High ACN has long been flagged as a potential limiting factor for truly long-range aircraft. The reality is that the frequency of operations at the highest MTOWs is usually a very small fraction of the operations from potentially limited runways, sufficiently infrequent to not significantly impact r...
Jump to postAeroflot, or maybe a financier/lessor will have made substantial progress payments on these aircraft. Sanctions prevent Airbus from doing business with AFL. Goodness knows what the contract says about force majeure such as is the situation today. Perhaps AFL will accept to release the aircraft from ...
Jump to postThe regulatory concern re the A340-500 and its integral/non-removable RCT centred on the possibility that in the case of a crash landing the centre landing gear might detach in such a way as to damage/rupture the RCT even if Airbus modelling suggested this was an extremely unlikely scenario. The Inn...
Jump to postUnless I am mistaken the KU "top up" as reported looks more like a re-mix with 6 A320neo becoming 6 A321neo, 3 A320neoLR added, with 8 A330-800 (2 delivered, third built) and 5 A350-900 becoming 4 and 2, with 7 A330-900s replacing them. A mix that seems to make more sense. The net increase...
Jump to postI imagine that Airbus management cares a lot about losing business but has concluded that the current QR management will not only decline to accept further aircraft as per the original contractual terms and will continue to withhold all due progress payments until the present legal dispute is resolv...
Jump to postCould it be that Airbus have put these two aircraft through what they believe to be a full legally binding acceptance process (customer absent by choice) and now consider the customer to be in default with no prospect of resolution, hence the cancellations. If so, will Airbus seek financial redress,...
Jump to postLogic suggests the ALAFCO planes will be some of the ex Hainan/HKAL airframes that they own but have sat idle for a long time.
Jump to postProbably a "marriage of convenience" in that Kuwait likely have no pressing need to take delivery and Airbus does not want to expend resources on reactivating MSN1888 for what may be a limited series of additional test flights. I don't recall if MSN2005 has been through cabin outfitting bu...
Jump to postA321 progress payments witheld beyond contractually binding dates as a by-product of the A350 dispute??? What next? Refusal to accept/Cancellation (by QTR) of all undelivered A350-1000s, including those already built????
Jump to postOnly a guess, but figure who amongst the other A350 customers has a large shareholding in IAG? Pure coincidence that the IBE aircraft are also going nowhere fast. EC-NLP was registered and seemingly ready to go in Dec 2020.
Jump to postExtra check flights more likely to be because frames are first flown in anticipation of delivery dates that are( progressively?) pushed back by the customer. Aircraft kept "warm" with regular check flights rather than being placed in longer-term storage. Look for the flight lengths - short...
Jump to postLL has been hangared since Jan 8th 2021 AFAIK
Jump to postAirbus continues to deliver new-build airframes to other customers who, if they subscribe to the worst-case speculation, would surely have demanded contractual guarantees that Airbus pick up the tab should they suffer the same issue. If so, Airbus is commited to spending whatever this entails. What ...
Jump to postHighly unlikely that AIB have not made (repeated?) attempts to placate QR. Presumably these have been deemed insufficient. Perhaps QR are asking AIB to write a blank cheque covering much more than paint? No manufacturer aggrevates a high profile, high volume customer and in doing so throws away the ...
Jump to postSurely the slippage or slow down in preparation for delivery of these (and the IBE A350-900s) is related to the falloff of demand due to COVID... unless you choose to speculate on the possible influence of the boss of a certain large minority shareholder in IAG.
Jump to postIf for 777W operators it is simpler/more economic to operate the 777F then a 777X/777XF mix logically has the inside track for replacements when needed. But what if the lack of an A350F has been one (admittedly amongst many other more important) reason(s) for not selecting the A350? As pax configure...
Jump to postThe origianl Airbus announcement was, if not publically named as such, an ATO - Authority to Offer, implying that the project had passed various critical internal review steps and been deemed worthy of presentation to potential customers. The LOI and MOU deals imply that commercial terms and conditi...
Jump to postNo real surprise that the A350F has taken so long to get to ATO/Launch. The - lets be polite - lacklustre A332F sales record must have made it much harder to persuade finance that freighters are good business. A couple of years A350-1000 experience and continued development surely must have helped r...
