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FAA Grounds 787 Part 4  
User currently offlineiowaman From United States of America, joined May 2004, 4404 posts, RR: 6
Posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 20 hours ago) and read 29437 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
FORUM MODERATOR

As the last thread was getting quite lengthy, please continue the discussion here.

Previous thread: FAA Grounds 787 Part 3 (by NZ1 Jan 19 2013 in Civil Aviation)

Enjoy the site!

[Edited 2013-01-21 14:38:07]


Next flights: WN DSM-LAS-PHX, US PHX-SJD.
269 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently onlinepacksonflight From Iceland, joined Jan 2010, 381 posts, RR: 0
Reply 1, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 19 hours ago) and read 29212 times:

Quote tdscanuck

No. I claim that spilled content does not violate the FAA special condition. That would only happen if the spilled content caused meaningful damage to surrounding components...so far, no evidence of that has been put forward. I'm sure it warrants some attention, if only to confirm that what spilled was what was expected to be spilled (if any).

You maintain that: That would only happen if the spilled content CAUSED meaningful damage to surrounding components
but the FAA says: COULD CAUSE meaningful damage...

There is a big difference, but I guess the FAA has the the authority. It is good to be the king......


User currently offlinenomadd22 From United States of America, joined Feb 2008, 1871 posts, RR: 0
Reply 2, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 19 hours ago) and read 29125 times:

From reply 217, previous thread.


"Oops, you are right, I was 100% sure because I have the Ultramat 14. But ... it turned out that I have the Ultramat 14 plus. Here is the right docu:
http://www.graupner.de/mediaroot/fil...4_Ultramat_14_plus_de_en_fr_it.pdf

But everything that I said is valid."

Still no. That document specifically says the balance capability is for nicad and nimh. It does not do Lithium because it's not that simple. Reduced charging current or increased voltage through a Lithium cell can mean it's charged or defective. The opposite can mean it's discharged or defective. You have to have an intelligent device that can look at the voltage/current/time charging curve to decide if the cell is losing capacity, leaking or ready to run away. That simple balancing function is just an attempt to keep nicad and nimh cells about equal to prevent reverse charging of weak cells. It would be useless in predicting and removing a Lithium cell about to run off.

I'm not denying that chargers you describe exist just because I don't know of any outside of Tesla or the ISS. (Future ISS batteries will be Lithium upgrades)
Just that the referenced charger and document ain't it, and dumb race car batteries sure the heck don't have the ability.
I'd be happy to be proved wrong. Those big oil clean up boats you saw in the Gulf a few years back could use battery upgrades for the remote skimmer controllers, and I'd like to find a charger that could predict imminent cell failure. Right now I'm dropping Radio Shack RC nicad packs in them.
Uh,,,Blah,Blah 787 Blah, (Sorry about the rambling)

[Edited 2013-01-21 15:42:29]


Andy Goetsch
User currently offlineBraybuddy From Ireland, joined Aug 2004, 5740 posts, RR: 32
Reply 3, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 18 hours ago) and read 29023 times:

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 247):
Hence, when a regulator uses terms such as "extremely remote", "explosion", "self-sustaining", "failure", "major or more severe failure condition" in a regulation addressed to the professional community of aeronautical engineers, it is using them as technical terms which have a defined and precise meaning that is understood by the professionals to whom they are addressed. What Wikipedia or a non-professional non-engineer thinks they might mean is irrelevant - fortunately.

Which is why it is probably not a good idea for technicians or engineers to use such terminology when aruging with people who have a different, or less esoteric, interpretation of these words.

You can argue all you like that an explosion is not an explosion, but what term do you then use when you want to actually describe an explosion? And the same goes for smoke, fire or containment.


User currently offlineJoeCanuck From Canada, joined Dec 2005, 5472 posts, RR: 30
Reply 4, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 28640 times:

Quoting Braybuddy (Reply 3):

Considering this thread is dealing with exact technicalities in a specific field, if one strives to be accurate, they should defer to language and word definitions used in that field. Of course, the lay person may not know these specific definitions, but it's good to learn new things.

As a lay person in the aeronautical fields, (but not a complete thicko), my standard definitions might not be completely accurate in the context of, say, the investigation concerning battery fires on a 787.

Semantics are crucial to the language used because these are legal definitions and liability may hang on such subtle nuances.



What the...?
User currently onlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 31055 posts, RR: 87
Reply 5, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 28467 times:
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Quoting JoeCanuck (Reply 4):
Considering this thread is dealing with exact technicalities in a specific field, if one strives to be accurate, they should defer to language and word definitions used in that field. Of course, the lay person may not know these specific definitions, but it's good to learn new things.

And we are fortunate that we have members who understand these exact technicalities in this specific field and have tried very hard to provide specific definitions so that these incidents can be correctly and accurately discussed.

[Edited 2013-01-21 17:22:44]

User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12587 posts, RR: 25
Reply 6, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 28330 times:

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 1):
Quote tdscanuck

No. I claim that spilled content does not violate the FAA special condition. That would only happen if the spilled content caused meaningful damage to surrounding components...so far, no evidence of that has been put forward. I'm sure it warrants some attention, if only to confirm that what spilled was what was expected to be spilled (if any).

You maintain that: That would only happen if the spilled content CAUSED meaningful damage to surrounding components
but the FAA says: COULD CAUSE meaningful damage...

The FAA said the reason for the AD was that it could cause meaningful damage, not that it did cause meaningful damage.

I believe the special condition / design constraint is that it not cause meaningful damage.

As far as we know it did not cause meaningful damage, so the design constraint is not violated.

The FAA is concerned by the two incidents that a future one could cause meaningful damage, yet such has not yet happened.

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 1):
There is a big difference, but I guess the FAA has the the authority. It is good to be the king......

Indeed the king is concerned that something bad could happen.



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently offlinePHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 7639 posts, RR: 18
Reply 7, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 28278 times:

How are some of the flights being accommodated? Has SEA been upgauged to a 772 and what about BOS?

SAN is cancelled through the 25th.



我思うゆえに我あり。(Jap. 'I think, therefore I am.')
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 8, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 28207 times:

Quoting packsonflight (Reply 1):
You maintain that: That would only happen if the spilled content CAUSED meaningful damage to surrounding components
but the FAA says: COULD CAUSE meaningful damage...

The "that" in my quote refers to the incidents that occurred violating the containment. Since, as far as we know, neither event caused meaningful damage to surrounding components it's not clear that the requirements around fire containment were violated. This is in direct conflict to multiple posters in the prior thread who claimed that the incidents *demonstrated* that the containment was violated.

I agree that, if it's shown that spilled content could cause meaningful damage then Boeing would have another problem to deal with. But the events we actually know about do not show that damage occured, therefore we can't latch on to them as proof that the design features didn't work.

Tom.


User currently onlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 31055 posts, RR: 87
Reply 9, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 28096 times:
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Quoting PHX787 (Reply 7):
How are some of the flights being accommodated? Has SEA been upgauged to a 772...

