The main point is that it seems nothing has improved in 50 years. That’s probably the main root cause, but even routine upkeep and cleaning seemed neglected since the last turn of the century: overpowering urine stench, grime on the walls streaked by leaks, litter everywhere… I couldn’t wait to get...
Jump to postI’ve been to NYC this summer as a tourist and found travelling by subway a miserable experience: just getting 3 one-ride tickets was awfully inconvenient (took us at least 5 mins at an automated vending machine throwing random errors every 20-30 seconds, try again please!), nightmarish maze of cramp...
Jump to postThe angle of the video makes it difficult to judge, but it looks to me that the plane didn't clear the palm trees behind the party stand with much vertical separation, and that's *after* the violent pitch up maneuver. So I believe that task fixation (lining up with the stand, getting as low as possi...
Jump to postAs a (non-aviation) automation professional I respectfully disagree with your evaluation. A control loop flip-flopping rapidly between 2 sensor sources is 95% a design flaw of the mode transition conditions. Sensor mode transitions adding a positive control input without a cumulative (integrative) ...
Jump to postI don't think there is any flaw per se. As a (non-aviation) automation professional I respectfully disagree with your evaluation. A control loop flip-flopping rapidly between 2 sensor sources is 95% a design flaw of the mode transition conditions. Sensor mode transitions adding a positive control i...
Jump to postPre-military interference it was a planned to be a much smaller vehicle with greater ease of reusability. 4 person crew, liquid fueled booster, and a larger planned fleet. Then once the military got involved it got much larger, more expensive, and more dangerous. ^ this. STS chances to reach its &q...
Jump to postThat is, two crew stay on the Orion, two go down on Lunar Starship for a 7 day surface time. Har, it's going to feel weird for the landing crew, crawling out of a capsule and stepping into a whole spaceship just for the two of them. However, I still don't get it: if the moonship is going to be fuel...
Jump to posthttps://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/option-a-source-selection-statement-final.pdf From what I gather, NASA/SpaceX is planning a series of launches before the first astronauts land on the moon: 1. 'Fuelship' (or several) 2. 'Moonship' + cargo, no fuel --> rendezvous with 'Fuelship' ...
Jump to postCould anyone summarize for me the planned NASA's lunar exploration architecture? IMU it's still based on a Lunar Gateway in NRHO (first launched on a Falcon Heavy with a "slow" transit to lunar orbit, fully robotic), and SpaceX only won the reusable transit-descent-ascent-transit element f...
Jump to postFascinating discussion about STS, but I'm missing one piece of information back on-topic: do we know what aspect of SN8's flight irked FAA? Do we know for a fact that it got higher than the authorized flight envelope? I cannot think of any other parameters that could be blown, as it went straight up...
Jump to postlightsaber wrote:The level of predictive maintenance, in particular on the engines, us a huge step forward on the MAX.
Who knows where Bransons project will lead. He’s taking huge risks. I say, all the best even if VG is nowhere near to a space X Not very far, downrange-wise. Not only VG has nowhere near the energy onboard to achieve a significant donwrange capability, but above all their energy-management approach...
Jump to postThen you argue why not T-7A which apparently is very close in operating and procurement costs if not (significantly) cheaper and has a "home-grown" advantage. Not really: the T-7A is very close in operating and (apparently) cheaper in procurement costs vs. the M-346 Master , which was pit...
Jump to postThen you argue why not T-7A which apparently is very close in operating and procurement costs if not (significantly) cheaper and has a "home-grown" advantage. Not really: the T-7A is very close in operating and (apparently) cheaper in procurement costs vs. the M-346 Master , which was pit...
Jump to postM-345 anybody? Same operating costs as a comparable turboprop (or lower, with today's fuel price), uses the same Williams International FJ44-4M tubofan as SK60, modern avionics, freshly certified...
Jump to postAlitalia will be working with the unions to make sure that not many staff will be losing their jobs. And that's why the 4° attempt will not fare better: AZ accrued over decades into a bottomless repository for screwed politicians, offspring/family members of politicians, screwed public managers fri...
Jump to postI'm starting to think that achieving the targeted reusability levels for Block 5 (10 cycles) is going to be harder than Musk let us believe... Hmmm... I don't see that with this particular failure. Musk has always said there would be many failures on the path to success (which really is a truism mo...
