zanl188 wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

I think Starliner needs missions beyond the ISS to the private space stations, to become profitable.

Boeing needs to get going, Blue Origin could beat them to that market at this rate.

Blue Origin doesn't have an orbital capsule in development, and has said they intend to use Starliner, at least initially. So I think there is a likelihood of business after ISS.

Starliner is also launcher agnostic, it can go up on any of the orbital launcher platforms. It's designed to boost the stations as well as supply them with crew and cargo. It still has a few minor issues to work out, before certification, but it will get there.

Boeing is mating the Starliner "Calypso" capsule to the service module, in preparation for the CTF mission tentatively scheduled for launch on April 13. The date could shift depending on the resolution of the ISS Soyuz issues.

NASA will host a media conference tomorrow, Friday at 11 am ET, to discuss the upcoming Starliner Crewed Test Flight to ISS, with Barry Wilmore and Suni Williams. The mission will last 8 days and is the final testing step in vehicle certification.

The launch is scheduled for April but may be shifted due to ongoing difficulties with Soyuz vehicles docked at the station. Starliner is currently being fueled and charged for power-up and flight.



https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa ... light-test

From the NASA Starliner CFT media conference today:

1. CFT is on track for launch in April, exact date depends in ISS scheduling. It needs a specific docking port to be free.

2. Full crewed certification will be complete by the end of 2023. The first regular rotation flight (PCM-1) is scheduled for early 2024.

3. NASA decided to do additional months of testing on the service module OMAC thrusters, which ended in February. This was to retire risk associated with not getting the service module back from OFT-2.

4. Large Starliner battery banks were considered a potential fire/explosion risk to ISS. Boeing has installed isolation barriers between cells.

5. Parachute main canopy textile attachment points were strengthened, based on observations on recovered capsule.

6. 60 day fueled timer is still in effect for valve oxidation mitigation. Purge system is now factory- built into the service module. Redesigned valves are coming for PCM 1 or 2.

7. The capsule-module umbilical separator has been redesigned with a smart initiator, to avoid separation timing issues as occurred with OFT-2.

8. Boeing is planning for multiple Starliner launches per year, even though only one is nominally required by NASA for ISS. It will have surge capacity and ability to service commercial stations.

9. Boeing is considering Vulcan as the replacement for Atlas, and work has already begun on adaptation. Starliner may have design changes to better utilize the heavier lift capability of Vulcan. But other launch providers are also being evaluated.

10. The Progress capsule is within limits for separation and deorbit without cooling. It will manuever around the station to allow imaging of the damaged components.

11. NASA will not install additional seats on either Starliner or Dragon, as they have other contingency plans in place for evacuation.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=1RWCd2owAfg

The Starliner CFT launch now has been shifted to mid-May, based on certification work and deconfliction with the Axiom mission to the ISS, which will now go first.

NASA has requested additional testing of the Starliner backup manual control system software, as part of the human rating certification.

The concerns raised by the ISS safety manager, about Starliner lithium batteries, have been resolved by additional monitoring during CFT. Boeing is considering some cell isolation hardware changes as well.

This also has the effect of deconfliction with the first Vulcan launch, since both are conducted by ULA.

From the NASA Starliner media briefing today, the CFT mission has now been shifted to July 21. The mid-May schedule announced earlier had very little margin, and the next window for ISS docking was in July, so they decided to move the mission, to allow for enough margin.

1. They will do one more ground test of the drogue parachute that pulls the cover off the top of Starliner, to make sure it will work under conditions of maximum dynamic pressure, during an abort. This provides a verification data point for their model.

2. They discovered a software error in the manual control system, earlier this year, so they are conducting a full review of that system, for quality assurance.

3. They continue to work on the certification documentation, to convert the Starliner interim human rating to a full human rating.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ABVJ6qpgy1M

Another day another delay.

bobinthecar wrote:

Another day another delay.

According to NASA, there are five lanes of certification activity that need to be completed before CFT. Four of these are essentially complete. The fifth is testing and verification, and that is the lane that has had new tests regularly added.

I don't think the Starliner team objects to that aspect of certification. They want the spacecraft to be fully compliant. Where there is a little frustration, is that because they are at the bottom of the scheduling totem pole for ISS visits, each request sets them back by several months. Which means they have to reset all the limited life stuff and develop a new launch plan, each time.

