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Captain Of AF447 Only Had 1 Hour Of Sleep  
User currently offlineManuCH From Switzerland, joined Jun 2005, 3011 posts, RR: 47
Posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 21 hours ago) and read 38674 times:
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According to a previously unreleased report by French news magazine Le Point, the Captain of flight AF 447 that plunged into the Atlantic while enroute between GIG and CDG, had only had 1 hour of sleep on the night before the flight.

Quote:

A new report reveals that Marc Debois, captain of the doomed AF447, wasn’t functioning at his finest during his June 2009 flight from Rio de Janiero in Brazil to Paris, France. According to a previously undisclosed report obtained by the French news magazine Le Point, the 58-year-old Dubois can be heard on a black box recording saying, “I didn’t sleep enough last night. One hour--it’s not enough.”

(...)

Dubois began complaining about being tired shortly after take off. His co-pilots, 32-year-old Pierre-Cedric Bonin and 37-year-old David Robert, weren’t doing much better. According to the report, they were also feeling groggy after spending the night in Rio with their wives and girlfriends.

Source: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/worl...our-sleep-report-article-1.1289998
Original article in French: http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/crash-...e-cachee-15-03-2013-1640312_23.php

This is an alarming twist of facts. While it's known that pilots sometimes have a hard time sleeping because of jet lag, spending the night in a city (essentially, partying) is certainly not an acceptable reason to be tired.

Some also ask for the full CVR recordings to be released:

Quote:

More puzzlement as to how an Air France A330-200 could have been belly flopped into the mid-Atlantic in 2009 should add pressure on the French air safety investigator, the BEA, to release the full recording of the conversations in the cockpit of the doomed jet.

What was said in cockpit, and what it reveals about the relationship between the three pilots present during the fatal plunge that killed all 228 people on board the flight between Rio and Paris is an increasingly obvious missing element in resolving the mystery.

Source: http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalk...-af447-tapes-must-be-released-now/

Of course pilots are trained to be fit to fly. But if it's true that sleeping is taken so lightly by some crew, I wonder what could be done to increase safety. Pilots are only humans after all, but still highly trained professionals, so one would expect them to behave accordingly.


Never trust a statistic you didn't fake yourself
279 replies: All unread, showing first 25:
 
User currently offlineairbuster From Netherlands, joined Mar 2007, 448 posts, RR: 0
Reply 1, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 21 hours ago) and read 38609 times:

Have you done long haul flying for a couple of years week in week out? It messes you up. The article doesn't state that they had been partying. Moreso the flight departed at 7 pm. To me that means that the captains comment about 1 hour of sleep may refer to a pre departure afternoon nap instead of the previous night. In that case it's very normal to have 1 hour of sleep before an evening departure.

If they had been partying and were dead tired then yes that may have aggravated the whole situation. And bad on them.

I do however think that they were just tired like every long haul crew is and this is sensualistic information.

You say that pilots are trained to be fit to fly, really? It's more like pilots are TOLD to be fit to fly. The only thing that would give you fit pilots on every flight is to change airline schedules and give them more layover- and leave time, that is no reality in today's economy.

May they rest in peace.



FLY FOKKER JET LINE!
User currently offlineManuCH From Switzerland, joined Jun 2005, 3011 posts, RR: 47
Reply 2, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 21 hours ago) and read 38350 times:
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Quoting airbuster (Reply 1):
I do however think that they were just tired like every long haul crew is and this is sensualistic information.

I surely hopes it turns out to be just that.

Quoting airbuster (Reply 1):
You say that pilots are trained to be fit to fly, really? It's more like pilots are TOLD to be fit to fly.

I stand corrected, I used the wrong word. But now I'm curious: what happens if a pilot calls the company and says he doesn't feel fit to fly, because of lack of sleep? Are there any consequences? This would surely mess up scheduling if an AF pilot does so while in GIG. Do pilots avoid admitting their lack of sleep to prevent a scheduling chaos and a huge delay? Where does one draw the line?



Never trust a statistic you didn't fake yourself
User currently offlineIndependence76 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 256 posts, RR: 0
Reply 3, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 19 hours ago) and read 37839 times:

Would this have dramatically changed the ability to provide instruction towards the First Officer(s) in control? He was in the crew bunk for 9 minutes before he was called down urgently. One would think after only 1 hour of sleep that going back to bed in the night would put him to sleep rather quickly.

Being called down only a few minutes later means it was likely he was even more tired than before. Not what you want to have in a non-normal critical situation.



"In general, pride is at the bottom of all great mistakes." - John Ruskin
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 4, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 19 hours ago) and read 37588 times:
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The above post is a surprising third level opinion on an already very subjective report by "experts" to the judicial system.
1/ - One has to know - and it deserves repeating - that for every accident, a judge is in charge of the investigation, of which the BEA report is just one piece.
2/- Judicial experts are then appointed by the judge to comment / complete / criticize the oficial BEA report. Among these experts are AF current or ex pilots.
3/- The possibility of fatigue is always considered in these reports, especially when the official BEA report remained silent on the subject.
4/- The departure was at 22.00 Z, which is 18.00 local.
5/- For AF crews, Rio is not exactly the safest place to go "partying" ; They've seen too many aggressions and muggings to really go out on the town at night.
So.
We have a subjective reporting of the experts on things like "lack of dynamism in the ETOPS preparation", and the taking as fact the captain's complaint that he didn't sleep more than an hour. That reporting is then further subjectively exploited be a weekly magazine, putting it together with the main pilot union pointing at crew fatigue on long haul duties, occulting the fact that these were in no respect related.
Then a NYC newspaper goes on by saying :"they were also feeling groggy after spending the night in Rio with their wives and girlfriends."
The report only mentions that a wife and a companion were in Rio with these pilots. The other part of the report mentions only as a possible factor :"4.3 Maximum fatigue in the low phase of the circadian cycle"
The 19.00 L departure means that the crew had to take some rest during daylight hours. The problem is that the rest quality during these hours is low.
And then you add your own comments on these "facts". Are you really so sure that these aircrews could be just a bunch of jolly party goers totally lacking professionalism ?
And do you have the witnesses who could testify on these nocturnal activities by this crew ? At least even the report,and the newspapers haven't.

[Edited 2013-03-16 12:32:29]


Contrail designer
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 5, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 19 hours ago) and read 37468 times:
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Quoting ManuCH (Reply 2):
what happens if a pilot calls the company and says he doesn't feel fit to fly, because of lack of sleep? Are there any consequences? This would surely mess up scheduling if an AF pilot does so while in GIG. Do pilots avoid admitting their lack of sleep to prevent a scheduling chaos and a huge delay? Where does one draw the line?

I can answer that very quickly : It happened to me in Guadeloupe. Too tired to fly. OPS was advised, the flight was delayed 7 hours, to allow another pilot present to have his minimum rest... I took over his scheduled flight some 24 hours later. Our regulations are that a pîlot is sole responsible for estimating his physical / mental capacity to operate as a crew member.
I was given 10 days of rest by the airline medical department, and had to do a check-up before I resumed my duties.



Contrail designer
User currently offlineltbewr From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 13141 posts, RR: 15
Reply 6, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 18 hours ago) and read 37211 times:

It is possible that the pilots may not have gotten a good quality of sleep or nap within the previous 24 hours, the pilot commenting may have meant they only got 1 true hour of deep sleep. Still, I am quite sure other airline's flights in what is a higher risk region may have had similar sleep cycle issues but they didn't go down.

User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 7, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 18 hours ago) and read 37005 times:
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Quoting ltbewr (Reply 6):
I am quite sure other airline's flights in what is a higher risk region may have had similar sleep cycle issues but they didn't go down.

And your point is ?... Especially when the official report doesn't even acknowledge a possible fatigue as a factor of the accident ?



Contrail designer
User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 8, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 17 hours ago) and read 36900 times:

The fact that the final report by the BEA only selectively quotes from the CVR and has omitted a reference to fatigue implies that it is protecting the airline.

It also removes from the scope of the report a critical safety issue that Annex 13 ICAO requires crash reports to address, which is the safety lessons to be learned, which would include fatigue risk and management.

As the author of the blog quoted early in this thread can I make the point that unless we know everything there is to know from the CVR as to what happened between the men in the cockpit we cannot truly known what it is that happened to the machine.

This should not in my opinion be an issue as to sensationalist reporting or otherwise.

This is about the omission of vital information from a final report into a major crash, and omission will always, quite rightly, lead to suspicion.

The full tapes must be released. In the interests of safety.


User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 9, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 17 hours ago) and read 36417 times:
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Problem is I do not for one second trust alleged objectivity from third parties.
The whole damn loty is just about someone saying that he didn't sleep for more than one hour ( how many times have you heard such exaggeration ? ) and some very dubious interpretations from some people who listened to the tape as to the "dynamism " of the crew - or lack thereof - during a briefing on ETOPS available airports.
There is nothing else and your conspiracy theories are just that : Theories.
Ah ! Sensationalism !
I stand with the BEA and all the other organisms which participated in this investigation. And our CVR recordings are not for the ghouls who would seek some sick pleasure in listening to the last words of dead people.
Go look somewhere else, I'd say to them.
There will be a court phase and experts from all sides will be discussing this aspect. They will make references to the tapes, but the transcript is not for public use.
We pilots will not allow it.



Contrail designer
User currently offlineblueflyer From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 4076 posts, RR: 2
Reply 10, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 17 hours ago) and read 35660 times:
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Quoting airbuster (Reply 1):
To me that means that the captains comment about 1 hour of sleep may refer to a pre departure afternoon nap instead of the previous night. In that case it's very normal to have 1 hour of sleep before an evening departure.

You are editorializing. As quoted by the OP and confirmed in the French article he links to, the captain states "last night I didn't sleep enough." Even at 7 pm, "last night" is the only correct translation, not earlier this afternoon or another variation, there is simply no wiggle room for interpretation there.

This assumes the report is correct, however. Hard to know for a fact since only selected sections of the CVR were ever released, and yet in this particular case, the claim from the magazine should be easy to refute because the French article states, down to the second, at what time the captain is allegedly heard making this comment (010419).

Finally, the French magazine that this report comes from may not be Le Monde, but it isn't in the habit of finding Elvis alive in a Caribbean island or another every other month either. I would take this report very seriously, barring any evidence contradicting it, evidence that, as explained above, would be very easy to provide.

As the trial nears, I would think we would eventually get a full version of the CVR released. In light of this article, if it doesn't happen, allegations, and suspicions, of a cover-up will only increase.

[Edited 2013-03-16 15:23:46]


I've got $h*t to do
User currently offlinedfambro From United States of America, joined Nov 2009, 333 posts, RR: 0
Reply 11, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 16 hours ago) and read 35433 times:

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 8):
The full tapes must be released.

There should be no presumption of privacy during operation of a public transport.


User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 12, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 16 hours ago) and read 34987 times:
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Quoting blueflyer (Reply 10):
In light of this article, if it doesn't happen, allegations, and suspicions, of a cover-up will only increase

You forget the court case. That point will be discussed at length. The tape will not be made public.

Quoting dfambro (Reply 11):
There should be no presumption of privacy during operation of a public transport.

Fortunately I live in France and privacy is very much protected. By law.
Again, the pilot unions will not allow it, and the law is, on this subject, on our side.

For the poster who claims that it is required for safety reasons, we, pilot unions of all countries through IFALPA have acted and are still acting a lot more on fatigue and rest than anybody else, be they bloggers or just thrill seekers. The studies made on these subjects are quite wide ranging and involve a lot more specialised knowledge than you'd think : aeronautical physicians, sleep specialists, psychologists and airline pilots, some of them being also physicians.
So your argument is, I'm afraid, moot.

[Edited 2013-03-16 15:14:38]


Contrail designer
User currently offlineairproxx From France, joined Jun 2008, 638 posts, RR: 1
Reply 13, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 16 hours ago) and read 34754 times:

Quoting airbuster (Reply 1):
You say that pilots are trained to be fit to fly, really? It's more like pilots are TOLD to be fit to fly. The only thing that would give you fit pilots on every flight is to change airline schedules and give them more layover- and leave time, that is no reality in today's economy.

Thanks for this sentence, actually the only one that does make any sense here.

Quoting ManuCH (Thread starter):

I'm quiet surprised that, considering the fact that such a PR (whatever the source is) is objectively a regular bashing against a dead crew, with all the sensationalism needed to have it published even on A.net, you, as a "moderator" would spread it without any other form of concern towards all the victims.

Now just a small light on the investigations made by French BEA:

You all aviation fans from A.net and others, should know that every AF447 investigations made by the BEA and DGAC, have been biased by an industrial pressure, leading to an incredible and amazing denigration campaign against an air crew, we haven't seen since the A320 accident in Habsheim. The climax of it all occurred when a CVR strip, showing pilots conversation seconds before crash, bleeded illegally into the medias.
While everyone is arguing about what a good pilot should do, must do, should have done this night, etc... The true question should be; why is it so? Why such an important piece of investigation is now publicly revealed?
How come an institution of this importance like BEA made such a mistake?
The result? There's been a terrible buzz around the fact that, if the AF447 pilots were completely panicked on the last moments of the flight, maybe the crash was their own and very fault...!

So reading to this (stupid) story, I'm fearing the same thing is happening as when the CVR extract was (illegally) revealed.

No I'll stop here, knowing that as soon as I can change my A320 type rating for anything-else-but-an-Airbus type rating, I'll go for it.



If you can meet with triumph and disaster, and treat those two impostors just the same
User currently offlineairproxx From France, joined Jun 2008, 638 posts, RR: 1
Reply 14, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 16 hours ago) and read 34665 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 12):
Fortunately I live in France and privacy is very much protected. By law.
Again, the pilot unions will not allow it, and the law is, on this subject, on our side.

Won't they? They already did, actually.



If you can meet with triumph and disaster, and treat those two impostors just the same
User currently offlineWingedMigrator From United States of America, joined Oct 2005, 2219 posts, RR: 56
Reply 15, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 16 hours ago) and read 34616 times:

Quoting ManuCH (Thread starter):
an increasingly obvious missing element in resolving the mystery.

Excuse me, what mystery?


User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 16, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 16 hours ago) and read 34516 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 12):
Again, the pilot unions will not allow it, and the law is, on this subject, on our side.

Why won't the union allow it? Certainly every Part 121 pilot in the United States at least accepts it.

It seems to me that the answer to the question is "E.U. privacy law provides a shield that, here, shields incompetence."

Pilots should be publicly accountable when they do something wrong, no different from professionals in any other industry (though perhaps the public has a heightened right to know with pilots since they are employees of a common carrier).

Quoting Pihero (Reply 12):
For the poster who claims that it is required for safety reasons, we, pilot unions of all countries through IFALPA have acted and are still acting a lot more on fatigue and rest than anybody else, be they bloggers or just thrill seekers.

The issue is one of government accountability, not of fatigue.

Sometimes, all government investigative agencies (BEA, NTSB, AAIB, etc.) make mistakes. The more information is public, the better that interested parties can evaluate their work.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineblueflyer From United States of America, joined Jan 2006, 4076 posts, RR: 2
Reply 17, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 15 hours ago) and read 33822 times:
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Quoting Pihero (Reply 12):
Fortunately I live in France and privacy is very much protected. By law.

I would be the first one to argue that most countries should do better to protect the privacy of their citizens, but I would also say that the right to privacy is not and should never be absolute. If someone enters in a profession where their behavior outside normal working hours can and does have consequences, sometimes fatal, on their performance during working hours and members of the public, they need to accept that, at some point in their career, their right to privacy may have to come second to the right to know, whether that professional is a doctor, a pilot or a plant operator.

That doesn't mean I have the right to know what a pilot does on every layover, but on a layover preceding a fatal accident that he didn't survive to explain himself, it does.



I've got $h*t to do
User currently offlineManuCH From Switzerland, joined Jun 2005, 3011 posts, RR: 47
Reply 18, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 15 hours ago) and read 33824 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
HEAD MODERATOR

Quoting Pihero (Reply 4):
And then you add your own comments on these "facts". Are you really so sure that these aircrews could be just a bunch of jolly party goers totally lacking professionalism ?
And do you have the witnesses who could testify on these nocturnal activities by this crew ?

Of course not. I have quoted what I've found. This has been some major news here and a lot of media have talked about it, so I thought it was worth a discussion on A.net. That's what forums are about after all.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 5):
I can answer that very quickly : It happened to me in Guadeloupe. Too tired to fly.

Thank you.

Quoting airproxx (Reply 13):
I'm quiet surprised that, considering the fact that such a PR (whatever the source is) is objectively a regular bashing against a dead crew, with all the sensationalism needed to have it published even on A.net, you, as a "moderator" would spread it without any other form of concern towards all the victims.

I don't consider that source to be particularly unreliable in general. It's an online news site like many others that may be quoted as sources. As I said, it is something that is making the news, and is causing quite some noise. Why not discuss it on A.net? Again, that's what forums are about. There are some very skilled professionals in here and I was sure that some would have shed some light on the matter, and debunk/discuss/whatever there is to say on that article.

Everyone, there's no need to get so upset here. It's a discussion, and you are all free to bring your arguments. I don't think it's a taboo to speculate, even if there's a final report already.

Quoting WingedMigrator (Reply 15):

Quoting ManuCH (Thread starter):
an increasingly obvious missing element in resolving the mystery.

Excuse me, what mystery?

Not my quote - ask the person who wrote the article/blog.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 12):
Fortunately I live in France and privacy is very much protected. By law.
Again, the pilot unions will not allow it, and the law is, on this subject, on our side.

What is the objective reason why the pilot unions are against making the CVR transcripts publicly available? Couldn't it provide interesting information to improve safety?



Never trust a statistic you didn't fake yourself
User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 19, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 15 hours ago) and read 33629 times:

This is not a witch hunt concerning the pilots, as I have repeatedly emphasized elsewhere not as a matter of opinion, but as a matter of law and convention, and in close consultation with sources competent to speak about such matters as well as experienced Airbus pilots among my contacts in the US, in France and in Australia.

The airline is responsible for the performance of its pilots. It is responsible for providing the pilots with a safe work place, and with the appropriate SOPS and fatigue risk management.

What happened to AF447 is the responsibility of Air France. Why it happened is of critical importance to air safety, and the whole purpose of crash investigations is not to blame but to learn and apply, and we cannot learn and apply the lessons of AF447 unless we know everything that happened in the cockpit.

The pilots seem needlessly defensive considering the questions that arise as to how they were managed by the company.

One of the first things A330 pilots did to me in relation to this report was show me what the captain would have seen standing at the back of the cockpit. He would have seen the position of the side stick controllers, including the one the PF kept for almost the entire duration of the crash sequence in the fully back position.

This makes his engagement in resolving the control crisis very important. The disclosure of fatigue is a critical element of this, and one needs to ask, why would the BEA exclude this?

I would urge everyone reading the final report whether in English or French to do what my panel of contacts required me to do, which is print it out, then go through it with a marker pen separating what is a narrative as to what the BEA thinks happened and what the BEA found happened.

The structure of this report is intriguing, in that it includes very early a narrative that sets up the situation in which the less experienced of the two first officers is designated by the captain as the PF, something not discovered by the other first officer until he returned to the flight deck.

The report makes an important point about the way in which the hand over was, or in this case, wasn't fully conducted.

In its guidance post the accident and at about the time an AF panel of review that made confidential recommendations to the company AF did make it clear that new instructions had been issued as to how hand overs were to conducted.

What is intriguing, among many things, in this BEA report, is that it opens certain issues in the narrative but them doesn't close them. How the pilots interacted with each other is of crucial importance.

We cannot get to the truth without knowing what they actually said and did during every second of the crash sequence.

The responsibility for what they did is borne by Air France, not by the pilots. By international convention.

This accident is yet another illustration of the limitations of blogs like mine and the media in general.

Serious study of original material, diligent pursuit of experienced opinion, and refresher reading of the ICAO guidlines for accident reports, all consume an immense amount of time.

Yet we live in a world where it all has to be reduced to a few hundred words or dot points.

My plea to readers of stories about such topics, is NOT to rely on journalists for anything more than signals as to where interesting and hopefully important things may be found. The idea is to start a discussion, and at times, a demand for action. But not to provide shortcuts to answers.


User currently offlineCX Flyboy From Hong Kong, joined Dec 1999, 6620 posts, RR: 55
Reply 20, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 15 hours ago) and read 33087 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 5):
Our regulations are that a pîlot is sole responsible for estimating his physical / mental capacity to operate as a crew member.
I was given 10 days of rest by the airline medical department, and had to do a check-up before I resumed my duties.

