the flight control inputs and instrumentation readouts in between the quotes:


02:13:40 (Robert) Remonte... remonte... remonte... remonte...
Climb... climb... climb... climb...

02:13:40 (Bonin) Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure!
But I've had the stick back the whole time!

At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself.

02:13:42 (Captain) Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non.
No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.


The poor captain, sitting in the jumpseat watching in horror as his airplane plunges through 5,000 feet, finally understanding why they've literally fallen out of fthe sky.

It kind of breaks your heart.



Do you like movies about gladiators?
User currently offlineEDICHC From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 4, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 12 hours ago) and read 26701 times:

Quoting Grid (Reply 2):
In normal situations, when pilots are increasing altitude when already at cruising speed, what would the climb rate be?

Depending on a/c type anything from 1200-1800 fpm.


User currently offlinespacecadet From United States of America, joined Sep 2001, 3629 posts, RR: 12
Reply 5, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 26326 times:

Quoting Pu (Reply 1):
The passenger experience must have been utterly terrifying.

The passenger experience was probably nonexistent. There's no indication anybody would have known anything was happening. All indications from the BEA are that it wasn't even all that turbulent - certainly not abnormally turbulent. And a passenger would have no way of "feeling" a sustained stall in a large airliner - there's no way to feel angle of attack. Their attitude was not all that abnormal except for being somewhat nose-up through most of the descent, and with engines at full power. I suspect most people simply thought they were trying to climb to a higher altitude to get out of the turbulence, as is normal. Then they suddenly hit the water, at which point it's unlikely anybody knew anything further.

Quoting Grid (Reply 2):
It says the plane was climbing at a rate of 7000 feet per second

Gotta be 7000 feet per minute; 7000 feet per second, you'd need a rocket engine attached to the plane.



I'm tired of being a wanna-be league bowler. I wanna be a league bowler!
User currently offlineltbewr From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 13116 posts, RR: 12
Reply 6, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 9 hours ago) and read 26027 times:

One of the issues discussed in this fine article is how the pilots didn't even plan to try to avoid the worst risk weather/environmental area in a place infamous for that while other flights did so. I have long believed that had they made an adjustment of as little as 5 miles, or a few degrees north, as other flights did in the region of the South Atlantic, they could have avoided the worst of the storm and been able to never be in trouble. One has to wonder if the PIC was afraid to deviate due to overly strict rules as to flying routes to limit fuel use and to limit the need for a refueling stop.

The article notes the unusually warmer weather at their cruising level, that they knew of the risks of that, which in part resulted in the icing conditions they flew into, icing the pitot tube speed sensors and inaccurate speed readings with the scenario that some experts believe led in part for the flights doom.

I wonder since the AF 447 disaster, AF and other airlines have changed their polices as flying routes in the South Atlantic Equatorial zone to allow PIC's to change routes to avoid the highest risk situations as was with AF 447 even if shorten range and require a refueling stop.


User currently offlineGrid From Kazakhstan, joined Apr 2010, 624 posts, RR: 0
Reply 7, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 6 hours ago) and read 25636 times:

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 5):
Gotta be 7000 feet per minute; 7000 feet per second, you'd need a rocket engine attached to the plane.

Yep, that was a typo on my part.



ATR72 E120 E140 E170 E190 Q200 717 727 737 747 757 767 777 A319 A320 A321 A330 A340 MD11 MD82 MD83 MD88 MD90
User currently offlinespacecadet From United States of America, joined Sep 2001, 3629 posts, RR: 12
Reply 8, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 3 hours ago) and read 25319 times:

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 6):
One has to wonder if the PIC was afraid to deviate due to overly strict rules as to flying routes to limit fuel use and to limit the need for a refueling stop.

Well, that was discussed (and if I remember right, debunked) in the many other threads on this accident. But what it says in that same area of this article - and it's a detail I hadn't known before - is that the radar was set in an "incorrect mode". Now, this article is not bad but I still think it was written by a non-aviator and therefore has a few oddities about it, and so I wonder if they really meant wrong "mode" or that it just wasn't optimally set - aviation weather radar is complex, and it may have been in the right "mode" but just not set in a way that could identify the weather ahead of them until they tried some different settings. But this seems like it would be at least another link in the accident chain in either case, though not necessarily the fault of the pilots.

However, as both this article and the official interim report have made pretty clear, the weather was not the cause of this accident, so diversion or not wouldn't have mattered. The weather they actually flew into was not really that bad. Or who knows, maybe if they'd been just 10 feet to the left, their pitot tubes wouldn't have frozen over and they'd still be here today. But they'd still be flying around with inadequate training and experience and with pitot tubes that can too easily freeze, and this would still be an accident waiting to happen, and at some point, the same thing would happen to them or somebody else. Murphy's Law applies to aviation more than anything else I can think of. The actual problems that led to this accident needed to be addressed.



