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Survivability For Militarized Commercial Aircraft  
User currently offlineSidishus From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 519 posts, RR: 4
Posted (9 years 2 weeks 3 days 16 hours ago) and read 3980 times:

From the Spring 2005 Aircraft Survivability Journal
http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/PDF/AS_Newsletter2005_spring.pdf

Airliner Air Force: Survivability for Militarized Commercial Aircraft

by Dr. Torg Anderson and Dr. Lenny Truett

As an attractive, cost-saving measure, the Services are looking more and
more at large commercial aircraft to accomplish select missions. While this may avoid the high development costs of a new platform, the savings go beyond the purchase price, since tried-and-true commercial airplanes have demonstrated low operating costs and high reliability. To further support this argument, the manufacturer and airline logistics systems can be adopted to reduce operational costs.
While this cost saving may be extremely appealing, there are hidden costs that must be understood. In the area of survivability, you get what you pay for.
There are numerous recent examples—


  • The infamous KC–767 Air Force tanker is no longer in the plan,
    but it wasn’t even going to be purchased by the Air Force—it
    was a lease arrangement.

  • The Air Force is proceeding withthe Multi-Mission Command and Control Aircraft (MC2A), or E–10A platform, to replace a number of current aircraft that provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
    and will be fully interoperable with other aircraft and systems. The E–10A will use an extended range version of the Boeing 767, adding electronics and sensors to accomplish its mission.

  • The Army leads the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) program using a modified Lockheed-Martin Embraer ERJ–145 regional jet with electronic sensors to monitor enemy electronic emissions. This is intended to replace the Army’s RC–12 Guardrail and the Navy’s EP–3E ARIES II aircraft.

  • The Navy has selected a variation of the Boeing 737 as the platform for its Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) to replace the aging P–3 Orions for anti-submarine warfare. This system is expected to be extremely versatile and capable of conducting a wide range of other combat and non-combat missions.


Since commercial aircraft weren’t designed to operate in a combat environment, survivability wasn’t considered in their designs. Safety is a major requirement for the airlines,but this is only a starting point for combat vulnerability requirements.
For some systems, such as the MMA, confrontations with enemy threats
are expected during combat missions. For others like the E–10A, the Services indicate that the system operate clear of the threats and be shielded by suitable support aircraft.
However, if these aircraft accomplish their missions effectively, they will
be central features of the U.S. battle force and, as such, will be high value
targets for enemies with resourcefulness and capabilities to reach them.


Common Issues

The ability to add vulnerability reduction to a commercial platform varies as much with each program as it does with the platforms. One thing is certain though—it’s more difficult to include these features in existing commercial designs for numerous reasons—

  • The whole reason for purchasing a commercial system is the attractive low cost. Expensive changes in design are contrary to this initial philosophy.

  • Since the design is virtually complete when the Service program begins, the manufacturer and the program resist any significant design changes. This
    simply adds time and cost.

  • The pre-existing aircraft design puts vulnerability analyses and vulnerability reduction further behind the schedule than usual. It’s hard to sell extensive test requirements that would further delay the program.

  • To exacerbate the problem, manufacturers are reluctant to release design details because of intellectual property concerns.This also interferes with the
    vulnerability reduction effort, putting it further behind.

Whether designed for commercial or military use, though, aircraft have some common vulnerability issues when considered for combat. Most of these are obvious. The aircraft structure is directly vulnerable to ballistic impacts. The flight controls are also directly vulnerable or may be incapable of compensating for structural or aerodynamic damage from a combat threat. Fuel tanks introduce vulnerabilities related to hydrodynamic ram structural damage or fires generated in the air space within the tanks. Dry bays provide
opportunities for sustained fire when combustibles are ignited directly by ballistic threats or by other ignition sources through cascade damage mechanisms. Survivability common solutions can be brought to bear.

