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FAA Grounds 787 Part 5  
User currently offlineiowaman From United States of America, joined May 2004, 4364 posts, RR: 6
Posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 3 hours ago) and read 33951 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
FORUM MODERATOR

Please continue the discussion here as the previous thread was quite lengthy.

I politely ask members to avoid personal attacks and flamebait to keep the quality of our forums up. Part 4 required a lot of moderating deletions due to these issues.

Previous thead:
FAA Grounds 787 Part 4 (by iowaman Jan 21 2013 in Civil Aviation)

[Edited 2013-01-23 12:08:18]


Next flights: WN DSM-LAS-PHX, US PHX-SJD. Return: US SJD-PHX, WN PHX-MDW-DSM
267 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlinePygmalion From United States of America, joined Jun 2006, 966 posts, RR: 38
Reply 1, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 2 hours ago) and read 33898 times:

Quote:

OK, I am sure that there are a dozen reasons why what I am about to suggest is a horrible idea,

We all know that different objects can be deployed from the aircraft in-flight. RAT, landing gear ect.

Most of the concern centers on "battery fire while x hours from possible landing". presumably over open ocean or artic landscape.

While this is not an 'easy' fix, what about having the batteries in future designs be in a belly location where they can be jettisoned? The most contained battery fire is the one that is 30K below and 10 miles back. This would require breakaway connectors and some additional seams on the exterior surface....

Bessides the fact the FAA has a really really bad aversion to parts coming off aircraft especially over inhabited areas... no one wants a 50+ pound object coming through the roof of their house.

the fault tree for the jettison system would have to preclude a jettison failure from causing its own incident especially if it failed during takeoff/landing or during an engine failure etc where the battery was required to provide standby power to continue safe flight...

adding a bunch more complexity to a system is rarely a good way to mitigate risk


User currently offlineflyingcello From United Kingdom, joined Jul 2010, 139 posts, RR: 0
Reply 2, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 2 hours ago) and read 33857 times:

What about a very brief overview of the current position to start the new thread off?

User currently offlinealfablue From Spain, joined Jan 2013, 43 posts, RR: 10
Reply 3, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 2 hours ago) and read 33797 times:

Quoting flyingcello (Reply 2):

What about a very brief overview of the current position to start the new thread off?
http://www.chicagotribune.com/busine...to-flight-20130123,0,1747659.story


QUOTE:

"The fact that such electrical system-related incidents would occur consecutively, purely from my perspective, could not have been expected. We are finding it difficult trying to figure out what kind of investigative stance we should take."

The investigation has also renewed scrutiny on the FAA's 2007 decision to let Boeing use a highly flammable battery technology on the 787. A U.S. Senate committee will hold a hearing in coming weeks to examine aviation safety oversight and the FAA's decision, a congressional aide said on Tuesday.

"I can't really say anything about the timeframe of the investigation. The NTSB is really the only authorized authority in the U.S. to talk about this investigation and they made some recent statements, but I can't speculate on timeframe," Sinnett said Wednesday in recorded remarks supplied to Reuters.

FAA Administrator Michael Huerta, appearing at the same event, said the review was looking at the 787's certification, manufacturing and assembly processes, and that he could not speculate on an end date.

For at least one Chinese customer, the uncertainty about the Dreamliner's production and delivery schedule has meant delays in launching new routes.

"Frankly, it's a little disappointing the aircraft has been delayed so many times," said Chen Feng, chairman of Hainan Airlines Co Ltd parent HNA Group, in an interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos. "We still think it's a good aircraft, but this has had some effect on our planning."

AlfaBlue


User currently onlineredzeppelin From United States of America, joined Feb 2012, 545 posts, RR: 0
Reply 4, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 2 hours ago) and read 33757 times:

Just checked Boeing's stock price and was pleasantly surprised to see that it has help up pretty well through the grounding so far. Looks to be above their 6-month average, and has actually been trending up through the day today. So the market hasn't lost much confidence yet.


Happiness is rediscovering a forgotten L-1011 in your flight log.
User currently offlineairmagnac From Germany, joined Apr 2012, 303 posts, RR: 44
Reply 5, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 2 hours ago) and read 33595 times:

Quote:
Many of the people that share this attitude are shameless fans of BA, engineers or designers
Quote:
The incompetence and infallibility complex of pilots are what have caused most noteworthy crashes of commercial airliners in the last 50 years.
.

Enough of this confrontational BS !! Please !

You people make it sound like engineers and pilots are in a permanent war against each other. That's not true, they are the two sides to the same coin.
The primary job of the engineer is to design and build an airplane that will not put the pilot in a precarious situation
The pilot's primary job is to not bring his airplane into a dangerous position.

But both groups are made of fallible human beings. BOTH OF THEM.

So the engineers have to also design the plane to continue to work in case of a failure. Either introduced in the design & manufacturing, or by the pilot.
And pilots have to be able to keep their arcraft out of a mess even if they make a mistake or if the plane is not functioning nominally.

IOW the pilots and the engineers have to work TOGETHER. And when they fail, when the dreaded accident happens, then they fail TOGETHER. Point me to one single accident which involves only the design, or only the pilots ; I don't know one.

Pilots and engineers have been complementing each other, have been for a hundred years, and will continue to be so. And the result is that we have thousands of aircraft flying all around the globe, transporting each day the equivalent of the population of London, with a very good level of safety. Please keep that in mind before you start another "it's his fault" - "no, it's his fault" argument worthy of a 3 year old. Or before you start accusing people of being incompetant morons, or corrupt greedy bags of s**t.

Both pilots and engineers have highly complicated decisions to make, in their respective areas of competence. Both use an advanced set of knowledge & skills. But in the end both are working to make aviation as economical as possible while maintaining a high level of safety. And as I said, so far the results are rather good.

It is normal to not understand the complex situations they study, and the resulting choices they make. And it is your right to choose not to try to understand.
But if you so choose, please refrain from confontation and mud throwing against those who prefer to understand and solve the problem

Rant over. Carry on.

[Edited 2013-01-23 13:21:20]


One "oh shit" can erase a thousand "attaboys".
User currently offlinercair1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2009, 1305 posts, RR: 52
Reply 6, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 1 hour ago) and read 33217 times:
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Quoting Pygmalion (Reply 1):
no one wants a 50+ pound

ah- em - a 50+ pound flaming object.....

This....

Quoting alfablue (Reply 3):
QUOTE:

"The fact that such electrical system-related incidents would occur consecutively, purely from my perspective, could not have been expected. We are finding it difficult trying to figure out what kind of investigative stance we should take."

is not this....

Quoting flyingcello (Reply 2):
What about a very brief overview of the current position to start the new thread off?

Keep reading...

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 5):
You people make it sound like engineers and pilots are in a permanent war against each other.

Boy - I'm in trouble. I'm both a pilot and an engineer. And I have a number of engineer friends who are pilots. On top of that I'm a fire fighter who deals with failures of both pilots and engineers. Boy - I must by skitzo.

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 5):
Enough of this confrontational BS !! Please !

Thank you for your rant.

Quoting flyingcello (Reply 2):
What about a very brief overview of the current position to start the new thread off?

The current position - of the investigation, not the a.net flame fest.

After 2 incidents involving Li-Ion battery failures on Boeing 787's in 9 days, the FAA issued an order grounding 787 flights while investigation into the cause and effect of the failures is being conducted.

The JAL incident involved the APU battery and occurred while the aircraft was parked in Boston. The battery, for reasons unknown, failed and apparently went into a thermal runaway condition that caused it to burn within its containment vessel. The battery was removed and extinguished by fire fighters.

In the ANA incident the aircraft was in flight and pilots received a warning of a failure in the main "ship" backup battery and detected an unusual order. The pilots made an emergency landing and the a/c was evacuated. Investigation showed the ship battery, again for unknown reasons, had failed in a mode that caused it to burn in it's containment structure. I'm unaware of any action taken by fire crews in the ANA case. In the ANA case, electrolyte from the battery escaped the containment - though it is unclear from public information the extent of that (lots of statements, not much data).

The two batteries are identical, but located in different parts of the a/c. The APU battery is used only to start the APU when other sources are not available. The ship battery is used for backup when other sources fail. It is not used in normal flight operations.

The batteries consist of 8 Li-Ion cells manufactured by Yuasa and packaged by Thales to Boeing's specification - including a containment structure. The containment system also includes a smoke evacuation system for the two bays where the batteries are located to prevent smoke from getting into the cabin during flight. That system operated by causing air flow from the cabins through the bays and out of the a/c via outflow valves. In the case smoke is detected in either bay - the system is re-configured to increase that flow rate. That reconfiguration will not occur automatically in the in the presence of smell (a bad odor will not cause it), but it can be configured that way by pilots.

At the current point - the investigation continues. Data from DFDR on the ships indicate neither battery was overcharged. leading to some speculation that the cause was a defect in the batteries themselves. However, no findings have been released and we really don't know the detail that the FAA or other agencies are looking at.

------
Believe it or not - that is about it. We had 2 battery fires. Neither appeared to have endangered the a/c - however, concern about the battery, charging system, containment, etc. is such that the FAA is concerned and grounded the aircraft until the incidents can be fully understood and it can be ascertained that there is or is not a flight safety issue. The grounding obviously presumes there is and is the safe course of action. At such point as analysis reveals what happened and the potential impact of the incidents becomes clear, such action as is deemed needed will be ordered by way of AD, completed and the a/c will, presumably, return to flight.

Neither I - nor anybody on this forum, or probably the FAA/Boeing/NTSB yet know the cause/effect or actions required.

It is hard to believe the actual facts that lie behind 5 threads is that brief. The vast majority of discussion here is in the form of people expressing various opinions and adding their bit of knowledge about systems and actions.



rcair1
User currently offlineAirframeAS From United States of America, joined Feb 2004, 14150 posts, RR: 24
Reply 7, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 1 hour ago) and read 33162 times:

I am now getting quite skeptical about the new UA DEN-NRT 787 launch date for March 31. Something tells me (a gut feeling) that this may not happen. I hope I will be very, very wrong.


A Safe Flight Begins With Quality Maintenance On The Ground.
User currently offlineKELPkid From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 6343 posts, RR: 3
Reply 8, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 1 hour ago) and read 33158 times:

Quoting alfablue (Reply 3):
The investigation has also renewed scrutiny on the FAA's 2007 decision to let Boeing use a highly flammable battery technology on the 787. A U.S. Senate committee will hold a hearing in coming weeks to examine aviation safety oversight and the FAA's decision, a congressional aide said on Tuesday.

And yet, no one has come forward showing where there has been significant fire damage to anything beyond the battery itself, except for smoke residue on the belly of the NH bird (which many speculated was actually battery electrolyte?). I know the investigation is still young, and we're being spoon fed pictures. I will reiterate what I said in the (now locked) #4 thread, the picture of the battery box before it was opened looks very similar to what I saw when a coworker destroyed a lead acid battery once in a GA plane, by charging a 12 volt battery with 28 volts DC. In that instance, battery acid boiled out and even dripped down out of the engine cowling. Since no one turned on the master switch in the hapless plane, the mechanic was able to put a new battery and battery box in the same day, and clean up all the battery acid, and had the plane flying again the same day.

It is looking, at this point, like the problem is in the battery itself. I'm guessing a long term solution is going to be more monitoring circuits to monitor the health of the individual cells in the LiIon batery, especially since in both incidents, the safety boards (NTSB + Japanese counterpart) are now saying no overvoltage occurred during charging.

[Edited 2013-01-23 13:49:14]


Celebrating the birth of KELPkidJR on August 5, 2009 :-)
User currently offlineflood From United States of America, joined Feb 2009, 1381 posts, RR: 1
Reply 9, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 1 hour ago) and read 33118 times:

From previous thread:

Quoting PITingres (Reply 252):
While I don't dispute your statement as such, the fact does remain that up until the grounding event, the dispatch reliability for the 787 fleet was reported as being on par with other new type introductions, specifically the 777 numbers. Are you suggesting that those 787 numbers were false / incorrect? or is this just an "I told you so"? (which might be immodest but there's no rule against it!)

Keep in mind the claimed DR applies to the 787 fleet worldwide, whereas mcdu was specifically referring to UA. Having tracked UA's fleet for the past 40 days or so, I don't see how they could have attained a DR rate of over 93% during the time, if that. I imagine the folks at UA cringe whenever Boeing touts their DR figures.


User currently offlinePygmalion From United States of America, joined Jun 2006, 966 posts, RR: 38
Reply 10, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day 1 hour ago) and read 33026 times:

Boeing quotes are fleetwide dispatch reliability and would include all 50 airplanes including UA

User currently offlineikramerica From United States of America, joined May 2005, 21472 posts, RR: 60
Reply 11, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day ago) and read 32824 times:

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 6):
Believe it or not - that is about it. We had 2 battery fires. Neither appeared to have endangered the a/c - however, concern about the battery, charging system, containment, etc. is such that the FAA is concerned and grounded the aircraft until the incidents can be fully understood and it can be ascertained that there is or is not a flight safety issue. The grounding obviously presumes there is and is the safe course of action. At such point as analysis reveals what happened and the potential impact of the incidents becomes clear, such action as is deemed needed will be ordered by way of AD, completed and the a/c will, presumably, return to flight.

This is where I don't agree with your analysis.

The FAA only grounded the aircraft AFTER the JAA did so. It was not out of concern, but out of CYA. There is no other answer I can see, because despite the two incidents happening within 2 weeks, they were very different, and neither contributed to a "safety of flight" situation that anyone can prove. One wasn't even flying for goodness sake.

But the FAA is not going to be upstaged by the JAA, plain and simple. And the JAA will not take the risk of failing to act after the nuclear regulatory agency in Japan was shown to be a miserable failure of an agency, and considering the public black-eyes regarding safety concerning automobiles (including battery fires) and aircraft seats from Japan over the last few years.

It is my belief that had the JAA not grounded the 787, the FAA would not have and 787s would be flying safely today. They would have continued with their already announced investigation WITHOUT grounding the aircraft, possibly recommending the testing of all batteries.

But now what? The FAA can't say "we checked things out and will allow the aircraft to fly while XYZ happens" because they haven't defined what they need to do so they have no idea how they will know it's finished.

I believe Boeing will have to sue the FAA to get the 787 back in the air, with a federal judge enjoining the FAA to prove imminent threat to life to keep the grounding alive, or to lift the grounding. After all, if it's simply a maintenance nightmare and not a threat to life, that's between Boeing and the airlines. We don't ground other hanger queens simply because they go tech more often.

But then, would any other agency around the world follow if the ban were lifted by the courts? Surely not the EU, as the damage this will do to Boeing is in the best interest of the EU. Maybe the JAA as they will feel pressure from ANA and JAL to lift the ban anyway.

Maybe the FAA can say "replace the main backup batteries with tested good batteries and remove all APU batteries" until things are better understood. This action alone would cut the risk of battery fire by some factor greater than 2, and since there is no evidence a battery fire would cause anything but a diversion, the risk is already low, so it would be over twice as low as before.

But there are egos involved, and a lot of CYA still to occur, so it could be a long grounding.



Of all the things to worry about... the Wookie has no pants.
User currently offlinewarden145 From United States of America, joined Aug 2010, 501 posts, RR: 0
Reply 12, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day ago) and read 32701 times:

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 6):

I just wanted to say, thank you for the recap of the situation. I've been wanting to know what's been going on, but with the flame wars through over two hundred posts per thread in four threads now, it was all but impossible to get the information without spending hours I don't have sifting through the wars to try and get the info, and I didn't want to start another thread to ask. So, thank you sir.  



ETOPS = Engine Turns Off, Passengers Swim
User currently offlineStressedOut From United States of America, joined Dec 2008, 78 posts, RR: 0
Reply 13, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day ago) and read 32621 times:

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 5):
Enough of this confrontational BS !! Please !





