MSY-MSP From United States of America, joined Jun 2002, 151 posts, RR: 0 Posted (11 years 10 months 5 days 17 hours ago) and read 2634 times:
I heard this on the news radio on the way to work this morning. Last night around 10:30 a NW DC-9 MSP-YEG had an engine catch fire while on the ground at MSP. No passengers were hurt, and were accommodated on other flights. The aircraft is now in the maintenance hanger at MSP while mechanics attempt to identify the problem.
So does anyone know what happened? Was it a -10, -30, -40, -50? My guess is a -10 since MSP-YEG is a thin route, run with both RJ's and Mainline.
Please do not turn this into a discussion about why NW needs to get rid of the old DC-9's.
BR715-A1-30 From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 1, posted (11 years 10 months 5 days 11 hours ago) and read 2491 times:
I think NW needs to get rid of those DC9s LOL
Actually, It was probably something minor. Nothing Serious. My Question is how did the pilots know? Did they see some irregular activity on the gauges or did ATC radio them. I am guessing they are just going to replace the engine.
BR715-A1-30 From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 4, posted (11 years 10 months 5 days 9 hours ago) and read 2395 times:
I would say the majority of jet aircraft have some sort of fire detection system (ie. warning light/sound) if an engine is on fire...
I remember an aircraft that crashed because there was a fire on the left engine, and then the pilot came on the intercom and said there was a problem with the right engine. He shut down the Working engine, and the airplane crashed. I just have one word to say to that accident. "D'OH!!!!!!!"
I like the explanation of why it was late!
It seems like NWA has gone on a semi-honesty streak lately. Most airlines say "EQUIP. CHANGE"
Broke From United States of America, joined Apr 2002, 1322 posts, RR: 3
Reply 5, posted (11 years 10 months 5 days 9 hours ago) and read 2366 times:
All jets have fire detection (actually heat detection) loops around the engine; but if you have a tail pipe fire, there only method of detection is an alert eyeball from someone on the ground. The is nothing yet reported to determine whether there was a tail pipe fire or a fire detection warning.
Wing From Turkey, joined Oct 2000, 1571 posts, RR: 23
Reply 7, posted (11 years 10 months 3 days 23 hours ago) and read 2138 times:
On 737 engines we have dual loop fire and overheat detectors which senses engine overheat and fire and warns the cockpit with both fire bell and visual lights.
Theaccident you referred is actually true(although it didn't happened the way you described)and since that accident we have the medhod of confirmation of the troubled engine while the other pilot restricts the working engine to avoid mistakes.(Basicly one pilot holds the working engine start lever,the other holds the truoble one and ask for a confirmation of other pilot that he was cutting the correct engine.After both agree that that is the one he shuts it off)Still we don't have any procedures of announcing in through the intercome though.Every little lesson is learned after big big (and bloody)mistakes and accidents.
Dash8tech From United States of America, joined Jul 1999, 732 posts, RR: 5
Reply 8, posted (11 years 10 months 3 days 22 hours ago) and read 2118 times:
I think in the British Midland accident the pilot throttled back an engine to determine which was causing vibrations, then they decided to shut it down altogether. When attempting landing the other one lost power (which was the real culprit) thus causing the aircraft to crash.
I also heard somewhere that fire warning was wired backwards in this aircraft thus furthering the confusion...? Anyone know of any truth to that?
Cedarjet From United Kingdom, joined May 1999, 8114 posts, RR: 53
Reply 9, posted (11 years 10 months 3 days 21 hours ago) and read 2109 times:
BD accident: the autothrottle was pumping more and more fuel to the failing engine (it wasn't on fire). There was no clear indication on the flight deck of which engine was causing the vibration, so they throttled back one engine to see what happened. The act of reducing power on either engine cancelled the autothrottle altogether, so as they throttled back on the good engine the autothrottle stopped pumping extra fuel to the bad engine, which promptly settled down. A-ha, problem solved. Then they began a descent at flight idle on the bad engine with the good engine now shut down. It was only on finals with the flaps and gear out that they pushed the engine up and it promptly caught fire and failed completely.
Hope that makes sense and shows how easily the mistake was made. The crew acted correctly (or at least, "understandably") given the symptoms the aircraft showed at the time.
fly Saha Air 707s daily from Tehran's downtown Mehrabad to Mashhad, Kish Island and Ahwaz
Azjubilee From United States of America, joined Apr 2000, 3933 posts, RR: 27
Reply 11, posted (11 years 10 months 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 2060 times:
"Basicly one pilot holds the working engine start lever,the other holds the truoble one and ask for a confirmation of other pilot that he was cutting the correct engine.After both agree that that is the one he shuts it off"
Interesting proceudre - our policy is that the flying pilots largest responsibility is to FLY THE PLANE. The nonflying pilot then runs the memory items which include visually identifying the engine to shut down by using the lighted indications as well as engine gauge info and then physically retards the bad thrust lever - while asking the flying pilot to confirm.