Jump to postPragmatic decision, if confirmed. Balancing the cost of removing FTE (wiring etc) and bringing the plane up to saleable standard at a time when new sales are few and far between and doubtless at or close to fire sale prices with the value of what can be recovered for spares. Airbus would, I suspect,...
Jump to postHighly doubtful that the EK announcement has any impact on A350F prospects. Lessors/Financiers must be falling over each other offering sweet deals on the 300ERs coming off lease in the coming years. Long before the A350F becomes available. No contest.
Jump to postThe principle reason Airbus chose to pass on dimmable windows until now was that the technology did not fully obscure daylight (or moonlight). 3rd gen presumably manages to do so. Always been a tough call as to freedom to look out, especially when almost everyone else wants to sleep or watch a movie...
Jump to postUltra-aggressive pricing, be it from A or B, has potential consequences on existing MFN deals with other customers that call for repricing adjustments if a better deal is later offered to potential competotors elsewhere. I doubt if A has slammed the door and thrown away the key. They simply recognis...
Jump to postA bit more insight into the TLS-UK ops. G-ASYD operated (at least) 12/89 to 7/93 probably to end 93, BAC 1-11-500s G-AVMH/I/N/T/W at various times 1994-98, BAe146 G-JEAO/R/V/W 1998-2002. Probably a few more one-off substitutions during these years, such as BAe146-300 G-BTTP in 1993.
Jump to postThe TLS-Filton-Hawarden ("Chester") flights were operated by BAC 1-11 for many years, notably the prototype G-ASYD until it was retired to Weybridge/Brooklands, then a variety of Air Bristol BAC 1-11 500s, including for a while one that had four-abreast seating. SN601 Corvettes were amongs...
Jump to postAirbus, having determined internally that a reasonable technical, industrial and business case may exist for an A350F, is now sounding out potential launch customers. Nothing less, nothing more. As already noted in this thread, an A350F was always seen as a possibility, one day. Its not about going ...
Jump to postUnlikely that Airbus Execs are losing sleep over A319neo sales losses or that the 737-7 will command that market sector (certain US majors apart). The A320 is not a direct competitor in capacity/range. The Airbus focus is doubtless on driving down supplier costs (a repeatedly stated objective) while...
Jump to postPoints to consider when judging lease rates. The net price of the aircraft, probably somewhere around 50% of the "sticker price", the low cost of capital, and the possibility that the rate steps up after a certain time. I suggest these kinds of deals are short term opportunism rather than ...
Jump to postRe possible "commercial penalties" I was looking at the bigger picture in terms of guaranteed asset values, buyback support, financing, etc. Plus the residual value hit to the worldwide fleet once a type goes out of production. All of which may, as suggested, add up to a small sum. There m...
Jump to postRe production cost, assuming Airbus has amortised or written down the R&D of the NEO, then they are down to the cost of production alone, also assuming they can twist supply chain arms to prevent costs from rising despite the mow rate. The choice then becomes one between the marginal cost of bui...
Jump to postAn overly harsh judgement to suggest that Airbus were not pro-freighter post A310F/A300F. There was an enthusiastic team out promoting the A330F. A failure to convince potential operators that one-stop EU-Asia was more advantageous that running a 747F nonstop and, as mentioned in previous posts, an ...
Jump to postOn the few A330-200s and the DLH A340-600s with lower deck toilets the floor structure was modified to create the necessary standing height. One reason why this feature was not popular was that although there were design schemes (on the A330 at least) to insert a structural plug to bring the floor l...
Jump to postIIRC the door 3 deactivation authorisation ended (or was reversed) because of the "60 foot" rule, requiring no two exit pairs to be more than 60 apart. Some if not all aircraft had the doors 3 reactivated. Airbus attempted to challenge this with the A340-600 (something like 72 feet if no o...
Jump to postI don't want to deviate too far from the core A330 thread subject, but the A300F shutdown arguably handed Boeing monopoly 767F pricing and ultimately helped to keep the line alive while the KC- contest was lost/won. Equally, if I recall correctly, the freight market dynamics evolved and UPS were bac...
Jump to postLogically low(er) rates should hike costs. Much will depend on supplier contracts, the ability to redeploy labour and to repurpose facilities. Rolls might be expected to be content to stay onboard rather than forego PBTH income downstream and see its global market share further eroded. Airbus ended ...
