I'm sure many people have opinions on this, because the facts of the case seem somewhat guarded by the French ministry. The plane was to perform a low pass in landing configuration at 100ft and then continue around for another pass in the "clean" configuration.
The aircraft was being piloted by two of Air France's most experienced pilots, although we must remember this was a very new aircraft with a relatively untried type of human-interface.
According to the final report, the French ministry would like us to believe it is entirely the crew's fault. The government's story claims that they let the aircraft decend to 30-35ft. before application of go-around power. I find it incomprehensible that any highly experienced pilot would not realize he needs to add more power until that late. What is more likely to have happened, in my opinion, is that the pilot applied go-around power, but the engines did not begin to spool up until they fell well below their 100-ft. mark. Their is evidence that the early CFM engines had a problem with responiding to application of full power in this situation. This was not the spool-up time issue, instead the engines would remain at idle when the throttles were put full-forward. This problem has since been corrected, but it seems to have been avoided by the French ministry. Since the government of France had billions at stake with the success of this aircraft, it seems to be a conflict of interest for them to be investigating A320 accidents. Having been televised around the world, this did not bode well for the A320, so it seemed convenient to blame it on the pilots.
In my opinion, if the systems had been working properly, there would have been no accident. I think the technology of the A320 is largely misunderstood by the public. It's not like this aircraft (F-GFKC), had perfectly-functioning systems that created a deadly situation that would make any A320 in the same situation crash--there was a design flaw. This was a very different airplane and, since its introduction, some things have been refined in the cockpit design and the software which have made it safer.
I think Airbus is on the right track with the envelope-protection, but they should have more physical-feedback in the cockpit like traditional yokes and auto-throttles that actually move the throttles. The real danger is with the human interface; with the A320-type of design, the crew must be completely vigilant and CRM is of utmost importance. Pilots become systems managers. The key is to not have a flaw in the aircraft as in Mulhouse. Any airplane could have a fatal flaw, FBW or not.