L410Turbolet From Czech Republic, joined May 2004, 5810 posts, RR: 18
Reply 1, posted (9 years 11 months 2 weeks 2 days 16 hours ago) and read 827 times:
What I don't understand is why the entire infrastructure of Iraqi army and police was completely dispersed? Was it really necessary, especially in the case of police? Wasn't slow transition with gradual elimination of those really . In every totalitarian regime you have also regular street cops, who direct traffic or investigate thefts and do not have to be necessarily Saddam's henchmenr and fanatics and keeping them retains the skeleton of the police force and maybe even command structure and then you have easier job not being forced to train tens of thousands cops in two weeks.
I had a chance to speak to a guy who trained future Iraqi policemen in Basra and he said that the work is hard and progress really slow, with high "mortality" rate due to large portion of cadest dropping out or simply not coming back one day (for whatever reason) and generally quite poor work discipline of those who remained, they also had to
a) sort out those with genuine interest in police work from those who see becoming policeman only as an opportunity to gain social influence and/or opportunity to be corrupted
b) deal with illiterates
c) get almost everyone in shape because doing even few pushups appeared to be mission impossible in the beginning
d) teach them the very basic skills of handlig guns, arrest procedures, etc. because they have Kalashnikov in everyhousehold, those who can properly handle guns are really scarce
What were they thinking at the Pentagon or wherever when they planned post-invasion Iraq? My overall impression is that they did not even bother to think about the day Saddam's gone +1? It's really surprising since tehere is the know-how from occupation and transition of post-WW2 Germany and Japan, which could be applicaple in many aspects?
-> in "good old Saddam's time" police infiltrated opposition forces ! But US-Americans in their desire to stop anybody who did have a Ba'athist past, overlooked reality
Quoting L410Turbolet (Reply 1): What I don't understand is why the entire infrastructure of Iraqi army and police was completely dispersed?
-> there were THREE major mistakes done by the USA in Iraq
A) to prohibit the Ba'ath Party. The "Socialist Party of the Arab Reawakening" was NOT Saddam's party and was NOT founded by him. He joined that party in the late 50ies, and MIS-used the party after coming to power in 1979. BUT the majority of Ba'ath Party people were NOT Saddam loyalists. He controlled the party through a dense network of secret service agents in disguise.
B) to dissolve all of the armed forces. Saddam has never been in military service and was NOT a "soldier". Most folks in the armed forces DISliked Saddam. He controlled the armed forces through a dense network of secret service agents in disguise. So that it would have been sufficient to screen the whole organisation for Saddam loyalists.
C) to dissolve the whole police force. Most policemen and police-officers had nothing or not much to do with Saddam. He controlled the police-forces through a dense network of secret service agents in disguise. But here again, it would have been sufficient to screen the forces for Saddam loyalists
Experienced and reliable army and police officers were "retired" because they were/are convinced Ba'athists. But the Ba'ath Party is the secularist slightly left-wing main party of Arab nationalism. OK, the US-Americans for a while believed they could separate Iraq from the Arab World, and were most angry when the provisional government as first action abroad went to Cairo to secure and re-arrange the Iraqi seat in the League of Arab States.
You see, the US-American problem in Iraq mostly is that they do not understand or do not want to understand regional mentality and preferences.