I was being dramatic/sarcastic to illustrate how ridiculous his statement was. It is absurd to denigrate engineers and designers with very little reason. I work with engineers and pilots and find his statements a bit rich.

[Edited 2013-01-23 14:47:57]

User currently offlinerobsaw From Canada, joined Dec 2008, 232 posts, RR: 0
Reply 14, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day ago) and read 32576 times:

Given all the rhetoric, I fully expect Boeing and its partners will come up with a solution. However, I also suspect given the positions of some people, those same people will never be satisfied that ANY Li-ion battery can EVER be safe on an aircraft.

Absolutely safe life only exists in fantasy - reality always has risks. If it weren't for the willingness of the technologically innovative to take life-threatening risks there would be no such thing as an aircraft today.


User currently offlineflood From United States of America, joined Feb 2009, 1381 posts, RR: 1
Reply 15, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day ago) and read 32572 times:

Quoting Pygmalion (Reply 10):
Boeing quotes are fleetwide dispatch reliability and would include all 50 airplanes including UA

Yes, that's my point - their figures represent the average for all 50 frames. But UA and ANA aren't operating their fleets with similar DR rates. They're nowhere close. ANA's numbers are driving up the worldwide average considerably.


User currently offlineairmagnac From Germany, joined Apr 2012, 303 posts, RR: 44
Reply 16, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day ago) and read 32462 times:

Quoting StressedOut (Reply 13):
I was being dramatic/sarcastic to illustrate how rediculous his statement was.

If so, you have my apologies. I was a little violent there.
But I wasn't aiming at anyone in particular ; I removed the names of the posters in the quotes because this is a general observation. I just couldn't hold it in after reading through the entire part 4 thread in one go. So I stand by my post



Quoting rcair1 (Reply 6):

Boy - I'm in trouble. I'm both a pilot and an engineer

Same here

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 6):
On top of that I'm a fire fighter who deals with failures of both pilots and engineers. Boy - I must by skitzo.

Wow, you really must be totally nuts ! 
But as crazy as you may be, your posts are full of sense, and are highly appreciated.



One "oh shit" can erase a thousand "attaboys".
User currently offlinePygmalion From United States of America, joined Jun 2006, 966 posts, RR: 38
Reply 17, posted (1 year 6 months 1 day ago) and read 32416 times:

Quoting flood (Reply 15):
Yes, that's my point - their figures represent the average for all 50 frames. But UA and ANA aren't operating their fleets with similar DR rates. They're nowhere close. ANA's numbers are driving up the worldwide average considerably.

not surprising since ANA has a third of the existing 787 fleet and has operated it the longest.

UA didn't start service until Nov 2012. They didnt even get half their fleet until late Dec. Not to worry, they will catch up.


User currently offlinePHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 7175 posts, RR: 17
Reply 18, posted (1 year 6 months 23 hours ago) and read 32190 times:

From Stitch in the other thread: "Well if they believe it's the battery, and not the 787's charging system, then I don't see why the 787 needs to remain grounded once "known good" batteries can be identified and procedures can be put into place to test them to ensure that they remain "known good".

While the 787 did have two battery incidents in about as many weeks, many seem to forget that the fleet had over 100,000 hours of revenue flying without a battery incident. JA804A - the NH plane - had flown for a full year without a battery incident. Three other NH planes had flown for over a year without a battery incident. And JL had two or three planes with nine months of service without a battery incident."


Well at this point en Boeing needs to contact Yuasa and rigorously test the good batch, get them installed, and proceed with their lives.

At the same time though: has anyone else confirmed or denied if the batteries were just from one faulty batch?



One of the FB admins for PHX Spotters. "Zach the Expat!"
User currently offlineaeroblogger From India, joined Dec 2011, 1363 posts, RR: 0
Reply 19, posted (1 year 6 months 23 hours ago) and read 32158 times:

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
Well at this point en Boeing needs to contact Yuasa and rigorously test the good batch, get them installed, and proceed with their lives.

Your obsession with Yuasa is tiring. It is too early to launch a probe, "rigorously test," or throw the book at Yuasa.

First, the problem needs to be isolated. Rigorous testing won't accomplish anything at all if nobody knows what needs to be tested for.



Airports 2012: IXE HYD DEL BLR BOM CCU KNU KTM BKK SIN ICN LAX BUR SFO PHX IAH ORD EWR PHL PVD BOS FRA MUC IST
User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 20, posted (1 year 6 months 23 hours ago) and read 32117 times:
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Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):

Well at this point en Boeing needs to contact Yuasa and rigorously test the good batch, get them installed, and proceed with their lives.

At the same time though: has anyone else confirmed or denied if the batteries were just from one faulty batch?

We don't have any firm information that the batteries involved were from the same production run or "batch." NTSB did say the JL incident was not an "overcharging" incident. We are getting only dribbles of information and some of that information isn't exactly phrased so its open to interpretation which means we don't know squat yet.

Investigations are ongoing on three continents at the moment. Some media "sources" implied Boeing had some extra procedures/checks/inspection routines ready and I'm sure has dozens of engineers working around the clock to solve the issues.

As I've stated before, the FAA won't lift its order until the cause of the battery "thermal events" are known and there are fixes in place from a manufacturing or design standpoint plus testing whatever fixes or additional checks are recommended.


User currently offlineScipio From Belgium, joined Oct 2007, 833 posts, RR: 9
Reply 21, posted (1 year 6 months 22 hours ago) and read 31932 times:

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):
The FAA only grounded the aircraft AFTER the JAA did so.

Not correct.

ANA and JAL voluntarily grounded their aircraft, but the Japanese Transport Ministry mandatorily grounded the B787 only after the FAA did so.


User currently offlineblueflyer From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 3917 posts, RR: 2
Reply 22, posted (1 year 6 months 22 hours ago) and read 31892 times:
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Quoting rcair1 (Reply 6):
Believe it or not - that is about it.

I thought I read in the early days after the grounding that the FAA was also going to review the certification process for the electrical system. Has that been dropped, or were these statements made by uninformed officials who wanted to look like they knew something?

Other than that question, thanks for the summary. I am learning more about batteries than I thought I ever would, and it actually has some relevance for my work as it turns out, even though the only thing I send flying is paper airplanes.

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):
The FAA only grounded the aircraft AFTER the JAA did so.

The JAA grounded the 787? I thought ANA decided to ground theirs, followed by JAL, or are you implying they did so not of their own initiative but under penalty of the JAA officially ordering them to?



I've got $h*t to do
User currently offlinejreuschl From United States of America, joined Jul 2009, 539 posts, RR: 0
Reply 23, posted (1 year 6 months 22 hours ago) and read 31809 times:

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
At the same time though: has anyone else confirmed or denied if the batteries were just from one faulty batch?

It is believed that the two bad batteries were 3 serial numbers apart, since the battery in the ANA incident was recently replaced, and the JAL airplane was less than a month old.

Boeing can hope the problem is as "simple" as that, but someone needs to figure out why they failed and find out if other recent batteries have the same problem.


User currently offlinercair1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2009, 1305 posts, RR: 52
Reply 24, posted (1 year 6 months 22 hours ago) and read 31800 times:
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Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):
This is where I don't agree with your analysis.
The FAA only grounded the aircraft AFTER the JAA did so. It was not out of concern, but out of CYA. There is no other answer I can see, because despite the two incidents happening within 2 weeks, they were very different, and neither contributed to a "safety of flight" situation that anyone can prove. One wasn't even flying for goodness sake.

Wasn't really trying to analyze - trying to elucidate the status.
But...

Wrong.

JCAB (not JAA - there is no JAA) issued the ground order after the FAA issued it's emergency AD.
ANA did voluntarily ground it's fleet - but I can't even tell if that was before the FAA official order.
The FAA was the first to issue the order - other national agencies followed.

Which makes the rest of your post more or less pointless.



rcair1
User currently offlinercair1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2009, 1305 posts, RR: 52
Reply 25, posted (1 year 6 months 22 hours ago) and read 32578 times:
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Quoting blueflyer (Reply 22):
I thought I read in the early days after the grounding that the FAA was also going to review the certification process for the electrical system. Has that been dropped, or were these statements made by uninformed officials who wanted to look like they knew something?

It could be. Certainly the news about Congress/Senate holding hearings mentions that. BTW - have we ever seen anything meaningful come out of congressional hearings of this type?



rcair1
User currently offlineAesma From France, joined Nov 2009, 6515 posts, RR: 9
Reply 26, posted (1 year 6 months 22 hours ago) and read 32461 times:

Quoting blueflyer (Reply 22):
FAA was also going to review the certification process for the electrical system.

The "certification debate" is today's news, but before the grounding (before the second incident) there was an investigation into the 787 electrical system that was launched.



New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 27, posted (1 year 6 months 21 hours ago) and read 33098 times:

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):
The FAA only grounded the aircraft AFTER the JAA did so. It was not out of concern, but out of CYA.

How's it CYA when they did it first? JCAB acted to comply with the FAA emergency AD *after* it was issued.

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):
I believe Boeing will have to sue the FAA to get the 787 back in the air

I'll eat my hat if that happens. This is a bad enough PR mess already...can you imagine the outcry if Boeing *sued* the US federal government to make an airplane fly that the FAA didn't want flying?

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):
After all, if it's simply a maintenance nightmare and not a threat to life, that's between Boeing and the airlines.

There's a very wide gulf between "maintenance nightmare" and "everyone's going to die". This battery issue lies somewhere in between. It's tough to describe this problem as merely economic (which is what "maintenance nightmare" implies to me).

Quoting robsaw (Reply 14):
However, I also suspect given the positions of some people, those same people will never be satisfied that ANY Li-ion battery can EVER be safe on an aircraft.

True. This despite that fact that your average commercial aircraft contains a few hundred Li-ion batteries, the vast majority of which have no certification or containment.

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
At the same time though: has anyone else confirmed or denied if the batteries were just from one faulty batch?

There's lots of rumour running around but I haven't seen any hard data yet. The problem is compounded by the fact that the cells may be from different production runs...it's unlikely that consecutive cells ended up in consecutive batteries.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 20):
Investigations are ongoing on three continents at the moment. Some media "sources" implied Boeing had some extra procedures/checks/inspection routines ready and I'm sure has dozens of engineers working around the clock to solve the issues.

I'd suspect more like hundreds of engineers...plus techs and flight crews.

Tom.


User currently offlineflood From United States of America, joined Feb 2009, 1381 posts, RR: 1
Reply 28, posted (1 year 6 months 21 hours ago) and read 33011 times:

Quoting Pygmalion (Reply 17):

It's not surprising that ANA is driving up the average and I have no doubt UA will catch up sooner or later. Point remains, UA shouldn't have to be catching up from this far behind to begin with - and mcdu's claim that their 787s are "unreliable" reflects what I've seen in their daily operations. Their decision to position not just one, but two spare aircraft to LAX for the NRT inaugural says it all about their confidence in the aircraft.

For what it's worth, I think the problems UA has been experiencing also played a big part in the FAA's decision to launch the review.

Quoting jreuschl (Reply 23):
It is believed that the two bad batteries were 3 serial numbers apart

If I recall, it was said to be 30.

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
many seem to forget that the fleet had over 100,000 hours of revenue flying without a battery incident.

"The airplane has logged 50,000 hours of flight"
http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2558


User currently offlinemcdu From United States of America, joined Apr 2005, 1448 posts, RR: 17
Reply 29, posted (1 year 6 months 20 hours ago) and read 32578 times:

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
many seem to forget that the fleet had over 100,000 hours of revenue flying without a battery incident

And how many hours between the two battery failure incidents?


User currently offlinePHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 7175 posts, RR: 17
Reply 30, posted (1 year 6 months 20 hours ago) and read 32399 times:

Quoting aeroblogger (Reply 19):
Your obsession with Yuasa is tiring. It is too early to launch a probe, "rigorously test," or throw the book at Yuasa.

Well they are the battery maker remember. besides the occasional windshield issues I don't see anything else holding back the 787.
And about the Yuasa thing- Keep in mind I have a lot of interest in Japanese businesses. I haven't seen any other company reported so much about the 787 in Japanese media. Sure it could be hype but a lot of it is relevant information. And again with your comment about my obsession please note that I don't snip at you for your fields of interest.
Just an inb4: note that windshields of any aircraft are always subject to cracking due to temperature differences.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 20):
We don't have any firm information that the batteries involved were from the same production run or "batch." NTSB did say the JL incident was not an "overcharging" incident. We are getting only dribbles of information and some of that information isn't exactly phrased so its open to interpretation which means we don't know squat yet.
Quoting jreuschl (Reply 23):
It is believed that the two bad batteries were 3 serial numbers apart, since the battery in the ANA incident was recently replaced, and the JAL airplane was less than a month old.
Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 27):
There's lots of rumour running around but I haven't seen any hard data yet. The problem is compounded by the fact that the cells may be from different production runs...it's unlikely that consecutive cells ended up in consecutive batteries.

I see, thanks for the answer. NH was also not an overcharging incident per most sources.

Quoting mcdu (Reply 29):
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
many seem to forget that the fleet had over 100,000 hours of revenue flying without a battery incident

And how many hours between the two battery failure incidents?

Note I was quoting user Stitch and wasn't making much of a reference to that particular line:
But for the sake of it, the hours apart were about 48 hours apart.

If we want to draw connections back to the "serial numbers" speculation, we would have to see when both of those were first manufactured and installed. Thats when we can draw similarities at this point, judging by what you all have said.



One of the FB admins for PHX Spotters. "Zach the Expat!"
User currently offlinesquad55 From Canada, joined Nov 2001, 258 posts, RR: 0
Reply 31, posted (1 year 6 months 20 hours ago) and read 32398 times:

Out of curiosity, what happens to the 787 pilots during the grounding? Are they still being paid etc?

User currently onlineBoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1557 posts, RR: 3
Reply 32, posted (1 year 6 months 20 hours ago) and read 32388 times:

Quoting ikramerica (Reply 11):
I believe Boeing will have to sue the FAA to get the 787 back in the air, with a federal judge enjoining the FAA to prove imminent threat to life to keep the grounding alive, or to lift the grounding.

Worst idea ever! Think of the liability that Boeing would assume, would insurers even be willing to cover this risk? Plus are Boeing going to sue EASA and Japanese Transport Ministry next..

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
From Stitch in the other thread: "Well if they believe it's the battery, and not the 787's charging system, then I don't see why the 787 needs to remain grounded once "known good" batteries can be identified and procedures can be put into place to test them to ensure that they remain "known good".

Even assuming that the problem is exclusively that of failing batteries how long does it take a 'known good' battery to turn bad, 1 month, 1 week, 1 charge?

Also the problem of not meeting the special conditions, the FAA would be put in the position of defending waving its certification safety standards.



BV
User currently offlineprebennorholm From Denmark, joined Mar 2000, 6385 posts, RR: 54
Reply 33, posted (1 year 6 months 19 hours ago) and read 32185 times:

I stumbled over this document from an Airbus conference about lithium battery safety almost a year ago:

http://www.multimedia-support.net/fl...-safety-conference/docs/20-3-1.pdf

I noticed especially on page #13 the line: "Specific venting outside the battery/aircraft when relevant"

I also read in a Reuters press report that Airbus has developed a special titanium pressure valve for a Li-Ion thermal runaway incident.

The "outside battery/aircraft" thing, and this pressure valve, could indicate that Airbus has chosen a somewhat more conservative containment design approach to fulfill the FAA/EASA special requirements.

Anybody out there with some knowledge about that?



Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs, Preben Norholm
User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 34, posted (1 year 6 months 19 hours ago) and read 31615 times:
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Q:
Out of curiosity, what happens to the 787 pilots during the grounding? Are they still being paid etc?