They will get there in the end, NASA is still fully committed to Starliner. Maybe they will boost the scheduling priority as well.

NASA has released an update on Starliner CFT progress. Launch is still scheduled for NET July 21. Fueling is scheduled to begin in June. 95% of the certification issues are closed, including all those resulting from the OFT-2 mission.

The Li-Ion battery assessment is complete. It's approved for the CFT flight, with further mitigations to come in future flights.

Here is what remains open:

1. Thermal cooling system valve replacement.

2. Evaluation of wiring system protection tape adhesive, for flammability.

3. Evaluation of parachute rigging joints, to ensure they have the required factor safety for strength.

These are expected to be completed by the time fueling begins. There is some additional margin if needed.

https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/2 ... readiness/

Just from an aesthetics standpoint, the way Starliner is mounted to Atlas V has got to be the most ghetto, totally afterthought-looking vehicle interface I've ever seen for a manned spacecraft.

744SPX wrote:

Just from an aesthetics standpoint, the way Starliner is mounted to Atlas V has got to be the most ghetto, totally afterthought-looking vehicle interface I've ever seen for a manned spacecraft.

Starliner complies with the commercial crew program requirement that it be launcher-agnostic. Therefore it has an aero-skirt and launch adapter to fit various launchers (including Falcon).

SpaceX has applied for a waiver on all it's commercial programs, to use only its own launchers. NASA granted the waivers since the SpaceX manufacturing and launch stacks are fully integrated.

So for example, Starliner can move to the Vulcan launcher as the Atlas retires. Or other launchers as necessary.

Avatar2go wrote:

744SPX wrote:

Just from an aesthetics standpoint, the way Starliner is mounted to Atlas V has got to be the most ghetto, totally afterthought-looking vehicle interface I've ever seen for a manned spacecraft.

Starliner complies with the commercial crew program requirement that it be launcher-agnostic. Therefore it has an aero-skirt and launch adapter to fit various launchers (including Falcon).

SpaceX has applied for a waiver on all it's commercial programs, to use only its own launchers. NASA granted the waivers since the SpaceX manufacturing and launch stacks are fully integrated.

So for example, Starliner can move to the Vulcan launcher as the Atlas retires. Or other launchers as necessary.

The skirt for the Atlas V was also added after the initial announcement when they figured out some aerodynamic issues with flow separation likely to damage the booster. Makes the whole getup look weird but is perfectly functional and safe.

Launch postponed. The insulator tape on the parachute system needs to be addressed. It's a safety-critical system, fire hazard.

Several journalists asking if pulling the plug on the program is considered.

NASA held a media conference for Starliner issues that were discovered within the last two weeks in the certification process. This resulted in a stand down of the planned July launch.

1. Parachute soft links were found to have an error in the ultimate load calculations. In actual tests over the last few days, the links failed at the lower loads of the corrected analysis. The links satisfy the limit load requirements, but without the desired safety factor of twice the limit load. So the links will require reinforcement or replacement.

2. The wiring protection tape was found to have a higher flammability potential in the adhesive, than was expected. There are specific vulnerable cables that may require over-wrapping, for additional safety margin.

3. A malfunctioning cooling valve has been replaced and sent back to the manufacturer for diagnosis & evaluation.

The time required to mitigate these issues would not have permitted the planned July launch. So indefinite delay until the resolutions are in place.

The plan at present is to maintain the first operational Starliner mission schedule for March or April of 2024. But it's too soon to predict a new date for CFT.

The parachute problem was found during spacecraft certification, when the contractor Airborne was asked to redundantly reproduce and test their calculations. They found the error and notified Boeing.

The tape problem was found in earlier incidents with other spacecraft, which changed the requirements for using the tape. Due to ambiguity on the revised specs, they were not applied to the entire Starliner harness. The limit is on the ability of the power carried in a cable, to initiate flammability in the adhesive, assuming the tape and wire insulation are damaged.

Both problems thus have existed since early in the design, but the certification process flushed them out, as it is expected to do. And both are statistical failure mode issues, but nonetheless have to be addressed before crewed flight.

Several journalists tried to infer that either NASA would cancel Starliner due to safety concerns, or that Boeing would cancel Starliner due to cost concerns.

