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BEA Final Report AF447: July 5, 2012  
User currently offlineBEG2IAH From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 972 posts, RR: 18
Posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 18 hours ago) and read 29858 times:
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Folks,

It seems the AF 447 final accident report is due tomorrow. I hope BEA will come up with some good recommendations. Still hard to believe three years passed already.

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flig...f.447/pressrelease30may2012.en.php


FAA killed the purpose of my old signature: Use of approved electronic devices is now permitted.
215 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlineIndependence76 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 256 posts, RR: 0
Reply 1, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 29783 times:

I've waited for this day for 3 years.

Hopefully we can truly peer through the eyes of the pilots for the first time with all the answers in front of us. I do not mean to sound overdramatic (I apologize if I do), but this may go down as the landmark example of "the true danger of automation with an inexperienced flight crew" within the aviation community.

The Airbus Fly-By-Wire system is incredible and I admire it greatly. However, for this flight crew sitting in front of 200+ people not immediately realizing the first sign of trouble is, to me, a distressing scenario in the practice of pilot training. Alternate Law 1 & 2 are virtually "page 2" material of Airbus flight characteristics.

I'm somewhat indifferent on the proposition of altering the side stick and throttles to be backdriven, but it would be of a greater benefit to pilots in my honest opinion, and this accident potentially may not have happened if they were. One could argue that making them backdriven would assist in CRM awareness, but this is a debate I'm willing to let the BEA settle.


I will be eagerly awaiting the final report.

[Edited 2012-07-04 19:11:34]

[Edited 2012-07-04 19:12:27]

[Edited 2012-07-04 19:12:35]


"In general, pride is at the bottom of all great mistakes." - John Ruskin
User currently offlinejustloveplanes From United States of America, joined Jul 2004, 1062 posts, RR: 1
Reply 2, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 15 hours ago) and read 29706 times:

It is a tough call to make. The other side of the coin is how many crashes has the Airbus system avoided? Thousands of times more I am will to bet. So one must be careful about throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Best solution is better training an pitot tubes that don't ice up IMHO.


User currently offlineLH707330 From United States of America, joined Jun 2012, 794 posts, RR: 0
Reply 3, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 13 hours ago) and read 29552 times:

This will be an interesting read, I'm most curious to see what the human factors group comes up with. Hopefully they will have something more material than "pilot error: they failed to execute the checklist" as the probable cause. Maybe they will mention personality issues between flight crew members, etc. Who knows....

User currently offlineJoKeR From Serbia, joined Nov 2004, 2238 posts, RR: 9
Reply 4, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 29244 times:

Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 2):
It is a tough call to make. The other side of the coin is how many crashes has the Airbus system avoided? Thousands of times more I am will to bet. So one must be careful about throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Exactly my thought! If there was a serious flaw, 330s would be dropping out of the sky at regular intervals, thank Lord that's not happening.

I suspect human factor, inadequate training and poor communication will be the main culprits, though fingers will probably be pointed left, right and backwards. Really hope that the families find peace and closure after this report - sadly nothing that this report says will bring back their loved ones or take away the pain they have endured.



Kafa, čaj, šraf?
User currently offlinePHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 7752 posts, RR: 18
Reply 5, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 28565 times:

So I took a look at it, and it's a pretty interesting read, but it's pretty much confirming the initial report, with faulty airspeed readings causing pilot errors. I hope that this doesn't happen again.


我思うゆえに我あり。(Jap. 'I think, therefore I am.')
User currently offlineDrColenzo From UK - Scotland, joined Jan 2012, 143 posts, RR: 1
Reply 6, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 28534 times:

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 5):
I hope that this doesn't happen again.

Following that point, I saw that they made an additional 25 further recommendations on the top of the ones issued previously and are pursuing a manslaughter investigation against Airbus and Air France.

I cannot look too deep right now as I am working, but do you have any details on what the recommendations and accusations are?


User currently offlineAirlineCritic From Finland, joined Mar 2009, 728 posts, RR: 1
Reply 7, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 28538 times:

News agencies are reporting that the report is out, though I can not yet find it on the BEA web site.

The news are quoting the main investigator who believes the crash was due to "pilot and technical failure".

See, for instance:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18720915
http://www.france24.com/en/20120705-...-blames-pilot-error-faulty-sensors


User currently offlinePHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 7752 posts, RR: 18
Reply 8, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 28469 times:

Quoting DrColenzo (Reply 6):
I cannot look too deep right now as I am working, but do you have any details on what the recommendations and accusations are?

I was looking at the quibbits from USAToday



我思うゆえに我あり。(Jap. 'I think, therefore I am.')
User currently offlineN14AZ From Germany, joined Feb 2007, 2757 posts, RR: 25
Reply 9, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 28467 times:

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 5):
So I took a look at it

Where did you find it? I scanned the BEA webpage but couldn't find it.


User currently offlinemotif1 From United States of America, joined Sep 2005, 250 posts, RR: 0
Reply 10, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 28411 times:

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 5):
So I took a look at it

A link would be appreciated. Thanks!



