Kaitak From Ireland, joined Aug 1999, 12564 posts, RR: 35
Reply 1, posted (12 years 7 months 2 weeks 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 914 times:
I believe the best place to get info on these is the NTSB website, as it gives info on all incidents, even small ones, over the past 20 years or so and if you can find the dates, you should find the incident.
From my memory, the AA MD80 incident involved the aircraft clipping trees, although I think it landed safely (although that's presumably more than can be said for the crew's careers).
As for the 744, that aircraft had an engine failure on t/o from SFO and came down so close that car alarms were set off; the FO was the flying pilot and one of the problems identified by the NTSB was the fact that with multiple crew flights (4 on many flights), crews weren't getting enough "stick" time - i.e. although part of the crew, they weren't flying t/os and landings enough.
TCAS From France, joined Sep 2006, 0 posts, RR: 0
Reply 2, posted (12 years 7 months 2 weeks 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 883 times:
NTSB Identification: DCA96MA008 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFRPart 121 operation of Air Carrier (D.B.A. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. )
Accident occurred Sunday, November 12, 1995 at EAST GRANBY, CT
Aircraft:McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration: N566AA
Injuries: 1 Minor, 77 Uninjured.
The airplane impacted trees, then an ILS antenna as it landed short of the runway on grass, even terrain during a night VOR approach in strong, gusty wind conditions. At the time of the accident, the indicated altitude (height above airport elevation) that the airplane's QFE altimeter was indicating was about 76 feet too high (based on the altimeter setting received at 0030), resulting in the airplane being 76 feet lower than indicated on the primary altimeters. Because the flightcrew knew that the atmospheric pressure was falling rapidly, they should have requested a current altimeter setting from the approach controller when was not given, as required, upon initial radio contact. Although the flightcrew did not use the most current QNH setting they had available (29.40 inches of Hg.) in the standby altimeter, this error did not affect the accident sequence of events because the flightcrew had the correct, but outdated, QFE setting (29.23 inches Hg.) in the altimeters they were using when the accident occurred. If the first officer had monitored the approach on instruments until reaching minimum descent altitude (MDA) and delayed his search for the airport until after reaching the MDA, he would have been better able to notice and immediately call the captain's attention to the altitude deviation below the MDA.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows.
the flightcrew's failure to maintain the required minimum descent altitude until the required visual references identifiable with the runway were in sight. Contributing factors were the failure of the BDL approach controller to furnish the flightcrew with a current altimeter setting, and the flightcrew's failure to ask for a more current setting. (NTSB Report AAR-96/05 adopted 11/13/96)