I'm tired of being a wanna-be league bowler. I wanna be a league bowler!
User currently offlineRIXrat From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 789 posts, RR: 0
Reply 9, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 2 hours ago) and read 24736 times:

I'm not pro A or B, but I think that that the sticks for both pilots should indicate forward or backward movement. The second pilot didn't have a clue until the very end that the junior FO had pulled the stick all the way back during the whole incident. That could have done them in.

User currently offlineUALWN From Andorra, joined Jun 2009, 2806 posts, RR: 2
Reply 10, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 1 hour ago) and read 24390 times:

Quoting RIXrat (Reply 9):
The second pilot didn't have a clue until the very end that the junior FO had pulled the stick all the way back during the whole incident.

This is not true, and it has been discussed here a number of times. The PNF was constantly communicating with the PF about what he was doing. Read the report.



AT7/111/146/Avro/CRJ/CR9/EMB/ERJ/E75/F50/100/L15/DC9/D10/M8X/717/727/737/747/757/767/777/AB6/310/319/320/321/330/340/380
User currently offlinenighthawk From UK - Scotland, joined Sep 2001, 5157 posts, RR: 33
Reply 11, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 1 hour ago) and read 24234 times:

Quoting UALWN (Reply 10):
This is not true, and it has been discussed here a number of times. The PNF was constantly communicating with the PF about what he was doing. Read the report.

The article linked in the original post specifically states that the PNF was not aware of the fact that the PF had pulled the stick back, and they suggest this contributed significantly to the accident.

Is this article therefore incorrect?



That'll teach you
User currently offlineUALWN From Andorra, joined Jun 2009, 2806 posts, RR: 2
Reply 12, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 1 hour ago) and read 24215 times:

Quoting nighthawk (Reply 11):
Is this article therefore incorrect?

Again, read the official BEA report and draw your won conclusions.



AT7/111/146/Avro/CRJ/CR9/EMB/ERJ/E75/F50/100/L15/DC9/D10/M8X/717/727/737/747/757/767/777/AB6/310/319/320/321/330/340/380
User currently offlinetommytoyz From Tonga, joined Jan 2007, 1353 posts, RR: 6
Reply 13, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days 1 hour ago) and read 24128 times:

Quoting UALWN (Reply 10):
This is not true, and it has been discussed here a number of times. The PNF was constantly communicating with the PF about what he was doing. Read the report.

The voice transcript does indicate there was confusion, as the pilot was told to go down and he didn't, even though he said he would, etc....I really have an issue with those side sticks as there is no tactile feedback for the monitoring pilot and no easy visual cue either. With the yokes just about everybody else uses (not just Boeing), there are much better tactile and visual cues for the monitoring pilot.

I know many people think I am wrong. But that's my opinion. And I think it's pretty clear and the AF447 incident provides a lot of food for thought on that. I've heard a lot of arguments against my opinion and nothing has convinced me to change my opinion. Clear and strong tactile and visual cues to monitoring pilots as to the control inputs are critically important, especially in emergency situations.


User currently offlineairproxx From France, joined Jun 2008, 636 posts, RR: 0
Reply 14, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 5 days ago) and read 23740 times:

Quoting holzmann (Thread starter):
Two years after the Airbus 330 plunged into the Atlantic Ocean, Air France 447's flight-data recorders finally turned up. The revelations from the pilot transcript paint a surprising picture of chaos in the cockpit, and confusion between the pilots that led to the crash.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/tech...11877

I thought before that guys posting articles on A.net were a little concerned about aviation matters in a good way. NOT about tabloids released by poorly informed and biased press.

There's actually a lawsuit filed by AF biggest pilots union, SNPL, to find how this transcription can now be found that simply on the internet, and most of all, how it has been leaked from the so called "respectable" BEA.

This institution is a shame for civil aviation, this type of info should have never been leaked on any book, or any publication of any type before the official report was released. I'm curious to see what the investigation about this leaks will conclude.... But again, Otelli is a stupid ass, with no other concern than his own profit on this story. He is not a pilot, not even a man. No respect for pilots and their families.

Starting a book entitled "erreurs humaines" (human errors) to treat of a fatal crash which conclusions have not be published yet it, to me, criminal. This man should be treated like a criminal.

I'm ashamed that Otelli is french, I'm ashamed the BEA is french, I'm ashamed to see that France is still under the influence of a downgraded press, manipulated by bigger interest, and first of these, the Airbus reputation worldwide.
I'm ashamed to be french.

Human lives in this country have no price, and yet, no cost.