Not only is this incomprehensible but the ink is ugly and the paper is from the wrong kind of tree
User currently offlinePHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 7752 posts, RR: 18
Reply 11, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 28208 times:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/s...5/Air-France-crash-2009/56024902/1
http://avherald.com/h?article=41a81ef1/0080&opt=0

Press conference to discuss more of the details.



我思うゆえに我あり。(Jap. 'I think, therefore I am.')
User currently offlineAirlineCritic From Finland, joined Mar 2009, 728 posts, RR: 1
Reply 12, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 28018 times:

Quoting motif1 (Reply 10):
A link would be appreciated.

AvHerald says:

Quote:
The summary of final report will be summarized as soon as the report has been released a few hours after the end of the press conference and processed as usual.


User currently offlinePHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 7752 posts, RR: 18
Reply 13, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 27983 times:

Quoting AirlineCritic (Reply 12):
Quote:
The summary of final report will be summarized as soon as the report has been released a few hours after the end of the press conference and processed as usual.


I could've been reading the AVherald wrong



我思うゆえに我あり。(Jap. 'I think, therefore I am.')
User currently offlineN14AZ From Germany, joined Feb 2007, 2757 posts, RR: 25
Reply 14, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 3 hours ago) and read 27864 times:

In th past, BEA made available the interim reports on their webpage directly after the press conference (please correct me if I am wrong but that's what I remember).

User currently offlineTeamAmerica From United States of America, joined Sep 2006, 1761 posts, RR: 23
Reply 15, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 3 hours ago) and read 27840 times:

BEA final report is here:
http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/rapport.final.en.php



Failure is not an option; it's an outcome.
User currently offlineKlaus From Germany, joined Jul 2001, 21484 posts, RR: 53
Reply 16, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 3 hours ago) and read 27703 times:

Quoting Independence76 (Reply 1):
Hopefully we can truly peer through the eyes of the pilots for the first time with all the answers in front of us. I do not mean to sound overdramatic (I apologize if I do), but this may go down as the landmark example of "the true danger of automation with an inexperienced flight crew" within the aviation community.

Is the problem any larger than an inexperienced crew without automation?

I would say no, even to the contrary.

A crucial lack of experience is always dangerous and unacceptable.

Quoting Independence76 (Reply 1):
I'm somewhat indifferent on the proposition of altering the side stick and throttles to be backdriven, but it would be of a greater benefit to pilots in my honest opinion, and this accident potentially may not have happened if they were.

It would have changed absolutely nothing, since the pilots were made aware by the systems that they were going into a stall already and yet they reacted incorrectly to that.

The backdrive would have stopped as well when the systems lost forward speed again during the stall, so it would not have been of any use.

The crew was confused, beginning with their failure to execute the mandatory checklist on the loss of airspeed indication. And they made multiple crucial errors of judgment after that as well, actively keeping the aircraft stalled against aerodynamic forces.


User currently offlinenomadd22 From United States of America, joined Feb 2008, 1880 posts, RR: 0
Reply 17, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 3 hours ago) and read 27519 times:

Quoting Klaus (Reply 16):
Is the problem any larger than an inexperienced crew without automation?

The theory is that the inexperience was aggravated , or caused by a too automated flight system. The more planes go toward push button flying, the less experience pilot have at truly flying them. To put it in vague terms, they can lose the "feel" for the operation. It sounds like the AF crew had the indicators they needed, but failed to put them together into a coherent picture of what was happening, aggravated by a breakdown of cockpit discipline.

Automation has surely prevented more loss of life than it's caused. It just has it's downsides too.
It's not just flying planes. It's something that's happening in fields everywhere. Many people don't need to understand how machines work at the most basic levels anymore as they get more complex and automated. It's a problem when that automation fails.

[Edited 2012-07-05 07:54:07]


Andy Goetsch
User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 18, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 2 hours ago) and read 26992 times:

One word of warning to folks reading the BEA report and various news articles

Nothing in English can be taken as exact or the final word.

The pilots were speaking French and the official report is in French.

We've seen in the earlier reports and the CVR transcripts that many things which seemed crucial in the English translations do not mean what we thought in the original French.


User currently offlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21675 posts, RR: 55
Reply 19, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 26425 times:

The report references the CVR transcript in its list of appendices, but doesn't include it. Peculiar - anyone know if it's available?

Quoting Klaus (Reply 16):
The backdrive would have stopped as well when the systems lost forward speed again during the stall, so it would not have been of any use.

   The sudden lack of it may have even made things worse.

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offlineKlaus From Germany, joined Jul 2001, 21484 posts, RR: 53
Reply 20, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 26022 times:

Quoting nomadd22 (Reply 17):
The theory is that the inexperience was aggravated , or caused by a too automated flight system. The more planes go toward push button flying, the less experience pilot have at truly flying them. To put it in vague terms, they can lose the "feel" for the operation. It sounds like the AF crew had the indicators they needed, but failed to put them together into a coherent picture of what was happening, aggravated by a breakdown of cockpit discipline.

