WARNING: Due to the last thread going off topic quickly and turning into a 'battle ground', the moderators will be watching this thread frequently and ANY offending/rule breaking posts will be removed. Please respect each others right to have their opinion.
PHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 5102 posts, RR: 14 Reply 1, posted (4 months 1 week 2 days 8 hours ago) and read 29823 times:
Well here we go. Hope enough people had time to calm down so I can actually post news from Japan.
As we all know, a single cell on the JL flight caused the whole battery to go off. What Boeing, FAA, NTSB, and the other investigators need to do now is figure out why it was just that one cell.
Batteries were often switched before the recent issues were acknowledged, some electricity powerback issues were to blame:
Quote: All 10 replacements occurred last year—two in May, four in October, two on one day in November and two in December—involving seven Dreamliners, she said. The airline operates 17 of the planes.
ANA had not reported the replacements to the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) because “the 10 problems were found before flights so were considered not to affect safety”, Yamamoto said.
A JAL spokeswoman said the company had experienced “quite a few cases” where Boeing 787 batteries had to be replaced before the aircraft was grounded worldwide. She added that no further details were immediately available.
sweair From Sweden, joined Nov 2011, 1597 posts, RR: 0 Reply 3, posted (4 months 1 week 2 days 6 hours ago) and read 29582 times:
What if this comes down to bad batteries of later batches? Have they changed the chemistry since EIS? Shorts in the battery they say, does that not point to a manufactoring glitch? They will need to beef up the containment, is that a long certification?
The cells that shorted, they must be identfied for root cause and fixed at the factory?! But if they find the "smoking gun" what happens next?
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 5, posted (4 months 1 week 2 days 2 hours ago) and read 29052 times:
Quoting sweair (Reply 3): What if this comes down to bad batteries of later batches? Have they changed the chemistry since EIS? Shorts in the battery they say, does that not point to a manufactoring glitch?
Apparently a higher-than-normal proportion of batteries have required replacement since the 787 entered service - but none of the previous incidents have caused any danger. As far as a 'trend' can be established, the previous incidents have involved the batteries becoming fully discharged (mostly, apparently, due to incorrect disconnection/discharges while the aeroplanes were on the ground), at which point safety cut-offs operated and the batteries had to be exchanged.
So while Boeing will obviously have exhaustively to check the batteries themselves, it looks as if they will also have to check the rest of the aeroplane's power systems - especially the recharging processes.
For information, the batteries, as we know, are produced by GS Yuasa in Japan. The firm in general charge of the design of the 787's electrical systems is the French company, Thales. The recharging system was designed by a firm called Securaplane, based in Tucson, Arizona - they were a US firm when they joined the 787 programme, but they have since been taken over by a British company, Meggitt PLC.
So it looks as if a truly international effort will be needed to sort this business out.......
Quoting Speedbird128 (Reply 2): I trust that this single test flight is not going to be a basis for a thumbs up to lift the grounding....???
No chance at all of that, Speedbird128. I imagine that test flights will continue nonstop for quite a while.
[Edited 2013-02-10 04:46:41]
"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
Speedbird128 From Germany, joined Oct 2003, 1151 posts, RR: 2 Reply 6, posted (4 months 1 week 2 days 1 hour ago) and read 28964 times:
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 5): No chance at all of that, Speedbird128. I imagine that test flights will continue nonstop for quite a while.
I would also imagine so... it just sounded that 1 positive test flight and it was looking good. That in itself is great, but 99.9% of flights had no battery thermal runaways either... so it was just my inquisiviteness at the wording of the report.
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 5): So it looks as if a truly international effort will be needed to sort this business out
Thats what the 787 is (and most major other engineering projects as well) - a major international effort.
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 8, posted (4 months 1 week 2 days ago) and read 28738 times:
Quoting Aesma (Reply 7): I don't think that's true. At least when we were talking about the ZA002 incident, it was Zodiac that was involved. Another French company.
Looks like they're both involved, Aesma? I've no idea to what extent the situation affects each individual company:-
"Les malheurs du 787 pourraient avoir de sérieuses conséquences pour les équipementiers aéronautiques français. De tous les Boeing, cet avion est celui sur lequel la part d'équipements français est la plus importante, si l'on exclut les moteurs CFM du 737. Safran, Thales et Zodiac vendent chacun pour plusieurs millions de dollars d'équipements par appareil. Tout problème technique qui ralentirait le rythme de production et de livraison du « dreamliner » serait autant de chiffre d'affaires en moins pour eux."
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 10569 posts, RR: 21 Reply 11, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 28201 times:
I agree with the thread starter, let's talk ideas/opinions/issues and leave any comments about fellow posters out of this.
What I was going to post to the other thread is that I agree that the 787 won't return to service till the root cause is found and eliminated. I think it's likely that the airlines themselves if not other international agencies would reject any workaround based scheme that doesn't conclusively eliminate the root cause. From what has been made public we know short circuits appear in individual cells of the Li-Ion battery but we we haven't been told the cause of the short circuit. It seem the test flights are geared towards determining if the cells flex during flight and cause the short circuit.
It's a real ugly situation for Boeing. Changing the battery technology then requires changes to the upstream charger and monitoring tech. Not changing the battery technology means they have the burden of proving the relatively new tech is safe after the highly public failures.
It seems this is one of those times that CEOs are supposed to be earning their ridiculously high salaries (something like 400 times the average worker's wage in the US). Time to see if McNearney et al can save the day!
2175301 From United States of America, joined May 2007, 988 posts, RR: 0 Reply 12, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 27965 times:
Hmmm.
I would disagree that the root cause has to be eliminated. It has to be understood; and contained from causing significant flight or safety issues.
It is also possible that they may never find a leading Root Cause. Sometimes all you do in these investigations is identify things that need improvement; even if you cannot conclude that one (or two) of them are the Root Cause.
I would also agree that the batteries on the test flights are heavily instrumented with all kinds of extra sensors. For example mounting stress/strain gauges on the connecting bus bars and individual terminal posts seems rather obvious. I do believe that it is likely that the flexibility of the cells and the rigidity of the connecting bus bars are causing unanticipated flexing in the cells near the terminal post. That kind of problem occurs in all kinds of industries. Usually the answer is to provide more flexibility as you can rarely make the rest of the system ridged enough.
My personal guess at the solution for these batteries is:
1) The basic cell is reused as is.
2) Ridged connecting bars between the cells are replaced by flexible cables
3) To prevent a run-away cell from overheating the next cell about a 1/16" - 1/8" layer of insulating ceramic (likely the same material as the Space Shuttle Tiles as it is readily available) will be placed between the cells.
4) The containment box will become more robust.
5) They may include better temperature monitoring of the individual cells; which will require software changes in at least the monitoring and data storage software (I doubt this warrants any changes to information presented to the flight deck).
DTW2HYD From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 195 posts, RR: 0 Reply 13, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 18 hours ago) and read 26219 times:
Would large number of smaller cells helped with thermal runaway issue. I was reading Telsa Roadster's battery system paper. It has 6800 small cells vs 8 large cells on B787. Likelyhood of a car battery pack getting damaged is very high, but not many lives at risk. Tesla's theorey is 6800 x approx AA size batteries create large surface area to dissipate heat optimally.
jetblueguy22 From United States of America, joined Nov 2007, 2053 posts, RR: 1 Reply 14, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 26155 times:
I know someone who is high level in UTC Aerospace Systems (the company Goodrich is now a part of) and he has said they did tests on the electrical system they provided and found it has nothing to do with the issues. It all leads back to the battery. Obviously I can't reveal who it is so people may not believe me but I put a lot of faith in this guy.
Pat
Professor Foltz: You push down on that yoke, the houses get bigger, you pull back on the yoke, the houses get bigger.
sweair From Sweden, joined Nov 2011, 1597 posts, RR: 0 Reply 15, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 17 hours ago) and read 26100 times:
Quoting RNAVFL350 (Reply 13): I am completely confused by this response to PHX787's post. Care to explain what exactly was absurd about his post (reply 13)
He insinuated that Boeing would be happy to do a test flight and declare the plane safe. If they have learned something it is how fast the media spreads negativity and if they would even think acting that way..well it is absurd!
Not even the most greedy bean counter would think of that being a good idea right now, look we took a test flight and now back to business..
PHX787 From Japan, joined Mar 2012, 5102 posts, RR: 14 Reply 16, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 25417 times:
Quoting sweair (Reply 16): He insinuated that Boeing would be happy to do a test flight and declare the plane safe. If they have learned something it is how fast the media spreads negativity and if they would even think acting that way..well it is absurd!
That wasn't what I was insinuating. I am suggesting that B make these test flights, see the input and output with the battery, possibly show that it was a Yuasa thing, and bada-boom bada-bing paperwork tests etc FAA lifts ED and we're all happy again. If the tests show irregularities with the batteries' performance and/or safety hazards, then appropriate action will be taken, will it not?
And a side note sir- your comment is exactly why 777ER issued a temporary ban on discussion about the battery problems. No need to get all attacky on me.
Back on topic:
I don't know if anyone seen this yet from NH's page, but it says that they're not going to fly the 787 again until at least the 30th of March.
Quote: ANA has revised all flight schedules on the assumption that operations of the Boeing 787 will not recommence before March 30th. Nonetheless, we will continue to cooperate with all parties to ensure and confirm the safety of this aircraft, so that 787 flights may recommence as soon as possible.
Due to the above situation, cancellations and schedule changes have been implemented on certain routes. Also, other routes will be subject to aircraft type changes, including some routes other than those originally scheduled for Boeing 787 operation. Operational information is available from the links below.
An update for operations commencing on March 31st will be provided in this space, as soon as further details are determined.
Includes a schedule:
https://www.ana.co.jp/topics/notice130116/index_list_e.html
ComeAndGo From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 950 posts, RR: 0 Reply 18, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 25295 times:
They're doing the test flights to pinpoint the problem. Is it vibrations affecting the batteries, is it humidity affecting the batteries or are the cells too large and creating temperature variations within the cells like some have claimed.
The roadway back to flight is a temporary fix with more spacing between individual cells and a more robust battery case.
The permanent fix is a new battery design that avoids any kind of thermal runaway.
Without knowing the root cause there's no solution.
cornutt From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 228 posts, RR: 1 Reply 21, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 12 hours ago) and read 24206 times:
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 17): That wasn't what I was insinuating. I am suggesting that B make these test flights, see the input and output with the battery, possibly show that it was a Yuasa thing, and bada-boom bada-bing paperwork tests etc FAA lifts ED and we're all happy again.
I don't think that's what anyone really wants to see accomplished with the test flights, though. If it were me, I'd want the test flight to show that the failure, or at least the type of plate damage seen in the CAT scans of the JAL battery, can be re-created under specific conditions. Once that's done, we have a defined chain of events for how the failure occurs, and from there, we can figure out what to do about it. Presumably there would then be design mods, and an additional test flight to verify the modified battery.
The FAA doesn't care whose "thing" it is. They only care about what the problem is and how is it going to be fixed. Even if it were shown to be a manufacturing problem confined to one batch of batteries (which I doubt at this point), the FAA would want to know what is being done to prevent it from happening again.
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 22, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 12 hours ago) and read 24094 times:
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 17): That wasn't what I was insinuating. I am suggesting that B make these test flights, see the input and output with the battery, possibly show that it was a Yuasa thing, and bada-boom bada-bing paperwork tests etc FAA lifts ED and we're all happy again. If the tests show irregularities with the batteries' performance and/or safety hazards, then appropriate action will be taken, will it not?
Not quite. Even if the batteries never fail again, the containment system has to be fixed as well.
DTW2HYD From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 195 posts, RR: 0 Reply 23, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 11 hours ago) and read 23914 times:
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 17): I am suggesting that B make these test flights, see the input and output with the battery, possibly show that it was a Yuasa thing, and bada-boom bada-bing paperwork tests etc FAA lifts ED and we're all happy again. If the tests show irregularities with the batteries' performance and/or safety hazards, then appropriate action will be taken, will it not?
I see few issues, No one is going to trust Boeing/FAA paper tests, not NTSB, not customers, not media, not public. NTSB already warned FAA about single cell testing assumption.
Second if Boeing design assumptions and written specs to Thales/Yuasa were wrong, it is difficult to pin on Yuasa. In a outsourced model Yuasa's responsibility is to live up to the written specs, not what Boeing thinks what a battery system should do. Obviously vendors/sub-vendors will do everything to address the issue, for PR reasons, not legal reasons.
AeroWesty From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 19257 posts, RR: 63 Reply 25, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 11 hours ago) and read 24379 times:
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 25):
So the NTSB/FAA aren't on board these flights? Hmm I do see some conflicts then.
If you read the link you posted upthread (which is repeated by other news outlets), it says the test flight carried "a crew of 13 pilots and testing personnel", without identifying which parties they represented.
The article also reminds us that since the flight was part of the ongoing investigations of the 787 battery events, Boeing could not release any further details.
kanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 2498 posts, RR: 21 Reply 26, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 11 hours ago) and read 24313 times:
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 25): So the NTSB/FAA aren't on board these flights? Hmm I do see some conflicts then.
Let's not find problems and let them test. That comment is the type that starts the trolls.
Consider that Boeing, the FAA, and NSTB spend days/weeks designing a test series and instrumenting the plane, when everyone agrees, they run the test. It takes another week to review all the data. Once reviewed, they develop the second series and the cycle goes on. The thing is not all agencies need to be on the plane if they've agreed to the test protocols.
There probably is a Designated Representative (DR) on board, and from personal experience they are tougher than the agency they represent.
7BOEING7 From United States of America, joined Oct 2012, 580 posts, RR: 3 Reply 27, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 11 hours ago) and read 24806 times:
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 25): So the NTSB/FAA aren't on board these flights? Hmm I do see some conflicts then.
I'm guessing whatever Boeing is doing now is just "data collection". If and when there is a certification flight the FAA will more than likely be onboard. If the NTSB were to fly, which I doubt, it would be political.
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 28, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 11 hours ago) and read 24777 times:
Quoting PHX787 (Reply 25): So the NTSB/FAA aren't on board these flights? Hmm I do see some conflicts then.
It would depend what stage Beoing is at. If they are saying "See it works", then I would expect FAA on board, if they doing a "We wonder if this works", then no need for FAA.
rheinwaldner From Switzerland, joined Jan 2008, 2073 posts, RR: 6 Reply 29, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 9 hours ago) and read 24351 times:
Quoting sweair (Reply 3): Shorts in the battery they say, does that not point to a manufactoring glitch?
No, not only, sadly, it could also have been charged too much, discharged too much or discharged with too much current to have a short. Or there was a small problem, that would be easily switched off normally, raised to a big problem, because it went undetected too long because of the large format cells. You see the problem is not one-dimensional.
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 30, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 8 hours ago) and read 24181 times:
Quoting 2175301 (Reply 12): 3) To prevent a run-away cell from overheating the next cell about a 1/16" - 1/8" layer of insulating ceramic (likely the same material as the Space Shuttle Tiles as it is readily available) will be placed between the cells.
4) The containment box will become more robust.
This press story appears very much to confirm your 'diagnosis,' 2175301:-
"The Boeing 787 Dreamliner might get some design changes especially to its infamous batteries to keep fire risk at a minimum. This is temporary solution to keep the plane flying while a permanent solution to the technical problems is in the works.
"The lithium ion batteries that seem to be the cause of the Dreamliner’s problems might be modified with separation between the batteries cells increased."
---------------------
"Boeing hopes to solve the matter as soon as possible, and have the new batteries ready to be shipped out by the end of February. If they manage this the most optimistic scenario should mean that all passenger flights should be opened sometime in March."
francoflier From France, joined Oct 2001, 3251 posts, RR: 10 Reply 31, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day 6 hours ago) and read 23779 times:
Quoting 2175301 (Reply 12): 3) To prevent a run-away cell from overheating the next cell about a 1/16" - 1/8" layer of insulating ceramic (likely the same material as the Space Shuttle Tiles as it is readily available) will be placed between the cells.
I think that would worsen the case...
If a cell overheats, then this shield would prevent the excess temperature to be spread out to the rest of the battery and would accelerate the thermal runaway for that cell. The result would be almost as catastrophic as before for the battery.
The solution would probably be to space them more to help air circulation around them to help them keep cool. air would also act as thermal insulation between cells.
Or maybe wrap each individual cell in a thermally conducting material and connect them to a heatsink. Maybe put a fan in there somewhere.
I think this is, in essence what one of these professors was advocating, wasn't it?
Looks like I picked the wrong week to quit posting...
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 10569 posts, RR: 21 Reply 32, posted (4 months 1 week 1 day ago) and read 23096 times:
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 30): "The Boeing 787 Dreamliner might get some design changes especially to its infamous batteries to keep fire risk at a minimum. This is temporary solution to keep the plane flying while a permanent solution to the technical problems is in the works.
"The lithium ion batteries that seem to be the cause of the Dreamliner’s problems might be modified with separation between the batteries cells increased."
Personally, I feel that while Boeing will want to use a temporary solution to get the planes flying as soon as possible, that won't be acceptable to the US and Japanese regulators nor the airlines. Yes, I know that temporary solutions have been used in the past, but I think the amount of risk and the amount of publicity this specific problem has created will make a temporary solution unacceptable.
AvWeek speaks to the difficulties to be faced even when an acceptable solution is found:
Quote:
Among the 50 grounded aircraft belonging to eight operators which, for example, will be modified first? Likewise, how will modifications be implemented on the growing fleet of undelivered 787s that continue to stack up at Everett, Wash., where new 787s are rolling off the line at the rate of five per month?
