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Superjet Pilot Switched Off Taws Before Crash  
User currently offlineRubberJungle From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 24596 times:

This doesn't really come as a huge surprise, but the captain of the SSJ100 which crashed in Indonesia turned off the terrain-awareness system after it sounded. Simulations show there was plenty of time to save the aircraft.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...ced-terrain-warning-system-380320/

Why do you think pilots still seem to disregard the "pull up" warning?

52 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlineSemaex From Germany, joined Nov 2009, 833 posts, RR: 2
Reply 1, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 24503 times:

When in doubt, trust the aircraft. It's the first rule of IFR flying.

However, there's no rule that suits to pilots who are so full of themselves that they don't even dare think there is something to doubt. It's hopeless and it always will be.   

I'm glad I fly with airlines that choose their pilots based on more important things than who has the biggest cojones.



// You know you're an aviation enthusiast when you look at your neighbour's cars and think about fleet commonality.
User currently offlinenighthawk From UK - Scotland, joined Sep 2001, 5186 posts, RR: 33
Reply 2, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 24426 times:

The article states that the system gave a warning of "terrain ahead, pull up" and "avoid terrain". Are these alerts given in english or Russian on the Superjet and other Russian/Ukrainian built aircraft?

I'm not suggesting this is a factor in the accident, I'm just curious if these aircraft that are predominantly operated in Russia and former Soviet Union countries still use english for alerts.



That'll teach you
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 3, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 21 hours ago) and read 23782 times:

Quoting RubberJungle (Thread starter):
Why do you think pilots still seem to disregard the "pull up" warning?

They thought it was a database problem, which means they'd lost situational awareness. Once that happens, confirmation bias becomes a huge issue...the crew believes they know what's going on (even though they don't) so they fit any new information into their theory of what's going on rather than revising the theory.

*If* you believe the terrain database is incorrect, then you *expect* erroneous terrain warnings. In a perverse way, continued warnings in that situation confirm to the crew that they're correct.

Tom.


User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 4, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 20 hours ago) and read 23549 times:

Quoting RubberJungle (Thread starter):
Why do you think pilots still seem to disregard the "pull up" warning?

The only person on this forum who has flown over that area and has detailed knowledge of the area, the terrain and where the flight was supposed to be is mandala499.

In his detailed posts after the crash, he explained how the pilots had drifted out of the area where the flight was supposed to be taking place.

Also that they were probably fixated on avoiding a higher 'more dangerous' nearby mountain, not realizing they were below the level of the mountain/ ridge they hit.

As Tom said - they lost awareness of where they were.


User currently offlinedynamo12 From United States of America, joined exactly 6 years ago today! , 64 posts, RR: 0
Reply 5, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 17 hours ago) and read 21216 times:

I'm in a different field, but we have somewhat similar systems.

A question I have for pilots is how often are there actual "database problems" that cause false alarms. What I've noticed is that it only takes a few false alarms for the response to the alarm to degrade very significantly. Particularly if the actual alarm situation is infrequent to non-existent.

Folks designing safety systems, particularly alarms, should spend a very significant amount of time avoiding false alarms. This flows from simple math. If 99.99% of the time there is no problem (1 in 10,000 incident rate), and in even 1% of the no problem time there is a false alarm you end up with 100 false alarms per real alarm. That just doesn't work.

My impression was that TAWS worked to avoid this issue pretty carefully, but I'm curious about the reality.


User currently offlineJoeCanuck From Canada, joined Dec 2005, 5478 posts, RR: 31
Reply 6, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 17 hours ago) and read 20704 times:

Pilots fly in conditions worse than what the Superjet was flying in every day without problems, even with instrument issues. The chances of any 'new' problem happening is pretty slim.

As Tom mentioned, it's a perception issue...which is a problem when training tells you that something is infallible, like your instruments...as in; If one infallible instrument can fail, what's to say that all of the infallible instruments haven't failed but they just look like they are working? In this case, it seems that nothing failed but the pilot thought something did.

Anybody, including the very experienced and well trained, can be overwhelmed under some circumstances. When that happens, the brain locks up and nothing makes sense.



What the...?
User currently offlineredzeppelin From United States of America, joined Feb 2012, 640 posts, RR: 0
Reply 7, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 20643 times:

I have a lay man's question: How is TAWS connected with a database? I guess that I always assumed that TAWS was based on active radar or some other means of directly detecting an obstruction. But the reference to a database makes it seem that TAWS is comparing the aircraft's position and altitude to a topographic database. Is that the case?