In many airlines an event like this more than once in your career will cause the airline to ground you and recommend that you see therapists for sleep etc... Pure intimidation and the fact is that I would say most airline pilots would continue to work even if they felt exhausted just prior to the flight.

The fact is, longhaul flying is tiring. Many people cannot sleep on demand and if a flight leaves late evening, it would mean waking up for that flight 3-4 hours prior which means that in order to have a good nap prior to the flight, you ned to get into bed and fall asleep by say 4pm....something which is not easy to do. Pilots are humans too and chances are that when you are in the cabin, tired and uncomfortable and unable to sleep in the middle of the night, the pilots could be feeling the same way at the controls. Its just a fact. This is somewhat mitigated by some airlines that have pilots from mixed crew bases, so that on longhaul flights, two crew are tired and sleeping, and two crew are wide awake. Works well but isn't too common in this industry.


User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 21, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 15 hours ago) and read 32877 times:

Quoting ManuCH (Reply 18):
What is the objective reason why the pilot unions are against making the CVR transcripts publicly available? Couldn't it provide interesting information to improve safety?

Aviation authorities, using results of official investigations, are responsible for recommending/authorizing/mandating safety improvements, not the public. The investigators will use the original recordings as their primary source, not transcripts, and there is no justifiable reason for the original recordings to be made available to the public.


User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 22, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 32799 times:

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 19):
we cannot learn and apply the lessons of AF447 unless we know everything that happened in the cockpit.

Really? Everything? You seek perfection in an imperfect world.


User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 23, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 32586 times:

Quoting hivue (Reply 21):
The investigators will use the original recordings as their primary source, not transcripts, and there is no justifiable reason for the original recordings to be made available to the public.

Of course, his question was about transcripts. I can't speak for the European authorities, but I have never known of a transcription issue with the NTSB.

Quoting hivue (Reply 21):
Aviation authorities, using results of official investigations, are responsible for recommending/authorizing/mandating safety improvements, not the public.

By virtue of being governmental bodies, aviation authorities are--or should be--accountable to the public.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 24, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 32265 times:

Hivue,

The BEA report is supposed to be about safety lessons learned and applied.

The public prosecutor will pursue matters of blame, and punishment, if it goes that far.

Let's step back and consider this as a matter of strategy. If the pilots want to ensure that blame is placed on the systemic issues in the work place that contributed to this tragedy and if they want to have decisive action taken to reform their work place to make it a safer, better equipped workplace, they have I would suggest, very good reason to accept full disclosure in their best interests.

Or, they can join with the company perhaps in wishing to keep it all confidential.

It is also worth keeping in mind the obvious signs in the media in Europe that the full transcript is ready to burst out into the open whether some parties like it or not.

It might therefore be smart to reconsider blanket opposition to full disclosure, and think about the benefits pilots should pursue when it does come out.


User currently offlinedfambro From United States of America, joined Nov 2009, 333 posts, RR: 0
Reply 25, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 32465 times:

Quoting hivue (Reply 21):
Aviation authorities, using results of official investigations, are responsible for recommending/authorizing/mandating safety improvements, not the public. The investigators will use the original recordings as their primary source, not transcripts, and there is no justifiable reason for the original recordings to be made available to the public.

There are plenty of people who have a professional interest in aviation safety issues who should have access, including researchers in academia and professionals at other airlines. There should be a mechanism for access. And for everyone and anyone the transcripts should be available because

Quoting dfambro (Reply 11):
There should be no presumption of privacy during operation of a public transport.

That's an inherent principle in an open society. When it's not adhered to, the result it predictable: distrust.


User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 26, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 32373 times:
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First of all, I am for knowing, ands revealing the truth in accident investigatioin.
I for one believe in the institutions of my country, be they official investigations bureaux or the judicial system.
Otherwise, I might as well join the ranks of the anarchists.
That claim of mine above also means that as much as I can I shall work in the improvement of the said institutions, as all responsible citizens should do... and so far, that has been my aim and some not unimportant part of my activities.

The truth shall come out of the court phase ; it will be probably still partial as they will concentrate on responsibilities and financial reparations... But we shall know at the very least what were the influences of every factor that led to the accident, and fatigue may well be one. And we do not need to make public the transcript, or some would love to, full disclosure of the recording. The court, the attorneys and the experts will have that knowledge and that is enough.
I'vea lready seen enough imbeciles crowing on the revealed tapes in which someone cried his love for his mother. To me, that's sick and we will not allow it, whatever the self-righteous claims for reasons of improved safety... blah blah blah are. Just hypocrisy.
The problem is that this thread, and the sensationalism it leads to are based on some very dodgy circumstancial evidence : one sentence from a captain and some really far-fetched interpretations on how the crew was working prior to the accident. How in hell do you know they were tired just because you "felt", "had the impression", "surmised"...etc... that they were acting outside the routine of a so far uneventful flight ?

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 19):
The disclosure of fatigue is a critical element of this, and one needs to ask, why would the BEA exclude this?

Because, contrarily to what you think, the BEA was very thorough in interrogating the crews who stayed in the same hotel and discovered nothing untoward about their behaviour, nothing out of the ordinary for people who took their wives and companions on a trip to do some touring of Rio.

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 19):
The structure of this report is intriguing, in that it includes very early a narrative that sets up the situation in which the less experienced of the two first officers is designated by the captain as the PF, something not discovered by the other first officer until he returned to the flight deck.

How do you know that ? The procedure is that the PF, if one of the FOs would remain in charge by virtue of having the knowledge of the flight, one coming this late would not have. There was no command or hierarchy structure in a flight deck composed of two FOs. The captain is just three meters away. ( this was partly corrected by the airline later)

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 19):
We cannot get to the truth without knowing what they actually said and did during every second of the crash sequence.

That part, from the beginning of the ECAM messages to the end of recording is complete.

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 19):
What is intriguing, among many things, in this BEA report, is that it opens certain issues in the narrative but them doesn't close them. How the pilots interacted with each other is of crucial importance.

So, in fact, having the whole transcript from the handover to the final moments wasn't enough, right ? Makes quite a dent on your argument, doesn't it ?
By the way, I would really love to hear what would have been , in your opinion a proper hand-over briefing.

Quoting CX Flyboy (Reply 20):
In many airlines an event like this more than once in your career will cause the airline to ground you and recommend that you see therapists for sleep

People usually do not make a habit of it. The contract I signed stipulates : nobody else but me can decide on my physical ability to start a flight duty and I took my responsibility. It has happened to other pilots, with the same conclusion.

Quoting CX Flyboy (Reply 20):
get into bed and fall asleep by say 4pm....something which is not easy to do. Pilots are humans too

Yes, you're right and I know it. That's the discipline the job requires. Minimum rest in Japan is hell... The worst... and a three day layover there is even worse : One can't get one's circadian rythm is such a short time, but one's body is already engaged in the correction of the jet lag.

Quoting hivue (Reply 21):
Aviation authorities, using results of official investigations, are responsible for recommending/authorizing/mandating safety improvements, not the public. The investigators will use the original recordings as their primary source, not transcripts, and there is no justifiable reason for the original recordings to be made available to the public.

Thank you. I can't agree more.



Contrail designer
User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 27, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 32492 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 23):
Of course, his question was about transcripts

Yes, I understood that. But the point he was making was that transcripts in the hands of the public lead to imporved safety. I can think of no instance where that has been the case.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 23):
I have never known of a transcription issue with the NTSB.

Nor have I. And NTSB transcripts routinely are redacted of (what the NTSB thinks is) irrelevant information (e.g., profanities, mention of names unrelated to the accident, etc.). I'm not sure I've ever seen a non-redacted one. The NTSB includes transcripts in their reports for the sake of complete documentation, not because some new information will be unearthed by readers.


User currently onlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21693 posts, RR: 55
Reply 28, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 14 hours ago) and read 32550 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 16):
though perhaps the public has a heightened right to know with pilots since they are employees of a common carrier

The public does not have a right to know. The public has a right to safe travel and competent oversight, but that does not mean they get to make the calls on safety and judge when an error that affects the flight gets made and when it doesn't, or convict someone in the court of public opinion.

Quoting ManuCH (Reply 18):
What is the objective reason why the pilot unions are against making the CVR transcripts publicly available? Couldn't it provide interesting information to improve safety?

It could, to those who know how to interpret those transcripts. To others, it could lead to baseless accusations, lawsuits, and embarrassment for the families of the crews.

Quoting CX Flyboy (Reply 20):
In many airlines an event like this more than once in your career will cause the airline to ground you and recommend that you see therapists for sleep etc... Pure intimidation and the fact is that I would say most airline pilots would continue to work even if they felt exhausted just prior to the flight.

And it only takes working at one airline like that to make an impact your whole career. If this guy worked at an airline where the fatigue policy doesn't match what the company manual says it is, I'd expect him to be very reluctant to call in fatigued at every airline he works for after that, even if they do have a very good fatigue policy (as AF does, if Pihero's story is correct - I have no doubt it is).

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 29, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 13 hours ago) and read 32146 times:

I think we are losing track of the fact that a trained, professional crew flew the airplane out of its envelope and into a high altitude stall and never understood it. Even a fatigued crew should not have done that (someone mentioned a "mystery" earlier; I think at this point this is the only mystery). If the pilots on the flight deck actually were "groggy," I imagine that would have (and should have) disappeared rather quickly when the AP and A/THR packed it in.

There seems to be the traditional "the public has a right to know" attitude here. But when the subject is as technical as this the public (or the vast majority of it) actually knows very little. They are not trained for it and have very little interest in the details.


User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 30, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 13 hours ago) and read 32208 times:
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Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 24):
The BEA report is supposed to be about safety lessons learned and applied.

The public prosecutor will pursue matters of blame, and punishment, if it goes that far.

Let's step back and consider this as a matter of strategy. If the pilots want to ensure that blame is placed on the systemic issues in the work place that contributed to this tragedy and if they want to have decisive action taken to reform their work place to make it a safer, better equipped workplace, they have I would suggest, very good reason to accept full disclosure in their best interests.

I shall quote the conclusions of the BEA report ( English version )
..............
Thus, the accident resulted from the following succession of events:
ˆ Temporary inconsistency between the airspeed measurements, likely following
the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals that, in particular, caused the
autopilot disconnection and the reconfiguration to alternate law;
ˆ Inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path;
ˆ The lack of any link by the crew between the loss of indicated speeds called out
and the appropriate procedure;
ˆ The late identification by the PNF of the deviation from the flight path and the
insufficient correction applied by the PF;
ˆ The crew not identifying the approach to stall, their lack of immediate response
and the exit from the flight envelope;
ˆ The crew’s failure to diagnose the stall situation and consequently a lack of inputs
that would have made it possible to recover from it.
These events can be explained by a combination of the following factors:
ˆ The feedback mechanisms on the part of all those involved that made it impossible:
y To identify the repeated non-application of the loss of airspeed information
procedure and to remedy this,
y To ensure that the risk model for crews in cruise included icing of the Pitot
probes and its consequences;F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
201
ˆ The absence of any training, at high altitude, in manual aeroplane handling and
in the procedure for ”Vol avec IAS douteuse”;
ˆ Task-sharing that was weakened by:
y Incomprehension of the situation when the autopilot disconnection occurred,
y Poor management of the startle effect that generated a highly charged
emotional factor for the two copilots;
ˆ The lack of a clear display in the cockpit of the airspeed inconsistencies identified
by the computers;
ˆ The crew not taking into account the stall warning, which could have been due to:
y A failure to identify the aural warning, due to low exposure time in training to
stall phenomena, stall warnings and buffet,
y The appearance at the beginning of the event of transient warnings that could
be considered as spurious,
y The absence of any visual information to confirm the approach-to-stall after
the loss of the limit speeds,
y The possible confusion with an overspeed situation in which buffet is also
considered as a symptom,
y Flight Director indications that may led the crew to believe that their actions
were appropriate, even though they were not,
y The difficulty in recognizing and understanding the implications of a
reconfiguration in alternate law with no angle of attack protection...

...............

Where iis the conspiracy ? the report puts the blame ( it doesn't but it is very clear ) squarely on the flight deck crew, on theitr training and some ergonomics aspects of the alarm messages , aural warnings... etc...

So your following sentence :

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 24):
Or, they can join with the company perhaps in wishing to keep it all confidential.

Shall I remind you that without the airline insistence and expenses in pursuing the search, we wouldn't have a clue on why this accident happened and more to the point we wouldn't even talk about recording that would have been left at the bottom of the ocean.



Contrail designer
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 31, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 13 hours ago) and read 31849 times:
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Quoting Mir (Reply 28):
The public does not have a right to know. The public has a right to safe travel and competent oversight, but that does not mean they get to make the calls on safety and judge when an error that affects the flight gets made and when it doesn't, or convict someone in the court of public opinion.

Thank you, Mir. I couldn't have written it better.

Quoting Mir (Reply 28):
Quoting ManuCH (Reply 18):
What is the objective reason why the pilot unions are against making the CVR transcripts publicly available? Couldn't it provide interesting information to improve safety?

It could, to those who know how to interpret those transcripts. To others, it could lead to baseless accusations, lawsuits, and embarrassment for the families of the crews.

That has happened, and still does, which makes me hopping mad.

Respect is due.

Quoting dfambro (Reply 25):
There should be no presumption of privacy during operation of a public transport.

That's an inherent principle in an open society. When it's not adhered to, the result it predictable: distrust.

You're either wrong or you have a selected memory : Whatever the facts, the proofs (even scientific ), the arguments are, there will always be a good part of the population who will believe in a conspiracy theory. See the web for thousands of examples... and unfortunately, this is one.



Contrail designer
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 32, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 13 hours ago) and read 31561 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 26):
I for one believe in the institutions of my country, be they official investigations bureaux or the judicial system.
Otherwise, I might as well join the ranks of the anarchists.

Not so, and it's not correct that there has to be a conspiracy, as you later posited, either. We have to recognize two things:

1) Governments are made up of people, and people make mistakes. That's why all civilized societies have institutions like appellate courts. Judges, though a creation of the government, make mistakes.

2) Sometimes, there's not a mistake but a group of educated people outside the government can come to different (and maybe even better) conclusions that a similar group of people within the government. No government is omniscient.

Quoting hivue (Reply 27):
And NTSB transcripts routinely are redacted of (what the NTSB thinks is) irrelevant information (e.g., profanities, mention of names unrelated to the accident, etc.). I'm not sure I've ever seen a non-redacted one.

Can you point to a single redaction that you contend is inappropriate?

Quoting hivue (Reply 27):
But the point he was making was that transcripts in the hands of the public lead to imporved safety. I can think of no instance where that has been the case.

How would you prove it one way or the other? Sunshine laws don't tend to be something that has a lot of empirical support, partially because we take it for granted. And it's worth nothing that AF--which apparently operates in a country with a lot of secrecy surrounding aviation safety--has a pretty chequered safety record. Correlation obviously doesn't prove causation, but it's an interesting question. I believe AF is the only western carrier with multiple widebody hull losses in the past decade.

Quoting Mir (Reply 28):
The public does not have a right to know. The public has a right to safe travel and competent oversight, but that does not mean they get to make the calls on safety and judge when an error that affects the flight gets made and when it doesn't, or convict someone in the court of public opinion.

You and I both hold positions that require a license issued by the government. Those licenses are privileges. As a result, at least in the States, it's pretty well settled that the public has a near-absolute right to know about conduct that falls below a certain threshold.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 33, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 13 hours ago) and read 31376 times:

I think that had common sense and decency been applied to the question of the disclosure of the full CVR transcript we would not be having this discussion.

The inclusion of the fatigue element would have radically changed the aftermath of such a report to one in which very fatigued pilots were unable to cope with a situation which as the report points out, had been dealt with but without disaster by various other crews on A330 flights that experienced blocked pitots or episodes of unreliable speed data.

It is reasonable to think that the interests of pilots and those who fly would also have been improved by an open discussion and consideration of fatigue in pilots, as well as the important discussion it has already caused, which is over reliance on automation, which is a discussion that goes to airline attitudes to automation, upset recovery training and the training of pilots in an age of significant systems changes in modern airliners of any marque.

There are sensitive personal moments that are recorded on CVRs in tragic circumstances. They ought never be disclosed. They are distressing. They can be identified as (exclamation) or (personal). But we do need to know what happened between the men in relation to the machine to know what happened to the machine.

And neither in France, nor Australia, do we live in societies where we should ever fully trust secret deliberations or 'assertions' made in public after private deliberations, to produce fair, truthful and above all safe outcomes.

The use of public hearings by the NTSB is I believe, a net positive for air safety.

Those in Australia may know that I'm involved in a campaign to overturn the final ATSB report into the Pel-Air crash near Norfolk Island in 2009. That was, I contend, a report that was grossly unfair to the pilot concerned, and to the public, and an abuse of due legal process, and the evidence in support of this has been produced and tabled before a special Senate committee inquiry, which means that the media can now reveal matters previously kept invisible to the public in internal audits and emails, and are now reportable without risk of legal sanctions under the protection of parliamentary privilege.

Pel-Air is nothing like AF447, other than questions of transparency in public administration. There will be more developments in that cause shortly.

[Edited 2013-03-16 18:53:16]

User currently offlineBC77008 From United States of America, joined Sep 2011, 312 posts, RR: 0
Reply 34, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 12 hours ago) and read 31209 times:

Quoting ManuCH (Thread starter):
But if it's true that sleeping is taken so lightly by some crew

It's usually taken very lightly by an airline's crew scheduling department.



"He waited his whole damn life to take that flight. And as the plane crashed down he thought 'Well isn't this nice...'"
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 35, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 12 hours ago) and read 30974 times:
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Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 32):
And it's worth nothing that AF--which apparently operates in a country with a lot of secrecy surrounding aviation safety--has a pretty chequered safety record. Correlation obviously doesn't prove causation, but it's an interesting question. I believe AF is the only western carrier with multiple widebody hull losses in the past decade.

Interesting. So you're just illustrating what I said above : without proof, a conspiracy theory on "secrecy".
Prove it.
It may well be the case that we've seen multiple hull losses in the past decade.
But why don't you mention that some US airlines have seen a series of such, in the not very distant past.
Taking your decade as a measure, didn't AA lose in the span of six years ( 1995-2001) one A300, two 757s and one 767, claiming the lives of 585 passengers and some 1800 people on the ground ? And didn't UAL see the loss of 1DC10, one 767 and one 757 in the span of 11 years ?
And as a conspiracy theorist, have you forgotten that to this day some of your countrymen still believe in a cover-up by the NTSB on what happened on the above-mentioned AA A300, or the TWA 800 747 ? Where are the "more educated people outside the governmen"t to correct these facts ?
Please, no more lessons.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 32):
1) Governments are made up of people, and people make mistakes. That's why all civilized societies have institutions like appellate courts. Judges, though a creation of the government, make mistakes.

And that exactly what I ask people to start trusting in.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 32):
2) Sometimes, there's not a mistake but a group of educated people outside the government can come to different (and maybe even better) conclusions that a similar group of people within the government. No government is omniscient.

And on what basis ?

[Edited 2013-03-16 19:19:39]


Contrail designer
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 36, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 12 hours ago) and read 30843 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 35):
So you're just illustrating what I said above : without proof, a conspiracy theory on "secrecy".
Prove it.

No conspiracy theory at all. You're here talking about how it's a good thing that some of the transcript has not been released because it protects pilot privacy. You are suggesting, I think, that in France pilot privacy trumps safety and truthfinding, no? Please let me know if I'm mistaken.

It's a pretty common sentiment in the E.U., by the way. Privacy also trumps the truth-finding function of courts in a way that a lot of us in common law countries find really disturbing. But for a whole host of interesting historic reasons, France tends to be more protective of its own people than other European countries and certainly than other similarly-developed countries in the rest of the world.

Of course, that's a value choice. It's impossible for me to say that it's "better" or "worse" than another country's set of values. We must, however, not pretend that those choices lack consequences.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 35):
And on what basis ?

Read some literature on group decision making. This isn't something that's particularly controversial or unsettled.

Two groups of similarly-educated people attacking the same incomplete hypothetical will often come to different conclusions because they make different assumptions. If one of those groups is the government, the government's conclusion isn't right just because it comes from the government.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlinedfambro From United States of America, joined Nov 2009, 333 posts, RR: 0
Reply 37, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 12 hours ago) and read 30623 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 31):

Quoting dfambro (Reply 25):There should be no presumption of privacy during operation of a public transport.