I would assume it has gone back to the daily 777-300ER it was prior to the 787-8 taking over M-F (it was still a 777-300ER Sat-Sun).


User currently offlinecornutt From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 338 posts, RR: 1
Reply 10, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 28060 times:

Since people have been asking, let me go over some of the hazard and probability definitions as defined by the FAA. Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A, "System Design and Analysis", is the document that lays out the FAA's general specifications for how hazards are classified and what probabilities they must meet, in regard to commercial airliners. The AC defines four categories of hazardous event, defined by severity. The terms and definitions are:

Minor: "Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce airplane safety, and which involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities." (Material in quotes is the actual words from the AC)

Major: "Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example: A significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or some discomfort to occupants."

Severe-major: "A large reduction of safety margins or functional capabilities, or higher workload or physical distress so that the crew could not be relied on to perform its tasks accurately or completely, or adverse effects on occupants." (Note here: the term "severe-major" does not actually appear in this AC. However, it is widely used in the industry to match this definition, and it is defined in the complementary AC 23.1309, which defines the standards for general aviation.)

Catastrophic: "Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and landing."

The AC defines these acceptable probability levels for each category. A hazard in the category must be shown to be less likely than the standard, via the fault tree analysis:

Catastrophic: 10^-9 per flight hour, or 1 in 1,000,000,000 flight hours
Severe-major: 10^-7 per flight hour, or 1 in 10 million flight hours
Major: 10^-5 per flight hour, or 1 in 100,000 flight hours
Minor: no limit

(Note that these probabilities go out the window when it comes to software. Because software doesn't fail in a probabilistic manner like hardware does, there is a completely different way of evaluating it. If you're in the industry, you may have heard of the DO-178C standard for avionics software. It basically lays out standards and processes for software, according to the hazard severity level associated with the software. It is a *lot* of work to develop flight-critical software in accordance with DO-178C.)


User currently offlineprebennorholm From Denmark, joined Mar 2000, 6461 posts, RR: 54
Reply 11, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 27998 times:

About this hair splitting of "contained" or "not contained". We have to look at two different things:

1. Heat
2. Residue

About heat: Those batteries went to full destruction on their known thermal runaway failure mode. We have no evidence telling that any other equipment suffered any heat damage. Therefore the heat can be assumed to be contained in these incidents.

But that's not all it takes to be "safe". If nobody know whether it takes twice as much heat to do any damage, or we came to 99% of the threshold, then we are not sure what margin we have. If such uncertainty exists, then the FAA may not at the moment consider it contained.

About residue: Residue - electrolyte - was floating on the EE-bay floor. It made cosmetic damage to the floor, but otherwise it is believed that it did no further damage.

But with chemicals on the floor it takes no more than turbulence and negative G to have it all over.

Therefore we go and ask questions to the subcontractors of all equipment in the EE-bay: "Is it okay to spray chemicals from a burst Li-Ion battery on your equipment? Was that requirement written in the specification, from which you developed your gear?"

If they all answer "Yes", and if the FAA agrees with them, then the residue contamination was contained.

Problem is that FAA already wrote the words "could damage" in their AD. If the FAA some day should eat those words again, then.... But until then it is fair to say that FAA already told us that the failure was not contained.

New subject:
Since the 2010 test incident in the EE-bay ultimately by Boeing was blamed on FOD, but too small to be positively identified, then I doubt that the EE-bay is totally Li-Ion runaway goof proof. As I read the FAA AD they seem to have the same opinion. That doesn't necessarily mean that a worst thinkable EE-bay contamination is catastrophic, but it certainly eats away redundancies and grows some really thick branches on the fault tree.



Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs, Preben Norholm
User currently onlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 31055 posts, RR: 87
Reply 12, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 27968 times:
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Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 11):
Since the 2010 test incident in the EE-bay ultimately by Boeing was blamed on FOD, but too small to be positively identified, then I doubt that the EE-bay is totally Li-Ion runaway goof proof.

But Boeing knows it wasn't caused by a battery leak. And considering the panels are, per reports of people who have seen them, enclosed in a case themselves, even if liquid electrolyte solution were sprayed on them, the interior should be protected.




Quoting cornutt (Reply 10):
Note that these probabilities go out the window when it comes to software.

I have heard an unconfirmed report that some 787s recently received a software update that changed the power system battery charging algorithm(s) and controls. I do not know what those changes entail, and again, it's something I heard third-hand so I cannot vouch for it's validity. However, if a change was made, and it was made to the NH and JL birds, it could be a potential source of the problem and why they occurred so close together after so many hours without incident.


User currently offlineiahmark From United States of America, joined Nov 2007, 51 posts, RR: 0
Reply 13, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27945 times:

I have a quick question of some piece of information I found in other site.

It seems the importance of the APU in a 787 is much more so that a mere "Auxiliary Power Unit" to run things when the plane is on the ground.

According to these posters it also performs main duties as controlling flight control surfaces; i.e basically parts of the FBW system...this to me is crazy;...... Here's a copy an paste of the exchange between these two posters and I would like to know how true is this information: (read comments of "Blogger A")

Quote:


I have a question?
The apu is not a critical system for the plane to operate consider the word "auxiliary". The only time it is used is on the ground or in the air if an engine generator has failed. Otherwise planes really don't need them when you have air start carts and gpu's. The only reason they have them is to elimii have a question? the use of ground equipment and to fly a plane with 1 main generator inoperative. Boeing is trying to be innovating, when they should stick to what works a nicad. Lastly the FAA grounded the fleet because it started a fire multiple times in different aircraft. So they are not risking fires in transatlantic flights, can't land on water.

Blogger A
Boeing's design isn't what you'd conventionally think of in an APU. They replaced a good deal of the drive hydraulics with electro actuators. Rather than bleed off of engine power to drive all of that hardware, their APU design feeds all of the surface drive systems during flight.

I have a question?:
I'm always learning something new, but I do know is there is redundancy among aircraft's. That aircraft should be able to fly without an operative apu. Otherwise we can't call it an apu.

Blogger A
In theory, it is able to fly without an operative APU - because it has battery backup and because in extreme emergencies you have the ability to shunt main bus power to the control systems for a limited amount of time

I have a question?
I'm going to believe you because it seems like you know this aircraft very well. What powers the the main bus?
It should be in "reality" instead of theory cause the feds would not let this plane fly...

Blogger A
Main bus is supplied by engine driven generators. This is traditionally a relatively low current bus that drives things like avionics, cabin lighting & entertainment, etc. Upgrading the engine driven generators to a point sufficient to drive the control surface systems would have resulted in too much of a drain on the engines, resulting in lower fuel efficiency. Driving that set of systems off of the APU allows the main engines to operate at greater efficiency. Remember that Boeing's main selling point for this plane was that it uses less fuel.

I have a question?
I'm still having trouble wrapping my fingering around it... From what your telling me the control surfaces are controlled apu generator to save fuel? Cause running a third smaller turbine engine is using more fuel than just two big genx or rolls 1000.