A: most if not all 787 pilots are still certified 777 or 767 aircraft. They have seniority and will fly those ac.


User currently offlinePassedV1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2012, 220 posts, RR: 0
Reply 35, posted (1 year 6 months 16 hours ago) and read 30525 times:

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 34):
Q:
Out of curiosity, what happens to the 787 pilots during the grounding? Are they still being paid etc?

A: most if not all 787 pilots are still certified 777 or 767 aircraft. They have seniority and will fly those ac.

I can only reply as to the United Pilots, but yes, they are still getting paid. Pilots have a monthly minimum gurantee which at United is 70 hours/month.

United would have to "displace" the current 787 pilots out of their seats, at which point they could bid anywhere their seniority could hold. They would then have to be retrained for their new seats (they don't have to bid back to what they held previously). When United decided they were needed again, United would have to put out a new bid and then the pilots could return to flying the 787. Problem is, the same pilots might not bid back to the 787...or other more senior piots may decide to bid the 787, creating yet more training. Since every full training cycle costs 30k on average, for practical purposes, unless it is looking like it is going to be closer to months instead of weeks, then the United 787 pilots will be at home, waiting.


User currently onlineAeroWesty From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 20354 posts, RR: 62
Reply 36, posted (1 year 6 months 16 hours ago) and read 30206 times:

For those looking for official news, the next NTSB update regarding the JAL 787 Boston investigation will be at a press conference scheduled for 2:30pm EST on Thursday, Jan 24. Photography will be allowed during the lab tour where the battery is being examined.

http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2013/130123.html



International Homo of Mystery
User currently offlinekeegd76 From UK - Northern Ireland, joined Aug 2009, 108 posts, RR: 0
Reply 37, posted (1 year 6 months 13 hours ago) and read 28794 times:
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Quoting airmagnac (Reply 5):
Point me to one single accident which involves only the design, or only the pilots ; I don't know one.

BA 38 - FOHE design allowed ice to clog the system - Engineering Issue, no pilot error;
Tenerife - Pilot took off without clearance - Pilot Error, no mechanical issue;
Charkhi Dadri Mid Air Collision - Crew failed to follow ATC instructions and left assigned height - Pilot Error, no mechanical issue;

To name but three.

No offence but you walked into that one.

Apologies for straying off-topic.



Nothing comes down faster than a VTOL aircraft upside down.
User currently onlinetrex8 From United States of America, joined Nov 2002, 4681 posts, RR: 14
Reply 38, posted (1 year 6 months 9 hours ago) and read 26621 times:
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Quoting rcair1 (Reply 24):
JCAB (not JAA - there is no JAA) issued the ground order after the FAA issued it's emergency AD.
ANA did voluntarily ground it's fleet - but I can't even tell if that was before the FAA official order.
The FAA was the first to issue the order - other national agencies followed.

NH and JL voluntarily grounded their planes and the FAA then followed. There was never a Japanese government edict to ground prior to the airlines doing it on their own.


User currently offlineblrsea From India, joined May 2005, 1412 posts, RR: 3
Reply 39, posted (1 year 6 months 8 hours ago) and read 25537 times:

Today's seattle times has this report. Looks like the plane worked as designed. However, the electrolyte getting splayed inside the electronics bay is an issue, and the fact that Boeing didn't expect that many incidents to happen.

787 battery blew up in ’06 lab test, burned down building

Quote:
...
People familiar with the investigation so far confirm that electrolytes sprayed out of the battery in the ANA jet, leaving a dark sooty residue across the electronics bay. Photos show the insides of the battery burned out and blackened.
...
...
In its 2007 comments, the pilots union initially asked that the FAA require “means for extinguishing fires” caused by the lithium-ion batteries.

However, in a subsequent email to the FAA later that year, the union switched gears and asked that the focus be “preventing a fire and not reacting to one.”

ALPA did not respond to requests for comment Wednesday.
...
...
Mike Sinnett, Boeing vice president and chief 787 project engineer, explained why in a conference call last week and detailed Boeing’s engineering solution.

To completely rule out any catastrophic high-energy fire or explosion that could result from overcharging a battery, Sinnett said, Boeing designed four independent systems to monitor and control the battery charge.

However, he conceded that if an internal cell shorts and overheats, “the electrolyte can catch on fire and that can self-sustain.”

“Something like that is very difficult to put out,” Sinnett said. “Because the electrolyte contains an oxidizer, fire suppressants just won’t work.”

Boeing’s design solution is to contain that outcome until the combusting battery cell or cells burn out.

“You have to assume it’s not going to go out,” Sinnett explained. “You have to assume that it’s going to go and that it’s going to expend all of its energy.

“You have to be good with the amount of heat and smoke that’s generated from that event,” he added.

Sinnett pointed out that the air flow in the electronics bay will be redirected when smoke is detected, so that the smoke is vented overboard, not into the passenger cabin or cockpit.

Nance, the veteran pilot, said he assumes Boeing’s engineers have got that right — in which case, it’s possible the incident on board the ANA jet played out as they intended.


But still, he said, Boeing “may not have adequately planned for the number of potential incidents” that might occur during a jet’s lifetime.
...
...


User currently offlinesankaps From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 2255 posts, RR: 2
Reply 40, posted (1 year 6 months 8 hours ago) and read 25186 times:

Quick question, and apologies if it has been answered already in the 5 threads on this topic: Besides the 787 and A380, are there any other commercial airliners that use Lithium Ion batteries in major applications?

Thanks.


User currently offlineTristarsteve From Sweden, joined Nov 2005, 3976 posts, RR: 34
Reply 41, posted (1 year 6 months 6 hours ago) and read 24217 times:

Quoting sankaps (Reply 40):
A380

The main and APU batteries (all 4 of them) on the A380 are Ni-cad


User currently offlineUALWN From Andorra, joined Jun 2009, 2738 posts, RR: 2
Reply 42, posted (1 year 6 months 6 hours ago) and read 24174 times:

Quoting neutronstar73 (Reply 41):
I don't remember a thread being this long over any other aircraft issue. FIVE PARTS!?!? Over batteries?!? Jeez Louise....

The thread is about the grounding of the 787 by the FAA, now in its second week. This is the first FAA grounding since 1979, so it's a big deal. And in 1979 there was no a.net, so no long thread about the DC10 back then...



AT7/111/146/Avro/CRJ/CR9/EMB/ERJ/E75/F50/100/L15/DC9/D10/M8X/717/727/737/747/757/767/777/AB6/310/319/320/321/330/340/380
User currently offlinercair1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2009, 1305 posts, RR: 52
Reply 43, posted (1 year 6 months 6 hours ago) and read 24162 times:
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Quoting trex8 (Reply 38):
NH and JL voluntarily grounded their planes and the FAA then followed. There was never a Japanese government edict to ground prior to the airlines doing it on their own.

The FAA grounding 'followed' ANA and JAL voluntary action in the temporal sense. I think the FAA made their own decision.

Quoting sankaps (Reply 40):
Quick question, and apologies if it has been answered already in the 5 threads on this topic: Besides the 787 and A380, are there any other commercial airliners that use Lithium Ion batteries in major applications?

Many commercial airliners use multiple Li-Ion batteries - but these are small batteries used for things like exit signs. The only aircraft in service that uses Li-Ion of the size and capacity of what we are talking about is the 787. The A350 will use them in this manner - there will be 4, all co-located in one bay.. I can't tell for sure, midst all the ranting, conspiracy theories and garbage in this thread if the capacity of the A350 batteries is larger or smaller individually or in total capacity. There are people claiming both.



rcair1
User currently offlinefrmrcapcadet From United States of America, joined May 2008, 1710 posts, RR: 1
Reply 44, posted (1 year 6 months 5 hours ago) and read 23231 times:

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 25):
It could be. Certainly the news about Congress/Senate holding hearings mentions that. BTW - have we ever seen anything meaningful come out of congressional hearings of this type?

As I recall hearings on these sorts of things tend to be an official briefing. There is no intention on finding new things. Legislatures likely ask if current regulation and enforcement are adequate, and if not does congress need to change anything. Legislators may ask for terms to be explained in more common language. There likely will be some explanations of risk management statistics, and attempted translations in lay terms.



Buffet: the airline business...has eaten up capital...like..no other (business)
User currently onlineLTC8K6 From United States of America, joined Jun 2009, 1201 posts, RR: 0
Reply 45, posted (1 year 6 months 5 hours ago) and read 22707 times:

Quoting blrsea (Reply 39):
787 battery blew up in ’06 lab test, burned down building

If I recall correctly, that was not the same battery.


User currently offlineplanesmart From New Zealand, joined Dec 2004, 871 posts, RR: 0
Reply 46, posted (1 year 6 months 4 hours ago) and read 22164 times:

'The two batteries are identical, but located in different parts of the a/c. The APU battery is used only to start the APU when other sources are not available. The ship battery is used for backup when other sources fail. It is not used in normal flight operations.'

If the batteries only purpose in life is as described, a less radical option would be inflight monitoring of the battery container temperature, and say weekly out of aircraft testing, with pre-tested batteries re-fitted to minimise time on the ground.

Could charging also be turned off inflight?

I'm not minimising the task each battery set is designed to perform, but does it perhaps suggest from the authorities reaction, that they may perform additional purposes, either routinely or in emergencies?


User currently onlinetrex8 From United States of America, joined Nov 2002, 4681 posts, RR: 14
Reply 47, posted (1 year 6 months 4 hours ago) and read 22033 times:
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Forgive me if I missed this in the several hundred posts on the subject but maybe this incident is of some relevance to the issue.Certainly scary if these batteries can do this much damage.

http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech...eing-787-suppliers-facility/60809/

"
Comments

An explosion in a lithium battery under development for use in the Boeing 787 Dreamliner resulted in a fire that destroyed the Tucson, Ariz., facility of manufacturer Securaplane in 2006"

edited to add quote

[Edited 2013-01-24 10:44:45]

User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 48, posted (1 year 6 months 4 hours ago) and read 21560 times:
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Quoting trex8 (Reply 47):
Forgive me if I missed this in the several hundred posts on the subject but maybe this incident is of some relevance to the issue.

It's been raised a number of times, but with so many posts and threads...  

It should be noted the battery was connected to prototype equipment and not the system used by the 787.

The Seattle Times ran a good article on the incident and related issues today.

[Edited 2013-01-24 11:31:01]

User currently offlinercair1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2009, 1305 posts, RR: 52
Reply 49, posted (1 year 6 months 3 hours ago) and read 21391 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
CUSTOMER SERVICE & SUPPORT

Quoting trex8 (Reply 47):
An explosion in a lithium battery under development for use in the Boeing 787 Dreamliner resulted in a fire that destroyed the Tucson, Ariz., facility of manufacturer Securaplane in 2006"

This event has been discussed widely - and there are a number of things you need to look at to fully understand the issue. For instance, reports that when the event occurred, the cell monitoring system on the battery being charged was not connected. Certainly it was in a lab situation, not a production or commercial situation.



rcair1
User currently onlineAeroWesty From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 20354 posts, RR: 62
Reply 50, posted (1 year 6 months 3 hours ago) and read 21356 times:

Public confidence in the 787 once it's back in the air has been one of the themes in these threads. During the UA 4Q earnings call held today, UA CEO Jeff Smisek gave his thoughts on the subject:

United: Customers will 'flock' back to Dreamliner

"The aircraft is a terrific aircraft, and customers love the aircraft, and I have no doubt that customers will flock back to that airplane once we're able to get it back up again," said Jeff Smisek, CEO of United Continental .

...

But when a reporter asked Smisek if either pilots or customers would be reluctant to fly the Dreamliner once it was allowed back in service, he said he didn't believe so. He said he was confident that the FAA would not give an OK to the plane until a fix had been found, and that both pilots and customers would be satisfied with that fix."



International Homo of Mystery
User currently offlineglideslope From United States of America, joined May 2004, 1603 posts, RR: 0
Reply 51, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20558 times:

I think it's time for nice big " Group Hug " in here, eh?

Come on, I'll start:   



To know your Enemy, you must become your Enemy.” Sun Tzu
User currently offlineScipio From Belgium, joined Oct 2007, 833 posts, RR: 9
Reply 52, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20632 times:

NTSB says "much more work" is needed to determine the cause of the B787 fires:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...amliner-ntsb-idUSL1N0ATEMT20130124


User currently offlineBoeEngr From United States of America, joined Feb 2010, 321 posts, RR: 35
Reply 53, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20570 times:

Quoting PHX787 (Reply 30):
Quoting mcdu (Reply 29):
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 18):
many seem to forget that the fleet had over 100,000 hours of revenue flying without a battery incident

And how many hours between the two battery failure incidents?

Note I was quoting user Stitch and wasn't making much of a reference to that particular line:
But for the sake of it, the hours apart were about 48 hours apart.

The two battery incidents were 9 days apart. The JAL Boston incident was January 7 and the NH incident was January 16.


User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 54, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20551 times:
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I came in on the Q&A part of the NTSB event, but the spokeswoman did note that the JL APU battery had entered thermal runaway and there were short-circuits inside the battery.

Per The Chicago Sun-Times, examination of all eight cells in the JL APU battery showed thermal damage in each.

The NTSB continues to not rule anything out. They are concerned that two events happened within nine days of each other.

The NTSB is not currently considering the NH battery a "fire event", instead classifying it as a "smoke event", so maybe we can finally put that particular argument to rest. The JL battery is currently considered a "fire event". The NTSB is still trying to determine if both batteries from the same event.

The Seattle Times just posted an update.

Quote:
It looks like Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner fleet, grounded worldwide for the past week, will stay grounded for some time.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) chair Deborah Hersman said Thursday the agency has reached no conclusion so far on the cause of the fire aboard a 787 in Boston on Jan. 7.

Despite multiple redundant safety features built into the system by Boeing, “those systems did not work as intended,” NTSB chair Deborah Hersman said.

“We need to understand why,” she added.


[Edited 2013-01-24 12:47:40]

User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 55, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20511 times:
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Quoting Scipio (Reply 52):
NTSB says "much more work" is needed to determine the cause of the B787 fires:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...30124

This is precisely why there is no "quick fix" to this problem; NTSB, Boeing and its suppliers do not yet know why the incidents occurred. The FAA will need to be satisfied the problem(s) is/are accurately identified and the proposed fix/modification/redesign will correct the problem(s).


User currently onlineAeroWesty From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 20354 posts, RR: 62
Reply 56, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20304 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 54):
It looks like Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner fleet, grounded worldwide for the past week, will stay grounded for some time.

Having watched most of the press conference, I have to agree with that quote. The gist of it for me was that barring anything leaping off the page at them as a definitive cause, the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb. It came across more as a "don't get your hopes up" message for a return to service anytime soon.



International Homo of Mystery
User currently offlinen471wn From United States of America, joined Dec 2003, 1510 posts, RR: 2
Reply 57, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20231 times:
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I agree that this will take some time and if I were the airlines involved I would be looking for some additional lift capacity......not many 777's are available but 767's are plentiful

User currently offlineKELPkid From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 6343 posts, RR: 3
Reply 58, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20050 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 54):
Despite multiple redundant safety features built into the system by Boeing, “those systems did not work as intended,” NTSB chair Deborah Hersman said.

Any details as to what did not work as intended, and why? Just curious  



Celebrating the birth of KELPkidJR on August 5, 2009 :-)
User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 59, posted (1 year 6 months 2 hours ago) and read 20063 times:
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Quoting KELPkid (Reply 58):
Any details as to what did not work as intended, and why?

I do not believe the NTSB has yet determined that. All they know is that a fire should not have happened, but did, so something didn't work as designed (be it with the 787 or the battery).