Flown: DL,OS,NZ,UN,VV,NW,AA,UA,HP,TZ,AS,AF,KL,SK,WS,AZ,OK; op by OO,MQ,XJ,9E,G7,EV,QX,RP
User currently offlinetravelavnut From Netherlands, joined May 2010, 1670 posts, RR: 7
Reply 8, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 20299 times:

Quoting redzeppelin (Reply 7):
guess that I always assumed that TAWS was based on active radar or some other means of directly detecting an obstruction.

IIRC a classic GPWS works that way. An EGPWS is also connected to a terrain database to give earlier warnings. Please somebody correct me if I'm wrong  



Live From Amsterdam!
User currently offlineColombia From Colombia, joined Nov 2005, 15 posts, RR: 0
Reply 9, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 19808 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 3):
*If* you believe the terrain database is incorrect, then you *expect* erroneous terrain warnings. In a perverse way, continued warnings in that situation confirm to the crew that they're correct.

I think You are right here, however when flying in areas that one is not familiar with , one should climb to the MEA, MORA, MSA or whatever it is that You have at hand when in doubt, what do You guys think?

Best Regards



You Can't Fail If You Never Try
User currently offlineDufo From Slovenia, joined May 1999, 811 posts, RR: 4
Reply 10, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 19507 times:

This accident is a perfect classroom material, unfortunately with many lives lost.
Flying VFR in IFR in unknown airspace AND not only ignoring the warnings but disabling them completely. Amazing.



I seriously think I just creamed my pants without any influence from any outside variables.
User currently offlineirelayer From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 1073 posts, RR: 2
Reply 11, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 19289 times:

You can turn off the terrain awareness system? Why would you want to do that? Can you turn off TCAS too? It seems that those critical alert systems should never be overridable.

-IR


User currently offlinecbphoto From United States of America, joined Dec 2003, 1572 posts, RR: 6
Reply 12, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 19204 times:

While it doesn't excuse what the pilots did, lets keep one thing in mind, they were on a demo/fun flight. In normal operations this would never have happened, and because they were on this demo flight, they wanted to give the passengers a ride and view of a lifetime and pushed the envelope of safety to do so. Unfortunately, it ended in a tragic way. Many sight seeing flights have done similar things in the past and have had a perfectly safe flight. Regardless of if the database was correct or not, the Captain should have used his best judgment and once he had entered the clouds, should have called off the fun flight and returned to a safe altitude. In the end, we may never know exactly why they continued on the path they did, but sometimes with the greatest rewards, also come the greatest risks!


ETOPS: Engines Turning or Passengers Swimming
User currently offlineBoeingGuy From United States of America, joined Dec 2010, 3258 posts, RR: 7
Reply 13, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 19108 times:

Quoting irelayer (Reply 11):
You can turn off the terrain awareness system? Why would you want to do that? Can you turn off TCAS too? It seems that those critical alert systems should never be overridable.

On Boeing airplanes you can't turn off all of TAWS. You can inhibit the terrain lookahead, using the terrain database and GPS position, but you cannot turn off the radio-altimeter based GPWS function (the original GPWS without the "E" for "enhanced"). Even the reasons for turning off the terrain look-ahead portion have become mostly obsolete so I'm not really aware of any reason to do it anymore. Current EGPWS systems can handle QFE operations, and most or all airports are in the approved coordinates survey.

Quoting travelavnut (Reply 8):
Quoting redzeppelin (Reply 7):
guess that I always assumed that TAWS was based on active radar or some other means of directly detecting an obstruction.

IIRC a classic GPWS works that way. An EGPWS is also connected to a terrain database to give earlier warnings. Please somebody correct me if I'm wrong

Yes, that's basically correct. GPWS (without the "E") looks at decreasing radio altitude. In other words, the ground is rapidly rising below you. As I said, there's no way to turn this off.

Quoting nighthawk (Reply 2):
The article states that the system gave a warning of "terrain ahead, pull up" and "avoid terrain". Are these alerts given in english or Russian on the Superjet and other Russian/Ukrainian built aircraft?

Ah, they had the ACSS supplier TAWS, not Honeywell EGPWS. Only the former gives the Avoid Terrain alert. All aurals on the flight deck are in English. That's the universal language of aviation.