Low-Hanging Fruit

Redundancy and separation of systems are obvious vulnerability reduction
methods that can be applied to commercial aircraft if the basic design is
not extensively affected. Redundancy in flight controls, hydraulic systems
and structural members can significantly reduce vulnerability by preventing
single ballistic encounters from affecting critical functions. These considerations come with cost, weight and reliability penalties, though. For commercial applications, component and system reliabilities may be such
that redundancy isn’t necessary. In military applications, the penalties
may still be significant, but the advantages to vulnerability reduction are
worth evaluating.
Two vulnerability reduction technologies developed for combat aircraft over the last couple of decades offer significant improvements for survivability in many platforms. Fuel tank ullage inerting replaces combustible air with nitrogen in the fuel tank air space so that an ignition source is not sufficient to start a fire or create an explosion.
The C–5 Galaxy employs an inerting system using liquid nitrogen. Commercially available on-board inert gas generating systems (OBIGGS) are capable of
separating nitrogen from the air for this purpose. The weight and volume
of these systems is significant, but may be acceptable on larger platforms
such as commercial aircraft. Survivability analyses and the appropriate trade studies can evaluate the
effectiveness of this capability.
Dry Bay Fire Suppression (DBFS) systems have also demonstrated their
effectiveness in live-fire tests. These consist of fire detectors, control systems and suppressors that discharge agents in response to fire indications.
These agents interfere with the combustion chain reactions and extinguish
the fires. Since dry bay fires are a significant contribution to the potential vulnerability of an aircraft, DBFS systems can greatly improve survivability. These components are compact and can easily be accommodated in commercial aircraft designs with little penalty, but there is a significant
design and test effort required to ensure their effectiveness.


Unique Issues

Another advantage of commercial aircraft designs is their extensive operational history that can be used to identify possible design issues. Maybe more importantly, accident and incident histories provide insight into the differences in commercial and military design philosophies that affect vulnerability.
Some specific examples can illustrate this—

  • Cargo doors on two DC–10’s were improperly latched on the ground and were blown off the aircraft as they climbed above 10,000 feet. The resulting
    explosive decompression created a pressure differential that buckled the cabin floor, causing interference with the flight controls. In one case, control of the
    aircraft was lost and it crashed with the loss of 346 passengers and crew. Corrective action was repair of the cargo door to prevent improper latching.

  • Loss of hydraulic power and resulting loss of all aircraft controls resulted when the fan disk on the #2 engine of a DC–10 disintegrated and ruptured
    hydraulic lines in the tail of the airplane. A landing was attempted using differential engine control, but the aircraft crashed. One-hundred eleven
    out of 296 people on board were killed.

  • An ullage explosion in the center wing fuel tank of a Boeing 747 resulted from an electrical short outside of the tank that created an electrical arc in the ullage space (postulated cause, but never proven). The aircraft
    disintegrated killing 212 people.

  • Loss of rudder control and a hard-over rudder resulted in loss of control of 737’s in three instances. In one case, control of the aircraft was regained. In
    the others, the aircraft crashed killing 157 people. The likely cause was associated with the single hydraulic rudder control actuator, although the specifics were never determined.


Perhaps the most apparent difference between commercial and military aircraft
design is in the philosophy used to address potential cascade failures.
The DC–10 cargo door cases demonstrate this most vividly. In these examples,
safety depends on preventing the initiating event to disrupt the cascade
chain. The corrective action was to fix the cargo door design and eliminate
the possibility of that event. The potential for the remaining cascade
remained, but presented no problems in subsequent operations. Similarly,
there would have been no problem in the DC–10 hydraulic failure and the
747 ullage explosion events without the initiating event.
When designing for vulnerability reduction, though, the initial event is a ballistic encounter and is given (thus, Pk/h is the probability of a kill given a hit). Survivability must depend on design features that break or eliminate the subsequent cascade chains.
As mentioned earlier, redundancy and separation of systems treated the same in commercial and military designs. In commercial aircraft, cost saving can be made using single but very reliable components and routing aircraft systems
to common “service centers” so that they can be easily accessed from a
single location. Vulnerability reduction in combat aircraft suggests
that redundancy and separation of redundant systems should be applied
at the expense of reliability and ease of maintenance. The DC–10 hydraulic
failure and 737 examples expose critical subsystems in these specific
commercial aircraft that could be extremely vulnerable to single ballistic
encounters. These subsystems would be prime candidates for redesign
if these aircraft were to be used in military applications.