They never had control of the situation right from the get-go: Failing to even execute the unreliable airspeed checklist leaves no doubt about it.

Automation or not was not the problem there.

Inexperience and a lack of competence in general has nothing to do with automation. That's mostly a phantom debate in this context.

Quoting Mir (Reply 19):
The report references the CVR transcript in its list of appendices, but doesn't include it. Peculiar - anyone know if it's available?

Wasn't it in the interim report already?


User currently offlineAirlineCritic From Finland, joined Mar 2009, 728 posts, RR: 1
Reply 21, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 25977 times:

Some interesting points as I keep reading through the report. This part is in 1.16.2, a study of previously happened unreliable speed incidents. The study found that:

Quote:

With regard to the crews’ reactions, the following points are notable:
The variations in altitude were contained within about one thousand feet. There were five cases of deliberate descent, including one of 3,500 feet. These descents followed a stall warning;
Four crews did not identify the unreliable airspeed situation: in two cases, the crews concluded that there was an inconsistency between the angles of attack; in the two other cases, the crew considered that the speeds were erroneous rather than unreliable.
For the cases studied, the recorded flight parameters and the accounts given by the crews did not reveal any application of the memory items from the unreliable airspeed procedure, nor the procedure itself:
The reappearance of the indications of flight directors on the PFD suggests that no disconnection inputs were made into the FCU;
The durations of engagement of the thrust lock function indicate that no attempt was made to rapidly disconnect the autothrust followed by a manual adjustment of the thrust to the recommended value;
There was no attempt to command display a pitch attitude of 5°.

I find it amazing that other crews (not just AF447) often did not identify the unreliable speed situation. And more interestingly, apparently none of the crews performed the unreliable airspeed procedure.


User currently offlineflood From United States of America, joined Feb 2009, 1381 posts, RR: 1
Reply 22, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 25902 times:

Quoting Mir (Reply 19):
The report references the CVR transcript in its list of appendices, but doesn't include it. Peculiar - anyone know if it's available?

The listed Appendix 1 / CVR transcript is in the report itself, starting p.87

edit: apologies, that's p.87 in the interim report  



Appendix 1 can be found separately here:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/annexe.01.en.pdf


[Edited 2012-07-05 10:15:37]

User currently offlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21675 posts, RR: 55
Reply 23, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 25808 times:

Quoting flood (Reply 22):
The listed Appendix 1 / CVR transcript is in the report itself, starting p.87

I didn't see it there, but it's okay, since it's available at this link:

Quoting TeamAmerica (Reply 15):
BEA final report is here:
http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/rapport.final.en.php

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 24, posted (2 years 3 months 2 weeks 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 25784 times:

Quoting Mir (Reply 19):
The report references the CVR transcript in its list of appendices, but doesn't include it.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/annexe.01.en.pdf

Quoting Klaus (Reply 20):
Quoting Mir (Reply 19):The report references the CVR transcript in its list of appendices, but doesn't include it. Peculiar - anyone know if it's available?
Wasn't it in the interim report already?

A more complete CVR transcript is available on the BEA page linked above - with many comments in different English words than the interim report version.

It appears to me that this translation does a better job of conveying the 'flavor' of the pilots words - based on the more accurate cultural translations from the French we've had on past threads.

This CVR transcript makes it clear that both the PF and the PNF felt they had to climb and were trying to make the aircraft climb as it fell in the deep stall.

But as cautioned in the CVR forward - the CVR transcript cannot viewed as a complete description of what happened in the cockpit - the FDR data has to be linked to the CVR to have a more complete view.