User currently offlineRubberJungle From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 14, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 18469 times:

Quoting cbphoto (Reply 12):
because they were on this demo flight, they wanted to give the passengers a ride and view of a lifetime and pushed the envelope of safety to do so

There doesn't appear to be much evidence of a sightseeing element. The first demonstration flight turned back before reaching the mountains. The second flight used a different runway, and the investigators say the need to lose altitude was the reason for the early descent and orbit. The crew never intended to fly around the mountain.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...d-as-fighter-investigators-380349/


User currently offlineDocLightning From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 20365 posts, RR: 59
Reply 15, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 18339 times:

Quoting dynamo12 (Reply 5):
Folks designing safety systems, particularly alarms, should spend a very significant amount of time avoiding false alarms. This flows from simple math. If 99.99% of the time there is no problem (1 in 10,000 incident rate), and in even 1% of the no problem time there is a false alarm you end up with 100 false alarms per real alarm. That just doesn't work.

What you have just described is called "positive predictive value." It also explains how 90% of people with a positive HIV test that is "99% accurate" will not actually have HIV.

That said, what would have been the harm in pulling up? He was in IMC flying VFR and got a warning. Frankly, it's another stain on the Russian flying profession and it was all so unnecessary and avoidable.


User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 16, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 18238 times:

Quoting Colombia (Reply 9):
one should climb to the MEA, MORA, MSA or whatever it is that You have at hand when in doubt

The flight was supposed to be conducted in an area safe from rising terrain. Well clear of any mountains. The flight was operated at an altitude well above the minimum safe altitude for the area of the demonstration.

The pilots were apparently confused by a different runway for takeoff for this second flight, which allowed them to go a few miles south of the authorized practice area.

Quoting redzeppelin (Reply 7):
How is TAWS connected with a database?

The way I understand the information from the earlier flight, when the plane would turn in certain directions, the TAWS would alert for the highest mountain in the area, even though the pilots were in a turn which would take the plane well clear of that mountain.

Indonesia, and several other island areas, would give alerts for mountains where the pilots had no intention to fly. For example, landing at HNL on Rwy 26L from the east would give TAWS alerts because the TAWS does not know the pilots are planning to turn left two miles out from the runway.

Quoting cbphoto (Reply 12):
because they were on this demo flight, they wanted to give the passengers a ride and view of a lifetime and pushed the envelope of safety to do so.

I've seen nothing to show that occurred in the earlier flight. The pilot did demonstrate the aircraft capabilities, but stayed well clear of the mountains.

We have to remember there were two mountain areas outside the approved demonstration area. The crew appears to have been aware of and careful to keep clear of the 'dangerous' higher mountain.

When they took off for the second flight, IF they followed the previously programmed flight plan and distances, it would have put them five or eight miles too far south.

That crossed out of the approved area into the second lower mountain area. There was no indication I've heard they tried to give the passengers a closeup view of the mountain. They were likely unable to see the second mountain or the ridge they hit until the last few seconds.

The attitude of the impact with the mountain side indicates they likely saw it at the last few seconds and tried to pull up to avoid the collision.

The key information goes back to basics. They allowed the aircraft to drift south of the planned demonstration area, and with limited visibility over the volcanic mountains, they were not aware how close they were to the mountain they crashed into.

Again, referring to a local source who has flown over that area many times, local pilots know to be aware of the area, to exercise extra caution. These two pilots with very little local experience did not.


User currently offlineAquila3 From Italy, joined Nov 2010, 323 posts, RR: 0
Reply 17, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 18072 times:

Quoting irelayer (Reply 11):
You can turn off the terrain awareness system? Why would you want to do that? Can you turn off TCAS too? It seems that those critical alert systems should never be overridable.

It does not make so much difference. If you have lost awareness, you can simply choose to ignore it, like it seems the AF447 pilots did with the stall indicator.
Very sad stories, both.

BTW, nobody did ever try to implement an active CFIT protection, something like the envelope protection?
Then, of course, you would need something to override it



chi vola vale chi vale vola chi non vola è un vile
User currently offlineBoeingGuy From United States of America, joined Dec 2010, 3258 posts, RR: 7
Reply 18, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 17767 times:

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 16):
Quoting redzeppelin (Reply 7):
How is TAWS connected with a database?

The way I understand the information from the earlier flight, when the plane would turn in certain directions, the TAWS would alert for the highest mountain in the area, even though the pilots were in a turn which would take the plane well clear of that mountain.

Not totally true. TAWS' look-ahead vector turns when the airplane is in a bank and turning. It doesn't (yet) know projected LNAV flight path, but it knows if you are, say, turning to the left and the terrain is only instantaneously in front of you but not in front of the way you are turning.