Blogger A
Yes. Generators are gear driven directly off of the turbine through reduction. They introduce drag and therefore mess with your bypass ratio. GenX and Trent are both high-bypass designs. Trent especially, at 10:1, so when you start introducing drag, you lose thrust and your fuel efficiency goes into the toilet. To fix that, you'd have to essentially redesign the entire engine.

I have a question?
I would also have to say apu is not for flight controls unless you have a source or can provide one i would love to read up on it. That battery that burnt up i bet is just for starting the apu like every airplane with an apu.





[Edited 2013-01-21 18:38:02]

[Edited 2013-01-21 18:41:26]

User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 14, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27882 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 12):
But Boeing knows it wasn't caused by a battery leak. And considering the panels are, per reports of people who have seen them, enclosed in a case themselves, even if liquid electrolyte solution were sprayed on them, the interior should be protected.

Those power panel cases have significantly sized air vents for cooling. It is not unreasonable that, under the right conditions, you could get electrolyte in there (albeit in small drops). Note that the changes made to the power system after the ZA002 event were designed to let the system respond properly *even if* you got FOD inside the panels...electrolyte drops would be considered FOD.

However, it's rather important to note that the aft EE bay contains another significant 787 technology...the power electronics cooling system (PECS), which runs a mixture of glycol, water, and some additives through an extensive set of tubes, backplanes, and connectors within the aft EE bay. Since there's no chance that the FAA would have accepted a statement that "the PECS system will never leak", Boeing would have had to design the entire aft EE bay to handle chemicals flying around anyway.

Tom.


User currently offlineCM From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 15, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27862 times:

Quoting iahmark (Reply 13):
I have a quick question of some piece of information I found in other site.

The entire explanation in the thread you have posted is incorrect. See my explanations of standby power, the function of the APU, Batteries and RAT in the previous thread.


User currently offlinephxa340 From United States of America, joined Mar 2012, 891 posts, RR: 1
Reply 16, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27843 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 12):
I have heard an unconfirmed report that some 787s recently received a software update that changed the power system battery charging algorithm(s) and controls.

This would help explain why the NH bird had this happen a full 1 year after its In-Service date. That would be welcomed news.


User currently offlineRickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 841 posts, RR: 0
Reply 17, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27833 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 8):
The "that" in my quote refers to the incidents that occurred violating the containment. Since, as far as we know, neither event caused meaningful damage to surrounding components it's not clear that the requirements around fire containment were violated. This is in direct conflict to multiple posters in the prior thread who claimed that the incidents *demonstrated* that the containment was violated. I agree that, if it's shown that spilled content could cause meaningful damage then Boeing would have another problem to deal with. But the events we actually know about do not show that damage occured, therefore we can't latch on to them as proof that the design features didn't work.

I don't know who you mean when you refer to 'other posters', but I have continually referred to the spilled content, myself, and see that as being sufficient to question the claim that it was contained adequately. I have never claimed that this is proof that it would cause severe damage, but I agree with the claim by the FAA that it is possible..


User currently offlineiahmark From United States of America, joined Nov 2007, 51 posts, RR: 0
Reply 18, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27812 times:

Quoting CM (Reply 15):
Quoting CM (Reply 15):
The entire explanation in the thread you have posted is incorrect. See my explanations of standby power, the function of the APU, Batteries and RAT in the previous thread.

That's what i wanted to know, Ii seemed crazy to put all that burden on a APU!!


User currently offlineordwaw From United States of America, joined May 2006, 74 posts, RR: 0
Reply 19, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27756 times:

Quoting tdscanuck reply 270 of previous thread

"It's not a guess, it's a design condition. The battery would have burned itself out without damaging surrounding equipment, the fumes and smoke would have gone out the outflow valve and stayed out of the main deck, and the plane would have landed safely. "

Given the above statement I became curious. Let's play out the following scenario... B788 flying ORD-WAW route, just left the continental Canada an hour ago. Pilots get notified about APU battery being on fire. Should they ..

(a) start immediate diversion
or
(b) continue on knowing that it is an APU battery fire, by design it will be contained, it will go on for another 30 minutes or so when the battery will have burnt itself out without damaging surrounding equipment, the outflow valve will vent all the fumes and smoke out, we are good to continue".
or
(c) perform a different procedure (?)

What does the OP advise in the above situation?

[Edited 2013-01-21 19:02:18]

User currently offlineCM From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 20, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27615 times:

Quoting ordwaw (Reply 19):
Given the above statement I became curious. Let's play out the following scenario... B788 flying ORD-WAW route, just left the continental Canada an hour ago. Pilots get notified about APU battery being on fire. Should they...

Always option A. Divert.

Every fire event on the airplane is designed to be managed or suppressed, but the crew procedure is always to divert. In teh case of the 787, cargo fire suppression systems are designed for 5.5 hours (ETOPS 330), but you would certainly choose a closer airport if one is available.

[Edited 2013-01-21 19:10:21]

User currently offlineprebennorholm From Denmark, joined Mar 2000, 6461 posts, RR: 54
Reply 21, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27612 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 12):
But Boeing knows it wasn't caused by a battery leak.

Of course the 2010 incident wasn't a battery leak. If it had been that simple, then Boeing would have known immediately.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 12):
And considering the panels are, per reports of people who have seen them, enclosed in a case themselves, even if liquid electrolyte solution were sprayed on them, the interior should be protected.

And problem is that this contradicts FAA when they write "could damage".

But as I wrote in reply #11, don't ask "people who have seen them". Ask the subcontractors about what specifications they had to fulfill when they designed and built them. And ask FAA for approval.

"People who have seen them" may see totally enclosed boxes. Still they may have fan driven cooling ventilation on the back side. Just one thing which.....

We will again enjoy flights on the beautiful 787 when the FAA has approved it. "People who have seen them" boxes do not decide.



Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs, Preben Norholm
User currently offlineCM From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 22, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27446 times:

Quoting CM (Reply 15):
The entire explanation in the thread you have posted is incorrect. See my explanations of standby power, the function of the APU, Batteries and RAT in the previous thread.
Quoting iahmark (Reply 18):
That's what i wanted to know, Ii seemed crazy to put all that burden on a APU!!

I just went looking for my previous posts and can't even figure out what thread they are in! I guess I shouldn't expect you to be able to find them. Man, this topic is out of control! Here is a thumbnail explanaiton:

For normal operations, the APU is started when the airplane is on the ground and is used to provide power for main engine start. For most every flight you will fly on, the APU is then shut off and will remain off for the rest of the flight. It's only other purpose is as a redundant power source (bleed and electric on most airplanes) for when the engine sources cannot supply the power.


User currently offlinedfambro From United States of America, joined Nov 2009, 330 posts, RR: 0
Reply 23, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27408 times:

Quoting tdscanuck, prior thread
Quoting dfambro (Reply 256):
WingedMigrator is correct, you can calculate confidence interval for a rate from a single event. You can calculate it for zero events.