NASA responded that they are fully committed to Starliner as the needed second provider for ISS and future commercial operations. And Boeing responded that they are considering manufacturing additional Starliners due to future customer demand.

Also in response to the ASAP panel request for an independent evaluation of Starliner, NASA said they were embedding engineers that would report through a separate command chain directly to the chief engineer, who provides documentation to ASAP.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=SwuDuX2XifU

On 16 September 2014, NASA announced that SpaceX and Boeing had been selected to provide crew transportation to the ISS.

SpaceX had their dragon capsule operational 3 years ago. NASA should cancel this trainwreck of a Boeing program. Surely they have an exit clause in the contract due to excessive delays. Two capsules were selected to reduce risk and provide redundancy. This is no longer needed.

In the civil section of this forum member were shocked by Boeing's reasonable financial situation during the peak of the 737MAX crisis. It was the billions in handouts from NASA on programs like this keeping them going. No doubt there was lots of lobbying behind closed doors to make this happen.

The USAF couldn't even get a second engine option for the F-35 funded. After one engine proved to be reliable the second option was cancelled. NASA should do the same. Someone needs to hold NASA accountable. The USAF plays hardball with Boeing on the KC-46 and T-7 as their contracts are air tight.

RJMAZ wrote:

On 16 September 2014, NASA announced that SpaceX and Boeing had been selected to provide crew transportation to the ISS.

SpaceX had their dragon capsule operational 3 years ago. NASA should cancel this trainwreck of a Boeing program. Surely they have an exit clause in the contract due to excessive delays. Two capsules were selected to reduce risk and provide redundancy. This is no longer needed.

In the civil section of this forum member were shocked by Boeing's reasonable financial situation during the peak of the 737MAX crisis. It was the billions in handouts from NASA on programs like this keeping them going. No doubt there was lots of lobbying behind closed doors to make this happen.

The USAF couldn't even get a second engine option for the F-35 funded. After one engine proved to be reliable the second option was cancelled. NASA should do the same. Someone needs to hold NASA accountable. The USAF plays hardball with Boeing on the KC-46 and T-7 as their contracts are air tight.

Very notably, like the KC-46 and T-7, the Boeing commercial crew program is fixed cost, so Boeing has absorbed the additional costs. Boeing has endorsed all the decisions to delay the program, and volunteered to repeat the OFT flight at their own expense.

NASA also reiterated the absolute need to have two providers, and their absolute commitment to that goal. That has never wavered, and NASA today praised Boeing's safety culture, openness and transparency, in participating with NASA in press conferences and answering questions from the public. As well as their commitment to resolving the issues.

Avatar2go wrote:

NASA also reiterated the absolute need to have two providers, and their absolute commitment to that goal.

I find that hard to justify. NASA had zero providers for a decade. Now with Dream Chaser they will have three spacecraft for cargo and/or crew. The moon is meant to be the priority. This clear and blatant wasting of money should see any responsible government pulling funding, firing staff and cancelling many NASA programs.

Yet the unlimited gravy train of public money continues to flow and NASA spends it like a teenager with daddy's credit card.

It is crystal clear to me that the only reason we see two providers and a duplication of capability is because Boeing and Lockheed must receive work due to their lobbying. In an open market this would not happen. When it is a military program and Boeing and Lockheed are in competition they are happy to do a gentlemen's agreement. Suddenly one provider is perfectly fine.

RJMAZ wrote:

I find that hard to justify. NASA had zero providers for a decade. Now with Dream Chaser they will have three spacecraft for cargo and/or crew. The moon is meant to be the priority. This clear and blatant wasting of money should see any responsible government pulling funding, firing staff and cancelling many NASA programs.

Yet the unlimited gravy train of public money continues to flow and NASA spends it like a teenager with daddy's credit card.

It is crystal clear to me that the only reason we see two providers and a duplication of capability is because Boeing and Lockheed must receive work due to their lobbying. In an open market this would not happen. When it is a military program and Boeing and Lockheed are in competition they are happy to do a gentlemen's agreement. Suddenly one provider is perfectly fine.

I can only quote what NASA said. They have consistently sought multiple providers for all the commercialization programs.

ISS cargo, ISS crew, xEVA suits, CLPS missions, HLS landers, all have multiple providers. That creates redundancy and also meets the commercialization objective, which is to foster and develop the private space industry.

That is their mandate from Congress. It's not their intention or objective to select for development, any particular provider.

Apart from the initial software errors, which were on Boeing, Starliner has had a long run of odd problems and scheduling conflicts.

One of the questions for the ISS manager today was, will you prioritize CFT in the fall, or bump it again. He said it will have priority, as he wants to see the first operational Starliner mission next spring. NASA said that as well. So we'll see what happens.

As long as there is a fair competition between potential providers, which we have had, I don't see why two providers is necessary at this point.
And yes, there is Dream Chaser.

It is almost as if they are doing it on purpose. Wrong tape, parachute link not strong enough?? These are engineering basics. How the hell is that even possible...

JonesNL wrote:

It is almost as if they are doing it on purpose. Wrong tape, parachute link not strong enough?? These are engineering basics. How the hell is that even possible...

To clarify, it's not the "wrong tape". The tape is commonly used throughout the space industry. It's literally everywhere.

In 2019, there was an incident in another spacecraft, after which the recommendation for the tape adhesive changed, for some applications that might involve high temperatures.

The 213 tape uses acrylic-based adhesive, while the 212 tape uses silicone-based. Acrylics are favored because they don't contaminate surfaces as silicone does, but silicone is better on the flammability scale.

Starliner was largely constructed by the time this happened. For pre-existing applications, incidents can be mitigated as they occur. But for the purposes of certification, the 2019 recommendation must be incorporated. That's just the way certification works.

As for the parachute soft link design, the safety factor for the chute in general is 1.6. However the soft links have an elevated safety factor of 2.0, because they are stress concentration points. It appears that the contractor Airborne inadvertently applied the lower safety factor to the soft links.

This error was not apparent to either Boeing or NASA. It was discovered by Airborne in the final stages of certification, during the standard process of re-evaluating all design calculations in their as-built condition.

The purpose of certification is to flush out these kinds of issues. The timing is unfortunate, but they are both resolvable.

Another aspect of this, is that certification requires tolerance to multiple simultaneous failures. The chute soft link safety factor assumes that one of the three chutes has already failed. The wiring protection tape safety factor assumes that damage has already ocurred, to expose the adhesive to an oxygen-rich atmosphere.

744SPX wrote:

As long as there is a fair competition between potential providers, which we have had, I don't see why two providers is necessary at this point.
And yes, there is Dream Chaser.

NASA doesn't want to be reliant on any one vendor, after giving up design control & ownership as they do for commercialization contracts. It's a point of vulnerability, which is not really any different than reliance on Soyuz.

For NASA designed hardware, if a contractor becomes unable or unwilling to fulfill the obligations, NASA can enlist another vendor. For commercialized projects, NASA does not own the design, so the only choice would be to start over from scratch.

Having multiple vendors provides some insurance. Note that the ongoing cost is no higher, it just distributes the cost between vendors. Which as noted, furthers the Congressional mandate of fostering private industry.

DreamChaser may eventually have a crewed version, but that is still some years away yet.

interesting that no matter how many OEM's have a capsule to make, none of them stumble on the same problem..

Maybe we will see Artemis 2 launch before the next Starliner...

bajs11 wrote:

Maybe we will see Artemis 2 launch before the next Starliner...

Actually there should be both the crewed test mission, and the first operational mission, before the Artemis 2 launch which is November 2024.

NASA media conference today on Starliner:

1. Wiring tape issue was due to ambiguity in NASA database on the flammability rating for the tape, in different oxygen environments. Decision was made to replace most of the tape, along with barriers and coatings. Currently 85% of upper crew capsule section has been reworked, but is just beginning in the lower section. Expected to complete this work by the end of September.

2. The parachute soft links were improperly tested by the vendor, early in the design cycle, and did not have the required safety factor of 2.0. The link has been redesigned and the fabrics strengthened with Kevlar. New chutes already had been scheduled for drop testing in November, so the new links are being integrated with those chutes, which will be used for CFT.

3. The extra time is being used to close out other aspects of the certification, and cert work is being brought forward from the first operational mission. This includes modifications to the battery system.

Starliner is expected to be ready for launch in March 2024. No date is set for CFT but multiple opportunities exist in the schedule around that time. NASA would like to get the first operational mission in by the end of 2024, but too soon to tell.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=iqPslXCL8f0

Avatar2go, thanks for the updates!