Conclusions

Commercial aircraft designs can provide huge cost benefits when applied to military program needs, but programs should consider that, in part, these savings result from reduced survivability. The programs must recognize and accept the costs necessary to get survivability back into the system. Two general aspects of vulnerability reduction need to be considered.
Some basic vulnerability reduction techniques can be effective for any
large platforms and should be considered for every commercial platform
used in a military application. Ullage inerting and dry-bay fire suppression
significantly improve survivability as has been demonstrated in numerous
live-fire test programs. These systems can be implemented as addons
to the basic aircraft and have little impact on the platform’s basic design. Programs should plan for the expenses of these systems and the design efforts necessary to ensure their effective implementation.
Programs need to understand the differences in philosophy in designing
commercial versus combat aircraft and evaluate the design with these differences in mind. This may help to identify survivability weaknesses that might have otherwise been overlooked. This gives the program a chance to correct these deficiencies and make significant improvements in the aircraft’s overall effectiveness.



the truth: first it is ridiculed second it is violently opposed finally it is accepted as self-evident
13 replies: All unread, jump to last
 
User currently offlineDc1030guy From United States of America, joined Apr 2004, 60 posts, RR: 0
Reply 1, posted (9 years 2 weeks 3 days 9 hours ago) and read 3936 times:

Great article ... but I must say that I agree and I disagree.

I disagree with the statement that nothing was done to the DC10 to prevent the further cascading of systems leading to a crash (specifically the cargo door incident).

The floor of the DC10 was vented, allowing pressure equalization between the upper and lower decks, preventing the floor from collapsing and snapping the flight control cables. Additionally, an emergency procedure created calls for the pilots to fly the airplane by use of the autopilot since the wiring for the autopilot runs along the roof of the airplane (geographically separated from the flight control wires). This technique was even flight tested when a DC10 which at the time did not have the redesign, lost flight controls after the cargo door blew open causing the floor to collapse. They landed the airplane safely by using the autopilot.

Now, the part where I agree. I agree that commercially procured aircraft are going to be at a disadvantage from a survivability standpoint; this wasn't a design criteria. Knowing these short comings, the air force uses these platforms in a way to reduce the chances of being "ballistically fired on." In other words, we avoid the threat in the first place. Therefore you end up with cheaper less survivable platforms used in a manner which reduces the risk of being destroyed.

In recent history, I don't know of any high value asset that has been targeted AND destroyed. With respect to the AWACS and tankers, threat analysis is always key as to where we operate in the battlespace. There is no reason for these platforms to be on the front lines and within direct enemy fire. Therefore, is the money spent on making these aircraft safe from ballistic fired weapons put to good use???

Pat


User currently offlineSidishus From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 519 posts, RR: 4
Reply 2, posted (9 years 2 weeks 2 days 18 hours ago) and read 3868 times:

Quoting Dc1030guy (Reply 1):
In recent history, I don't know of any high value asset that has been targeted AND destroyed. With respect to the AWACS and tankers, threat analysis is always key as to where we operate in the battlespace. There is no reason for these platforms to be on the front lines and within direct enemy fire. Therefore, is the money spent on making these aircraft safe from ballistic fired weapons put to good use???

The past is not Prologue in this case. There are two significant differences today-and more importantly in the years ahead-that makes the argument that "none have been shot down so far..." a very misguided one.
First off, tanker and ISR assets are in fact operating in threat envelopes already while being employed in tactical roles. Significant tanker losses were anticipated over Iraq. Thank God for the almost comical incompetence of the Iraqis!! JSTARS, RC-135s, P-3s, and EP-3s, all have been routinely employed "deep" in recent conflicts. That trend will only continue in the years ahead.
Next is the fact that potential adversaries, and companies that cater to potential adversaries, have recognized the value of these assets to our network centric way of war. A whole new class of "Awacs Killer" weapons systems are being funded and fielded to specifically target these aircraft.
Given the limited inventories of ISR assets, the loss of even one will be a critical blow to our ability to conduct operations. Push tankers farther away, and the ground folks will no longer have the "persistence" of airpower which has become such an integral part of our operational doctrine.
So, given the increasingly pivotal nature these militarized airliners-or as I like to call them, Faux Warbirds-have on our ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations, making them less vulnerable is money well spent.



the truth: first it is ridiculed second it is violently opposed finally it is accepted as self-evident
User currently offlineSidishus From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 519 posts, RR: 4
Reply 3, posted (9 years 2 weeks 2 days 17 hours ago) and read 3853 times:

Quoting Dc1030guy (Reply 1):
Therefore, is the money spent on making these aircraft safe from ballistic fired weapons put to good use???

