Planeflyer wrote:Ozair wrote:jupiter2 wrote:
Export customers should be paying more for these aircraft, not less, unless they are a risk sharing partner. They haven't gone through the burden of the delays, the short falls in performance and the price of developing the aircraft and engines in the first place. If the program had any chance to make money, then the aircraft should be priced accordingly and if the export customers want the extra performance, they should be paying top dollar, not bargain prices where the original buyers are just desperately trying to get back some of their investment in the project.
It really depends on the export sale. The US FMS program requires that nations pay towards the non-recurring costs, both for development and for production, but nations are able to obtain a waiver for these costs. The waivers can be granted to NATO partners, Australia, Japan etc in instances were the acquisition advances US interest in standardisation. I’d expect every F-35 acquirer will not pay NC costs given the standardisation argument.jupiter2 wrote:As for the F-35, haven't all the initial customers been risk sharing partners in the project ? Also, doesn't the U.S receive their later F-35's at a much lower cost than the early ones ?
Exactly. The argument was nonsensical and not only that but when FMS sales occur, which happened with Japan and South Korea, they pay the price the US pays for the aircraft in that year, plus admin fees above.ZaphodHarkonnen wrote:[Generally the risk sharing partners get a benefit from having a set percentage of construction contracts going to their countries. This is what's happening with the F-35 for example. So any sales on top of the base orders become profit for the countries that threw money into development. At the purchase end it's whatever a country can negotiate with the builder.
The A400M context is slightly different though. In 2011 the deal for bailout cash included each of the partners paying an “export levy facility” to EADS. The intent was that EADS would pay this money back out of future export sales. So far no export sale has occurred since that date…
Let’s be clear though, there is no way that any export success would allow the program to break even. Airbus has taken approximately nine billion Euro in write offs on this program, not including the additional funding sums that the partner governments have provided. The acquisition price of the aircraft, even counting for inflation, is about twice what it was advertised.
Another article on the potential for the Spanish to seel a portion of their aircraft to South Korea and even then they want to shed 13 aircraft but South Korea is only interested in four to six.
Korea enters transport planes talks with SpainSouth Korea has started talks with Spain about a potential sale of KT-1 and T-50 trainer jets in exchange for military transport aircraft Airbus A400M.
Korea’s officials said the Ministry of National Defense and Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) have been reviewing Spain’s proposal to trade some of its A-400M transport planes, made by Airbus, for KT-1 and T-50 trainer jets produced by KAI.
Spain made the offer “through an unofficial route” in July 2018 at the Farnborough International Airshow in the United Kingdom.
According to the Korea Times English-language newspapers, Spain has reportedly ordered 27 A-400Ms from Airbus. But has decided to sell 13 of them and received consent from Airbus.
It is reportedly hoping to deliver four to six A-400Ms to Korea in return for 30 KT-1s and 20 T-50s.
Also reported that if the deal is reached, Spain is willing to sell the A400M plane at 15 percent of the per-unit price of some $27 million, adding the total value of the swap deal could be approximately $890 million.
According to Airbus, the A400M is the most advanced, proven and certified airlifter available, combining 21st century state-of-the-art technologies to fulfill the current and upcoming Armed Forces’ needs. The A400M combines the capability to carry strategic loads with the ability to deliver even into tactical locations with small and unprepared airstrips. And in addition it acts as a frontline-tanker for other aircraft.
https://defence-blog.com/news/korea-ent ... spain.html
do you have details on the timing of the 9 billion Euro write off?
Sorry, over 8 billion Euro, not 9 billion, a few of the different websites I read listed US compared to euro figures.
Airbus Takes €436M Charge for A400M Program But Agrees New Contract
Airbus announced this morning that it had taken a new charge of €436 million for the A400M program in its 2018 accounts, bringing its total since the program began to over €8 billion.
This unexpected charge, added to the delays in ratifying a new contract amendment agreed a year ago, and continued program risks suggest that, almost halfway through its production run, the A400M is not out of the woods.
As part of today’s statement on Airbus’ 2018 financial results, CEO Tom Enders also revealed that Airbus had agreed a new re-baselining of the program with the partner nations, which is now going through national “approval processes [and] should conclude in the coming months.”
“The contract amendment is expected to be formalised during the first half of this year, upon conclusion of national approval processes,” a source said.
Airbus signed a Declaration of Intent (DoI) in February 2018 on the contract amendment with the customer Nations, “agreeing on a global re-baselining of the contract, including a revised aircraft delivery schedule, an updated technical capability roadmap and a revised retrofit schedule.”
The fact that it has still not been ratified 12 months later suggests that some nations disagree with the new contract terms. Germany is often pointed out as having consistently pushed for a hard line against Airbus.
Also in today’s statement, Airbus CEO Enders adds that “All in all, we have achieved significant de-risking of the A400M in 2018,” without detailing any de-risking measures.
However, the statement also states that “Risks remain on the development of technical capabilities and the associated costs, on securing sufficient export orders in time, on aircraft operational reliability in particular with regards to engines, and on cost reductions as per the revised baseline,” which appears to limit the scope of the “de-risking” mentioned by Enders.
As we announced on Jan. 28, Airbus said it delivered 17 A400M aircraft during the year, down from 19 in 2017.
It also “continued with development activities toward achieving the revised capability roadmap. Retrofit activities are progressing in line with the customer-agreed plan,” again without providing any other details. An Airbus spokesman declined to provide additional information.
The latest financial charge is explained as being due to “An update of the contract estimate at completion [which] triggered a net additional charge of € 436 million on the programme,” mainly reflecting “the outcome of the negotiations and updated estimates on the export scenario, escalation and some cost increases.”
A year ago, announcing its 2017 financial results on Feb. 15, Airbus said it had taken a €1.3-billion charge against the A400M, but “promised that the charge would draw a line under the contract after years of cost overruns and performance setbacks,” Reuters reported at the time.
“After agreeing a ‘new baseline’ for deliveries and capabilities with the program's seven government launch customers earlier this month, Airbus' remaining exposure going forward is expected to be more limited," the group said a year ago, a hope that has been dashed by the new €436 million charge announced today.
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... tract.html