We had an incident one night in DTW that was quite a show for all on the ground as well as those seated aft of the engine. Apparantly a fuel line ruptured and was pouring more fuel than needed into the engine and as a result a VERY long flame was streaking out of the engine. This was witnessed by other planes on the ground as well as a pilot riding onboard. The crews didn't even know what was happening... why? because the heat detection loops were all forward of the "hot" part of the engine. I believe since this incident 1 set of detection loops was moved as aft as possible, as close to the hot spot - but not too close as to create erroneous indications.
Perhaps there wasn't even a fire in the NW incident - but just an overheating or bleed air problem. However the media freaks out - unfortunately due to not having the whole story. The only indications on the flight deck would be engine fire.
777236ER From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 13, posted (11 years 10 months 3 days 14 hours ago) and read 2001 times:
From the above accident report:
After an uneventful take-off and climb the crew suddenly heard an unusual noise, accompanied by vibration, as the aircraft passed through FL 283. The noise was heard in the cabin as a series of thuds and the FDR indicated that it was directly associated with the stalling of the fan and/or the LP compressor with attendant surging of the No 1 engine. In addition to the noise and vibration, the lateral and longitudinal accelerations recorded on the FDR were consistent with the reported lower frequency shuddering that was sufficiently marked to shake the walls of the forward galley. Very soon after the onset of these symptoms there was a smell of fire and possibly some visible smoke in the cockpit. This combination was interpreted by the pilots as evidence of a serious engine malfunction, with an associated fire, and appears to have driven them to act very quickly to contain this perceived condition.
Neither pilot appears to have assimilated from the engine instruments any positive indication of malfunction but subsequent tests showed the engine instrument system to have been serviceable and there was no evidence to indicate that it did not display the large engine parameter variations that occurred when the compressor surged. The FDR showed four distinct excursions in N1 on the No 1 engine, with a 6 second period of relative stability between the second and the third.
Throughout the period of compressor surging the No 2 engine showed no parameter variations but because the first officer was unable to recall what he saw on the instruments, it has not been possible to determine why he made the mistake of believing that the fault lay with the No 2 engine. When asked which engine was at fault he half formed the word 'left' before saying 'right'. His hesitation may have arisen from genuine difficulty in interpreting the readings of the engine instruments or it may have been that he observed the instruments only during the 6 second period of relative stability between the second and third surges. However, any uncertainty that he may initially have experienced appears to have been quickly resolved because, when the commander ordered him to 'THROTTLE IT BACK', without specifying which engine was to be throttled back, the first officer closed the No 2 throttle.
The commander said that he gained from the engine instruments no clear indication of where the trouble lay. He had, however, disengaged the autopilot 8 seconds after the first compressor surge and most of his attention thereafter would probably have been on the handling of the aircraft and the flight instruments. The fact that when the aircraft rolled to the left he made no corrective movements with the flying controls appeared to indicate that he did not detect from the behaviour of the aircraft any loss of thrust from the No 1 engine. After the accident, he stated that he had judged the No 2 engine to be at fault from his knowledge of the aircraft air conditioning system. His reasoning was that he thought the smoke and fumes were coming forward from the passenger cabin; the air for the cabin came mostly from the No 2 engine; therefore the trouble lay in that engine. Whilst this reasoning might have applied fairly well to other aircraft he had flown, it was flawed in this case because some of the conditioning air for the passenger cabin of the Boeing 737-400 comes from the No 1 engine. In any case, his assessment was not supported by the evidence because the fumes had been perceived in the cockpit, and it was not for some time that he was able to confirm from the flight service manager that there had also been smoke in the passenger cabin. It seems unlikely that in the short time before he took action his thoughts about the air conditioning system could have had much influence on his decision. It is considered to be more likely that, believing the first officer had seen positive indications on the engine instruments, he provisionally accepted the first officer's assessment.
The speed with which the pilots acted was contrary to both their training and the instructions in the Operations Manual. If they had taken more time to study the engine instruments it should have been apparent that the No 2 engine indications were normal and that the No 1 engine was behaving erratically. The commander himself might have had a better chance to observe these abnormal indications if he had not disengaged the autopilot but this action by itself should not have prevented him from taking whatever time was necessary to assimilate the readings on all the engine instruments. In the event, both pilots reacted to the emergency before they had any positive evidence of which engine was operating abnormally. Their incorrect diagnosis of the problem must, therefore, be attributed to their too rapid reaction and not to any failure of the engine instrument system to display the correct indications.
If I remember correctly, BA's 737-400s (G-DOC*) were delivered with the non-solid state EIS displays as a consequence of this crash.