Yes, you can calculate it, but you can't do anything with the information because the confidence interval is infinitely wide.

************************


If you're using the word "infinitely" in regard to the zero event case, it's true. I just brought it up as illustration to counter the claim that there is no rate information in a single event. Of course there is, and there is even rate information in the zero event case. I also stated the rate is unbounded on one side (=infinitely wide) in the zero event case. But that's the uninteresting case, as you know. The interesting case is what a single event tells you about rate, and that is not infinitely wide. And it will be actioned, if the time to first event is sufficiently rapid, because you can exclude with statistical confidence that the rate is very low.

What's intriguing to me is how you deal with the multiple-hypothesis testing problem when looking at isolated failures in a system as complex as a cutting-edge airliner.

Here, the first battery event occured a year into service and (so I read) greater than 1 million flight hours into the program, which does not exclude with statistical confidence that the failure rate is appropriately miniscule. And it wasn't actioned with a grounding, rather it was just targeted for investigation. And then a second battery event/fire occurred...


User currently offlineCM From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 24, posted (1 year 8 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 27382 times:

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 21):
But as I wrote in reply #11, don't ask "people who have seen them". Ask the subcontractors about what specifications they had to fulfill when they designed and built them. And ask FAA for approval.

"People who have seen them" may see totally enclosed boxes. Still they may have fan driven cooling ventilation on the back side. Just one thing which.....

Protection from PECS coolant spray is a design requirement for all equipment / racks / boxes in the aft equipment bay.