That's an inherent principle in an open society. When it's not adhered to, the result it predictable: distrust.
You're either wrong or you have a selected memory : Whatever the facts, the proofs (even scientific ), the arguments are, there will always be a good part of the population who will believe in a conspiracy theory. See the web for thousands of examples... and unfortunately, this is one.

Yes, there will always be conspiracy nuts, but that's not relevant to the point I was making. Even the non-nuts distrust when reasonable disclosure is lacking.

An example for you - US President Richard Nixon repeatedly refused to release portions of his Whitehouse tapes to the Congressional House Judiciary Committee investigating the Watergate break-in, citing executive privilege and national security. Ulitmately he was legally compelled to release them. The evidence in the tapes was damning, and Nixon resigned 3 days after the key tape was made public. So, you see, sometimes the authorities are in fact hiding things behind a cloak of privilege/privacy.


User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 38, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 11 hours ago) and read 30076 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 32):
Can you point to a single redaction that you contend is inappropriate?

No. Every one has been appropriate as far as I can recall. My point is that the whole transcript could be redacted from the published NTSB report with no affect one way or the other on determination of probable cause or on safety improvements. I read CVR transcripts because the subject interests me, but I can't think of any instance where this has been of any practical use to me or anyone else. I rely completely on NTSB interpretations of FDR data (the original material is boring and I don't have the expertise to undestand it), and I' m sure I could get by just fine with the same regarding CVR data.


User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 39, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 11 hours ago) and read 30028 times:

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 33):
The inclusion of the fatigue element would have radically changed the aftermath of such a report to one in which very fatigued pilots were unable to cope with a situation which as the report points out, had been dealt with but without disaster by various other crews on A330 flights that experienced blocked pitots or episodes of unreliable speed data.

Agree to an extent, BenSandilands, but only that the captain's fatigue caused him to 'take a break' in 'difficult weather' - and he may also have 'contributed' to the accident by designating the least experienced of the other two pilots as 'Pilot Flying.' But is there evidence that the other two pilots were suffering from severe fatigue as well?

I ask because, as far as I know from the reports, the basic cause of the accident was that the pilots lost all speed indications through icing of the pitot-heads? The PF seems to have lost his bearings and pulled back on the sidestick, raising the nose, losing flying speed, and putting the aeroplane into a stall. Then he seems to have interpreted the remaining indications (particularly, I expect, the rapidly-unwinding altimeter) as an indication that the aeroplane was in a steep dive - and gone ON pulling back on the sidestick, prolonging the stall?

Given that there is no 'feedback' on the sidesticks - and apparently no old-fashioned "Angle of Attack' display - the more experienced 'Pilot-Not-Flying' probably never realised what was happening (especially the nose-up attitude and the continued pulling-back) and what the true cause of the steep descent was? And therefore, rather than taking control, he went back to call the captain - which took up most of the remaining time down to the water?

Please correct me if I've got any of that wrong? But if it's mostly right, it's pretty clear that 'fatigue' didn't cause the accident - the main causes appear much more likely to have been inexperience and/or insufficient training, and possibly inadequate instrumentation?



"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlinemayor From United States of America, joined Mar 2008, 10512 posts, RR: 14
Reply 40, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 29122 times:

Quoting ManuCH (Reply 2):
I stand corrected, I used the wrong word. But now I'm curious: what happens if a pilot calls the company and says he doesn't feel fit to fly, because of lack of sleep? Are there any consequences? This would surely mess up scheduling if an AF pilot does so while in GIG. Do pilots avoid admitting their lack of sleep to prevent a scheduling chaos and a huge delay? Where does one draw the line?

Well, in this case, there would have been a relief crew, right? Perhaps AF could have just switched the crews and their responsibilities, IF the relief crew was fit to fly (which they should have been).




Back in the early 80s, in SLC, before the merger with Western, we had a 727 to DFW, where the Captain got sick before departure time. Not being a pilot base, we were kind of stuck for crew members, but fortunately, we had a Captain that lived in Utah and commuted to DFW, which was his base. We got the okay from flight control (and others) in ATL and he took the flight out, dressed in green slacks, green tie and a green and white, plaid coat. Kind of funny, actually.



"A committee is a group of the unprepared, appointed by the unwilling, to do the unnecessary"----Fred Allen
User currently offlineAA87 From United States of America, joined Jun 2005, 147 posts, RR: 0
Reply 41, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 29068 times:

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 39):
and apparently no old-fashioned "Angle of Attack' display

NAV20, you summarized the basics well. But what I've never understood (as a low-time private pilot) is why at least the higher time NPF FO didn't notice the HSI showing the nose up ?? I'm not playing Monday morning quarterback, and I agree that a dead crew is entitled to the fullest respect and reservation of judgment from non-experts (me included) ... but if before this tragedy someone had said to me "quickly now -- you're in IMC, loss of airspeed indicators, you're pulling back on the stick, HSI shows nose up and alitmeter is unwinding ... why ?" I'm pretty sure I would have said "uh, a stall ... nose down asap".

I think that is the mystery others on this board have referred to.


User currently offlinelightsaber From United States of America, joined Jan 2005, 13271 posts, RR: 100
Reply 42, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 29033 times:
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Interesting... I wanted to rebut a bunch of the 'conspiracy theory' arguments, but what I cannot find is the distribution of the CVR or FDR data as normal... In a normal FAA investigation, which I've participated in, the avionics, airframer, engine maker, FAA, NTSB, and often *their competitors* receive a copy of the CVR and FDR data. This is so that those with an interest to find no-fault and those with an interest to find a fault (competitors/government) look through.

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 33):
The use of public hearings by the NTSB is I believe, a net positive for air safety.

Even the 'private stuff' gets distributed. For example, I went through the Egypt Air flight 990 FDR data as did a few other Pratt engineers. When done, I was certain one pilot was trying to kill everyone (one side's commands were always the opposite of what you should do to the engines at that point of flight).

But what I note is that none of the people I know at GE saw the FDR data for 447... I'm not saying no one did... but I cannot verify through my rumor mill.

I really want to dismiss conspiracy theory and normally I could with most crashes. But the information is lacking on AF 447. It definitely wasn't a NTSB investigation... When those happen, like with the current 787, my 'rumor mill' lights up a bit.  

Lightsaber



Societies that achieve a critical mass of ideas achieve self sustaining growth; others stagnate.
User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 43, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 28994 times:

NAV20,

This is why we need the full, but not personal transcript according to those who were good enough to lead me through the known sequence of events, and some of those similar pitot related events experienced by other A330 pilots.

The iced up pitots caused the unreliable speed indications which caused the disconnection of the auto-pilot, at which point an inappropriate response was made by the PF. The exact altitude at which the pitots cleared, or as the report describes, the speeds came back, was within the necessary time for a full recovery to have been made provided the correct procedure was followed. The report quotes an altitude, but I'm not in a position this afternoon (or evening for that matter) to retrieve and read it again.

This is where the question arises, what did the captain see or say or do when he reaches the back of the cockpit and asks 'what is going on here'. He was in a position to see that the PF side stick controller was pulled hard back.

What engagement was there between the more experienced PNF and the PF. Any? None? We get a summary by the two pilots (or was it one) of their bafflement to the captain. But what did they say before that, since their discussions weren't done using telepathy? At one point the captain is recorded as telling the PF to bring the nose down. The BEA report says that after that there was a shift in the PF side stick, but that after a short interval it was pulled back hard.

What is unfortunate is that we now have some pilots on a different page to those calling for more detailed disclosure about what was going on at the human level between the pilots and between them and the aircraft.

In my opinion, it wouldn't have taken too much additional disclosure to have everyone on one page, and Air France on the other since it has the ultimate responsibility for everything done by pilots on its flights.

Non-disclosure of the comments about fatigue takes pressure off Air France. What else has been left out of the transcript? Are we even discussing, or seeking clarity, about the right issues if we don't actually know what happened in the cockpit?

I'm a bit sensitive to accident reports that leave out information that reveals unsafe or unsatisfactory performances by operators given the evidence taken by the Senate Committee inquiry into the Pel-Air report.

It was personally a sharp lesson for this reporter to discover that I had trusted two bodies in Australian air safety to tell the truth, the ATSB and CASA, and that I had been deliberately deceived and misled, and as a result published false and injurious reports based on trusting official sources.

[Edited 2013-03-16 21:21:23]

User currently offlinemcdu From United States of America, joined Apr 2005, 1474 posts, RR: 17
Reply 44, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 28727 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 16):
Pilots should be publicly accountable when they do something wrong, no different from professionals in any other industry (though perhaps the public has a heightened right to know with pilots since they are employees of a common carrier).

Are doctors audio and or video r.tapes available after a death on the operating table? The investigators have a need to know. You and other non-pilots have a desire to know. Unless you are an official assigned to an investigation you don't have a need to know. Curiosity is not a need.


User currently onlineMir From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 21693 posts, RR: 55
Reply 45, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 10 hours ago) and read 28565 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 32):
You and I both hold positions that require a license issued by the government. Those licenses are privileges. As a result, at least in the States, it's pretty well settled that the public has a near-absolute right to know about conduct that falls below a certain threshold.

True. However, they don't have a right to determine, for themselves, whether particular conduct falls below a certain threshold. Not all conversation that goes on in the cockpit of an accident flight is related to the accident, nor does it reflect conduct that isn't up to standards. If there's superfluous conversation at some point in a flight, there's no particular need for it to show up in a transcript.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 36):
Two groups of similarly-educated people attacking the same incomplete hypothetical will often come to different conclusions because they make different assumptions. If one of those groups is the government, the government's conclusion isn't right just because it comes from the government.

Also true. But that doesn't mean that the job of checking the government's conclusions should fall to people who have no knowledge of the field in question. There are groups of experts in the field who are better suited to make that call.

-Mir



7 billion, one nation, imagination...it's a beautiful day
User currently offlineAirPacific747 From Denmark, joined May 2008, 2434 posts, RR: 24
Reply 46, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 8 hours ago) and read 27420 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 5):
I can answer that very quickly : It happened to me in Guadeloupe. Too tired to fly. OPS was advised, the flight was delayed 7 hours, to allow another pilot present to have his minimum rest... I took over his scheduled flight some 24 hours later. Our regulations are that a pîlot is sole responsible for estimating his physical / mental capacity to operate as a crew member.
I was given 10 days of rest by the airline medical department, and had to do a check-up before I resumed my duties.

Is it a small airline? In many carriers, if you call in sick, you have to provide the airline with a doctor's note, no matter what you felt was the problem. They tell the pilots to always call in sick in case they feel they are unfit to fly, but when they require a doctor's note every single time, then the pilots won't be bothred and go to work even if they didn't sleep at all the night before the flights.

Quoting BC77008 (Reply 34):
It's usually taken very lightly by an airline's crew scheduling department.

 checkmark  as long as they fulfill the official regulations, they make their pilots work as much as possible, even though the regulations might be wrong.

[Edited 2013-03-16 23:43:42]

User currently offlineManuCH From Switzerland, joined Jun 2005, 3011 posts, RR: 47
Reply 47, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 4 hours ago) and read 24915 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
HEAD MODERATOR

Quoting mcdu (Reply 44):
You and other non-pilots have a desire to know. Unless you are an official assigned to an investigation you don't have a need to know. Curiosity is not a need.

And this is how mistakes happen. As Cubsrule pointed out earlier:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 36):
Read some literature on group decision making. This isn't something that's particularly controversial or unsettled.

Two groups of similarly-educated people attacking the same incomplete hypothetical will often come to different conclusions because they make different assumptions. If one of those groups is the government, the government's conclusion isn't right just because it comes from the government.

Not because a government entity comes to a conclusion, it must necessarily be correct. There surely are plenty of people out there who have the necessary competences to make their own judgement on an accident report, but who aren't on the investigative board and therefore wouldn't have access to the data. This is wrong in my opinion.

BenSandilands, who seems to be well informed, has challenged the ATSB report of the Pel-Air crash. This would all have been much easier, I believe, had the ATSB disclosed all the information up front.

Also, the public which is not informed still has a right to know. It's "public transportation". Yes, they may not understand most of it, but the information must be there, open for consultation. A government entity shouldn't have to work in secrecy, unless national security is at stake. I agree that some of the most dramatic parts should be either replaced with (redacted) or (personal), but that's it.

Another reason for which I'm in favor of public data accessibility is to reduce the amount of conspiracies that may arise. If the data are there for open consultation, the facts are clear and there's no speculation. Yes, I do believe that conspiracies arising among the public are a bad thing, and certainly don't help an airline's reputation.

Again, unless it's a matter of national security, government work should be open and accessible (put hurdles in it to make it accessible if you want, so that not everyone can just download a PDF from an open site - like the need to send a letter to get access, or whatever - but it still should be available to everyone).

[Edited 2013-03-17 03:10:04]


Never trust a statistic you didn't fake yourself
User currently offlinemcdu From United States of America, joined Apr 2005, 1474 posts, RR: 17
Reply 48, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 3 hours ago) and read 23608 times:

You want to dissect the pilots actions, comments etc, just to prevent a possible government coverup? That is the argument of cubs and CH. Should doctors and nurses be subjected to the same? If they take an action that results in a death shouldn't everyone that doesn't have a medical backgrounds be allowed to Monday morning quarterback their actions? I personally believe the investigation should be handled by experts versus the self claimed experts that often post in forums on the internet.

User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 49, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 3 hours ago) and read 23521 times:

Quoting AA87 (Reply 41):
NAV20, you summarized the basics well. But what I've never understood (as a low-time private pilot) is why at least the higher time NPF FO didn't notice the HSI showing the nose up ??

Appreciate your comment, AA87. But I'd be grateful if one of the professionals on here would tell us whether a 'Horizontal Situation Indicator' is always shown on the instrument panel display - or whether the pilots of modern aeroplanes have to press 'Button B' or 'Button D' or something to get one?

Like you, I didn't accumulate many hours - and most of them were on sailplanes at that. I got married instead, and that was the end of flying.   But 'attitude/sinkrate' were always fundamental concerns (probably THE fundamental concerns) to me - especially in gliders, for obvious reasons.

I hope that one of the more experienced pilots on here can tell us both whether, and how, it is even possible for an aeroplane of any kind (leave alone an airliner flown by professionals) to remain in a nose-up attitude, below flying speed, for several minutes, all the way down to ground level, evidently without any of the three professional pilots involved noticing?

[Edited 2013-03-17 05:00:34]


"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlinemoo From Falkland Islands, joined May 2007, 4021 posts, RR: 4
Reply 50, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 3 hours ago) and read 23471 times:

Quoting mcdu (Reply 48):
If they take an action that results in a death shouldn't everyone that doesn't have a medical backgrounds be allowed to Monday morning quarterback their actions?

Why not? Its a free country - speculation is perfectly fine on all topics.

Quoting mcdu (Reply 48):
I personally believe the investigation should be handled by experts versus the self claimed experts that often post in forums on the internet.

I personally believe that the investigation should be handled by experts with credentials to back their status up, but I also believe that anyone who wants to is perfectly entitled to provide their own views, opinions and thoughts on the matter.

Which one of those two groups you personally listen to is up to you. But the fact that you don't like what the second group has to say doesn't mean they shouldn't be able to say it.


User currently offlineManuCH From Switzerland, joined Jun 2005, 3011 posts, RR: 47
Reply 51, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 2 hours ago) and read 23452 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
HEAD MODERATOR

Quoting mcdu (Reply 48):
Should doctors and nurses be subjected to the same? If they take an action that results in a death shouldn't everyone that doesn't have a medical backgrounds be allowed to Monday morning quarterback their actions?

Honestly? Yes, I think so. Of course by preserving the patient's identity/privacy etc. But medical errors are one of those things that make me angry every once in a while. Plenty of cover-ups there if you ask me (and believe me, I'm no conspiracist, I'm just realistic, and I have talked to my fair share of doctors and nurses who have the very same opinion I have, for the same reasons). Some (not all, some!) doctors would be much more careful in what they do if they knew that the public (because there *are* informed people among the public) could watch over their shoulders, if they wanted to.

Quoting mcdu (Reply 48):
I personally believe the investigation should be handled by experts versus the self claimed experts that often post in forums on the internet.

No, the investigation shouldn't be handled by self claimed experts, or by people who are passionate about it. But those people should be allowed to form their opinions. To do so, they need complete information.



Never trust a statistic you didn't fake yourself
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 52, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 2 hours ago) and read 22786 times:
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What I uinderstand is that of all the references I made to this accident, the extract from the BEA official final report, etc... none has been replied to.
Bensandilands goes on on his appeal for full disclosure and doesn't even respond to the other posters. Talk about obsessive behaviour !
All want public access to the documents, whether they understand the technical / psychological / meteorological aspects of the document or not. That in my opinion leaves wide open, contrarily to the commen belief, a whole can of worms.
Let's see the results of some of the more widely publicised results of air accidents :
1/- Concorde at Gonesse : The majority on this site and espec ially those who are not French dispute a/ the report findings ; b/ the court findings ; c/ the AF poublications. Basically everyone is claiming a Freench conspiracy and an unjust blame on some engineer the other side of the Atlantic. No one - or close to no one - has ever questioned the way the repair on the DC-10 was made, the procedures of that airline... etc...
2/- The 320 accidents in Habsheim and Mount St Odile : Thirty years later, after the end of the judicial investigations there are still people distrusting the findings ( and btw, the full transcript of those accidents have been made public, to the scandal of the pilots Unions, so that the argument that full disclosure prevents conspiracy theories are quite far off their intended mark )
3/- I won't give you examples of NTSB completely dismissed conclusions... just let's remember the AA A300. As far as I remember, the tapes transcripts have been made public, or am I mistaken ?

I had a look last night at some of the Westwind ditching... What is the extraordinary news that completely changes the gist of the report ? Fatigue ? (in which case the airline gets a greater responsibility) or something else, really sinister about the Australian administration ? Training ?... Did it fundamentally alter the event reporting and the course of the factors leading to the ditching ? As far as I know, no.
This thread started with a reporter writing that the captain said "... I only slept one hour last night... that's not nearly enough" and , BLAAAM KERBOOOM ! a bunch of people jump into the bandwagon : Those dastardly French are once again hiding the truth to protect... God only knows what ?
Question : Are you really really sure that you have access, as the Constitution stipulates, every control of your government actions, the fine print on everyday-affecting regulations, be they on safety / security / legal matters, and the right to access ?



Contrail designer
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 53, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 2 hours ago) and read 22630 times:
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Quoting AA87 (Reply 41):
the higher time NPF FO didn't notice the HSI showing the nose up ?

HSI is for "horizontal Situation Indicator", ie a display of the navigation plan and the compass rose. It displays the VOR / ADFs indicator needles if desired by pilots. I9 don't see how you could derive a stalling situation from it.
Unfortunaterly, it qualifies you into the "Monday Quarterbacking" you described well.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 49):
tell us whether a 'Horizontal Situation Indicator' is always shown on the instrument panel display

Yes. We need it for the "Navigate" part of the job.



Contrail designer
User currently offlineManuCH From Switzerland, joined Jun 2005, 3011 posts, RR: 47
Reply 54, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 1 hour ago) and read 22310 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
HEAD MODERATOR

Everyone, I know this is a sensitive and controversial topic, but please make sure not to get personal and/or offensive towards other users.


Never trust a statistic you didn't fake yourself
User currently offlineworkhorse From France, joined Jul 2005, 219 posts, RR: 0
Reply 55, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 1 hour ago) and read 22204 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 53):
he higher time NPF FO didn't notice the HSI showing the nose up ?

HSI is for "horizontal Situation Indicator", ie a display of the navigation plan and the compass rose. It displays the VOR / ADFs indicator needles if desired by pilots. I9 don't see how you could derive a stalling situation from it.
Unfortunaterly, it qualifies you into the "Monday Quarterbacking" you described well.

Well, the term used was not the right one, but the question still remains: how could none of them pay attention to the plane's nose up attitude? Also, the other question was, is the artificial horizon always visible on the PFD, whatever the display mode?

My understanding is that the answer to the second question is "yes", and to the first one, "we don't know".