User currently offlineSemaex From Germany, joined Nov 2009, 833 posts, RR: 2
Reply 19, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 17393 times:

Just one question: is (E)GPWS and TWAS the same thing, just different names?

Quoting redzeppelin (Reply 7):
I have a lay man's question: How is TAWS connected with a database? I guess that I always assumed that TAWS was based on active radar or some other means of directly detecting an obstruction. But the reference to a database makes it seem that TAWS is comparing the aircraft's position and altitude to a topographic database. Is that the case?

Concerning GPWS, the system is connected to the database, which references its position through the accelerometers, GPS and rho-rho (DME-DME) or rho-beta (DEM-VOR) information. So the longer the flight is, the less accurate the position becomes and thus the less accurate the position warning will be in case of high terrain. But we're talking about a couple of dozen meters on modern airplanes, so hardly worth mentioning.
However, the radio altimeter is quite accurate at any given time. The problem with the radio altimeter though is that it only starts operating at an altitude of 2500AGL. So if you have high terrain which is rising extremely rapidly, then this margin of 2500ft may not be enough to give a timely warning (as far is I remember the picture of the crashsite in Indonesia, the terrain was rising very fast). The look-ahead function of the GPWS then again relies on the database and position update, unless you use the weather radar for surface scanning, of which I'm not sure the pilots of the SSJ did, since in IMC you ought to use it for weather detection, obviously.
More knowledgable people on the subject feel free to correct me.

Quoting Colombia (Reply 9):
I think You are right here, however when flying in areas that one is not familiar with , one should climb to the MEA, MORA, MSA or whatever it is that You have at hand when in doubt, what do You guys think?

True, but don't forget that this was a demonstration flight. I'm not sure if it was smart in the first place to do this under IMC, but money and fame played a role too I guess.

Quoting irelayer (Reply 11):
You can turn off the terrain awareness system? Why would you want to do that? Can you turn off TCAS too? It seems that those critical alert systems should never be overridable.

You can turn TCAS off by simply selecting the Transponder on a non-S mode. It would be quite annoying to do any aerodrome movement with TCAS on, since it would alarm every single second due to the close proximity of other aircraft in that area.
You can turn GPWS off too, as some of the seven submodes are not necessary at all times (for example the "flaps flaps" warning when you are doing flap-up landings for training purposes).

Quoting Aquila3 (Reply 17):
BTW, nobody did ever try to implement an active CFIT protection, something like the envelope protection?
Then, of course, you would need something to override it

While giving aircraft a CFIT protection would reduce the global amount of fatal accidents by something like 50%, the problem with it is in itself. Think about it: after all, every landing is nothing more than another "controlled flight into terrain", with gear down. Having the aircraft go around by itself everytime it gets near to the ground is rather pointless. It would need such an amount of override for all kinds of situations that probably financially and logically it doesn't make sense to install such a system.
And quite frankly, the GPWS and TCAS do an incredibly good job when handled correctly and responed to actively.



// You know you're an aviation enthusiast when you look at your neighbour's cars and think about fleet commonality.
User currently offlineRickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 900 posts, RR: 0
Reply 20, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 17167 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 3):
They thought it was a database problem, which means they'd lost situational awareness. Once that happens, confirmation bias becomes a huge issue...the crew believes they know what's going on (even though they don't) so they fit any new information into their theory of what's going on rather than revising the theory.

*If* you believe the terrain database is incorrect, then you *expect* erroneous terrain warnings. In a perverse way, continued warnings in that situation confirm to the crew that they're correct.

Tom
Quoting Aquila3 (Reply 17):
It does not make so much difference. If you have lost awareness, you can simply choose to ignore it, like it seems the AF447 pilots did with the stall indicator.
Very sad stories, both.

What Tom said instantly reminded me of AF447 as well. Two crashes with experienced crew with planes that performed exactly as designed, that in the same situation most pilots would have avoided the crash.


User currently offlinesturmovik From India, joined May 2007, 515 posts, RR: 0
Reply 21, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 17077 times:

Quoting nighthawk (Reply 2):
Are these alerts given in english or Russian on the Superjet and other Russian/Ukrainian built aircraft?

The Superjet has a lot of western systems on board, and the warnings were almost certainly in English. A few Russian and Chinese aircraft do have systems that are in the local language, both in terms of what is displayed on screens and what is spoken. However, I doubt this is the case with the SSJ, which has been built with the intention of selling it in markets outside of what is traditional for Russian manufacturers. I may be wrong on this.