25 prebennorholm : That seems to really rock the FAA wording "could damage" etc, which to me at least seems to be their major reason for grounding. If the boxes are tot
26 RickNRoll : They refer to the leakage as 'flammable'.
27 Post contains links bellancacf : Perhaps the following site and thread have been mentioned, but there's a drawing, some photos, and, as here, back and forth commentary: http://www.ppr
28 7BOEING7 : Don'y know where you're getting the "1 million flight hours" from, including flight test it's probably closer to 55,000 at best.
29 dfambro : Thought I saw that written somewhere, but yea, after a moment's thought it can't be nearly that many.
30 Aesma : Glycol/water cooling for the electronics, cool, I use that in my computers too. If it leaks it can cause shorts but shouldn't start a fire.
31 Post contains images WingedMigrator : indeed there is, although this can be hard to grasp. If the 787 fleet had accumulated 0.13 million flight hours when the first battery event occurred
32 smolt : I'm afraid this has already been told here, but a TV special program of ANA 787 I watched yesterday showed, 1. There was a hole of several centimeters
33 RNAVFL350 : That is a very interesting piece of information that should,but probably will not, silence many naysayers that seem to think Boeing somehow forget ho
34 DocLightning : But glycol and water may have very different properties than electrolyte. Is electrolyte caustic or alkaline? How reactive is it? Will it burn if it
35 hOmsAR : How could the 787 fleet have accumulated 1.3 million flight hours by now? That's equivalent to over 100 planes flying 24 hours a day, nonstop, from s
36 RickNRoll : According to the FAA, they are concerned about flammable material coming from the batteries.
37 Post contains images WingedMigrator : Sorry, I read that somewhere and must have mis-remembered it. It obviously can't be that high... probably closer to 130,000.
38 CM : I think it was Mike Sinnett who mentioned the battery had 1.3 million operational hours, between lab, flight test and commercial operations. Not real
39 RickNRoll : I think that is pretty much how I understand it. Well written.
40 7BOEING7 : Probably one of the "body drains" which run along the bottom of the airplane. The hours that count are the ones in the airplane and the number that w
41 PHX787 : Was that where all of that smoke came from in the earlier linked videos from TAK?
42 rcair1 : Which fits with my observation of a fluid on the ground below the a/c and the "smoke" actually being (maybe) condensation (like the peoples breath) f
43 Post contains links boacvc10 : Wait, what "valve actuator" ? Also, is the investigation taking a serious turn, or is the press fishing for a story? GS Yuasa Searched After Boeing 78
44 seahawk : Thank you for many informative replies. I am sorry I got many facts wrong (like believing there are other battery packs in the rack). Looking into the
45 rwessel : The point is that everything is fairly well shielded against a spray of (conductive!) coolant (of drastically lower viscosity) anyway. A bit of corro
46 BoeingVista : I actually find it a bit concerning that you take it upon yourself to reinterpret the words of the NTSB, its a bit patronising don't you think? You t
47 yeelep : Could be in connection with the inadvertent fuel dumping.
48 flood : Thanks for the link. I had previously only seen a photo of the damaged battery when it had already been removed... there's another photo of it still
49 AeroWesty : The 787 emergency airworthiness directive was issued by the FAA, not the NTSB, and is in the public domain. CM's personal interpretation of the AD, w
50 packsonflight : I dont see any grounds for you frustration with the FAA statement, but that appears to be in line with the story cooked up in Boeing media room, so p
51 smolt : A news says that the battery is sent to JAXA in Tokyo (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) for inspection using CT scanning to aquire mulitple layers
52 Post contains links rheinwaldner : Sorry, this time your are wrong. On the bottom of page 40 you e.g. find the display, where a lipo battery is charged using the balancer socket. The b
53 FlyingAY : And how can we know that the measurement is correct? I know of cases where LiPo batteries have burned down because the voltage measurement in the cha
54 JoeCanuck : Ditto that. Not me. At this point, the NTSB is reporting observations, not conclusions. For instance, they don't say how extensive any damage was, wh
55 KC135Hydraulics : I have a picture of the KC-135 battery arrangement coming soon for those of you unfamiliar with it. It will make you cringe. The "containment" is the.
56 Tristarsteve : Yes. There was a statement about this in the Sunday English papers, but can't find it. The fuel valve that spilled fuel had an actuator made in the U
57 liquidair : This discussion of containment, not containment- risk, not risk.... Seems irrelevant to me. I'm no engineer, pilot or expert- buy I do know that I wou
58 AlfaBlue : "Ladies and gentlemen this is your captain speaking - Sorry to interrupt your lunch but we have some indications that we might have a battery fire on
59 Kaiarahi : Obviously you don't read anything carefully - the statement was issued by the FAA, not the NTSB. Your remarks are not only derogatory, they're irrele
60 Post contains images mcdu : well said
61 Cubsrule : . . . and yet, that's exactly how the aircraft was certified. Are you suggesting it should not have been certified with Lithium ion batteries aboard?
62 liquidair : seconded!
63 AlfaBlue : And now those same people (who conveniently provided all the data that this technology is safe to the certifying body) have to deal with the fact tha
64 Cubsrule : That's incorrect. Lithium ion batteries, like all batteries, fail from time to time. Lithium ion batteries fail in a more spectacular way than other
65 AlfaBlue : I think we have safer battery tech available and saving some weight and improving economics is no acceptable reason to endanger lives. In that case I
66 Post contains images lightsaber : I'm glad we're having this debate. A hundred years ago the average life span in the US was only 47 years... I further add that. I am an expert in flig
67 liquidair : How many mass produced passenger jets are there with lith-ion batteries? Which were designed to have failing thermal runaway fires? Forest, trees any
68 tarheelwings : Interesting post, thanks. I for one can weigh your input against that of a.netters who participated in the certification/flight testing of the Dreaml
69 Cubsrule : You are suggesting that the 787 should never have been certified. Where were you (and those with that viewpoint) during the certification process? Wh
70 rheinwaldner : Why? I bet you can't tell a single reason why it can happen. The condition for it to happen are known and it is possible to build the system that it
71 liquidair : your questions are valid- and I would cautiously respond by saying that the certification process isn't flawless.
72 Cubsrule : How? Is anyone still downplaying the grounding? I'm not sure anyone who has commented in this part of the thread has.
73 Post contains images PlaneInsomniac : Wow, thank you so very much. Some much needed perspective on a very serious topic! The amount of word mincing, pseudo-legal babble, and over- and re-
74 Cubsrule : I agree, and it's important to remember that the use of lithium ion batteries in the 380 emergency lighting system is quite a bit different from what
75 rcair1 : You are also interpreting the comments by the FAA (not NTSB) as are most of the people here- me included. A useful response might be to provide a dif
76 Stitch : They're focusing on the batteries because the 787 had over 100,000 hours of in-service flight and thousands of hours of test flights with no reports
77 Post contains links PHX787 : http://www.japantoday.com/category/n...vestigate-boeing-787-battery-maker The transport ministry is launching an investigation now. This may keep drea
78 AlfaBlue : Why did the Boeing management flip upon the news of the grounding? Because they know about the flaws and the flawed elec. system and now the whole wor
79 holzmann : I so called this! I posted days ago that Boeing should turn to TELSA, now Elon Musk is tweeting: https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/29232160637677977
80 Post contains links Humanitarian : They are saying the ANA battery was overcharged. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...na-787-battery-malfunction-381268/
81 Post contains images tarheelwings : And the true agenda comes out: Boeing management knew about the problems but chose to ignore them and allowed a dangerous plane to fly......since thi
82 CXB77L : Who exactly is downplaying these incidents? Please provide some direct quotes. Yes, there has been a discussion over the meaning of certain words but
83 spacecadet : Depending on the problem that's eventually found, there's a good chance it shouldn't have been. It's grounded now, and not for any problem related to
84 rcair1 : Hmmm - maybe I'll withdraw that trust I mentioned in my previous post? What airline do you fly for? Are you saying Douglas is gone because they were
85 Cubsrule : The fact that the 787 was going to use lithium ion technology wasn't exactly a state secret, just as it's public knowledge that the 350 is going to e
86 AlfaBlue : I am not an engineer neither a law maker, I am just a dumb user (pilot and pax) who has seen too many scary youTube videos of exploding batteries. Som
87 Post contains images tarheelwings : Of course I'm kidding, my post was meant to be sarcastic, please note the Like you, I get frustrated at some of the "opinions" expressed by some a.ne