These Survivability folks have their own lexicon. When they are talking about "ballistic" they are talking about the process ("kill mechanism") of the fragments hitting the aircraft and not how the weapon that created the fragments was targeted or how it flew to the point of detonation.



the truth: first it is ridiculed second it is violently opposed finally it is accepted as self-evident
User currently offlineDuce50boom From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 4, posted (9 years 2 weeks 2 days 17 hours ago) and read 3852 times:

Quoting Sidishus (Reply 2):
The past is not Prologue in this case. There are two significant differences today-and more importantly in the years ahead-that makes the argument that "none have been shot down so far..." a very misguided one.
First off, tanker and ISR assets are in fact operating in threat envelopes already while being employed in tactical roles. Significant tanker losses were anticipated over Iraq. Thank God for the almost comical incompetence of the Iraqis!! JSTARS, RC-135s, P-3s, and EP-3s, all have been routinely employed "deep" in recent conflicts. That trend will only continue in the years ahead.
Next is the fact that potential adversaries, and companies that cater to potential adversaries, have recognized the value of these assets to our network centric way of war. A whole new class of "Awacs Killer" weapons systems are being funded and fielded to specifically target these aircraft.
Given the limited inventories of ISR assets, the loss of even one will be a critical blow to our ability to conduct operations. Push tankers farther away, and the ground folks will no longer have the "persistence" of airpower which has become such an integral part of our operational doctrine.
So, given the increasingly pivotal nature these militarized airliners-or as I like to call them, Faux Warbirds-have on our ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations, making them less vulnerable is money well spent.

Sid, We all know you mean well. But you're telling us all, and specifically DC1030guy (an AD KC-10 pilot) things that we already know but have tactics and procedures to mitigate the risk which we're exposed to. Case in point:

B-1 low levels. During OIF there weren't any low level bomb runs; they were all done at their normal cruise altitudes. This was done due to the Iraqi air defense's status it was felt that low levels are not worth the risk, that their mission could be accomplished just as well by staying out of range of AAA in the 20s. In another war, coming to an AOR near you, the B-1 may very well be doing low levels to survive. My point is that the same reasons that kept the bombers high up also allowed tankers to operate closer to the front lines; low risk of enemy fire. You were talking about the GW1 in which heavy (25% IIRC) losses of the tanker fleet were anticipated the first week. Luckily that didn't happen. But if it does, and "AWACS killers" are used, then really no amount of "military hardening" of aircraft will be effective. Tankers, well, really anything that big, are not maneuverable enough to give a missile like that a run for it's money. I think the best bet is equipping them with RWR/chaff/flares and maybe some ECM equipment and operating like they are now.

In a perfect world I'd like to see them incorporate what you're supporting into older designs and then build a new tanker around that concept. But it's not going to happen. There are many more things the AF and DoD would like to spend their congressionally allocated dollars on and I can pretty much guarantee you this is not very high on the totem pole. I would rather see that money spent on fighters (yes, even the F-22) to keep us fatboys safe than spend it all on our survivability factors. Maybe this mindset will change if a HVAA is downed in the future, but it will not change until that happens. And even then is doubtful.


User currently offlineSidishus From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 519 posts, RR: 4
Reply 5, posted (9 years 2 weeks 2 days 15 hours ago) and read 3842 times:

Duce50, you are espousing the same mindset that TACAIR types-both USN and USAF- had a generation ago. It was a mindset that cost aircraft and lives needlessly too.


  • That any hit is a kill

    Quoting Duce50boom (Reply 4):
    then really no amount of "military hardening" of aircraft will be effective

  • That reliance on "Susceptability Reduction"(countermeasures, speed, tactics, etc.) obviates the need for "Vulnerability Reduction"(aircraft hardening through separation of systems, enhanced fire suppression, etc.)

    Quoting Duce50boom (Reply 4):
    I think the best bet is equipping them with RWR/chaff/flares and maybe some ECM equipment and operating like they are now.



    Quoting Duce50boom (Reply 4):
    But you're telling us all, and specifically DC1030guy (an AD KC-10 pilot) things that we already know but have tactics and procedures to mitigate the risk which we're exposed to

    These misconceptions certainly didn't work for TACAIR world during Vietnam. Since then much has been done to enhance TACAIR asset survivability...but in those days you guys spent your flying hours in benign airspace (with some heroic-but very rare-exceptions), so those hard lessons learned were never applied in your world.
    Today, the proliferation of weapons such as the FT-2000, S-400, and KS-172 are putting you folks in the same position TACAIR was in way back in 1961 when they were confronted by SA-2s and ZSU-23-4s. And I see there is too little recognition today of applying those tragic lessons learned before the sh*t hits the fan the next time around.

