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UA857
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Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Thu Jul 16, 2020 12:06 am

In the 1970s the USAF started a program called Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft (ATCA) during the program the C-5, 747, DC-10, L-1011 were studied while the DC-10 was chosen as the primary widebody tanker could the USAF have augmented the KC-10 with the KC-25 (747-200F) and later the KC-33 (747-400F) since the KC-25/33 had a greater range and cargo capacity?
 
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FLALEFTY
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Thu Jul 16, 2020 1:01 am

UA857 wrote:
In the 1970s the USAF started a program called Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft (ATCA) during the program the C-5, 747, DC-10, L-1011 were studied while the DC-10 was chosen as the primary widebody tanker could the USAF have augmented the KC-10 with the KC-25 (747-200F) and later the KC-33 (747-400F) since the KC-25/33 had a greater range and cargo capacity?


The Civil Air Reserve Fleet can utilize over 500 aircraft (mostly long-range heavies, including B744's) from nearly every US-flaggged airline, including all of the majors. It is more economical for the USAF to wet lease (for example) a B744F from Atlas, than to buy, crew, train and maintain a USAF-owned dedicated fleet of the same aircraft.

The KC-10 was meant to fill a specific need for a strategic, long-range tanker, based on lessons learned during the Viet Nam War.
 
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LyleLanley
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Thu Jul 16, 2020 2:08 am

Short answer: nope.

Longer answer: nope. If you needed more range/cargo capacity you'd buy more 10s or other airlifters rather than introduce a completely new fleet type to "augment" an already in-service type. In the end, the USAF got ~100 more C-17s than they asked for, which completely negated any imagined need for a 747 tanker/airlifter.

The KC-25/33 you're referencing was basically vaporware for the RAAF in the late 90s/early 00's. It never had a serious shot in this hemisphere, nor in that one.
"I've sold monorails to Brockway, Ogdenville, and North Haverbrook, and, by gum, it put them on the map!"
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Thu Jul 16, 2020 5:17 am

Why did the KC-25/33 fail?
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Thu Jul 16, 2020 1:54 pm

Sen, Scoop Jackson (D-Boeing and WA) died, any further interest died with him. The USAF didn’t want them and planned assigning them to the N.Y. ANG at Stewart.
 
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flyingturtle
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Thu Jul 16, 2020 5:39 pm

https://www.avgeekery.com/kc-747-the-too-big-tanker/ has a picture of an U.S. 747 refuelling an Iran Air Force 747. And a video of a 747 refuelling F-111, B-52 and F-4, among others.

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-w ... 1581314071 is another page with info.
Reading accident reports is what calms me down
 
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LyleLanley
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Fri Jul 17, 2020 3:50 am

UA857 wrote:
Why did the KC-25/33 fail?


Too big, too expensive, redundant.

It was too big to refuel A-10s and C-130s. Also, the pros of having a large offload were already realized with the KC-10. A KC-25 would simply add another fleet type money pit without much value added.

For cargo, it was also too big. Sure, it could maybe carry as many pallets as a C-5, but it needed international airport sized airports as well as major ground equipment investment in those fields in order to utilize that capability as the 747 is too high to easily utilize forklifts. Sure, it could offload vehicles with its stupid built-in ramp, which would take up lots of cargo space and would probably be prone to breaking, but the C-5 could lift the same vehicles, and heavier ones, and offload them via ERO without any ground equipment.

If there were no KC-10, the KC-25 would have been a good idea, but procuring it to 'augment' the KC-10 would have been ridiculously stupid. Even for the Pentagon.
"I've sold monorails to Brockway, Ogdenville, and North Haverbrook, and, by gum, it put them on the map!"
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Aug 12, 2020 6:43 pm

Could the USAF done a split order between the KC-10 and KC-25?
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Aug 12, 2020 6:44 pm

Are the Iranian Air Force´s 747-100 tanker/cargo aircraft considered as KC-25s or are they just called KC-747s?
 
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kc135topboom
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Aug 12, 2020 11:49 pm

UA857 wrote:
Are the Iranian Air Force´s 747-100 tanker/cargo aircraft considered as KC-25s or are they just called KC-747s?