Questions also remain over which of these takes priority and what follow-on disruption the modification program may cause to the already slowing process of change incorporation at the Everett Modification Center (EMC). The 100th 787 is on the assembly line, 50 have been delivered and the balance is made up of the original six development aircraft, 25 earlier production aircraft undergoing or awaiting modification in the EMC and more recently built aircraft awaiting delivery.
Even the basic suggestion of strengthening the cell walls and improving the containment will require two sets of such improved batteries and containment structures for each of the 50 grounded aircraft plus those already awaiting delivery due to the grounding. One clearly can't snap ones fingers and have 100+ sets manufactured overnight so even a temporary solution will be a challenge.
alfablue From Spain, joined Jan 2013, 42 posts, RR: 11 Reply 33, posted (4 months 1 week 23 hours ago) and read 22754 times:
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 30): "Boeing hopes to solve the matter as soon as possible, and have the new batteries ready to be shipped out by the end of February. If they manage this the most optimistic scenario should mean that all passenger flights should be opened sometime in March."
7 times official delayed and grounded by the authorities does not give me confidence in Boeings hopes - it looks (to me) that the press statements are ouf of touch with engineering.
Coming back to the 787 problems. It looks that the authorities (and more or equally important) the insurance companies getting cold feet with that new battery technology. How can Boeing or the FAA justify maintaining those special conditions and lets remember other manufacturers pulled them out of their designs (Cessna and Gulfstream). The insurers will ask for a premium based on recent events compared to existing technology (especially after other abandoned that technology due to safety concerns).
Gulfstream decided to switch battery types barely a year before the G650's final FAA certification in September 2012, and Cessna abandoned the lithium-ion batteries on the nascent CJ4 fleet less than two years after first delivery.
Humanitarian From United States of America, joined Jan 2012, 83 posts, RR: 0 Reply 34, posted (4 months 1 week 19 hours ago) and read 22189 times:
From what I am reading here and elsewhere is that any modifications may be done within the exisiting footprint of the battery boxes. The only change would be in exchanging the unmodified batteries with newly modified ones. I suspect any other 'possible' airframe modifications would be minor and done fairly quickly if even needed.
justloveplanes From United States of America, joined Jul 2004, 876 posts, RR: 1 Reply 36, posted (4 months 1 week 18 hours ago) and read 21804 times:
Maybe just separating the 8 cells far enough apart in an upgraded box that contains splashing electrolyte is enough. Essentially 8 parallel, individually housed packs = each pack = one cell. Even 2 independent thermal runaways on the pack of 8 would perhaps be tolerable in terms of current and voltage available to start the APU? Would need low resistance connections to the bus, but otherwise, don't think the certification would be that great for this. This has probably been discussed already, but maybe worth repeating.
ServantLeader From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 37, posted (4 months 1 week 17 hours ago) and read 21716 times:
Quoting alfablue (Reply 33): Coming back to the 787 problems. It looks that the authorities (and more or equally important) the insurance companies getting cold feet with that new battery technology
Right, it is cascading intangibles like this that will make it difficult for this to be resolved quickly and cleanly. The engineering work that should have been done prior to certification will get done over the next weeks / months, but due to the inherent unkowns of Li-ion batteries as being utilized on the 787, engineering "fixes" may not be enough to statisfy certain key stakeholders.
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 10569 posts, RR: 21 Reply 38, posted (4 months 1 week 17 hours ago) and read 21609 times:
Quoting Humanitarian (Reply 34): From what I am reading here and elsewhere is that any modifications may be done within the exisiting footprint of the battery boxes.
I'm sure that's the hope, but I don't see a lot of excess room:
brilondon From Canada, joined Aug 2005, 3274 posts, RR: 1 Reply 40, posted (4 months 1 week 16 hours ago) and read 21380 times:
Quoting Aesma (Reply 7): Quoting NAV20 (Reply 5):
The firm in general charge of the design of the 787's electrical systems is the French company, Thales.
I don't think that's true. At least when we were talking about the ZA002 incident, it was Zodiac that was involved. Another French company.
and to pursue that angle will get the thread shut down.. even in jest...
Thales designed the battery system, Zodiac the distribution system.. and there are others designing other parts of the electrical systems.. This isn't a plane where all similar components come from just one supplier.
A 'worldwide conspiracy' by the look of it.........
"Even the first couple of tiers of the supply chain for these electrical systems are intricate.
"Thales of France supplies the 787 power conversion system, with subcontracts to GS Yuasa of Japan for the main batteries; Securaplane Technologies of Tucson, Ariz., for the battery charger system; and Kanto Aircraft Instrument of Japan for the charge monitoring system.
"Thales said all its systems have been certified by “very robust” processes.
“Thales is working very closely with Boeing in coordination with the investigative and regulatory authorities to understand the events and resolve the (battery) issue,” it said in a statement.
"The aerospace systems unit of United Technologies supplies many of the rest of the 787 electrical systems, but it also subcontracts with multiple companies.
"Nabtesco of Japan supplies the high-voltage power distributor. ECE Zodiac of France makes the power distribution panels.
"United Technologies supplies two power control modules that plug into the ECE power panel motherboard."
airplanecrazy From United States of America, joined May 2006, 38 posts, RR: 0 Reply 43, posted (4 months 1 week 14 hours ago) and read 21243 times:
I heard on CBS news that "the damage to the Japan Airlines 787 was so severe the tail could have fallen off had the fire occured in flight." I found this related article:
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 44, posted (4 months 1 week 14 hours ago) and read 21153 times:
Looks like Boeing aren't planning any more test flights for now:-
"Boeing said Monday's flight included two pilots and 11 flight test personnel. The test plane includes special equipment that lets it track the conditions of its two big lithium-ion batteries during the flight. It's one of Boeing's fleet of six 787 test planes that were used for flight testing before the plane went into full production.
------------------------
"Boeing said it will be analyzing data from the flight in the days ahead. It said the data is part of the investigations into the battery incidents, so it wouldn't release any details about what it found either on Monday's flight or on the earlier one conducted Saturday."
14ccKemiskt From Sweden, joined Nov 2010, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 45, posted (4 months 1 week 14 hours ago) and read 21074 times:
Quoting Revelation (Reply 32): Personally, I feel that while Boeing will want to use a temporary solution to get the planes flying as soon as possible, that won't be acceptable to the US and Japanese regulators nor the airlines. Yes, I know that temporary solutions have been used in the past, but I think the amount of risk and the amount of publicity this specific problem has created will make a temporary solution unacceptable.
Agreed!
My analysis of the events that lead to the current situation is as follows:
• Boeing wants to put in all new technology advances there is at the same time into the same all new design.
• As all the new techs are put together in a plane, more and more issues arise which makes the project more and more late, more embarrassing and increasingly complex to manage.
• Management becomes highly stressed and presses the technicians that along with the FAA keeps most of their focus on what's not working at all. In the hurry and under that pressure they fail to think about the other parts of the design that is not malfunctioning at the moment but which would normally attain extra focus.
• The project barely manages to keep its head above water to get certified, but with an abnormal amount of exceptions having to be made. Since the battery design issue went past undetected, chances are higher than normal that there are more problems of the same dignity luring under the surface.
To me it is rather obvious that the both the design and the certification processes were flawed. If Boeing and the FAA don't go through both of them (and not only the battery issues) now during this grounding period, chances are in my opinion high that new serious problems arises. Getting the planes back in the air a.s.a.p. must never be top priority here. Another grounding of the 787 might be unbearable.
ual747-600 From United States of America, joined Sep 1999, 540 posts, RR: 0 Reply 46, posted (4 months 1 week 14 hours ago) and read 21073 times:
Quoting airplanecrazy (Reply 43): I heard on CBS news that "the damage to the Japan Airlines 787 was so severe the tail could have fallen off had the fire occured in flight." I found this related article:
airplanecrazy From United States of America, joined May 2006, 38 posts, RR: 0 Reply 47, posted (4 months 1 week 14 hours ago) and read 21055 times:
Quoting ual747-600 (Reply 46): I was just wondering if this news story had been verified. Was the JAL 787 that had the fire on board flown back to Japan or is it still in Boston?
I first heard the story on the CBS Radio News World News Roundup on my drive home tonight, so I thought it came from a credible source. I am having trouble finding any good substantiation of the claim, however, on any other reputable web site. In fact, it is not even showing up as a story on cbs.com. Furthermore, Sharyl Attkisson (supposedly the original reporter of this information) isn't mentioning it on her twitter site.
"NTSB investigators found only minor damage to electronics bay on JAL Boeing 787, following Jan 7 battery fire."
Since I don't imagine that it's possible to have minor damage to the EE bay, which is where the battery lives, but yet have "significant" structural damage elsewhere, I'm going to say that the CBS news report is simply incorrect.
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 49, posted (4 months 1 week 13 hours ago) and read 20971 times:
Quoting airplanecrazy (Reply 43): I heard on CBS news that "the damage to the Japan Airlines 787 was so severe the tail could have fallen off had the fire occured in flight." I found this related article:
Is this true? News reports from sources have been known to be wrong before, especially when a claim this dramatic is made.
airplanecrazy From United States of America, joined May 2006, 38 posts, RR: 0 Reply 50, posted (4 months 1 week 13 hours ago) and read 20906 times:
Quoting PITingres (Reply 48): "NTSB investigators found only minor damage to electronics bay on JAL Boeing 787, following Jan 7 battery fire."Since I don't imagine that it's possible to have minor damage to the EE bay, which is where the battery lives, but yet have "significant" structural damage elsewhere, I'm going to say that the KIRO report is simply incorrect.
Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 49): Quoting airplanecrazy (Reply 43):I heard on CBS news that "the damage to the Japan Airlines 787 was so severe the tail could have fallen off had the fire occured in flight." I found this related article:Is this true? News reports from sources have been known to be wrong before, especially when a claim this dramatic is made.
All,
Apologies for posting what must have been some kind of fabrication. Again, I did hear it on CBS Radio News and I found another web site with the same claims, so I did post in good faith. The information was also twittered by Charlie Kaye Executive Producer for Radio, CBS News, but it now appears that he has deleted the post.
blrsea From India, joined May 2005, 1228 posts, RR: 3 Reply 51, posted (4 months 1 week 13 hours ago) and read 20894 times:
I hope Boeing was able to repro the runaway either in lab or on the test flights or both. That will give more confidence in the proposed solution.
But I also agree that in some systems, it may not be able to repro the issue, and one can only consider all possible scenarios and try to develop solutions to mitigate them.
cornutt From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 228 posts, RR: 1 Reply 52, posted (4 months 1 week 13 hours ago) and read 21034 times:
Quoting airplanecrazy (Reply 47):
I do not know the current location of the JAL 787 in question.
It's still in Boston. And yeah, that bit about the tail falling off because of the battery is really far-fetched, especially considering that electronics bay in question is in the mid-fuselage area. There would be obvious damage to the plane if that were true. The photos of the airplane that I've seen show no damage that is visible from the exterior.
Aesma From France, joined Nov 2009, 4934 posts, RR: 9 Reply 53, posted (4 months 1 week 13 hours ago) and read 20908 times:
They speculate on what would have happened if the battery had been left to burn with the plane flying. Not that their conclusion is that much better in light of this.
New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
UALWN From Andorra, joined Jun 2009, 2349 posts, RR: 2 Reply 54, posted (4 months 1 week 12 hours ago) and read 20830 times:
Quoting PITingres (Reply 48): Since I don't imagine that it's possible to have minor damage to the EE bay, which is where the battery lives, but yet have "significant" structural damage elsewhere.
Well, the BFD put out the fire, so there could have been more damage had the fire occurred mid flight. Still, having the tail fall off seems like a wild exaggeration.
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 55, posted (4 months 1 week 12 hours ago) and read 20841 times:
Quoting UALWN (Reply 54): Well, the BFD put out the fire, so there could have been more damage had the fire occurred mid flight. Still, having the tail fall off seems like a wild exaggeration.
Which is one question that has never been answered. To what extent did fire breach the containment? Not at all? A little? Only when the fire brigage opened the containment?
XT6Wagon From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 3150 posts, RR: 4 Reply 56, posted (4 months 1 week 12 hours ago) and read 20804 times:
Quoting UALWN (Reply 54): Well, the BFD put out the fire, so there could have been more damage had the fire occurred mid flight. Still, having the tail fall off seems like a wild exaggeration.
um, you can't put out this fire. When people talk about what to use on a lithium ion battery to "put it out" what they are really talking about is containing the heat output till it burns itself out. The containment structure has proven to work fine in both cases at preventing damage to nearby components. The boston fire clearly shows damage to the containment structure from being dropped from the plane by the fire department. We also have reports that they damaged the plane in their attempts to remove the battery. While I appreciate their training and desire to put out the fire, in this case I feel we would have been far ahead if they had left it alone and just monitored it such that they could suffocated any secondary fires if containment truely failed.
PITingres From United States of America, joined Dec 2007, 966 posts, RR: 12 Reply 57, posted (4 months 1 week 11 hours ago) and read 20694 times:
Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 55): Which is one question that has never been answered. To what extent did fire breach the containment? Not at all? A little? Only when the fire brigage opened the containment?
Agreed that I'm not sure we know that in detail. There was apparently some open flame in the EE bay but given the lack of exterior paint damage on the battery box, and the limited scorching in the bay itself, my personal guess is that the open flames were leaked electrolyte flaring off. I'm also assuming, perhaps rashly, that the main difference between the JAL and ANA events was that the ANA battery went off in-flight, so that there was better venting of the EE bay in the ANA case; perhaps that kept the flammables concentration low enough to prevent open flame, and everything I've read says that there was no sign of overt flame in the ANA case.
There were reports of "2 foot flames" in the JAL ee bay, but assuming those reports were valid, flames that size couldn't have lasted very long since fire fighters were able to go in and get the battery out. Also, the damage photos aren't consistent (IMHO) with sustained extensive flame. I'm thinking that any such flames were short-lived flare-offs.
packsonflight From Iceland, joined Jan 2010, 328 posts, RR: 0 Reply 58, posted (4 months 1 week 11 hours ago) and read 20784 times:
Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 56): um, you can't put out this fire. When people talk about what to use on a lithium ion battery to "put it out" what they are really talking about is containing the heat output till it burns itself out. The containment structure has proven to work fine in both cases at preventing damage to nearby
Looks like that the NTSB is not agreeing with you. According too the NTSB statement from 14. of January the BFD contained the fire but not the containment structure surrounding the battery.
"The airport emergency response group documented the airport rescue and firefighting efforts to extinguish the fire, which included interviews with first responders. Fire and rescue personnel were able to contain the fire using a clean agent (Halotron)"
There is no proof so far that the containment system would have worked because it was never put to the test, courtesy of the BFD who stepped in.
XT6Wagon From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 3150 posts, RR: 4 Reply 59, posted (4 months 1 week 11 hours ago) and read 20741 times:
Quoting PITingres (Reply 57): my personal guess is that the open flames were leaked electrolyte flaring off
The connectors that go through the containment vessel appear to have been melted, it might be that was producing the visible flames. If so it could be visually impressive, bad to breathe, but no threat to the plane as that quanity of burning plastic wouldn't produce much heat at all.
woodsboy From United States of America, joined Mar 2000, 1015 posts, RR: 3 Reply 60, posted (4 months 1 week 7 hours ago) and read 20254 times:
Why not do what Gulfstream and Cessna did and just ditch this LiOn battery all together and go with what they use in say, the 777. Does it make sense to try and make the somewhat inherent "danger" of a LiOn less of a threat or just install a battery that we know to be safe? At least in the remaining undelivered and unbuilt 850 planes, this should not be as big of a deal as it is to tear out equipment from existing planes.
I haven't participated much in this discussion since the early threads - decided to take a back seat and let things develop a bit more first.
The image quoted above is very interesting to me - all the discussion (that I have seen) thus far has been centered around the idea that Boeing used 8 (arguably) unconventionally large lithium cells. But the picture looks (to me) like the "bricks" are comprised of more conventional sized cells (groups of six in parallel per brick).
It also looks like they could free up some space inside the existing enclosure if they move the circuitry (I assume the monitoring equipment) external to the enclosure. I'm not sure if they consider the circuitry to be a fire risk, though?
nm2582 From United States of America, joined Jun 2007, 24 posts, RR: 0 Reply 62, posted (4 months 1 week 7 hours ago) and read 20231 times:
It would be interesting to study the design options to make this battery modular - each "brick" being isolated in it's own flame/electrolyte leakage proof enclosure, each individually temperature monitored and fused. A single failing brick could not induce a thermal runaway in neighboring bricks; preventing the failure from spreading would reduce the total amount of heat/electrolyte/flame released into the aircraft (up to 7/8 reduction in a single brick failure, worst case scenario).
It might also have economic advantages - if individual bricks do fail from time to time, then an individual brick could be swapped in instead of replacing the entire battery. The charging/monitoring equipment would have to be flawless, though..
boacvc10 From United States of America, joined Jul 2006, 520 posts, RR: 0 Reply 63, posted (4 months 1 week 5 hours ago) and read 20110 times:
Quoting airplanecrazy (Reply 43):
I heard on CBS news that "the damage to the Japan Airlines 787 was so severe the tail could have fallen off had the fire occured in flight." I found this related article:
During the US incident of a B787 landing at MSY Incident United B788 on 12/4/2012, an a.net poster made a comment that felt odd at that time, and I paraphrase here: " ... two more
minutes and it would have been a serious problem"
Note, at that time, none of the battery related issues had come to light, and there were, AFAIK some discussion as to whether the paraphrased statement above was sensationalist or not.
In light of what we know now, lithium battery film separators and all, does that comment hold any water ? Was it a wholly different set of problems, and if so, have they also been included in this investigation ?