    [Edited 2005-08-07 10:10:29]


the truth: first it is ridiculed second it is violently opposed finally it is accepted as self-evident
User currently offlineSidishus From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 519 posts, RR: 4
Reply 6, posted (9 years 2 weeks 2 days 14 hours ago) and read 3831 times:

Quoting Sidishus (Reply 5):
SA-2s and ZSU-23-4s

...make that S-60/Type 59's



the truth: first it is ridiculed second it is violently opposed finally it is accepted as self-evident
User currently offlineAFHokie From United States of America, joined May 2004, 224 posts, RR: 1
Reply 7, posted (9 years 2 weeks 2 days 9 hours ago) and read 3790 times:

Quoting Duce50boom (Reply 4):
I would rather see that money spent on fighters (yes, even the F-22) to keep us fatboys safe than spend it all on our survivability factors.

That is the most cost effective method to keeping HVAA's safe. You defeat a weapon like the KS-172 by having your own fighters shoot down whatever is carrying it. The only time a ground threat is a credable threat against a HVAA is during t/o and landing. While SOF units are usually pretty good, I highly doubt they'll pack in a large crew served weapon like an S-60. Even more doubtful to see a terrorist group pack one in. If/when the US goes against another country with a credible threat to air operations, you will see HVAAs employed behind the FEBA with DEFPATS mixed in.

Yes, yes you can redesign existing or design completely new aircraft that have a much greater survivablity built in than what is flyig right now. Is it cost effective, probably not.

Like I said above, the most likely threat to a HVAA is during t/o or landing, and while there's always the golden BB, a MANPAD or small arms fire could bring one down, I think they're pretty survivalbe against them already. Case in point, the DHL A300 that was hit by a MANPAD on approach to Baghdad.


User currently offlineLt-AWACS From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 8, posted (9 years 2 weeks 2 days 8 hours ago) and read 3780 times:

Dave, you remember our old E-3 methods right? Vector in the sacrificial tanker between the E-3 and the threat  Wink

Ciao, and Hook 'em Horns,
Capt-AWACS, Watching you from 30,000 feet


User currently offlineDuce50boom From , joined Dec 1969, posts, RR:
Reply 9, posted (9 years 2 weeks 2 days 7 hours ago) and read 3772 times:

Quoting Lt-AWACS (Reply 8):
Vector in the sacrificial tanker between the E-3 and the threat  Wink

That's where our ace-in-the-hole comes in--radio problems galore: "Say again, AWACS. You're coming in loud and unreasonable."

Quoting Sidishus (Reply 5):
Duce50, you are espousing the same mindset that TACAIR types-both USN and USAF- had a generation ago. It was a mindset that cost aircraft and lives needlessly too.

Fair enough, but there's a not so small difference in tactics, mindset, and employment of fighter/attack types and HVAA. They're supposed to operate in that high threat environment, we're not. Fighters have to do their job in bad guy land. HVAAs are not supposed to be there, it's sort of like you bringing your fat cousin out to a bar where fights normally break out. You'll be fine, but your cousin will get his a$$ kicked before he gets to the bar and orders himself a milk. Regardless of whether a HVAA is destroyed or only damaged (that's the most hardening will do) by the next gen "HVAA killers" the enemy's scored a huge knockout blow. He's knocked a HVAA out of the fight. Mission success. The ONLY way to mitigate that threat is to increase the seperation between the meat eaters and herbivores, beef-up the fighters doing CAPs, or both. That's one reason why 15C guys were so bored in OIF. They could've been back in San Francisco but instead were doing orbits in case the Iraqis tried their stuff against us.

The biggest threat, I think, to HVAAs are MANPADS. I'm much more scared of Ahmed Raziz and his crazy neighbor Abdullah trying to knock us down just after takeoff with an SA-7. This is what we should be focusing on, not the HVAA killers, and for this situation all you need is some relatively inexpensive defensive equipment


User currently offlineSidishus From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 519 posts, RR: 4
Reply 10, posted (9 years 2 weeks 1 day 16 hours ago) and read 3686 times:

Quoting Duce50boom (Reply 9):
Fair enough, but there's a not so small difference in tactics, mindset, and employment of fighter/attack types and HVAA. They're supposed to operate in that high threat environment, we're not.