25 rfields5421 : The passage you quoted emphasises the need for better, more focused training. We've wondered why this crew alone seemed to have failed to follow proc
26 Klaus : They were constantly pulling deep into a stall, but they were not in a deep stall![Edited 2012-07-05 10:51:48]
27 canoecarrier : As you say, the transcript in this final report is much more comprehensive than the one they released in the Interim Report. Previously there were ga
28 DrColenzo : With the 'zero tolerance' approach to failure in the industry, surely the replication of the similar reactions to similar situation suggests a wider
29 AirlineCritic : Example of the CRM and decision procedures in the crew (Section 2.1.1.2): and choice of relief pilot (Section 2.1.1.3.2): [Edited 2012-07-05 11:56:36]
30 canoecarrier : This part is a little interesting. We've talked about how the crew ignored (or seemed to ignore because they didn't comment on it) the stall warning(s
31 rfields5421 : The initial BEA report was 'shocking' to the industry - in that about 3 dozen similar events were identified quickly. Such super-cooled icing at alti
32 Post contains links Pihero : A long awaiterd document anrd really worth the wait . For those who don't understand french doc presentation, the final report in English is Here and
33 Semaex : Oh how I wished I did not have to learn the memory items for my flight training in the PA28. They were annoying, consumed valuable study time and I n
34 Colombia : I think Klaus has a good point here. More than automation the point is the lack of training, in many airlines this maneouvre is performed only until
35 airtechy : In section 2.1.2.3 the reports notes: "It would also seem unlikely that the PNF could have determined the PF’s flight path stabilisation targets. It
36 railker : One thing I noticed, and correct me if I'm wrong here ... but reading through the CVR transcript which included all the sounds, it was already pointed
37 AirlineCritic : Airbus has flown test flights to determine buffeting levels in configurations corresponding to AF 447 (Section 1.16.5): Apparently, ECAM was not very
38 Post contains images tom355uk : Having read this report, one glaring issue seems to point to a lack of handling experience, both in non-normal operations and manual flight. It states
39 Mir : If the crew believed the initial stall warning was faulty (and they certainly had reason to - we know it was driven by corrupted input from the air d
40 airtechy : .....an additional thought. Because the report says that recovery was unlikely once they fell back through 35,000 feet, I'm not sure they had time bet
41 Klaus : System complexity would go way up and reliability would take a significant hit (right down to canceled flights on malfunctions), which doesn't seem l
42 zeke : If your in the cruise, all you need to do initially is to turn the flight directors off and manually maintain the pitch attitude and thrust setting i
43 Mir : But it did sound, in conjunction with the loss of air data indications. That's enough to link the two in the back of your mind, and if you don't real
44 Post contains links and images AirlineCritic : And that makes a lot of sense. Thanks, Zeke. I also think that is the general idea with the unreliable speed procedure: Paraphrasing a bit, it essent
45 zeke : Read the first line, "if the safe conduct of the flight is impacted", that is not the cruise. You are already level, above MSA. This is the problem w
46 AirlineCritic : Ah, yes. Thanks. Question: Does this also cover not necessarily turning off PD/AP, if the crew can observe that they are not immediately causing a pr
47 zeke : The checklist is 5 pages long, it is broken up in different phases of flight. The initial part of the checklist which you posted is designed for the
48 AirlineCritic : The a.net discussions have often looked at the role of the stall warnings that were no longer continuous after some time had passed and the aircraft a
49 huxrules : I have a quick question. The report says that for low altitude stall recovery the suggested method is 12.5 deg and TOGA throttle. It goes on to say th
50 rcair1 : You are connecting items that are not connected. The fact that a system, any system, works most of the time does not mean that it cannot be improved.
51 ricknroll : Unbelievable. It's a testament to the plane there weren't more crashes, if there was such incompetence and lack of adherence to procedures.
52 AirCalSNA : I would hope that this accident prompts Airbus to rethink its over-reliance on computerized flight control, which, consistent with the use of joy stic
53 rfields5421 : The information tells me that it is not incompetence. Rather there is a training, and systems issue, in properly identifying unreliable airspeed in m
54 Klaus : That's a prejudiced knee-jerk judgement which is simply not covered by the investigation. If anybody was "over-reliant" on anything, it was Air Franc
55 jollo : In the english version, at page 201, the last in the list of factors believed to explain the (to me, still incredible) failure of the flight crew to t
56 Post contains links ltbewr : Former US Airways pilot Cpt. Sully Sullenberger, best known for the 'Hudson River Miracle', is now an aviation and safety advisor/commentator for the
57 AirCalSNA : Given the amount of time and money that have gone into understanding what went wrong with AF447, it seems that even one accident like this is enough
58 dfambro : rfields, thanks for your great work on help on understanding the report and issues around the accident. To nitpick, though, the BEA does not believe
59 Klaus : The amount of concern is beyond doubt and directly related to the extent of the tragedy. Where I think you're going wrong is by leaping to a conclusi
60 canoecarrier : I'll have to go back and check our timeline from the previous threads, but didn't the Captain enter the cockpit just as the last stall warning was so
61 rfields5421 : You believe that even though the report identifies several Boeing aircraft accidents due to near identical source events, and very similar crew react