ZKCIF From Lithuania, joined Oct 2010, 228 posts, RR: 0 Reply 64, posted (4 months 1 week 5 hours ago) and read 20044 times:
Quoting woodsboy (Reply 60): Why not do what Gulfstream and Cessna did and just ditch this LiOn battery all together and go with what they use in say, the 777. Does it make sense to try and make the somewhat inherent "danger" of a LiOn less of a threat or just install a battery that we know to be safe?
As far as I understand, the two issues are: lack of space and need to develop a new containment system. Hence, it involves some redesign in any case.
Cheers
rheinwaldner From Switzerland, joined Jan 2008, 2073 posts, RR: 6 Reply 65, posted (4 months 1 week 4 hours ago) and read 19801 times:
Quoting justloveplanes (Reply 36): Essentially 8 parallel, individually housed packs = each pack = one cell.
Parallel? Connecting single cells parallely does not give the require voltage.
You could however build 8 packs, where each consists of 8 cells serially, that could be connected parallely. That would result in 64 cells totally.
The space for proper heat propagation suppression would still not be there however.
Quoting nm2582 (Reply 61): But the picture looks (to me) like the "bricks" are comprised of more conventional sized cells (groups of six in parallel per brick).
No, this image must be misleading. Because cells with 70Ah or more are not sized conventionally (the capacity indicates 1:1 the cell size). Conventional cells might have up to 10Ah. So the 787 cells are really whoppers. The technology is new, error prone and by far not as proved as the small cells, that are shipped by the millions e.g. from Apple alone.
Seat55A From New Zealand, joined Jan 2013, 31 posts, RR: 0 Reply 66, posted (4 months 1 week 3 hours ago) and read 19648 times:
Quoting nm2582 (Reply 61): But the picture looks (to me) like the "bricks" are comprised of more conventional sized cells (groups of six in parallel per brick).
The electrodes are long and are folded into an accordion shape.
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 67, posted (4 months 1 week 2 hours ago) and read 19510 times:
Quoting Seat55A (Reply 66): The electrodes are long and are folded into an accordion shape.
Many thanks for that information, Seat55A - and the site with illustrations.
That settles it for me. In my business days I'd have 'rocketed' any clerk who even folded a letter that carelessly.......
This story seems to add yet another dimension to the problem:-
"Aviation safety investigators are examining whether the formation of microscopic structures known as dendrites inside the Boeing Co. BA -0.91%787's lithium-ion batteries played a role in twin incidents that prompted the fleet to be grounded nearly a month ago.
"The new information from the National Transportation Safety Board offers a glimpse into what could become an important line of inquiry for the investigation into a Jan. 7 battery fire aboard a Japan Airlines Co. 9201.TO +3.53%787 Dreamliner parked in Boston.
"Investigators have so far said they know that fire was triggered by short circuits, but haven't been able to determine the original cause of the incident, or of another one in which an overheating battery forced an All Nippon Airways Co. 9202.TO -0.52%787 in Japan to make an emergency landing. Japanese investigators have said the battery in that ANA incident also experienced an internal short-circuit and a "thermal runaway."
"Dendrites are tiny deposits of lithium resembling microscopic whiskers that can grow within the cells of a battery, potentially causing short circuits and significant heat and even fire. They are often a byproduct of rapid or uneven charging of lithium-ion batteries, according to experts."
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 68, posted (4 months 1 week 2 hours ago) and read 19482 times:
PS quote above is from the WSJ (John Ostrower) - the link won't post. Nor could I add my final comment - that I hope Boeing somehow 'create' the needed extra space and revert to 'proven' batteries ASAP......
[Edited 2013-02-12 04:18:56]
"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
rcair1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2009, 950 posts, RR: 25 Reply 69, posted (4 months 1 week ago) and read 18994 times:
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Quoting nm2582 (Reply 62): It would be interesting to study the design options to make this battery modular - each "brick" being isolated in it's own flame/electrolyte leakage proof enclosure, each individually temperature monitored and fused.
What you are doing here is reducing fuel load. Nothing about this design would lower the probability of a cell going into runaway - but it would reduce the fuel load. That means the situation where you have a runaway and fire in a battery still exists and the containment idea must be fulfilled and certified. It also means significant connections external to each pack connecting it to the others. As rheinwaldner noted, you would connect them in series, not parallel, to achieve design voltage.
Note - individual cell monitoring is not helpful except as a indicator. Once the cell goes into thermal runaway- there is nothing you can do externally but isolate it and hang on.
Also - keep in mind that in a series connection - each wire between each cell will carry full load current - so they are not 1/8 the size - hmm - maybe. Each one would need to be interuptable. I need to think about that - it is the obvious answer, but I probably better spend some time with circuit models for LiIon batteries. Been too many years since I've done this kind of design work.
Since containment of a battery fire is still a requirement, it is not clear to me that the advantages of 1/8 the fuel load will offset the complexity of a system like this. But - I'm quite sure it is under investigation.
It will be interesting to see what they come up with.
Quoting nm2582 (Reply 62): t might also have economic advantages - if individual bricks do fail from time to time,
I think there may be some serious matching problems. When we replace batteries in our fire engines - we replace the set - whether series or paralleled. (some have 3 parallel, some 2 sets of 2 in series for 24V). If we don't, we tend to destroy the new battery due to the imbalanced capacity on the old ones. More of a problem on the parallel systems than series. We do use 'smart' charges that monitor each cell individually.
The point is that if a 'brick' or 'cell' goes - I'm thinking you would not want to swap out a new one with a bunch of old ones.
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 67): "Dendrites are tiny deposits of lithium resembling microscopic whiskers that can grow within the cells of a battery, potentially causing short circuits and significant heat and even fire. They are often a byproduct of rapid or uneven charging of lithium-ion batteries, according to experts."
Dendrites are a classic failure mode in NiCads as well - though they do not lead to runaway, they lead to lowered capacity.
This is looking more and more to be a flaw in the battery itself (design/manf), than the system.
rheinwaldner From Switzerland, joined Jan 2008, 2073 posts, RR: 6 Reply 70, posted (4 months 1 week ago) and read 18982 times:
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 67): They are often a byproduct of rapid or uneven charging of lithium-ion batteries, according to experts."
For the root cause analysis you have to ask "why" until there is no further reason. So continueing that for this statment leads to the following upstream reasons:
- The former (the "rapid" aspect) can mean, that the charger is flawed (wrongly dimensioned). Rapid discharging would mean, that the load can exceed the current-capacity (the C-constant) of the battery. Which again can mean that the battery has not a large enough C-rate - or - that the battery power consumers can reach a state, where they draw too much current.
- The later (the "uneven" aspect) can mean, that the balancer is not up to the task. Or the large cells behave not uniformally internally.
Just here are five potential root causes. Three lay in the surrounding design of the battery system (charger supplies too much current, bug in the battery consumers or balancing fails). And two lay within the battery itself (C-rate too small or cells are too large).
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 71, posted (4 months 6 days 23 hours ago) and read 18882 times:
Quoting boacvc10 (Reply 63): During the US incident of a B787 landing at MSY (Incident United B788 on 12/4/2012), an a.net poster made a comment that felt odd at that time, and I paraphrase here: " ... two more minutes and it would have been a serious problem"
I believe you are confusing the comments made by F9animal (based on his speaking with "higher ups at Boeing") about the incident with ZA002 at Laredo.
As I recall, the UA plane experienced the failure of one of the six generators which caused some minor load-shedding (IFE system reboots and cabin lights flickering) as the system switched over to the other good generators.
7BOEING7 From United States of America, joined Oct 2012, 580 posts, RR: 3 Reply 72, posted (4 months 6 days 23 hours ago) and read 18783 times:
Quoting woodsboy (Reply 60): Why not do what Gulfstream and Cessna did and just ditch this LiOn battery all together and go with what they use in say, the 777.
Cessna "ditched" the LIon batteries to get their airplanes back in the air, however, they still plan to return to LIon in the future.
kanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 2498 posts, RR: 21 Reply 74, posted (4 months 6 days 21 hours ago) and read 18428 times:
regarding the Boston Fire Dept. they may have been confused as to the make up of the battery and what extinguishing techniques would work and not feed the fire. (see RCAIR1's comments on earlier threads).
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 75, posted (4 months 6 days 21 hours ago) and read 18411 times:
Quoting kanban (Reply 74): regarding the Boston Fire Dept. they may have been confused as to the make up of the battery and what extinguishing techniques would work and not feed the fire.
They were trained on how to respond to emergencies with the 787, so how to respond to a battery fire may have been part of that training.
Aquila3 From Italy, joined Nov 2010, 218 posts, RR: 0 Reply 76, posted (4 months 6 days 21 hours ago) and read 18332 times:
Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 56): The boston fire clearly shows damage to the containment structure from being dropped from the plane by the fire department. We also have reports that they damaged the plane in their attempts to remove the battery. While I appreciate their training and desire to put out the fire, in this case I feel we would have been far ahead if they had left it alone and just monitored it such that they could suffocated any secondary fires if containment truely failed.
Quoting kanban (Reply 74): regarding the Boston Fire Dept. they may have been confused as to the make up of the battery and what extinguishing techniques would work and not feed the fire. (see RCAIR1's comments on earlier threads).
So it might seem that the whole problem could be solved issuing a retrainig directive for Fire Depts. Not any more a Boeng problem.
Great.
chi vola vale chi vale vola chi non vola è un vile
justloveplanes From United States of America, joined Jul 2004, 876 posts, RR: 1 Reply 77, posted (4 months 6 days 20 hours ago) and read 18473 times:
Quoting rcair1 (Reply 69): Since containment of a battery fire is still a requirement, it is not clear to me that the advantages of 1/8 the fuel load will offset the complexity of a system like this. But - I'm quite sure it is under investigation.
The individual containment per cell can help prevent heat induced thermal runaway from one cell to the next (assuming proper thermal isolation , i.e. aerogel, between cells and adequate heat transfer via Fins or Fans to the environment for a failed cell). So the effect of an incident in terms of thermals for a bad cell is reduced by 7/8 or about 86%. Re connections, the applications consist of common/ordinary voltage and current levels to start and APU so cabling and shielding should be a routine design matter.
Quoting rcair1 (Reply 69): As rheinwaldner noted, you would connect them in series, not parallel, to achieve design voltage.
This is a more vexing problem, as one cell will probably lose the battery capacity for the APU duty.
However, at this point, you are now principally looking at a system availability issue and not (or greatly mitigated to the point of acceptability) a thermal or fire threat. This could be the difference to get the Plane back in the air while something like a parallel voltage pack architecture is designed (say maybe 3 packs of (smaller) 8 cells each - 1 failure doesn't affect any other cells, no drop in voltage, 1/3 Amp hours loss, which might still work).
XT6Wagon From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 3150 posts, RR: 4 Reply 78, posted (4 months 6 days 20 hours ago) and read 18394 times:
Quoting Aquila3 (Reply 76): So it might seem that the whole problem could be solved issuing a retrainig directive for Fire Depts. Not any more a Boeng problem.
With or without the grounding, we would be seeing the same investigation into preventing more fires from the battery. My statements should be in no way taken to mean that there is no problem. I think most reasonable people would like the Fire Departments to be better trained on this issue regardless of the fix. If your efforts are ineffective and cause additional damage to a 150M plane....
That said, hindsight is 20/20, and the batteries were likely one tiny section in a very large training package. The training was likely focused on traditional important things like the changes to fuselage and what it means for piercing.
kanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 2498 posts, RR: 21 Reply 79, posted (4 months 6 days 18 hours ago) and read 17937 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 75): They were trained on how to respond to emergencies with the 787, so how to respond to a battery fire may have been part of that training.
Remember our initial confusion back about thread 3.. the extinguishing of lithium type batteries is substantially different for each formulation.. and the guys who showed up may have been thinking along the lines of laptop batteries where let them burn out is preferred.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 80, posted (4 months 6 days 16 hours ago) and read 17642 times:
Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 78): With or without the grounding, we would be seeing the same investigation into preventing more fires from the battery. My statements should be in no way taken to mean that there is no problem. I think most reasonable people would like the Fire Departments to be better trained on this issue regardless of the fix. If your efforts are ineffective and cause additional damage to a 150M plane....
Were did you get the information that the action of the fire department on Boston did more damage to the plane, rather than saving the plane from more damage?
DTW2HYD From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 195 posts, RR: 0 Reply 81, posted (4 months 6 days 15 hours ago) and read 17387 times:
Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 78): think most reasonable people would like the Fire Departments to be better trained on this issue regardless of the fix. If your efforts are ineffective and cause additional damage to a 150M plane....
This is the first fire incident for this model in the world. One cannot blame Fire Department for not doing a perfect job for a new model started service just 3+ weeks earlier. Doesn't matter it is $150 Million or $500 Million, not worth putting even a single firefighter's life in risk.
XT6Wagon From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 3150 posts, RR: 4 Reply 82, posted (4 months 6 days 13 hours ago) and read 17057 times:
Quoting DTW2HYD (Reply 81): This is the first fire incident for this model in the world. One cannot blame Fire Department for not doing a perfect job for a new model started service just 3+ weeks earlier. Doesn't matter it is $150 Million or $500 Million, not worth putting even a single firefighter's life in risk.
I think I covered that. I know why their response wasn't "perfect", and I mentioned it.
going into the aircraft *ADDED* to the danger to the firefighters, as did the dropping of the battery from the aircraft.
strfyr51 From United States of America, joined Apr 2012, 488 posts, RR: 0 Reply 83, posted (4 months 6 days 12 hours ago) and read 16966 times:
The NTSB is investigating if the recent Boeing 787 battery issues could be linked to the formation of small build-ups, known as dendrites, inside lithium-ion batteries.
Dendrites have been suspected among the possible causes of two battery incidents that prompted the grounding of all 50 787s in operation.
Dendrites build up in lithium batteries, usually through uneven absorption and desorption of lithium ions, and can penetrate the inner membranes that divide the anode and cathode. The dendrites, which also can be triggered by foreign object particles on the surfaces, introduce a physical contact between the positive and negative electrodes, generating a short circuit.
strfyr51 From United States of America, joined Apr 2012, 488 posts, RR: 0 Reply 84, posted (4 months 6 days 12 hours ago) and read 16915 times:
if the Lithium Ion battery is so easily contaminated then it might not be the best battery for the 787 no matter HOW much power it generates. if the battery has to be assembled in a "Clean Room" and serviced in a "Clean Room" then the field servicing and care of the battery would neither be cost effective nor damage tolerant. which would limit the airplane to major maintenence hubs just in case the battery had a malfunction. Heck !!t This is a worse situation than obtaining and shipping chemical oxygen Generators
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 86, posted (4 months 6 days 12 hours ago) and read 16895 times:
Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 82): I think I covered that. I know why their response wasn't "perfect", and I mentioned it.
going into the aircraft *ADDED* to the danger to the firefighters, as did the dropping of the battery from the aircraft.
You said that the fire fighters damaged the plane or made the damage worse by touching the battery.
You imply that the removal of the battery was not necessary.
Please show on what information you build that, or did you personally check the plane?
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 87, posted (4 months 6 days 11 hours ago) and read 16801 times:
Quoting strfyr51 (Reply 84): if the Lithium Ion battery is so easily contaminated then it might not be the best battery for the 787 no matter HOW much power it generates.
NiCad batteries are also susceptible to dendrite build-up, though I'm not sure it causes short circuits. It does lead to loss of charging capacity.
Part147 From Ireland, joined Dec 2008, 366 posts, RR: 0 Reply 88, posted (4 months 6 days 6 hours ago) and read 16359 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 87): NiCad batteries are also susceptible to dendrite build-up, though I'm not sure it causes short circuits. It does lead to loss of charging capacity.
And despite such a physically microscopic issue - there is a big difference between loss of charging capacity in a NiCad battery and Thermal Runaway in a Lithium Ion battery.
I think it's fair to say that the damage tolerant design philosophy can only apply to the former.
If this this is indeed the smoking gun (and I hope it is something as simple as this) then I can see this technology having to mature further before un-grounding
It's better to ask a stupid question during training, rather than make a REALLY stupid mistake later on!
rheinwaldner From Switzerland, joined Jan 2008, 2073 posts, RR: 6 Reply 89, posted (4 months 6 days 5 hours ago) and read 16256 times:
Quoting strfyr51 (Reply 83): The NTSB is investigating if the recent Boeing 787 battery issues could be linked to the formation of small build-ups, known as dendrites, inside lithium-ion batteries.
This point is in the news everywhere, but we also have to read carefully.
Quote: She also said investigators haven't seen evidence of the crystals in other batteries they have examined.
So current examinations did not confirm that possibility so far.
Quote: The particles are among several areas under investigation that could have caused one of eight cells within the battery to short-circuit and burn, igniting adjacent cells, Nantel said.
So dendrites are just one of several areas, that is investigated.
Quote: The safety board is looking into whether a manufacturing defect, the charging process or the battery design could have led to the fire, Chairwoman Deborah Hersman said at a news conference Feb. 7.
So the whole rest that we also have discussed here (issues with manufacturing, surrounding systems or the battery design) are still not ruled out.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 90, posted (4 months 6 days ago) and read 15689 times:
Quoting Part147 (Reply 88): If this this is indeed the smoking gun (and I hope it is something as simple as this) then I can see this technology having to mature further before un-grounding.
If it is just dendrite buildup, if a non-invasive examination can be performed of the batteries, then that should allow the 787 to be returned to service with an inspection period to detect this dendrite buildup and remove the batteries for repair.
Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 89): So current examinations did not confirm that possibility so far.
Or perhaps it is not a common occurrence, which could explain why 787 batteries were not entering thermal runaway on a regular basis over the previous year.
rheinwaldner From Switzerland, joined Jan 2008, 2073 posts, RR: 6 Reply 91, posted (4 months 6 days ago) and read 15573 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 90): Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 89):
So current examinations did not confirm that possibility so far.