In an enviroment where S-400s, KS-172s and FT-2000s will be operational ... and you can bet weapons such as this will be operational "in an AOR near you" Real Soon Now...you will be in the Badlands just as much as the fighter pukes will be Duce. This Fourth Generation of Bad Guys has no scruples. They don't want to do any chivalrous jousting with F-22s; they want to blow away your ass because that delivers the best bang for the buck (or if you prefer, dinar or yuan).
Point is that HVAAs will be specifically targeted. And with wily opponents such as those encountered in Bosnia and Cope India, the kind of weapons like those above will be real trouble indeed. The "difference" you speak of will be nil then...to the enemy at least.
And the bottom line is that the ever smaller numbers of HVAAs mean that we can ill afford to lose but a handful before we are faced with a real disaster in a future conflict.

Quoting Duce50boom (Reply 9):
Regardless of whether a HVAA is destroyed or only damaged (that's the most hardening will do) by the next gen "HVAA killers" the enemy's scored a huge knockout blow.

Your perception is myopic Duce. Survivability requires a balance between Susceptability Reduction (tactics countermeasures) and Vulnerability Reduction (aircraft hardening). Here is what some experts on the subject have to say:

"One of the major barriers to designing the right amount of survivability into an aircraft is the perception that survivability might be too expensive, particularly those features that make the aircraft tougher or less vulnerable. Some believe that a hit is a downed aircraft, and nothing can be done about it.sound familiar Duce? There is also the perception that the benefits from survivability will never be realized if the aircraft is never used in combat; and if it is used in combat, a return on investment might not be achieved until late in the life cycle of the aircraft.
These beliefs and perceptions are not correct, and they must be eliminated using realistic cost-effectiveness analyses. These analyses will show that designing for survivability pays off, an aircraft that is both mission capable and survivable in combat will achieve its mission objectives and return home more often, it will be used more aggressively in high risk combat scenarios, and it will win battles."

Robert E. Ball

"In the last 40 or so years, aircraft survivability has shifted away from damage tolerance to hit avoidance. As technology advanced and threats became more lethal, it made a lot of sense to keep the aircraft from being hit in the first place. With advanced countermeasures and low observable technology, this was possible. As our technology increased and we were able to outfit our aircraft with a lot of high-tech gizmos, the focus shifted from developing vulnerability reduction features to developing advanced sensors for threat detection, engagement, and target destruction at greater distances. You see, if you can detect and identify a threat at 500 miles, engage it at 450 and destroy it at 400, there really isn’t a need to worry about getting hit. The only problem with that is—we aren’t there yet.
If you took a poll of operators in the fleet and asked them what they wanted most on their aircraft, they would say—
1)advanced sensors,
2)range and speed,
3)long range and very accurate weapons,
4)low observable technology, and
50)vulnerability reduction.
Yes that was number 50, not number 5. There are two reasons for this. First, vulnerability reduction technology is not very sexy. A cool new radar that can identify a target at 500 miles is always preferable to a fuel tank liner. And second, most operators just assume that basic vulnerability reduction features such as fire protection and redundancy are a given in aircraft design. If you asked an operator if he would prefer target ID at only 400 miles while guaranteeing he would not burn up in flight because of a fuel leak, you might get a different answer.
Keep in mind that vulnerability reduction is still a very important part of the overall survivability equation. Until we can truly develop technologies that can keep our aircraft from being hit in combat, this will be the case."

CDR Andrew (Andy) Cibula






[Edited 2005-08-08 09:20:08]


the truth: first it is ridiculed second it is violently opposed finally it is accepted as self-evident
User currently offlineSidishus From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 519 posts, RR: 4
Reply 11, posted (9 years 2 weeks 1 day 15 hours ago) and read 3666 times:

Quoting AFHokie (Reply 7):
Case in point, the DHL A300 that was hit by a MANPAD on approach to Baghdad.

You're right. Case in point. An ballistic encounter with fragments approximating the mass of a golf ball caused the wing to nearly burn off. It's survival can be chalked up to luck-it was empty and the air was still-and not to any ruggedness of design. Minor quibble, it was departing.
Problem is that the certification for airliners doesn't require any mitigation against hydrodynamic ram. This is the kind of expensive stuff that needs to be back engineered into Faux Warbirds.
A later model 'bus would likely have had it's control laws all confused during the attempt to get back to the field and would have flipped over and found a smoking hole in the ground probably before even the first go around was attempted. Rewriting flight control codes to deal with such encounters portends yet another expensive fix for any MRTT offering from EADs.