62 Post contains images airtechy : Undoubtedly having tracking joysticks would add complexity to the Airbus control design. So does having multiple pitots, the ability to switch display
63 AirCalSNA : I understand but disagree with your point, and I'm not offering an expert opinion. Notably, however, my lay-person's concerns about Airbus echo those
64 rfields5421 : In the B727 accident discussed in the report - both pilots held the yoke full aft and never realized the aircraft was stalling. Also mentioned in the
65 AirCalSNA : Interesting, but undoubtedly they all work in different ways. Have the other heavily computerized systems caused the same type of spectacular catastr
66 zeke : It does not stall the aircraft, exceeding the critical angle of attack does. A stall can occur in any attitude and at any speed. What your theory doe
67 airtechy : An interesting point. I would be interesting to know if the response to control inputs changes between the flight modes on the 777 as it seems to do
68 rfields5421 : There are several different things to remember about computerized aircraft systems. When most folks talk about fly-by-wire - that is not what they me
69 airtechy : I respect your opinion....and agree with the last part, but this would only require new joysticks capable of tracking and a controller to link the tw
70 rfields5421 : The PF appears to have been significantly focused on maintaining a wings level position. The aircraft continually wanted to roll to the right. The pl
71 zeke : You are.
72 Klaus : You're again drawing a preconceived conclusion that the BEA investigation does not share.
73 Mir : It doesn't say that the Airbus systems caused the confusion either. We could point to minor differences all day and try and pin blame on one manufact
74 Post contains images airtechy : I once thought that Fly-By-Wire was a direct replacement for the control cables. i.e a device such as a potentiometer determined the yoke or joystick
75 airtechy : I'm not sure I understand the affect auto-trim has on the stability of the plane. Doesn't it merely relieve the biasing of the force required by the
76 N14AZ : This is a very simplistic conclusion, to say it diplomaticallly. If your concerns were correct, the safety report would not have more than 200 pages
77 airtechy : I wonder what drove this change re: Air France changes since the accident? 5.1.2 Documentation ˆˆ- Changeover to manufacturer’s documentation in E
78 amritpal : No matter what the report said, I think pilot did what they could to best of their abilities based on the what they had infront of them. They are prof
79 aerobalance : I don't have time to read the report since the project I'm working on needs my attention, and reading through the posts hasn't offered what happened..
80 Post contains links airtechy : The report fairly specifically details what caused the accident and spreads the blame like butter on a piece of bread. Download and skip to section 4
81 ricknroll : I am guessing a large part of the effort is the standoff that must be occurring between Airbus and AirFrance. Airbus is very keen to clear itself, as
82 airtechy : Which is probably why no changes will occur until all the lawsuits have been settled. Making changes at this point, even if the report recommended th
83 David L : I'm not sure I follow. The current set-up means that if your hand is on the side-stick it's your aircraft. The Priority buttons only disable the othe
84 tom355uk : I'm very disappointed in Cpt Sullenberger, I should have thought he knows better than this. For all his piloting skills, I truly believe he never gav
85 garpd : Sorry but: Bollocks, absolutely pure, unrefined, bollocks. It is possible to stall an Airbus, AF447 tragically shows this. (Yes I know about the diff
86 tom355uk : Bit harsh, but I will defend my opinion. Which had no bearing on 1549, as the aircraft remained in normal law the whole time. What reference speeds?
87 scbriml : Sadly, for all the passengers on board, their best appears to have been woefully inadequate.
88 moose135 : I remember an experienced 3-man crew that flew a perfectly good L-1011 into a swamp because a light bulb burned out... Thanks for the thorough explan
89 garpd : I have not seen any mention in any report that the envelope protection assisted in the incident. If there is such a citation, please share it. I stil
90 Post contains links tom355uk : NTSB Report, Page 88: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2010/AAR1003.pdf The NTSB concludes that, despite being unable to complete the Engine Dual F
91 jollo : Not easy to wrap-up 200 pages in a nutshell, but I'll give it a try. Basically, BEA concludes that the accident was caused by: * failure of the crew
92 garpd : No it doesn't. It merely shows that the envelope protection was available. Which isn't a bad thing obviously. There is, AFAIK, no data showing that t
93 tom355uk : Page 89: However, FDR data indicated that the airplane was below green dot speed and at VLS or slightly less for most of the descent, and about 15 to
94 s5daw : As far as i understand the captain is criticizing the ergonomy of joysicks, not envelope protection?
95 U2380 : It may well be a no brainer. However, I don't believe they reached the part of the checklist which specified starting the APU, it would have been ver
96 tom355uk : Quote from article: Capt. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, CBS News' aviation and safety expert, said the same disaster would have been "much less likel
97 Mir : The auto-trim will maintain the pitch attitude of the aircraft when the sidestick is released. So if you pitch up to five degrees and let go, the air
98 s5daw : In reply56 of thhis thread we can read he is referring to inability to see PFs commands in A, versus B where it is clear what PF is doing. It has bee
99 Post contains images flipdewaf : I now trust everything he says because those CFM 56's are much more tough on 737's. Back on topic, How long would any recomendations from accidents c
100 Post contains images David L : The Captain and the PNF both kept telling the PF that he was "going up" and should "go down" instead. Why would they tell him to stop doing something
