Irt wrote:There wont be another Swedish specific aircraft. I think the lessons have been learned with the Gripen, what works for Sweden dont work for many other nations. There is no point in develop a Swedish radar or EW suite or better STOL performance for at most 50-60 planes. I think Saab and the other involved firms will delelop the avionics together, one baseline version for all involved nations to reduce cost.
Disregarding the development cost for the systems, a distinct Swedish variant would reduce maintenance and operations compatibility with other air forces. This would run counter to the Swedish emphasis on forward bases and dispersed operations. If STOL performance, for example, was bought by simply increasing engine thrust, this would create a different maintenance program with new schedules. If there are actually modified parts, Sweden must have larger numbers in stock since the UK (or Italy) could not provide compatible spares in times of need. In joint operations, mechanics would need training on both variants.
Ozair wrote:What do you expect could be transferred to Eurofighter/Rafale/Gripen that you would want in your 5.5th gen aircraft anyway…? What has transferred from US 5th gens back to 4th gen? What was tested on 4th gens that was moved to 5th gens?
What we will see is MADL gateways to allow MADL equipped aircraft share what they can with non MADL aircraft, clearly not the full picture but enough to improve the overall tactical picture for all assets.
Ozair wrote:Spear 3 will be a good weapon for the UK. I expect once integration is complete there will be other F-35 users who will be keen to acquire this capability.
The British pick MBDA’s Spear 3 cruise missile for their F-35sFor the moment, the weapon, which has a range in excess of 140 kilometers, is destined to be fitted solely to the F-35B models. But that could change, with Ministry of Defence officials admitting there is a possibility Spear 3 might also eventually be installed on the Royal Air Force’s fleet of Eurofighter Typhoon fighters.
...
https://www.defensenews.com/global/euro ... eir-f-35s/
There's one example of tech that was developed for a 5th Gen aircraft being (potentially) transferred to existing 4th Gen aircraft.
In general, though, I agree that major technology transfer requires upgrades to the avionics, which are costly and have a high risk of delays. Aircraft software is, sadly, not as easily transferrable between systems compared to regular PC software. Similarly, electronics are often heavily customized to the platform, even if individual components are shared with others.
The opposite process is more likely, i. e. that improvements of the Gripen / Eurofighter / Rafale are transferred to the new 5th/6th Gen programs. For example, the new Eurofighter AESA radar (or a variant of it) could easily be used for the early FCAS or Tempest with the option to upgrade later on. Likewise, the 4th Gen aircraft can serve as testbeds for UI/UX improvements that are transferrable.
It is also possible that the more complex processing & sensor fusion is done on the more powerful 5th Gen avionics, and the results are transferred to the 4th Gen aircraft (similar to a streaming service at low data rates). For the time being, that would be done through Link 16 as a common standard interface, not MADL which is only on the F-35 (and B-2). Note that MADL was not implemented for the F-22
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/f-3 ... er-is-yes/ .
I have not seen any indication whether FCAS & Tempest want to adopt MADL or if a new data link might be developed. A joint operator of Tempest + F-35, like the UK or Italy, would probably prefer to have compatible systems.
Ozair wrote:As the RAND study from a couple of months ago
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_repo ... 311-1.html made clear, NATO non 5th gen fighter assets likely contribute in different ways in future air conflicts and will still have a role into the 2030s, just not perhaps the role originally envisioned.
I have an issue with the premise of the study:
One common scenario considers a calculation by the Russian government that Russia could leverage a regional imbalance in ground forces to occupy some slice of NATO territory, employ air defenses to stave off allied air forces, present a fait accompli similar to that seen in Crimea, and politically divide NATO by calling for negotiations. The ability of European fifth-generation fighters to penetrate Russian air defenses and make significant combat contributions from the opening hours of a response—at the vanguard—would most likely challenge the logic behind this scenario, improving deterrence by increasing the Russian risks associated with this approach.
An open attack on NATO territory would be dissimilar to the situation in Crimea or Georgia; in both cases the attacked territory and state did not belong to NATO and therefore NATO was unable / unwilling to support, even if they had had the military power to do so. Crimea in particular was independent of fighter jets or major military actions at all. The study at no point justifies the stated premise.
However, other parts of the technical analysis are valid.
one Norwegian Air Commodore has highlighted the extent to which rapid post–Cold War technological developments made the offense superior to defense in air warfare
This is quite obvious given the lack of funding for SAM among NATO members. NATO could easily develop a competitor to the S-400. However, it does strike me as odd that NATO considers their own offense far superior to their defense, while at the same time the largest perceived threat is the enemy defense, not their offensive capability. There is at least one NATO member, Turkey, that considered a modern defensive capability important enough to sacrifice their F-35 for it.
Georgia, as mentioned above, is also an interesting case since Georgia had an effective ground-based air defence that shot down several aircraft. Yet, that did not deter the (non-stealth, non-SEAD) Russian air force from bombing targets at will, including military bases and the capital, Tbilisi. I would argue that the SAM threat is assessed differently due to the willingness to accept losses, even if the actual threat to the individual aircraft is the same.
The article also mentions:
A subsequent RAND study similarly noted the potential role of NATO combat aircraft in destroying Russian ground maneuver and artillery systems during a Baltic scenario, highlighting an imbalance in globally available combat aircraft: While NATO countries maintained 5,457 combat-capable aircraft worldwide in 2017 (of which 2,529 were non-U.S.), Russia maintained a total of 1,251.
but doesn't further comment on the effect of this imbalance. Although Russia is commonly said to prefer a "quantity over quality" approach, these numbers alone should indicate that Russia could not hope to win any conventional war against a united NATO by sheer size - with or without 5th Gen aircraft. Of course nobody wants a "fair fight", you should ensure that the fighting happens in the enemies' territory.
Quite interesting as well:
The resultant situational awareness and ability to defeat multiple threats at the same time makes an AESA capability essential for aspects of high-intensity operations—for example, to intercept cruise missiles. The French decision to procure AESA is informed by the opportunity to provide a 50 percent increase in detection range, including of low-observable targets, and maximize the value of new weapon systems such as the Meteor beyond visual range missile.
Whether on Tempest/FCAS or the 4th Gen platforms, all European nations will have to invest in good AESA systems and the associated HMI that makes use of the added capability.
The study concedes:
For defensive counter-air missions outside the threat range of Russian IADS, the F-35 offers few relative advantages to advanced fourth-generation fighters.
which should come as no surprise. The Eurofighter & Rafale were designed to counter older 4th Gen adversaries, while the US fighters have received continuous upgrades to keep up with them. The only thing that could change this balance is the introduction of enemy stealth aircraft, though the study makes no reference to the Su-57.
Relevant to the Swiss competition:
Ultimately, cutting costs [on the F-35] may require "less stressful missions such as flying straight and level in good weather conditions instead of high altitude missions in colder weather with lots of maneuvering” to decrease stress on an aircraft and maintain lifespan.
Okaaaay.