88 alfablue : No - After all I flew one of their products and loved it. But any company can go bust, self inflicted, bad management or by bad luck like a comet whi
89 Cubsrule : . . . or like lithium ion batteries, no?
90 Kaiarahi : Indeed! It's starting to resemble the early AF447 threads where some of the same people posting here claimed: - that AF and BEA were colluding to not
91 seahawk : I think it is too early to call for actions, when the cause of the problem is still unknown.
92 rcair1 : Per mods - reposting because this was at the end of the locked thread part 3. I agree 100%. Also - some of this safety for occupants comes at the cost
93 Post contains links bellancacf : I've wondered from the start of these threads why the Li cells were in proximity to each other. Post #20 at the following link has this to say: http:/
94 Post contains images ncfc99 : Is that not the point of the grounding. It wasn't supposed to happen, there are design measure in place incase it does happen. It has happened. It is
95 Stitch : I would not be surprised if Tesla designed their battery packs the way they did due to the necessity of compliance with regulations concerning an aut
96 rheinwaldner : I bet 100% that it has already a balancer. It must have. If not (note: this is a possibility that impossibly can be), I would go as far and call Boei
97 bellancacf : to Stitch at 95: A two-fer, then? Much-reduced chance of conflagration in use, and lessened chance of "catastrophe" in a crash. Sounds like good desig
98 Post contains images alfablue : - I have learned a lot here too - dont worry - I didn't talk about discs just debris I think nor do I know all facts by heart. Memory is a bad tool f
99 rcair1 : Thanks - I thought so! Part of the point of my post was to point out to others the absurdity here. And with this string - you can't be sure about sar
100 Aesma : Airbags (and even safety belts) also kill people in accidents. They just save far more.
101 par13del : So in relation to this thread, does every a/c you operate have no items on the MEL, do you fly a/c with inop items that are allowed by the MEL, if so
102 Post contains links and images ADent :
103 bradmovie : As a newbie and long-time lurker I have made it a habit on these forums to read every post carefully. There is a lot of technical jargon and informati
104 alfablue : The MEL gives me dispatch conditions, limitations, procedures and time to think. I can if needed review system and possible or common failure modes a
105 Aesma : Well if that wasn't downplaying the events I wonder what if was (in part #3) :
106 kanban : no matter what criteria you want to attach to this clearly trolling and flame baiting opinion, what it really does is without a doubt exposing your b
107 rheinwaldner : Aircraft crash safety is another topic, that could add to the problems of the current design. If the containment breaks and smoke can reach the cabin
108 Kaiarahi : And all in the forward electronics bay. Clearly, they're 4 times more criminal than Boeing, which only has 1 per bay. BTW, the Airbus Director of Pro
109 Kaiarahi : Not to mention if the wings break and fire breaks out. Clearly, fuel is an unreasonable danger on aircraft and they should be designed to fly without
110 robsaw : Too bad you have to use absurdo reductum techniques to point out (and rightly so) the specious, slanderous and baseless accusations implicit in too m
111 ContnlEliteCMH : Does anybody else find it comically ironic that a pilot insists that the ship he commands should never be certified with a device that can produce a f
112 Kaiarahi : A perfect example of selective quoting and what's wrong with this thread. Here's the whole post: "Here's my own feeling... The FAA is either going to
113 lightsaber : I'll restate. I would happily fly on a 787. I would sleep sound too. What is a 'balancer? Links are appreciated. As I prefaced, I do not claim to be
114 rheinwaldner : I only wanted to express that it really is a safe bet, that there is a balancer. The comparison should only highlight how weird the opposite assumpti
115 Post contains links Kaiarahi : On any flight, there are typically dozens of uncontained Li batteries in the passenger cabin, which is full of combustible material. Obviously, lapto
116 rcair1 : In interesting approach and perhaps one that Boeing/FAA should be looking at. If they find the current containment scheme was not sufficient. (cue th
117 Aesma : I quoted the most interesting part in my opinion, since I'm sure many readers skip the bottom half of too long posts as I do (and clearly some here h
118 alfablue : Jet A has a proven track record is years in the industry and currently does not have an alternative (versus a safer batterie technology exists). Ther
119 rcair1 : Indeed - and airbags have been modified to improve that. Seat belts as well. This points out that nothing is foolproof. You pick one person - quote h
120 Stitch : After an airliner crash, you're performing an emergency evacuation. And as we saw with JA804A at TAK, that can be completed before smoke reaches the
121 Cubsrule : Do you believe that the 380 should be grounded until the lithium ion batteries are removed from its emergency lighting system?
122 Post contains images KELPkid : On the surface, doesn't look too bad...I remember a battery box (containing a lead acid battery) looking like this after a coworker hooked up 28 volt
123 ADent : Yeah - I don't think so. If the Li-Ion battery is unflyable, they could lash together a system using qualified batteries from other models of aircraf
124 alfablue : If they are a danger to flight safety than yes. But I can only speculate as I don´t know the details of that design (location, type,...). I am not e
125 AeroWesty : What you're leaving out is that the design may be solid, simply executed poorly. No one yet knows the answer to any of the questions posed in this di
126 NathanH : You state something as a fact, and then your very next sentence talks about rumors. It makes it hard to take what you say seriously in light of peopl
127 Cubsrule : Your previous argument was unrelated to absolute safety but instead focused on a safer (but less useful) alternative. Which is it?
128 Stitch : Per the A350 Systems Description, the A350 uses four identical Lithium-Ion batteries connected to the 28V DC network. These four batteries: • Ensur
129 alfablue : I can not judge that - I even said it before that maybe it was just all bad luck - either way it will be hard to just let it fly again - that was my
130 Cubsrule : Why? AA has had two fleet groundings in recent memory (both Boeing products, incidentally). Has it hurt AA's reputation? Did the DH4 grounding at SK
131 AeroWesty : Again, you're projecting. You don't know that for a fact, since you don't know what the root problem is. None of us do yet. Example: My car didn't pa
132 alfablue : No because the Airline does not manufacture but uses the products (apples vs. oranges) Thats why I said it is my opinion and I will bite my words. An
133 dfambro : It would have been a PR disaster if there had been a crash, especially one with loss of life. It may be a big topic on here, but it's pretty much dis
134 RNAVFL350 : This is the same kind of thinking 60 years ago when the prop engine was being replaced with the jet(yes I know that this is not anywhere near as big
135 ComeAndGo : yes, but they're made by Saft and not that Japanese motorcycle battery maker.
136 ComeAndGo : No, you have a potential source of fire and no extinguishers. that's not the same.
137 AeroWesty : Neither you nor I nor even LaHood at this point know what the problem is. Your posts are simply filled with undocumented and unproveable conjecture t
138 Post contains links alfablue : she is grounded - isn't that a fact? A grounding after certification is no problem? two battery fires are no problems? http://money.msn.com/now/post.
139 Stitch : McNerney has to retire within two years no matter what - he's 63 and Boeing's mandatory retirement age is 65 - so tossing him now seems counter-produc
140 liquidair : So now a difference in opinion is trolling? And the words you write, they are gospel? sorry but the last few posts are nothing more than bigoted bully
141 BEG2IAH : If you read the previous three threads, including this one, I would say we established the fact that B787 is grounded. What's the point of repeating
142 ContnlEliteCMH : While I agree with this, I also think it largely irrelevant to this discsussion, which is about understanding and addressing two battery failures in
143 DTW2HYD : Still trying to understand if you have issue with Boeing or FAA certification process, Even if there are issues with FAA certification process, every
144 wjcandee : I have to say that the level of hysteria in the media, government and, sadly, many A.net members about this event is really-remarkable. I think it ref
145 ContnlEliteCMH : Aside from the obviously incorrect historical nature of this statement -- technological advance usually involves risk to life and health -- why not?
146 Stitch : They both use Lithium-Ion batteries in major roles. This will also be the first major use of Li-Ion batteries in an Airbus Commercial product (the A3
147 Post contains links rcair1 : That is a cheap shot that is unwarranted. GS-Yausa does more than motorcycle batteries. http://www.gs-yuasa.com/us/products/index.html Thank you wjca
148 alfablue : not risking more unknown battery fires with unknown outcome is being on the safe side - thanks some in the FAA had the same thought! point 1 makes th