101 Klaus : No, they were not behaving like professionals, and that is directly why they crashed their aircraft into the sea, as sad as it is. Which doesn't just
102 jollo : Stall warning is fed by AoA, and AoA vanes are unreliable under a certain airspeed (60 kts, IIRC). The design goal is to disable an alarm as soon as
103 rfields5421 : I believe control input position indications would not have changed anything in this accident. As the BEA noted in the other incidents they analyzed
104 s5daw : How about changing ALT2? If I understand correctly, high AOA rpotections are retained UNLESS the two air data references disagree. This was the case i
105 rcair1 : Yes, that is correct. It is a position many have taken, including me. Others reject it, out of hand, with the argument that if it was that bad then A
106 tom355uk : I appreciate that - but to me it seems that in a situation such as this that an overspeed would have been less dangerous than a nose high low airspee
107 Klaus : Upward autotrim was a result of the PF keeping the stick pulled aft most fo the time. It wasn't the autotrim that made it a problem.
108 tom355uk : The autotrim moved the THS virtually to it's full up-stop as per its design. If the aircraft had degraded immediately to direct law, then the autotri
109 rfields5421 : The FDR annex says the THS was at -2.8 when the event occured. The aircraft pitch is 1.8 degrees nose up at that time/ setting. The THS goes to -3.2
110 135mech : Text edited out by 135mech[Edited 2012-07-06 09:09:47]
111 Klaus : They never attempted such a return. Quite the contrary, which is why the upwards trim resulted in the first place. Losing autotrim would most probabl
112 rfields5421 : EDIT - Quote deleted The crew did change course to avoid some weather - we don't know what they saw on the radars because that is not recorded in any
113 Kaiarahi : I'm reading carefully - in the original French. As always, and particularly when analyzing "states of mind" (cognitive + emotional factors), there ar
114 AirCalSNA : It's interesting how hard you try to avoid drawing any conclusion from the report. Unless the pilots were deranged or drunk, the only source of confu
115 Post contains links racko : Regarding US Airways 1549, the well-known American author (and former professional pilot) William Langewiesche has written an excellent book about the
116 David L : I think you've neglected a more significant group than the few who "reject it, out of hand". There's also a group that has given specific reasons for
117 airtechy : I thought I read a report that tests showed the protection limits caused the Sully A320 to hit the water at a higher airspeed than if they had been di
118 AirlineCritic : Here are some additional interesting excerpts. Section 2.4 on page 191 goes to what we discussed with Zeke earlier on. The report says not only that i
119 135mech : I've read through a lot of this thread and it has an amazing amount of information and input. However, I have not read anything yet about why the pilo
120 canoecarrier : This is completely oversimplifying the cause of the accident. There are several reasons (mentioned in the report) why the incident happened completel
121 rcair1 : You are correct. In editing this rather long post, I deleted some words that would have separated the discussion of "out of hand" and "logical" belie
122 s5daw : If I read all this correctly, in a way Airbus DID tell Pf to pull up! the computer disengaged AP and went into ALT2 Law with no pitch protection, but
123 rfields5421 : We really don't know and will never know the full answer. The PF - Pilot Flying - was 32 years old and had 2,936 total flight hours. His PPL was issu
124 135mech : Thank you for the information! Again, this is truly a sad event!
125 Post contains images David L : OK, now we're on the same page.
126 PHX787 : The one thing that baffles me to no end is why they completely ignored the stall warning. IIRC, you're not supposed to reduce airspeed, right? Didn't
127 Klaus : They were not "deranged" or "drunk", but they were unprepared, at least in part quite literally. And that caused their confusion and catastrophically
128 Klaus : Particularly since the combination of flat-to-upward horizon, maximum thrust and at the same time rapid descent told exactly the same story.
129 XT6Wagon : Airspeed measurement went unreliable. They started a climb and lost airspeed while having no reliable airspeed indication. This is part of the issue
130 Pihero : I'm far from finished with the report but there are still quite a few aspects that deserve some looking into. I've always been in the opinion that di
131 canoecarrier : Correct me if I'm wrong but haven't you said the PNF was the most experienced pilot in type that night? He did have nearly 3,000 more hours than the
132 PHX787 : Oh I had no idea they were using max thrust It makes sense but could A be able to do that? Wouldn't the engine makers have to do something as well to
133 airtechy : No. The pilots control the engines by manually moving the throttles. In auto-thrust, as a very simplistic example, a motor could do the same thing di
134 Post contains images Kaiarahi : My point earlier. Some things (psychological profiles, personal situations) may not be disclosed in a public report. I spend a chunk of my life doing
135 ltbewr : The pitot tubes were iced, giving bad data. Like with any computer as the old saying goes GIGO - garbage in garbage out. Perhaps the closest compariso
136 ricknroll : Has the BEA uncovered a systemic training failure, or adherence to the rules failure? I can understand that every so often, pilots will make a mistak
137 Klaus : And it's a misrepresentation in this case. When input data was detected to be unreliable, it was flagged as such and all automatic systems reliant on
138 Aesma : It would not stall an Airbus in normal law. Which is probably better than hitting it with lower airspeed but higher vertical speed due to a stall...