If you can meet with triumph and disaster, and treat those two impostors just the same
User currently offlinenighthawk From UK - Scotland, joined Sep 2001, 5157 posts, RR: 33
Reply 15, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 23250 times:

Quoting tommytoyz (Reply 13):
I know many people think I am wrong. But that's my opinion. And I think it's pretty clear and the AF447 incident provides a lot of food for thought on that. I've heard a lot of arguments against my opinion and nothing has convinced me to change my opinion. Clear and strong tactile and visual cues to monitoring pilots as to the control inputs are critically important, especially in emergency situations.

I completely agree with you, the fact that there is no feedback to the PNF is rather weird to me. The concept that if one pilot pulls back, and the other pushes forward, the plane chooses to average these out is also a little weird. Clearly one of them is right, and one wrong, so to do nothing seems counter productive.



That'll teach you
User currently offlineUALWN From Andorra, joined Jun 2009, 2806 posts, RR: 2
Reply 16, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 23220 times:

Quoting tommytoyz (Reply 13):
The voice transcript does indicate there was confusion, as the pilot was told to go down and he didn't, even though he said he would, etc..

That was the PF's problem, not a feedback problem.

Quoting tommytoyz (Reply 13):
I really have an issue with those side sticks

We know that.

Quoting tommytoyz (Reply 13):
I know many people think I am wrong.

Indeed.

Quoting tommytoyz (Reply 13):
I've heard a lot of arguments against my opinion and nothing has convinced me to change my opinion.

So I won't try again.



AT7/111/146/Avro/CRJ/CR9/EMB/ERJ/E75/F50/100/L15/DC9/D10/M8X/717/727/737/747/757/767/777/AB6/310/319/320/321/330/340/380
User currently offlinemurchmo From United States of America, joined Sep 2005, 166 posts, RR: 0
Reply 17, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 23189 times:

Am I the only one that remembers that there was a possibility of the weather radar showing a small cell that blocked the larger storm behind it? That all previous flights diverted around but 447 didn't because the smaller cell may have blocked their radar from seeing the worse weather behind it. Ring any bells?


to strive to seek to find and not to yield
User currently offlinefsnuffer From United States of America, joined Jun 2007, 252 posts, RR: 0
Reply 18, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 23011 times:

The question I have for the group is once your instrumentation becomes unreliable when do you trust it again? They had no outside visual references, unreliable instrumentation, at an altitude with very little stall/over speed margins, and in a violent thunder storm. I guess this accident falls back to the advice I got from one of my instructors when he said always trust your instruments. When I asked him what if they were unreliable his response was "you're dead anyway at that point"

User currently offlinetommytoyz From Tonga, joined Jan 2007, 1353 posts, RR: 6
Reply 19, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 22 hours ago) and read 22848 times:

Quoting nighthawk (Reply 15):
I completely agree with you, the fact that there is no feedback to the PNF is rather weird to me. The concept that if one pilot pulls back, and the other pushes forward, the plane chooses to average these out is also a little weird. Clearly one of them is right, and one wrong, so to do nothing seems counter productive.

I don't think it works that way, where both can input at the same time. At least not how AB has it programmed. With AB, only one or the other is in control at one time, but not both.

But that does not change the fact that the tactile and visual cues have been almost totally removed - by design. Like I posed before, what happens for instance in a smoke filled cockpit? And probably other situations were flight monitoring is much more difficult, compared to interconnected yokes or sticks. At the very least, I think AB should interconnect the side sticks somehow, to allow at least the tactile feedback for the PNF.

I am not saying this would have saved AF447, but I am not ruling it out either, as it is not perfectly clear that the others were completely aware of the stick inputs by the PF. And I don't think this can ever be answered definitively. This is not an AB bash or pump for Boeing.


User currently offlinetommytoyz From Tonga, joined Jan 2007, 1353 posts, RR: 6
Reply 20, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 22 hours ago) and read 22805 times:

Quoting fsnuffer (Reply 18):
The question I have for the group is once your instrumentation becomes unreliable when do you trust it again

The only instrument unreliable was the airspeed and they called out unreliable airspeed. Something to the effect of...so we've lost the speeds...They still had everything else and nothing else was called out as unreliable. What went through their heads, is another matter, especially the Pilot Flying (PF).


User currently offlineRevo1059 From United States of America, joined Mar 2006, 133 posts, RR: 0
Reply 21, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 21 hours ago) and read 21712 times:

Just out of curiosity, would having GPS based instrumentation onboard helped with the airspeed issue? I would think that it would not be affected.

User currently offlinewashingtonian From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 22, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 20 hours ago) and read 21357 times:

Quoting murchmo (Reply 17):
Am I the only one that remembers that there was a possibility of the weather radar showing a small cell that blocked the larger storm behind it? That all previous flights diverted around but 447 didn't because the smaller cell may have blocked their radar from seeing the worse weather behind it. Ring any bells?