149 liquidair : you misunderstand my point- I was replying to reply 137 , who seemed to assert that risk is inherent when progressing technologically. Mine may be fa
150 NathanH : The statement was made that technological advancement shouldn't risk life. All that was being said was that in the course of human history, that has
151 Post contains links and images alfablue : The news overnight seems to have become increasingly troubling for Boeing, as investigations into the 787′s problems fan out in all directions. htt
152 Stitch : A significant plurality of the 1000+ posts have been arguing that Lithium-Ion batteries are inherently dangerous and their installation aboard a comm
153 RNAVFL350 : The potential source of fire is installed within a containment (vented so as to not produce a bomb) which seems to have worked as per its design. Oth
154 UALWN : As far as I know, there has not been any fire attributed to the Li ion batteries in the almost 100 A380s that are flying since first entering service
155 RNAVFL350 : Fact is it was grounded because 2 separate battery incidents occured in a very short span of time and the containment of said batteries also needs to
156 kanban : Of course most technological advances seem to come from military applications intent on ending life and health that are then tamed for non military u
157 kellmark : Nathan I have to say, in following this thread, that Alfablue makes a lot of sense, especially from the point of view of someone that puts his life a
158 cmf : Careful, incomplete data is dangerous statistics.
159 nm2582 : A balancer is a circuit designed to equalize the voltage of all cells in a series-wired lithium battery pack assembly. No two lithium cells are absol
160 Stitch : So even if one of the cells in the pack is significantly degraded in comparison to it's peers, provided it receives a steady 4V during charging thank
161 aeroblogger : There were issues with a UA aircraft's electrical system, which caused a divert to MSY. QR grounded an aircraft due to a similar issue. An Air India
162 Shenzhen : Lets just hope that the FAA doesn't start grounding entire fleets when something happens that they can't explain (such as an airplane crashing into t
163 alfablue : but wouldn't mitigation of the risk be to provide ANA and other affected airlines with interim lift and do a thorough investigation into the system a
164 AeroWesty : What evidence do you have that the 787 is being rushed back into service? Links to anything which would be relevant would be helpful.
165 nm2582 : That's essentially correct. There are a few edge cases, but you can absolutely take an old degraded cell (perhaps one that has lost 20% of it's capac
166 Shenzhen : Mitigation, as I see it, would be a comprehensive testing of the batteries and their charging systems. OHM/CMM manuals provide the means to test comp
167 Post contains links alfablue : here you go - an article about the attitude of the Boing management - if they think the grounding is unjustified and and tell operators that all is a
168 Post contains images Stitch : Thank you for that insight. If Boeing has the power to "rush" the FAA into lifting the grounding, one would think they would have had the power to pr
169 Post contains images bellancacf : to nm2582 at 168: The Tesla roadster has, I read elsewhere, 6831 cells in its battery. What on earth does the balancing circuit look like? Is each cel
170 Shenzhen : Every year there are dozens of ADs, mandating something. An AD is not created unless someone feels there is a safety issue. Most provide up to 2, 4,
171 tdscanuck : That method only works if you have a normal distribution (or a large sum of identically distributed distributions). In this case, we have no idea if
172 Shenzhen : By Andrea Shalal-Esa WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A key Senate committee will hold a hearing in coming weeks to examine U.S. aviation safety oversight and t
173 DocLightning : If it had happened twice in two days, then I would have argued that the A330 fleet world-wide should be grounded. It didn't for a very good reason: i
174 PHX787 : Well they have every right to inspect it. I mean, Japanese government is getting involved too. We just don't need anything bad happening anymore to a
175 Post contains images par13del : Stop, you are starting to make sense This one makes absolutely no sense, we all know that the politicians in the USA are in Boeing's back pocket, see
176 WingedMigrator : A normal distribution is not relevant to the problem at hand. Confidence levels can be calculated for the Poisson distribution just as they can for a
177 Post contains images AeroWesty : So you've gone from asking, "whether rushing the 787 back into service is the solution," as if this was a foregone conclusion based on factual events
178 tdscanuck : This is the type of "upplaying" I was talking about. Battery fire was a design condition; not one that anybody expected would even be called into pla
179 Shenzhen : Its not the bottom line (maybe yours). When an Egypian 777 flight deck burns due to an oxygen fire, the FAA mandates changes to the crew oxygen syste
180 Post contains images Stitch : Well they just extended the US debt ceiling until May, so they evidently have some free time on their hands...
181 RickNRoll : I find it hard to accept that the battery in the second incident was 'designed' to fail the way it did. What appears to have happened from the photo
182 AirframeAS : Sorry for the off topic, but I'm curious about this.... Is this for higher ups only or for all Boeing employees? As for the topic at hand, what is th
183 Shenzhen : There are operator reports of airplane thermal damage due to batteries overheating in "non" 787 airplanes. Maybe the FAA will bring these reports to
184 Shenzhen : They actually "mitigated" the effects of the snowballing in the exchanger by requiring flights crews to push the throttles forward before their decen
185 prebennorholm : One thing is sure, Airbus will never try to have a similar design certified by EASA. To even try to have a dozen CAAs and the airlines accept that af
186 bellancacf : Here's an excerpt from Wikipedia's "Tesla Roadster" article. Non-propagation of thermal runaway and constant cooling are emphasized. Note that this ar
187 Post contains images Shenzhen : Too funny, isn't it? They probably know as much about batteries as they do budgets Cheers
188 tdscanuck : The batteries are never designed to fail. The rest of the aircraft is designed to keep flying safety *if* the battery fails. That's what people mean
189 ikramerica : It's political and corrupt. Japan, in an effort to save face, grounds the 787 without sufficient reason. This may be in response to criticism after t
190 Aesma : About car accidents, need I explain the differences with airplanes crashing ? Anyway I'm betting that when autodrive is safe/cheap/reliable it will be
191 RickNRoll : Engines have protection for blades flying off and fire extinguishers in case of fire. They are designed to cope with failure. I can't see where the b
192 Post contains images Shenzhen : What about the turbine disk that went through the side of a T-tail and killed a passenger. What about the BIG hole in front of the engine, what prote
193 kanban : Nobody is rushing the plane back into service, they are rushing to understand the cause... your comment is typical trolling Trolling again?... yes Co
194 cornutt : Good question. Considering a fairly optimistic scenario... let's say that they determine tonight that the problem is a manufacturing problem with the
195 prebennorholm : The reason is clearly that they will make sure that such an incident on for instance an A350 is a lot better contained. Exactly. Something like that
196 tdscanuck : In a situation like that, especially since the number of airlines is low, seed units are a virtual certainty. Boeing would pre-emptively do the test
197 YVRLTN : I dont know the answer, but from the photo from Shamu330 in post 207 in thread 3, as well as the green substance there does seems to be some brown sc
198 XT6Wagon : I'm saddened by the amount of trolling in these threads. Do all these people avoid flying in highly flammable aluminum airliners? I mean its been used
199 SonomaFlyer : I don't think we have enough information to do anything but wildly guess. There are too many things we have to assume to make such a guess. The Japan
200 Shenzhen : These things wouldn't be done in series. I would say that a large number of the batteries and maybe the chargers have already been removed from airpl
201 Stitch : Because it's sensationalist. The electrolyte is brown in color. So what you are seeing is electrolyte that was ejected from an outflow valve and coat
202 spacecadet : A better question would be, why wasn't it grounded beforehand? 230 more people (give or take) would be alive right now. The answer is that the FAA wa
203 XT6Wagon : Um, You HAVE to make economic vs safety judgements or there is no point in having the industry. The Airline industry is the safest form of transport
204 Post contains links rcair1 : Let the flame fest begin! So - I got really tired of reading patents today and so I started looking for concrete new data on Li-Ion battery fire dange
205 Post contains links nm2582 : Tesla has very different requirements for their battery than does Boeing. The Tesla battery stores a LOT more energy than does the 787 battery and ha
206 Post contains links seahawk : I think the problem is that if we combine the 2 events, there is a theoretical possibility for a major problem in the 787. In first failure the contai
207 nm2582 : I am sure tests like these are already being done, but it would be really interesting to know how the 787 handles these situations... (this is by no m