User currently offlineComeAndGo From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 1034 posts, RR: 0
Reply 60, posted (1 year 6 months 1 hour ago) and read 20028 times:

Apparently they used a lithium ion battery of older design. Lithium cobalt oxide which is more prone to thermal runaway.

User currently offlineKELPkid From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 6343 posts, RR: 3
Reply 61, posted (1 year 6 months 1 hour ago) and read 19934 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 59):
I do not believe the NTSB has yet determined that. All they know is that a fire should not have happened, but did, so something didn't work as designed (be it with the 787 or the battery).

IIRC, though, the battery box and E&E bays are designed to contain the fire if the battery catches fire. But some stuff (like electrolyte) might still spew out. The E&E bays will safely ventilate the combustion byproducts overboard (via holes in the belly-like on the NH bird) in the event of a fire...but sitting on the ramp might be an edge case. There are no pressure differentials like there would be if the aircraft were in flight.



Celebrating the birth of KELPkidJR on August 5, 2009 :-)
User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 62, posted (1 year 6 months 1 hour ago) and read 19794 times:
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Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 60):
Apparently they used a lithium ion battery of older design. Lithium cobalt oxide which is more prone to thermal runaway.

That is correct. Boeing evidently did add manganese to the mixture to greatly improve the useful life of the battery. If they also add nickel, that would improve the stability and lower the chances of thermal runway.


User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 63, posted (1 year 6 months 1 hour ago) and read 19623 times:
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Quoting Stitch (Reply 62):

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 60):
Apparently they used a lithium ion battery of older design. Lithium cobalt oxide which is more prone to thermal runaway.

That is correct. Boeing evidently did add manganese to the mixture to greatly improve the useful life of the battery. If they also add nickel, that would improve the stability and lower the chances of thermal runway.

That raises an interesting question if adding nickel (for example) to improve the stability of the battery, would they they have to completely redo the cert for the battery/system or would the change plus a new set of statistical analysis based on the new formulation [and some in flight testing] be enough?


User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 64, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19502 times:

Quoting planesmart (Reply 46):
If the batteries only purpose in life is as described, a less radical option would be inflight monitoring of the battery container temperature, and say weekly out of aircraft testing, with pre-tested batteries re-fitted to minimise time on the ground.

Inflight monitoring of the container temperature won't help you much...once you see the temperature signature of thermal runaway of the battery it's too late. Testing the batteries presupposes that they know what to test for; based on the NTSB press conference they still don't know what that test would be.

Quoting planesmart (Reply 46):
Could charging also be turned off inflight?

It could, but not without impacting a huge number of other failure modes in the fault trees. All the others systems assume that the batteries are charged back up by the airplane starting as soon as the generators come online.

Quoting planesmart (Reply 46):
I'm not minimising the task each battery set is designed to perform, but does it perhaps suggest from the authorities reaction, that they may perform additional purposes, either routinely or in emergencies?

The batteries do perform several emergency functions.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 56):
the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb.

The NTSB has no particular interest in certification...their mission is to find what happened and identify what changes would prevent it from happening. They look at it purely from the technical side...did the as-built conform to design, was the design adequate, etc. FAA owns the certification process and will decide which NTSB recommendations will be implemented.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 63):
That raises an interesting question if adding nickel (for example) to improve the stability of the battery, would they they have to completely redo the cert for the battery/system or would the change plus a new set of statistical analysis based on the new formulation [and some in flight testing] be enough?

Almost nothing would drive "completely redo" the cert. They would have to show that regulations might be impacted by the change and then show how that they're still in compliance with those regulations. That could be any combination of analysis and test.

Tom.


User currently offlinejreuschl From United States of America, joined Jul 2009, 539 posts, RR: 0
Reply 65, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19442 times:

UA is probably in the best position to wait for the 787 to return vs. the other carriers, correct?

User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 66, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19466 times:
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Quoting jreuschl (Reply 65):
UA is probably in the best position to wait for the 787 to return vs. the other carriers, correct?

I suspect so given the small number they have and the size of their wide body fleet. It may mean delaying the start of the DEN-NRT route but UA is in a better position than NH for example.


User currently offlineScipio From Belgium, joined Oct 2007, 833 posts, RR: 9
Reply 67, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19469 times:

Flightglobal also reporting now:

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...in-jal-787-battery-failure-381464/

The FT also has an article on the NTSB press conference (ft.com - subscription website).

This is my take, based on the press reports:

- The NTSB considers the B787 battery problems a "very serious safety concern" (the term "very serious" was apparently used multiple times)
- It is not close to determining the cause, and not far advanced in eliminating possible causes
- The prevention and containment mechanisms did not work as envisaged, and it is not clear why this is the case
- The NTSB cannot tell how long its investigation will take. There is no deadline or target completion date
- It is not yet known whether the two failed batteries are from the same batch

The implications:

- We are likely looking at a lengthy investigation
- There is no chance that the B787 will be restored to service before the investigation is completed and/or the regulators are satisfied that they fully understand what went wrong
- Based on their findings, the regulators may require modifications to any or all of (i) the battery, (ii) the battery management system, and (iii) the battery fire containment system
- The possibility that the B787 might be returned to service only on the basis of identifying faulty and non-faulty batteries seems remote, given the breadth of the NTSB's concerns.
- We may not be able to fly on a B787 for a long time to come: the cumulative time needed for a lengthy investigation, designing possibly comprehensive solutions, getting those solutions certified, and modifying already produced airframes, ...
- Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.


User currently offlinejreuschl From United States of America, joined Jul 2009, 539 posts, RR: 0
Reply 68, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19430 times:

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):
Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.

Does the A350 have a similar battery setup?

At least Airbus will be able to learn from what mistakes were made here.


User currently onlineAeroWesty From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 20354 posts, RR: 62
Reply 69, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19324 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 64):
The NTSB has no particular interest in certification.

I don't know what I misunderstood then, the FlightGlobal article has similar wording:

"Another critical part of the investigation is considering the certification process for the 787 batteries."



International Homo of Mystery
User currently offlineHumanitarian From United States of America, joined Jan 2012, 106 posts, RR: 0
Reply 70, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19324 times:

The NTSB typically takes one year to make a determination in an accident or incident. It was the FAA that grounded the 787 with the AD -- not the NTSB. The NTSB can only make safety recommendations to the FAA but it is the FAA that will decide on the acceptance of any solutions that comply with the AD.

My read of what caused the FAA the most heartburn was the ejection of flammable material from the ANA battery into the E/E compartment. That event apparently violated their FAR special conditions for Li-ion batteries. Once Boeing can show the FAA they have a viable solution to this problem, they should be in compliance of the AD.

Some years ago I watched an aircraft Ni-Cad battery have a similar problem. Batteries are not full proof and therefore the FAA requires a solution to mitigate any adverse effects that put safety of flight at risk.


User currently offlineViscount724 From Switzerland, joined Oct 2006, 24796 posts, RR: 22
Reply 71, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19271 times:

Quoting UALWN (Reply 42):
Quoting neutronstar73 (Reply 41):
I don't remember a thread being this long over any other aircraft issue. FIVE PARTS!?!? Over batteries?!? Jeez Louise....

The thread is about the grounding of the 787 by the FAA, now in its second week. This is the first FAA grounding since 1979, so it's a big deal. And in 1979 there was no a.net, so no long thread about the DC10 back then...

And if A.net had been around in 1947/48 when the DC-6 was grounded for 4 months about 6 months after it went into service, there probably would have been a long thread.


User currently offlineRickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 780 posts, RR: 0
Reply 72, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19239 times:

Quoting Humanitarian (Reply 70):
My read of what caused the FAA the most heartburn was the ejection of flammable material from the ANA battery into the E/E compartment. That event apparently violated their FAR special conditions for Li-ion batteries. Once Boeing can show the FAA they have a viable solution to this problem, they should be in compliance of the AD.

I think that's how I understood it.


User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12331 posts, RR: 25
Reply 73, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19254 times:

Quoting KELPkid (Reply 58):
Quoting Stitch (Reply 54):
Despite multiple redundant safety features built into the system by Boeing, “those systems did not work as intended,” NTSB chair Deborah Hersman said.

Any details as to what did not work as intended, and why?

The Reuters link above gives more of what she is thinking of:

Quote:

"We do not expect to see fire events onboard aircraft. This is a very serious air safety concern," Deborah Hersman told a news conference in Washington.



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently offlinegemuser From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 5607 posts, RR: 6
Reply 74, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19105 times:

Quoting UALWN (Reply 42):
This is the first FAA grounding since 1979, so it's a big deal.

The FAA has not issued an AD requiring action "before further flight" since 1979? Really? Because that's what we have got here with the B787

Gemuser



DC23468910;B72172273373G73873H74374475275376377L77W;A319 320321332333343;BAe146;C402;DHC6;F27;L188;MD80MD85
User currently offlinepar13del From Bahamas, joined Dec 2005, 7048 posts, RR: 8
Reply 75, posted (1 year 6 months ago) and read 19110 times:

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 56):
the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb. It came across more as a "don't get your hopes up" message for a return to service anytime soon.

The NTSB mandate, it has always been thus, their only concern is safety.

Quoting Humanitarian (Reply 70):
The NTSB typically takes one year to make a determination in an accident or incident. It was the FAA that grounded the 787 with the AD -- not the NTSB. The NTSB can only make safety recommendations to the FAA but it is the FAA that will decide on the acceptance of any solutions that comply with the AD.

  

There may well come a time when the FAA looks at the NTSB and advises them that while they continue to investigate the cause of the issues, a temporary fix which would allow safe flight is required, the NTSB, Boeing and the other OEM's involved will then have to sit at a table and draft rules and procedures even hardware adjustments to implement to allow return to service. The industry will need some sort of time frame on the return to service so that planning can commence on how to alleviate the shortage of a/c.

I expect there will be


User currently offlineComeAndGo From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 1034 posts, RR: 0
Reply 76, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 19085 times:

Quoting gemuser (Reply 74):
The FAA has not issued an AD requiring action "before further flight" since 1979?

No it's not. The ATR 72 was grounded in the 90's for their icing issues that crashed one plane and almost crashed another one.


User currently offlinemacc From Austria, joined Nov 2004, 1031 posts, RR: 3
Reply 77, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 19041 times:

How will the grounding implicate production? At what time will Boeing be forced to stop assembly?


I exchanged political frustration with sexual boredom. better spoil a girl than the world
User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 78, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 19052 times:
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Quoting macc (Reply 77):
How will the grounding implicate production?

At the moment, Boeing is continuing production at the normal rate and is continuing to ramp towards 10 per month.



Quoting macc (Reply 77):
At what time will Boeing be forced to stop assembly?

I guess in theory when they run out of parking room, but they may be able to get permission to fly completed airframes to storage fields.


User currently offlineScipio From Belgium, joined Oct 2007, 833 posts, RR: 9
Reply 79, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 18942 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 78):
I guess in theory when they run out of parking room, but they may be able to get permission to fly completed airframes to storage fields.

From a logistical viewpoint, this is correct. From an economic perspective, at some (earlier) point it no longer makes sense to build airplanes without knowing if and when you will be able to deliver them. It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

I suspect that the question of delaying the production ramp-up will arise fairly soon.


User currently offlineUALWN From Andorra, joined Jun 2009, 2738 posts, RR: 2
Reply 80, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 18780 times:

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 76):
No it's not. The ATR 72 was grounded in the 90's

Correct. I should have specified "jet." In any case, no a.net in 1994 either...



AT7/111/146/Avro/CRJ/CR9/EMB/ERJ/E75/F50/100/L15/DC9/D10/M8X/717/727/737/747/757/767/777/AB6/310/319/320/321/330/340/380
User currently offlineRickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 780 posts, RR: 0
Reply 81, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 18806 times:

It looks like at least one airline expects a long downtime.

SAN To NRT To Resume Jan 30 With 777 (by sanflyr Jan 23 2013 in Civil Aviation)


User currently offlineprebennorholm From Denmark, joined Mar 2000, 6385 posts, RR: 54
Reply 82, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18609 times:

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 76):
Quoting gemuser (Reply 74):
The FAA has not issued an AD requiring action "before further flight" since 1979?

No it's not. The ATR 72 was grounded in the 90's....

Correct. The FAA grounded ATR-72 following the American Eagle accident in 1994. And demanded improved anti icing boots before re-certification by the FAA.

But that was a local grounding - USA only.

In principle that was similar to the Q400 grounding in Scandinavia a few years ago.

In both cases the planes were improved following recommendations in the investigation reports.

The 787 grounding is the first world wide grounding of an airliner type since DC-10 in 1979.



Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs, Preben Norholm
User currently offlineWisdom From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 83, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18536 times:

At this point, if I were Boeing I would hedge the risk and start looking at a plan B involving good old lead-acid batteries and at STCeing it, with limitations (ie no Etops, special procedures, emergency power training, etc...). That is something that can be done in a matter of a few months at minimal cost.

User currently offlinepar13del From Bahamas, joined Dec 2005, 7048 posts, RR: 8
Reply 84, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18461 times:

Quoting Scipio (Reply 79):
It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

Well, it will also take up a hell of a lot of money to have suppliers and partners stop production and lay off workers, pay additinal and new penatlies to airlines to delay their deliveries even further. If they continue to build a/c, if and when the cause is identified and a full or partial fix allowed, it will be much quicker to modify a/c already built versus modify the a/c while building.
This is the economic situation that the FAA will ultimately have to adress if it does not appear as if the cause can be identified in a month or two, its not just Boeing and its suppliers / partners who are involved, but airlines all over the world and their customers. The Japanese carriers who have the bulk of the a/c in service will have the largest burden.


User currently onlineBoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1557 posts, RR: 3
Reply 85, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18446 times:

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):
Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.

It shouldn't, certification criteria are agreed between the OEM and certifying authority before the test campaign begins, the aircraft is built to be in conformation with these agreed criteria. If the certifying authority was to keep shifting the goalposts it would be impossible to certify an aircraft.



BV
User currently offlineRickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 780 posts, RR: 0
Reply 86, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18517 times:

"Good old" in this case would be Ni-Cad. The A380 still uses Ni_Cad for it's main batteries, which surprises me, I would have thought Ni-Mh would be better. The newer ones have great performance in consumer goods. Perhaps technology is moving too fast for the designers to keep up, consider the long lead/certification times required.

User currently offlineAesma From France, joined Nov 2009, 6515 posts, RR: 9
Reply 87, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18442 times:

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 76):
No it's not. The ATR 72 was grounded in the 90's for their icing issues that crashed one plane and almost crashed another one.
Quoting UALWN (Reply 80):
Correct. I should have specified "jet." In any case, no a.net in 1994 either...
Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 82):
Correct. The FAA grounded ATR-72 following the American Eagle accident in 1994. And demanded improved anti icing boots before re-certification by the FAA.

I did a little searching and from what I found the ATR was not grounded. It was banned from flying in icing conditions. Some airlines chose to not use it at all, but others moved their planes to the southern US.



New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 88, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18463 times:
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Quoting Scipio (Reply 79):
From a logistical viewpoint, this is correct. From an economic perspective, at some (earlier) point it no longer makes sense to build airplanes without knowing if and when you will be able to deliver them. It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

I suspect that the question of delaying the production ramp-up will arise fairly soon.

I guess it depends on how far along the subs are with their own production ramps. They're not going to want to cut back on their own shipsets because that would impact their own downstream suppliers.

This also assumes that the 787 remains grounded for an extended period of time (6 months or longer). The FAA restored the DC-10's Type Certificate after a month once they determined that the engine separation was due to improper procedures used by AA and other airlines. At the time of the restoration, I believe the DC-10 still lacked a locking mechanism to maintain the position of the leading-edge slats and that critical wiring remained in the leading edge of the wing (when the engine and pylon went over the wing, it damaged the leading edge and cut the wires).



Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):
Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.
Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 85):
It shouldn't, certification criteria are agreed between the OEM and certifying authority before the test campaign begins, the aircraft is built to be in conformation with these agreed criteria. If the certifying authority was to keep shifting the goalposts it would be impossible to certify an aircraft.

The FAA and Boeing agreed on certification criteria for the 787 in terms of the Lithium-Ion batteries and the 787 was certified to that criteria. Now the FAA is worried that certification criteria was not sufficiently robust and has grounded the plane.

I would not be surprised if EASA now wants to review their own criteria already agreed with Airbus based on the issues with the 787 to ensure that they are sufficient to contain a battery fire and a battery leaking electrolytes.

[Edited 2013-01-24 16:56:59]

User currently offlineRickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 780 posts, RR: 0
Reply 89, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18451 times:

Quoting par13del (Reply 84):
This is the economic situation that the FAA will ultimately have to adress if it does not appear as if the cause can be identified in a month or two, its not just Boeing and its suppliers / partners who are involved, but airlines all over the world and their customers. The Japanese carriers who have the bulk of the a/c in service will have the largest burden.

The economic situation is of no concern to the FAA.


User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 90, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18473 times:
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Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 89):
The economic situation is of no concern to the FAA.

I expect that is not the case.

The FAA will want to ensure that the 787 will not crash if the battery catches fire and burns for whatever length it's fuel supply will allow, as well as preventing electrolyte from being able to spray around the EE bay and catch fire. Once they have those assurances, I would expect them to lift the grounding.

Even if the issue is identified as being solely with the two batteries, I do not expect the FAA to say "Good to go!" and lift the grounding while leaving the 787 unchanged. I am sure they will put into place new policies and procedures to protect against a repeat while working on stronger containment systems and perhaps new battery formulations. But those will be ADs that will still allow the 787 to fly in commercial passenger service. The FAA did this with the DC-10 in 1979 - the plane still had flaws, but they were allowed to be returned to service while McD worked to correct them via AD.

Of course, if they find multiple causes, that will increase the amount of work needed to be done to sufficiently prove the protection systems are up to the task.

[Edited 2013-01-24 17:05:59]

User currently offlineDocLightning From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 19371 posts, RR: 58
Reply 91, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18507 times:

Quoting alfablue (Reply 3):
A U.S. Senate committee will hold a hearing in coming weeks to examine aviation safety oversight and the FAA's decision, a congressional aide said on Tuesday

Oh, fantastic. The politicians are here! Everything will be OK now!  
Quoting Wisdom (Reply 83):
At this point, if I were Boeing I would hedge the risk and start looking at a plan B involving good old lead-acid batteries and at STCeing it, with limitations (ie no Etops, special procedures, emergency power training, etc...). That is something that can be done in a matter of a few months at minimal cost.

Without at least ETOPS 120, the 787 is worthless for the vast majority of routes it flies.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 79):
From a logistical viewpoint, this is correct. From an economic perspective, at some (earlier) point it no longer makes sense to build airplanes without knowing if and when you will be able to deliver them. It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

I suspect that the question of delaying the production ramp-up will arise fairly soon.

When (there is no "if") the aircraft is returned to service, they can do the repairs on completed frames and do a spate of deliveries all at once. That will mean no delay on downstream frames. There is plenty of room at both plants and storage arrangements can be made.

If they delay the production ramp-up, it will take years to recover from the delay.


User currently offlinefrmrcapcadet From United States of America, joined May 2008, 1710 posts, RR: 1
Reply 92, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 18287 times:

I wonder if airframe manufacturers should not have cooperated on battery/charging, controlling and had at least two different systems. Cooperative effort would have spread the cost. And if the fore and aft batteries were themselves different and able to use either system this would not have been so big an event.


Buffet: the airline business...has eaten up capital...like..no other (business)
User currently offlineB777LRF From Luxembourg, joined Nov 2008, 1300 posts, RR: 3
Reply 93, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 18290 times:

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 89):
The economic situation is of no concern to the FAA.

On the contrary, I would say: The FAA is both the promoter and regulator of civil aviation in the US, and therefore the financial well being of the industry it regulates is very much in its interest.



From receips and radials over straight pipes to big fans - been there, done that, got the hearing defects to prove
User currently onlineBoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1557 posts, RR: 3
Reply 94, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 18280 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 88):
The FAA and Boeing agreed on certification criteria for the 787 in terms of the Lithium-Ion batteries and the 787 was certified to that criteria.

While it was certified to that criteria the 787 clearly does not meet the criteria it was certified to..

But could the FAA / 787 debacle affect the A350? Yes, its possible.

From what I read though all Li-x technology does not carry the same risks either in design or application.



BV
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 95, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 18281 times:

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):
- The prevention and containment mechanisms did not work as envisaged, and it is not clear why this is the case

What that "It's not clear why the containment did not work as envisaged" or "It's not clear from the NTSB statement why they don't think the containment worked as envisaged"?

I think we can all agree the prevention mechanisms didn't work as envisaged.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):
- There is no chance that the B787 will be restored to service before the investigation is completed and/or the regulators are satisfied that they fully understand what went wrong

Technically the investigation isn't complete until the report is out. However, that lags significantly behind them figuring out what the problem is. The grounding can be lifted when the FAA (not NTSB) is satisfied that they understand what caused it and are satisfied that the problem is mitigated...the NTSB investigation will likely continue for some time after that.

Quoting jreuschl (Reply 68):
Does the A350 have a similar battery setup?

The technology is roughly similar, although the A350 uses more batteries all together in a single space with a somewhat different containment concept. The cert criteria will almost certainly be equal or more stringent than what the 787 went through but Airbus may demonstrate compliance differently.

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 69):
"Another critical part of the investigation is considering the certification process for the 787 batteries."

NTSB is absolutely interested in how the system got certified since that informs why the design is what it is...they can't actually change the certification criteria though, that's the FAA.

Quoting macc (Reply 77):
How will the grounding implicate production? At what time will Boeing be forced to stop assembly?

I'd expect them to keep running even for a pessimistically long grounding. At some point they'll have to get ferry permits and move the aircraft off Paine Field, but there's a lot of room at Victorville, Moses Lake, or San Antonio. San Antonio would be a great spot, since they're already set up to do 787 rework.

Quoting Scipio (Reply 79):
From a logistical viewpoint, this is correct. From an economic perspective, at some (earlier) point it no longer makes sense to build airplanes without knowing if and when you will be able to deliver them. It eats up a hell of a lot of money to build planes only to put them into storage...

This needs to be balanced against the cost of stopping and (especially) starting the supply chain. That's an almost mind-bogglingly large number...that's why they kept building all through the production and flight test delays. And I really can't see this grounding going on that long.

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 85):
It shouldn't, certification criteria are agreed between the OEM and certifying authority before the test campaign begins, the aircraft is built to be in conformation with these agreed criteria.

Although this is true, the regulator always reserves the right to update the criteria as the certification effort progresses based on the data and experience gathered. I've never heard of any major cert program that went end-to-end without some modified criteria from the regulators. They can also cover pretty much anything they want under FAR 25.1301, so they've got a blanket authority to ask for more testing to prove compliance.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 89):
The economic situation is of no concern to the FAA.

The FAA doesn't care about the economic health of individual airlines or OEMs, but they are responsible for maintaining a safe and efficient air transport system primarily because of the economic impact that system has. They are acutely concerned with keeping that system viable.

Tom.


User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12331 posts, RR: 25
Reply 96, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 18194 times:

Quoting Wisdom (Reply 83):
if I were Boeing I would hedge the risk and start looking at a plan B involving good old lead-acid batteries and at STCeing it, with limitations (ie no Etops, special procedures, emergency power training, etc...).

I'm pretty sure some of those hundreds of engineers Tom mentioned are certainly looking at such a Plan B as well as C, D, and so on. There's too much at risk to not be doing it.

Quoting DocLightning (Reply 91):
Without at least ETOPS 120, the 787 is worthless for the vast majority of routes it flies.

Right, but there are certainly things some customers could be doing with the planes short term w/o ETOPS 120. Of course it makes one wonder if they'd accept the plane w/o the root cause found and fixed because while Boeing owns it, it's Boeing's burden to deliver a fully certificated plane fully up to spec.

Ahh, beam me back to the days of old where all we had to worry about was when Boeing would be patching up all those out of rev planes lying all around KPAE!



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently onlineAeroWesty From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 20354 posts, RR: 62
Reply 97, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 18145 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 95):
NTSB is absolutely interested in how the system got certified since that informs why the design is what it is...they can't actually change the certification criteria though, that's the FAA.

Then I don't see what the issue was that you brought up with the following post of mine:

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 56):
The gist of it for me was that barring anything leaping off the page at them as a definitive cause, the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb.



International Homo of Mystery
User currently offlineDocLightning From United States of America, joined Nov 2005, 19371 posts, RR: 58
Reply 98, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 18099 times:

Quoting Revelation (Reply 96):
Right, but there are certainly things some customers could be doing with the planes short term w/o ETOPS 120. Of course it makes one wonder if they'd accept the plane w/o the root cause found and fixed because while Boeing owns it, it's Boeing's burden to deliver a fully certificated plane fully up to spec.

If I were a customer, I would under no circumstances accept a frame that would not do what it said it would do in its contract without a major revision to the contract.


User currently offlinercair1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2009, 1305 posts, RR: 52
Reply 99, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 18019 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
CUSTOMER SERVICE & SUPPORT

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):
- We may not be able to fly on a B787 for a long time to come: the cumulative time needed for a lengthy investigation, designing possibly comprehensive solutions, getting those solutions certified, and modifying already produced airframes, ...

Which is a real drag.... I may get to go to Japan this summery - and DEN-NRT on a 787 is high on my list....

Quoting Scipio (Reply 67):
- Airbus will face very skeptical regulators when it tries to get the A350's batteries certified... At the very least, it faces significant uncertainty about what certification criteria will be applied.

At the same time, because much of the analysis and fixes are public knowledge by law - Airbus is benefiting from a lot of free RnD....

Quoting Humanitarian (Reply 70):
My read of what caused the FAA the most heartburn was the ejection of flammable material from the ANA battery into the E/E compartment. That event apparently violated their FAR special conditions for Li-ion batteries. Once Boeing can show the FAA they have a viable solution to this problem, they should be in compliance of the AD.

I'll agree with is if we make sure to focus on the word "apparently" - because it is clearly a case of "could" not "must" or "did" cause damage. The special condition does not say the battery cannot eject gas/electrolyte. It says, something like, it cannot do it in a manner that causes critical damage or makes the situation worse. It is unclear, at this time, that the 'spewed' electrolyte actually did that. - no actually, it is clear it did NOT do that. The question is COULD it do that. And - yes - the FAA special condition is quoted all over these strings - and no - I can't find it right now.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 86):
I would have thought Ni-Mh would be better.

One issue with Ni-MH is a fast self discharge rate and poor cold temp performance. They may have to put higher capacity NiMH's in to meet load requirements.

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 89):
The economic situation is of no concern to the FAA.

Not true. That would be true of the NTSB, not the FAA.

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 94):
While it was certified to that criteria the 787 clearly does not meet the criteria it was certified to.

No - of course, you and I have had this argument - it is not clear. It is possible - they are investigating.



rcair1
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 100, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 18023 times:

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 97):
Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 95):
NTSB is absolutely interested in how the system got certified since that informs why the design is what it is...they can't actually change the certification criteria though, that's the FAA.

Then I don't see what the issue was that you brought up with the following post of mine:

Quoting AeroWesty (Reply 56):
The gist of it for me was that barring anything leaping off the page at them as a definitive cause, the NTSB intends to methodically go through everything from design to certification to implementation with a fine-toothed comb.

It's the idea that the NTSB will "methodically go through...certification...with a fine-toothed comb". Although the 787 certification process is being reviewed as a separate effort, that's not under NTSB.

Tom.


User currently offlineScipio From Belgium, joined Oct 2007, 833 posts, RR: 9
Reply 101, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 17914 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 88):
This also assumes that the 787 remains grounded for an extended period of time (6 months or longer). The FAA restored the DC-10's Type Certificate after a month once they determined that the engine separation was due to improper procedures used by AA and other airlines. At the time of the restoration, I believe the DC-10 still lacked a locking mechanism to maintain the position of the leading-edge slats and that critical wiring remained in the leading edge of the wing (when the engine and pylon went over the wing, it damaged the leading edge and cut the wires).

I do not expect the 1979 scenario to be repeated, for several reasons:

- nothing points in the direction of an easy-to-fix maintenance or handling problem. The plausible explanations at this stage all point toward manufacturing and/or design issues.
- the flying public and the safety authorities are a lot more risk averse now than they were in 1979. They are not willing to settle for 1979 safety levels, having gotten used to 2012 safety levels. Fatal crashes were still a fairly common occurrence back then... (The ACRO registered 320 accidents with 2,531 fatalities in 1979, against 117 accidents with 794 fatalities in 2012, this despite the explosive growth of air travel between 1979 and 2012)
- the message brought by the NTSB today was a very firm one -- strong vocabulary ("an unprecedented event", "a very serious air safety concern", “the expectation in aviation is to never experience a fire on board an aircraft”, ...) and a quite explicit warning (motivated on the basis of several reasons) that no quick fixes should be expected

After the NTSB press conference, I think that the grounding is much more likely to last for more than 6 months than to be lifted within 3 months or less.


User currently offlineWisdom From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 102, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 17929 times:

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 86):
"Good old" in this case would be Ni-Cad. The A380 still uses Ni_Cad for it's main batteries, which surprises me, I would have thought Ni-Mh would be better. The newer ones have great performance in consumer goods. Perhaps technology is moving too fast for the designers to keep up, consider the long lead/certification times required.

Ni-Cad is good technology too, but it's easier, cheaper and faster to tailor-design a lead-acid.
This is also likely to be an interim solution, so it would be a larger waste of money to invest in Ni-cad.

As for operating without ETOPS it's not that bad, as you still have the 60 minutes rule.

For domestic Japan (NH/JL) and domestic U.S. (UA), this should be acceptable as it will allow the operators to shuffle the aircraft around, but still operate them in a useful manner. I'm sure that AI, QR and LO could use them in that way too, because new crews need to build experience on them too, pending more deliveries after the resolution of the crisis.

ET would probably not be able to operate (efficiently) due to lack of diversion airports in all directions. At best, they would have to fly around the Sahara desert to Europe.


User currently offlineprebennorholm From Denmark, joined Mar 2000, 6385 posts, RR: 54
Reply 103, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 17957 times:

Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 94):
But could the FAA / 787 debacle affect the A350? Yes, its possible.

Maybe. Airbus has said very little about this whole Li-Ion issue, (I would guess that they want to talk as little as possible). But here is what one Airbus spokesman has told in a Reuters interview:

"Airbus expects that their containment design on the A350 is so much more robust that it will be certified as is. Anyway they are following the investigations as closely as possible, and should revised certification criteria be decided by the FAA (or EASA or both), then the systems will be re-designed accordingly. It could potentially delay the A350 EIS slightly".

That fits only if we assume that the FAA continue to stand by the current "spacial conditions" criteria, AND they regard the 787 situation as a violation of those criteria.

My personal guess would be that FAA ends up with ammended special conditions. And whatever happens, Airbus will of course work according to them since they will never ever attempt to sell a plane anywhere in the world with no FAA certification. They may even try to blame an otherwise unavoidable delay on new battery rules, who knows... 



Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs, Preben Norholm
User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 104, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17929 times:
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Quoting Scipio (Reply 101):
nothing points in the direction of an easy-to-fix maintenance or handling problem. The plausible explanations at this stage all point toward manufacturing and/or design issues.