Yes, I remember this from a few months ago. I am confused by the Popular Mechanics article though--it alludes three times to other airliners diverting around the storm that night, but 447 not doing so. No explanation given except that pehaps their weather radar was on an "incorrect" setting, whatever that means. Can anyone elaborate?

Also, I'm confused by how the two pilots could have been yanking the controls in different directions. If both pilots are doing that, which one does the airplane computer accept?


User currently offline5MillionMiler From Australia, joined Sep 2011, 88 posts, RR: 0
Reply 23, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 20 hours ago) and read 21075 times:

Might be helpful to have an indicator on the primary display reflecting each side sticks input direction. Side sticks are nice that they give space, but yokes with sympathetic movement and moving throttles in auto do give you a reassuring sense of what is happening mechanically.

I appreciate that human error post equipment failure is a big factor here, but the number of factors that hit them quickly and overwhelmed them undoubtedly created a situation which is much easier to judge from the safety of an armchair on the ground. When you are flying in the dark, in cloud, in turbulence and you cannot trust your instruments that would be chaos. Look at the ANA 73G that rolled on its back and they did not even notice it until they were inverted. Gs, AOA hard to sense and the human gyro gets confused.

Hope that this scenario is trained for now. Can anyone comment on whether this is scenario is done in sim checks like DL 191 was profiled for training in the sim for microbursts? Two 757s have been lost due to PITOT issues resulting in disorientation at night, so it's not just an Airbus or a computerised plane issue.

But getting into that situation in the first place perhaps could have been averted altogether as the start of the chain of events begins with a flight through an area with significant weather considerations that others wisely chose to avoid. Flying into an area of severe weather is always asking for trouble.

QF 72 had the AIRDU issues in clear air in daylight. Had that been at night in weather it could have been much worse. Fortunately in that case, when machine failed, man quickly took control and recovered the airplane.


User currently offlinedaviation From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 24, posted (2 years 9 months 2 weeks 4 days 19 hours ago) and read 20559 times:

One item that caught my eye was the pilots' (short-lived) happiness that they were flying the 330 rather than the 340. Supposedly, the 330 has better performance at altitude than the 340. Why would that be? I was under the impression that the performance characteristics are virtually the same.