208 RickNRoll : They are apparently flammable.
209 Post contains links and images N14AZ : Well, since this thread is discussing all kind of things except for the current investigations I feel free to post my theory: I think FAA should inves
210 Post contains images KC135Hydraulics : How's this for containment? KC-135 battery arrangement:
211 seahawk : What type of battery?
212 UALWN : The fleet wasn't grounded but the Thales pitot tubes had to changed quickly. One could argue that this should have been mandated way before, since th
213 Post contains links faro : It seems media focus is shifting to the FAA's role in approving Boeing's decision to install Li-Ion batteries back in 2007: http://www.reuters.com/art
214 s5daw : Apparently at least the fumes part was problematic in the ANA incident...
215 Post contains images cmf : Actually it is one of the most dangerous, only bikes and motorcycles are more dangerous. It is some 30 times more dangerous than using a bus. Three t
216 liquidair : Eh? I'm not advocating that a fail safe design shouldn't be incorporated- of course you need some sort of containment in the event of said failure. A
217 Aesma : The US has enough powerful politicians to have some in Airbus pockets too. But here if I wanted to see a political conspiracy I would rather see it a
218 DTW2HYD : To the contrary, Boeing rubbed the current administration's National Labor Relations Board wrong way when Boeing tried to open Charleston,SC plant. S
219 Kaiarahi : Which would require banning many (most?) electronic devices.
220 rcair1 : The media follows politicians. Politicians - particularly the US Congress and Senate are feeling rather impotent - so this is a chance for them to ge
221 par13del : Apologies to all, it was a comment in jest, should have used the smiley, point was that a few months ago everything was the US government covering Boe
222 Stitch : I wonder if Yuasa can do a materials change in the battery to a cathode chemistry more stable than the lithium cobalt oxide used in the 787's batterie
223 Aesma : Someone has mentioned France launching an investigation, can that be backed up, because I don't think it's true ? The BEA is involved into the NTSB in
224 abba : Thanks Tom. This is a absolutely brilliant way of explaining the issue in a way that even I understand. As so often before your posts are highly appre
225 sankaps : Why wasn't the 787 grounded after the JAL incident? Because it was just ONE incident. If a second similar one were to have happened within days on th
226 nm2582 : If I were in charge of working on the battery (which I'm not - I'm a software guy by trade, and not in the aviation industry or anything connected to
227 PITingres : I suppose I shouldn't feed the trolls, but ... I don't understand why you and others seem to think that some posters are trivializing the situation.
228 TheSultanOfWing : Just to get practical here for a moment: Any info on what airframes are being checked physically? Did Boeing send staff to NRT, ORD, DOH, SCL etc to c
229 AeroWesty : +1. One of the best lines in this thread. I'm amazed and appreciative of the patience and continued measured and intelligent responses from those wit
230 Post contains links alfablue : http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...eing-787-faa-idUSBRE90M04620130123 Quote: FAA rules do not cover lithium batteries, so the agency in 2007 set n
231 justloveplanes : Forgive me if I am repeating previously posted information, but these threads are long. With regards to the above, I recall that the FDR didn't recor
232 liquidair : If you regard my opinions as trolling, then you're free not to read them. I think that in reality, tone is often lost when writing- and absolutism co
233 Stitch : Lithium-Ion fires are Class D events. The most effective way to fight such a fire is to use a dry powder extinguisher, which smothers and acts as a h
234 tarheelwings : His point still stands, doesn't it? You were the one making the following statement: And he is simply asking:
235 Kaiarahi : Not necessarily. It says: If it's a manufacturing defect, para 2 is not violated. Or an internal short resulting from a production defect.
236 liquidair : If you read my whole post, and actually understood it, you'd notice that I'm saying that at times written words come across as absolutism whereas per
237 seabosdca : Said it better than I could have. Panic helps solve nothing in this sort of situation. Dispassionate analysis, on the other hand, will eventually fin
238 Cubsrule : Well, yes, it certainly can be. Fire is an acceptable risk in engines, for instance, because it's unavoidable and we have good ways of mitigating it.
239 rcair1 : Stitch - I'm correcting you here because you (probably) got this information from me and it is incorrect. See my long post about that in this thread
240 PHX787 : Oh my god it's so difficult to sift through what's actually factual. I clicked the SD button for this whole thread because I don't have the time to si
241 liquidair : This isn't trivialising? Please, let's not use extremism to counter statements. I wouldn't say the two things are the same. You might, I wouldn't. In
242 tdscanuck : Oh, we realize it. What I don't think many people realize is that that's how you *have* to design commercial systems. You can always spend more money
243 Stitch : Well if they believe it's the battery, and not the 787's charging system, then I don't see why the 787 needs to remain grounded once "known good" bat
244 Cubsrule : Nope, it's correcting a statement that is far too broad and thus wrong. The fact that fire is not always unacceptable does not mean that battery fire
245 liquidair : A little pedantic, perhaps? thank you- appreciated as always... But.. surely this is the whole point of testing? so that there are no risks once in s
246 Cubsrule : You run in to the question of how much testing is necessary or desirable. The government has answered that question in different ways for different i
247 Kaiarahi : In that case, no aircraft would ever enter service. In order to know what the risks might be after 20 years of service and x,000 cycles, you'd have t
248 PITingres : Sure, I'll debate it. It depends on what you mean by "unacceptable". An analogy would be the difference between a rotor burst and a fan blade-out in
249 DocLightning : You just answered your own question. Developing and executing these procedures will take some time.
250 mcdu : I agree that there is a cavalier attitude by many about the issues of the 787. Many of the people that share this attitude are shameless fans of BA, e
251 justloveplanes : Looking more and more likely, see below Agree, as has been mentioned, 100K hours with no battery problems. Agree, prudent and an AD, but not groundin
252 PITingres : If you had written "... are the ones who seem to have the most fear, uncertainty, and doubt" I would agree. Concern is something else entirely and th
253 Kaiarahi : Actually, their professional discipline is all about fallibility - but by all means, let's do away with designers and engineers and have aircraft des
254 Stitch : I'd argue that just declaring that something to be "unacceptable" could hinder safety, rather then advance it. If the FAA declared that "battery fire
255 RNAVFL350 : I am pretty sure that the only reason you have a job is because of engineers and designers that build the planes that you fly! Of all the comments th
256 alfablue : I would like to respectfully disagree with you. I don't think they were foreseen in that frequency and in the way they developed. I have read now a f
257 Shenzhen : Totally agree. Once the suspect batteries are removed from service, the easiest way to ensure the remainder remain good would be to hard time the bat
258 NathanH : You literally entrust your entire life to engineers every time you do your job. It is odd that just now you are doubting their qualificaitons. Also,
259 starrion : So if both events are now known not to involve over-charging, that leads back to a bad lot of batteries. If the known -bad lot can be identified, then
260 PITingres : I'm sorry, but you do, every day, and I'm not just talking about the engines. Electrical fires, hydraulic fires, cargo fires, all can happen and have
261 wjcandee : Witness our friend Patrick Smith's recent media appearances. It was evident that he really had no idea about 787 systems, certification or engineerin
262 seahawk : One defect points to a faulty battery, 2 defects point to a more complex problem, unless you can find a third battery from the same production batch t
263 Post contains links alfablue : I do trust our engineers. 100% I can assure you that. I have the uttermost respect of them and we get along very well - you even become friends with
264 Post contains images SonomaFlyer : I like that analogy If and ONLY IF these two incidents are traced to a "bad batch" of batteries then the FAA will want to know: 1. What was the natur
265 Cubsrule : Performance and design objective includes not failing, no?
266 RickNRoll : I think that addresses my concerns.
267 Pygmalion : How about "Ladies and gentlemen this is your captain speaking - Sorry to interrupt your lunch but we have some indications that we might have a cargo
268 starrion : OK, I am sure that there are a dozen reasons why what I am about to suggest is a horrible idea, We all know that different objects can be deployed fr
269 Post contains links iowaman : Please continue the discussion in Part 5 as this thread is quite long: FAA Grounds 787 Part 5 (by iowaman Jan 23 2013 in Civil Aviation)[Edited 2013-0
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