The 16.5-foot-tall (5-meter) capsule propelled itself off its test stand at 7:15 a.m. MST (9:15 a.m. EST; 1415 GMT) Monday. The Starliner used the same launch pad originally built for a pad abort test of NASA’s Orion crew capsule in 2010.

Other than the parachute deployment failure, everything appeared to work as designed on Monday’s pad abort test.

“It’s designed to operate with two chutes, and operate well,” said Chris Ferguson, a Boeing test pilot and astronaut who will fly on the Starliner’s first crewed space mission next year. “Everything landed well, all the airbags functioned properly. I was just super-jazzed that we got to where we were.”

Tugger wrote:

The Boeing Starliner CST-100 had its launch pad abort test this weekend and I can't figure out if it was a success or a failure. The launch looked good but only two of three on the parachutes deployed. They say this is "acceptable" and the system is designed to succeed with just two deployed but I can't believe anyone is pleased really. What do you think?

You know we're sitting on four million pounds of fuel, one nuclear weapon and a thing that has 270,000 moving parts built by the lowest bidder. Makes you feel good, doesn't it?

Tugger wrote:

The Boeing Starliner CST-100 had its launch pad abort test this weekend and I can't figure out if it was a success or a failure. The launch looked good but only two of three on the parachutes deployed. They say this is "acceptable" and the system is designed to succeed with just two deployed but I can't believe anyone is pleased really. What do you think?

angad84 wrote:

Full text of the report — and really, this is required reading for anyone with even a cursory interest in aeronautics — can be found here: https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/mi ... ndix-F.txt

flyingturtle wrote:

angad84 wrote:

Full text of the report — and really, this is required reading for anyone with even a cursory interest in aeronautics — can be found here: https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/mi ... ndix-F.txt

"Why bother? Our astronauts survived every damn time..."

nycbjr wrote:

I'm in agreement here, however I'm sure they will investigate the failure and see if they can resolve, no?

aumaverick wrote:

Did anyone else catch the mention of the excessive smoke from the toxic propellant on landing?

https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/11/starliner-flies-for-the-first-time-but-one-of-its-parachutes-failed-to-deploy/

"One other notable event during Monday's test was the large amount of orange smoke from dinitrogen tetroxide propellant that emanated from Starliner's Service Module as it came down to the ground. Some of this drifted across the area where the capsule came to rest, potentially fouling the recovery site. It was not immediately clear whether this presented a real issue."

DarkKnight5 wrote:

aumaverick wrote:

Did anyone else catch the mention of the excessive smoke from the toxic propellant on landing?

https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/11/starliner-flies-for-the-first-time-but-one-of-its-parachutes-failed-to-deploy/

"One other notable event during Monday's test was the large amount of orange smoke from dinitrogen tetroxide propellant that emanated from Starliner's Service Module as it came down to the ground. Some of this drifted across the area where the capsule came to rest, potentially fouling the recovery site. It was not immediately clear whether this presented a real issue."

When I turned on the live stream late, the camera was focused on the plume of toxic smoke, and I was afraid they had suffered an explosive anomaly like spacex. I believe nasaspaceflight.com noted the fire was expected as the separated service module was going to impact the ground at high speed no matter what. Apparently when this happens in the ocean the fire may not be a problem, but I’m skeptical of that.

WKTaylor wrote:

My 2cents...

The long-duration dinitrogen tetroxide propellant 'plume' from the crashed service module was very unnerving. Assuming this was not a wholesale pad abort... and that booster failure occurred later-in-flight, at higher altitude over water, this should not be a problem/issue...

Oddly.. there was a significant delay between 'zero/launch' announcement and actual thrust build-up to launch. Is this delay a phenomena of the 'internal thrust-build-up' sequencing [including valves opening, etc]... or was this an unintended delay?

Also... the 3rd parachute did not even appear to deploy from, the spacecraft.. which likely means that the ballistic deployment 'shot' was to blame... which... to me... is a LOT scarier than an ejected chute that failed to open or 'didn't catch air' [due to aerodynamic blanking]... or otherwise collapsed or was even structurally failed...

aumaverick wrote:

flyingturtle wrote:

angad84 wrote:

Full text of the report — and really, this is required reading for anyone with even a cursory interest in aeronautics — can be found here: https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/mi ... ndix-F.txt

"Why bother? Our astronauts survived every damn time..."