The containment system failed to contain the electrolytes, but that should be fixable with either a larger containment vessel and/or a better venting option (perhaps directly to the atmosphere as the A350 looks to do). I don't expect that to take Boeing a year to develop.

The batteries short-circuited, but not due to overcharging. So the evidence currently suggests that the 787's charging system is sound - it provides the proper voltage to the pack and the individual cells. So that suggests a manufacturing defect with the batteries, not a design issue with the 787's charging system. So the battery manufacturer needs to improve their quality control and testing - something unlikely to take a year.



Quoting Scipio (Reply 101):
the message brought by the NTSB today was a very firm one -- strong vocabulary ("an unprecedented event", "a very serious air safety concern", “the expectation in aviation is to never experience a fire on board an aircraft”, ...) and a quite explicit warning (motivated on the basis of several reasons) that no quick fixes should be expected

The NTSB has no authority in regards to the grounding. There may indeed be no quick fixes for everything, but everything does not need to be fixed to lift the grounding.


User currently offlineScipio From Belgium, joined Oct 2007, 833 posts, RR: 9
Reply 105, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17891 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 95):
What that "It's not clear why the containment did not work as envisaged" or "It's not clear from the NTSB statement why they don't think the containment worked as envisaged"?

"She said the battery had spewed out very hot, molten electrolytes, despite the presence of numerous systems meant to prevent such an event."

"We have to understand why this battery resulted in a fire when there is so many protections designed into this system," she adds.

"These events should not happen as far as design of the airplane," Hersman says. "There are multiple systems to prevent a battery event like this. Those systems did not work. We need to understand why."

It is clear to me from these quoted statements that the NTSB likes neither the fact that the battery "events" occurred nor what their consequences were. I.e., prevention and containment systems are both implicated.


User currently offlinePHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 7175 posts, RR: 17
Reply 106, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17820 times:

Quoting Scipio (Reply 52):
NTSB says "much more work" is needed to determine the cause of the B787 fires:

Thanks for the article.

Quoting BoeEngr (Reply 53):
The two battery incidents were 9 days apart. The JAL Boston incident was January 7 and the NH incident was January 16.

Thanks for the correction.


So back to practicality- anyone have any guesses or estimations when the 787 is allowed to fly again?



One of the FB admins for PHX Spotters. "Zach the Expat!"
User currently offline2175301 From United States of America, joined May 2007, 1034 posts, RR: 0
Reply 107, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17860 times:

I would expect the grounding to be in the range of 1-2 months, perhaps 3 months; based on the following:

I work in the Nuclear Power Industry and am a Trained Root Cause Investigator at the same level of what the NTSB investigations are (we actually use the same training materials and hire the same Root Cause vendor when we need help). I have been the technical lead on several Root Cause Investigations related to Nuclear plant issues (and its my name and signature on the cover page that goes to the NRC).

The comments by the NTSB after 1 week are totally consistent with the normal state of any Root Cause investigation after 1 week. You may have ruled a few obvious things out - but the main focus so far has been listing all of the possible questions.

By 2-3 weeks the Investigation Team will likely have a good idea of where the issue is - and where it is not.

Typically at 3-5 weeks you understand what the issue is - and start developing concepts on how to resolve the issue. Specific additional testing may be needed to fully flesh out something (some of which can take time).

Typically 4-6 weeks a workable solution is known. Getting it tested and accepted by the regulator may take more time (and even in the nuclear world Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval of Tech Spec or other Design Basis changes may take months). However, in most cases at least a temporary solution can be implemented within a few weeks.

I would not even think that there would be a very long grounding until I hear what the NTSB says at the 3 week stage.


Have a great day,


User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12331 posts, RR: 25
Reply 108, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17826 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 104):
The batteries short-circuited, but not due to overcharging. [snip] So that suggests a manufacturing defect with the batteries, not a design issue with the 787's charging system. So the battery manufacturer needs to improve their quality control and testing - something unlikely to take a year.

It's not that clear to me that it's a QC/testing issue: what if there is a currently unknown failure mode that occurs after the device leaves the factory that cannot be detected at the factory? It seems to me to be one of the possibilities, given that we believe there is a lot of testing for the known failure modes, or at least I do. Of course, it could just be a fault that should have been found at the factory, but one has to wonder if that can be determined to be the case after the device has largely destroyed itself. I suppose some such faults can and others can't, but I'm not an expert in this space.



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently onlineBoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1557 posts, RR: 3
Reply 109, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17812 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 104):
The batteries short-circuited, but not due to overcharging. So the evidence currently suggests that the 787's charging system is sound - it provides the proper voltage to the pack and the individual cells.

Thats not what the NTSB said, while they did say that the battery overall was not overcharged they specifically said that they did not know if it was possible that one or more cells were overcharged.

Which brings up questions of monitoring of the individual cells; why are the NTSB still not able to determine the charge of individual cells? If they have not pulled the data on this by now we have to assume that the data does not exist.

So either:

1) Individual cell charge data is not being collected and analysed in which case knowing known LI-ion failure paths the design is unsafe and should not have been certified.

or

2) The data may have been destroyed in the meltdowns, which points to a bad design, you should never lose the data relating to the state of equipment before failure in the failure event because it makes determining the root cause unnecessarily difficult, possibly impossible to troubleshoot.

[Edited 2013-01-24 19:12:10]


BV
User currently offlineScipio From Belgium, joined Oct 2007, 833 posts, RR: 9
Reply 110, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17706 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 104):
The batteries short-circuited, but not due to overcharging. So the evidence currently suggests that the 787's charging system is sound - it provides the proper voltage to the pack and the individual cells.

The NTSB explicitly said today that they could not yet rule out overcharging (especially of a single cell) as a possible cause.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 104):
The NTSB has no authority in regards to the grounding.

It has no formal authority, but it has a lot of moral authority. After today's NTSB press conference, I do not think that any FAA official will be willing to sign off on a resumption of B787 commercial service until the NTSB is much further down the road in its investigations. Keep in mind that the NTSB is looking into the certification process as well, as is the US Senate, so the FAA is already under fire for being too lenient and/or insufficiently competent ...

Heads would roll at the FAA if it cleared the B787 for flight and another battery incident would happen shortly afterwards...


User currently offlineRickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 780 posts, RR: 0
Reply 111, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17587 times:

Quoting 2175301 (Reply 107):
I would not even think that there would be a very long grounding until I hear what the NTSB says at the 3 week stage.

I that the definition of 'very long' would depend on where you sit. For a lot of people, six weeks is very long.


User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 112, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17641 times:
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Quoting Revelation (Reply 108):
It's not that clear to me that it's a QC/testing issue: what if there is a currently unknown failure mode that occurs after the device leaves the factory that cannot be detected at the factory?

That we had over 50,000 hours and over a year of airline service before these two incidents, such a failure mode seems even more likely tied to a QC issue with a specific production run of batteries.


User currently offlinerotating14 From United States of America, joined Jan 2012, 616 posts, RR: 0
Reply 113, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17661 times:

http://seattletimes.com/html/busines...020199686_787batterysafetyxml.html

Thought some folks here might make use of this data. From the looks of it, Boeing rushed this thing into service.


User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 114, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 17550 times:
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To those that suggest this a/c should stick to a non ETOPS or 60 minute rule, that won't fly with the airlines that bought the plane. This plane was designed and sold as a long range/transcontinental aircraft. It was marketed with 180 as the standard with 330 as the goal. Does anyone think QR would stand for such a restriction?

People need to get away from the notion of a short term fix. We don't even know why these incidents occurred. Until we know why the incidents occurred, we are no where.

At this rate, I think it would be silly to suggest this ac could be back to revenue service before the Spring and that assumes they ascertain the cause quickly. I have no dog in the A versus B fight but I'm bummed this plane is grounded. I am also shocked that these kinds of issues were not caught at the testing phase or QA with the battery mfr.


User currently offlinenm2582 From United States of America, joined Jun 2007, 124 posts, RR: 0
Reply 115, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17514 times:

With regards to Boeing's plan B's, C's, etc.; here's my view on what kind of plan it's going to take to get the 787 back into the air.

(1) the most concern seems to be around leaking electrolyte. Boeing will need to come up with a better containment vessel which demonstrably prevents electrolyte leakage.

(2) at least one "smoking gun" of why the batteries failed will need to be found and demonstrably corrected.

My opinion is that this would convince FAA/NTSB etc. that they have greatly reduced the risk of another failure, and if they DO have another failure, the risk to the aircraft (whatever you may believe that risk or isn't) is also greatly reduced.

I believe this will be done with the current cell technology.

In the long run (4+ years out) they will probably switch to a different lithium chemistry after research, testing, re-certification, etc.

Just my uninformed guesses!


User currently offlinen471wn From United States of America, joined Dec 2003, 1510 posts, RR: 2
Reply 116, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17452 times:
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Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):
People need to get away from the notion of a short term fix

You are so right here----there will be no rush to judgement on this. This is very different than the DC-10 grounding which had a profound impact on air travel and I was there to see it----it would be like grounding the 737 now. But in this case the 787 are relatively low in numbers, can be substituted with other a/c and have been long delayed to begin with. We are in for many weeks of (and perhaps months) of no 787's.


User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 117, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17453 times:
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Quoting rotating14 (Reply 113):
Thought some folks here might make use of this data. From the looks of it, Boeing rushed this thing into service.

That fire was caused by a prototype charger, not the one installed on the 787.

It also happened five years before the 787 entered service, so not exactly my idea of "rushing" something.

And the building burned down where the 787 did not. Maybe Securaplane should have put a containment vessel on the battery when testing it in the lab...


User currently offlineprebennorholm From Denmark, joined Mar 2000, 6385 posts, RR: 54
Reply 118, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17446 times:

Quoting rcair1 (Reply 99):
Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 86):
I would have thought Ni-Mh would be better.

One issue with Ni-MH is a fast self discharge rate and poor cold temp performance. They may have to put higher capacity NiMH's in to meet load requirements.

Exactly. Ni-MH, while having a considerable capacity advantage over Ni-Cd, they have the highest internal resistance of all battery types when discharged, especially in cold weather.

Car batteries are today listed with two performance numbers, capacity and cold cracking performance.

The latter is given in amps. It is the maximum amps a battery can deliver continuously during 30 seconds at -18 deg C (zero deg. F) while maintaining a voltage drop under that load at no more than 40% below nominal voltage (that will be 7.2 volt on our 12 volt car battery.

There are different standards or test methods applied for non-lead-acid batteries. But when measuring Ni-Cd and Ni-MH to the same standard, then Ni-MH will always come out vastly superior in capacity, while Ni-Cd will come out vastly superior in cold cranking performance.

When the Toyota Prius first appeared, and winter came to Alaska, then customers complained that the Ni-MH battery didn't work. It worked perfectly well according to specs, but at extreme winter temperature it didn't deliver the expected fuel saving. Quite the opposite because it had mostly become a heavy ballast to drag along.

Li-Ion also degrades cranking performance with reduced temperature, but at a favourably low rate. Then it has other limitations. For instance it won't even take an abuse like the test method specified for lead-acid. It would be considered a short which might create a thermal runaway. Li-Ion is specified with a maximum discharge rate. It could be 10C, which means that maximum discharge rate in amps is 10 times the capacity in amps/hour, meaning that a full, continuous discharge must last at least 6 minutes. Earlier this figure was a rather limiting number, but today special lithium batteries may be specified 25C or 30C, or even double of that for bursts of less than one second.



Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs, Preben Norholm
User currently offlinepar13del From Bahamas, joined Dec 2005, 7048 posts, RR: 8
Reply 119, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17377 times:

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):
To those that suggest this a/c should stick to a non ETOPS or 60 minute rule, that won't fly with the airlines that bought the plane. This plane was designed and sold as a long range/transcontinental aircraft. It was marketed with 180 as the standard with 330 as the goal. Does anyone think QR would stand for such a restriction?

Well, the existing a/c is overweight, the engines do not meet the specs that both OEM's promised the airlines, so there is some precedent for accepting and flying a/c that do not meet OEM specifications.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):
I am also shocked that these kinds of issues were not caught at the testing phase or QA with the battery mfr.

Why, the a/c has been flying for over a year with no problems, in addition to those conducting test flights, the one battery issue was traced to FOD.
Now if they never have to change a part on the a/c QA would never be an issue, but parts do wear out and some are mandated to be changed after a set period of time, so something that was no problem a year ago could become one when it or items around it are replaced, it does not have to be the battery.
QA on a/c is ongoing, it is not static.


User currently offlineiahmark From United States of America, joined Nov 2007, 51 posts, RR: 0
Reply 120, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17360 times:

I think they will be changing to NICd batteries because they are proven to be safe, because they are available and already in use with most planes. This actually be good PR and a way out for Boeing an also to the FAA to allow the plane to get back in the air.

They will continue researching Li ion and maybe incorporate it later on in the 787-9/10 but it would be a safer chemistry (no Li Cobalt) if used at all.

I expect from 3-6 months before this plane takes up in the air, they might have some tests flights allowed until they sort out the details.


BTW researching the news I came to this interview with Vince Weldon, former Boeing engineer that was unceremoniously given the boot for doubting the viability of composites in serious crashes, show dates back to 2006; I liked because it makes you see that some things were rushed into this project.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epDtu...ture=share&list=PLCF3B72608336EB0A

[Edited 2013-01-24 19:49:16]

User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 121, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17324 times:
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Quoting Revelation (Reply 108):
It's not that clear to me that it's a QC/testing issue: what if there is a currently unknown failure mode that occurs after the device leaves the factory that cannot be detected at the factory?

That we had over 50,000 hours and over a year of airline service before these two incidents, such a failure mode seems even more likely tied to a QC issue with a specific production run of batteries.

************

I'd like to believe that but the information we got is these batteries failed in different ways. If it is a failure, they still don't know how the failure occurred much less why. I agree there were 50k operating hours racked up but that doesn't foreclose the possibility of causes other than a battery QC issue.


User currently offlineblrsea From India, joined May 2005, 1412 posts, RR: 3
Reply 122, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17329 times:

How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out? I think Boeing will go for that, as that might be faster compared to trying to find the root cause for battery catching fire.

User currently offlinepar13del From Bahamas, joined Dec 2005, 7048 posts, RR: 8
Reply 123, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17251 times:

Quoting blrsea (Reply 122):
How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out? I think Boeing will go for that, as that might be faster compared to trying to find the root cause for battery catching fire.

I'll bet that Boeing actually has engineers and designers working on that in addition to the other teams who are working along with the NTSB to identify the root cause of the problem, both are not mutually exclusive.
The a/c was certified with that type of containment in mind, that it failed does not mean that the principle is flawed - which is open to NTSB and FAA change of mind - but that the implementation was flawed.


User currently offlinePanAmPaul From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 242 posts, RR: 0
Reply 124, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17257 times:

Quoting blrsea (Reply 122):
How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out? I think Boeing will go for that, as that might be faster compared to trying to find the root cause for battery catching fire.

Except that I don't think that the FAA will allow the Dreamliners to fly untilthe root cause has been found.

That is why it will take much longer than originally thought.


User currently offlinespacecadet From United States of America, joined Sep 2001, 3606 posts, RR: 12
Reply 125, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17295 times:

Quoting Scipio (Reply 110):
After today's NTSB press conference, I do not think that any FAA official will be willing to sign off on a resumption of B787 commercial service until the NTSB is much further down the road in its investigations.

