Bravo45: I said that TCAS is a very intelligent device but whats the use of it when the users(pilots) don't know how to make the best of it. And thats is basically a problem related to the equipment and thats what I said.
No. Of course TCAS should be continually improved like any other system (including its "user interface"). But what´s happened was a problem of training
those devices properly
Bravo45: If the Russian pilot was trained to prefer ATC, then he shouldn't be blamed (that individual). he balme goes to all those who led him to this point and thinking. And all those who were supposed to correct him and didn't.
"Blame" is a pretty useless concept here. The decision about how to prioritize TCAS and ATC commands in pilot training was probably (my guess) made with the view of not wanting to overthrow "time-tested" standing procedures and just adding TCAS for compliance with european regulations.
Things like that can
go well. Or they can
lead to spectacular failure. But it´s not a clear-cut case of assigning "blame" to anyone. Even though it will probably be a good idea to modify bashkirian/russian pilot training in the future. But it still means juggling probabilities
of failure on different levels.
Bravo45: I too am not qualified but assuming that you are correct, I don; think that it was a very professional way to keep all the emphasis on only one of the two.
Yeah, probably. But that´s exactly the problem with people under too much pressure: If you want everybody to act professionally all the time you need to give them enough space and time to work with.
Bravo45: Night skies are always relatively emptu and the shift is easy neglecting the fact that night is supposesd to be for rest. But these ppl have moulded themselves to feel it as day. So whether 2 or five, he was certainly not under a very consumed situation. As you said "acceptable", and he did accepted it.
I think the ongoing investigation will get a clearer picture of what kind of work environment Skyguide had. And yes, the controllers should not have accepted an understaffed shift with critical equipment out of order. It´s quite possible, though, that there was significant commercial pressure in play. We just can´t know yet. But it´s very clear that the whole planning of that shift was screwed up, badly. The chain of events apparently started right there.
Bravo45: I am not blaming the controller entirely or jumping on to any conclusions. What I am saying is that the controller did play a crictical role here. Where as you as far as I have had the impression, blame only the russian pilot and that "shock" and "push though" that sounds like panic when I read your remark, is considered by by you as natural.
No. I said the pilot probably acted according to his training
, but with what we know from the analysis, objectively wrong
. No space for assigning blame to him. But yet another indication of where to look for improvement.
Bravo45: Whereas for such people like these, there training teaches them to anticipate.
Of course the controller screwed up. And recognizing the nightmare of every controller materializing before his very eyes, he made yet another mistake. Training or no training; A state of shock can do the strangest things to you. The human brain seems to be bent on concentrating on a single way out
in such a situation. But tunnel vision
is the worst possible thing when you´re trying to get out of a complex problem
So extra care should be taken not to let such situations arise in the first place. And apparently, they just took the risk...