[Edited 2013-03-17 06:10:39]

User currently offlinemcdu From United States of America, joined Apr 2005, 1474 posts, RR: 17
Reply 56, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days 1 hour ago) and read 21954 times:

Quoting AA87 (Reply 41):
you're in IMC, loss of airspeed indicators, you're pulling back on the stick, HSI shows nose up and alitmeter is unwinding ... why ?" I'm pretty sure I would have said "uh, a stall ... nose down asap".

As mentioned by another poster the HSI is not an attitude instrument. You are trying to say AADI. However, the airbus uses PFD's for primary flight display.

Believe I recall the transcript the airspeed on AF was showing an over speed due to the iced over pitot static tubes. The FO raised the nose to correct the over speed.

Large heavy aircraft have thin margins between low and high speeds at altitude and heavy weights like AF. It did not take much to create the stalled condition. My memory of the transcript is that during the nose up high airspeed event the stall system was triggered. Now you are faced with contradictory flight information. Once stalled the heavy airplane requires significant unloading and a pitch down to recover. Something that was generally only demonstrated once in a Sim. The altitude required and pitch needed to recover are very unnatural. No matter who is flying deep south trips the hours of flying are at low circadian cycles and to sort an issue like this in daylight on your local body clock would be difficult. I certainly wouldn't want to be faced with the same set of circumstances myself.


User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 57, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 5 days ago) and read 21543 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 53):
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 49):
tell us whether a 'Horizontal Situation Indicator' is always shown on the instrument panel display

Yes. We need it for the "Navigate" part of the job.

Cheers, Pihero, always (sincerely) good to see you!   Thing is, though, in a glider, you have to make sure that you're maintaining a 'sink-rate' of at least 45 feet a minute, and adequate airspeed - if you don't, unless you're lucky enough to be enjoying lots of 'lift,' you're risking a stall. Any MORE than that, and you'll likely have to walk home!  

I think that I might, by accident, just by googling, to have found most of the answer to AF447. In simple terms, it appears that ''modern' pilots are not taught to rely on what oldies like us would call 'instrument flying.' Instead, they appear to rely on 'Flight Directors' - which, as far as I can tell, are developed by geeks, not pilots:-

"In its final report into the loss of an Air France Airbus A330 over the South Atlantic on June 1, 2009, French air accident investigation agency BEA (Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyses) has managed to explain most–but not all–of the pitch-up inputs by the pilot who was flying the aircraft at the time of the accident during the last minutes of Air France Flight 447. The report, published on July 5, said that the pilot flying (PF) kept pulling the stick and this caused the Airbus A330 to stall and prevented a recovery.

"In a tense press conference held last Thursday at Le Bourget Airport in Paris BEA director Jean-Paul Troadec and his team pointed at human-machine interface issues that made the situation extremely confusing for the crew. All 228 occupants died when the aircraft, flying from Rio to Paris, crashed at night while negotiating a region with heavy thunderstorm activity. BEA had published an interim report in July 2011.

"A major new finding in the final report concerned the flight director, which normally displays symbology on the pilots’ primary flying displays that give guidance on control inputs to reach a desired steady-state flightpath. After the autopilot and autothrottle disengaged, as the flight control law switched from normal to alternate, the flight director’s crossbars disappeared. But they then reappeared several times. Every time they were visible, they prompted pitch-up inputs by the PF, investigators determined. It took them a long time to “rebuild” what the flight director displayed since this is not part of the data recorded by the flight data recorder.

"The BEA acknowledged that the PF might have followed flight director indications. This was not the right thing to do in a stall but it seems that the crew never realized that the aircraft was in a stall. Moreover, the successive disappearance and reappearance of the crossbars reinforced this false impression, the investigators suggested. For the crew, this could have suggested their information was valid.

"None of the pilots recognized that the flight director was changing from one mode to another because they were just too busy. The PF may have trusted the flight director so much that he was verbally agreeing to the other pilot’s pitch-down instructions, while still actually pitching up.


"The BEA’s report includes significant recommendations about the flight director. One of them calls for European Aviation Safety Agency to review its “display logic.” The flight director should disappear or present “appropriate orders” in a stall.

"The BEA’s report includes significant recommendations about the flight director. One of them calls for European Aviation Safety Agency to review its “display logic.” The flight director should disappear or present “appropriate orders” in a stall.

"The investigators made it clear that from the start the crew should have followed a procedure called “unreliable indicated airspeed,” which involves disconnecting the flight director. They also concluded that the still-connected flight director behaved in a way that is not specific to the A330. However, Leopold Sartorius, head of the investigation’s avionics systems working group, said he did not conduct an exhaustive study on other airliners to determine whether the flight director would have behaved in the same way."


http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-ne...wed-flight-director-pitch-commands

Sorry for the long post and quote - but I hope it 'progresses' the discussion.  Smile

[Edited 2013-03-17 07:08:27]


"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlineAA87 From United States of America, joined Jun 2005, 147 posts, RR: 0
Reply 58, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 20446 times:

Quoting mcdu (Reply 56):
As mentioned by another poster the HSI is not an attitude instrument. You are trying to say AADI. However, the airbus uses PFD's for primary flight display.

Thank you, meant attitude direction (director ?) indicator. I've been in Airbus cockpits many times, including in flight, isn't the ADI always displayed ? After so many years and reading so many threads and analyses on this accident, I still don't understand why the crew clearly did not seem to appreciate that the nose was too high most of the time.

Quoting mcdu (Reply 56):
Believe I recall the transcript the airspeed on AF was showing an over speed due to the iced over pitot static tubes. The FO raised the nose to correct the over speed.

Makes perfect sense.


User currently offlineAA87 From United States of America, joined Jun 2005, 147 posts, RR: 0
Reply 59, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 20311 times:

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 57):
It took them a long time to “rebuild” what the flight director displayed since this is not part of the data recorded by the flight data recorder.

Finally ! To my credit, I said to an ATP friend after the CVRs were firrst released years ago that we'll never know exactly what the pilots were seeing on their displays, and that was the critical missing link in understanding their actions and reactions. Everyone following this knew that the Airbus human-system interface had to be an important factor.

Pihero, please lighten up. Anyone can see I am not second guessing the crew, even if I confused HSI with AADI. In fact, I have felt all along that whatever mistakes the crew made -- and they unquestionably did make grave mistakes -- the mistakes could not be understood and prevented in the future without assessing exactly what information they were receiving and, most importantly, perceiving. That's not Monday morning quarterbacking. I'm a lawyer, it's called asking the right questions.


User currently offlineAA87 From United States of America, joined Jun 2005, 147 posts, RR: 0
Reply 60, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 20126 times:

Quoting workhorse (Reply 55):
Also, the other question was, is the artificial horizon always visible on the PFD, whatever the display mode?

That was the point of my question. I would be shocked if the artificial horizon, which is such a basic instrument, was not visible in all PFD modes. And even if it isn't, don't all Boeing and Airbus have a fixed, standby ADI near the center console ?

Also, wasn't there a comment on the CVR by I believe the PF at one point saying "I've lost everything " ? I've always believed (and feared as a pax) that loss of one or several data sets during instrument conditions could lead a crew to doubt the remaining data. I've always supected that's what happened here. While it may have been easy to replicate a successful outcome in the sim, I think a sudden, unexpected loss of airspeed PLUS involuntary switch to alternate law led certainly the PF FO and eventually the NPF FO to start doubting everything they were seeing. As all instrument pilots know, when that happens, a good outcome is nearly impossible.


User currently offlineairmagnac From Germany, joined Apr 2012, 316 posts, RR: 52
Reply 61, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 20051 times:

I don’t understand this fuss about voice recordings disclosure, to be honest. It is a case of balancing collective rights – right to safety – and individual rights – the pilot’s rights to privacy. Authorities currently think that there is no need to completely squash the pilot’s rights in order to maintain an acceptable level of safety, and as far as I can see, the steadily increasing overall safety performance of the industry does not contradict this decision.

And safety is the unique goal here, I don’t see why we need to introduce the vague notion of “trust” in the balance. Who’s supposed to trust who, exactly ? What kind of trust are we talking about ? The general public implicitly trusts the professionals of the industry, or nobody would ever set a foot on an airplane. So what additional amount of “trust” are we trying to gain here by disclosing every single detail ? And what good can that do ? Most accusations against investigative authorities are the result of misinterpretations of data due to cognitive biases and lack of knowledge. Heck, just look at the first “787 grounded” threads, where we managed to have strong, even violent, disagreements of the meaning of an NTSB statement of about 4 lines. Providing more data, especially ambiguous and non-decisive data, will only provide food for more BS theories.

Also, as Pihero rightly pointed out, conspiracy theories die hard. To carry on with his example, it’ll soon be 25 years since Habsheim ; from the start it is known that the first data listing was wrong, with for example an aircraft position in Africa. The reason for this was quickly identified (a mistake in the decoding protocol) and corrected. And yet 25 years later you still have lots of people basing theories on the “erroneous data”. The president of the victims association even mentioned such a theory in a report on Canal + as recently as last fall. Give all the factual information you want, some people will only see what they want to see.

Another thing : it has been mentioned that all investigation details must be shared between various different “groups” in order to be sure the conclusions are valid. This is absolutely correct, and is the basis of scientific thought. Which is precisely what technical investigations aim to be. And that is why data is already shared between the various investigation boards from all countries through observers, why data is shared with manufacturers, pilot unions, airlines and so on, why final reports go through reading loops and comment processes. And I’m pretty sure that at an individual level, investigators from any country can contact each other personally if they find something that seems strange in each other’s work. Same for engineers, pilots, controllers… And as citizens it is quite possible to contact investigation boards directly. So qualifying investigations as being “secret” is a bit rich, IMO.

That the report is scientific also means that anything it states must be clearly demonstrated with clearly confirmed observations. If something is not certain, than it doesn’t go in. You cannot base safety measures on ambiguous, partial or uncertain assessments. So before screaming about secrecy and conspiracy, if something is not in a report it may be just a case of it not being sufficiently certain


As a matter of fact, as I have not seen it yet in the thread, here is what the final report says about fatigue :

Quote:

1.16.7 Aspects relating to fatigue
The professional timetable of the three crew members during the month that
preceded the accident flight shows that the limitations on flight and duty times, as
well as rest times, were in accordance with the provisions of European Regulation
(EC) n°859/2008 of the European Commission (sub-section Q of Annex III).
The investigation was not able to determine exactly the activities of the flight crew
members during the stopover in Rio, where the crew had arrived three days earlier. It
was not possible to obtain data on their sleep during this stopover.
This lack of precise information on their activity during the stopover, in particular in
relation to sleep, makes it impossible to evaluate the level of fatigue associated to
the flight crew’s duty time.
The CVR recording does, however, make it possible to show that the crew showed no
signs of objective fatigue, as the following elements indicate:
The level of activity and implication of the augmented crew in the first part of
the flight, with the Captain and the copilot seated in the right seat, then in the
second part of the flight with the two copilots, are in accordance with what is
expected from a crew in the cruise phase. No signs of drowsiness or sleepiness
are noticeable;
At 0 h 58 min 07, the Captain was concerned with the state of fatigue of the
copilot in the right seat. («try maybe to sleep twenty minutes when he comes
back or before if you want ») who answered that he didn’t want to sleep;
Questioned on his return to the cockpit, the copilot who took the Captain’s place
answered that he had “dozed”

We all know human factors played a significant role, there is no need to be an expert for that. It is remarkable that the final report says very little about those, even though BEA created a dedicated work group. But I do not see it as a matter of hiding anything. I just think they had lots of guesses, but few actual confirmed conclusions. As human factors are already a big topic of research, pilot fatigue in particular, the investigators probably judged they could not bring anything useful to the topic, and decided there was no need to mix the other confirmed findings with wild-ass guess work (IMO)

But accusations of cover-ups are so much more dramatic than cold, dry, boring logic...



One "oh shit" can erase a thousand "attaboys".
User currently offlineairmagnac From Germany, joined Apr 2012, 316 posts, RR: 52
Reply 62, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 23 hours ago) and read 19690 times:

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 57):
just by googling, to have found most of the answer to AF447

That's an idea, let's shut down all accident investigation boards and replace them with Google. Full access to info, no hiding anything, any answer you want, immediately. Just awesome  



Quoting NAV20 (Reply 57):
'Flight Directors' - which, as far as I can tell, are developed by geeks, not pilots

- geeks can sometimes be pilots (and pilots can be geeks)
- FDs are developed by geeks not pilots...but they are supposed to be used by pilots, not geeks
- geeks don't just develop gadgets in a garage in isolation from the rest of the world. They work together with pilots (among others) to decide what to develop.
Please don't portray "geeks"/engineers and pilots as two conflicting, independant groups


Oh, and no accident can be boiled down to a single item. Just to give you a hint, among other things involved, there were :
- complex icing phenomena in complex meteorigical conditions combined with complex high speed air flows
- integrity of passive air data sensor systems
- ambiguous exchange of information / communication between aircraft systems
- ambiguous exchange of information / communication between aircraft and crew (ergonomy & type training)
- ambiguous exchange of information / communication crew members (CRM)
- ambiguous exchange of information / communication between airlines, manufacturer and authorities
- airmanship training methods and tools

All of which contributed to a loss of situational awareness and, following, very bad decision-making. Obviously in the cockpit during those last few minutes, but equally so in meeting rooms and offices half-way around the world, several months before the plane took off.

And let's not forget the communication problems between aircraft, ATC and SAR services

To sum it up : this accident is not the fault of the pilots OR Airbus OR AF OR the authorities OR Thales OR whatever
It is the failure of the pilots AND Airbus AND AF AND the authorities AND etc... all together.

[Edited 2013-03-17 08:48:09]


One "oh shit" can erase a thousand "attaboys".
User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 63, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 22 hours ago) and read 18805 times:

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 62):
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 57):
just by googling, to have found most of the answer to AF447

That's an idea, let's shut down all accident investigation boards and replace them with Google. Full access to info, no hiding anything, any answer you want, immediately. Just awesome

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 57):
'Flight Directors' - which, as far as I can tell, are developed by geeks, not pilots

- geeks can sometimes be pilots (and pilots can be geeks)
- FDs are developed by geeks not pilots...but they are supposed to be used by pilots, not geeks
Quoting airmagnac (Reply 62):
To sum it up : this accident is not the fault of the pilots OR Airbus OR AF OR the authorities OR Thales OR whatever
It is the failure of the pilots AND Airbus AND AF AND the authorities AND etc... all together.

I guess we largely agree, armagnac. All we have to settle on are the 'percentages' of guilt. Establishing that'll take five years or so, hope you live that long. Statistically speaking, given that I'm already 73, I probably won't........ 

Thing is, life has to go on. And ALL the agencies that you refer to - and others, including Boeing - will have to play their part in ensuring that.

There are only two major firms left in the aviation business. At the moment, Airbus has suffered the most recent accident, and their 'accident percentage' is a bit over 50% - but the 'law of averages' says that the next one will probably be a Boeing one.

BOTH current major airliner manufacturers are safer than any others that have been previously established, in world history, so far. Does that fact 'bother you' in some way?



"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 64, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 21 hours ago) and read 18481 times:

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 62):
That's an idea, let's shut down all accident investigation boards and replace them with Google.

Thing is, airmagnac mate, in real life, dealing with any problem, you have to investigate, analyse, conclude, recommend.......

Please give us all an outline of your conclusions - and recommendations?



"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlinethreepoint From Canada, joined Oct 2005, 2162 posts, RR: 9
Reply 65, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 21 hours ago) and read 18443 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 9):
And our CVR recordings are not for the ghouls who would seek some sick pleasure in listening to the last words of dead people.

They will make references to the tapes, but the transcript is not for public use.
We pilots will not allow it.

As a professional pilot and devotee to the philosophy of 'learn from the mistakes of others; you'll not live long enough to make them all yourself', I object to this statement above. Yes, there is always going to be a fraction of the population who take perverse fascination with the demise of others. But not releasing CVR recordings and/or transcripts is doing a great disservice to aviation and to all those who fly or fly in airplanes.

I have heard and read many 'last words' as you term them and have learned a lesson (or a few lessons) from each of them. Indeed, I regularly teach in a CRM course one particular example ('Palm 90' in 1982) at the end of which the first officer is heard to state "Larry, we're going down" and the captain replies "I know it". Hardly ghoulish, is it. But it illuminates the thrust of the lesson, in which this exchange is the only functional communication between the flight crew during the takeoff and accident sequences. Analyzing exchanges like this one allows us to form positive communication techniques that help ensure that anomalies are detected, announced and resolved quickly rather than have a pilot sitting idly with silent misgivings as they hurtle towards an accident.

I can appreciate pilots' and unions' concerns about cameras in the cockpit. I suspect most of their opposition has more to do with fear of discipline by management than real concerns about invasions of privacy. But to deny the lessons learned from what was said (or not said) in the time leading to an accident or incident does, as I stressed above, deny the rest of the aviation community valuable lessons that they may apply to avoid repeating the affected crew's fate. So when today's pilots refuse to permit dissemination of accumulated knowledge just because somebody may have died, do they realize how they might be contributing towards the accidents of tomorrow's pilots?

[Edited 2013-03-17 10:16:58]

[Edited 2013-03-17 10:20:32]


The nice thing about a mistake is the pleasure it gives others.
User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 66, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 20 hours ago) and read 18280 times:

Quoting threepoint (Reply 65):
Quoting Pihero (Reply 9):They will make references to the tapes, but the transcript is not for public use.
We pilots will not allow it.

As a professional pilot and devotee to the philosophy of 'learn from the mistakes of others; you'll not live long enough to make them all yourself', I object to this statement above.

As a "professional pilot" you do not qualify as "the public" in this situation.

Quoting threepoint (Reply 65):
I have heard and read many 'last words' as you term them and have learned a lesson (or a few lessons) from each of them. Indeed, I regularly teach in a CRM course one particular example

That's excellent. Aviation professionals certainly should have access to transcripts and sometimes even recordings. The public, on the other hand, should not have access to recordings, and for us transcripts merely make interesting reading and serve no useful purpose.


User currently offlineManuCH From Switzerland, joined Jun 2005, 3011 posts, RR: 47
Reply 67, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 20 hours ago) and read 18249 times:
AIRLINERS.NET CREW
HEAD MODERATOR

Quoting hivue (Reply 66):
Aviation professionals certainly should have access to transcripts and sometimes even recordings. The public, on the other hand, should not have access to recordings

How do you define "aviation professionals" and how where would you draw the line between those who can get access, and those who can't? And how do you enforce that? Would a CPL license be enough, or do you need an ATPL? A valid rating too? An employment at an airline?

And how would you identify yourself as such a professional? Would a pilot who wants access need to send copies of his license to the safety board who completed the investigation? That would be a mess and a bureaucratic nightmare.



Never trust a statistic you didn't fake yourself
User currently offlineairmagnac From Germany, joined Apr 2012, 316 posts, RR: 52
Reply 68, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 20 hours ago) and read 18285 times:

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 63):
All we have to settle on are the 'percentages' of guilt

Actually I don't give a d*** about aportioning blame. I don't even think it's possible. I'm a system engineer ; I see the airline industry as a huge system made up of several interacting parts : flight crews, cabin crews, airframe, ATC, maintenance, ops planning, and more. Each of these parts is itself a system made up of several interacting sub-parts. All these elements must work together to deliver saftey and performance. That means they exchange information and interact with each other. Which causes something which is rather difficult to understand : although each and every part of a system may be working perfectly well, the system may very well fail. The pilots may very well make the proper decisions based on the data they have, and their aircraft may be responding perfectly to their inputs, but the assembly {aircrfat + pilots} may fail.
For a system to work properly, it is obviously necessary that each sub-part work properly. But it is far from sufficient.
Another way to see it is that you cannot seperate the parts : pilots without an airplane are pedestrians ; an airplane without pilots is a pile of scrap metal (or composite material, I guess). Aportioning blame on single parts of the system means taking each part in isolation from the rest of the system. But if the problem lays in the interaction between the parts, then what ?
So no, aportioning guilt to each part of the system is useless. What we still have to do is identify the problems, propose possible solutions, decide on the best solution, and implement that solution. And there is still a long way to go to get that done.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 63):

There are only two major firms left in the aviation business

That's a rather unfair statement for Bombardier, Embraer, Dassault, Sukhoi, Gulfstream, Cessna and so many other firms ! 
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 63):
At the moment, Airbus has suffered the most recent accident, and their 'accident percentage' is a bit over 50% - but the 'law of averages' says that the next one will probably be a Boeing one.

