I think another point that hurt PA, and to a lesser extent TW
was the creation of the various hubs.
Every time a route came up from a new U.S. gateway, PA and/or TW
would apply. But it usually went to the airline who operated a hub there.
I know that Pan Am applied to fly DFW
, but AA
, repectively, were awarded those routes into LGW
One wonders if PA and/or TW
would be flying today if they had European and Asian service from the likes of MSP
, and IAH
Pan Am should have tried to merge with either UA
, thus giving it a full-scale domestic system. National's system was still too regional to feed PA's European hub at JFK
and Latin American hub at MIA
As for TW
, Carl Icahn may have been a financial wizard, but he had no clue how to operate a business. I read that no one could convince him that spending millions to buy new planes was cost efficient, i.e. saving money on fuel, maintenance, and reduced crew size. Meanwhile, the fleet got older and more expensive to fly.
The other thing that hurt TW
was getting squeezed out of ORD
had been, prior to deregulation, the #3 carrier at ORD
, but had almost the same number of flight operations as AA
. Because Icahn didn't understand the concept of O&D traffic, he got squeezed out of ORD
and forced to set up shop at STL
. A good airline manager would have tried to beat AA
at getting slots at ORD
and keep up with UA
in terms of daily service.