139 bellancacf : Would lives have been saved if the pilots had known beyond a doubt that they were stalled, even though their attitude was more or less stable? If I we
140 Aesma : I don't see how that would have helped here ? GPS gives ground speed, when what is needed is airspeed.
141 Aesma : There is the angle of attack sensor already.
142 PHX787 : I have always had a problem with GPS systems when there is a lot of cloud cover in the area. If an airplane flies into a storm like AF447 I'm not sur
143 Mir : Your mindset is one of "if there is no evidence disproving it, it must be true", which is a logical fallacy. In order to assert something, you need t
144 comorin : GPS would give you ground speed, not airspeed...might help if they could design pitot tubes that could 'sneeze' if blocked.
145 Post contains links and images AirlineCritic : There already is plenty of redundancy, also redundancy in terms of other instruments that they could have been following, such as the artificial hori
146 rwessel : Even stalled wings produce lift - just very inefficiently. And they were in a steady descent (about 10,000ft/min), which implies that the wings (plus
147 bellancacf : rwessel @ 146: Thanks for your thoughts. I can't help but think that the pressure distribution (magnitudes, differentials) around the wing is differen
148 Aesma : By that time it was too late to recover.
149 zeke : The FBW A&B use digital control systems, the pilot inputs are nothing more than demands into this control system, the control system will work ou
150 airtechy : Some interesting points. I assume the stalled airspeed was low enough at that altitude to not rip the gear off. What would spoilers do at that high a
151 justloveplanes : What is the redundancy on pitot tubes for an A330 (I.E. how many do they have?). Some approaches to critical control in other industries include 3 in
152 Mir : Three. There is a caution message that will occur if there's a disagreement between sensor sources, yes. And there will be a checklist to run in asso
153 zeke : I think any aircraft would have a lot greater issues landing if airloads could rip them off. Gear doors may be damaged, or depart the airframe, gear
154 Klaus : Given that the spoilers would be in the turbulent wake on top of the stalled wings at that point, I would not be very surprised if they had very litt
155 par13del : You are trained to operate a computerized a/c with redundancies that it is virtually impossible to have all computers fail at once, I can see operato
156 rfields5421 : That is what the THS does - but it moves the horizontal stabilizer rather than a trim tab to equalize force on the elevators.
157 Klaus : That would be confusing separate matters. The claim was "garbage in, garbage out", and while that is a well known saying, it does not apply to the sy
158 par13del : Klaus thanks for taking my post as intended, just a couple simple questions on the basic fundamentals from a layman, I did not want to attempt to get
159 Klaus : I do work in computer systems and software design, but with no connection to aviation in that regard, so while I can speak to the principles of UI an
160 frmrCapCadet : As I read comments it quoted the study as saying that 30,000 feet altitude may have been too low to recover. If I read that right would any of the pil
161 ltbewr : That is what bugs many here and elsewhere. 1000's of flights a week and indeed at least 6 flights within 100 NM of AF 447 make it through the area an
162 Klaus : The problem with AF447 seems to have been that the cockpit crew immediately lost awareness and control of the situation when the situation was not ve
163 InsideMan : The wheather did contribute to the accident, since the freezing of the pitot tubes was the catalyzing effect that launched the sequence of disorientat
164 Klaus : That does happen every now and then and it is almost always survived by crews who are reacting properly. Even those who are not doing it by the book
165 zeke : Just aboubt every airliner flying today ( prob apart from the newest) have had incidents with pitot tubes being unreliable. This was not something ne
166 airtechy : I think that's correct as regards the cockpit voice recorder as the required data rate is pretty high. On this flight I recall it was two hours norma
167 tom355uk : I understand the lack of forward motion affects the pitots' ability to provide accurate speed measurements, but I think you misunderstood the way I'v
168 InsideMan : Please re-read my post. I know it did happen on many occasions before and only this crew managed to put the a/c into a full stall and crash into the
169 zeke : Probably the reason why that is not done is the air data computers are part of the few vital systems that continue to run when the aircraft is in an
170 tom355uk : Just the sort of answer I was after. Thanks Zeke - concise and to the point as always.
171 tdscanuck : It would fix that issue, absent electrical reconfigurations as zeke noted. However, zeke touches on another crucial point...it introduces a whole hos
172 flyingturtle : Today, I read nearly the whole report, skipping the more technical parts (certification of the pitot probes, organization of the maritime control and
173 XT6Wagon : Much better to have extra training hours regarding stalls and stall warnings, as this will cover more potential problems for the same or less cost.
174 Aesma : I didn't think they were stalled at all. Or maybe I'm confusing with spins.
175 spacecadet : Much lower than 33,000 feet. Many tests are done at between 10,000 and 15,000 feet and the expectation is that you will lose little altitude during t
176 mandala499 : That's the sad reality... Cognitive limitations. I'll throw this argument of the window. I'll have to combine the new transcript into the spreadsheet
177 bellancacf : re mandada499 @ 176: The problem is when the crew doesn't recognize the stall (unarrestable nose down movement and a one wing drop)... We have discuss
178 ricknroll : I think the argument against that in this instance was that they already had plenty of information that they were in serious trouble, and ignored it.