A weird statistic based on many underlying assumptions which may or may not be true : equal fleet sizes, equal "safety level' between the fleets of both airframers, equivalent mission profiles for both fleets...
But more importantly, as I have already said, an accident is the failure of the entire airline industry ; you cannot single out any sub-part of the system. Which is why these stats saying "Airbus has x accidents compared to y for Boeing" or "Air France has crashed 3 planes in ten years" are meaningless.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 63):

BOTH current major airliner manufacturers are safer than any others that have been previously established, in world history, so far. Does that fact 'bother you' in some way?

Not at all, because as I said, such statements are meaningless. Airbus and Boeing can build the most sophisticated airplanes, if the pilots are not trained correctly, if maintenance is shoddy or if controllers give bad directions, you'll still have a poor safety record.
What can be said is that the safety performance of the industry keeps getting better. And that does not bother me at all !

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 64):

Thing is, airmagnac mate, in real life, dealing with any problem, you have to investigate, analyse, conclude, recommend.......

Quite right. But wouldn't that best be done by reading the final BEA report, and using it, instead of looking up a single short, simplified article quoting the report on a single aspect of the accident, taken out of context and reinterpreted by a reporter who may or may not be competent ?



One "oh shit" can erase a thousand "attaboys".
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 69, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 20 hours ago) and read 18175 times:
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To Airmagnac :
That is the best post I've seen so far on this thread and, as a matter of fact, the AF447 accident.
Respect is due.
If I may, I would have just added some more emphasis on the lines Nav20 picked up as they are really the crux of the matter :
: "...To sum it up : This accident is not the FAULT of the pilots OR Airbus OR Air France OR the authorities OR Thales OR whoever.
It is the FAILURE of the pilots, AND Airbus AND Air France AND the authorities AND Thales etc... altogether. "

Some comments : The captain, in response to a cockpit visitor said " ...cette nuit, je n'ai pas assez dormi . Une heure, c'était pas assez tout à l'heure "
which translates as "...last night I didn't have enough sleep. (just) one hour wasn't enough later", referring to an early afternoon nap, in all probability.

The experts'reports sees as factors of the accident :

" 4.2 : adverse conditions : at night, in turbulence and absence of ouside visual references.
4.3 : Maximum fatigue in the low circadian phase"


I asked a physician about the meaning of such a statrement and the answer was : "One has to consider scientific results on many researches about human ability to perform a given task during normal circadian cycles. Whatever the quality of rest, performance is degraded during these phases when normal activity would be sleep. The maximum degradation happens in the hours before sunrise and it is also dependent on trhe time zone one is at against the perceived time zone of one's internal clock."
It is not a subjective assessment of this crew's fatigue for their activities during their three days in Rio.
Finally, the experts' report has been leaked on the net... and the CVR transcript has edited all the "non-pertinent" words and sentences the crew said... so the ghouls can stay away from it.
There is though an attempt - and a good one - at making laypeople understand the technical aspects of the accident. But still, in order to get the most of it, one has to speak - and understand technical and legalese - French and be a pilot or an aeronautical engineer.

[Edited 2013-03-17 11:48:06]

[Edited 2013-03-17 11:48:44]


Contrail designer
User currently offlinecaptainmeeerkat From Russia, joined Aug 2010, 390 posts, RR: 1
Reply 70, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 19 hours ago) and read 18010 times:

How does "last night" become the actual day of flying? Or is there something lost in translation?


my luggage is better travelled than me!
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 71, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 19 hours ago) and read 18020 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 52):
The majority on this site and espec ially those who are not French dispute a/ the report findings ; b/ the court findings ; c/ the AF poublications. Basically everyone is claiming a Freench conspiracy and an unjust blame on some engineer the other side of the Atlantic. No one - or close to no one - has ever questioned the way the repair on the DC-10 was made, the procedures of that airline... etc...

Most of the squeamishness about the Concorde crash, at least that I've seen, has nothing to do with the technical questions but is legal or cultural and related to the following issues:

1) It is very unusual (dare I say very French?) for criminal charges to be leveled for what all agree is, at worst, simple negligence;
2) It is very unusual for criminal charges to be leveled for FOD; and
3) There is a perception--maybe not a fair perception--on this side of the Atlantic that the subpar design of the Concorde that permitted a fairly small piece of FOD to cause catastrophe has not received adequate scrutiny in France.

Quoting Mir (Reply 45):
Not all conversation that goes on in the cockpit of an accident flight is related to the accident, nor does it reflect conduct that isn't up to standards. If there's superfluous conversation at some point in a flight, there's no particular need for it to show up in a transcript.

Agreed. That said, I review a lot of CVR transcripts because of some human factors work with which I'm involved in a similar industry, and I've never had reason to believe that any NTSB redaction was inappropriate.

Quoting Mir (Reply 45):
Also true. But that doesn't mean that the job of checking the government's conclusions should fall to people who have no knowledge of the field in question. There are groups of experts in the field who are better suited to make that call.

But if the government gets to make the call on who has access to the information, what does that really accomplish? We still have the potential for the government to be wrong.

Can you point me toward an example in the States where information that NTSB made publicly available hurt the industry or any of the actors involved with a particular crash? If not, what's the downside of making lots of information available.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineart From United Kingdom, joined Feb 2005, 3382 posts, RR: 1
Reply 72, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 19 hours ago) and read 17884 times:

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 49):
I hope that one of the more experienced pilots on here can tell us both whether, and how, it is even possible for an aeroplane of any kind (leave alone an airliner flown by professionals) to remain in a nose-up attitude, below flying speed, for several minutes, all the way down to ground level, evidently without any of the three professional pilots involved noticing?
Quoting AA87 (Reply 58):
Thank you, meant attitude direction (director ?) indicator. I've been in Airbus cockpits many times, including in flight, isn't the ADI always displayed ? After so many years and reading so many threads and analyses on this accident, I still don't understand why the crew clearly did not seem to appreciate that the nose was too high most of the time.

Bit off topic but I, too, am baffled that the crew did not see some instrument or display showing that the aircraft had its nose above the horizon.


User currently offlineltbewr From United States of America, joined Jan 2004, 13141 posts, RR: 15
Reply 73, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 19 hours ago) and read 17821 times:

While I do support that potential alertness issues could be a factor in what happened with AF447, I think some here are just wanting to fine the 'ah-ha' or some singular factor that was critical as to the PIC/FO that led to this terrible crash.

User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 74, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 18 hours ago) and read 17787 times:

As someone new to the board but a reader for some time, I'm struck by the way unrelated issues distract from the core issue.

Let me summarise:

Le Point reveals that on the unreleased portions of CVR the captain makes disturbing disclosures about fatigue.

Those disclosures do two things.

They raise fatigue as a potential factor in the crash at a level not apparent in the final report, and

They tells us that the BEA has suppressed information relevant to an air crash investigation which is also information that embarrasses or implicates the national icon, Air France, which is responsible for the actions of its pilots and the the safety of their workplace.

These are really serious issues.

They leave us asking, what else has been suppressed, and how important might such information be to a full and balanced finding by the safety investigator?


User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 75, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 18 hours ago) and read 17645 times:
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Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 71):
simple negligence

There are, my dear sir a great deal of instances where "simple negligence" led to catastrophies, even some which do not involve the French : The Ermenonville DC-10 comes to mind.
The DC-10 which lost an engine was another...
If we just sit here ascribing these accidents to "simple negligence " akin, as I understand you, as an "Act of God", tell me : What's the use of accident investigation ?

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 71):
There is a perception--maybe not a fair perception--on this side of the Atlantic that the subpar design of the Concorde that permitted a fairly small piece of FOD to cause catastrophe has not received adequate scrutiny in France.

That smacks of a "not designed here" syndrome : Think of the - again - DC-10 cargo door, the Comet window frame, the Electra, the 737 rudder...the Space Shuttle... are they subpar designs too ? The industry is at the pointy end of technological knowledge and despite rigourous testing, we continually find areas where some improvements need to be done : The 787 battery problems belong in that area. Would you treat it as subpar design, too ? or more fairly something that hasn't shown in three years of testing and service and came as a surprise to all aviation interested people ?

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 71):
Can you point me toward an example in the States where information that NTSB made publicly available hurt the industry or any of the actors involved with a particular crash? If not, what's the downside of making lots of information available.

There is an answer to that paragraph : Can you point me toward an example in the United States where an NTSB report is different from a BEApublicly available report, CVR transcripts included ? They have to adhere to an internationally agreed format and one can even find the articles follow an agreed plan.

Quoting threepoint (Reply 65):
Indeed, I regularly teach in a CRM course one particular example ('Palm 90' in 1982) at the end of which the first officer is heard to state "Larry, we're going down" and the captain replies "I know it". Hardly ghoulish, is it. But it illuminates the thrust of the lesson, in which this exchange is the only functional communication between the flight crew during the takeoff and accident sequences.

You misunderstood me. The last words I refer to are of a "personal quality" which do not have any pertinence to the accident. Whether a dying pilot calls his mother or his wife should not be your concern and should not be made available to people who otherwise have no understanding whatsoever of the technical / human factors... aspects of the accident.

If you had done any reading of the AF447 CVR transcript, you would have found lots of these instances : although of a personal nature, they illustrate the total misunderstanding of ther situation they were in.

There are even, in some transcripts some exchanges that could lead to a better understanding of the dynamics of CRM in emergency situations : the Sioux City accident is one instance in which there was total acquisition of the strategic plan by all in the cockpit , until the final moments when the synergy completely broke down : the opposition between slowing down - and letting the nose drop - and keeping the nose up with the risk of landing too long... I studied that event at length and wrote a paper for a course : nobody on that course was arrogant enough to pretend he could have saved the day... and nobody had any criticism for that crew : it was just an illustration on an exceptionally good CRM and crew dynamics...until the end.
That's one example where an accident report can help improve consciousness and knowledge from the professional crews.
And for that, one doesn't need expletives or expressions of religious faith... to be made public. They belong to the realm of privacy, or dare I say intimity.

[Edited 2013-03-17 13:47:46]

[Edited 2013-03-17 13:54:42]


Contrail designer
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 76, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 17533 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 75):
There are, my dear sir a great deal of simple negligence that led to catastrophies, even some which do not involve the French : The Ermenonville DC-10 comes to mind.

I agree. But besides Concorde, have ANY led to criminal charges? That's the difference that has caused a lot of concern in the States, fair or not.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 75):
If we just sit here ascribing these accidents to "simple negligence " akin as I understand you as an "Act of God", tell me : What's the use of accident investigation ?

Outside of France, accident investigation generally does not lead to criminal charges. The concern comes from the criminal charges, not from the investigation.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 75):
Would you treat it as subpar design, too ? or more fairly something that hasn't shown in three years of testing and service and came as a surprise to all aviation interested people ?

Provided that no design problem is found in the batteries, I don't think there's a design problem with the 787. The containment vessels worked as designed and intended.

Certainly, there are plenty of examples of poor design leading to accidents, including several of the cases you cited.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 75):
Can you point me toward an example in the United States where an NTSB report is different from a BEApublicly available report, CVR transcripts included ? They have to adhere to an internationally agreed format and one can even find the articles follow an agreed plan.

i don't read many BEA reports, so I am basing my comments on what you said at the very beginning: that in France and at the behest of unions, it is acceptable for safety-relevant information that is "personal" to be withheld from BEA reports. If that is incorrect, let me know.

[Edited 2013-03-17 14:18:52]


I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlinemcdu From United States of America, joined Apr 2005, 1474 posts, RR: 17
Reply 77, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 17472 times:

Quoting art (Reply 72):
Bit off topic but I, too, am baffled that the crew did not see some instrument or display showing that the aircraft had its nose above the horizon.

normal cruise flight is a few degrees nose above the horizon. In fact a heavy transport aircraft is rarely nose below the horizon. Most descents can be made at or slightly below zero pitch. Approaches are flown with positive pitch angles.

Also an airplane can be stalled at any pitch. It is the AOA that really matters.

What took place that night was tragic. The crew had serious loss of information and flight guidance. In cloud or at night recovery would have been extremely difficult with the contradictory flight information they were working with.

The captain complaint of sleep is normal in long haul flying. This thread is another enthusiasts over reaction unfortunately.


User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 78, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 17355 times:
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Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 76):
But besides Concorde, have ANY led to criminal charges

Basically most of them. some people have been imprisoned for reckless behaviour leading to manslaughter.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 76):
That's the difference that has caused a lot of concern in the States, fair or not.

That's the way our system works. And you have to respect it. As we do the US way of dealing with other subjects, securityhaving been the biggest one for some time.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 76):
Outside of France, accident investigation generally does not lead to criminal charges. The concern comes from the criminal charges, not from the investigation.

Actually, there are quite a number of countries which have similar systems. Fair or not in your opinion doesn't matter. That is their judicial system.
And the BEA report doesn't lead to criminal charges : that's the privilegte of the instruction judge and the judge of the tribunal.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 76):
it is acceptable for safety-relevant information that is "personal" to be withheld from BEA reports. If that is incorrect, let me know.

That's not what I meant : The CVR recording : Hell ! NO!!!
The full transcript : Over our dead bodies !!!
See my last post above, it gives you how far we are ready to go in the intrerest of understanding an accident : Basically the last five minutes haven't been edited at all : Thjre is absolutely no technical aspect in those last instants. That absence in fact is very important as in basic terms they were no longer pros, just three people baffled by events beyond their understanding. Do you really, really need more ?



Contrail designer
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 79, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 17320 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 78):
That's the way our system works. And you have to respect it. As we do the US way of dealing with other subjects, securityhaving been the biggest one for some time.

I do respect it, but by the same token you need to understand why a lot of folks on this side of the pond (particularly those who, unlike me, lack comparative law training) have concerns about how the events surrounding that crash.

Why was CO charged and not EADS (as successor in interest to Aerospatiale) or BAe (as successor in interest to BAC)?

Quoting Pihero (Reply 78):
Basically the last five minutes haven't been edited at all : Thjre is absolutely no technical aspect in those last instants. That absence in fact is very important as in basic terms they were no longer pros, just three people baffled by events beyond their understanding. Do you really, really need more ?

I'm certainly not willing to concede that there is never relevant information outside the last five minutes.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 80, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 17287 times:

What is not normal is that the accident report has suppressed a reference to fatigue which is a reflection on the operator if we accept that the leak from the CVR is correct.

Selective disclosure in an accident report is improper, and the more so when it involves the national carrier.

The fact that fatigue is an issue for all pilots and all airlines doesn't make it less relevant to the AF447 report, if anything, if we follow the James Reason approach to aviation safety analysis, it makes it even more important for the report to include this issue in the other issues it deals with.

For example, if as many of writers have suggested, there is something inherently wrong with the Airbus control system, severe fatigue may in fact be profoundly important if it makes a bad system even more difficult to handle.

I'm not necessarily agreeing that the system in Airbuses is bad, but if there is a 'problem' did fatigue make it worse? Did it make the flight more vulnerable? What safety lessons do we learn from this?

The point is we are reading evidence of a report that has deliberately left out something which appears to have been important to the captain. What was important to the captain of AF447 is of necessity relevant to the inquiry.

Which brings us back to the need, with appropriate personal safeguards, for everything that happened in the cockpit be analysed and discussed in the final report, keeping in mind that the report's authors are not actually charged with writing for the public, but with fulfilling an ICAO obligation to to write a report for all aviation stakeholders including other regulatory authorities, to further air safety.


User currently offlinemayor From United States of America, joined Mar 2008, 10512 posts, RR: 14
Reply 81, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 17 hours ago) and read 17256 times:

Quoting mcdu (Reply 77):
normal cruise flight is a few degrees nose above the horizon. In fact a heavy transport aircraft is rarely nose below the horizon. Most descents can be made at or slightly below zero pitch. Approaches are flown with positive pitch angles.

True.....I'm sure they all vary, but all fly better, a little "nose up". I remember doing weight & balance on the 727 and it flew better and was more efficient a little more tail heavy.



"A committee is a group of the unprepared, appointed by the unwilling, to do the unnecessary"----Fred Allen
User currently offlinethreepoint From Canada, joined Oct 2005, 2162 posts, RR: 9
Reply 82, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 17226 times:

Quoting hivue (Reply 66):
As a "professional pilot" you do not qualify as "the public" in this situation...The public, on the other hand, should not have access to recordings, and for us transcripts merely make interesting reading and serve no useful purpose.

Nonsense. I'm very much a part of the general public. You may not know but most aviation safety courses outside the airlines are delivered to pilots not by in-house instructors, but by private individuals who may be consultants, etc. Aviation safety is enhanced not only by those employed by an airline or regulatory body.

If you can think of a piece of software or hardware that improves aviation safety, it was most certainly designed and built by members of 'the general public'.



The nice thing about a mistake is the pleasure it gives others.
User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 83, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 17198 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 79):
Why was CO charged and not EADS (as successor in interest to Aerospatiale) or BAe (as successor in interest to BAC)?

The head of the Aerospatiale Concorde division and the chief engineer were suspects in the criminal investigation, for negligence with over 70 instances involving Concorde tires.

The four people charged with manslaughter were the CO mechanic, the CO mechanic's supervisor, the head of the Aerospatiale Concorde division and a former French regulator (I assume his position was similar to an FAA inspector over the Concorde).

The investigation didn't just go after Continental.

The CO supervisor and the French officials were found not to be guilty of manslaughter, and the mechanic received a 15 month suspended sentence.

Continental as a company was found criminally responsible, however that was overturned on appeal. (CO was still found partially financially responsible - very similar to how the system works in the US.)

But again - this was a normal French criminal proceeding, not associated with the BEA investigation.

The Captain of AF296 - the A320 which settled into the forest in the low flyby back in 1988 was convicted and sentenced to 6 months in prison and 12 months probation in a similar criminal proceeding. When he appealed, his sentence was increased to 10 months in prison, and 10 months probation.

I do not know if he actually served time in prison.


User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 84, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 17156 times:

Quoting art (Reply 72):
Bit off topic but I, too, am baffled that the crew did not see some instrument or display showing that the aircraft had its nose above the horizon.

In an fantastically detailed analysis of released FDR data, A.Net member mandala499 showed us how it appeared the PF was chasing a nose up pitch of approx 12 or 15 degrees (I forget the exact number.)

This is the nose up pitch for losing air speed data at low altitude, low speed such as soon after takeoff or on landing approach.

This is a memory item, as is the nose pitch angle of approx 3 degrees for loss of air speed data during cruise.

It appears he simply remembered and tried to apply the wrong number. One which stalled the aircraft. And he never understood why the plane was not reacting the way it was 'supposed to react'. He might have become fixated on trying to make that too high nose up angle work.

The other pilot in the cockpit does not appear to have provided any help, read any checklists, suggest any options, etc - at all during the fatal plunge.


User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 85, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 17122 times:

Quoting ManuCH (Reply 67):
How do you define "aviation professionals"

The poster I was addressing in my response identified himself as a professional pilot and as teaching a CRM course. That was easy. You are correct in implying that other situations could be more difficult.

Quoting ManuCH (Reply 67):
where would you draw the line between those who can get access, and those who can't?

For CVR recordings, on a case-by-case basis. For transcripts, the easiest way for people who have a legitimate professional need for access to get access is for the transcripts (appropriately redacted) to be included in official investigation reports, which currently is what happens. I have no problem with that. It is the attitude that the public needs to have this information and that investigators are committing some fraud on the public when they excise material they conclude, in their official capacities, is not relevant to the investigation that concerns me.

Quoting ManuCH (Reply 67):
Would a pilot who wants access need to send copies of his license to the safety board who completed the investigation?

To get access to recordings or non-redacted transcripts that were not the versions in the official reports he (or anyone else) should have to make a very good case and submit quite a bit of paper work.


User currently offlineAzure From France, joined Dec 2012, 629 posts, RR: 16
Reply 86, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 17118 times:

I am struck by a number of comments that seek to establish a conspiracy in which the BEA would be the big boss.
I fail to understand what is the purpose of this conspiracy. To protect Air France? In order to leave Airbus solely responsible? But Airbus is much more an icon in France than Air France - or its economic weight is far more important, to be more realistic.
This theory does not hold water if I may say so.
The BEA did not mention fatigue as a decisive factor in the accident because its mission was to establish the technical reasons and/or the breaches of the regulations which have led to the accident. The BEA should have mentioned this fatigue if it came from some staff mismanagement by Air France, but here it is the pilots private life which is at stake.
Furthermore the BEA did not exempt the pilots from any liability in the crash so far. As a matter of fact, when it released its report, the pilots' unions protested and so did the victims associations because both thought that the report was too favorable to AF and Airbus, by "overwhelming" the pilots. But in regard of the law, AF remains responsible for its pilots even if the cause of their fatigue is to be found in their private life.
The least that can be said about AF in this tragedy is that it did not spare any effort and spent hundreds million of Euros to find the voice recorders of flight 447 in the depth of the Atlantic Ocean. I am not sure that many airlines in the world would have gone so far.