The FAA has ignored NTSB recommendations many, many times in the past, including with regard to high profile accidents that have cost hundreds of lives. For example, there was no real fix for the problem that caused TWA 800 for 12 years after that accident occurred, and the 747 continued flying throughout: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-ne...-explains-more-about-twa-800-crash

Half of the FAA's mission is to promote an efficient aviation network. That can put them at odds with the NTSB, whose *only* mission is to make safety recommendations. If the only solution to a safety problem would bankrupt every airline and airplane manufacturer, the NTSB would still make that recommendation. That's their job. The FAA's job is to weigh that safety recommendation against the overall efficiency of the network. That's why this grounding is so unusual, despite it *not* being the first case since 1979 to warrant it for safety reasons. The FAA has known about pre-existing design and maintenance safety issues with individual aircraft and airlines several times since then, and has not grounded those airlines and airplanes because of the potential economic consequences to the industry. Their job boils down to risk management.

Quoting Stitch (Reply 112):
That we had over 50,000 hours and over a year of airline service before these two incidents, such a failure mode seems even more likely tied to a QC issue with a specific production run of batteries.

It's *less* likely to be that answer with every press conference and public statement that we have like this. The NTSB aren't stupid - they're the pre-eminent aviation investigative body in the world. They have some of the top engineers in many different fields, and they do these kinds of high profile investigations for a living. So for them to come out at this stage and basically say "we don't know what's going on" suggests to me that it is not any of these simple solutions that some people have been hoping for. A "QC issue" would have been one of the first things they would have looked at, and we know Yaesu has been "probed" (meaning they've taken part in the investigation). That's how these investigations go - you first rule out the simple answers, then you move on to the more complex possibilities.

Anything is still possible, but the longer things go the less likely any of the simple answers is the right one. The fact also that the NTSB specifically brought up containment failures also suggests to me that there's a lot more going on from their perspective than a simple battery problem.

From my managerial perspective, I don't really see how it makes sense to continue flogging the lithium ion horse right now. Switch to something else temporarily to get these planes flying again, and work on a retrofit in the meantime to fix the lithium ion system for the future.

[Edited 2013-01-24 20:15:05]


I'm tired of being a wanna-be league bowler. I wanna be a league bowler!
User currently offlineComeAndGo From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 1034 posts, RR: 0
Reply 126, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17238 times:

Quoting blrsea (Reply 122):
How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out? I think Boeing will go for that, as that might be faster compared to trying to find the root cause for battery catching fire.
Quoting Stitch (Reply 62):
Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 60):
Apparently they used a lithium ion battery of older design. Lithium cobalt oxide which is more prone to thermal runaway.

That is correct. Boeing evidently did add manganese to the mixture to greatly improve the useful life of the battery. If they also add nickel, that would improve the stability and lower the chances of thermal runway.

They're going to add nickel to the battery chemistry and make it more stable. That given mixture is touted as the next gen Li-Ion automotive battery.


User currently offlineAesma From France, joined Nov 2009, 6515 posts, RR: 9
Reply 127, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 17346 times:

Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 118):
Li-Ion also degrades cranking performance with reduced temperature, but at a favourably low rate. Then it has other limitations. For instance it won't even take an abuse like the test method specified for lead-acid. It would be considered a short which might create a thermal runaway. Li-Ion is specified with a maximum discharge rate. It could be 10C, which means that maximum discharge rate in amps is 10 times the capacity in amps/hour, meaning that a full, continuous discharge must last at least 6 minutes. Earlier this figure was a rather limiting number, but today special lithium batteries may be specified 25C or 30C, or even double of that for bursts of less than one second.

Is that the same thing as the power figures in watts I see mentioned for Li-Ion batteries ?

I'm also informing myself on lead-acid batteries since it's below 0C here and my car battery is not liking it at all, from what I found the original one has been replaced by one with twice the capacity (in Ah) to overcome such problems but it's not enough, or alternatively it's dead.

According to the notice of the charger I bought a car battery lasts for about 1000 cycles, so it's no better than Lithium-Ion in that regard.



New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
User currently offlineComeAndGo From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 1034 posts, RR: 0
Reply 128, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 17306 times:

Quoting spacecadet (Reply 125):
For example, there was no real fix for the problem that caused TWA 800 for 12 years after that accident occurred,

i thought they had adopted a corrective procedure to keep enough fuel in the center fuel tank to avoid potential explosive fuel vapor mix.


User currently offlineComeAndGo From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 1034 posts, RR: 0
Reply 129, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 17308 times:

Quoting Aesma (Reply 127):
According to the notice of the charger I bought a car battery lasts for about 1000 cycles, so it's no better than Lithium-Ion in that regard.

it depends on how you charge the battery. If you go from 30% capacity to 80% capacity a Li-Ion can handle 100,000 cycles. If you charge it to 100% and use it down to 20% the cycles become very few.


User currently offlineblrsea From India, joined May 2005, 1412 posts, RR: 3
Reply 130, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 17223 times:

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 126):

They're going to add nickel to the battery chemistry and make it more stable. That given mixture is touted as the next gen Li-Ion automotive battery.

What impact does it have on the battery performance? Any change wrt voltage delivered, charging/discharging capacity, ability to deliver charge for rated time etc?


User currently onlineLTC8K6 From United States of America, joined Jun 2009, 1201 posts, RR: 0
Reply 131, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 17213 times:

Quoting rotating14 (Reply 113):
http://seattletimes.com/html/busines...020199686_787batterysafetyxml.html

Thought some folks here might make use of this data. From the looks of it, Boeing rushed this thing into service.

Those chargers and batteries are apparently not used in the 787.

"Boeing spokesman Marc Birtel said the 2006 fire resulted from “an improper test set up, not the design of the battery.” FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said the agency “investigated Mr. Leon's complaints in 2008 and 2009. The investigation determined that the battery charging units in the complaints were prototypes, and none are installed in Boeing 787 aircraft. "

"Boeing’s Birtel said the batteries referenced in the correspondence between Securaplane and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration are not “the specific battery type currently under NTSB investigation or subject of the FAA emergency airworthiness directive.”"

http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech...ility/60809/?oref=nextgov_today_nl


User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 132, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 16999 times:
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Quoting par13del (Reply 119):
Well, the existing a/c is overweight, the engines do not meet the specs that both OEM's promised the airlines, so there is some precedent for accepting and flying a/c that do not meet OEM specifications.

Not to the degree that was suggested which is essentially eliminating ETOPS for this a/c. Do the math regarding how much longer point to point routes would be without ETOPS. It would mean this a/c would essentially be restricted to continental operations. The airlines won't accept that nor should they.

L/N 90 onwards is on spec weight wise and the engines are within 1% or so of spec. That is a far cry from telling JL and NH that their routing between Japan and North America must operate within 60 minutes of a suitable diversion airport.


User currently offlineAesma From France, joined Nov 2009, 6515 posts, RR: 9
Reply 133, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 16991 times:

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 129):
it depends on how you charge the battery. If you go from 30% capacity to 80% capacity a Li-Ion can handle 100,000 cycles. If you charge it to 100% and use it down to 20% the cycles become very few.

I don't think that's true. A cycle is defined as the equivalent to 100%->0%->100%, if you do 80->30->80 that's half a cycle, do it twice and it's a cycle.



New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
User currently offlineFlyingfox27 From United Kingdom, joined Jul 2007, 424 posts, RR: 0
Reply 134, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 16978 times:

I havent read every post in the 5 threads so sorry if my question is repeated.

When that cargo 747 crashed full of Li - Ion batteries, you would think Boeing would say ok that battery is a bad idea. But the other thought i had was they are probably wondering why our cameras dont blow up on each flight? Unless thankfully our camera batteries are too small or somehow not affected. If so why not have the battery places in a mega scale canon battery support structure? Unless thats too overweight.

I think this is the reason why new planes are delayed, stop pressuring them into delivering a plane i'd rather it years late and fully safe and servicable than rushed and things like this get forgotten.

Alternatively i would build a plane in secret, test all of it then announce a new plane instead but i wonder if theres a reason why they dont do that?

Anyway i hope its fixed soon.


User currently offlineAesma From France, joined Nov 2009, 6515 posts, RR: 9
Reply 135, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 16796 times:

All batteries can have a thermal runaway but it's more likely to happen during charging or significant discharging. In the case of cameras most aren't using Li-Ion batteries at all, but high end ones do, I would contend that they're very lightly stressed during use however. Now laptop batteries that's another story and there have been incidents, although not in planes as far as I know.

Quoting Flyingfox27 (Reply 134):
Alternatively i would build a plane in secret, test all of it then announce a new plane instead but i wonder if theres a reason why they dont do that?

Because it costs so many billions to develop a new plane that you can't get your financing if you don't have a clear plan and customers lining up.



New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
User currently offlinenm2582 From United States of America, joined Jun 2007, 124 posts, RR: 0
Reply 136, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 16760 times:

Quoting Aesma (Reply 133):
Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 129):
it depends on how you charge the battery. If you go from 30% capacity to 80% capacity a Li-Ion can handle 100,000 cycles. If you charge it to 100% and use it down to 20% the cycles become very few.

I don't think that's true. A cycle is defined as the equivalent to 100%->0%->100%, if you do 80->30->80 that's half a cycle, do it twice and it's a cycle.

It's all semantics. You can rate the cell in different ways and get vastly different lifespans out of it.

Let's say you have a lithium cell that is rated at 10Ah, absolute maximum voltage of 4.2v, and a minimum voltage of 3.2v. If you cycle that cell for all it's worth (4.2v to 3.2v and back) it might last a few hundred cycles.

But now take the same exact cell, rate it with a 4.0v max voltage and 3.6v minimum voltage, and you might only get 8Ah out of it. But now it will last several thousand cycles, which means a lot less maintenance expense to the aircraft owner/operator.

Taking lithium cells to the limits of the chemistry is hard on them, very hard. The economics are better if you use slightly larger cells (to make up for the lost capacity) and don't use them to the extremes of what the chemistry can do.

[Edited 2013-01-24 22:26:35]

User currently offlineWingedMigrator From United States of America, joined Oct 2005, 2212 posts, RR: 56
Reply 137, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 16623 times:

Quoting nm2582 (Reply 136):
Let's say you have a lithium cell

There are dozens of lithium ion chemistries, all with varying properties.


User currently offlineseahawk From Germany, joined May 2005, 954 posts, RR: 0
Reply 138, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 14 hours ago) and read 16238 times:

Quoting Flyingfox27 (Reply 134):
I havent read every post in the 5 threads so sorry if my question is repeated.

When that cargo 747 crashed full of Li - Ion batteries, you would think Boeing would say ok that battery is a bad idea. But the other thought i had was they are probably wondering why our cameras dont blow up on each flight? Unless thankfully our camera batteries are too small or somehow not affected. If so why not have the battery places in a mega scale canon battery support structure? Unless thats too overweight.

There are plenty reports of laptop, smartphone or camera batteries having a thermal rundown, there are even specialized bags on the planes to contain those events. However the stored energy is way lower than the one stored in the 787 batteries, so the potential danger is lower. Even some emergency flashlights vented in the past, due to the small size of the batteries without causing many problems.

For me the easiest solution is to reduce the number of cells in a battery. Worst case they need to put just 1 cell into one battery, so that every cell has its own containment and charger. I think this could be tried within weeks, so the grounding could be short.


User currently offlinepar13del From Bahamas, joined Dec 2005, 7048 posts, RR: 8
Reply 139, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 11 hours ago) and read 15419 times:

Quoting ComeAndGo (Reply 128):
i thought they had adopted a corrective procedure to keep enough fuel in the center fuel tank to avoid potential explosive fuel vapor mix.

So did they identify the root cause of the problem, was that a fix of the root cause or just a temporary fix to allow the a/c to continue in operation?
Is that any different from the faulty pitot tubes or the engine starvation on the 777, here's a question, are those pitot tubes still in operation on some a/c even after they had some input into the AF disaster, remember that the notices about them was that they should be changed during routine maintenance cycles, in the interim improved pilot procedures were implemented when air speed became suspect. How about the RR engines on the 777, have all of them now had the engine fix to prevent fuel starvation, that is another incident where a temporary fix was put in place while the engineers and safety regulators identified the root cause and a permanent fix.

The principle of putting in place temporary measures to allow an a/c to return or stay in service while final corrective measures are implemented is well documented, I see no reason why the 787 will be any different. If it takes a year to identify the root cause, does anyone really believe that the 787 will be grounded the entire time, how long would it take Boeing to switch batteries and the FAA certify the a/c with new batteries, that is also an option. In any event, we are talking about a hit to the aviation industry of millions if not billions, Boeing, suppliers and yes us customers who will have to pay higher fares, after all, replacement a/c are not sitting down unbuilt waiting for operators.
700+ backlog of a/c, even if all are cancelled today, how much money will be returned to the buyer, what is their source of replacement, and what premiums will either OEM charge for these new a/c, or do we believe that they will take pity on the airlines and offer up huge discounts as compensation, Boeing might why would Airbus?


User currently offlineart From United Kingdom, joined Feb 2005, 3379 posts, RR: 0
Reply 140, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 10 hours ago) and read 15045 times:

Sorry if this has already been posted:

"The Boeing 787 battery involved in the Japan Airlines incident on 7 January reveal signs of a short-circuit in one cell and thermal runaway that led to a fire, says the US National Transportation Safety Board. "

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...in-jal-787-battery-failure-381464/


User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12331 posts, RR: 25
Reply 141, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 9 hours ago) and read 14710 times:

Quoting art (Reply 140):
Sorry if this has already been posted:

It was, but it's a good pointer to the state of play at this point in time.

Quoting art (Reply 140):
"The Boeing 787 battery involved in the Japan Airlines incident on 7 January reveal signs of a short-circuit in one cell and thermal runaway that led to a fire, says the US National Transportation Safety Board. "

Kind of ambiguous, but I imagine the actual short circuit would/could become an open circuit during/after the fire.

The article also says:

Quote:
"We have to understand why this battery resulted in a fire when there is so many protections designed into this system," she adds.

Yet we know everyone from the 787 Chief Engineer on down has said fire was allowed for in the design, the design is focused on containing the (statistically likely) fire.

Seems the state of play known to the public is:
A) Understand how the short circuit developed in the JAL fire event and see if its cause can be minimized/prevented
B) Determine the root cause of the ANA not-fire event and see if its cause can be minimized/prevented

SInce it's taken over two weeks to disclose the JAL issue and they events were 9 days apart, in theory we could know more (publicly) about the ANA not-fire event the end of next week.

This must be painfully slow to Boeing employees and shareholders, and will be very frustrating if the NTSB final report ends up looking like:

Quoting WingedMigrator (Reply 137):
There are dozens of lithium ion chemistries, all with varying properties.


How well understood are the thermal runaway properties of all of these dozens of chemistries?



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently offlineKaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2948 posts, RR: 29
Reply 142, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 9 hours ago) and read 14566 times:

Quoting Aesma (Reply 135):
Now laptop batteries that's another story and there have been incidents, although not in planes as far as I know.

As of October, 2012, the FAA has documented 132 incidents of venting/smouldering/fire involving consumer electronic device batteries in cabins, baggage and cargo - mostly Li-Ion. And that's just incidents within the FAA's jurisdiction.



Note à moi-même - il faut respecter les cons.
User currently offlinealfablue From Spain, joined Jan 2013, 43 posts, RR: 10
Reply 143, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 9 hours ago) and read 14573 times:

Quoting Revelation (Reply 141):
Yet we know everyone from the 787 Chief Engineer on down has said fire was allowed for in the design, the design is focused on containing the (statistically likely) fire.

The following is pure imagination and was sparked by above comment:


Boeing: Hey we want to build a plane with dangerous batteries

FAA: But those catch fire

Boeing: Oh we just built a container around

FAA: cool - we give you special conditions

Pilot Unions: We don't want fires on board!

JAL: Hey Boeing, we had a fire!

FAA: Shit - I told you guys - what shall we do? -- ok lets do a safety review!

ANA: Hey guys, we had another fire - this time while flying and we needed to evacuate - turn on the TV - there is some nice footage around!