179 AirbusA370 : An exact copy of this accident won't happen ever again, due to the extremely low accident rate in aviation. Statistically, the next dozen of accidents
180 zeke : Contrary to what you may have told before, post stall, a wing still produces lift, and lots of it. I have not seen post stall flight test data for th
181 Kaiarahi : For what it's worth (there's not much in the report from the specialized Human Factors Working Group commissioned by BEA): 1. The vastly less experien
182 BA84 : Kaiarahi, You need to edit the references to the pilots. Better to call them PF and PNF.
183 N14AZ : I have to be careful here and I would like to start with saying that this report is not made for our entertainment. However, I also would have been i
184 Kaiarahi : Understood and agreed. If the working group's activities uncovered personal information, I would not expect it to be included in a public report.
185 Post contains images bikerthai : Actually for us "non-pilots", left seat and right seat was easier to visualize and understand. I know there is more information embedded with PF and
186 Post contains images Kaiarahi : Left seat / right seat is important here, because the FO sitting in the left seat was not trained to fly from the left seat. Having said that, I made
187 Aesma : Also, when talking about PF and PNF, you assume those don't change or aren't expected to, when here there was a discussion as to who should fly the pl
188 cmf : Is leaving as they entered ITCV a big deal? Why is it a display of lack of leadership? Correct me if I'm wrong but it isn't every pilot qualified to
189 bellancacf : Thanks to ricknroll, AirbusA370, and zeke for their thoughtful replies. re ricknroll@178: "they already had plenty of information that they were in se
190 tdscanuck : They have a direct measurement and a clear display. The crew chose to ignore it. Yes, that's what he's arguing. And he's correct. They were in a 1g d
191 zeke : It is not an argument, is it just aerodynamics. Past the stall angle of attack the wing still produces lift, lift is primarily a function of the angl
192 bikerthai : For those out there who is not following the logic being discussed. An everyday example would be to take a thin sheet of ply wood and try to fly it.
193 Kaiarahi : Qualified and experienced are not the same thing. On previous threads, many experienced captains indicated they would have remained in the cockpit fo
194 Post contains images bellancacf : Thanks to tdscanuck@190, zeke@191, and bikerthai@192 for thoughtful, informative, and -- for me -- enlightening responses. The "lots of lift as AF447
195 N14AZ : This is an aspect I even didn't think about. Surely they made a characterization of the three persons similar to what you did above. However, and as
196 Post contains links and images zeke : The aircraft actually climbed after it stalled, this is a plot of the vertical trajectory, airspeed, angle of attack As it became fully developed the
197 flyingturtle : One could hope that this report will be leaked... Has happened before with the full CVR transcript that was published in a book. IMHO, this part of t
198 tdscanuck : No argument from me on that one. It's not impossible; if you could do it with fiber optics you could avoid running any electrical power in the tank.
199 bellancacf : re tdscanuck@198: That's basically how you do pressure distribution during flight test now (the sensors are called "pressure belts" Well, I'll be darn
200 bellancacf : re zeke@196: Interesting graphics. I would like to respond intelligently, but I have to confess that I have lost track of the point you are making. Th
201 Post contains links tdscanuck : The OEM's work really really hard to make sure all the stuff that's powered is ahead or or behind the spars (i.e. in the leading and trailing edge) o
202 bellancacf : re tdscanuck@201: "He's showing that even past the stall point, the wing is making considerable lift. It's the drag, not the lift, that gets you in a
203 bellancacf : re tdscanuck@201: Mowe Awww, that's a sweet plane. I want to build it and see how it goes. [edit: Ooops. I looked at the Focke-Wulf passenger plane fr
204 tdscanuck : Yes, that's a very accurate statement. Tom.
205 billreid : This is irrelevant to the crash because the Airbus systems failed to save the flight, passengers and crew. Read the comments on reply 105. This guy i
206 bellancacf : re tdscanuck@204: And I guess you'd like the rotation of the resultant to lag behind the rotation of (the normal to) the wing chord (maybe the resulta
207 Post contains images Unflug : I think you know that you believe it, but I don't believe that you know it There have been many discussions on that matter. I was always left with th
208 Post contains images David L : Mistrust of the Airbus method comes almost entirely from people without experience of it. There was even scepticism in France in the beginning, when
209 zeke : When an aircraft stalls, it is normally not the whole wing, only a portion of it initially. Even the parts of teh wing that are stalled still produce
210 Post contains images InsideMan : *sigh* I've spoken to many pilots professionally and none of them prefered the Boeing system, quite contrary it was refered to as antique and outdate
211 rfields5421 : Before the recovery of the FDR, and the report of the data - I doubt you could have found anyone on this forum, or other aviation forums who would be
212 Post contains images bikerthai : Yes, but with a composite wing (787, A350). . . there might be a possibility to embed the wires (&sensor) in the lay-up itself. Maybe not now . .
213 rfields5421 : The maintenance part of me finds that frightening. Having to take apart a wing to fix a broken wire. Yes, I know - extremely remote possibility. But.
214 tdscanuck : Anyone who claimed that is either ignorant or trying to start something. The 787 has a yoke because the 777 has a yoke and they share a common type r
215 bellancacf : re rfields5421@211: Before the recovery of the FDR, and the report of the data - I doubt you could have found anyone on this forum, or other aviation
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