I fly because it releases my mind from the tyranny of petty things - A. de Saint Exupery
User currently offlineairmagnac From Germany, joined Apr 2012, 316 posts, RR: 52
Reply 87, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 17027 times:

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 80):
keeping in mind that the report's authors are not actually charged with writing for the public, but with fulfilling an ICAO obligation to to write a report for all aviation stakeholders including other regulatory authorities, to further air safety.

And yet your complaint is based on the fact that this single sentence was not disclosed to the public. Many countries appointed observers to the investigation, all reports were sent out to stakeholders before official publication to get feedback and comments. Do you have any evidence that this recorded sentence was withheld from the observers and stakeholders ? Do you have any evidence that there was disagreement on the following extract of the final report ?

Quote:

The CVR recording does, however, make it possible to show that the crew showed no
signs of objective fatigue, as the following elements indicate:
The level of activity and implication of the augmented crew in the first part of
the flight, with the Captain and the copilot seated in the right seat, then in the
second part of the flight with the two copilots, are in accordance with what is
expected from a crew in the cruise phase. No signs of drowsiness or sleepiness
are noticeable;

Do you have any evidence that the BEA failed to "fulfill an ICAO obligation to write a report for all aviation stakeholders including other regulatory authorities, to further air safety", which as you say yourself, is a serious accusation ?

If not, then we're back to the question of whether or not all information should be made public, to which I repeat my opinion : what's the point ?



One "oh shit" can erase a thousand "attaboys".
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 88, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 17009 times:

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 83):
The head of the Aerospatiale Concorde division and the chief engineer were suspects in the criminal investigation, for negligence with over 70 instances involving Concorde tires.

The four people charged with manslaughter were the CO mechanic, the CO mechanic's supervisor, the head of the Aerospatiale Concorde division and a former French regulator (I assume his position was similar to an FAA inspector over the Concorde).

All correct as far as I know. My point was that Aerospatiale/EADS (corporate) were neither investigated nor charged when it was obvious that there were design issues. Otherwise, Henri Perrier and, apparently, Jacques Herubel would not have been charged. Why is that?

Do you see why it sets off some alarm bells when arguably the most nationalistic legal system in the G-20 charges the US company whose employees it charges but not the French company whose employees it also charges?



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineairmagnac From Germany, joined Apr 2012, 316 posts, RR: 52
Reply 89, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 16984 times:

I have very little legal knowledge, so just out of curiosity, what makes you say the the French have

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 88):
arguably the most nationalistic legal system in the G-20

?



One "oh shit" can erase a thousand "attaboys".
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 90, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 16982 times:

Quoting airmagnac (Reply 89):
I have very little legal knowledge, so just out of curiosity, what makes you say the the French have

It's a good question. Generally, French law is much more protective of French nationals (as opposed to nationals of other countries) than other civil law systems.

I don't know there's a concrete answer to why that is so in one place, so it might be easiest to give an example. As of four or five years ago, France was the only developed country where a court had adjudicatory jurisdiction if the plaintiff was a French citizen but neither the parties nor the action had any other connection to France. I think that portion of the Civil Code may have changed recently, but it's a good, fairly recent example.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 91, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 16 hours ago) and read 16955 times:
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Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 79):
Why was CO charged and not EADS (as successor in interest to Aerospatiale) or BAe (as successor in interest to BAC)?

You remember wrong. Henri Perrier, The Concorde "father" and his assistant Herubel have been condemned for negligence leading to involontary manslaughte rand, as a matter of fact, EADS was condemned for quite a lot more than Continental.
In the appellate court, both Continental employees were relaxed.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 79):
I'm certainly not willing to concede that there is never relevant information outside the last five minutes.

So, may I suggest you take a read of the whole transcript as there are quite a few other instances. The last five minutes have just been an example I took to illustrate my point, the rest of the transcript has quite a lot more. That, basically because I don't want us to discuss principles without proper intimacy with the subject.
Isn't it one of the basic tenets of your profession ?



Contrail designer
User currently offlineOzGlobal From France, joined Nov 2004, 2723 posts, RR: 4
Reply 92, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 16887 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 88):
Do you see why it sets off some alarm bells when arguably the most nationalistic legal system in the G-20 charges the US company whose employees it charges but not the French company whose employees it also charges?

You're kidding, right? The US is notorious in placing itself and its citizens outside international and extra-national law. It is alone in unique in the non-recognition of international tribunals and courts accepted by ALL developed nations: International Court of Justice, Courts of Human Rights, etc. For this reason it is often characterised as a pariah state in these contexts.



When all's said and done, there'll be more said than done.
User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 93, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 16827 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 88):
when it was obvious that there were design issues.

While design issues might possibly have been apparent, the BEA report found the primary active element of cause was the improper unauthorized repair on the CO DC-10 which left the piece of metal on the runway.

I don't like that view, but I understand how they could come to that conclusion. And they probably know more about accident investigation and the aircraft than I do.

The 'obvious design issues' were more in the line of why wasn't something done to minimize the possibility of this happening before.

Where the criminal probe was focuses on 'what was different which caused this tyre burst to be a fatal crash'

Much as a US grand jury looks at what caused the loss of life, rather than what could have been done on the broader scale to prevent a loss of life from becoming possible.

I really don't see a difference in how the French system operated in this case and how the US criminal justice system works the times I've been on a grand jury, other than the fact that the French system allows a corporation to be held criminally responsible, where we could not do that in the US.

Continental's criminal responsibility, which was overturned by the French appeals court, was improperly supervising the employee, ensuring there was a system in place to make sure such an action by a single employee could not happen.

Obviously the French appeals courts found that Continental could not be held to a criminal negligent standard in this case.

In the US we would not even be able to ask that question.


User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 94, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 15 hours ago) and read 16773 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 91):
as a matter of fact, EADS was condemned for quite a lot more than Continental.

Do you have a source for EADS being charged? For instance, the BBC's writeup says this:

Quote:
Air France Concorde trails fire from its engine (2000). The crash occurred shortly after take-off from Charles de Gaulle airport. US airline Continental and five people will stand trial over the 2000 Concorde crash near Paris which killed 113 people, French judicial officials say.


The BBC's pre-charges article says this:


Quote:
A French prosecutor has asked judges to bring manslaughter charges against US airline Continental over the crash of an Air France Concorde in 2000.

The prosecutor also recommended similar charges against two Continental employees and two French officials.
Quoting OzGlobal (Reply 92):
You're kidding, right? The US is notorious in placing itself and its citizens outside international and extra-national law. It is alone in unique in the non-recognition of international tribunals and courts accepted by ALL developed nations: International Court of Justice, Courts of Human Rights, etc. For this reason it is often characterised as a pariah state in these contexts.

Rejection of international law--where the US is pretty much in a league of its own--is different from a legal system that protects citizens at the expense of aliens. It's not like the US says that the ICJ does not apply to its own citizens but that it applies to aliens in identical situations.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 95, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 14 hours ago) and read 16670 times:
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Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 94):
Do you have a source for EADS being charged?
"Aucune faute pénale n’a, en revanche, été retenue contre trois cadres de l’aéronautique français, dont Henri Perrier, considéré comme le père du supersonique français. Le parquet avait requis 24 mois de prison avec sursis à son encontre. Le constructeur du Concorde - aujourd’hui EADS - devra cependant s’acquitter de 30 % des dommages et intérêts dûs aux victimes, après avoir été reconnu responsable de négligences au civil."
In here

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 94):
Rejection of international law--where the US is pretty much in a league of its own--is different from a legal system that protects citizens at the expense of aliens. It's not like the US says that the ICJ does not apply to its own citizens but that it applies to aliens in identical situations.

I call that splitting legal hairs.



Contrail designer
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 96, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 14 hours ago) and read 16618 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 95):
Le constructeur du Concorde - aujourd’hui EADS - devra cependant s’acquitter de 30 % des dommages et intérêts dûs aux victimes, après avoir été reconnu responsable de négligences au civil."

Civil negligence and money damages, no? Quite a bit different from criminal charges.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 95):
I call that splitting legal hairs.

Maybe, but it's an important distinction.

How would you feel if you were in a car wreck in France with an American, he sued you in America and an American court entered judgment against you? Until recently, the opposite of that was permitted in France (and it may still be).



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 97, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 14 hours ago) and read 16602 times:
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Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 96):
the opposite of that was permitted in France (and it may still be).

I have no idea, and I haven't been awre of that fact.KL I guess is that unless we have comparable laws and penalties, these anomalies will remain, like the case of extradition : we do not extradict criminals who would risk a death penalty in the countrry which asks for them. Simple, and IMHO very correct.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 96):
Civil negligence and money damages, no? Quite a bit different from criminal charges.

The public ministry ( I believe the equivalent of your district attorney) asked for a criminal charge of manslaughterr and 24 months suspended jail sentence against Perrier and his assistant, which was in fact a heavier penalty than for the Continental employees. That the court dismissed the criminal charges was its privilege.
Wasn't that exactly what happened to OJ Simpson ?

But aren't we way off topic ?

[Edited 2013-03-17 17:34:56]


Contrail designer
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 98, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 13 hours ago) and read 16519 times:
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Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 93):
The 'obvious design issues' were more in the line of why wasn't something done to minimize the possibility of this happening before.

Sorry . I was involved somewhere else.
The design issues came as a complete surprise to all concerned : the wing skin and the fuel tank were punture-proof from rubber / stone / metal parts at the airplane's takeoff speeds. The tanks were not punctured ,actually, but the big tire piece hitting the bottom of the wing provoked a shockwave that spread in the fuel and the back of the tank seal which then brooke open, causing the massive leak that got lit by the afterburner...(to this day, the British AAIB , in spite of all the testing done, doesn't acknowledge the "shockwave theory" as absolute proof ). No one had any notion of such destructive phenomenon. It was , as a matter of fact, the French Air Force enginneers who had experience of such destruction due to erxplosives that initially came with the explanation. Nobody, though, could come out with another explanation.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 83):
The Captain of AF296 - the A320 which settled into the forest in the low flyby back in 1988 was convicted and sentenced to 6 months in prison and 12 months probation in a similar criminal proceeding. When he appealed, his sentence was increased to 10 months in prison, and 10 months probation.
I do not know if he actually served time in prison.

He did.



Contrail designer
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 99, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 13 hours ago) and read 16468 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 97):
But aren't we way off topic ?

The question was, I think, why some don't take everything BEA says as gospel truth, and it seems to me that this is all related.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 97):
The public ministry ( I believe the equivalent of your district attorney) asked for a criminal charge of manslaughterr and 24 months suspended jail sentence against Perrier and his assistant, which was in fact a heavier penalty than for the Continental employees.

Charging the individual and charging the company are two different things. The employees were treated fairly similarly, but Continental (itself) was charged and EADS (itself) was not (nor was BAe).

Quoting Pihero (Reply 98):
The tanks were not punctured ,actually, but the big tire piece hitting the bottom of the wing provoked a shockwave that spread in the fuel and the back of the tank seal which then brooke open, causing the massive leak that got lit by the afterburner...(to this day, the British AAIB , in spite of all the testing done, doesn't acknowledge the "shockwave theory" as absolute proof ). No one had any notion of such destructive phenomenon. It was , as a matter of fact, the French Air Force enginneers who had experience of such destruction due to erxplosives that initially came with the explanation. Nobody, though, could come out with another explanation.

Are you saying that a catastrophic tire failure during the takeoff roll (regardless of cause) was not an anticipated failure mode? That's shocking if true.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 100, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 13 hours ago) and read 16431 times:
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Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 99):
Are you saying that a catastrophic tire failure during the takeoff roll (regardless of cause) was not an anticipated failure mode? That's shocking if true.

Sorry. I tried to have a nice chat with you., but unfortunately I'm just an airline pilot and we do not have a subject to talk about on equal terms.
So let's leave it at that, shall we ?
Regards

[Edited 2013-03-17 18:39:31]


Contrail designer
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 101, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 13 hours ago) and read 16404 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 100):
Sorry. I tried to have a nice chat with you., but unfortunately I'm just an airline pilot and we do not have a subject to talk about on equal terms.

You've piqued my curiosity: what did the designers think would happen with a tire failure during the takeoff roll?



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineAA87 From United States of America, joined Jun 2005, 147 posts, RR: 0
Reply 102, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 13 hours ago) and read 16405 times:

Quoting mcdu (Reply 77):
In cloud or at night recovery would have been extremely difficult with the contradictory flight information they were working with.

All the technical back and forth by professionals on this board is fascinating, but that is the upshot. The most shocking and terrifying thing about this particular crash is how utterly understandable it is. It seems obvious that: 1) the debate on this tragedy will continue for years and 2) eventually, based on this incident, we will see subtle but significant changes in systems design in the cockpit and training for critical data loss in instrument conditions.


User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 103, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 11 hours ago) and read 16147 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 99):
why some don't take everything BEA says as gospel truth, and it seems to me that this is all related.

No one is saying everything the BEA says is gospel truth. The other poster has made his opinion of some of the decisions reached by BEA investigators known many times.

You also need to add taking the NTSB as gospel truth, because the NTSB was substantially involved in both the Concorde and AF447 investigations. I'm not aware of any dissent from the NTSB investigators. And the NTSB is not shy about offering 'dissenting opinions' on factual matters.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 99):
Charging the individual and charging the company are two different things. The employees were treated fairly similarly, but Continental (itself) was charged and EADS (itself) was not (nor was BAe).

What does the French criminal legal system have to do with the BEA accident investigation process?

They are separate, just as separate as an NTSB investigation in the US and the occasional, though rare, state level criminal case brought against people in aircraft accidents.

The prosecutors sought stronger penalties against the French citizens than they did against the US citizens.

The prosecutors also sought to bring criminal charges against EADS/ Aerospatiale.

Just like our US legal system, at times the jury and judges do not agree with the charges brought by the prosecutors.

From what I've understood over the years, in France the 'sole' blame is not on Continental in the French public's mind. Air France, nor EADS/ Aerospatile, nor the French version of the FAA - escaped extensive public criticism for their responsibility in the crash.

On the civil side of the Concorde case - EADS was assessed 30% finiancial liability by the French courts - http://www.examiner.com/article/fren...ncorde-crash-continental-to-appeal - though I do not know if that was appealed.


User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 104, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 10 hours ago) and read 16013 times:

Quoting AA87 (Reply 102):
eventually, based on this incident, we will see subtle but significant changes in systems design in the cockpit and training for critical data loss in instrument conditions.

I hope that one simple (and not overly subtle) change is made soon. This accident was basically caused by one simple fact - that the PF hauled his sidestick back right at the beginning, and kept it there. And, according to the transcript, he went ON pulling it back even after the more senior pilot had taken control. But neither the senior pilot or the captain could see what he was doing; and the sidesticks aren't linked the way conventional yokes (and sticks in smaller aeroplanes) have always been linked in the past. I hope that Airbus learns that lesson from this episode, and takes urgent steps to link them as soon as possible.

[Edited 2013-03-17 21:44:58]


"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 105, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 7 hours ago) and read 15798 times:

NAV20

Stand at the back of an A330 cockpit. You can see where both side stick controllers are.

This is why I suspect the fatigue reference alleged to have been made by the captain would assume considerable even report changing importance. If the man was whacked out of his mind with fatigue, and the two first officers weren't talking to each other, or enough, we have a safety of flight issue of direct relevance to this tragic sequence of events.

We would also have a terrible example of an issue that bedevils the industry.

OK, it's only one line. But it could be a very important one line.

And why, why, why, would it be left out of the report if not to deflect adverse implications for Air France.

This is why, personal words of anguish omitted, we need-the-full-by-the-second CVR transcript.


User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 42
Reply 106, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 5 hours ago) and read 15537 times:

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 104):
This accident was basically caused by one simple fact - that the PF hauled his sidestick back right at the beginning, and kept it there.

Seriously? After how many threads on the subject? Please read the report.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 104):
But neither the senior pilot or the captain could see what he was doing

Again, please read the report.


User currently offlineKaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 3035 posts, RR: 28
Reply 107, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 2 hours ago) and read 15227 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 76):
Outside of France, accident investigation generally does not lead to criminal charges.

Actually, it does (or can) in most civil law jurisdictions - Spain, Italy, Germany, South America, etc. For example, Williams F1 management were charged after the death of Ayrton Senna at the San Marino Grand Prix. It's a function of the civilian system where investigative hearings are conducted by a juge d'instruction, and is not peculiar to France.



Empty vessels make the most noise.
User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 42
Reply 108, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 1 hour ago) and read 15076 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 101):
what did the designers think would happen with a tire failure during the takeoff roll?

It was not simply "a tyre failure". After several years of asking, many of us are still waiting for evidence that other types running over a titanium "knife-blade" and being instantaneously sliced open at high speed would not be at risk of a serious incident - and that evidence can't begin with "I would imagine that...". It hadn't happened to any type before and it hasn't happened since. Furthermore, tyre failures have led to fatalities on other types before.


User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 109, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 4 days 1 hour ago) and read 15031 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 99):
Are you saying that a catastrophic tire failure during the takeoff roll (regardless of cause) was not an anticipated failure mode? That's shocking if true.

He did not say that.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 98):
The design issues came as a complete surprise to all concerned

The tanks possibly being punctured by a tire failure during takeoff or landing roll were a consideration. That is why the Concorde was retrofitted to hopefully prevent puncture.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 98):
the wing skin and the fuel tank were punture-proof from rubber / stone / metal parts at the airplane's takeoff speeds.

We all assummed that the tanks were broken and the flames we saw on the pictures and video were from holes in the fuel tanks.

The investigation showed that was simply not true.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 98):
The tanks were not punctured ,actually, but the big tire piece hitting the bottom of the wing provoked a shockwave that spread in the fuel and the back of the tank seal which then brooke open,

The bulkhead of the fuel tank failed due to the shockwave.

This had never previously happened despite the several incidents of puncture of a Concorde fuel tank.

The failure of the seal/ bulkhead resulted in a massive fuel spill, never seen before, or even considered possible previously.


User currently offlineAirlineCritic From Finland, joined Mar 2009, 728 posts, RR: 1
Reply 110, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 22 hours ago) and read 14759 times:

This thread reminds of the old joke about someone wishing to die like his grandfather, peacefully in his sleep, and not screaming in terror, like his passengers.   

But back to the topic. I think this thread would be better off with the conspiracy theories about hiding information moved elsewhere, or not discussed at all. The question of what information should be revealed from accidents is a good question, but confuses the AF 447 story. And I would not trust a vague statement in a newspaper. As noted, it could mean multiple things, be an exaggeration, etc. Not even the BEA knows the full story, probably. The pilots and their close ones from the same trip are all dead.

So this leaves me with: a captain that had multiple problems making it hard for him to solve a bad situation. Personal issues with the other pilots. A worst possible moment to be awakened. Possible fatigue. Non-adherence to CRM, by him and others in the cockpit.

And the reason for doing crash investigations is not that we'd find out everything about how the event unfolded. We do them to prevent them from happening again. There are plenty of learnings from this one, the big ones for me are on the human side, what can we do to ensure crews fit together at a personality level, teaching and practising this and other important procedures, CRM, etc.


User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 111, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 22 hours ago) and read 14625 times:

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 105):
If the man was whacked out of his mind with fatigue

Thank you. You have supplied a perfect example for those of us who find quite ridiculous all this speculation about conspiracies, the BEA covering for AF, etc. that is based on a few words that weren't included in the official transcript. Short on sleep has become whacked out of his mind. That's the way these things always progress. Wait a while longer. He will have become completely incoherent.  


User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 112, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 14536 times:

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 103):
nor the French version of the FAA

If anything, BEA is most culplable because . . .

Quoting David L (Reply 108):
After several years of asking, many of us are still waiting for evidence that other types running over a titanium "knife-blade" and being instantaneously sliced open at high speed would not be at risk of a serious incident - and that evidence can't begin with "I would imagine that...". It hadn't happened to any type before and it hasn't happened since. Furthermore, tyre failures have led to fatalities on other types before.