Airlines/FAA: Damn - We better ground the aircraft now!

Media: Shit-storm

Public: Outcry


I could add and subtract to that imaginary conversation. Some people will acuse me of starting a war, being polemic even outright insult me. What happened when the FAA said it would do a safety review is that the 787 was moved into the spotlight. The batterie is deeply integrated into the system and you cant just pull out a fist class seat and screw another type of batterie into its place as an intermediate fix.

If the 787 has any other incident with whatever system (its a new aircraft and will have teething problems) and leads to an emergency (will happen - we have emergencies almost every day) while the safety review is still under its way and the NTSB is still investigating it will not let Boeing, authorities or operating airlines look good.

It (the grounding) is not only a battery problem anymore!

AlfaBlue


User currently onlineCF-CPI From Canada, joined Nov 2000, 1041 posts, RR: 0
Reply 144, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 8 hours ago) and read 14435 times:

As of Friday morning, the reports are that the circuit board which controls the battery was too far 'fried' to get useful data from it. (I didn't see this mentioned here - apologies if it was). We could indeed be in for a long investigation, unless there are other means of gathering data.

User currently offlineblrsea From India, joined May 2005, 1412 posts, RR: 3
Reply 145, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 8 hours ago) and read 14484 times:

Today's Seattle Times has some additional info about how the NTSB is investigating the issue. Interesting read. Also official confirmation that for the last fire incident in Japan, the aircraft's battery was indeed replaced in October.

NTSB’s methodical probe means longer grounding for Boeing 787

Quote:
...
Hersman said the plane was not plugged into a ground charger before the fire broke out.

She said that when NTSB investigators got to the plane, the battery had already been ripped out by firefighters.

Her team noted structural and component damage in the electronics bay within about a 20-inch radius of the battery.

The battery is used to start the auxiliary power unit, or APU, a small turbine in the tail of the jet.

“The APU battery was spewing molten electrolytes, very hot material,” Hersman said.
...
...
The methodical, high-profile investigation is unfolding inside the modest forensic laboratory at NTSB’s headquarters in southwest Washington, D.C.

In a fluorescent-lit room on the fifth floor holding a half-dozen investigators, reporters Thursday paraded by the burned battery from the Dreamliner.

The battery’s cobalt-blue casing sat splayed atop a wheeled cart. One of the battery’s eight cells was left inside for display. Investigators are focusing most on cells five, six and seven, the most damaged.

On an adjacent long table, two strips of 33-foot-long foil windings made of copper and aluminum — the innards of the battery cells — lay unspooled for examination. One of the windings was more heavily damaged, much of it charred and blackened.

The NTSB is working its investigators in two daily shifts in Washington, with more staff deployed to Japan, where the battery is made, and to Tucson, Ariz., where the battery charger is made.
...
...
Two electronic devices that recorded maintenance data on the JAL plane are being downloaded at Boeing in Seattle to obtain information recorded after the airplane’s electrical power was interrupted.

In addition to the detailed forensic examination of the plane’s electrical system, Hersman said the NTSB is reviewing manufacturing records and gathering information collected in supplier audits at battery maker GS Yuasa in Japan and the maker of the charging system, Securaplane Technologies. in Tucson.

It is also examining whether the FAA’s certification standards were adhered to and if those standards were adequate, Hersman said.
...
...
This main battery is “the final power source, should all other electrical generation fail,” Hersman said.

No fire was found, but again hot chemicals had sprayed out of the battery, leaving a trail of dark residue across the compartment.

Although the aircraft was an older jet, delivered to ANA a year earlier, the battery had been installed as a replacement in late October.

How long might the NTSB investigation take to come to a conclusion on the cause of the Boston fire?

“It’s really very hard to tell at this point,” Hersman said. “We have all hands on deck.”
...
...


User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12331 posts, RR: 25
Reply 146, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 6 hours ago) and read 13806 times:

Quoting alfablue (Reply 143):
JAL: Hey Boeing, we had a fire!

Boeing: Really? That's not supposed to happen for another 10^N flight hours! The boss ain't gonna like this!

Quoting blrsea (Reply 145):
In a fluorescent-lit room on the fifth floor holding a half-dozen investigators, reporters Thursday paraded by the burned battery from the Dreamliner.

Pretty much the definition of a "horse and pony show", no?



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently offlinen471wn From United States of America, joined Dec 2003, 1510 posts, RR: 2
Reply 147, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13531 times:
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Jim Hall, who was the former head of the NTSB, says it will be months and not weeks before the 787 will fly again

User currently offlinesofianec From Germany, joined Aug 2007, 237 posts, RR: 2
Reply 148, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13533 times:

Sorry if this has been noticed before but

United pulls pre-flight video touting Boeing 787 Dreamliner - http://www.latimes.com/business/mone...ner-video-20130118,0,4756437.story

United says it's no longer showing the pre-flight video touting the 787 Dreamliner as the "future of aviation."

This is becoming a massive PR disaster for Boeing and all airlines operating the aircraft.

ANA flight cancellations top 450 with Boeing jet grounded - http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/n...787-grounding-may-dent-growth-plan

For Japan's ANA, Boeing 787 grounding may dent growth plan - http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2...iner-cancellations-dreamliner-jets

In Japan travel delays and cancellations are usually treated very seriously. A Shinkansen train has less than a minute average delay per year it seems the grounding may prove futile for ANA. Are there any backup plans in a situation like this. Can a major airline find backup aircraft to cover for grounded type and what about the financial impact - these cancellations seem very expensive.

---



A350WARP
User currently onlineBoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1557 posts, RR: 3
Reply 149, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13529 times:

Quoting Revelation (Reply 146):
Pretty much the definition of a "horse and pony show", no?

Pretty much we have to show movement but we still really don't have a clue how the fire started... But here, look at some burnt things anyway.

Quoting blrsea (Reply 145):
Her team noted structural and component damage in the electronics bay within about a 20-inch radius of the battery.

20", over 3 feet or 1 meter for our European cousins, thats quite a large area of damage in a compact space like an electronics bay, this must be significant.



BV
User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 150, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13490 times:
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Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 149):
20", over 3 feet or 1 meter for our European cousins,

A foot is 12 inches, so it's 1 and 2/3rds feet or a half-meter.


User currently onlineBoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1557 posts, RR: 3
Reply 151, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13382 times:

Quoting Stitch (Reply 150):
A foot is 12 inches, so it's 1 and 2/3rds feet or a half-meter.

Jeeez, up too long I really need to go to bed..



BV
User currently offlinetdscanuck From Canada, joined Jan 2006, 12709 posts, RR: 80
Reply 152, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13562 times:

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):
People need to get away from the notion of a short term fix.

People need to realize that short term fixes are the norm for significant AD's. The short term fix gets you back to your intended level of safety so that operations can resume, usually at the cost of significant maintenance and/or operational burden. The long term fix gets rid of the maintenance/operational burden. This is how the vast majority of AD's get handled.

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):
I am also shocked that these kinds of issues were not caught at the testing phase or QA with the battery mfr.

They can only get caught if the defect responsible was present during testing or manufacturing QA...without knowing the cause, we don't know if that's true.

Quoting nm2582 (Reply 115):
(1) the most concern seems to be around leaking electrolyte. Boeing will need to come up with a better containment vessel which demonstrably prevents electrolyte leakage.

Or demonstrate that leaking electrolyte poses no threat to the other systems. There's nothing in the special condition that requires the electrolyte itself be contained, only that the damage be contained.

Quoting par13del (Reply 119):
Well, the existing a/c is overweight, the engines do not meet the specs that both OEM's promised the airlines, so there is some precedent for accepting and flying a/c that do not meet OEM specifications.

It's important to distinguish between specifications and contractual guarantees. There is always a gap in between. OEM's are responsible to meet contract guarantees, not specs. Airlines are free to forego delivery of aircraft that don't meet contractual guarantees, they have no legal basis to refuse delivery of aircraft that don't meet spec.

Quoting par13del (Reply 119):
Why, the a/c has been flying for over a year with no problems, in addition to those conducting test flights, the one battery issue was traced to FOD.

The FOD issue during test had nothing to do with the batteries. These battery issues are a completely post-certification phenomenon.

Quoting iahmark (Reply 120):
I think they will be changing to NICd batteries because they are proven to be safe

NiCd batteries can have thermal runaway too. They're not "proven safe", they're "proven unsafe" by most of the logic deployed in this thread. Their failure *probability* is different though.

Quoting iahmark (Reply 120):
BTW researching the news I came to this interview with Vince Weldon, former Boeing engineer that was unceremoniously given the boot for doubting the viability of composites in serious crashes

He wasn't given the boot for doubting the viability of composites in serious crashes. He did doubt the viability of composites in serious crashes (which was proven incorrect by doing composite crash testing), and he was also given the boot. Don't confuse correlation with causation.

Quoting blrsea (Reply 122):
How hard would it be for Boeing to redesign the container and vent so that electrolyte won't leak, and smoke and gasses are vented out?

Relatively easy, if that's all it took. But from the NTSB's latest press release I'm not sure they'd accept that. FAA might though.

Quoting Flyingfox27 (Reply 134):
When that cargo 747 crashed full of Li - Ion batteries, you would think Boeing would say ok that battery is a bad idea.

I can crush an aluminum can with my bare hands...this does not mean it's a bad idea to build airplanes out of aluminum. It's extremely unlikely that the basic battery chemistry is the problem here.

Quoting Flyingfox27 (Reply 134):
Alternatively i would build a plane in secret, test all of it then announce a new plane instead but i wonder if theres a reason why they dont do that?

Because you can't afford to. The risk is too high that you'd build something the customers don't want.

Quoting alfablue (Reply 143):
Boeing: Hey we want to build a plane with dangerous batteries

FAA: But those catch fire

This should really be rephrased as:
Boeing: He, we want to build a plane with batteries.
FAA: But batteries can catch fire...

All batteries *can* cause damage because they're all energy storage devices. All airplanes have to be designed assuming that the battery fails in the most spectacular possible manner, regardless of which battery chemistry you choose. The containment methods may differ from chemistry to chemistry but the FAA is *always* going to say "What are you going to do if this thing catches fire/shorts/leaks/etc.?"

Tom.


User currently offlineStitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 30537 posts, RR: 84
Reply 153, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13433 times:
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Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
All airplanes have to be designed assuming that the battery fails in the most spectacular possible manner, regardless of which battery chemistry you choose. The containment methods may differ from chemistry to chemistry but the FAA is *always* going to say "What are you going to do if this thing catches fire/shorts/leaks/etc.?"

Looking at the lead-acid batteries used on earlier 747 models and the NiCad batteries used on the 777, their containment system looks to be similar to that used by the Li-Ion system - a metal box with a removable lid.




(Both batteries are supplied by Securaplane Technologies, who are the suppliers of the batteries for the 787.)


User currently offlinettailsteve From United States of America, joined May 2006, 111 posts, RR: 0
Reply 154, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13386 times:

Hello,

I am a long time member but rarely post. I cannot keep quite any longer. I have followed the 787 very closely since its inception.

This plane should NEVER have been grounded and taken out of service. I have seen nothing to suggest the 787 is unsafe. This is nothing more than a teething issue all new aircraft have. The plane has not caused any accidents or injuries.

I can cite example after example of design issues with all types of aircraft with far worse ramifications than a battery scenario that has been planned for by the engineers and the FAA since day one.

The uncommanded rudder issue with the 737 is just one example that led to (2) planes drilling holes in the ground (USAir @ Philly and United @ Colorado Springs) and there was no grounding of the plane. Athe AF Airbus accident ect.....

Here we have a scenerio that was planned for, everyone conceded it was a possibility and safety measures were designed into the aircraft to contain the situation and those safety measures worked and yet we have a grounded plane.

Politics!!! Lets not forget that Boeing fought w the Obama Admin over a new non-union manufacturing facility.

No plane has ever been put under as much scrutiny as the 787.

The grounding of this plane will forever mare its reputation, is costing airlines and Boeing millions and millions of dollars, will create uneasyness with the traveling public and will cost J*O*B*S here in the USA.

This is much ado about nothing! I would galdy fly on the 787 between any two points on the globe. I cannot believe this plane has been grounded!!!

There should be outrage in the aviaton community!!!

Warm Regards,

Steve


User currently offlineRevelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 12331 posts, RR: 25
Reply 155, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 13360 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
All airplanes have to be designed assuming that the battery fails in the most spectacular possible manner, regardless of which battery chemistry you choose.

Unfortunately for Boeing, the NTSB Chairwoman says: “We do not expect to see fire events on board aircraft” so I don't think she's on board with your statement.



Inspiration, move me brightly!
User currently offlineSonomaFlyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1694 posts, RR: 0
Reply 156, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 4 hours ago) and read 13150 times:
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Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):

Quoting SonomaFlyer (Reply 114):
People need to get away from the notion of a short term fix.

People need to realize that short term fixes are the norm for significant AD's. The short term fix gets you back to your intended level of safety so that operations can resume, usually at the cost of significant maintenance and/or operational burden. The long term fix gets rid of the maintenance/operational burden. This is how the vast majority of AD's get handled.

This I understand but we can't have any fix until the cause is determined for both events. I should've been more clear in my statement though and linked the determination of cause coupled with an appropriate fix. I'm just not seeing these a/c getting into the air quickly given the issues involved. I hope to be proven wrong as this a/c is badly needed by the airlines - not to mention Boeing.


User currently offlinealfablue From Spain, joined Jan 2013, 43 posts, RR: 10
Reply 157, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 4 hours ago) and read 13145 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
People need to realize that short term fixes are the norm for significant AD's. The short term fix gets you back to your intended level of safety so that operations can resume, usually at the cost of significant maintenance and/or operational burden.

Good luck convincing them. We have a different safety culture now than we had during the DC-10 era and that's just fine and appreciated. Anyways you need to realize that those AD's you refer to usually concern frames with millions of hours and usually are not about fires. and to quote the NTSB:

Quoting Revelation (Reply 155):
NTSB Chairwoman says: “We do not expect to see fire events on board aircraft”.
Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
Or demonstrate that leaking electrolyte poses no threat to the other systems. There's nothing in the special condition that requires the electrolyte itself be contained, only that the damage be contained.

I have a different opinion. I think the special conditions aim was that there is no pressure built up (vents) and those vented gases have to poses no threat but the leakage of electrolytes in either the forward or aft E&E compartment was not allowed. That's just not imaginable. Anyways I have found some interesting reads:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/busine...-11e2-889b-f23c246aa446_story.html

User currently offlinetarheelwings From United States of America, joined Jul 2009, 209 posts, RR: 0
Reply 158, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 4 hours ago) and read 13097 times:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
Reply 152

Tom,

As always, thanks for a very thorough and informative post.


User currently onlinePITingres From United States of America, joined Dec 2007, 1121 posts, RR: 13
Reply 159, posted (1 year 5 months 4 weeks 1 day 4 hours ago) and read 12949 times:

Quoting Revelation (Reply 155):
Unfortunately for Boeing, the NTSB Chairwoman says: “We do not expect to see fire events on board aircraft” so I don't think she's on board with your statement.

I think you are mis-interpreting. A fire event is only one of lots of things that the NTSB "does not expect to see". That doesn't mean that you don't design for them to happen anyway! Remember:

Quoting tdscanuck (Reply 152):
the FAA is *always* going to say "What are you going to do if this thing catches fire/shorts/leaks/etc.?"

and the FAA is the certifying authority, not the NTSB. The NTSB's charter is actually quite a narrow one: to investigate things that go wrong, identify a probable cause and contributing factors, and make safety recommendations to the relevant authority (FAA in this case). The NTSB does not need to concern themselves with practicality, and the FAA is free to ignore any recommendation.



Fly, you fools! Fly!