Jump to postFirst, I think it should be clarified that when out of trim it is almost impossible to bring back using the manual wheel. It is possible with the electric trim switches. [...] It seems to me that the design of the wheel from the beginning was to be the backup in the event the actuators failed and t...
Jump to postPS I still think Boeing would be well served to change the stab trim cutout switches back to one controls auto-trim and the other manual electronic trim. This allows the flight crew to use electric trim in many of the failure modes above, reducing workload. Agre 100%. Furthermore, I’m stil looking ...
Jump to postYou need to read the Runaway Stabilizer AD 2018-23-51 on this page and the Folllowing OPS bulletin which was put out by Boeing MLI-15 Then maybe restate your position before starting the every 6 hour flamefest. Just scroll down on this page and you will find them http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm Boe...
Jump to postDid the recommended action include trimming electrically to neutral trim before cutting the switches? I ask because after thousands of posts, I don't remember if I imagined that or it is the case. The bulletin published by Boeing in the aftermath of the LionAir crash was, in my opinion, a masterpie...
Jump to postThe ET pilots had an idea but were still overloaded. They even performed the recommended action: Stabelizer Cut off Switches. But were still overlaoded and did not manage to regain sufficient control. Did the recommended action include trimming electrically to neutral trim before cutting the switch...
Jump to postDon't you think, that getting from 1 to 2 should have enough meat on the bone to discuss in this thread and that getting from 2 to 3 is distracting and off topic? Just look at the leverage, these two discussions have! Ok then let's discuss that - what pearls of wisdom would you like to offer? Oh, y...
Jump to postEither way, it's apparent that Boeing broke a cardinal rule in engineering: if you create a product (eg MCAS) to solve a safety issue (stick lightening), the failure of that product cannot cause a more severe issue (uncontrolled nose dive into terrain). Which is why I and many in aerospace engineer...
Jump to postPW100 wrote:So until that test flight, there is no evidence of your claim (bolded by me) either . . . .
Slide deck from a Boeing presentation to the FAA back in December 2018: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6544179/Boeing-Presentation-to-FAA-Dec-17-2018-MCAS.pdf Interesting that the dev and cert timeline slide is completely redacted From this presentation and the Lion Air final report, it...
Jump to postSo 12 months after the Max accidents, with all the hindsight and analysis, the experts and analysts here are still unable to concur on - 1. The correct actions to be taken incase of a similar MCAS caused emergency. I'm not sure that matters, since there will never be another MCAS 1.0 commercial fli...
Jump to post[*]3 - return to neutral stab trim with ANU electric trim inputs - those inputs need to last longer than MCAS's AND inputs, because MCAS has greater trim authority than manual electric trim inputs; e.g. it would have taken close to 4 seconds of continuous ANU manual electric trim input to neutraliz...
Jump to postIn regards to Flight deck warning systems creating a startle effect - please remember that the NTSB says this is not specific to the MAX - other designs such as the A330 are susceptible to the same issues(AF447). Assuming most Airbuses are designed around the same common cockpit this could be an is...
Jump to postIn regards to Flight deck warning systems creating a startle effect - please remember that the NTSB says this is not specific to the MAX - other designs such as the A330 are susceptible to the same issues(AF447). Assuming most Airbuses are designed around the same common cockpit this could be an is...
Jump to postIn regards to Flight deck warning systems creating a startle effect - please remember that the NTSB says this is not specific to the MAX - other designs such as the A330 are susceptible to the same issues(AF447). Assuming most Airbuses are designed around the same common cockpit this could be an is...
Jump to postIt probably would be a lot safer that if anything goes wrong - just push a big red button to turn off all the automatic systems and fly manually and focus training on manual flying skills - although make sure Electric Trim is available with a wire directly to a motor that can't be acted on by any c...
Jump to postIt probably would be a lot safer that if anything goes wrong - just push a big red button to turn off all the automatic systems and fly manually and focus training on manual flying skills - although make sure Electric Trim is available with a wire directly to a motor that can't be acted on by any c...