Jump to postInsomuch as Airbus found willing buyers for the A330s it "churned out to take advantage of 787 delays" they could hardly be blamed for doing so. If anything it was the subsequent (presumed) 787 commercial aggression applied to raise production rates to 14 pm in an attempt to see off the A3...
Jump to postI would be happy to be proven wrong, but the A332F was a lesson learned the hard way and an A338F would not offer enough more/better to warrant the investment. The 767F, supported by the KC-46 long-term, will always beat it on price, there are oodles of A330s sitting around as A330P2F feedstock and ...
Jump to postTypically, Airbus widebody production works on an 11 month year, so 44 in 2 years, from which there are still A330-200s to build for MRTT completion and & or 2 Beluga XL airframes to come, so NEO output should be somewhere in the mid-30s which is probably just about do-able unless air travel rem...
Jump to postI believe that most of the A380 customers would have bought some/more 747s - maybe not in big numbers but enough to sew up the top end of the market and align better with the Boieng VLA market forecasts. No two ways about it, the 773ER excelled way beyond what the AIrbus crystal ball gazers foresaw....
Jump to postA variety of circumstances behind these Airbus models. The A318 (a double shrink) was a low development cost attempt to persuade airlines that it was better to complement existing A320 Family fleets than buy a different aircraft type. The A318 probably sold at decent prices to VIP customers and cert...
Jump to postGeneral conclusion summing the opinions in all the many previous posts; that Airbus read the tealeaves wrong, were intent on capturing the high (capacity) ground and oversized the A380 as a result. And clung to unrealistic sales projections. But what if Boeing had executed to plan? Or exceeded targe...
Jump to postMy point on "undersizing" being (historically) costly in terms of commercial success is based on the notion of it being potentially much more expensive to resize a design later rather than stretch/extrapolate from the base model. I submit that a smaller A380 would simply have bolstered 777...
Jump to postFair comment re VC-10 runway performance, but it was undersized as well. Substitute the underpowered BAC 1-11 instead if you wish. Headline ranges are often deceptive, especially with LR widebody craft. Pile in all the amenities tucked into the non-seating areas, allow for the -800 carrying 600+ pax...
Jump to postHistory will record that the A380 was too much 'plane, probably launched at the wrong time, with too much emphasis on "bling" interiors (that Airbus promoted and the airlines welcomed), but for those who adhere to the view that it should have been smaller, lighter and less performant (an A...
Jump to postAs previously mentioned, Airbus saw the A380 as the next 747, a product (family) with a 50 year production life. Recall that the original 747 had WAY more capacity than the 707/DC-8 types it sat above. It was range deficient and (relatively) quickly evolved into higher weiight/higher thrust -200B mo...
Jump to postStaying with the engine "blame game" theme, who knows how much better the A380 might have turned out with a single source supplier. Count GE out (too much riding on Boeing models, with/without exclusivity clauses), PW losing momentum fast and no wilingness to invest what was needed to reco...
Jump to postThe A380-800 ended up being the base model. The A380F was intended as a stepping stone/catalyst for the A380-900 in terms of higher design weights and associated structural reinforcements. The -900 would have taken the length overall to the limit of the 80m box. A double stretch would have required ...
Jump to postThe A380 came about because Airbus believed (or convinced itself) that growth rates were such that another 747-like leap in aircraft seating capacity was going to needed. Anticipating (hoping) for a production life (with incremental imrovements) similar to that of the 747 (think 747-100 to -400 to -...
Jump to postIIRC this deal came about at a time when IAG fleet planners had alrteady identified the need for extra/replacement single-aisle aircraft, IAG Management had had its fill of delivery delays and/or quality issues with Airbus and was sharp enough to figure that the MAX difficulties meant that Boeing wa...
Jump to postEngine development and performance vs promises played its part in the relative successes of the MD-11, A340 and the 777 models. The MD-11, notably the PW4000 powered models required a whole orange full of PIPs and MTOW increases to get close to expectations. Who knows the SuperFan would have worked ...
Jump to postThe A380 like the A300 and other "foundation" AIrbus models was a strategic choice, based on the premise that air travel would continue to grow strongly (which it did) but not fragment to the extent it did (the fate that befell the A300 in Europe). The size/layout was a commercial/technica...
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