Or perhaps it is not a common occurrence
Correct, therefore I wrote that dendrites are not confirmed as root cause so far. They are certainly not ruled out either.
Quoting Stitch (Reply 90): If it is just dendrite buildup, if a non-invasive examination can be performed of the batteries, then that should allow the 787 to be returned to service with an inspection period to detect this dendrite buildup and remove the batteries for repair.
Not if they did happen because of that:
Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 70): Quoting NAV20 (Reply 67):
They are often a byproduct of rapid or uneven charging of lithium-ion batteries, according to experts."
In that case this applies:
Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 70): Just here are five potential root causes. Three lay in the surrounding design of the battery system (charger supplies too much current, bug in the battery consumers or balancing fails). And two lay within the battery itself (C-rate too small or cells are too large).
About the second last point I have to add that the C-rate typically also defines the charging current. So this would certainly be in scope.
sonomaflyer From United States of America, joined Apr 2010, 1178 posts, RR: 0 Reply 92, posted (4 months 6 days ago) and read 15581 times:
Quoting DTW2HYD (Reply 85): Dropping a battery to save 230+ souls makes sense even few get hurt on the ground.
If you are suggesting that the battery should be modified to be "ejected" in flight, that will never happen. Regulations forbid that kind of feature from being present on civilian aircraft.
The answer is fixing or modifying the existing battery system, not spending millions in designing an ejection system which would not be allowed in the first place.
DTW2HYD From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 195 posts, RR: 0 Reply 93, posted (4 months 5 days 23 hours ago) and read 15451 times:
Quoting sonomaflyer (Reply 92): If you are suggesting that the battery should be modified to be "ejected" in flight, that will never happen. Regulations forbid that kind of feature from being present on civilian aircraft.
The answer is fixing or modifying the existing battery system, not spending millions in designing an ejection system which would not be allowed in the first place.
When I replied firefighter's life is more valuable than not doing a perfect job, fellow member quoted my suggestion from one of the early threads. There were suggestions to keep couple of folks in electronics bay, install a webcam... all innovative ideas, none of those are feasible.
Point is it is all relative. BOS Fire Captain could have decided not to send anyone inside and let it burn out, because there is no one inside.
XT6Wagon From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 3150 posts, RR: 4 Reply 94, posted (4 months 5 days 20 hours ago) and read 15024 times:
Quoting DTW2HYD (Reply 93): Point is it is all relative. BOS Fire Captain could have decided not to send anyone inside and let it burn out, because there is no one inside.
Which is what I have been saying... Not sure why you are insisting that I am arguing in favor of them sending someone in?
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 86): You said that the fire fighters damaged the plane or made the damage worse by touching the battery.
You imply that the removal of the battery was not necessary.
Please show on what information you build that, or did you personally check the plane?
You can go over the last 8 threads, and other associated threads. Its been posted several times that there was damage to the surrounding area from a "axe", and the pictures of the enclosure shows clear damage from being dropped. Not sure how a fire could cause the enclosure to show clear signs of being dropped wiring connector side down from the distance you would expect if dropped out of a plane.
We also have clear evidence that the plane was in no danger thanks to the 2nd occurance which didn't burn up... and the battery self-extinquished prior to landing.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 95, posted (4 months 5 days 20 hours ago) and read 14894 times:
Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 94): ou can go over the last 8 threads, and other associated threads. Its been posted several times that there was damage to the surrounding area from a "axe", and the pictures of the enclosure shows clear damage from being dropped. Not sure how a fire could cause the enclosure to show clear signs of being dropped wiring connector side down from the distance you would expect if dropped out of a plane.
We also have clear evidence that the plane was in no danger thanks to the 2nd occurance which didn't burn up... and the battery self-extinquished prior to landing.
I do not know were you get your information.
Occurrence number one:
The battery burns on the JAL B 787 in Boston.
There is a fire in an air plane standing at a building with thousands of People inside.
You expect the fire department to let the fire in the plane continue and take the risk that the whole plane catches fire?
Occurrence number two:
In flight ANA the battery has a thermal runaway but fails to catch fire. How does that tell us if the fire in Boston should have been contained, what the fire department did, or not.
francoflier From France, joined Oct 2001, 3251 posts, RR: 10 Reply 96, posted (4 months 5 days 20 hours ago) and read 14841 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 90): if a non-invasive examination can be performed of the batteries,
I doubt it can. Those dendrites seem like microscopic formations deep inside the battery cell, near the electrodes.
You'd probably need to tear the battery cells apart to find them, which sounds more like an autopsy than an in-service check.
And it remains to be seen why those batteries would have formed dendrites with such an occurrence rate, if dendrites they were the cause, given the number of li-ion batteries already in service in cars and smaller devices.
Looks like I picked the wrong week to quit posting...
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 97, posted (4 months 5 days 15 hours ago) and read 14337 times:
Quoting francoflier (Reply 96): I doubt it can. Those dendrites seem like microscopic formations deep inside the battery cell, near the electrodes.
You'd probably need to tear the battery cells apart to find them, which sounds more like an autopsy than an in-service check.
cornutt From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 228 posts, RR: 1 Reply 98, posted (4 months 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 14284 times:
Quoting DTW2HYD (Reply 93): BOS Fire Captain could have decided not to send anyone inside and let it burn out, because there is no one inside.
I don't think they would have done that because the aircraft was parked at a gate. In that case, there's always the possibility of the fire spreading to adjacent aircraft, or the concourse building. Had the aircraft been parked at some far corner of the airport, it might have been different.
2175301 From United States of America, joined May 2007, 988 posts, RR: 0 Reply 99, posted (4 months 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 13886 times:
Quoting francoflier (Reply 96):
I doubt it can. Those dendrites seem like microscopic formations deep inside the battery cell, near the electrodes.
You'd probably need to tear the battery cells apart to find them, which sounds more like an autopsy than an in-service check.
In an investigation like this they typically will do a destructive examination of "good" batteries and at least 10X of the number of batteries that have failed.
Thus, I suspect that they have in fact disassembled at least 20 batteries that have decent service life on them looking for developing problems. While I have heard that they are looking for dendrites - I have not heard a thing about finding any.
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 100, posted (4 months 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 13839 times:
Quoting 2175301 (Reply 99): In an investigation like this they typically will do a destructive examination of "good" batteries and at least 10X of the number of batteries that have failed.
Thus, I suspect that they have in fact disassembled at least 20 batteries that have decent service life on them looking for developing problems. While I have heard that they are looking for dendrites - I have not heard a thing about finding any.
francoflier was commenting on Stitch's comment that they could inspect the batteries on the planes to see if they were still OK or needed replacing. I would doubt that is possible if you want to find dendritres.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 101, posted (4 months 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 13216 times:
Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 100): francoflier was commenting on Stitch's comment that they could inspect the batteries on the planes to see if they were still OK or needed replacing. I would doubt that is possible if you want to find dendritres.
On the plane would be nice, but I would expect that if a non-invasive procedure could be designed, it would be performed off the plane.
In other news, Scott Hamilton believes that Boeing can return the 787 to service within 3-4 months.
rcair1 From United States of America, joined Oct 2009, 950 posts, RR: 25 Reply 102, posted (4 months 4 days 19 hours ago) and read 12998 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW CUSTOMER SERVICE & SUPPORT
Quoting DTW2HYD (Reply 93): Point is it is all relative. BOS Fire Captain could have decided not to send anyone inside and let it burn out, because there is no one inside.
Yes - but it unlikely. Fire fighters are equipped and trained to enter areas of immediate life hazard - we do it carefully, but we do it. We do not limit it to only cases where 'lives are at risk'.
If I were IC on this fire - based on what I've heard and read, I would likely make entry and attempt to remove the battery/extinguish it.
As I said in a post many moons ago - it would take a lot of 'guts' for a fire crew to decide - let the containment handle it - even if they were sure it would. And -they do NOT have the detailed knowledge of the design to make that decision. You cannot learn to this level of detail on every craft. You learn "techniques" like - dealing with battery fires....
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 95): There is a fire in an air plane standing at a building with thousands of People inside.
You expect the fire department to let the fire in the plane continue and take the risk that the whole plane catches fire?
No
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 95): In flight ANA the battery has a thermal runaway but fails to catch fire.
I think the ANA battery did burn.
Quoting cornutt (Reply 98): I don't think they would have done that because the aircraft was parked at a gate. In that case, there's always the possibility of the fire spreading to adjacent aircraft, or the concourse building. Had the aircraft been parked at some far corner of the airport, it might have been different.
Yes. But likely if they felt it safe - they would have intervened.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 103, posted (4 months 4 days 18 hours ago) and read 12788 times:
Quoting rcair1 (Reply 102): I think the ANA battery did burn.
Some of the cells suffered damage from the heat generated by the runaway, but the JTSB did not officially classify it as a fire. So it sounds more like smoldering with heat then open flames.
AirlineCritic From Finland, joined Mar 2009, 623 posts, RR: 1 Reply 104, posted (4 months 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 12554 times:
I was thinking about the public relations impact of the 787 trouble today, as I was sitting next to this guy on a transcontinental flight across the US. He seemed reasonably educated and was maybe in his early 30s. At some point he was reading an article about the 787 troubles preventing JAL from opening some routes. He started chatting with me, and we talked about how funny it is that a small battery causes a major airliner to be grounded for a long time. So far so good...
Then he explained to me that the United Arab Emirates is the first airline to use the new 787 jet. He had been on a flight somewhere, and the captain had told that the new 787 jet is next to them. He explained how the plane was at least four times as large as the one they were on, and had two passenger decks. Uh oh... the A380 effect.
So much for the accuracy of public's view about aviation matters and aircraft models. The only thing that matters is size, and the only thing that they remember is that huge plane. If the press talks about some new aircraft, it must be that plane.
ServantLeader From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 105, posted (4 months 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 12375 times:
Quoting AirlineCritic (Reply 104): I was thinking about the public relations impact of the 787 trouble today
The 787 has been getting bad press since production delays began in 2008 -- that's a 5 year run. The only reason McNerney still has a job is that he doesn't have the guts to fire himself.
2175301 From United States of America, joined May 2007, 988 posts, RR: 0 Reply 106, posted (4 months 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 12350 times:
Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 105):
The 787 has been getting bad press since production delays began in 2008 -- that's a 5 year run. The only reason McNerney still has a job is that he doesn't have the guts to fire himself.
As much as it may seem otherwise here on A-Net. The 787 is just one modest program of many that Boeing has; and the vast majority of the other programs are doing very well (and the press ignores them).
Over the years that the 787 Project has existed Boeing's financials have been very good. No reason to think that McNerney's overall job performance is unacceptable.
ServantLeader From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 107, posted (4 months 4 days 14 hours ago) and read 12324 times:
Quoting 2175301 (Reply 106): The 787 is just one modest program of many that Boeing has
That is simply not true. The 787 is Boeing's flagship program. many senior managers have been given the heave-ho by McNerney over the past 5 years due the 787 missteps -- the only reason he has survived to date is that he is also COB.
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 109, posted (4 months 4 days 14 hours ago) and read 12194 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 101): On the plane would be nice, but I would expect that if a non-invasive procedure could be designed, it would be performed off the plane.
Having to remove the battery for a non-invasive process that does not exist yet does not sound too solid a concept at this point in time.
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 112, posted (4 months 4 days 12 hours ago) and read 11970 times:
Reading between the lines of this story, it look as if the two test flights have afforded no additional clues as to what may have caused the two fires:-
"(Reuters) - Two test flights of Boeing Co's 787 Dreamliner have not revealed the cause of the battery malfunctions that grounded the jets, leaving it to focus on low-tech interim fixes, the Wall Street Journal said, citing government and industry officials.
"More test flights are planned, including efforts to assess potential fixes, although no significant new clues emerged to help pinpoint the cause of the problem, the Journal said.
"Boeing is now considering putting the lithium ion batteries in a sturdier container to stop heat, flames and toxic chemicals from escaping if the power packs overheat, the newspaper said.
"People familiar with the design of the container told the Journal that titanium is a possible material for its construction."
It begins to look as if Boeing will just have to try to persuade the FAA that 'containment' will be enough for now; allowing the aeroplanes to return to service, while Boeing continues intensive testing and evaluation of the existing batteries, or alternatively considers eventually specifying different ones.
In my view that can be expected to move things to the 'political' level. The Federal Aviation Authority will likely be 'in the hot seat' - with Boeing arguing that two incidents, only one while the aeroplane was in the air, do not justify grounding an entire type indefinitely, especially if the containment has been beefed-up; and the National Transportation Safety Board pushing for a complete redesign and re-certification before the 787 re-enters service.
"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 113, posted (4 months 4 days 11 hours ago) and read 11875 times:
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 112): In my view that can be expected to move things to the 'political' level. The Federal Aviation Authority will likely be 'in the hot seat' - with Boeing arguing that two incidents, only one while the aeroplane was in the air,
I don't understand that 'only one while the plane was in the air' line of reasoning.
For example.
a) An engine fell off, but no while it was in the air.
b) There was a general power failure, but not while it was in the air.
c) The cockpit caught fire, but not while it was in the air.
In each case, it was lucky the plane was not in the air, but luck doesn't really count as an argument in favour of the planes safety.
As for the time to create a fix, it's taking a long enough time already to find the cause. At least with QF32, they could identify the cause relatively quickly and with some certainty, and they could do inspections to check for the problem easily.
The problem for Boeing is that it's so hard to just even know exactly what went wrong and why. The NTSB report is out in early March. Hopefully, they can add some certainty to this.
7BOEING7 From United States of America, joined Oct 2012, 580 posts, RR: 3 Reply 114, posted (4 months 4 days 8 hours ago) and read 11661 times:
Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 105):
The 787 has been getting bad press since production delays began in 2008 -- that's a 5 year run. The only reason McNerney still has a job is that he doesn't have the guts to fire himself.
Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 107): That is simply not true. The 787 is Boeing's flagship program. many senior managers have been given the heave-ho by McNerney over the past 5 years due the 787 missteps -- the only reason he has survived to date is that he is also COB.
The train wreck that is the 787 was already in place when McNerney took over, he was just stuck with Mullaly's mess and some messes are harder to clean up than others. If senior managers hadn't been given the "heave-ho" to try and "right the ship" he wouldn't have been doing his job and then he should have been fired.
rheinwaldner From Switzerland, joined Jan 2008, 2073 posts, RR: 6 Reply 116, posted (4 months 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 11186 times:
Quoting rcair1 (Reply 102): As I said in a post many moons ago - it would take a lot of 'guts' for a fire crew to decide - let the containment handle it - even if they were sure it would.
Absolutely. They even had to assume that the containment had failed, because otherwise they wouldn't have noticed at all that there was a fire.
So the following definition for a containment is not a good basis for the future IMO:
Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 59): The connectors that go through the containment vessel appear to have been melted, it might be that was producing the visible flames. If so it could be visually impressive, bad to breathe, but no threat to the plane as that quanity of burning plastic wouldn't produce much heat at all.
For that to be acceptable the certification requirements would have to be rewritten as follows:
a.) No cell is allowed to ever reach unsafe temperatures ... bla bla bla ...
x.) But - if the battery burns, no quantity of burning plastic may reach the surrounding compartment that produces more than visible and impressive flames, that make it hard to breathe....
It is and it will stay. What is currently going on does not impact the long term prospects. It does "only" reduce profitability and lengthen the time to break-even.
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 112): The Federal Aviation Authority will likely be 'in the hot seat' - with Boeing arguing that two incidents, only one while the aeroplane was in the air, do not justify grounding an entire type indefinitely, especially if the containment has been beefed-up; and the National Transportation Safety Board pushing for a complete redesign and re-certification before the 787 re-enters service.
The FAA will not sign off the 787 on Boeing's word a second time IMO. They will take care, that the battery will never start burning again.
If another case would happen in the near future, maybe far away from an airport, their reputation probably goes down the drain no matter whether the containment works or not. They don't want to be the guys that cleared "shacky" Boeing technology a second time (in the eyes of the public).
I also think that the place where the two incidents took place (in air or on the ground) is irrelevant. RickNRoll is completely right about that one.
There are no relaxed requirements while the aircraft is on the ground.
XT6Wagon From United States of America, joined Feb 2007, 3150 posts, RR: 4 Reply 117, posted (4 months 4 days 4 hours ago) and read 10988 times:
Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 116): For that to be acceptable the certification requirements would have to be rewritten as follows:
a.) No cell is allowed to ever reach unsafe temperatures ... bla bla bla ...
x.) But - if the battery burns, no quantity of burning plastic may reach the surrounding compartment that produces more than visible and impressive flames, that make it hard to breathe....
really dude? you might note that on the ground there is no requirements for smoke in the cabin. There was no airflow to cool the outside of the containment vessel like there would be in flight. So your points about the JAL fire have 0 merit.
rheinwaldner From Switzerland, joined Jan 2008, 2073 posts, RR: 6 Reply 118, posted (4 months 4 days 4 hours ago) and read 10843 times:
Quoting XT6Wagon (Reply 117): You might note that on the ground there is no requirements for smoke in the cabin. There was no airflow to cool the outside of the containment vessel like there would be in flight. So your points about the JAL fire have 0 merit.
Your claim is completely wrong. Show me where the certification requirements do differ between in-air and on-ground. I have read them and they don't support your dangerous attitude with one word.
According to your understanding of safety a fire on the ground during de-boarding would be acceptable due to lack of airflow to cool the outside of the containment. This is of course nonsense. Do you really believe that the 787 does not need to be safe when there is "no airflow"? E.g. while stuck in a queue on a taxiway prior departure? I am sure that the 787 is safely designed also while on ground with and without airflows. Because it must be.
