Search found 2 matches: Keesje 1951

Searched query: Keesje 1951

by keesje
Mon Nov 04, 2019 5:57 pm
Forum: Civil Aviation
Topic: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019, Production suspended
Replies: 5670
Views: 756167

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

AABusDrvr wrote:
keesje wrote:
asdf wrote:

there have been a few 737NG disasters with a trim context
but as far as there are no more of them coming up, it would probably be unreasonable to take any action on the NGs

the 737MAX ... other story ... it think it is unsafe because of its aerodynamic attidudes
it should not fly


Read through e.g. Turkish 1951, what happened, lack of redundancy, confusing emergency systems and how it was handeld. (Wait/hide behind not yet available official investigation reports as long as possible, indirectly question pilots/ training, play the media, give discounts, make changes silently).

Or how Boeing was able to keep NG crahes involving redundancy and human interfaces out of statistic to enable grandfathering of requirements and design for the 737MAX. With a (now) unsurprizing cooperative FAA.

Instead of taking the claimed excellent 737NG safety record as starting point, reason to by-pass, experts look at those NG records again, including incidents, accidents, re-tagging them for relation with insights they got more recently. That's what we pay them for.

Independent reviews of previous projects are logical here, for independent authorities taking themselves seriously.

Why is nobody asking for a formal Boeing responds to the JATR recommendations? The Senate could have asked.



Turkish 1951 didn't have anything to do with human interface or confusing emergency systems. Systems redundancy possibly, in a single radar altimeter feeding data to the auto throttles. But an automation dependent crew sat there for over a minute and a half, with the throttles at idle, while the airplane slowed down, and didn't do anything, until the stick shaker went off. Thats a pretty hard sell to blame Boeing, or the 737 for that one. Those guys were way behind the airplane, I don't care how automated it is, someone still has to be paying attention to what's going on.


I think it had to do with redundancy, allerting systems, human interfaces. A decade ago Boeing got away with it. Different times.The Turkish aircraft had to decent/ slow to reach the flight path. The crew saw not nothing strange in the throttles pulling back automatically, they were still doing the checklists.

They didn't see the aircraft was in landing mode, flaring because it was -8ft sea level. The alert system was telling the crew to lower the landing gear. A situation like this, stalling the aircaft, diving into ground could not happen on a 787 or 777, because they are designed top down and meet the latest standards.

The 737 NG does not, using grandfathered requirements from the sixties and fragmented system qualification, missing out on (human) interfaces. At least that is what JATR thinks.

JATR Recommendations 1-4, 7 that go far further than the 737MCAS system.

https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/The_Joint_Authorities_Technical_Review_(JATR)_-_Boeing_737_MAX_Flight_Control_System#Recommendations

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by AABusDrvr
Mon Nov 04, 2019 5:14 pm
Forum: Civil Aviation
Topic: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019, Production suspended
Replies: 5670
Views: 756167

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

keesje wrote:
asdf wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
The question is, is a look at the 737NG really needed. Sales of that frame have ended. It has a good safety record, though one could find quite a few things wrong with it.


there have been a few 737NG disasters with a trim context
but as far as there are no more of them coming up, it would probably be unreasonable to take any action on the NGs

the 737MAX ... other story ... it think it is unsafe because of its aerodynamic attidudes
it should not fly


Read through e.g. Turkish 1951, what happened, lack of redundancy, confusing emergency systems and how it was handeld. (Wait/hide behind not yet available official investigation reports as long as possible, indirectly question pilots/ training, play the media, give discounts, make changes silently).

Or how Boeing was able to keep NG crahes involving redundancy and human interfaces out of statistic to enable grandfathering of requirements and design for the 737MAX. With a (now) unsurprizing cooperative FAA.

Instead of taking the claimed excellent 737NG safety record as starting point, reason to by-pass, experts look at those NG records again, including incidents, accidents, re-tagging them for relation with insights they got more recently. That's what we pay them for.

Independent reviews of previous projects are logical here, for independent authorities taking themselves seriously.

Why is nobody asking for a formal Boeing responds to the JATR recommendations? The Senate could have asked.



Turkish 1951 didn't have anything to do with human interface or confusing emergency systems. Systems redundancy possibly, in a single radar altimeter feeding data to the auto throttles. But an automation dependent crew sat there for over a minute and a half, with the throttles at idle, while the airplane slowed down, and didn't do anything, until the stick shaker went off. Thats a pretty hard sell to blame Boeing, or the 737 for that one. Those guys were way behind the airplane, I don't care how automated it is, someone still has to be paying attention to what's going on.

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