25 BladeLWS : From the transcript it looks like the airspeed was only out for a short time in the begining, and that they had airspeed on both sides as they descen
26 RoseFlyer : The article is definitely journalism by a non aviation person and therefore not a technical read like a full accident report, but nonetheless I find i
27 ikramerica : The actions of the pilots caused the deaths of over 200 people. I am so tired of this idea that we must "respect" people who do harm simply because t
28 OB1783P : In my mind, I have classified this among the accidents that would not have happened in the daylight hours, like quite a few others: Kenya 431, Ethiopi
29 type-rated : I'm just shocked that the F/O just held continuous back pressure on the stick. Maybe he was frozen with fear? All they would have needed to do would b
30 Post contains images garpd : My sentiments exactly.
31 robsaw : I guess there is no gravity then. Of course we humans can feel all sorts of directional forces and roughly interpret angles as long as too many thing
32 tommytoyz : No, that is the problem of everyone on board. There is a reason why there is a monitoring pilot on all airliners and he has to be able to monitor in
33 Post contains images slvrblt : Exactly . Because this was an epic example of panic. Why the PIC wasn't instantly energized, upon realization of the predicament, to jump in, knock t
34 ukoverlander : GPS unfortunately only gives you ground speed, not air speed. That is not going to help you in a potential stall situation where air speed is the cri
35 Post contains images flyingturtle : In any case, they never called for the unreliable airspeed procedure... they were trying to solve all the stuff ad hoc. They never formulated a clear
36 garpd : I don't want to fan the flames on this debate, but I've spoken to 3 pilots now, all of whom have read the transcript in the linked article. They all
37 Post contains images tugger : I ask this genuinely: Do side sticks NOT match each other, meaning the sides sticks move in unison (regardless if only one is the one in command)? Si
38 airtechy : I like the idea of joysticks.....on Microsoft Flight Simulator. They have no place in an actual cockpit....at least the way Airbus has implemented the
39 spacecadet : Why don't you think it would happen in daylight hours? The pilots were well aware of their altitude and attitude. They were not aware of their speed,
40 Post contains images Birdwatching : Wow, I just read the whole transcript. I can't believe Air France puts pilots in their cockpits who pull up for minutes when the plane is stalling. Is
41 UALWN : This has been discussed in a.net to death by professionals: pilots, test pilots, accident investigators, etc. You can continue to tell us what you th
42 tozairport : I tend to agree. Air France obviously has a very serious training/safety problem that needs to addressed. They have had too many incidents/accidents
43 Revo1059 : Which makes me wonder, with todays planes having so much computer control and the pilot not required to do as much during normal flight these days I
44 tugger : While I understand that and have read the various releases to some degree and have continued to go back to them when needed, my comment was to yours
45 UALWN : This has been answered and discussed a number of times in the numerous AF447 threads. Unfortunately, those people are so far missing from this thread
46 tommytoyz : The side sticks are not coupled. When one is moved, the other doesn't. First of all, if it were such a great idea, then why does it continue to gener
47 COEWR787 : I fully agree with that sentiment. It is always better to publish critical information than to hid and massage it to serve the purposes of small grou
48 Qazar : Uhhhhh...... I feel a hole in my stomach after reading this article.... What a terrible terrible terrible way to die... The passengers, the crew, even
49 tommytoyz : It's interesting to note that the aircraft computer on AF447 knew it was stalled, but didn't do anything with that information. Here again, if the air
50 Post contains images United727 : With the mention of MSFS, there are SEVERAL joysticks available with servo activated feedback systems for a more real feel with flying a computer sim
51 UALWN : Did nothing? The stall warning blared for over 50 s uninterruptedly. I would say that that counts as transmitting that information to the pilots. Yet
52 XFSUgimpLB41X : The aircraft was yelling out "stall" to them almost continuously. They were in Alternate law... which apparently the neither of the FO's recognized.
53 csavel : Well, their ears would probably pop, as on ascent/descent and that is unusual in cruise, and if one were to look @ the moving map, well I don't know
54 United727 : Maybe, take over for the pilots and get the plane out of harm's sight???? I recall a TV segment on YouTube (specific to the A320) where the aircraft
55 tommytoyz : In the sense that the aircraft systems did not communicate the fully stalled condition to the pilots, even though the systems knew this to be the cas
56 tommytoyz : I think they knew they were in alternate law. If I remember correctly from the transcript, they called it out. Secondly the AoA was never interpreted
57 sandyb123 : That's actually quite a worrying fact that I haven't seen come out of this incident before. This was asked earlier in this thread but which input doe
58 797 : Everyone, I'm a pilot and I can definitely feel changes in attitude and heading when you reach the vicinities of the aircraft's envelope, eyes opened,
59 XFSUgimpLB41X : I don't remember reading that from the transcript, nor is it referenced in the PM article. His actions dictate that he believed he was in normal, how
60 dfambro : It's just A.net wishful thinking that passengers would have been blissfully unaware that something was seriously amiss. The interim report has nice t
61 UALWN : The aircraft was flying in alternate law because of the unreliable speed indication. Hence, the computer did not "take over". I've seen that. That wa
