I have appreciated the great, in-depth debate here on the systems. I'm not a pilot - instead an aviation enthusiast and auto mechanic. But I do like to sometimes try to contribute an outside-the--box, layman's-type view.
One issue that I don't see being discussed much at all on this thread, and which, to me, seems to make the situation more dangerous, is the fact that the problem happened to Lion Air not long after takeoff, with not a lot of altitude to play with for diagnosis and recovery.
Taking off out of LAX my whole life, I have always had in the back of my mind that the time of maximum hazard is when you're clearing the coastline and climbing out over Santa Monica Bay .... that if something happens to the engines/electrical system right then, there's not a lot of momentum or altitude to use to save the aircraft.
So what makes me concerned about this 737MAX issue is that - until the pilots fully identify and contain the problem, should it occur - the penalty could be a repeated (every 10 seconds?) loss of attitude and altitude through runaway trim. Upon takeoff, this can be the difference between recovery and tragedy.
When Pan Am 759 went down on takeoff due to a microburst in New Orleans in 1982,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_759the final report found that the reaction time of the PF copilot, was almost enough to save the aircraft, but instead the 727 clipped the trees on the east side of Williams Ave. The report found that microburst training was not thorough enough at the time, and that the copilot did react reasonably quickly, but not quite quickly enough.
What makes me uncomfortable, as a passenger, is that the recognition time is one factor - but then if the aircraft repeats the bad maneuver every 10 seconds (trim down), then the loss of altitude on takeoff (or landing) could be insurmountable. Sure, the pilots are supposed to turn off the system after the first time, but then that places the burden on them to get it diagnosed quickly and correctly the first time. I don't like it.
I'm going to stand on the side of those saying they won't fly the plane until this thing is fixed - and by fixed, I don't mean by pilot awareness. I think an immediate and effective software/hardware fix is necessary, or I would reluctantly say to ground the MAX. Let's hope Boeing can get it done quickly, and well.