AFAIK the 20 year history of pleas from NTSB to do something about protection from tire debris is unique to Concorde too, no? The design choices that drastically increased takeoff speeds were certainly unique to Concorde.

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 107):
Actually, it does (or can) in most civil law jurisdictions - Spain, Italy, Germany, South America, etc. For example, Williams F1 management were charged after the death of Ayrton Senna at the San Marino Grand Prix. It's a function of the civilian system where investigative hearings are conducted by a juge d'instruction, and is not peculiar to France.

You are correct, and I should have worded my post more artfully. The charges against a non-involved, foreign airline are unique to this crash. They are, for many who do not understand civil law systems, the source of a lot of the unhappiness about the Concorde crash.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineKaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 3035 posts, RR: 28
Reply 113, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 14458 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 106):
Please read the report.

        

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 105):
And why, why, why, would it be left out of the report if not to deflect adverse implications for Air France.

Perhaps because the BEA did, in fact, consider fatigue and human factors in extraordinary detail:

"The CVR recording does, however, make it possible to show that the crew showed no signs of objective fatigue, as the following elements indicate:

- The level of activity and implication of the augmented crew in the first part of the flight, with the Captain and the copilot seated in the right seat, then in the second part of the flight with the two copilots, are in accordance with what is
expected from a crew in the cruise phase. No signs of drowsiness or sleepiness are noticeable;

- At 0 h 58 min 07, the Captain was concerned with the state of fatigue of the copilot in the right seat. («try maybe to sleep twenty minutes when he comes back or before if you want ») who answered that he didn’t want to sleep;

- Questioned on his return to the cockpit, the copilot who took the Captain’s place
answered that he had “dozed”."

If the BEA had wanted to "deflect adverse implications for Air France", they would surely have also deleted those parts of the CVR, which are more "damaging" than the captain's off-hand remark to a flight deck visitor.

By the way, BEA also convened a Human Factors Working Group composed of independent pilots, ergonomics experts, and psychologists / psychiatrists. Their work features very extensively in section 1.16.8 of the Final Report, and includes the psychometric impacts of fatigue, anxiety, and surprise.

Quoting captainmeeerkat (Reply 70):
How does "last night" become the actual day of flying? Or is there something lost in translation?

From this:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 69):
" ...cette nuit, je n'ai pas assez dormi . Une heure, c'était pas assez tout à l'heure "

Literally: "Last night I didn't get enough sleep. One hour, a little while ago (tout à l'heure), wasn't enough". "Tout à l'heure" means the very recent past or the near future (soon) - it does not refer to the night before.

The title of this thread is therefore extremely misleading. If it were accurate, it would say "Captain of AF447 Had an Hours Sleep Just Before the Flight", which is quite different.

The previous AF447 threads were replete with posters quoting the English translation of the CVR and drawing conclusions that weren't supported by what the crew actually said in French.



Empty vessels make the most noise.
User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 42
Reply 114, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 14414 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 112):
AFAIK the 20 year history of pleas from NTSB to do something about protection from tire debris is unique to Concorde too, no? The design choices that drastically increased takeoff speeds were certainly unique to Concorde.

So, the wait for evidence continues, then. Once again, it was not simply a tyre failure of the type that had ever happened before or could be reasonably expected to happen. The way the tyre exploded and slammed a 2-metre "carcass" into the underside of the wing at very high speed had a lot to do with being sliced by a titanium "knife-blade". Do you know what would happen to other types in the same circumstances?

While there were some earlier cases of tyre failures causing small punctures to the fuel tanks, there had been none for a considerable time before Gonesse, so the notion that nothing had been done about it doesn't seem to fit the data. And, again, while rare, there have been fatalities due to tyre failures in other types.

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 113):
Perhaps because the BEA did, in fact, consider fatigue and human factors in extraordinary detail:

Yes, but, apart from that...   


User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 115, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 20 hours ago) and read 14354 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 114):
The way the tyre exploded and slammed a 2-metre "carcass" into the underside of the wing at very high speed had a lot to do with being sliced by a titanium "knife-blade". Do you know what would happen to other types in the same circumstances?

No, but it would surely be different. Remember that Concorde's takeoff speed was around 400 kilometers per hour, much higher than other types (30 percent or so higher than the 777 takeoff speed, for instance). The amount of energy with which the tire ("carcass") struck the aircraft could not, I don't think, happen with other types. With everything else equal, a 30 percent speed increase increases kinetic energy by 69 percent.

[Edited 2013-03-18 11:59:42]


I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlinerfields5421 From United States of America, joined Jul 2007, 7607 posts, RR: 32
Reply 116, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 14243 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 114):
Do you know what would happen to other types in the same circumstances?
Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 115):
The amount of energy with which the tire ("carcass") struck the aircraft could not, I don't think, happen with other types.

Tire carcass can be extremely high energy impacts. Even the 'alligators' we see in the roadways of the US.

Just two weeks ago a friend of mine had eight feet of floor, electrical wiring, plumbing and cabinet work ripped out from the bottom of his RV when a tire failed. Initial estimates are $20,000+ to repair the damage.

The highway tires can rip holes in the bottom of cargo trailers, dent and cause leaks in tanker trucks.


User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 42
Reply 117, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 14177 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 115):
could not, I don't think, happen with other types

Sorry but I put that in the same category as "I would imagine that...".  

It's easy to say what one thinks might happen when it had never happened to any type before, including Concorde, it has never happened since and the chances of it happening again are fairly low. If the tank had simply been punctured then you could probably quantify the effects of the tyre speed but in this case we're talking about a shock-wave rupturing the tank from within. Exactly how the tyre carcass hit and what shock-waves resulted made a big difference and that's a lot more complex.

There is also the possibility that a Concorde might have experienced similar circumstances 100 times and that might have been the only one that turned out as it did. We will never know.

The one and only time it happened, it happened to a Concorde. It happened to a Concorde because it took off shortly after the titanium part had been dropped on the runway. That's pretty much all that seems to be known about how the same circumstances could affect any type.

In any case, what about the fatalities due to tyre bursts on other types? Surely they couldn't happen, either? I'm not accusing you of such a thing but many people have claimed here that "a tyre burst should not bring an aircraft down". And yet, rare though it is...


User currently offlinecaptainmeeerkat From Russia, joined Aug 2010, 390 posts, RR: 1
Reply 118, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 14132 times:

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 113):
Quoting captainmeeerkat (Reply 70):
How does "last night" become the actual day of flying? Or is there something lost in translation?

From this:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 69):
" ...cette nuit, je n'ai pas assez dormi . Une heure, c'était pas assez tout à l'heure "

Literally: "Last night I didn't get enough sleep. One hour, a little while ago (tout à l'heure), wasn't enough". "Tout à l'heure" means the very recent past or the near future (soon) - it does not refer to the night before.

The title of this thread is therefore extremely misleading. If it were accurate, it would say "Captain of AF447 Had an Hours Sleep Just Before the Flight", which is quite different.

The previous AF447 threads were replete with posters quoting the English translation of the CVR and drawing conclusions that weren't supported by what the crew actually said in French.

Thank you, I had a feeling that the essence of this idiotic headline was lost in this translation somewhere.



my luggage is better travelled than me!
User currently offlineKaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 3035 posts, RR: 28
Reply 119, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 14121 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 112):
The charges against a non-involved, foreign airline are unique to this crash. They are, for many who do not understand civil law systems, the source of a lot of the unhappiness about the Concorde crash.

I think that translating the charge as "manslaughter" also contributed to the unhappiness. The actual provision in the Code pénal is more akin to "criminal negligence causing death" in Anglo-American law.

Such charges are not uncommon in common law jurisdictions - for example the navigation officer on the Queen of the North (B.C. Ferries) is currently on trial for criminal negligence causing death resulting from the ship running aground and sinking. There are multiple examples of locomotive drivers and bus drivers who've faced similar charges.



Empty vessels make the most noise.
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 120, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 19 hours ago) and read 14094 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 117):
Sorry but I put that in the same category as "I would imagine that...".

That's fair, but unlike the post-strike effects, we ought to be able to prove whether a burst tyre can acquire X kinetic energy with which to strike the aircraft on other aircraft that themselves have much less speed on takeoff.

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 119):
Such charges are not uncommon in common law jurisdictions - for example the navigation officer on the Queen of the North (B.C. Ferries) is currently on trial for criminal negligence causing death resulting from the ship running aground and sinking. There are multiple examples of locomotive drivers and bus drivers who've faced similar charges.

  

They also happen in the States. Wasn't the captain of the passenger ferry that struck the dock in New York a few years ago criminally charged?



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineKaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 3035 posts, RR: 28
Reply 121, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 18 hours ago) and read 13988 times:

Quoting captainmeeerkat (Reply 118):
Thank you, I had a feeling that the essence of this idiotic headline was lost in this translation somewhere.

To be fair to ManuCH (OP), the English translation of the article he referred to conveniently left out "tout à l'heure" - which completely changes what the captain said. Ben Sandilands blog does the same.



Empty vessels make the most noise.
User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 42
Reply 122, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 18 hours ago) and read 13952 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 120):
but unlike the post-strike effects

But... the post-strike effects are what caused the fuel tank to rupture, not just the kinetic energy in the initial impact. Unless it can be shown that, no matter how the internal shock waves interact and no matter what size or shape the tyre carcass from, say, a fully loaded 747 just before take-off, it cannot cause a fuel tank to rupture, we're back to square one.

If we're back to square one, I'd have to ask if it's reasonable for manufacturers to be expected to consider every possible internal shock-wave pattern when designing tyres, wings and fuel tanks - especially for a situation that had never happened before, has never happened since and is probably still considered to be highly unlikely? Depending on the size and shape of the tank, the amount of fuel within, the size and shape of the tyre carcass and precisely how the tyre carcass impacts, you might get less destructive shock-wave patterns from a higher energy impact. I just haven't seen anything to suggest that the manufacturers of Concorde, in particular, should have preempted those conditions. The only reason it's now known to be possible is that it happened.

All this on top of the fact that "more conventional" tyre failures have occasionally lead to fatalities on other types.


User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 123, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 13853 times:
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Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 121):
To be fair to ManuCH (OP), the English translation of the article he referred to conveniently left out "tout à l'heure" - which completely changes what the captain said

     

Which, once again should tell us to be more careful with newspaper reporting vs official reports.

There has been quite a lot of accusations cast at Air France and the BEA (for one poster, it reads as if France and Australia - on a similar subject of accident investigation - are fascist provinces of Northern Korea ).
Interestingly enough, the participants to the investigation- among whom the NTSB- are never mentioned, nor are the observers.

I'd like to quote from the BEA final report, if I may :

1/ the frame of the investigation :

... in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and to the French
Civil Aviation Code (Book VII), the BEA, as Investigation Authority of the State of Registry of the aeroplane, instituted a safety investigation and a team was formed to conduct it


This is clear : the BEA, as the investigation authority pf the sovereign state of France, by virtue of the State of registry of the aircraft had respopnsibility over the investigation.

2/- Further frame of the investigation :

..."In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13, Brazilian, American, British, German and Senegalese accredited representatives were associated with the investigation as the State of the engine manufacturer (NTSB) and because they were able to supply essential information to the investigation (CENIPA, ANAC) or because they provided assistance in the sea search phases (AAIB, BFU)"

So, the NTSB and the AAIB were parties to the investigation, like other official authorities.

3/- the observers :

..."The following countries also nominated observers as some of their citizens were among the victims:
ˆ China,
ˆ Hungary,
ˆ Ireland,
ˆ Italy,
ˆ Korea,
ˆ Lebanon,
ˆ Morocco,
ˆ Norway,
ˆ Russia,
ˆ Switzerland."


All the above bring the conspiracy to a truly international level, doesn't it ?
But, of course, what happened then ? Did France revert to their own usual sneaky, stealthy behaviour ?
See :

4/- Publication of the final report : it happened after July 2011 :

..."it was clear that it was necessary to understand the pilots’ behaviour more profoundly. It was thus decided to set up a new working group dedicated to Human Factors, the group being made up of pilots from EASA and the DGAC, a specialist in cognitive sciences, a doctor and BEA investigators.
This working group worked in close liaison with the “Operations” and “Systems and Equipment” groups. Its work formed the basis of the new elements in the investigation that were included in the Draft Final Report, which was sent for consultation to the participants in the investigation, in accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 and the European Regulation on investigations and the prevention of aviation accidents and incidents, in force since October 2010.
Integration of the comments received led to the drafting, then the publication, of the Final Report of the Safety Investigation, on 5 July 2012.
"


(stresses are mine).

Now for the articles in question :
The Le Point reporter's attention was brought to a sentence of the Judicial Expert's report that has been leaked to a well-known conspiracy group. The report is a 507 page document without its annexes and notes.
To only choose, out of context and with an opinionated interpretation a quarter of a line in such a big document can only be called "selective quoting".
I posit that it is more dangerous to our moral society than any conspiracy theory could ever be... Problem is : the same people use them both.

Regards

[Edited 2013-03-18 14:22:43]


Contrail designer
User currently offlineart From United Kingdom, joined Feb 2005, 3382 posts, RR: 1
Reply 124, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 17 hours ago) and read 13851 times:

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 121):
To be fair to ManuCH (OP), the English translation of the article he referred to conveniently left out "tout à l'heure" - which completely changes what the captain said.

It does - the captain said two things - he did not get enough sleep the previous night (no mention of how many hours he did sleep); he had slept for an hour earlier (on the day of the flight) but it was not enough. So the captain had 1 hour of sleep on the day of the flight + however many hours he slept the previous night.


User currently offlineKaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 3035 posts, RR: 28
Reply 125, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 13741 times:

Quoting art (Reply 124):
It does - the captain said two things - he did not get enough sleep the previous night (no mention of how many hours he did sleep); he had slept for an hour earlier (on the day of the flight) but it was not enough. So the captain had 1 hour of sleep on the day of the flight however many hours he slept the previous night.

Not to mention that it's completely devoid of context. For example, suppose that his friend (who was on the flight - that's also been the topic of a thread suggesting that he was humping her in the crew rest while he should have been resting!) stuck her head into the flight deck and asked "Are we still going out for lunch / driving to Lyons / whatever / when we get to Paris?" Then, "I didn't get enough sleep last night" takes on a totally different meaning than anything to do with being fatigued for the flight.

I also note that the Le Point article states "il n'y avait pas eu d'enquête sur l'activité et le repos pris par les pilotes, accompagnés par leurs épouses ou compagnes, lors de l'escale de Rio". The NY Daily News is pure tabloid sensationalism - "they were also feeling groggy after spending the night in Rio with their wives and girlfriends".

However, the BEA report explicitly states that it did investigate, but was unable to obtain reliable information; presumably, the investigation by the "expert judiciaire" fared no better, as it does not contain any information on what the crew did in Rio.



Empty vessels make the most noise.
User currently offlineBenSandilands From Australia, joined Mar 2013, 220 posts, RR: 1
Reply 126, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 13582 times:

Let me go back to the core issue, which isn't the Concorde tragedy, or the laws of France.

The core issue is the omission of sections of the CVR.

The full CVR, hopefully minus sensitive matters will clearly come out, one way or another.

Omission brings suspicion. If an authority or politician or corporate leader omits details which might otherwise better inform the curious or those who are affected by a matter at hand, suspicion will arise.

In an accident investigation which purports to make a finding on fatigue, yet deliberately redacts a reference to fatigue, it is important to ask why, and 'Trust me we are the BEA' isn't good enough.

Similarly, in assessing CRM issues, it is important to know what the crew said and how they interacted. The ATSB report into the notorious phone-texting incident involving a Jetstar A321 that descended below 400 feet over Singapore airport in an improperly configured and unstable state didn't published the CVR, but it did nevertheless point out that the captain said nothing to the first officer for almost the last three minutes of the botched approach, and when he told the FO to land it anyway the FO intervened and flew a go-around, and just in time.

What was, or wasn't said in the cockpit is thus crucial to understanding the CRM situation.

The BEA narrative does set up the situation in the cockpit with both tact and considerable detail at the outset, then leaves it hanging in the air, although AF did respond with alacrity to the matter of the conduct or form of a hand over.

There is a broad issue here, which is disclosure. I agree with those on this page who have persuasively argued for sensitivity and respect for the dead. But older readers may recall that way back, I think in the 70s, the NTSB report into a Delta DC-9 crash in the US released almost the entire transcript in which the crew were having an animated conversation about politics during the final approach, which we hear being discussed over the top of audible warnings as to the outer marker and the status of the approach, ending in the sound of impact and break up causing heavy loss of life.

In the case of AF447 my role has been that of listening to and being persuaded by pilots who feel that the BEA report is incomplete, and the latest media article renewed that concern. The correct translation of the reference is important, and it doesn't change the position that a reference to fatigue was redacted. Why was it left out? Who benefited from it being left out?


User currently offlinehivue From United States of America, joined Feb 2013, 1097 posts, RR: 0
Reply 127, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 13515 times:

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 126):
didn't published the CVR, but it did nevertheless point out that the captain said nothing to the first officer for almost the last three minutes of the botched approach, and when he told the FO to land it anyway the FO intervened and flew a go-around, and just in time.

What was, or wasn't said in the cockpit is thus crucial to understanding the CRM situation.

Obviously. But, it seems, publishing a CVR transcript is not.


User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 128, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 13 hours ago) and read 13410 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 122):
All this on top of the fact that "more conventional" tyre failures have occasionally lead to fatalities on other types.

. . . but not from the failure that we are talking about here (fuel tank rupture), or am I missing one?

Quoting David L (Reply 117):
The one and only time it happened, it happened to a Concorde. It happened to a Concorde because it took off shortly after the titanium part had been dropped on the runway. That's pretty much all that seems to be known about how the same circumstances could affect any type.

FOD on the runway, while unfortunate, is not all that uncommon--and while you are focusing on the word titanium, titanium is not a particularly hard or dense metal.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlinedfambro From United States of America, joined Nov 2009, 333 posts, RR: 0
Reply 129, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 12 hours ago) and read 13360 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 78):
Basically the last five minutes haven't been edited at all :

Really? Do you know that for a fact?

Frankly, I had assumed they have sigificant redactions because there are significant gaps with no talking during pretty crucial moments. For example. 2:10:50 to 2:11:20. In that thirty second window, which begins 43 seconds after the first audible alarm, there is only one brief comment from the co-pilot in the right seat, and two brief comments from the co-pilot in the left seat. Then at 2:11:21 the co-pilot in the left seat appears to be responding to something, but there's nothing in the transcript for him to be responding to. Similarly, the Captain says almost nothing in his first 30+ seconds. It looks heavily redacted.


User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 130, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 12 hours ago) and read 13325 times:
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Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 126):
The core issue is the omission of sections of the CVR.

Had you read quite a few of the posts above, you'd have understood that the full transcript won't be for your use. The tribunal has it, the experts it appointed saw / heard it. There is absolutely no place for you to have it. Get used to that idea.

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 126):
suspicion will arise.

Suspiscion arises from multiple areas. I suspect the people who leaked the experts' report to have an agenda. And I'm very serious. As you give a few examples, I haver one too, for you to reflect on : I suspect one very self-opinionated , self-righteous Australian senator to have destroyed the career and the reputation of some people who've done a lot more to Australia's safety cultrure than he ever did in his life.

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 126):
What was, or wasn't said in the cockpit is thus crucial to understanding the CRM situation.

A great number of people on this forum have a very good understanding of the dynamics of that crew. The parts published in the reportsq are more than enough to make a very informed opinion, and for the authorities some very pointed safety recommendations.

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 126):
The BEA narrative does set up the situation in the cockpit with both tact and considerable detail at the outset, then leaves it hanging in the air, although AF did respond with alacrity to the matter of the conduct or form of a hand over

Now we come to the beginning of your attempt at demolition of AF and the BEA . Unfortunately for you, the Air France Gen OPS manual mentioned the format of a handover briefing before the accident and the report says very clearly :

"... In his briefing, the PF mentioned the points listed by the Air France Operations Manual :
ˆ The presence of previous and future turbulence;
ˆ The fact that they were flying through clouds;
ˆ That they could not climb because of the higher temperature than expected and therefore a REC MAX “a little too low”;
ˆ The HF contact with the Atlantico centre and the logon failure with the Dakar centre;
ˆ The contact made with dispatch.
During this briefing the Captain recalled the Dakar HF frequencies when requested by the PF. Although he did not formally carry out the briefing himself, one can see that the objective of correct transmission of information to the relief pilot was reached."