62 UALWN : As far as I know, no aircraft warns the pilots about being in a full stalled situation. Why? Because you are not supposed to ever be in a full stall
63 ThrottleHold : They do not match each other. WHen one sidestick is moved, the other remains in the neutral position. Yes it can! Dual inputs are averaged out. So if
64 ThrottleHold : They're missing because it gets tedious trying to explain the same thing to people who make sweeping generalisations about things they don't actually
65 UALWN : I fully agree...
66 tommytoyz : That's what should change, IMO. While no airliner "should" ever be stalled, AF447 shows it can happen anyway, doesn't it? When stalled, it should be
67 UALWN : Sorry but he never mentions anything about a new alert for a fully developed stall. Wasn't this the point in discusion?
68 tdscanuck : Only by deliberately flying through the stall warning. There's nothing in aircraft to prevent a pilot from just driving off the end of the runway by
69 tommytoyz : I am certain that the AF447 pilots had no intention of stalling, and there for did not do so deliberately. It is not even clear they ever knew they w
70 tdscanuck : They didn't deliberately stall...they did deliberately pull through the stall warning (because they didn't believe it). It's very clear that they did
71 tommytoyz : They didn't believe what exactly? Since the stall warning is identical, whether 1) approaching a stall or 2) actually stalled, it does not communicat
72 ThrottleHold : From the article.. "Suddenly, a strange aroma, like an electrical transformer, floods the cockpit, and the temperature suddenly increases. At first, t
73 tdscanuck : They didn't believe they were approaching a stall. They appeared to lump the stall warning into the same bucket as the unreliable airspeed and treate
74 tommytoyz : Who ever said that? It wasn't me. Designs can always be improved upon and made better. Don't you agree? If you believe that, everything that follows
75 Post contains links Chamonix : http://af447.typepad.com/af447/2011/11/a330-pilot-speaks-out.html
76 UALWN : But they knew they were not in normal law (they called it out), while it's not obvious they knew they were approaching a stall (they did not call it
77 Pihero : This thread is such a load of rubbish that can't see where to start. That technique is certainly not taught to anybody flying a 'Bus. To write so sho
78 ComeAndGo : they applied the right procedure but for the wrong altitude. That's why it appears that they're not responding. The pilot was trained for stall &
79 airtechy : Not a very good testimonial for the sidestick or the throttle control ... or lack thereof..is it? Jim
80 tommytoyz : OK, that is where your knowledge of the exact procedure would help out here and clarify. It would be a great contribution. However, in reading Captai
81 Post contains links tommytoyz : Stall accidents are not as rare as some here believe: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener...ca0711p2.xml&headline=null&next=10 "Of the 89 fat
82 United727 : It says, and I quote, "Remember,the Airbus flies like no other aircraft in that the Sidestick provides no feedback to the pilot. It is a video game,n
83 Post contains links tommytoyz : I find it hard to believe, but if true, this is where the main fault is in the AF447 accident, no question, IMHO: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener
84 Post contains links tommytoyz : Fair use: ""If we just say the pilots screwed up, then we're not going to learn anything and we're not going to prevent future accidents." Ultimately,
85 tdscanuck : You said they should change the warning system. That's a design problem. Of course, but that's a complete red herring in this case. It's not related
86 tommytoyz : You can define improvements to technology that way, if you like. I'll take you word for it. My bad. Only if pilots are trained in high altitude recov
87 SandroZRH : On a recent flight, I discussed this incident in depth with my collegue and we used checklists and manuals to get just the slightest picture of what
88 tommytoyz : I stand corrected. Thanks for the info.
89 Pihero : Wrong. TOGA /Nose Up has never been a stall recovery method, on any aircraft that I know of, at any altitude. See Tom's : When are you going to ackno
90 United727 : Merely attempting to quote another...yet no one attempted to answer the real "logical" question about adding servo operated sidesticks... The questio
91 ThrottleHold : MSFS isn't real, just because the technology exists there doesn't make it correct. 99.9% of Airbus pilots have no problem with the sidestick. I love
92 tommytoyz : I'll take your word on that and that it applies to the A330. Thanks for the clarification. I have been "miseducated". I always thought that strange,
93 tdscanuck : It's an interesting human factors problem why a crew would take a procedure that is for one flight regime (low altitude) and not for this flight cond
94 Post contains images Pihero : A very real problem on this forum is that a lot of people have an agenda and funny enough, their articles are the most likely to be believed by non p
95 AdmiralRitt : Some folks here are being a bit esoteric in trying to contain the blame for AF447 to Air France. Part of the blame should go to Airbus. I am not sayin
96 Post contains images SandroZRH : Here we go again I'm not going to write a whole essay about this topic AGAIN, but i can wholeheartedly say that after over 1600 hours flying Airbuses
97 Pihero : ...and another gutter find . Some people seem to have really too much time to do the serious research. Instead Otelli, Rapoport... who 'll be the next
98 Post contains images mandala499 : Oh boy... here we go again eh Tommytoyz? OK, let me repeat again from the previous topics. The sidestick is a trajectory command input device, it is n
99 tommytoyz : mandala, I am talking about the difficulty in visually monitoring the control inputs by the PNF and you go on about what the stick does and how it wor
100 Pihero : I really do like people with an agenda. They are so obvious. But I know they're not going to change whatever the argument, so I'm out of this subject.
101 airtechy : It's not possible to argue against the side stick without getting into an AB comparison because as far as I know Airbus is the only commercial airline
102 ebbuk : If the pilots did not have the correct training to deal with the situation, how is a plane with a yoke or side stick going to help/ hinder them? It's
103 airtechy : It only requires one pilot who knows how to recover from a high altitude stall to take control and recover. If he is busy trying to access the conflic
104 tdscanuck : The AoA window doesn't get narrow at altitude...allowable AoA is speed-insensitive provided you're not talking about configuration changes. You can f
105 ThrottleHold : Well said. I'm still reading this thread, but I've no intention of adding anything to the "debate". It's just full of inexperienced amateurs with an
106 flyingturtle : Just to throw in a question: A stall warning always takes precedence over unreliable airspeed and other failures? Or are there any exceptions?
107 Post contains images David L : And yet the same has happened on aircraft with cross-coupled yokes. If you read the CVR transcript, you'll find that the PNF and Captain kept telling
108 Pihero : Sorry Tom. You're right I typed too fast , starting on a generalisation on "classic" flight controls, à la 767 and its generation. On top of that ,
109 tdscanuck : I'm not willing to swear there are no exceptions but I certainly can't think of one. I can't think of a failure (that can be corrected by the flight
110 COEWR787 : Very well put. That really is the core issue related to this sidestick vs yoke discussion. The rest of it is peripheral as far as the immediate issue
111 David L : It would have allowed the PNF and Captain to tell the PF to stop "going up" and to start "going down" and to tell him he was "going up" when he thoug
112 Post contains images mandala499 : The procedure apply for NORM, ALT1, ALT2 and DIRect laws. Certified airliners? Sukhoi Superjet use the sidestick. It does not get implemented as a co
113 PITingres : With the emphasis on "possibly", and this amateur thinks it's a very very remote possibility. People are much more sensitive to motion than to positi
114 Post contains links and images Pihero : I had a hope that on this forum for aviation fans, people would know a minimum about airplanes... Don't you realize that Boeing is in danger of being
115 jollo : I am not willing to contribute to the pro/anti Airbus tug-of-war, and with no new facts or analysis from reliable sources (the Popular Mechanics artic
116 Post contains images mandala499 : There is an argument against cross coupling... this one just came out of my bio-memory bank all of a sudden... Back in my anti-airbus, anti-non-movin
117 tommytoyz : First of of, we all have to admit that all modern airliners are very safe. Period. AF447 did not fall out of the sky because of the aircraft, despite
118 notaxonrotax : Hillarious thread! "none so blind as those who will not see". Certain users really think they know better than aircraft manufacturers. While real life
119 Post contains images Pihero : That's opne of the silliest claims I have ever seen on any forum. If tha was the case, pray tell us how or why we could have lift at low altitudes ?c
120 tommytoyz : I am sorry to say it, but you are 100% wrong. Max critical AoA does changes with altitude. Despite what you believe. That's what I said, it is useful
121 comeandgo : the guy talks about fighter jets and flying at the edge of the envelope trying to outrun the enemies gun . . . see the neighbor is a F16 pilot. That'
122 SandroZRH : Prove it.
123 flyingturtle : Let me join this hilarious undertaking... The real problems started *after* climbing at 7000 feet per minute, after which the airspeed wasn't 0.80 Mac
124 tommytoyz : OK, ask yourself, why does your Bus stall at an every increasing indicated KCAS the higher you go, everything else constant? That is your proof right
125 tommytoyz : AF447 was in alternate law, not normal law and not direct law and they managed to exceed AoA for minutes on end. So I don't get your point. I too tho
126 Post contains images SandroZRH : the reason why stall-speed increases with altitude is a whole different story. I'm still waiting for that proof of yours. What i seem to remember is
127 Post contains images jollo : Exactly: that's an excellent example of the failure modes (not necessarily mechanical) that would creep in. In general, "leave well enough alone" app
128 tommytoyz : That is true and wasn't a good example on my part. But high speed stalls are still easy to do. True on the Bus is in normal law, it's not possible. B
129 Post contains links tommytoyz : Regardless of altitude? Really? One popular myth is that the aircraft will stall at the same AoA and indicated or calibrated speeds regardless of alt
130 Post contains images Pihero : You're really scaring the sh@t out of me : An AoA that's both maximal AND criical is something so new it's frightening Generally for most parameters,
131 Post contains images flyingturtle : PLEASE. You even wrote "0.80 Mach" before the "yanking back on the stick" stuff, and at such a speed the protections will kick in to prevent F-16esqu
132 flyingturtle : At least one acknowledgement. But you fail to tell us why aviation was extremely safe in all these years even before Airbus FBW appeared. So to say t
133 zeke : The statement is not correct as presented, numerous factors can change with a change in altitude. The only factor which dictates the stall is exceedi
134 Post contains links tommytoyz : http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20041014-1 At approximately 21:52, the flight crew acknowledged to Kansas City Air Route Traffic Con
135 tommytoyz : Yes I have used these terms interchangeably. My bad. I mean for them to mean the same thing though - the maximum AoA before a stall. Please read my p
136 flyingturtle : You begin talking about the Colgan Air 3407, mention high-speed and high-altitude stalls and suddenly the story transforms into the infamous Pinnacle
137 tdscanuck : Although it's true that most sims won't have great fidelity in a fully developed high-altitude stall, they don't really need to...the point is to get