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 119, posted (4 months 4 days 3 hours ago) and read 10702 times:
Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 118): According to your understanding of safety a fire on the ground during de-boarding would be acceptable due to lack of airflow to cool the outside of the containment. This is of course nonsense. Do you really believe that the 787 does not need to be safe when there is "no airflow"? E.g. while stuck in a queue on a taxiway prior departure? I am sure that the 787 is safely designed also while on ground with and without airflows. Because it must be
That is the way it is designed, but IIRC, some of the deadliest plane fires have been on the ground, now that you put it that way. Another FAA requirement or specification that possibly needs clearing up. Do other planes have similar requirements?
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 120, posted (4 months 4 days 2 hours ago) and read 10610 times:
Quoting rheinwaldner (Reply 118): According to your understanding of safety a fire on the ground during de-boarding would be acceptable due to lack of airflow to cool the outside of the containment. This is of course nonsense. Do you really believe that the 787 does not need to be safe when there is "no airflow"?
Misunderstanding here, I think. As far as I know, the aeroplane on the ground had been 'shut down' for the best part of half an hour? And had no passengers or crew aboard? So there was no question of "a fire on the ground during de-boarding."?
If that's so, we could very well be looking at two problems, not one. The first (most serious) one being a malfunction in flight, the second being problems when a parked aeroplane was switched to the local 'ground power' for recharging etc. - only too possible, given that there are wide variations, worldwide, in voltage, amperage, etc.?
Stand by my view that the malfunction in flight was (and remains) by far the most serious issue.
[Edited 2013-02-15 04:14:28]
"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
scbriml From United Kingdom, joined Jul 2003, 11438 posts, RR: 50 Reply 121, posted (4 months 4 days 2 hours ago) and read 10508 times:
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 112): It begins to look as if Boeing will just have to try to persuade the FAA that 'containment' will be enough for now; allowing the aeroplanes to return to service, while Boeing continues intensive testing and evaluation of the existing batteries, or alternatively considers eventually specifying different ones.
I don't see the grounding being lifted unless something changes. There's no way the FAA will simply change their mind if a root cause cannot be clearly identified.
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 120): Misunderstanding here, I think. As far as I know, the aeroplane on the ground had been 'shut down' for the best part of half an hour? And had no passengers or crew aboard? There was no question of "a fire on the ground during de-boarding."?
I think rheinwaldner's question was hypothetical, not referring specifically to the Boston incident.
packsonflight From Iceland, joined Jan 2010, 328 posts, RR: 0 Reply 122, posted (4 months 4 days 1 hour ago) and read 10370 times:
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 120): Misunderstanding here, I think. As far as I know, the aeroplane on the ground had been 'shut down' for the best part of half an hour? And had no passengers or crew aboard? So there was no question of "a fire on the ground during de-boarding."?
This is the first of the special condition for certification of the batteries:
(1) Safe cell temperatures and
pressures must be maintained during
any foreseeable charging or discharging
condition and during any failure of the
charging or battery monitoring system
not shown to be extremely remote. The
lithium ion battery installation must
preclude explosion in the event of those
failures.
I would assume that this applies also when the aircraft is on the ground when it is "powered" because every time when the aircraft is powered up by ground power or the APU, the battery chargers are powered. On top of that, as we all know by now the battery is used to start the APU on the ground, and provide power for emergency lighting for disembarking on ground.
ServantLeader From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 123, posted (4 months 3 days 23 hours ago) and read 10069 times:
Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 114): The train wreck that is the 787 was already in place when McNerney took over, he was just stuck with Mullaly's mess and some messes are harder to clean up than others. If senior managers hadn't been given the "heave-ho" to try and "right the ship" he wouldn't have been doing his job and then he should have been fired.
McNerney was named CEO by the board in late 2005, well before things started to go south. Mullaly bolted for Ford--for which has done an outstanding job--due to the board bypassing him in favor of McNerney. I have no issue with McNerney firing senior executives as a means to improve the performance of the 787 program, but obviously those firings had no effect on the meltdown. McNerney is also COB, which is a built-in conflict of interest that blurs the lines between oversight and execution duties as it relates to the performance of the company under the leadership of senior management. IMO he should have been out in and around 2011 when deliveries slipped beyond 3 years late--he has demonstrated neither the ability to avoid the crisis nor lead Boeing out of it--he is part of the problem.
Pugman211 From UK - England, joined Dec 2012, 56 posts, RR: 0 Reply 124, posted (4 months 3 days 22 hours ago) and read 9884 times:
Its a shame we dont know more info about these 2 test flights. what were they testing/looking for etc. These 2 incidents have happened to in service aircraft, has Boeing tried to replicate the incidents using ground power?? Basically, do 2 - 3 test flights in a day with an aircraft as if it was in service to see if that replicates any symtoms, whether it be inflight or whilst on the ground. What is the sequence of events for a normal days ops for the 787 i.e,
ground power to start APU,
APU to start engines,
test flight to somewhere for a few hours (testing inflight)
land and park, back onto ground power as you would if in service whilst aircraft is prep'd for next flight.
ground power to start APU or APU battery
APU to start engines,
test flight back to base etc
Its another angle of approach but could shed some light if nothing is being discovered in test flights.
7BOEING7 From United States of America, joined Oct 2012, 580 posts, RR: 3 Reply 125, posted (4 months 3 days 22 hours ago) and read 9903 times:
Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 123): McNerney was named CEO by the board in late 2005, well before things started to go south. Mullaly bolted for Ford
The underlying issues that created the problems in design and manufacturing were present when the Board voted to offer the airplane for sale a year and a half before McNerney came on board, but you are right Mullaly "bolted" before the xxxx hit the fan.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 126, posted (4 months 3 days 22 hours ago) and read 9902 times:
Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 123): IMO he should have been out in and around 2011 when deliveries slipped beyond 3 years late--he has demonstrated neither the ability to avoid the crisis nor lead Boeing out of it--he is part of the problem.
So who should have replaced him? Mullaly was not going to leave Ford to come back.
kanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 2498 posts, RR: 21 Reply 128, posted (4 months 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 9927 times:
Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 123): McNerney was named CEO by the board in late 2005, well before things started to go south. Mullaly bolted for Ford--for which has done an outstanding job--
Some people need to look at Boeing's org chart before making absurd statements..Mullaly was never CEO.. he was President of Commercial Airplanes, a job now held by Conner..(there have been several people in this function since Mullaly left). I believe Albaugh was in the post when much of the internal sleeping was going on. While McKerney has at at the helm, he relies on the sub company presidents to run their businesses.
Mullaly leaving.. he left because when McKerney became CEO, Mullaly was no longer in the succession plan for CEO because he would be too old when McKerney retired. (Plus Ford offered a hefty reward for joining them).
So yell for heads to roll and make accusations, , but it won't change what the board thinks is the right course.
Quoting Pugman211 (Reply 124): Its a shame we dont know more info about these 2 test flights.
Actually it's a relief that some information remains internal since we have so many unqualified armchair quarterbacks. As I noted earlier, after tests they have to review the data and design new tests, get FAA concurrence for both the test and flight, revise instrumentation, and then go.. it's not an overnight process. They may even have found something that can be further tested in the lab making another flight unnecessary at this time.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 129, posted (4 months 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 9899 times:
Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 127): The board has a succession plan, they need to exercise it.
That succession plan is in place in the event McNerney is killed or incapacitated. And that successor would continue to execute corporate policy as McNerney has done, so nothing would change.
ServantLeader From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 130, posted (4 months 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 9832 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 130): That succession plan is in place in the event McNerney is killed or incapacitated. And that successor would continue to execute corporate policy as McNerney has done, so nothing would change.
That's a cynical view corporate governance and a low expectation of the role of the CEO. If it is as simple as executing corporate policy then why do CEOs get paid so much? McNerney is a textbook modern day disconnected CEO incapable of true leadership.
Actually I think Boeing has already learned its lesson. The next project will be different from the "dreamliner", I reckon. Hopefully Airbus watches closely.
alfablue From Spain, joined Jan 2013, 42 posts, RR: 11 Reply 132, posted (4 months 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 9143 times:
It's about "FAA Grounds 787, Thread 9" -- that includes management mistakes or shortcomings leading to this situation. This threat is not limited to batteries.
IMO recent developments have made it impossible now for Boeing to stick with that technology (type of battery and containment). Airbus officially pulled those batteries now from the A350 and ICAO will not allow the transportation of those batteries in Passenger planes as cargo which makes it very hard to get spare ones to stranded Dreamliners unless you pay for a dedicated cargo plane.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 133, posted (4 months 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 9177 times:
Quoting alfablue (Reply 136): IMO recent developments have made it impossible now for Boeing to stick with that technology (type of battery and containment).
It appears that the 787's electrical system is designed around Li-Ion batteries so Boeing may have no choice but to continue forward with them, first with a demonstrable-capable containment system and then with a new formulation that is far less susceptible to thermal runaway.
bradmovie From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 16 posts, RR: 0 Reply 134, posted (4 months 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 9018 times:
Stitch, what does it mean exactly that "the 787's electrical system is designed around Li-Ion batteries..."? How does the downstream electrical system react differently to the battery than it would if it were a NiCad or other traditional battery? From what I've read the Li-ion battery may be faster to provide power, and lighter weight. Is it that it starts the APU better?
I am not very knowledgeable about batteries, and did not know that electrical systems needed to be designed differently for a different battery. Does that mean some of the electrical components in the 787's systems also found on other aircraft have had to be changed to accommodate the Li-Ion battery? If so, I could certainly understand Boeing's reluctance to change battery types--the repercussions would be timely and expensive.
On the other hand, seeing that Airbus has dropped Li-Ion from the A350, how important is it for Boeing to stick with this technology? It seems with the difficulty of finding provable causes for the two battery incidents, and the anticipated design changes that must be coming, not to mention the politics of the FAA and NTSB, that at some point it could be a much wiser course for Boeing to take a slight weight penalty and go back to proven battery technology.
What I'm getting at, are more knowledgeable posters beginning to think that this may be the way to go?
prebennorholm From Denmark, joined Mar 2000, 6039 posts, RR: 55 Reply 135, posted (4 months 3 days 13 hours ago) and read 8745 times:
Quoting alfablue (Reply 136): IMO recent developments have made it impossible now for Boeing to stick with that technology (type of battery and containment). Airbus officially pulled those batteries now from the A350 and ICAO will not allow the transportation of those batteries in Passenger planes as cargo which makes it very hard to get spare ones to stranded Dreamliners unless you pay for a dedicated cargo plane.
Thanks, alfablue, for posting these two links. I think that your conclusion is very valid. To me this issue seems now to have been settled.
At least Airbus has put their potential issue to rest.
And it seems more and more impossible for Boeing to protect the Li-Ion battery in what becomes a more and more uphill battle. ICAO banning spare batteries on pax planes is a new and important one. That means not only "cargo plane", but "hazardous goods" on cargo plane - that is in itself not an unimportant issue, making things a lot more complicated (it being by plane, ship, train or truck), and many cargo companies simply don't deal with hazardous goods.
But there are many more issues left, even if Boeing and the FAA come to an agreement on a containment system and reliability in general. Airline insurance companies, PR in general, and the fact that airlines, when the 787 flies again, want to tell their pax that they are on the world's most modern airliner, and they are not test dolls on a hopefully properly fixed problem plane.
Quoting bradmovie (Reply 138): How does the downstream electrical system react differently to the battery than it would if it were a NiCad or other traditional battery? From what I've read the Li-ion battery may be faster to provide power, and lighter weight. Is it that it starts the APU better?
Right bradmovie. The downstream equipment in an 28VDC environment has no idea from what chemistry its electron flow was generated. But the charging and monitoring logic must be changed - copy and paste from 737, 747, 757, 767 or 777.
For the same capacity NiCad is slightly better delivering power at the critical condition - when they are cold. But they charge more slowly. They must be conditioned (fully cycled) once in a while to maintain proper capacity for many years (memory effect). And energy density is only about 40% of Li-Ion, meaning they are 2½ times heavier. So 2 x 30 kg become more like 2 x 75 kg = 90 kg more. That means 90 kg less fuel on a MTOW take-off, and almost 10 miles reduced range. And it means roughly 0.05% increased fuel consumption, give and take quite a bit depending on payload and sector length.
NiCads also take up more space, not 2½ times more, but still enough so I can't imagine them taking the space allowed for the Li-Ions in the E&E bays. But honestly, whatever the chemistry, batteries should not be placed in E&E bays. They belong to battery bays where can do all their nasty things without doing any harm except some mess in the battery bay.
So my best guess is a slightly reduced underfloor cargo space. Which may have the unlucly effect that one less standard container can be loaded.
Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs, Preben Norholm
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 137, posted (4 months 3 days 12 hours ago) and read 8614 times:
Quoting bradmovie (Reply 138): Stitch, what does it mean exactly that "the 787's electrical system is designed around Li-Ion batteries..."?
I don't know. The folks saying this in media reports don't say why.
Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 139): So my best guess is a slightly reduced underfloor cargo space. Which may have the unlucly effect that one less standard container can be loaded.
I'd be surprised if the battery pack was moved to the cargo bay. I would guess they'll strap them to the floor of the EE bay.
7BOEING7 From United States of America, joined Oct 2012, 580 posts, RR: 3 Reply 138, posted (4 months 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 8436 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 141): Quoting bradmovie (Reply 138):Stitch, what does it mean exactly that "the 787's electrical system is designed around Li-Ion batteries..."?
Quoting Stitch (Reply 141): I don't know. The folks saying this in media reports don't say why.
Folks saying that in the media are "aeronautically challenged".
Quoting prebennorholm (Reply 139): The downstream equipment in an 28VDC environment has no idea from what chemistry its electron flow was generated.
BoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1090 posts, RR: 2 Reply 139, posted (4 months 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 8363 times:
Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 142):
Folks saying that in the media are "aeronautically challenged".
Bit of a sweeping statement that...
Li-ion has different charge and discharge characteristics than Ni-cad, its just possible that the 787 systems rely on a specific Li-ion characteristic differences for correct functioning.
lightsaber From United States of America, joined Jan 2005, 10883 posts, RR: 100 Reply 140, posted (4 months 3 days 10 hours ago) and read 8310 times:
Quoting kanban (Reply 26): There probably is a Designated Representative (DR) on board, and from personal experience they are tougher than the agency they represent.
Agree on both parts. DRs (they have other names too) are very tough. They tend to like using ex-military types who know their stuff.
Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 140):
I guess that we should formally recognize that the Boeing 787-800 has now been grounded for 1 month..
Already!?! Only thread #9.
Most of the rest of this thread is speculation that seems to go around all the 787 threads... but there are useful tidbits.
cornutt From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 228 posts, RR: 1 Reply 141, posted (4 months 3 days 8 hours ago) and read 8168 times:
Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 143): Li-ion has different charge and discharge characteristics than Ni-cad, its just possible that the 787 systems rely on a specific Li-ion characteristic differences for correct functioning.
Maybe the APU starter. Most avionics won't care; they have to convert the battery voltage to lower voltages anyway, so as long as they're getting something in the 24-32V range, they don't care.
packsonflight From Iceland, joined Jan 2010, 328 posts, RR: 0 Reply 142, posted (4 months 3 days 7 hours ago) and read 8054 times:
Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 143): Li-ion has different charge and discharge characteristics than Ni-cad, its just possible that the 787 systems rely on a specific Li-ion characteristic differences for correct functioning.
This could apply to the brakes.
Conventional braking system on aircrafts relay on hydraulic accumulator pressure as last resort power for the brakes in case of hydraulic failure.
I would assume that the battery has to be capable to power the brakes in case of a total generator failure on the 787 since the brakes are electrically powered, and they possibly draw a lot of current when applied to the maximum.
jox From Sweden, joined Jan 2003, 79 posts, RR: 0 Reply 143, posted (4 months 3 days 7 hours ago) and read 7998 times:
Yesterday, I came across a guy that had a theory that is quite different from the ones I have read about here.
The 787 differs from most airliners in another way, besides the LiIon batteries - right? The composite airframe! This guy ha a theory that older fuselages acted as a Faraday cage to the static electricity (that is generated by the friction(?) between the fuselage and the surrounding air), and held the induced currents outside (or rather within the aluminum). But now, with a composite construction, that cage isn't there any more - thus making the plane being a "flying capacitor" - and that the induced currents in the long wires connected to the batteries could then charge the batteries without passing the normal charging regulators etc. There could also be spikes and transients entering the batteries this way.
I know waaay to little about static electricity etc to comment on this - what do you others think? Is this even something Mythbusters could call plausible or busted?
RicknRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 144, posted (4 months 3 days 7 hours ago) and read 7989 times:
Doesn't make sense to me. Besides that, the skin has to have enough conductivity to handle lightening strikes. IIRC, they have a conductive mesh embedded in it for that purpose.
Starglider From Netherlands, joined Sep 2006, 644 posts, RR: 44 Reply 145, posted (4 months 3 days 5 hours ago) and read 7820 times:
Quoting jox (Reply 147): But now, with a composite construction, that cage isn't there any more - thus making the plane being a "flying capacitor" - and that the induced currents in the long wires connected to the batteries could then charge the batteries without passing the normal charging regulators etc. There could also be spikes and transients entering the batteries this way.
Quoting RicknRoll (Reply 148): Doesn't make sense to me. Besides that, the skin has to have enough conductivity to handle lightening strikes. IIRC, they have a conductive mesh embedded in it for that purpose.
The 787 has a current return network (CRN) in its design to address these issues. I am sure the CRN will also be part of the investigation.
BoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1090 posts, RR: 2 Reply 146, posted (4 months 3 days 5 hours ago) and read 7767 times:
Quoting packsonflight (Reply 144): I would assume that the battery has to be capable to power the brakes in case of a total generator failure on the 787 since the brakes are electrically powered, and they possibly draw a lot of current when applied to the maximum.