So your above comment either denotes a gross un-understanding of one aspect of the technical issues of the flight or an attempt at blaming Air France.

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 126):
the NTSB report into a Delta DC-9 crash in the US released almost the entire transcript

What was the real usefulness of releasing the transcript ? They could just have written : "the CVR shows that the flight deck crews were having a heated political argument during the landing phase and they disregarded both the management of the flight and the various warnings caused by increasing ground proximity" or words to that effect.

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 126):
In the case of AF447 my role has been that of listening to and being persuaded by pilots who feel that the BEA report is incomplete, and the latest media article renewed that concern.

Your role seems to be listening to people we have no reference of ( which is strange as you claim the right of full disclosure but you leave us to trust sources we don't know anything about). Doesn't that sound to you as double standards ? And, of course you will protect your sources...   

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 126):
The correct translation of the reference is important, and it doesn't change the position that a reference to fatigue was redacted. Why was it left out? Who benefited from it being left out?

We are dealing here with FACTS, in which a remark made by someone to a guest in the flight deck could be interpreted in many ways ( was it an exaggeration ? Was it a precise appreciation of his sleep pattern ? Was it in jest ? )
The report, which deals with observable, undiscutable facts reveals, and I cite the whole paragraph :

"1.16.7 Aspects relating to fatigue

The professional timetable of the three crew members during the month that preceded the accident flight shows that the limitations on flight and duty times, as well as rest times, were in accordance with the provisions of European Regulation (EC) n°859/2008 of the European Commission (sub-section Q of Annex III).
The investigation was not able to determine exactly the activities of the flight crew members during the stopover in Rio, where the crew had arrived three days earlier. It was not possible to obtain data on their sleep during this stopover.
This lack of precise information on their activity during the stopover, in particular in relation to sleep, makes it impossible to evaluate the level of fatigue associated to the flight crew’s duty time.
The CVR recording does, however, make it possible to show that the crew showed no signs of objective fatigue, as the following elements indicate:
ˆ The level of activity and implication of the augmented crew in the first part of the flight, with the Captain and the copilot seated in the right seat, then in the second part of the flight with the two copilots, are in accordance with what is
expected from a crew in the cruise phase. No signs of drowsiness or sleepiness are noticeable;
ˆ At 0 h 58 min 07, the Captain was concerned with the state of fatigue of the copilot in the right seat. («try maybe to sleep twenty minutes when he comes back or before if you want ») who answered that he didn’t want to sleep;
ˆ Questioned on his return to the cockpit, the copilot who took the Captain’s place answered that he had “dozed”.

As someone who has used the crew rest area, I have never found it very comfortable, somehow claustrophobic and I have never achieved complete sleep (I don't really like to be away from the flight management) .

On this aspect, it is fair to cite the experts'report which adds as a factor the maximum fatigue associated with the low phase of the circadian cycle.

So, in reality,where is the conspiracy, where is the hiding facts that could hurt Air France or Airbus ?
You're on thin air... not a place safe from a stall, btw.

What is, in my opinion, the silliest aspect of the conspiracy theory is that it is the experts'report, a very official document written by sworn specialists ( therefore,according to the theorists, part of the conspiracy) that is used totally out of context to try and prove the partiality of the BEA document... which is the basis for their expertise.
Do they disagree with it in their conclusions ? No. They just mentioned that one activity prior to their entry to the ETOPS zone wasn't - in their words - very "dynamic". My opinion is that the captain's managerial method had more effect on that activity.


For those interested, this is a NASA brief on AF447 that illustrates the dynamics of the accident.
Of course, it is part of the conspiracy



Contrail designer
User currently offlinePihero From France, joined Jan 2005, 4597 posts, RR: 77
Reply 131, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 13301 times:
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I have just found an article on a French newspaper and it is obvious that the reporter has used this forum and another well known site for some really dodgy reporting and some sentences are just about verbatim translations of the more sensationalistic writings of the posters on this thread.
Some parts of that article concern intimate aspects of the private lives of these dead crew members and to me, that's intolerable.

Consequently, I will no longer answer any question on this aspect of AF447.

Lawyers and conspiracy theorists have achieved a great victory for the freedom of the press: the dirtying of some dead professionals' social and family environment . I hope they are proud of themselves.

[Edited 2013-03-18 19:56:18]

[Edited 2013-03-18 19:58:37]


Contrail designer
User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 132, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 11 hours ago) and read 13209 times:

Quoting BenSandilands (Reply 105):
NAV20

Stand at the back of an A330 cockpit. You can see where both side stick controllers are.

Agree as far as it goes, BenSandilands - but the more senior pilot could not have seen his colleague's sidestick from his seat - nor could he have known that, even after he had taken control, his inputs were still being countermanded. And the captain, when he arrived, did not stand at the back either, he appears to have sat down immediately.

In fairness to the BEA, this article shows that they were perfectly frank about the situation - and 'pinned things down' somewhat by stressing the point that the initial flight crew continued to follow not the basic instruments (assuming they had enough of them functioning) but followed the Flight Director - even though, as the BEA pointed out, correct procedure in a case of 'unreliable air speed' would have been to switch the flight director off. And things were made much more confusing for the pilots by the fact that both the Flight Director and the stall warning were only operating intermittently.

"In a tense press conference held last Thursday at Le Bourget Airport in Paris BEA director Jean-Paul Troadec and his team pointed at human-machine interface issues that made the situation extremely confusing for the crew. All 228 occupants died when the aircraft, flying from Rio to Paris, crashed at night while negotiating a region with heavy thunderstorm activity. BEA had published an interim report in July 2011.

"A major new finding in the final report concerned the flight director, which normally displays symbology on the pilots’ primary flying displays that give guidance on control inputs to reach a desired steady-state flightpath. After the autopilot and autothrottle disengaged, as the flight control law switched from normal to alternate, the flight director’s crossbars disappeared. But they then reappeared several times. Every time they were visible, they prompted pitch-up inputs by the PF, investigators determined. It took them a long time to “rebuild” what the flight director displayed since this is not part of the data recorded by the flight data recorder.

"The BEA acknowledged that the PF might have followed flight director indications. This was not the right thing to do in a stall but it seems that the crew never realized that the aircraft was in a stall. Moreover, the successive disappearance and reappearance of the crossbars reinforced this false impression, the investigators suggested. For the crew, this could have suggested their information was valid.

"None of the pilots recognized that the flight director was changing from one mode to another because they were just too busy. The PF may have trusted the flight director so much that he was verbally agreeing to the other pilot’s pitch-down instructions, while still actually pitching up."


http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-ne...wed-flight-director-pitch-commands

And here, for anyone who hasn't already seen it, is a (presumably full) transcript of the last few minutes on the CVR. Certainly seems to me highly likely that the underlying cause of the accident was lack of training and experience in 'hands-on' flying using the 'basic' instruments (especially in zero visibility, with no visible horizon), causing them to continue to rely on the flight director? Not helped by the stall warning only sounding intermittently?

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...rance-447s-cockpit/article4393626/



"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlinethreepoint From Canada, joined Oct 2005, 2162 posts, RR: 9
Reply 133, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 13085 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 75):
Whether a dying pilot calls his mother or his wife should not be your concern and should not be made available to people who otherwise have no understanding whatsoever of the technical / human factors... aspects of the accident...And for that, one doesn't need expletives or expressions of religious faith... to be made public. They belong to the realm of privacy, or dare I say intimity.

Well if these exclamations of a personal nature aren't human factors, I don't know what are. I think to censor the transcript of an accident to exclude such utterances takes away from the state of mind that a crewmember may have been in, and indeed serves to render the pilot, I don't know...less human? People under stress (professionals or otherwise) react to that stress in different ways. One pilot may be systematically problem solving under duress, while an otherwise identical pilot may be calling to his maker, having given up his struggle.

Reading a transcript - profanities and all - coupled with a CVR offers great insight into the human factors within an accident, as we both acknowledge, but I maintain this insight should not be confined to the select few investigators assigned to a particular case. In the absence of information, the media and general public is too often forced to resort to speculation, which generally ends up being more damaging to a company's, pilot's or manufacturer's reputation anyway.

What we will hear and read when reviewing the so-called 'last words' is one or a blend of emotions: fright, panic, calm, resignation, determination, anger, frustration, disbelief and a host of others that illustrate that the crew is human. You don't have to be involved in aviation to understand the frames of mind of people in a dire situation. My opinion is that your position condescends to the majority of the general public who may not understand the levels of technical aeronautical detail that you do, but are denied the opportunity to learn, to understand and to apply those lessons to whatever it is that they do. Perhaps you forget that the teachings of human factors are by no means confined to flight crews. What we have learned as a result of high-profile airplane crashes makes people safer in all manner of transportation and industrial occupations. And sadly, many of those lessons have been embedded in the final seconds of the afflicted crew's lives.

One doesn't need to listen to CVR transcripts to satisfy one's ghoulish nature. There are plenty of freely-available internet sites devoted to such pursuits.



The nice thing about a mistake is the pleasure it gives others.
User currently offlinemandala499 From Indonesia, joined Aug 2001, 6927 posts, RR: 76
Reply 134, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 7 hours ago) and read 12984 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 9):
I stand with the BEA and all the other organisms which participated in this investigation. And our CVR recordings are not for the ghouls who would seek some sick pleasure in listening to the last words of dead people.
Go look somewhere else, I'd say to them.

The funny thing, yes, I am pretty certain that the full CVR recordings would not reveal anything new other than more panic, mayhem etc... which puts a lot of emotional subjectivity to the case of AF447.
For those who think that the Captain lacking sleep is an important factor here, well, I do say to them, go look elsewhere! Rather irrelevant to this case to be honest. Just a quiet day in the media I guess.

Quoting ManuCH (Reply 18):
What is the objective reason why the pilot unions are against making the CVR transcripts publicly available?

I give you the answer:

Quoting airproxx (Reply 13):
The true question should be; why is it so? Why such an important piece of investigation is now publicly revealed?
How come an institution of this importance like BEA made such a mistake?
The result? There's been a terrible buzz around the fact that, if the AF447 pilots were completely panicked on the last moments of the flight, maybe the crash was their own and very fault...!

and...

Quoting airproxx (Reply 13):
No I'll stop here, knowing that as soon as I can change my A320 type rating for anything-else-but-an-Airbus type rating, I'll go for it.

Contrary to AF Pilots Union point of view (as far as I know, similar to what Airproxx purported), the pilots screwed up... BUT, we must always look beyond and find out why they screwed up. Trying to deny that they screwed up, does not serve the purpose of safety because we can't get to the causal factors why they screwed up... which, if found, could actually absolve liability from the dead pilots as they were mere "products" of the causal factors.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 26):
I'vea lready seen enough imbeciles crowing on the revealed tapes in which someone cried his love for his mother. To me, that's sick and we will not allow it, whatever the self-righteous claims for reasons of improved safety... blah blah blah are. Just hypocrisy.

Revealing the CVR tapes, does funny things... as do revealing the full CVR transcripts. I've seen a case where leaking the full CVR tape in a case where clearly the crew revealed they were clueless in what they were doing (due to improper training), we had experts calling them heroes because of the wrong actions they did which led to the tragedy... no, it's not AF447, but another equally 'mysterious' case. So I agree... simply revealing the tapes or full transcript, is very counter productive.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 79):
I'm certainly not willing to concede that there is never relevant information outside the last five minutes.

That's the attorney within you talking. For the purpose of flight safety, one must go beyond the prima faciae evidence. Otherwise, we'd just simply slap pilot error to almost all of the accidents! That's counter productive is it not?

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 101):
what did the designers think would happen with a tire failure during the takeoff roll?

They never expected FOD caused tire failure to have resulted in a bigger than anticipated slab of tires slamming the wings below the fuel tanks. Principle of Foreseeability applies. Just like no one anticipated ice particles in very low temp flight would clog the 777 fuel filters on the BA case in LHR.

Mandala499



When losing situational awareness, pray Cumulus Granitus isn't nearby !
User currently offlineJimJupiter From Germany, joined Sep 2011, 252 posts, RR: 0
Reply 135, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 6 hours ago) and read 12939 times:

Quoting Pihero (Reply 131):
Consequently, I will no longer answer any question on this aspect of AF447.

As a quiet reader of the AF447-threads since the beginning I just wanted to thank you (and of course the other knowledgeable contributors) for some of the most educating threads on this site (at least to us non-professionals). And for your patience, responding to ever the same lazy questions and weird accusations that come up about every six months since then.

[Edited 2013-03-19 01:17:40]


One is born, one runs up bills, one dies.
User currently offlinemozart From Luxembourg, joined Aug 2003, 2190 posts, RR: 13
Reply 136, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 4 hours ago) and read 12764 times:

Quoting JimJupiter (Reply 135):
As a quiet reader of the AF447-threads since the beginning I just wanted to thank you (and of course the other knowledgeable contributors) for some of the most educating threads on this site (at least to us non-professionals). And for your patience, responding to ever the same lazy questions and weird accusations that come up about every six months since then.

As another quiet (because too incompetent to contribute) reader of this thread I also want to express my gratitude and respect for the high quality of some of the posts in this thread. Rare to have this on a.net. Thanks for the enrichment.


User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 42
Reply 137, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 3 hours ago) and read 12683 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 128):
. . . but not from the failure that we are talking about here (fuel tank rupture), or am I missing one?

I think you're cherry-picking from my replies. I'd certainly be very wary of a legal system that can dismiss more predictable failures as "just one of those things" while coming down like a ton of bricks on an unprecedented and unpredicted failure. The effects of shock-waves within a fuel tank are a lot more complicated than just the kinetic energy of the impact.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 132):
but the more senior pilot could not have seen his colleague's sidestick from his seat - nor could he have known that, even after he had taken control, his inputs were still being countermanded.

After the countless opportunities you've had to learn a little about the systems you habitually criticise you still don't seem to know much about them. It would be easy to dismiss it and accept that you'll just never quite get it but it's not helpful to newer members of the forum who want to learn.

Take a look at the many A330 flight-deck photos in the A.net database. It is just wrong to say that one pilot cannot see what the other is doing with the side-stick.

If the Captain and the PNF did not know what the PF was doing with the side-stick, why did they keep telling him to stop doing it?

Dual-input results in aural and visual announcements. The PF clearly knew the PNF was manipulating the controls and (grudgingly) handed over control, albeit briefly.

The issue was not that neither pilot knew what the other was doing. The issue was that none of them had worked out what they should be doing.

Quoting Pihero (Reply 130):
Quoting mandala499 (Reply 134):

   As in all good conspiracy theories, in order to beef up the weight of one small element, many others have to be disregarded. Just because something isn't available to the general public, it doesn't mean other regulatory and safety organisations are being kept in the dark. When it comes to aviation safety, I hope we're still a long way from letting the internet decide.


User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 138, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 3 hours ago) and read 12630 times:

To quote from that transcript, David L:-

Bonin:
We're still going down.
Robert:
We're pulling. ... What do you think about it, what do you think? What do we need to do?
Pilot:
There, I don't know. There, it's going down.
Bonin:
There you are. ... That's good, we should be wings level, no it won't (not)
Pilot:
The wings to flat horizon, the standby horizon.
Robert:
The horizon (second)... Speed?
Bonin:
Okay.
Robert:
You're climbing.
Synthetic voice
Stall. Stall. (noise continues)
Robert:
You're going down, down, down.
Pilot:
[Expletive.] (Going down.)
Bonin:
Am I going down now?
Robert:
Go down.
Pilot:
No you climb there.
Bonin:
I'm climbing, okay? So we're going down.
Pilot:
You're climbing.
Bonin:
Okay, we're in TOGA. ... What are we here? ... On alti, what do we have here?
Pilot:
[Indiscernible] it's impossible."


Quoting David L (Reply 137):
The issue was not that neither pilot knew what the other was doing. The issue was that none of them had worked out what they should be doing.
Quoting NAV20 (Reply 132):
Certainly seems to me highly likely that the underlying cause of the accident was lack of training and experience in 'hands-on' flying using the 'basic' instruments (especially in zero visibility, with no visible horizon),

Honestly don't see where we're disagreeing, David L?



"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlineCubsrule From United States of America, joined May 2004, 23148 posts, RR: 20
Reply 139, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 2 hours ago) and read 12537 times:

Quoting David L (Reply 137):
The effects of shock-waves within a fuel tank are a lot more complicated than just the kinetic energy of the impact.

I don't disagree, but certainly, we'd expect that the kinetic energy of the striking object has a pretty significant impact on what sort of waves propogate, no?

Quoting David L (Reply 137):
I'd certainly be very wary of a legal system that can dismiss more predictable failures as "just one of those things" while coming down like a ton of bricks on an unprecedented and unpredicted failure.

Why? Let's step back and talk about failure engineering for a second. The idea is to predict the potential failure modes and, depending on the frequency and severity of those failure modes, design them out, guard against them or live with them. If an engineer doesn't predict a failure mode that should have been predicted, that's a problem. Obviously, you are not in any better position to I am to analyze whether this particular failure mode should have been predicted. Neither of us designed Concorde.



I can't decide whether I miss the tulip or the bowling shoe more
User currently offlineKaiarahi From Canada, joined Jul 2009, 3035 posts, RR: 28
Reply 140, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 2 hours ago) and read 12437 times:

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 132):
but the more senior pilot could not have seen his colleague's sidestick from his seat - nor could he have known that, even after he had taken control, his inputs were still being countermanded. And the captain, when he arrived, did not stand at the back either, he appears to have sat down immediately.

All factually wrong. Please, please read the report. It's here: http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf (English); http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601/pdf/f-cp090601.pdf (French - authoritative version).

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 138):
To quote from that transcript,

Please read the report, instead of quoting a journalist's version of a translation. This part of the transcript means nothing unless correlated with what inputs were being applied and what the plane was actually doing, which are both in the FDR plots contained in the reports.

To give a very simple example, if I'm watching a boxing match on tv and exclaim "Ouch", it means 'that must have hurt'; if I'm hammering in a nail and exclaim the same thing, it means something completely different.

This is a perfect example of the danger of speculating from a CVR that is unaccompanied by all the other contextual evidence - and a translation of what was actually said, to make it worse.



Empty vessels make the most noise.
User currently offlineNAV20 From Australia, joined Nov 2003, 9909 posts, RR: 36
Reply 141, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 12353 times:

Quoting Kaiarahi (Reply 140):
All factually wrong. Please, please read the report.

Tried to, Kaiarahi mate, but neither link worked! Please explain, in as few words as possible, to what extent the 'reports' to which you refer differs from previous publications? Blowed if I'll buy a whole new computer just to read it all..........:-}



"Once you have flown, you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards.." - Leonardo da Vinci
User currently offlineDavid L From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 9524 posts, RR: 42
Reply 142, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 12341 times:

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 139):
Obviously, you are not in any better position to I am to analyze whether this particular failure mode should have been predicted.

I am not an aeronautical engineer but I do have an Honours Degree in Physics. While certainly not an expert by any means, I don't think I'm entirely clueless on such matters.

Quoting Cubsrule (Reply 139):
If an engineer doesn't predict a failure mode that should have been predicted, that's a problem.

Are you sure that other manufacturers were any more thorough at the time in predicting all permutations of a 2-metre tyre carcass hitting the underside of the wing at take-off speed in all orientations? The total energy of the impact is only part of the story. It doesn't tell you where the shock-waves reinforce each other and where they cancel each other out.

If the tyre had simply penetrated the fuel tank itself, then you could simply examine the total energy and the area of contact. But it did not.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 138):

I quoted the comments I was disagreeing with. You're now attributing my responses to something else. Let me break it down...

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 132):
but the more senior pilot could not have seen his colleague's sidestick from his seat

Incorrect. Furthermore, your excerpt from the CVR only illustrates that none of them knew what was happening to the aircraft, or why, and none of them knew what to do. The PF was trying to climb, the others told him to stop trying to climb.

Quoting NAV20 (Reply 132):
nor could he have known that, even after he had taken control, his inputs were still being countermanded.

Incorrect. The aural and visual "Dual-input" announcements would have told him. Also, since he began manipulating the controls without telling anyone, he could have expected the PF to continue manipulating his own controls. That's why, on all types, there's a procedure for transferring control from one pilot to another. They did not follow that procedure.


User currently offlineUnflug From Germany, joined Jan 2012, 509 posts, RR: 2
Reply 143, posted (1 year 7 months 1 week 3 days 1 hour ago) and read 12327 times: