So they're saying this is normal behaviour ?
From the description it looks like MCAS...
The way that's being described to me is that the modes in which control input biases are applied, particularly in complex manoeuvres, were not immediately apparent to the pilot in time for him to take alternative action in a manner that would compensate fully for the biases.
Definitely doesn't sound like a MCAS situation, just that the controls behaved in a way in which the pilot was not expecting, and did not notice until it was too late.
It very much sounds like a mismatch between what the pilot inputted as his controls and expected the helicopter to do, versus what the flight control laws in the helicopter were programmed to do. Listening to Col. John Alexander's presser, the accident occurred when the pilot made a pitch, yaw, and roll input as he was setting up for the final approach to HMCS Fredericton for landing. The helicopter was under automated flight director control (akin to a form of an autopilot) at the time.
Per what is being described, making adjustments to pitch, yaw, and roll while under flight director control was part of the certification process; however, there was a limit placed on how long inputs can be made by the pilot to overrule the flight director control before the flight director modes that coupled the the pitch and roll axis would determine that further automated adjustments was neither desired, or engaged.
In this instance, the flight director onboard Stalker-22 was set to hold a specific altitude and speed, there is a bias in the flight director in which the pitch and roll axis could offset the inputs of the pilot. The effects of the bias varies in magnitude based upon the amplitude and duration of the pilot's inputs applied while overriding the pitch and/or roll selection as set in the flight director. The amount of inputs made by the pilots was outside the aircraft's certification resulted in a pitch bias where the crew would be caught unaware as they would have never experienced it, nor exposure prior to this accident, and with no knowledge on how to handle the situation. Thus, the accident was unavoidable based upon their low altitude because they lacked the time to realize that the aircraft was not responding to their inputs, and manually correct for the issue.