Yes, powering the brakes is a function of the ship battery in the case of a total electrical failure.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 147, posted (4 months 3 days 3 hours ago) and read 7546 times:
I do not understand this talk why it should be nearly impossible for Being to revert to nickel cadmium batteries.
Apart from the circuitry directly controlling the charging and discharging of the Li ion battery the rest of the system should not know about what type of battery is behind the voltage and ampere flowing.
The charging and discharging control units should be modular stuff you either take out and replace or geld and but in the new stuff parallel.
What could be the Problems:
1.Li ion gives you the full voltage longer while discharging.
Answer, go for a bigger battery and do not discharge as much or go to a Battery with a higher voltage and use a DC to DC converter to keep the right Voltage.
2.Li ion allows you to draw more ampere or watt per second than nickel cadmium battery of the same size.
Answer, I believe it is the other way round but if not go for a bigger battery.
3.You do not have enough voltage to charge the new battery.
Answer, go for a DC to DC converter, you can up the voltage.
4.It is to much work to do the certification.
Answer, you have of the shelf already certified circuitry including chargers used in other planes, you have certified batteries in other planes, you have one of the best groups of engineers in the industry, how hard can it be?
If you need space but a box in the cargo hold.
I think it is better to take the weight increase and get flying again.
My understanding from reading the many threads on this subject is that a bigger battery would require some significant structural modifications - perhaps even a complete redesign of the bay - to allow a bigger battery to fit. It is therefore not simple at all.
BoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1090 posts, RR: 2 Reply 149, posted (4 months 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 7310 times:
Quoting CXB77L (Reply 148): My understanding from reading the many threads on this subject is that a bigger battery would require some significant structural modifications - perhaps even a complete redesign of the bay - to allow a bigger battery to fit. It is therefore not simple at all.
Also the problem of physically getting it through the hatch and manoeuvring a battery that would be expected to weigh 65kg, 144lbs using only human power because of the tight confines. At this kind of weight practicality might dictate that you have to use 2 batteries which means other stuff ends up being redesigned too.
audidudi From United States of America, joined Oct 2007, 272 posts, RR: 0 Reply 150, posted (4 months 3 days ago) and read 7310 times:
The Qatar B788 A7-BCK at LHR has just been towed from BA Engineering Base towards T4. I don't have confirmation yet that it is on stand there, but if so then it must be getting ready to ferry back to DOH!
Update....it has been parked adjacent to T4, near the Royal Suite.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 151, posted (4 months 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 7050 times:
Quoting CXB77L (Reply 148): My understanding from reading the many threads on this subject is that a bigger battery would require some significant structural modifications - perhaps even a complete redesign of the bay - to allow a bigger battery to fit. It is therefore not simple at all.
Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 149): Also the problem of physically getting it through the hatch and manoeuvring a battery that would be expected to weigh 65kg, 144lbs using only human power because of the tight confines. At this kind of weight practicality might dictate that you have to use 2 batteries which means other stuff ends up being redesigned too
Put a box into the cargo hold to keep the batteries until you do a redesign.
I have anyway the question if having the batteries in the e-bays was a good idea.
If one battery is to heavy to handle take a size you can handle and take more of them.
Two half size take the same space as one full size.
Nothing some good engineers should not be able to handle.
In the Cessna business jet they had to exchange the lithium ion battery for a nickel cadmium and did it.
Must have been similar problems.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 152, posted (4 months 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 7110 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 151): Put a box into the cargo hold to keep the batteries until you do a redesign.
Since NiCad batteries can catch fire or leak, would having them in the cargo hold be a new risk? Also, what about worries about damage from the box being hit with LD3s or pallets? Then there is running the wiring looms and such from the hold to the bays - are their risks involved there, as well?
Would all this have to be tested and certified? And if so, how long would that take?
Or would the FAA/EASA/Etc. just issue a waiver because NiCads are better known than Li-Ion and therefore what could possibly go wrong? If said waiver was issued, how would that play in the media and public?
PW100 From Netherlands, joined Jan 2002, 2001 posts, RR: 10 Reply 153, posted (4 months 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 7072 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 147): If you need space but a box in the cargo hold.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 151): Put a box into the cargo hold to keep the batteries until you do a redesign.
Not sure if this will fly. I would expect that NiCad also have containment and ventilation requirements. It may not be a good idea to put a high intense energy (both electric and chemical) accumulator in a cargo hold where other flammable stuff might be present, stuff where you have only limited control over it contents and movements.
That might be a much larger fire hazard than the existing design, as there is basically nothing to burn in the EE bays (except from the battery itself and it’s electrolytes.
So as I understand (this may be incorrect, please correct me if I’m mistaken), any replacement type battery should still be placed in the same general area for the above requirements. Adapting a cargo hold would mean a very significant redesign of multiple other systems, and you still have containment issues which may be worse than what you are trying to solve.
Rgds,
PW100
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 154, posted (4 months 2 days 23 hours ago) and read 7040 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 152): Since NiCad batteries can catch fire or leak, would having them in the cargo hold be a new risk? Also, what about worries about damage from the box being hit with LD3s or pallets? Then there is running the wiring looms and such from the hold to the bays - are their risks involved there, as well?
Would all this have to be tested and certified? And if so, how long would that take?
Or would the FAA/EASA/Etc. just issue a waiver because NiCads are better known than Li-Ion and therefore what could possibly go wrong? If said waiver was issued, how would that play in the media and public?
The danger from the NiCads catching fire or leaking is far lower than of lithium ion, it is comparable a rather robust design.
If I talk about a box I do not talk about a paper box, but something keeping the battery save, you sound like the e-bay on the B787 has some special armour.
Running the wiring looms should be no problem, you have similar looms all through the plane.
On some air planes there are extra tanks installed or removed in the cargo hold, like the business versions of A320 and B737, are you afraid of pallets hitting them?
I started writing this as some people talk about the exchange of battery type on this plane would be a major redesign.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 156, posted (4 months 2 days 22 hours ago) and read 6994 times:
Quoting cmf (Reply 155): Not impossible as much as not practical. The problems are space and time. Technically it can obviously be done.
They found the space in a Cessna.
Why do some think that the recertification of the lithium ion takes less time than changing the battery to known technology?
Does somebody imagines that the B 787 will fly again with the current battery in the current containment?
audidudi From United States of America, joined Oct 2007, 272 posts, RR: 0 Reply 157, posted (4 months 2 days 22 hours ago) and read 6984 times:
Qatar's B788 has now been towed back to BA Enginerring Base, so no imminent ferry flight back to DOH. At least there was a little temporary excitement here at LHR!
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 158, posted (4 months 2 days 22 hours ago) and read 6977 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 154): If I talk about a box I do not talk about a paper box, but something keeping the battery save, you sound like the e-bay on the B787 has some special armour.
Not special armor, but it does have a metal containment box. And it's not susceptible to external impacts.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 154): Running the wiring looms should be no problem, you have similar looms all through the plane.
Yes, but those runs were all designed into the structure from the beginning.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 156): Does somebody imagines that the B 787 will fly again with the current battery in the current containment?
No, because it evidently cannot meet the original special requirements.
But that in no way means Boeing cannot develop a new containment system that does meet the special requirements and then prove it meets the special requirements via testing.
If Boeing has to, they can send up ZA005 with the crew strapped into parachutes, fly her out over the Pacific, and then set fire to the battery in the bay and let it burn and see if the plane can still fly for 330 minutes and land safely.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 159, posted (4 months 2 days 22 hours ago) and read 6896 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 158): Not special armor, but it does have a metal containment box. And it's not susceptible to external impacts.
I am getting a little bit tired of the metal containment box.
As a containment it did not work. In Boston it did not contain the flames, in Japan it did not contain flammable liquid or the vapours.
And before that starts again, flammable liquid is not something unspecified but a defined hazard.
Without the metal case there is no battery, just some electrical circuits and 8 single cells, quite difficult to handle without a box around it.
kanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 2498 posts, RR: 21 Reply 161, posted (4 months 2 days 22 hours ago) and read 6864 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 159): I am getting a little bit tired of the metal containment box.
A metal containment box is a regulatory requirement at this time.. and probably would remain even with a battery type change.
The containment did work .. as noted in many previous posts the containment was designed to allow vapors to prevent pressure build up and explosion. The electrolyte is a paste and when heated appears to run about as fast as hot molasses that solidifies as it cools.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 162, posted (4 months 2 days 22 hours ago) and read 6839 times:
Quoting kanban (Reply 161): A metal containment box is a regulatory requirement at this time.. and probably would remain even with a battery type change.
The containment did work .. as noted in many previous posts the containment was designed to allow vapors to prevent pressure build up and explosion. The electrolyte is a paste and when heated appears to run about as fast as hot molasses that solidifies as it cools.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 163, posted (4 months 2 days 21 hours ago) and read 6800 times:
The "containment" for the battery was never design to contain what happened.
It was not taken in account that the thermal runaway of one cell in the battery would induce the thermal runaway of the rest of them.
The thing happening twice was not expected to happen ever.
That the non containment of a flammable liquid in an electric bay is acceptable as contained is only possible if you are sure that the flammable liquid is not a danger by itself.
Spare us Wiki - please! First, it's completely irrelevant - the only definitions that apply in this context are those in the FARs (and equivalent regulations in other jurisdictions). Secondly, there are electrical, battery and aeronautical engineers posting on this thread who have much more relevant knowledge and experience than Wiki - should you choose to acknowledge their expertise.
kanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 2498 posts, RR: 21 Reply 165, posted (4 months 2 days 20 hours ago) and read 6498 times:
Quoting kanban (Reply 161): Are yo implying that the NTSB does not know what they are talking about?
no I'm implying that someone has not read the volumes of posts by knowledgeable people including a fire chief before making rash statements and rehashing discounted ideas..
We are still trying to establish the flashpoint for the electrolyte in both the paste stage and in the molasses stage. All things become flammable at some point, however it appears that the electrolyte needs a much higher temperature than would be found outside the containment. Also the normal lower lobe venting system did remove the vapors allowing the air mixture to reduce the concentration well below any chance of ignition.
Again based on design and vendor data, the containment box was designed for a 1 in 1M chance. it did it's job, could it have done more , yes. However the first task is to understand the failure and reduce that to an acceptable risk level. then look at modifications to the containment box. note when the change a battery, the box and all are removed and replaced as a single LRU.. so it is not opened in the plane to service.
The NTSB is talking about flammable liquids. If you do not like the Wikipedia please give me another official definition of flammable liquid, the Wikipedia definition matches with the one in my handbook regarding fire fighting.
Regarding the electrolyte in a lithium ion battery, there are two I know of, ethylene carbonate and diethyl carbonate.
One is a flammable liquid the other a combustible liquid according to the definitions I know.
You can easily look up the hazard sheets for those.
Both do not behave like a paste.
If you know the organic solvent used as an electrolyte in this batteries please state it, everybody can than have a look at the hazard sheet by himself.
As long as the NTSB is talking about a flammable liquid I take that and not undefined statements as a fact.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 167, posted (4 months 2 days 19 hours ago) and read 6383 times:
Quoting kanban (Reply 165): We are still trying to establish the flashpoint for the electrolyte in both the paste stage and in the molasses stage. All things become flammable at some point, however it appears that the electrolyte needs a much higher temperature than would be found outside the containment. Also the normal lower lobe venting system did remove the vapors allowing the air mixture to reduce the concentration well below any chance of ignition.
I do not know if you work with the safety aspects of this battery or you are discussing with other interested people this aspects.
Because: How do you make a safety analysis of something that can burn without knowing the flashpoint? In my books that is something that should have been known before the battery goes aboard an air plane.
You should know such properties before you transport it even.
bonusonus From United States of America, joined Nov 2009, 398 posts, RR: 0 Reply 168, posted (4 months 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 6104 times:
I'm interested in the differences between the Tesla design of Li-ion batteries (thousands of cells, each less than 2 amp-hr), and the GS Yausa design used in the 787 (8 cells, 65 amp-hr each, I believe). There's been a lot of talk about the risk of thermal runaway being much greater because of the energy released when one large cell fails compared to when a very small cell fails. Is it possible that Boeing/Thales/GS Yausa scaled up a system of consumer-electronics style batteries in a way that wasn't as safe as it could have been?
unfortunately persistence in equating the situation to what you are familiar with and to broad generalized data available on the internet does not relate to the case at hand.
We do know that the electrolyte used by Yuasa in these cells is a paste not a highly viscous fluid. (read threads 1 though 8). and being proprietary, Yuasa has not made it's exact formulation public. From pictures it can be deduced that it only foams at high temperatures and the foam exhibits more fluid like traits. however it also appears that the foam solidifies quickly.
As far as not knowing the ignition temperature, the question has been asked in the forum and outside of the manufacturers and investigators, nobody knows or will comment. Read comments by RCAIR1 on flammability and extinguishing.
For many of us concerned, now is a period of waiting for more detailed knowledge, rather than second guessing.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 170, posted (4 months 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 6046 times:
Quoting bonusonus (Reply 168): Is it possible that Boeing/Thales/GS Yausa scaled up a system of consumer-electronics style batteries in a way that wasn't as safe as it could have been?
I would consider this highly unlikely as Yuasa makes batteries for industrial applications and I would expect that is where they drew their design from.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 171, posted (4 months 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 5919 times:
Quoting kanban (Reply 169): unfortunately persistence in equating the situation to what you are familiar with and to broad generalized data available on the internet does not relate to the case at hand.
We do know that the electrolyte used by Yuasa in these cells is a paste not a highly viscous fluid. (read threads 1 though 8). and being proprietary, Yuasa has not made it's exact formulation public. From pictures it can be deduced that it only foams at high temperatures and the foam exhibits more fluid like traits. however it also appears that the foam solidifies quickly.
As far as not knowing the ignition temperature, the question has been asked in the forum and outside of the manufacturers and investigators, nobody knows or will comment. Read comments by RCAIR1 on flammability and extinguishing.
For many of us concerned, now is a period of waiting for more detailed knowledge, rather than second guessing.
Dear Kanban,
Ok everybody is guessing.
In my younger days I have been a volunteer fire fighter and or mountain rescue member.
Today I am an engineer, I run my own company and I have in my work also been doing risk assessment.
I like to guess on the safe side.
If we do not know the properties we do not when we are safe.
The reaction of the NTSB, FAA and ANA and JAL does not give me the impression that those guys were taken this lightly.
I had the feeling that quite a few members on this thread are taking this lightly and are too sure that there was no real danger.
I we know it is safe, its Ok, if we guess it is not.
bonusonus From United States of America, joined Nov 2009, 398 posts, RR: 0 Reply 172, posted (4 months 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 5922 times:
One more question. I know that reducing maintenance was a big concern about 20-30 years ago in aviation battery design. (http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=1684859&show=pdf). What is the typical maintenance interval (and downtime required) for modern Ni-Cad batteries? Do we have any information on how this compares to Li-ion batteries? (or at least Boeing's goals with Li-ion before these issues?)
airtechy From United States of America, joined Dec 2006, 344 posts, RR: 0 Reply 173, posted (4 months 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 5904 times:
As far as I can remember.....after nine threads, no one has posted a diagram of either of the electronics bays that contain the batteries. Therefore, we have no basis for judging whether a 777 ni-cad battery would fit or not. Indeed, we don't know the ni-cads dimensions so how can we say that it would fit or not.
Certainly substituting a known reliable battery would.....at least in the short term....seem to be the best fix. I certainly haven't seen the specs on either battery, but they are both 24 volts and likely have similar current ratings. The fact the 787 has substituted electrics for bleed air does not by itself mean that the batteries have to be able to supply more current with the implication that they would therefore be "bigger".
Also, batteries can be combined in many ways to get 24 volts at the required amperage eliminating the requirement for one "huge" battery requiring a "crane" to remove and replace. Indeed, the existing battery does this....they are just all in one case.
Interesting problem....and as a electrical engineer...I can appreciate the problem of finding the root cause. I suspect that the fact that Airbus has now reverted to a ni-cad....even temporarily... may influence the fix.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 171): I we know it is safe, its Ok, if we guess it is not.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 166): If you do not like the Wikipedia please give me another official definition of flammable liquid
As already mentioned, read the FARs (Federal Aviation Regulations) and IATA standards, which define what is hazardous in an aviation environment. Or read the contributions to these threads by rcair1 and other experts.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 175, posted (4 months 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 5842 times:
Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 174): As already mentioned, read the FARs (Federal Aviation Regulations) and IATA standards, which define what is hazardous in an aviation environment. Or read the contributions to these threads by rcair1 and other experts.
So dear Kaiarahi,
something what is a hazard in normal environment, for example a factory, becomes magically not a hazard when you put it aboard an aeroplane?
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 176, posted (4 months 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 5834 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 171): I had the feeling that quite a few members on this thread are taking this lightly and are too sure that there was no real danger.
Nobody has been taking these events lightly. And accusations that people have been were one of the reasons why the moderators almost didn't open this 9th thread.
Quoting bonusonus (Reply 172): Do we have any information on how this compares to Li-ion batteries? (or at least Boeing's goals with Li-ion before these issues?)
I'm going from memory here, but the original lithium cobalt oxide formulation proved to provide only about six months of usable service life. Yuasa subsequently added manganese to the formulation and this was expected to extend the lifetime to 3 or 4 years. The MSDS and the Fact Sheet for the battery notes the chemical system is Lithium-Colbalt Dioxide, so I do not know if they actually ever added some manganese (the amount may be so minimal that it does not warrant notation in the MSDS).
Quoting airtechy (Reply 173): As far as I can remember.....after nine threads, no one has posted a diagram of either of the electronics bays that contain the batteries. Therefore, we have no basis for judging whether a 777 ni-cad battery would fit or not. Indeed, we don't know the ni-cads dimensions so how can we say that it would fit or not.