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 3):
confirmation bias

  
I read in one of the news articles that there was a potential buyer in the cockpit who was conversing with the pilots for a good portion of the flight. This may have aided the unfortunate situation, distracting the pilots from reacting correctly to cues they may have otherwise not ignored.

Quoting irelayer (Reply 11):
Can you turn off TCAS too?

It can definitely go on standby mode. Switching off the transponder (or a malfunction, perhaps) can cause TCAS to not function, which was one of the contributory causes to the GOL 1907/ Embraer Legacy collision and subsequent crash of the 737. The Legacy jet had its transponder inadvertently switched off, thereby causing a TCAS outage the crew weren't aware of.



'What's it doing now?'
User currently offlineglideslope From United States of America, joined May 2004, 1629 posts, RR: 0
Reply 22, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 16984 times:

Situations such as this will never be completely avoided as long as Humans are part of the equation.

  



To know your Enemy, you must become your Enemy.” Sun Tzu
User currently offlineBoeingGuy From United States of America, joined Dec 2010, 3258 posts, RR: 7
Reply 23, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 16699 times:

Quoting Semaex (Reply 19):
Just one question: is (E)GPWS and TWAS the same thing, just different names?

Yes, TAWS is a generic industry term (Terrain Awareness and Warning System). GPWS is an industry generic term, even though Honeywell first developed that system. EGPWS (for "Enhanced") is a Honeywell trademarked term.

Quoting sturmovik (Reply 21):
It can definitely go on standby mode. Switching off the transponder (or a malfunction, perhaps) can cause TCAS to not function, which was one of the contributory causes to the GOL 1907/ Embraer Legacy collision and subsequent crash of the 737. The Legacy jet had its transponder inadvertently switched off, thereby causing a TCAS outage the crew weren't aware of.

That is only half of the story. The Legacy inadvertently turning their Transponder to Standby turned off their own TCAS. However, it caused a bigger issue than that. It also made the Legacy invisible to the 737's TCAS, which was on and in perfect working order. The 737 was doing everything right - TCAS on and in the right place. The 737's TCAS couldn't detect the Legacy because the latter's Transponder was off.


User currently offlinemandala499 From Indonesia, joined Aug 2001, 6972 posts, RR: 76
Reply 24, posted (2 years 1 week 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 16700 times:

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 4):
The only person on this forum who has flown over that area and has detailed knowledge of the area, the terrain and where the flight was supposed to be is mandala499.

OK... I'm here...   

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 4):
In his detailed posts after the crash, he explained how the pilots had drifted out of the area where the flight was supposed to be taking place.

I did several simulations to see where the aircraft would end up in zero wind condition and headed out of the right-hand orbit on heading 200... whilst descending from 10,000 to 6,000 at a rate of -1000ft per minute... it ended up a mere 500m from the crash site, same altitude, and about 100ft spare. If they were not distracted in completing their orbit, they wouldn't be facing a wall of terrain but would still be damn close.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 4):
Also that they were probably fixated on avoiding a higher 'more dangerous' nearby mountain, not realizing they were below the level of the mountain/ ridge they hit.

Yes, the MORA reflected the bigger mountain (up to 9,900ft high) to the east of the one they hit. This fixation was aided by the perceptions gained from the previous flight, and also the lack of terrain information they had in the area briefing they received... basically, they didn't know there was another mountain at 6000ft nearby... and it was covered by cloud.

Quoting cbphoto (Reply 12):
In normal operations this would never have happened, and because they were on this demo flight, they wanted to give the passengers a ride and view of a lifetime and pushed the envelope of safety to do so.

The CVR nor the FDR revealed any information that indicated intentional "wanting to give the passengers a ride and view of a lifetime and pushed the envelopeof safety to do so". There was no view of a lifetime on that fateful flight. The nice views they had on the first flight, was covered in thick cloud.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 16):
The flight was supposed to be conducted in an area safe from rising terrain. Well clear of any mountains. The flight was operated at an altitude well above the minimum safe altitude for the area of the demonstration.

The pilots were apparently confused by a different runway for takeoff for this second flight, which allowed them to go a few miles south of the authorized practice area.

The change of runway, ATC handling them seeing the aircraft type on the radar tag as an Su-30, and lack of terrain information in their area briefing, and purely using approach and enroute charts... sealed their fates.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 16):
Again, referring to a local source who has flown over that area many times, local pilots know to be aware of the area, to exercise extra caution. These two pilots with very little local experience did not.

Not quite. Airline pilots don't know... they don't fly to that area. Student pilots out of Halim and Air Force pilots operating out of Halim and nearby Atang Sanjaya generally avoid the area unless in clear VFR. Few, ventured there in marginal VFR or IFR... I did, and even former officials from the CAA of a "safe country" laughed at our preparations and contingencies... at least I'm alive because of that. But many local pilots don't know that area. They just know 'not to venture south of the training area below MSA without knowing where things are. Given that flight path, 9/10 pilots here I asked said they don't even know that mountain was there... they just know the bigger one making that high MORA.

Mandala499



When losing situational awareness, pray Cumulus Granitus isn't nearby !
25 JoeCanuck : Nice to have a first hand perspective....thanks.
26 DocLightning : Well, you could arrange the logic architecture to deactivate the protection if the gear is down and the aircraft is otherwise configured for landing.
27 BoeingGuy : There's another problem with that description. The TAWS databases know where the airports are. So it inhibits the alerts when you are landing at an a
28 awthompson : We can try but I think air safety is largely as good now as it's likely to get in the west. In Russia and certain other countries, they are not quite
29 Post contains images DocLightning : Very true. No aircraft, no matter how safe, is immune to CFIT.
30 Semaex : Concerning an "anti-CFIT" program, this situation then however becomes complicated again when the aircraft is out of the normal values for the positi
31 Post contains links tdscanuck : It's pretty rare. The more common cause of false alarms is algorithm artifacts, because the system doesn't react that well to very tall very thin obs
32 Post contains images flyinTLow : On any aircraft there have to be ways to turn these systems off in case of certain failures which, in case of that failure, could lead to nuisance war
33 BoeingGuy : Actually the newer EGPWS's for about the past 10 years do what's called "Geometric Altitude" not just Barometric altitude. It fuses Baro Alt, Radio A
34 flyinTLow : absolutly correct. I just used the term barometric to differentiate it from radio.
35 sturmovik : You are right, of course. I thought I could get away with the phrase 'contributory cause' since this discussion is not about that accident (and that
36 Mir : If they malfunction, then they need to be turned off in order to stop providing false alarms. You'd also have to provide for the case of a gear-up la
37 Post contains images keegd76 : Didn't know about the radar tag issue. What would cause a civilian jet to appear on radar as a fighter jet? I thought the radar tag was based on info
38 Mir : An incorrect input into the ATC system, either from an error when filing the flight plan, the system not recognizing the code and assigning what it f
39 RickNRoll : That and turning off the TAWS.
40 rfields5421 : Remember this was a new type aircraft never seen in this country before. Su-30 might have been the newest Sukhoi aircraft in the system aircraft type
41 RubberJungle : There was no reference in the flight-planning database for the Sukhoi Superjet, so the flight data officer at Jakarta selected the Su-30 to improvise
42 BoeingGuy : Again, you can't totally turn off TAWS, only the look ahead function. You can't turn off the radio altimeter based alerts. You can inhibit the gear a
43 txjim : It's also turned off when approaching a tanker
44 BoeingGuy : Actually you are probably turning off the Transponder in each case. That does, by default, turn off TCAS (there is also a TCAS OFF mode, which leaves
45 rfields5421 : One thing to remember about turning off the TAWS is that this aircraft was near the end of the flight and the pilots were descending for their approac
46 mandala499 : If they didn't get distracted, no TAWS (with basic GPWS still on) wouldn't result in the accident. They switched the TAWS off after getting the warni
47 Aquila3 : Thanks, Tom. That sounds like the right way to me. Glad that USAF invests conspicuous budget in this research, involving the top notch of US technolo
48 Gatorman96 : There is a good chance I missed this fact somewhere along the line and I am in NO way placing any blame as this and all accidents are very complex and
49 rfields5421 : Mandala499 provided some background on this back right after the crash. I'm writing this from memory. There were a couple factors which limited the A
50 mandala499 : I'll add to Rfields5421 as usual.. The final report stated the controller on duty was over burdened. He had to control his sector with 14-20 aircraft
51 747WanSui : I hope Mayday can do an episode on this crash at some point - I certainly think the details of this crash would make for a good episode for that serie
52 JoeCanuck : Absolutely...I think there's always something to learn from the tragic, 'human error(s)' accidents...even if it's; 'there, but for the grace of god,
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