George Bush and the axis of evil

Jan 31st 2002
From The Economist print edition

America is set on a brave but hazardous course

THERE is no doubt that it is a memorable phrase. George Bush's declaration in his state-of-the-union speech to Congress on January 29th that “an axis of evil” threatens the peace of the world will stand alongside Ronald Reagan's description of the Soviet Union as “an evil empire”—as, no doubt, it was intended to. It is also, like that previous slogan, meant to galvanise support by turning a long and tricky foreign-policy challenge into a simple, moral issue. That very simplicity may lead many people, especially outside America, to dismiss it as empty or to condemn it as foolish. On the second count, only time will tell. But the first is surely wrong. One thing that has become clear about President Bush is that, although he may not say very much, he tends to mean what he says.

What he said in his speech was not entirely new, but it was remarkable nonetheless (see article). Alongside the usual, easily forgettable stuff about unity and patriotism, and alongside the things he has said repeatedly in recent months about America being engaged in a long struggle against terrorism, President Bush made two broad points that will be important in the coming months and years for Americans and non-Americans alike. The first was that he pointed a finger directly at three countries—Iraq, North Korea and Iran—which he accused of arming themselves with weapons of mass destruction and forming that soon-to-be-famous axis of evil. In effect, he pledged to disarm them, whether by military or other means, and to do so sooner rather than later. No dates were set, nor plans laid out. But he made a clear pledge that this would form the core of America's—ie, his—foreign policy. The second was that this policy would be steered by a clear set of values: “non-negotiable demands”, no less, of human dignity. American presidents often talk about values. What is important here, though, is how the talk could bite. Many of America's allies do not meet his list of values, let alone its enemies.


From Jefferson to Wilson

George Bush, whether as president, governor or just plain mister, has also often talked of his values. But, when he talked about foreign affairs, he gave the impression of wanting America's engagement with the world to be limited. The country should be “humble, but strong”, he said. It should be effective when deploying military or other power overseas, but should do so sparingly and, it was implied, only for limited periods of time. With that approach, he was broadly in the tradition of Thomas Jefferson, even if by no means in his intellectual league. But with this speech, he changed tradition. His words placed him far closer to President Woodrow Wilson, the idealist whose “fourteen points” on human rights brought about the League of Nations in 1918 but persuaded Congress to reject its ratification.

Can that be right? Not entirely: President Bush does not otherwise exude a Wilsonian idealism. But he does share his missionary zeal. What seems to have happened is that, thanks to September 11th, he has found himself far more deeply engaged in foreign affairs than he expected to be. Well aware of the threat from unpredictable dictatorships wielding missiles and weapons of mass destruction, he had not expected to be fighting a war within a year of taking office. Now, the battle against the al-Qaeda terrorist network is, as he said, going to be a long and painstaking one. It is not over in Afghanistan, and must also be pursued in other countries. That conflict has also convinced him, just as it has convinced or reminded many others, that the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons poses an even bigger threat to the world's safety than do suicidal hijackers. So this too, though formally a separate issue from the battle against al-Qaeda, means that America has a cause it must pursue overseas. Limited engagement is not an option. And in taking on that burden President Bush, like President Reagan before him, is a man of instincts, who favours straightforward yardsticks to guide him.

This approach has some clear virtues. First and foremost, it is surely correct that both the pursuit of al-Qaeda and the control of weapons proliferation are essential and urgent. In the past, too much lip-service has been paid to them and too little action. Second, it is welcome that America's president has committed himself to these tasks. While the worst outcome of the war in Afghanistan would have been defeat, the second worst would have been a victory followed by American disengagement both from Afghanistan itself and from the wider problems that lie behind the terror. Third, a clear declaration of intent, by a man and an administration that have already showed that they mean business (in a non-Enron way), could have a salutary, chilling effect on rogues and malefactors everywhere. It will not be enough, but it is a welcome start.

It brings vices, too, however. One is simply integral to the task: that, by undertaking this project, America will undoubtedly make itself a continued target for terrorism and for criticism. Though they and their associates have suffered heavy blows in Afghanistan, militant Islamists are certain to carry on their fight (see article). The jihad may take a different form, quite probably one of attacks on American bases and operations overseas—which the engagement promised this week will extend in both geography and time. By switching attention to countries rather than just terrorists, President Bush was also raising the stakes in other ways (see article). Until now, Iran had been a semi-ally in the fight in Afghanistan. China, acquiescent in America's efforts, will raise its eyebrows at the mention of North Korea, of which it is, in an admittedly awkward fashion, an ally. No one will have been surprised at the mention of Iraq, least of all Saddam Hussein, but many will wonder what America actually plans to do.

The other vice—or, at least, hazard—lies with those “non-negotiable demands” about values. The list was impressive, and no westerner could disagree with the gist of it: “the rule of law...respect for women...private property...free speech...equal justice...religious tolerance.” The aim is admirable. The application will be harder. It will be harder because so many countries around the world do disagree with it, including many that now play host to American bases or are acting as allies: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Uzbekistan, to name but a few. It will be harder also, though, if the list comes to be a rigid indicator of who must be an ally and who an enemy. Alas, democracies that follow these values are also capable, on occasion, of being in the wrong and even of committing atrocities. The danger that President Bush might take too rigid an approach, with a ruinous effect on his other foreign-policy goals, is particularly acute in the Middle East (see article).

And there is another task. If America is to achieve these ambitious and worthy goals, it is going to need help. Plainly, it does not need military help; its European allies should be feeling shamed by the technological and practical prowess it has shown in Afghanistan. But it will need help with much else: sanctions, financial controls, diplomatic persuasion, the enforcement of anti-proliferation measures, police work, intelligence. However fine its values and just its cause, it will need to nurture the support of others. That support is more fragile than it should be, but also America seems less conscious than it needs to be of the importance of maintaining it. To fight an axis of evil, even a superpower needs an axis of its own.


- (the reason for posting this and the FT article was to illustrate a slightly more educated form of opinion than what usuall passes for 'Facts' on this forum) -