The diagram for the aft EE baty has been posted, though it is not to scale. There are also pictures of the bay in the NTSB PowerPoint presentation. Based on the dimensions given for the 777 battery, it won't begin to fit.
BoeingVista From Australia, joined Jan 2009, 1090 posts, RR: 2 Reply 177, posted (4 months 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 5908 times:
Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 164): Secondly, there are electrical, battery and aeronautical engineers posting on this thread who have much more relevant knowledge and experience than Wiki - should you choose to acknowledge their expertise.
While we should acknowledge their involvement in the industry you should acknowledge that they do not agree on a lot of this stuff.
Quoting Stitch (Reply 176): The MSDS and the Fact Sheet for the battery notes the chemical system is Lithium-Colbalt Dioxide, so I do not know if they actually ever added some manganese (the amount may be so minimal that it does not warrant notation in the MSDS).
Funnily enough I also looked up this MSDS today, its the most unhelpful MSDS that I have ever read. Compare it to the LFC40 that is also described as an aviation class LI-ion battery and you can see that it has many omissions.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 178, posted (4 months 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 5825 times:
Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 177): Funnily enough I also looked up this MSDS today, its the most unhelpful MSDS that I have ever read. Compare it to the LFC40 that is also described as an aviation class LI-ion battery and you can see that it has many omissions.
Electrolyte : Organic Solvent (mixture of alkylcarbonate solvents)
Lithium hexafluorophosphate (Li salt)
3. Physical Properties:
Electrolyte
Appearance & Odor : Colorless Liquid
Density : 1.22 at 20 degrees C
Boiling point : 118 degrees C
Melting point : Below –20 degrees C
Vapor Pressure : 2.7 kPa (20 mmHg) at 20 degrees C
Flash point : 27.9 degrees C
and under 4.
Electrolyte
Flammable. HF and POF3 gases may be formed in contact with moisture.
Fire extinguishing materials: Spray water, dry chemical, and carbon dioxide.
NOTE: Cool the cell completely, or the cell may cause re-ignition.
That fits well with my idea what the electrolyte in a lithium ion battery is.
Both the electrolytes I mentioned, ethylene carbonate and diethyl carbonate, are in the group of alkylcarbonate solvents.
All you experts, as understandable I am not, please explain to me what makes the electrolyte used in the battery of the B 787 so much less hazardous regarding fire.
I also recommend reading 6 Leak and disposal procedure, 7. Special handling information and 8. Transport information
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 179, posted (4 months 2 days 13 hours ago) and read 5777 times:
Quoting Stitch (Reply 176): Nobody has been taking these events lightly. And accusations that people have been were one of the reasons why the moderators almost didn't open this 9th thread.
Dear Stich,
When somebody says the containment worked that already I call making light of this incidents.
The containment should not allow hazardous materials to escape, which possible could endanger the aeroplane.
By my definition a flammable liquid in the e-bay is a possible dangerous situation.
Every hazard sheet I have read, every training I have had, have hammered into my brain the incompatibility between a electrical installation and possible vapours of a flammable liquid with one exception, the electrical installation is explosion prove.
(equipment for that is marked ex and the different classes).
We even talk about installations outside under the bare sky.
NAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9159 posts, RR: 37 Reply 180, posted (4 months 2 days 13 hours ago) and read 5670 times:
This story contains some faint glimmers of hope that the 'extra containment and additional monitoring' solutions may turn out to be 'adequate' for the time being:-
"As Boeing’s 787 enters the second month of its fleet-wide grounding, the U.S. airframer is poring over data collected on a series of flight and ground tests and says it is making “good progress” toward a solution.
"The fix, at least in the short term, continues to be focused on improving containment of the aircraft’s two existing lithium-ion batteries and adding more temperature monitors to provide earlier warning of abnormal battery performance via the engine indicating and crew alerting system.
"Program insiders say that initial data from the tests have reinforced the company’s confidence in its baseline redesign package and that it “feels good” about the revised configuration."
BEG2IAH From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 839 posts, RR: 12 Reply 181, posted (4 months 2 days 12 hours ago) and read 5601 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 179): When somebody says the containment worked that already I call making light of this incidents.The containment should not allow hazardous materials to escape, which possible could endanger the aeroplane.
This question was addressed at least 20 times in the previous threads. Again, the special condition says this:
(5) No corrosive fluids or gases that may escape from any lithium ion battery may damage surrounding structure or any adjacent systems, equipment, or electrical wiring of the airplane in such a way as to cause a major or more severe failure condition
and
(6) Each lithium ion battery installation must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of its individual cells.
---
Obviously, the above quoted special condition allows for escape of hazardous materials, but they shouldn't cause a damage capable of producing a major failure condition.
I respect your concern and wishful thinking that "containment" should've kept everything in (not sure if you think gasses as well), but that's not what the above regulation says.
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BEG2IAH From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 839 posts, RR: 12 Reply 183, posted (4 months 2 days 12 hours ago) and read 5527 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 182): And an explosion of the gaseous form of an flammable liquid would of course not damage the surrounding.
I don't understand your question. What explosion? Are you trying to say:
1) The containment should've kept an explosion in? or
2) An explosion is a possible major occurrence that can cause a major damage?
Answer to #1: There is no way you can keep gasses in that battery once thermal runaway occurs, otherwise you would have a bomb.
Answer to #2: Gasses are produced by thermal runaway and are vented overboard, as designed, so they never reach a saturation state when they can ignite. Explosion wouldn't happen.
Again, all this was explained far better by much more qualified people, but why you (and many others who wrote in this thread #9) refuse to read is beyond my capacity to understand human nature.
[Edited 2013-02-16 18:39:09]
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mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 184, posted (4 months 2 days 11 hours ago) and read 5421 times:
Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 183): I don't understand your question. What explosion? Are you trying to say:
1) The containment should've kept an explosion in? or
2) An explosion is a possible major occurrence that can cause a major damage?
Answer to #1: There is no way you can keep gasses in that battery once thermal runaway occurs, otherwise you would have a bomb.
Answer to #2: Gasses are produced by thermal runaway and are vented overboard, as designed, so they never reach a saturation state when they can ignite. Explosion wouldn't happen.
Again, all this was explained far better by much more qualified people, but why you (and many others who wrote in this thread #9) refuse to read is beyond my capacity to understand human nature.
Yes I mean an explosion. The venting is as I understand it not all the time, but to remove smoke when it occurs. The main venting is not steadily through the e-bay.
And even if you vent you can never be sure you do not get a local vapour concentration. Such vapour is oft heavier than air.
You get fuel air explosions outside under the bare sky.
The build up of vapour could happen long before the battery starts burning, before you get a smoke event. It is enough for the battery to heat up to start venting vapour. That is why the second incident is the more significant.
And what is when the aeroplane is on the ground rolling to the start or waiting an hour for de-icing and a battery goes of, does the venting works than?
In my opinion are the possible explosion of a vapour air mixture danger number one and the damage by fire danger number two. You will not get a corrosive liquid out of a lithium ion battery. You do not need to contain against that.
There seems to be nowhere on the net a hazard sheet regarding the battery used in the B 787.
Look at the description of that electrolyte. Definitive a flammable liquid, flashpoint below 30°C, boiling point 118°C.
The Battery reaches the boiling point long before there starts a fire.
Keeping such a battery near to an electrical installation is my opinion the worst idea of it all. It should be in a special compartment.
My solution: vent straight to the outside with an exhaust, do not vent into the aeroplane.
iahmark From United States of America, joined Nov 2007, 30 posts, RR: 0 Reply 185, posted (4 months 2 days 11 hours ago) and read 5372 times:
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 180): "The fix, at least in the short term, continues to be focused on improving containment of the aircraft’s two existing lithium-ion batteries and adding more temperature monitors to provide earlier warning of abnormal battery performance via the engine indicating and crew alerting system.
"Program insiders say that initial data from the tests have reinforced the company’s confidence in its baseline redesign package and that it “feels good” about the revised configuration."
This seems foolish to me; why don’t Boeing develop an alternate system with Ni Cads which are known to be safe, how hard can it be?
By using Ni Cads it will be a weight penalty of what..50/60 lbs. extra (no big deal).... and the obvious software rewrite which shouldn’t take that long if you have all the team involved especially considering what’s on the line: planes grounded, big backlog, PR image with Li Ion batteries.
Airbus already announced it will be using Ni Cads for the A350 so this puts Boeing on a hard place, to continue using Li Ion is putting the bulls eye on them; I imagine if they get any more electrical issues it will get them magnifying glass of the FAA, EASA, etc.
kanban From United States of America, joined Jan 2008, 2498 posts, RR: 21 Reply 186, posted (4 months 2 days 11 hours ago) and read 5357 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 184): There seems to be nowhere on the net a hazard sheet regarding the battery used in the B 787.
Bingo... it is not available, the one you quote is different. all assumptions made from erroneous data are suspect. This is why many of us are sitting back patiently waiting for better definition.
Being a company owner, you probably make all the decisions based on your unique knowledge.. in this instance that would be dangerous.
By the way.. the "Dear" salutation is condescending.. please stop it.
Quote: Is it possible that one of the key benefits of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, which is denser and more humid cabin air, is the factor that triggered the battery failures that lead to its grounding?
While the answer may be ‘No’ the question is a good one.
Two people who work for Boeing, one directly, one indirectly through a supplier, have raised the possibility in casual regular conversation.
Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 181): Obviously, the above quoted special condition allows for escape of hazardous materials, but they shouldn't cause a damage capable of producing a major failure condition.
The NTSB is still looking at this; at this point it is not confirmed that these two conditions were met.
Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 183):
Answer to #2: Gasses are produced by thermal runaway and are vented overboard, as designed, so they never reach a saturation state when they can ignite. Explosion wouldn't happen.
Just because it didn't explode in this instance does not mean that there was not the potential possibility of explosion. I;m sure that the NTSB are looking at what would have happened if the BFD had have stood back and let it burn out.
prebennorholm From Denmark, joined Mar 2000, 6039 posts, RR: 55 Reply 188, posted (4 months 2 days 10 hours ago) and read 5273 times:
Quoting iahmark (Reply 185): By using Ni Cads it will be a weight penalty of what..50/60 lbs. extra (no big deal)....
The battery weight penalty will be more like 200 lbs.
Current batteries 2 x 65 lbs = 130 lbs. Ni-Cads are roughly 2.5 times heavier = 325 lbs.
That translates to increased fuel consumption = roughly 0.05%. That again adds $0.20 (20 cent) to your fuel bill when you go to Australia on a 787 with Ni-Cad batteries.
Otherwise I agree 100% with your post #185.
That is assuming only a battery change to Ni-Cad. In the realistic world we must guess upon two alternatives which mights be acceptable by the FAA, one with Li-Ion and one with Ni-Cad.
It is realistic to say that a re-certified 787 with Li-Ion will have grown new containment hardware of not insignificant weight. So maybe your original guess, only 50/60 lbs extra, is indeed correct?
But this is only guesses. Maybe, when the FAA is satisfied, the Li-Ion has become the heavier option? We will see whenn Boeing has made up their mind and FAA has approved.
Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs, Preben Norholm
2175301 From United States of America, joined May 2007, 988 posts, RR: 0 Reply 189, posted (4 months 2 days 10 hours ago) and read 5267 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 175): what is a hazard in normal environment, for example a factory, becomes magically not a hazard when you put it aboard an aeroplane?
Welcome to the very strange world of "hazard definition" by different departments in the government. In this case (and I do not work in the Aerospace industry); I would tend to believe that the FAA has done a better job of determining what is a real hazard.
However, there are two very distinct things to keep in mind about hazard definition:
1) Quantity/configuration matter. Nitroglycerine absorbed into a mix of clay and other things and formed into a stick 1" diameter and 10" long is a Class 1A explosive with enough energy to severely damage a small house. Nitroglycerine absorbed into a mix of clay and other things and formed into tablets for medical purposes is not considered and explosive at all and people carry pill boxes full of them. Those pills could actually be detonated with sufficient energy input; but the energy released is so small that its not a concern.
Other items are only a hazard is assembled into a certain configuration - and reasonably safe in other configurations (the chemical industry is where most of these concerns exists - but the grand-daddy example is having a critical mass of nuclear material. Configuration totally matters.
2) Sometimes the regulations are just crazy. I work in the nuclear industry. Everything in the world is naturally mildly radioactive at some level. But, if we can measure radioactivity (at any level) on items in the nuclear plant they become at least low level radioactive waste, with expensive disposal requirements. Thus, the normal lake mud/silt from using lake water as a coolant for a number of heat exchangers in the nuclear plant has to be treated as a low level nuclear waste (on the non-nuclear side of the plant we can just was that mud/silt back into the lake from whence it came). By the way; we deliberately do not have any restrooms on the nuclear side of the plant so that we do not have to treat normal human wastes as low level nuclear wastes (and everyone's waste is slightly radioactive).
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 190, posted (4 months 2 days 9 hours ago) and read 5190 times:
Quoting kanban (Reply 186): Bingo... it is not available, the one you quote is different. all assumptions made from erroneous data are suspect. This is why many of us are sitting back patiently waiting for better definition.
Being a company owner, you probably make all the decisions based on your unique knowledge.. in this instance that would be dangerous.
By the way.. the "Dear" salutation is condescending.. please stop it.
You all have been guessing back and forth all this days.
I had been following this thread for a while now before I started to post.
When one starts posting a different view, one is told that experts know better in a very condensating way.
Here in this thread I have been reading that the fire department in Boston really did not know what they were doing, it would have been better and less damaging to the aeroplain if the would not have intervened.
I have been reading that the grounding of the B 787 had really been premature.
That if the NTSB talks about flammable liquid it is not really serious aluminium burns too.
That the containment worked and there was really no real danger.
That above seems to be OK, but when one talks there was a danger of explosion, than one should rather listen to the experts or wait for the facts.
antskip From Australia, joined Jan 2006, 887 posts, RR: 5 Reply 192, posted (4 months 2 days 8 hours ago) and read 5101 times:
Boeing needs to accept they have made a huge error of judgement with this only one of so many innovations on this revolutionary airliner, and read the writing that is on most walls except their own - better for them to ditch this bridge-too-far, dump the lithium batteries, and get the plane back in the air. They were damn lucky it was not the Comet-1 all over again. Boeing should be thankful for the issues, and be proactive, not defensive. But they continue to be just that. The language as well as the technology of "containment" is a continuation of the original problem. It is starting to look like a mind-set. A character flaw. It is not a good look. To go on with that "solution" is just more denial. Right now they still have the option to look good. That is, be big enough to admit to their problem, and big enough to make it right. Before they are told to.
BEG2IAH From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 839 posts, RR: 12 Reply 193, posted (4 months 2 days 8 hours ago) and read 5094 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 184): The venting is as I understand it not all the time, but to remove smoke when it occurs. The main venting is not steadily through the e-bay.
When the aircraft cabin doors are closed, if venting does not occur all the time, what triggers venting in your opinion? Smell, smoke, something else? Who or what decides when to vent the electronics and equipment (EE) bay? Note, it's not "e-bay".
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 184): And what is when the aeroplane is on the ground rolling to the start or waiting an hour for de-icing and a battery goes of, does the venting works than?
Yes, it does. Do you get any air flow from your passenger service unit (PSU) when you are waiting for takeoff? Why wouldn't an EE bay get any air? Electronics generate heat and they need some air to cool off.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 184): In my opinion are the possible explosion of a vapour air mixture danger number one and the damage by fire danger number two. You will not get a corrosive liquid out of a lithium ion battery. You do not need to contain against that.
So now you don't want to contain electrolyte, but you want to contain smoke? I'm confused. How many times could've you read here that that's just impossible and that is exactly why there is venting going on. The fact that there was more smoke in Boston was because the airplane was on the ground with all doors wide open and venting was either off or inefficient. The aircraft was parked at the gate.
Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 187): The NTSB is still looking at this; at this point it is not confirmed that these two conditions were met.
Wrong. NTSB and FAA are not happy with frequency, i.e., that two batteries went into thermal runaway within such a short period of time. If the other battery had gone off 2 years later, B787 would not have been grounded.
Quoting BoeingVista (Reply 187): Just because it didn't explode in this instance does not mean that there was not the potential possibility of explosion. I;m sure that the NTSB are looking at what would have happened if the BFD had have stood back and let it burn out.
There is always a possibility for everything. BFD started yanking that battery when most of it burned out and all dangerous electrolyte vapors were probably long gone.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 190): You all have been guessing back and forth all this days.
Almost choked on my coffee... What do you mean "you all"? If anyone is making wild guesses it's you and a few other ones posting here. It's pretty clear most of us are waiting to hear the results of test flights and investigations, while you keep posting multiple times an hour. You are so upset and nervous about this battery issue that I find you more volatile than Li-ion batteries. Patience is not that bad, trust me.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 190): When one starts posting a different view, one is told that experts know better in a very condensating way.
"A different view" is usually wild uneducated speculation which bluntly ignores what people who build and test airplanes wrote in this thread. They are experts and they do know better than others, including engineers not working in the aerospace industry.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 190): That the containment worked and there was really no real danger.
Per the special condition I copied above, containment did work per the government regulations.
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 190): That above seems to be OK, but when one talks there was a danger of explosion, than one should rather listen to the experts or wait for the facts.
That is exactly what everyone should do instead of guessing and creating more drama than there is. If Boeing has hundreds of engineers working on finding a solution to this issue, FAA is doing its job, NTSB is doing its job, why is everyone here behaving like they are above the Pacific Ocean in a burning B787 (caused by a battery fire, what else), plunging straight into the ocean and no one believes them they are about to crash... Go figure.
Have a good rest of the weekend.
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Quote: ...
