|Quoting checksixx (Reply 1):|
The Air Force "said it convened its own special task force to review its investigation, and the task force found the original conclusions were adequately supported."
Of course the Air Force would say this. It is a meaningless phrase intended to mitigate their poor performance by the AIB. This is also essentially what the Air Force said after a court found that it was not pilot error (as the AF
claimed) that killed an F-16 pilot but a known wire chafing design flaw by GD
From the original AFAIB report
"During the [mishap sortie], the [mishap pilot] most likely experienced a sense similar to suffocation when airflow to the oxygen mask stopped," the report says. "This was likely the [pilot's] first experience under such physiological duress. The unique and added stress of the breathing restriction contributed to the [pilot's] channelized attention."
1. "when airflow to the oxygen mask stopped." Gang banging the emergency oxygen may not have alleviated the absence of oxygen.
2. "pilot's first experience"... "unique and added stress of breathing restriction"..."suffocation." AF
training for hypoxia is based on insidious onset---time to recognize the symptoms and act accordingly. This was not hypoxia (the shortage of oxygen) this was apoxia (the absence of oxygen). I am sure you remember from your AF
flight physiological training that you are not taught what to do if the oxygen flow stops abruptly. The pilot, for all we know, may have thought there was a kink in his oxygen hose and was trying to determine, under atypical conditions, how to correct this problem."
It was, therefore, unreasonable for the AIB to conclude
"By clear and convincing evidence, I find the cause of the mishap was the [pilot's] failure to recognize and initiate a timely dive recovery due to channelized attention, breakdown of visual scan and unrecognized spatial disorientation," the president of the investigation board, Brig. Gen. James Browne, said in conclusion.
These issue alone cast doubt on the "clear and convincing evidence" argument. What BG
Browne describes as causative are in fact consequences of another event clearly determined to be a critical, life-threatening problem with the F-22's oxygen system.
Blame Jeff Haney, who is not here to defend himself, and the AIB can feel as if it has done something meaningful and can move on with the problem uncorrected, rather than blame the design and operation of the equipment which may not be easily fixed without spending a lot of money and creates a litigation environment with the manufacturer with whom the AF
has a fiduciary relationship.
Nope, nothing new here.
KC-135A, A(RT), D, E, E(RT), Q, R, EC-135A, C, G, L, RC-135S, U, V, W, X, TC-135S, W