[Edited 2005-08-08 10:07:41]


the truth: first it is ridiculed second it is violently opposed finally it is accepted as self-evident
User currently offlineAirRyan From United States of America, joined Mar 2005, 2532 posts, RR: 5
Reply 12, posted (9 years 2 weeks 1 day 5 hours ago) and read 3588 times:

Isn't the entire premise of the article somewhat fatally flawed in that the aircraft that the author is centering his piece around are all they themselves platforms not originally designed for military use and rather those that just like the current generation are designed around commerical aviation?

KC-135, E-3, et al: Boeing 707
P-3 Orion: Lockheed 188
KC-10: DC-10
VC-25: Boeing 747
C-40: Boeing 737NG
C-9: DC-9

KC-767: Boeing 767
KC-330: Airbus A-330
E-767: Boeing 767

Now, some versions of military aircraft that have been designed specifcally for military use have been great but they never parlayed over into the civilian world very well.

A/C-130
C-17
C-5
C-141

In an ideal world sure, we'd love to have specific platforms for all of our duties but believe it or not budgets are limited and the available funds are "suppossedly" allocated where they earn the most return. If we had to specifically design from the ground up an all new tanker well, just imagine the USAF designing the 787 but only doing so for 100 tankers - Boeing nor the USAF would be able to do such a thing for anything remotely resembling a practical price.

I find it interesting as to why Boeing for the first time suddenly comes out and says their new 787 isn't a good platform for tanking duties - are they telling the truth or is that just a ploy to sell what they have already invested their money into - a 767 product that has already paid for itself?


User currently offlineSidishus From United States of America, joined Oct 2004, 519 posts, RR: 4
Reply 13, posted (9 years 2 weeks 18 hours ago) and read 3575 times:

Quoting AirRyan (Reply 12):
Isn't the entire premise of the article somewhat fatally flawed in that the aircraft that the author is centering his piece around are all they themselves platforms not originally designed for military use and rather those that just like the current generation are designed around commerical aviation?

KC-135, E-3, et al: Boeing 707
P-3 Orion: Lockheed 188
KC-10: DC-10
C-9: DC-9

First off...Back to trying to eradicate persistent myth that the C-135 was spawned as a civil aircraft first. Boeing's original plan for the Dash-80 was to get the Air Force to buy it as a tanker and then sell the aircraft into civil use. We went round and round about this last winter. The KC-135 was born and bred as a military aircraft for a military application. The 707 morphed out of that effort as a distinctly different aircraft for civil use.
Granted, the E-3 E-8 E-6 are 707 based.

Next, each of the aircraft above (sans the C-40 since it's a new entrant and the VC-25 because it's a special case and has recieved vulnerability reduction features already) were aircraft ordered in the 70's or earlier. The chances of these aircraft taking enemy fire was considered remote.
That was then...Today it's a different matter.

The authors are not advocating not buying civil aircraft for military roles (i do though, it's a false economy). They are just reminding program managers that you get what you pay for and survivability will be an expensive backfit the will dull the bright promise of any savings. Even the the results may be less than optimum.

Here are the bios of the authors...
Dr. Torg Anderson is a member of the
Operational Evaluation Division at
the Institute for Defense Analyses in
Alexandria, Virginia, where he supports
aircraft live fire evaluations for several
programs including the F–35, the Multimission
Maritime Aircraft and the E–10A.
He has 25 years of experience at United
Technologies Research Center and Pratt
& Whitney primarily working in aircraft
engine combustor development and design
and combustion diagnostics development.
He is an active member of the AIAA
Weapon Systems Effectiveness Technical
Committee.
Dr. Lenny Truett is a member of the
Operational Evaluation Division at
the Institute for Defense Analyses in
Alexandria, Virginia, where he supports
aircraft live fire evaluations for several
programs including the C–5, C–17, C–
130J, C–130 AMP and Airborne Laser.
Before coming to IDA, he was a project
engineer with the 46th Testing Wing at
Wright-Patterson AFB specializing in fire
and explosion suppression. [/b]

[Edited 2005-08-09 06:43:39]


the truth: first it is ridiculed second it is violently opposed finally it is accepted as self-evident
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