Not sure if quote was sarcastic or if you forgot Apollo 1....

AWESOME PICTURE OF FRY HERE

DarkKnight5 wrote:

and as of today their ticker sits at zero.

iamlucky13 wrote:

DarkKnight5 wrote:

and as of today their ticker sits at zero.

They've done multiple tests of the parachutes. Here's a couple:

2012: https://www.nasa.gov/exploration/commer ... ptest.html
2017: https://www.boeing.com/features/2017/03 ... 03-17.page

The deployment failure will be investigated and addressed.

zanl188 wrote:

https://youtu.be/L9ifJzokFgA

New video from Boeing.

Speculation on my part: propellant smoke seen here is intentional jettisoning of propellant.

Francoflier wrote:

zanl188 wrote:

https://youtu.be/L9ifJzokFgA

New video from Boeing.

Speculation on my part: propellant smoke seen here is intentional jettisoning of propellant.

At around 00:29, we can clearly see one of the three drogue chute flying straight off pulling some sort of larger object which I assume was supposed to stay on the capsule... Is that the bag in which the main chute was stored?

Interesting.

Boeing, said an investigation after the Nov. 4 test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico led the company to conclude that a “lack of secure connection” between a pilot parachute and the main parachute prevented that main parachute, one of three, from deploying.

The pilot parachute is designed to deploy first, and pull out the main parachute. However, Mulholland said that hardware inspections and photographs taken during “closeout” of the vehicle prior to the test showed that a pin that links the pilot and main parachutes was not inserted properly.

“It’s very difficult, when you’re connecting that, to verify visually that it’s secured properly,” he said, in part because that portion of the parachute system is enclosed in a “protective sheath” intended to limit abrasion but which also makes it difficult to visually confirm the pin is in place. “In this particular case that pin wasn’t through the loop, but it wasn’t discovered in initial visual inspections because of that protective sheath.”

Mulholland said Boeing is modifying assembly procedures through what he called “fairly easy steps,” such as pull tests, to ensure those pins are properly installed.

Tugger wrote:

So apparently the parachute failure was caused by a pin that was not properly inserted/aligned and is not easily viewed on inspection.

Boeing, said an investigation after the Nov. 4 test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico led the company to conclude that a “lack of secure connection” between a pilot parachute and the main parachute prevented that main parachute, one of three, from deploying.

The pilot parachute is designed to deploy first, and pull out the main parachute. However, Mulholland said that hardware inspections and photographs taken during “closeout” of the vehicle prior to the test showed that a pin that links the pilot and main parachutes was not inserted properly.

“It’s very difficult, when you’re connecting that, to verify visually that it’s secured properly,” he said, in part because that portion of the parachute system is enclosed in a “protective sheath” intended to limit abrasion but which also makes it difficult to visually confirm the pin is in place. “In this particular case that pin wasn’t through the loop, but it wasn’t discovered in initial visual inspections because of that protective sheath.”

Mulholland said Boeing is modifying assembly procedures through what he called “fairly easy steps,” such as pull tests, to ensure those pins are properly installed.

https://spacenews.com/missing-pin-blame ... e-anomaly/

Great news for the program that it was so quickly found and is (apparently) easily addressed!

Tugg

Francoflier wrote:

At around 00:29, we can clearly see one of the three drogue chute flying straight off pulling some sort of larger object which I assume was supposed to stay on the capsule... Is that the bag in which the main chute was stored?

Interesting.

Aesma wrote:

As a skydiver I'm pretty familiar with parachutes, they're not rocket science (pun intended) but then again the ones I use do fail, and we carry a reserve one for that reason.

Keep in mind Soyuz 1 ended up in disaster with a dead Cosmonaut because of a parachute not deploying.

Maybe instead of 3 chutes with 2 being enough, they should go for 5 with 3 being enough ?

Nomadd wrote:

Would you really want 5 chutes trying to deploy at once?