The IIAF tankers are call KC-747s and KC-707s. Both are essentially 'off the shelf airplanes modified with the KC-135 Boom and fuel lines'. The IIAF KC-747s started life as TWA B-747-100s, the KC-707-320B/Cs were new builds.

The KC-25 would have been a new design and would have had a new refueling boom, which may or may not have been a modified and longer KC-135 Boom which would have had the same size refueling envelope as the KC-10.

The KC-10 was as much of a political decision as anything else. The California Congressional contingent was more than twice the size of the Washington state contingent, which is also the reason why half the KC-10s were initially stationed at March AFB, CA, KRIV (the other half was initially at Barksdale AFB, LA {KBAD}).

The KC-10 was to be built in Long Beach, California and the KC-25 in Everett, Washington.

The DC-10 was suffering in sales at the time, and the B-747 was not. So the KC-10 became a jobs program for California's Congresscritters and Senators and was ordered under the Carter Administration in hopes the program would help win California for Carter's reelection (it didn't as Reagan was a former CA Governor).

The fuel offload matrix was also set against Boeing and in MD's favor. The 100K refueling offload at 2,000 nm for the KC-25 required it to carry 75,000 lbs. of cargo, the KC-10 did not carry cargo. Who carries 75K of cargo 2,000 nm only to RTB after the air refueling? A fighter drag would begin the first refueling at about 500 nm, and continue at set points across the ocean. Both tankers could go TATL with cargo, pax, and refuel the fighters, but only the KC-25 could do it (great circle) TPAC.

The KC-25 could also support SAC's EWO missions from a ground alert posture (this was the reason for the FB-111 flight refueling tests), and the KC-10 could not, although it could refuel the FB-111 (but never did except in flight testing). Both tankers could support thier own HEAD DANCER missions while dragging fighters.

SAC and MAC initially had second thoughts about the KC-10 with the high accident rate, and particularly after the 1979 crash of AA-191 in ORD. The USAF had planned for commercial airline maintenance, and the removal of the wing engine, nacelle, and pylon as a single unit was an accepted airline and FAA maintenance procedure. It was this maintenance procedure that doomed AA-191 in 1979. World Airways in OAK had the KC-10 heavy maintenance contract (again a California company although it could have gone to United at SFO). Ten years later, in 1989 the UA-232 accident caused the USAF to quietly reroute the hydraulic lines well before the airlines did.

The KC-10 at MTOW of 593,000 lbs. requires a 11,000' runway, MMo is 0.89M.

A KC-25 at MTOW of 833,000 lbs. required a 10,900' runway, MMo is 0.92M

Both tankers would have used the same F-103 engines. The wingspan difference between the two tanker designs was about 30' (8.9 m). Operating costs was not a consideration as the SAC was already flying 3 E-4As (later modified to the "B" configuration) and 1 E-4B at the time.

The C-25 was also considered as a cruise missile carrier, as well as a flying aircraft carrier and even an AWACS;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_74 ... r_variants
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:26 pm

Is this the C-25 (747-200F)?

Image
 
cpd
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Aug 19, 2020 11:53 pm

It's not clear that those went any further than studies. I've seen the Secret Projects Unbuilt, unusual or experimental 747s topic before.

The MC-747 is interesting, so is the 747 AWACS plane.

Even better is the 747 Airborne Aircraft Carrier concept - truly crazy!
Last edited by cpd on Thu Aug 20, 2020 12:05 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
meecrob
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Thu Aug 20, 2020 12:02 am

kc135topboom wrote:
The 100K refueling offload at 2,000 nm for the KC-25 required it to carry 75,000 lbs. of cargo. Who carries 75K of cargo 2,000 nm only to RTB after the air refueling?


Was this due to weight and balance issues?
 
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Sat Aug 22, 2020 11:01 am

kc135topboom wrote:

SAC and MAC initially had second thoughts about the KC-10 with the high accident rate, and particularly after the 1979 crash of AA-191 in ORD. The USAF had planned for commercial airline maintenance, and the removal of the wing engine, nacelle, and pylon as a single unit was an accepted airline and FAA maintenance procedure. It was this maintenance procedure that doomed AA-191 in 1979. World Airways in OAK had the KC-10 heavy maintenance contract (again a California company although it could have gone to United at SFO). Ten years later, in 1989 the UA-232 accident caused the USAF to quietly reroute the hydraulic lines well before the airlines did.



The maintenance procedure that doomed AA-191 in 1979 was invented by Amercan Airlines, the Maintenance Manual did not provide instructions for removal of the engine and pylon as an integral unit. To facilitate the time required for bearing replacement, American Airlines developed a procedure using a forklift to remove, support, and replace the engine/pylon assembly.

One of the many examples of Economy first, safety second.

See : https://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main. ... LLTypeID=2
Operating a twin over the ocean, you're always one engine failure from a total emergency.
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Sat Aug 22, 2020 2:23 pm

“Forklift” Joe Leonard, later chief of maintenance at EAL, Lorenzo henchman. All FAA-approved,too.

https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os ... story.html
 
LTEN11
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Sun Aug 23, 2020 7:28 pm

747classic wrote:
kc135topboom wrote:

SAC and MAC initially had second thoughts about the KC-10 with the high accident rate, and particularly after the 1979 crash of AA-191 in ORD. The USAF had planned for commercial airline maintenance, and the removal of the wing engine, nacelle, and pylon as a single unit was an accepted airline and FAA maintenance procedure. It was this maintenance procedure that doomed AA-191 in 1979. World Airways in OAK had the KC-10 heavy maintenance contract (again a California company although it could have gone to United at SFO). Ten years later, in 1989 the UA-232 accident caused the USAF to quietly reroute the hydraulic lines well before the airlines did.



The maintenance procedure that doomed AA-191 in 1979 was invented by Amercan Airlines, the Maintenance Manual did not provide instructions for removal of the engine and pylon as an integral unit. To facilitate the time required for bearing replacement, American Airlines developed a procedure using a forklift to remove, support, and replace the engine/pylon assembly.

One of the many examples of Economy first, safety second.

See : https://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main. ... LLTypeID=2


AA may have developed the engine removal procedure that doomed AA 191, but they weren't the only airline using it. They were the unlucky one to have the accident, but the engine change procedure would've brought down a DC-10 sooner or later.
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Mon Aug 24, 2020 1:37 am

What was the planned range for the KC-25?
 
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Mon Aug 24, 2020 2:27 pm

UA857 wrote:
What was the planned range for the KC-25?


I would assume it would be in line with a 747-200B with CF6's and the heavy 833 klbs weights, although with a higher EOW due to the refueling kit and a few percentage points off the range due to aerodynamic drag. If you pull the 747 ACAP document from Boeing's website and pull up pg 71 in the pdf, you can get a sense of what it might be.

I'm assuming the proposal would have kept 833 klbs. When KC-10 went forward, they added a MTOW kicker as part of the project. DC-10 MTOW used to be 555 klbs, but migrated through a couple points (around 572 klbs) and then finally KC-10 made 593 klbs available. However, not many commercial birds were made with the highest weight (the Finnair birds being the only ones I'm aware of).

As mentioned above, I'm entirely satisfied with the explanation that politics drove the selection. However, I think it was the right decision as well in the technical sense. From what I've gathered being in the force but not part of an ARW, I got the sense that getting gas into the sky is not the problem - plenty can be lifted aloft. The problem is the number of refueling points in the sky. It becomes a bit of a tactical hang-up if you had 150 klbs of fuel ready for transfer - but only through one boom. You get a long conga line as a result. And so 747 or similar big birds (777) are likely skewing the cost-benefit equation: too much money into one airframe, for just one boom in return.
 
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Mon Aug 24, 2020 3:28 pm

Lord knows what weight either could have been if they used the C-5s WAT-limited climb gradient of 2.3% instead of 2.7% (-10) or 3.0% (747). And that was gross gradient, not net. None of that reduction of 0.8% to have a pad.
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Tue Aug 25, 2020 4:50 pm

Wasn''t the C-33 (747-400F) supposed to augment the C-17?
 
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Tue Aug 25, 2020 8:25 pm

UA857 wrote:
Wasn''t the C-33 (747-400F) supposed to augment the C-17?


No, for the umpteenth time, the USAF opposed Sen Jackson’s attempt to buy 747-200s prior to the C-5B contract during the 1981-82 DOD build-up by Reagan and Weinburger. It was the same 50-frame buy, the USAF threatened to assign the 747s to the NYANG at Newburgh. They were planning the move from O-2s to the 747 when Jackson died, Lockheed got the B-model contract soon afterwards. The last -Bs were delivered in -89-ish. I flew one at Altus with a whole 36 hours on it in training in early ‘88.

The first flight of the 744 was in April 88, long after the C-5B contract
 
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LyleLanley
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Aug 26, 2020 9:49 pm

Wow. Where to start?

kc135topboom wrote:
The KC-25 would have been a new design and would have had a new refueling boom, which may or may not have been a modified and longer KC-135 Boom which would have had the same size refueling envelope as the KC-10.


"May or may not" means it would be the same small 135 boom with the same small refueling envelope. Boeing put zero investment into a new boom, whereas McD developed the AARB before the ATCA competition, thereby strengthening their offer via reduced technical risk. Making the boom bigger only increases the envelope by a negligible amount, and nowhere near the size of the KC-10's envelope: 10* of azimuth on a larger boom offers only slightly more area than 10* on a smaller boom. What a larger boom offers is increased distance between the receiver and tanker, minimizing interrelated aerodynamic effects. In order to markedly increase the refueling envelope size you have to change the boom/fuselage pivot point (aka, the boom fork) from a yaw design to a roll design, among other things, to enable large refueling envelopes like the KC-10's 25* capability in roll. Boeing didn't invest in those improvements. McDonnell Douglas did.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032274.pdf

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048313.pdf

kc135topboom wrote:
The KC-10 was as much of a political decision as anything else. The California Congressional contingent was more than twice the size of the Washington state contingent, which is also the reason why half the KC-10s were initially stationed at March AFB, CA, KRIV (the other half was initially at Barksdale AFB, LA {KBAD}).


Wrong. It's always a "political decision" when it's something you don't agree with...

The fiscal environment in the late 1970s was hostile to the ATCA program, with many higher priority programs (B-1 for instance) competing for dollars in those 'hollow force' days. The ATCA program was zeroed out numerous times, the last of which was in 1982. Therefore, the most important consideration for the ATCA program was cost and getting the 'most bang for the buck'. Not in getting the 'biggest bang for the biggest buck'. This was partly due to the fact that there was no real fleet size expectation, so the cheaper the aircraft and it's sustainment costs, the more the AF could buy. The fact is, the KC-10's life cycle and initial procurement costs were nearly half what Boeing's 747 would have cost. Remember that aircraft are like tuna: you buy them by the pound. Aside from having one fewer engine (less fuel burn and mx), the KC-10's OEW was more than 100,000 lbs less than the 747's. To paraphrase General Charles Kuyk's testimony to Congress, while the 747 offered better cargo capabilities, the KC-10 offered more bang for the buck and was more flexible in performing the ATCA's core missions than the 747.

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana was the first Main Operating Base (MOB) and opened in late 1980. If the KC-10 program remained at 16 aircraft (as was programmed until mid-1982), Barksdale would have remained the only KC-10 MOB. The Air Force chose Barksdale because of central CONUS location, climate, available ramp space, and strategic receivers (B-52Hs). The next chosen MOB was March AFB, CA, in late 1982 because of distance to receivers/units to airlift, ramp space, climate, and easy access to routes perfect for the ATCA; i.e. the Pacific theater. Seymour Johnson AFB, NC, was the 3rd MOB chosen for similar reasons, and for TAC considerations. Robins AFB, GA, was to be the 4th MOB, if needed. One MOB in California, considering CA had more military bases than any other state by far, seems a proper military utility decision than politics.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA194398.pdf

kc135topboom wrote:
The DC-10 was suffering in sales at the time, and the B-747 was not. So the KC-10 became a jobs program for California's Congresscritters and Senators and was ordered under the Carter Administration in hopes the program would help win California for Carter's reelection (it didn't as Reagan was a former CA Governor).


Nonsensical, data-poor drivel. You're saying the Carter Administration bought fewer than a dozen DC-10s for cheap to curry favor with the CA voters, then turned around and cancelled the far larger and far more expensive made-in-California B-1A program? You can't have your argument both ways.

kc135topboom wrote:
The fuel offload matrix was also set against Boeing and in MD's favor. The 100K refueling offload at 2,000 nm for the KC-25 required it to carry 75,000 lbs. of cargo, the KC-10 did not carry cargo. Who carries 75K of cargo 2,000 nm only to RTB after the air refueling? A fighter drag would begin the first refueling at about 500 nm, and continue at set points across the ocean. Both tankers could go TATL with cargo, pax, and refuel the fighters, but only the KC-25 could do it (great circle) TPAC.


Wrong. Among other things, the ATCA program compared 6 different expected flight profiles to both competitors in a paper fly-off. Among the profiles were the dual-role (refueling fighters whilst carrying their personnel and cargo), as well as 100/150K of offload at 2,500/2,000 miles from home base and return. This simulated refueling C-5s, ala Operation Nickel Grass, as well as SR-71 missions. These high offload missions DID NOT involve carrying cargo.

It's nice to imagine the contest was rigged against your favorite manufacturer, but really, do you think Boeing would've just accepted the results of such a skewed profile and not fought back? That would be easy-pickings for contesting the source selection.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA194398.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/99th-congress-1985-1986/reports/85-cbo-018.pdf

kc135topboom wrote:
The KC-25 could also support SAC's EWO missions from a ground alert posture (this was the reason for the FB-111 flight refueling tests), and the KC-10 could not, although it could refuel the FB-111 (but never did except in flight testing). Both tankers could support thier own HEAD DANCER missions while dragging fighters.


Wrong. Supporting SIOP was never a part of the ATCA contract and specifications, and neither the KC-25, nor the KC-10, were equipped to support it. Although the KC-25 could theoretically be equipped with the same EWO-enabling systems as the E-4, this would've drastically increased cost, weight, and decreased commercial fleet commonality which was essential to lowering costs and development risks. The ATCA tankers were specifically NOT to be used for SIOP. Their only function which indirectly supported SIOP was relieving KC-135s of the air-bridge tanker role, thereby enabling more KC-135s to be used for their primary SIOP role, rather than relegated to dragging fighters and airlifts across the oceans. To quote: "One of the major considerations In conducting the ATCA system acquisition as a competition between only Boeing and DAC was to have minimal developmental costs and keep the buy "off-the-shelf" as much as possible. The aircraft would not be hardened against the effects of nuclear detonation, and therefore would have no SlOP mission."

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA194398.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/99th-congress-1985-1986/reports/85-cbo-018.pdf

kc135topboom wrote:
SAC and MAC initially had second thoughts about the KC-10 with the high accident rate, and particularly after the 1979 crash of AA-191 in ORD. The USAF had planned for commercial airline maintenance, and the removal of the wing engine, nacelle, and pylon as a single unit was an accepted airline and FAA maintenance procedure. It was this maintenance procedure that doomed AA-191 in 1979. World Airways in OAK had the KC-10 heavy maintenance contract (again a California company although it could have gone to United at SFO). Ten years later, in 1989 the UA-232 accident caused the USAF to quietly reroute the hydraulic lines well before the airlines did.


Wrong. They may have had initial concern, but they didn't have 'second thoughts' or buyer's remorse. Most of the DC-10's problems occurred (and were fixed) well before the ATCA contract was ever signed. The AF never planned for commercial airline maintenance: all day-to-day mx servicing, engine changes, and minor inspections were always intended to be Air Force manned. Heavy maintenance, supply, and overhauls were (and always have been) contractor-run by the winner of the logistics support contract. McDonnell Douglas won the contract for the first five-years of heavy maintenance and sustainment, and I believe Continental Airlines won the second five-year round. The Air Force modified the hydraulic lines when McDonnell Douglas authorized the procedure for fuse plugs and rudder standby power.

kc135topboom wrote:
The KC-10 at MTOW of 593,000 lbs. requires a 11,000' runway, MMo is 0.89M.


Nope. At the KC-10's MTOW of 590,000 lbs, not it's maximum taxi weight of 593K, it requires less than 10,000', and that's with no wind. Less runway than that if winds are taken into account. I've taken off at 590 from Travis's 11,000' runway and McGuire's 10,000' runway more times than I can remember. And MMO is 0.88M.

kc135topboom wrote:
Both tankers would have used the same F-103 engines. The wingspan difference between the two tanker designs was about 30' (8.9 m). Operating costs was not a consideration as the SAC was already flying 3 E-4As (later modified to the "B" configuration) and 1 E-4B at the time.