The goal is to get the planes flying passengers again, according to multiple sources with knowledge of the matter, while Boeing works on a comprehensive redesign of the lithium-ion battery system that could take nine months or more to implement.
The interim fix includes a heavy-duty titanium or steel containment box around the battery cells, and high-pressure evacuation tubes that, in the event of a battery fire, would vent any gases directly to the outside of the jet.
...
..
However, it’s unclear if the FAA is ready yet to accept containment of an overheated battery cell rather than prevention.
...
Even if the FAA agrees, the short-term fix will take at least three months to design, test, certify and retrofit, said an Everett source who knows details of Boeing’s proposed solutions.
...
According to Herbert, Boeing currently has approximately 90 engineers in Japan working on a complete redesign of the battery.
Boeing also appointed a top-level team from outside the 787 program, including non-Boeing battery experts, to provide clear-eyed analysis by people not wedded to previous approaches.
The initial redesign includes a fireproof battery box, made of titanium or steel, several sources said. That will seal the cells, keeping moisture out and flames in.
It also includes a venting system that will directly evacuate to the outside any vapor and liquid flowing from the battery.
...
...
sweair From Sweden, joined Nov 2011, 1597 posts, RR: 0 Reply 195, posted (4 months 2 days 7 hours ago) and read 4913 times:
Maybe along with a better containment, change the charge/recharge cycle to an even more conservative one? And a very stringent temp monitor, cut the battery off with just a small temp rise. Is it possible to catch a Li-Ion before thermal run away?
Then go for the long term fix, a different chemical mix, one that is more stable, not nic-cad. Most drama queens think that B should go for nic-cad. Because their beloved OEM will do that and they can do no wrong..
astuteman From United Kingdom, joined Jan 2005, 9257 posts, RR: 96 Reply 196, posted (4 months 2 days 6 hours ago) and read 4856 times:
Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 193): If anyone is making wild guesses it's you and a few other ones posting here. It's pretty clear most of us are waiting to hear the results of test flights and investigations, while you keep posting multiple times an hour.
We're 200 posts into the NINTH thread, and "most of us are waiting?"
From my seat, just about everyone posting on here is speculating, no matter what their experience.
Those that don't possess the knowledge and are really "waiting" (like me) are reading the threads and avoiding posting This is my second post in 9 threads.
Quoting BEG2IAH (Reply 193): "A different view" is usually wild uneducated speculation which bluntly ignores what people who build and test airplanes wrote in this thread. They are experts and they do know better than others, including engineers not working in the aerospace industry.
Of course experts that DO know better than others and work in the aerospace industry put a battery configuration into the air on the 787 that has now been grounded for some 5 weeks, and shows no sign of going anywhere soon.
For me, conscious incompetence is arguably the most underrated characteristic in human behaviour.
Those that choose to ignore ANY inputs that come from outside the field just because they come from outside the field are on a course which will inevitably ultimately lead to failure.
Of course that doesn't mean that every "lay" input is relevant and valuable
Thanks for your wonderfull contribution. I did read all the nine threads, participated at times quite actively. Your post is a most welcome reflection on this sunny Sunday morning . . .
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
14ccKemiskt From Sweden, joined Nov 2010, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 198, posted (4 months 2 days 4 hours ago) and read 4370 times:
It now seems as Boeings temporary solution actually will be to provide a better containment box and to vent out any smoke or gasses outside of the plane, should any new battery fires occur.
Although I can see why many people don't like this solution, how is a new fire event supposed to be handled by the pilots after the new safe containment system is in place?
Is it
"Oh, battery is on fire again. Let's fly another three hours to LAX as planned and replace it there. "
or will it be
"Oh, battery is on fire. We all know that it is not dangerous, but lets land a.s.a.p. just in case"
packsonflight From Iceland, joined Jan 2010, 328 posts, RR: 0 Reply 199, posted (4 months 2 days 3 hours ago) and read 4234 times:
Quoting 14ccKemiskt (Reply 200):
It now seems as Boeings temporary solution actually will be to provide a better containment box and to vent out any smoke or gasses outside of the plane, should any new battery fires occur.
The fact that Boeing is considering better containment system is a clear confirmation of that the containment failed or is inadequate. But I can not see the regulators accepting any interim solution that does not fully comply with the special condition set for the Li batteries, meaning that it is not enough to simply address the battery fire containment. The failure frequency has to be addressed too, and be brought to the previous level of one fail per 10 million flight hours.
Where have you seen Boeing being satisfied with just fixing the containment? Hey we fixed the box, burning battery is no problemo..
I don´t think B even knows how to declare the 788 safe right now, fixing the enclosure is just one part, making sure batteries don't go up in flames is not yet solved, it might be a tighter tolerance model being implementing, shutting down way before any deemed unsafe level is reached.
The ultimate solution will be changing the chemistry of the cells, but that will take more than a year, so an interim fix that will be deemed safe enough will be put forward.
14ccKemiskt From Sweden, joined Nov 2010, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 201, posted (4 months 2 days 2 hours ago) and read 4184 times:
With the current failure rate, there is going to be multiple battery fires every year. Will the new containment fix be so safe that the planes wont have to abort any flights? In that case, will then the passaengers at least be informed on why the plane emits smoke.
"Ladies and gentlemen, we're currently having a battery fire onboard and thats why some of you see smoke outside the windows. This is totally normal and we will continue the fight to our destination."
No, this does not sound like an acceptable solution.
Kaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2587 posts, RR: 24 Reply 202, posted (4 months 2 days 2 hours ago) and read 4168 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 175): Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 174):
As already mentioned, read the FARs (Federal Aviation Regulations) and IATA standards, which define what is hazardous in an aviation environment. Or read the contributions to these threads by rcair1 and other experts.
So dear Kaiarahi,
something what is a hazard in normal environment, for example a factory, becomes magically not a hazard when you put it aboard an aeroplane?
Please refrain from putting words in my mouth. What I said was that the FARs and equivalent regulations in other jurisdictions contain precise definitions of what is hazardous in an aviation environment, and Wiki, a volunteer fireman's guide, etc are irrelevant. Workplace health and safety regulations are also irrelevant to the design and certification of an aircraft.
BestWestern From Ireland, joined Sep 2000, 6510 posts, RR: 58 Reply 203, posted (4 months 2 days 2 hours ago) and read 4106 times:
Quoting blrsea (Reply 194): Even if the FAA agrees, the short-term fix will take at least three months to design, test, certify and retrofit, said an Everett source who knows details of Boeing’s proposed solutions.
From this thread, we are learning that the minimum time to make, test, certify and install a quick fix containment box is three months. If we assume that this is the route that Boeing will go, we are looking at a relaunch in time for Northern Summer peak travel. Will this be an acceptable fix?
Quoting blrsea (Reply 194): a comprehensive redesign of the lithium-ion battery system that could take nine months or more to implement.
The odds that this aircraft will fly before the end of the IATA summer schedule are getting slimmer by the day. I'd say that plates are being thrown in Doha at the cost of this delay.
mjoelnir From Iceland, joined Feb 2013, 401 posts, RR: 0 Reply 204, posted (4 months 2 days 1 hour ago) and read 3944 times:
Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 204): Please refrain from putting words in my mouth. What I said was that the FARs and equivalent regulations in other jurisdictions contain precise definitions of what is hazardous in an aviation environment, and Wiki, a volunteer fireman's guide, etc are irrelevant. Workplace health and safety regulations are also irrelevant to the design and certification of an aircraft.
That is why Boeing and the FAA did that a great job certifying this battery.
And to be absolutely clear about it, the two incidents show that they got it wrong.
They got not only wrong how often it would happen, but also what could happen.
You only have to read the provisional reports of the NTSB with open eyes to understand that.
If a flammable liquid poses a fire and explosion risk in a closed room in a factory, a tank truck, a fuel depot and even under the bare sky in a not closed area, it will pose a risk in an aeroplane.
If the aviation regulation says otherwise it got it wrong.
It is good to get your sneer at a volunteer fire fighter in, of course not being professional we have no idea what we are talking about.
Ever given a thought that volunteer fire fighters are often in areas were there is not a dense population, and that we are often asked to do jobs in more different areas than a specialized professional force and that that keeps us on our toes, to know about fire fighting in a lot of different environment´s including what to do if an aircraft is on fire?
And that we do similar training and met the professionals on the courses we take, and that the main difference is not getting paid for it?
Some guys in these thread seem even to know everything better than the professional fire departments, but that is OK they are aviation experts.
It is very arrogant to disregard any information not marked Aviation and a sign how blind people can get when never looking over the rim over their own cup of coffee.
JerseyFlyer From United Kingdom, joined May 2007, 475 posts, RR: 0 Reply 205, posted (4 months 2 days ago) and read 3815 times:
Quoting BestWestern (Reply 205): The odds that this aircraft will fly before the end of the IATA summer schedule are getting slimmer by the day
Agree. Not only do they have to design and certify a fix, they have to fit it to 50 grounded aircraft and all those built but not delivered during the groundings.
Kaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2587 posts, RR: 24 Reply 206, posted (4 months 2 days ago) and read 3716 times:
Quoting mjoelnir (Reply 206): If a flammable liquid poses a fire and explosion risk in a closed room in a factory, a tank truck, a fuel depot and even under the bare sky in a not closed area, it will pose a risk in an aeroplane.
If the aviation regulation says otherwise it got it wrong.
I doubt that any factory would be allowed to store 300,000+ litres of fuel a metre or so away from two massive turbines running at 900C degrees. So you're saying that aviation regulations got it wrong in allowing wing tanks?
Every item certified for an aircraft is certified for that aircraft, regardless of how it might be regulated in a factory or other environment.
CF-CPI From Canada, joined Nov 2000, 854 posts, RR: 0 Reply 207, posted (4 months 1 day 23 hours ago) and read 3673 times:
Quoting 14ccKemiskt (Reply 200): Although I can see why many people don't like this solution, how is a new fire event supposed to be handled by the pilots after the new safe containment system is in place?
Right. Given the failure rate of the batteries based on a 50-airframe fleet, as far as I am concerned, preventing the overheats and fires in the first place is the only option.
I must have missed something, but is anyone seriously contemplating resuming passenger ops simply on the basis of better containment?
ServantLeader From United States of America, joined Jan 2013, 62 posts, RR: 0 Reply 208, posted (4 months 1 day 22 hours ago) and read 3484 times:
Quoting astuteman (Reply 196): For me, conscious incompetence is arguably the most underrated characteristic in human behaviour.
Those that choose to ignore ANY inputs that come from outside the field just because they come from outside the field are on a course which will inevitably ultimately lead to failure.
Right, I have been called names and told to go play in another sandbox by the self-proclaimed rulers of this thread for daring to criticize Boeing's handling of the 787 crisis--which has been textbook wrongheaded. I do appreciate the technical expert opinions regarding the battery situation and have learned quite a bit from it. But there's only so much that can be done / said about chemistries and their behaviors in given environments. IMHO if Boeing stays the course of defending the Li-ion battery system instead of abandoning it as not ready for prime commercial flight time they will become the new modern day standard of how not to handle a crisis situation.
RickNRoll From Afghanistan, joined Jan 2012, 508 posts, RR: 0 Reply 209, posted (4 months 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 3333 times:
Quoting blrsea (Reply 194):
Seattle times is reporting that the interim fix is more towards containment and that Boeing will look at battery design changes in the long term .
The time frames mentioned here are what I have been expecting all along. Which is unfortunate for Boeing, but there is no way out of it.
The Boeing proposal for a better containment system made from titanium that vents directly outside is also something that I have expected would be needed. That is, it acknowledges the NTSB complaint that the containment did not work to the extent that it expects, or even now expects. Perhaps the wording for this requirement was never completely expressed properly and unambiguously to the agreement of both parties.
sweair From Sweden, joined Nov 2011, 1597 posts, RR: 0 Reply 210, posted (4 months 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 3288 times:
A less agressive charge cycle, would it be doable? Staying out of the current set limits, or would that not fly with the FAA as a backup system? Longer charge and discharge, would it be possible?
Kaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 2587 posts, RR: 24 Reply 212, posted (4 months 1 day 21 hours ago) and read 3222 times:
Quoting ServantLeader (Reply 210): Boeing's handling of the 787 crisis--which has been textbook wrongheaded.
Perhaps this could be the subject of a separate, dedicated thread if you want to pursue it. Although organizational/situational leadership is one of my professional fields, I don't know enough about what's happening inside Boeing to form much of an opinion.
goosebayguy From United Kingdom, joined Sep 2009, 239 posts, RR: 0 Reply 213, posted (4 months 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 3005 times:
It has amazed me that the FAA found it so acceptable to have a battery catch fire so long as there was a containment system and a vent overboard for the smoke and fumes. Just because new technology is there it doesn't mean its better than what came before. In the space race the Americans spent millions on a pen to write in zero g conditions whilst the Russians used a pencil. Okay it probably never happened but the gist of it may apply here to the battery problem.
7BOEING7 From United States of America, joined Oct 2012, 580 posts, RR: 3 Reply 215, posted (4 months 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 2995 times:
Quoting sweair (Reply 213): Are pneumatics that much less efficient?
This has absolutely nothing to do with pneumatics has been pointed out in a multitude of replys. If the 787 was a pneumatic airplane it still would have had a LIon battery.
Stitch From United States of America, joined Jul 2005, 26952 posts, RR: 83 Reply 216, posted (4 months 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 3000 times:
Quoting goosebayguy (Reply 215): It has amazed me that the FAA found it so acceptable to have a battery catch fire so long as there was a containment system and a vent overboard for the smoke and fumes.
NiCad and Lead Acid batteries can also catch fire, hence they also are required to have containment systems and the ability for any escaping gases to be vented overboard. Such requirements were not unique to Li-Ion.
That post must have been moved here, I asked that in another thread.
My question was about changing the charging cycle as a temporary solution, a slower charge/recharge cycle and lower maximum and minimum. The dendrites were said to form by fast charge/recharge.. I started thinking this might be a way around it for the time being along with a beefed up containment.
Revelation From United States of America, joined Feb 2005, 10569 posts, RR: 21 Reply 218, posted (4 months 1 day 20 hours ago) and read 2992 times:
I don't get this part of the ST article in #194 above:
Quote:
Secondly, as Teal Group aviation analyst Richard Aboulafia points out, the Airbus jet’s critical systems are more conventional — most of them powered by hydraulics or pneumatics, not electricity. To increase fuel efficiency, the 787 uses electricity for those systems, and so it requires a high-energy, quickly recharging backup power source.
“Boeing needs a faster response time,” said Aboulafia. “It needs lithium ion.”
It seems to me our more expert contributors here have told us the loads seen by 787 and other traditional jet transports are the same while airborne in the emergency situation of two engines out and RAT deployed. The main driver of needing a larger battery is the need for electricity for braking on the ground, which older a/c run via hydraulics that have a reservoir large enough to deal with the need. So what is this talk of "faster response time"?
Quoting 14ccKemiskt (Reply 200): It now seems as Boeings temporary solution actually will be to provide a better containment box and to vent out any smoke or gasses outside of the plane, should any new battery fires occur.
Although I can see why many people don't like this solution, how is a new fire event supposed to be handled by the pilots after the new safe containment system is in place?
No different than what the JAL pilot did.
Quoting CF-CPI (Reply 209): Given the failure rate of the batteries based on a 50-airframe fleet, as far as I am concerned, preventing the overheats and fires in the first place is the only option.
I must have missed something, but is anyone seriously contemplating resuming passenger ops simply on the basis of better containment?
That's what the article in #194 above states.
Clearly Boeing is feeling the need to try that approach, but it's far from clear how the various regulators, operators and insurers will react, not to mention the travelling public.
If they try that approach and it doesn't get approved, they have an even worse situation on their hands. Also if they try that approach and there is another incident, they have a far worse situation on their hands.
Boeing is in between a rock and a hard place.
Clearly this is a situation that demands determination and resolution of the root cause, but it's fairly likely that the damage to the two failed batteries will not allow for that.
If you can't say what the root cause is, you can't say that you've fixed the problem.
People get very uncomfortable when you start talking about likely root causes, but it seems that may be the way it has to be.
The article says "the most likely culprit is a tiny metal shard contaminating the cell during the manufacturing process" but how do you prove that a metal shard is NOT present inside the cell?
It would seem whatever testing they have now is not detecting that case.
Can you intentionally contaminate a cell and then show that (presumably improved) testing would detect the contamination?
Sassiciai From Belgium, joined Jan 2013, 33 posts, RR: 0 Reply 219, posted (4 months 1 day 19 hours ago) and read 2925 times:
This is thread 9 on the topic, and it's almost 99% devoted from the start of Thread 1 to amateur speculation about batteries, speculation that just goes round and round! I must say, in all my years of watching this site, I haven't seen anything quite so shallow as this sequence! I wondered how to participate in the last 4 or 5 weeks, but never found a suitable reason to join in!
I guess I'll keep looking every few days, and reading diagonally through most items! But mostly, I'll wait until "real news" becomes available, and even hope that some of the most frequent posters eventually run out of enthusiasm for their hobby horses!
Wish there was a "serious" thread on this topic! Maybe I need to open a thread on other non-battery issues. I'm a "user" of airliners, not a battery technician, so I'm perhaps more interested in the impact the grounding of 50, and the delay on another 750, has on the world's airline industry!
I wonder how many a-net people contributed to all these 9 threads, each of +/- 200 posts - seems to me there is a small set of "fanatics who know tons about batteries". Not too many others, especially the more knowledgeable, who seem to have stayed out! As is often the case, it's 20% who do the first 80%, and the remaining 80% who do the other 20%
I did, one call a crisis in leadership -- I was called a troll and a freshman MBA student for my troubles and the mods shut it down because it was too radical a departure from phd level physics to be of interest.
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