138 Post contains images SandroZRH : An article on a website of an aviation magazine is all you can come up with? I actually looked it up in Airbus manuals, Aerodynamics book that are us
139 zeke : Sounds like a classic mixup between CAS and TAS.
140 tommytoyz : Well, I will do some research on this topic later and I will get back. But you dismiss an aerodynamic engineer, which none of you are.
141 zeke : Both Tom and myself are aeronautical/aerospace engineers working in the industry. I also actually fly A330 as well.
142 Post contains links tommytoyz : So none are not aerodynamics engineers, which is what we are talking about. And perhaps Boeing is wrong too: ...the stall warning AOA typically was s
143 tdscanuck : Yes, I are. There's no such degree as "aerodynamics engineer". By training, you're an aeronautical or aerospace engineer. If you mean "engineer who u
144 billreid : We are having pilots and engineers argue about design, laws, AoA, weather, blond or brunette, etc on this thread. But what is technical about over tw
145 tommytoyz : Boeing clearly states: ...stall AOA is a function of Mach number... - Boeing And since it is well known that Mach varies with altitude, in air speed,
146 comeandgo : you have to realize that no one expected the plane to hit the ocean in just 3 minutes. The PNF probably thought he had plenty of time to deal with th
147 tdscanuck : Nobody disputes that. Zeke and I both said it before you brought it up. Now this is...interesting. It is certainly not "well known" because it's not
148 tommytoyz : Your statement above, does not square with Boeing's statement below And: ...the stall warning AOA typically was set at a conservative level to accomm
149 Post contains images EPA001 : Then I guess you have read incorrectly. Many respected pilots in this thread, including Tom who does this at Boeing as (if I am not misatken) a fligh
150 Pihero : No, you've used them in the same sentence, which is not the same at all and shows how little you underdstand the principles involved. ...and as you u
151 tommytoyz : This also is at loggerheads with Linda D Pendelton and the further statements by Boeing I found: "Aneroid sensors bias the system for the changes in
152 Pihero : Thank you. IMHO, that's a fair summation of that accident. What's left to wait is the recommendations the BEA /AAIB /NTSB wvent that sort of happenin
153 Post contains images flyingturtle : Google and most of what you find on the internet is a good slave, but a bad master. I really recommend you picking up one or several textbooks on avia
154 Post contains images David L : I'm not sure what your point is. Is it that we shouldn't be arguing about it because people died? I hope not, since you then go on to contribute to s
155 David L : Yes, I have to say I was surprised by that when the CVR transcript was released. At first I put it down to a loose translation. Then I saw that it wa
156 Post contains links and images mandala499 : Claim: Answer: (And yes, tdscanuck, is very familiar with the Boeing flight test department... he work with the type of people who write stuff that yo
157 tdscanuck : Include the rest of the quotes, as mandalla499 did (Thanks!). The variation is due to different Mach, not different altitude. Mach is a function of T
158 notaxonrotax : What a long display of........patience. Some here keep lecturing this guy while as I said before: "none so blind as those who will not see". I admire
159 Post contains links CALTECH : What Are the flight crews taught ? Especially if the crew did not believe they were in a stall, as it appears to be from their actions, one could see
160 Post contains images canoecarrier : Tom, I almost find it humorous that you Pihero, Zeke and Mandela are getting baited into the same conversation we had with Tommy 2 months ago. At lea
161 Post contains images Pihero : Thank you, you made my day ! Try and stop it once for all, the silliness has gone too far !
162 Post contains images mandala499 : Well... First... it's Mandala! Second... am a troll-feeder. Third... the 220 souls or so that died, deserve respect. Respect, for me, is to eliminate
163 N14AZ : I forgot when it's due - when will BEA publish their final report? Canoecarrier Said early next year but for which month is it scheduled?
164 Post contains images canoecarrier : Won't happen again! All four of you know I appreciate your efforts to do so. Glad I could help make your day. Their office is down by the SEA airport
165 Post contains links canoecarrier : BEA has only said that the final report is planned for "the first half of 2012". The Human Factors Working Group is scheduled to complete their work
166 jollo : Ok, fair enough for me, as long as the recovery technique is really simple (just push the nose down...). If things are not so straightforward (near-a
167 airtechy : I agree...the discussion is not about FBW itself ....It's about the mechanical method of introducing the electrical signals into the FBW system by th
168 Pihero : No. We (should) use very precise terms, in this case "Cabre" or "pique" or "augmente /diminue ton assiette".
169 jollo : Thanks. Even more chilling, then...
170 Post contains images David L : For information, one of the aforementioned Aeronautical Engineers appears to be a member here so I think we should bear that in mind when addressing a
171 tommytoyz : Everything being equal, CLmax decreases with altitude, that is well known. Also well known is that stall speed increases with altitude, because of the
172 Pihero : No, and it shows - ONCE AGAIN -that you understand NOTHING in this subject. The FCOM procedure could be translated thus : "At lift-off : T/L .... TOG
173 canoecarrier : Dave, I'd love to have him join the conversation. Should he ever join this discussion I'm sure he would be a little more objective than the quotes th
174 srbmod : This discussion has run its' course as some of the participants would rather insult other posters instead of discussing the topic. In addition, it's b
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