A 30 foot difference in wingspan is not a small sum when operating from TAC/USN/USMC fighter bases in order to airlift those units to where they're needed in the world, to say nothing of the taxiing difficulties and pavement requirements. How are you going to move these units when you can't land/maneuver in their airfields? They can't just drive their stuff to the nearest international airport, you know...

Operating costs were absolutely a consideration, if not the most important consideration in the ATCA program! Life cycle costs were one of the prime drivers of the ATCA, along with capability on the dollar. Furthermore, LCC was one of the main reasons why the E-4 was never procured for the broader Looking Glass mission and regional commander mission, with the initial 3 E-3A reconverted to Knighthawk support of the NCA with the sole E-4B.

https://www.google.com/books/edition/Supplemental_Appropriations_for_1982/l3EcAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=kc-10+atca+747&pg=PA437&printsec=frontcover

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA194398.pdf

Bottom line: the KC-10 was slightly less technically capable than the KC-25, but it was far cheaper, could use more airfields, and was a better bargain for the USAF. Rather not unlike the eternal debate between the KC-46 and the KC-30...
"I've sold monorails to Brockway, Ogdenville, and North Haverbrook, and, by gum, it put them on the map!"
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Tue Sep 01, 2020 4:16 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
UA857 wrote:
Wasn''t the C-33 (747-400F) supposed to augment the C-17?


No, for the umpteenth time, the USAF opposed Sen Jackson’s attempt to buy 747-200s prior to the C-5B contract during the 1981-82 DOD build-up by Reagan and Weinburger. It was the same 50-frame buy, the USAF threatened to assign the 747s to the NYANG at Newburgh. They were planning the move from O-2s to the 747 when Jackson died, Lockheed got the B-model contract soon afterwards. The last -Bs were delivered in -89-ish. I flew one at Altus with a whole 36 hours on it in training in early ‘88.

The first flight of the 744 was in April 88, long after the C-5B contract


I'm talking about NDAA C-33 (747-400F) that was proposed in the 1990s.
 
FGITD
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Tue Sep 01, 2020 5:11 pm

UA857 wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
UA857 wrote:
Wasn''t the C-33 (747-400F) supposed to augment the C-17?


No, for the umpteenth time

I'm talking about NDAA C-33 (747-400F) that was proposed in the 1990s.


I think you’re missing the whole point of what Galaxyflyer is trying to say. The proposed c33, modified 744, wasn't "supposed" to do anything. It wasn't a real airplane, it was a proposal put forth by Boeing for a study.

So in a very general sense, yes. It was theorized that a heavily modified 744 could help transport military cargo. Therefore they studied it, and decided that it wasn't worth it.

I'm sure one of the various users in this thread knows much more than I do. You have to realize this discussion is being held with good, respectable users who have flown these planes, and been heavily involved in them. You might not find articles or studies to back up everything, but I damn sure trust someone who flew it more than someone who wrote about it.
 
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Sep 02, 2020 12:09 am

UA857 wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
UA857 wrote:
Wasn''t the C-33 (747-400F) supposed to augment the C-17?


No, for the umpteenth time, the USAF opposed Sen Jackson’s attempt to buy 747-200s prior to the C-5B contract during the 1981-82 DOD build-up by Reagan and Weinburger. It was the same 50-frame buy, the USAF threatened to assign the 747s to the NYANG at Newburgh. They were planning the move from O-2s to the 747 when Jackson died, Lockheed got the B-model contract soon afterwards. The last -Bs were delivered in -89-ish. I flew one at Altus with a whole 36 hours on it in training in early ‘88.

The first flight of the 744 was in April 88, long after the C-5B contract


I'm talking about NDAA C-33 (747-400F) that was proposed in the 1990s.