Jump to postI think the only potential "MAX 2.0" modifications that you will see (which would then be retrofitted to existing examples) would be maybe adding a 3rd AoA vane I bet the MAX will end its service life without a 3rd AoA sensor, but I also bet it will prove safe enough with a sane control l...
Jump to postDon't all of the other failures due to a single failed AoA sensor exist on every other 737 starting with the -100? Since, based on the MAX, the failure rate of an AoA sensor is relatively high, it seems that pilots must be able to deal with all the associated failures easily. Yes, but all the “othe...
Jump to postI don't agree with that. Two redundant sensors is a vast improvement. When one fails, the system will know that there is a failure and automatically deactivate MCAS. Instead of a string of confusing failure messages plus conversion into kamikaze mode, the crew will be told that there is an AoA sens...
Jump to postIf people would stop shouting that there was nothing that pilot's could have done to save the flights Really, I’ve been reading these threads for a while and I can’t remember anyone claiming that the accidents could not be avoided. On the other hand, I remember you repeating over and over that any ...
Jump to postThus you show the fallacy of your 260x statistic: it compares the unfixed MAX to planes that had problems that got fixed and flew for decades. In statistics you can compare things like they are. This confirms you do not understand how statistics work. You can compare statistics from dissimilar popu...
Jump to postLets start my comment by stating that I believe Boeing messed up the original MCAS version on the 737Max. For that they are responsible. [...] Thus the pilots were overloaded beyond the test conditions used. Boeing is in my opinion responsible for that error. Thanks for the interesting post, and ap...
Jump to postI'm curious, for everyone calling for MAX specific training. Have you ever attended a formal simulator type rating course? What exactly do you think should be trained, and how much training time should be spent on it? Off the top of my mind: 1) revised check-lists (including NNCs) 2) new memory ite...
Jump to postespecially if you hide the manual from him, because he has to believe it is not different from your pickup and especially if the driver's responsibilities include switching off power steering within a few seconds of a single sensor failure, because otherwise the car will steer autonomously onto the...
Jump to postI think it's very telling that the FAA wants the new system to be trained on by 'Average pilots" meaning to me that the lack of understanding and awareness in the cockpit was a very large contributing factors in the 2 MAX 8 crashes. I see this as similar to letting your 14 year old child drive...
Jump to postIMO there's still something fundamentally wrong with the prevailing "Boeing over-estimated the capability of pilots to neutralize MCAS in their FMEAs" narrative. Boeing is trying to legitimize the concept that, in a single sensor failure scenario, everything is going to be ok IF the averag...
Jump to postI find the periodic recurrence of blame-the-pilots orchestrated campaigns, both on the press and here on a.net, both disturbing and disrespectful. If, as some posters suggested up-thread, it's a paid operation to raise sympathy for Boeing, it's not working: wasted money. However, another round of bl...
Jump to postIf I was coming up with a design to add a 3rd sensor, what I would do is add a separate AoA processing module that contains its own redundant processors. The input to the module would be the 3 AoA vanes. It would process the data with an algorithm to mitigate a single failed sensor. The output woul...
Jump to postWould you prefer your bureaucrats be less qualified, or take a less direct interest in important issues? Perhaps it’s just envy that your résumés don’t look like his. I'd rather they stick to the facts. No need for all the extra expressions. To say that the Max would have to be the safest plane in ...
Jump to postAs far as I know, the kind of failure that occurred with the 737max MCAS system has never occurred before. Thus, questions related to it was not on the FMEA Forms for that kind of system (I'm sure they will be in the future). [...] As it applies to a FMEA: If the error is at the open block question...
Jump to postThe screw up was many poor decisions by engineers with regard to MCAS. We read that these happened largely because of management pressure, but when push comes to shove it is a part of an engineer's job to resist management pressure and produce safe designs and implementations to the best of one's a...
Jump to postYou need to be more precise - in your original post you were implying that there was nothing the crews could do to counteract MCAS. In your own words "Let's not forget that MCAS 1.0 is (or was) an automation system with unlimited authority, vulnerable to single sensor failure, with no input sa...
Jump to postAF447 was an A330. You need to be more precise Yes, well: when I am not precise, I thank for the correction and move on. Of course, AF447 was an A330, thanks for the correction. Not that it makes one bit of difference for the argument. In your original post you were implying that there was nothing ...
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