Ok, I looked up the C-33, yes a paper proposal that was never gonna get far in the 90s when AMC virtually had C-17 tattooed on everyone’s foreheads to display fealty to the God Buddha. The 747 never had a military mission but hauling pallets, which can much more cheaply be done by chartering. The C-5D never was going anywhere either for the political reasons even though it was probably a better strategic lifter. If it’s not Ro-Ro, it’s hard to use in the military.
 
strfyr51
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Sep 02, 2020 1:44 am

UA857 wrote:
Could the USAF done a split order between the KC-10 and KC-25?

for some reason people only think of having the airplane and not maintaining it. . the DC-10 took one set of equipment and the 747 takes quite another and each has it's own set of challenges to maintain them. It's not nearly as easy as people make it out to be. Especially have3 worked at an airline that flew both the 747 and the DC-10 at the same time.
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Sep 02, 2020 10:48 pm

Boeing C-25 (747-200F)

Image

Boeing C-33 (747-400F)

Image
 
UA857
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Sep 09, 2020 4:00 am

Can someone give me information about the RAAF KC-25 (747-200F) and KC-33 (747-400F)?
 
Ozair
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Sep 09, 2020 7:59 am

UA857 wrote:
Can someone give me information about the RAAF KC-25 (747-200F) and KC-33 (747-400F)?

More info than you could ever want here, https://www.ausairpower.net/APAA/APA-2005-02.pdf noting that Carlo Kopp and APA made quite a few logical leaps that aren't based on fact or fiscal reality.

Noting additionally that the RAAF never really sought the KC-25/33 (it just wasn't a viable or realistic option as already explained by others) but it was championed by Crazy Kopp and his APA cronies...! The RAAF Strategic Tanker contest was always between the A330 and B767 variants.
 
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747classic
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Sep 09, 2020 8:25 am

Ozair wrote:
UA857 wrote:
Can someone give me information about the RAAF KC-25 (747-200F) and KC-33 (747-400F)?

More info than you could ever want here, https://www.ausairpower.net/APAA/APA-2005-02.pdf noting that Carlo Kopp and APA made quite a few logical leaps that aren't based on fact or fiscal reality.

Noting additionally that the RAAF never really sought the KC-25/33 (it just wasn't a viable or realistic option as already explained by others) but it was championed by Crazy Kopp and his APA cronies...! The RAAF Strategic Tanker contest was always between the A330 and B767 variants.


Technically and operational it wasn't a bad proposal, the RAAF could have obtained the just retired six Qantas 747-400ER aircraft for a bargain to act as identical "green aircraft" and all modification info could be obtained from Boeing or reversed engineered by IAI. It would have been a relative low risk programme

But as always the military decision makers are more political motivated (protecting their own jobs) and are lacking (most of the time ) operational and technical knowledge.

Note : I have witnessed the Dutch KDC-10 tanker conversion programme from nearby, everthing went ok, until the high brass became involved.
Operating a twin over the ocean, you're always one engine failure from a total emergency.
 
Ozair
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Wed Sep 09, 2020 11:21 am

747classic wrote:
Ozair wrote:
UA857 wrote:
Can someone give me information about the RAAF KC-25 (747-200F) and KC-33 (747-400F)?

More info than you could ever want here, https://www.ausairpower.net/APAA/APA-2005-02.pdf noting that Carlo Kopp and APA made quite a few logical leaps that aren't based on fact or fiscal reality.

Noting additionally that the RAAF never really sought the KC-25/33 (it just wasn't a viable or realistic option as already explained by others) but it was championed by Crazy Kopp and his APA cronies...! The RAAF Strategic Tanker contest was always between the A330 and B767 variants.


Technically and operational it wasn't a bad proposal, the RAAF could have obtained the just retired six Qantas 747-400ER aircraft for a bargain to act as identical "green aircraft" and all modification info could be obtained from Boeing or reversed engineered by IAI.

?? The tanker selection started in 2001 with final selection in 2005... The RAAF is not seeking today any new tankers and in fact cancelled the two additional KC-30s they were seeking from 2015.

747classic wrote:
But as always the military decision makers are more political motivated (protecting their own jobs) and are lacking (most of the time ) operational and technical knowledge.

Double ?? That comment makes no sense and even less in this case.
 
UA857
Topic Author
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Fri Sep 25, 2020 1:48 am

Wasn´t the KC-25/C-25 going to have a self-loading device?

Image
Image
 
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LyleLanley
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Re: Would the KC-25/33 been about to augment the KC-10?

Fri Sep 25, 2020 1:55 am

Maybe.
"I've sold monorails to Brockway, Ogdenville, and North Haverbrook, and, by gum, it put them on the map!"

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