People who are pretty well informed think that March is overly optimistic.

Nomadd wrote:

People who should know think that March is optimistic to say the least.

Yeah, the issue is that the spacecraft is disassembled to access the harnesses, which are also disconnected. So all the assembly and wiring integrity checks have to be repeated. It's a major task.

The work itself should be complete by November at latest. But there are a couple months of checkouts at least, then fueling, then stacking. Then they need a window at the ISS. So March would be best case.

Avatar2go wrote:

Then they need a window at the ISS

This honestly seems to be the biggest stumbling block and from memory it was a major issue with getting the initial test flight repeat complete. In some ways it's a great problem for NASA to have as there's so much demand for the ISS that it's effectively slot controlled.

The ISS. The world's first slot controlled spaceport.

ZaphodHarkonnen wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

Then they need a window at the ISS

This honestly seems to be the biggest stumbling block and from memory it was a major issue with getting the initial test flight repeat complete. In some ways it's a great problem for NASA to have as there's so much demand for the ISS that it's effectively slot controlled.

The ISS. The world's first slot controlled spaceport.

Yes, the ISS has only 2 of the 3 constructed International Docking Adapters (IDA), as the first was lost in a launch mishap. The 3rd would be really useful right now. The 2 ports have to service Cargo Dragon, Crew Dragon, and Starliner.

NASA prefers to keep an expedition's crew vehicle docked in case of emergency, and for the return trip. So really only 1 free port that has to be juggled between Cargo, Starliner, and Axiom missions.

It's a bit amusing that NASA always has the ISS manager participate in the Starliner briefings, as proof that it isn't being held back. He always asserts this, and I don't doubt it's true. But then he reels off the activity schedule, and it's immediately apparent what the problem is.

NASASpaceFlight has an article on Starliner progress. It pretty much recaps the media briefing from last week.

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2023/08 ... er-update/

They could write a book on that tape. There are conflicting tales, but it seems that SpaceX started using it and changed it out when they couldn't make the characteristics from the NASA database add up. Boeing seems to have cherry picked the numbers that would be the most convenient. (They thought)
That could be inaccurate and it might just be a matter of some wiring areas getting hotter than they expected and pushing the limits.
Both companies have made some bonehead mistakes, but one of them seems to be a lot better at fixing them. Paying attention to bend radius on chute line specs is so basic it's hard to understand how it could have happened.

Nomadd wrote:

They could write a book on that tape. There are conflicting tales, but it seems that SpaceX started using it and changed it out when they couldn't make the characteristics from the NASA database add up. Boeing seems to have cherry picked the numbers that would be the most convenient. (They thought)
That could be inaccurate and it might just be a matter of some wiring areas getting hotter than they expected and pushing the limits.
Both companies have made some bonehead mistakes, but one of them seems to be a lot better at fixing them. Paying attention to bend radius on chute line specs is so basic it's hard to understand how it could have happened.

To clarify, both companies made the same error interpreting the NASA wiring database, which NASA has admitted was an ambiguity. The error was caught when a Dragon capsule returned from space with signs of charring on a harness, in 2019.

This is where things get murky. SpaceX addressed the issue by changing out the tape while refurbishing the capsule, but did not make the incident publicly known. Under the terms of the commercial contract, NASA cannot publicize Dragon events, it's a SpaceX decision.

NASA updated their database and also the certification requirements, which previously had allowed the tape. Both Dragon and Starliner were built to that standard, and Dragon was certified under it, while Starliner was not yet certified.

There is some question as to whether and when Boeing was notified of the certification changes. Neither NASA nor Boeing has addressed that issue, so we don't know. Since Starliner flew twice under NASA observation, it seems that there wasn't much awareness of the change on either side.

It's also notable that no charring or other issue was observed in either Starliner flight, so there were no outward signs of a problem.

As to the parachute softlink, the error was made by the parachute vendor, who designed the chute to Boeing spec. The error was also caught by the vendor, during certification review when they were asked to verify their design. Although it met the design limit load as specified by Boeing, it didn't have the required safety factor of 2.

As I understand it, the solution was devised by a NASA engineer who is a skydiver, and somewhat of an expert on chutes. He went home and redesigned the soft link in his garage, and his design as submitted to the vendor, met the safety factor requirement with margin.

Lastly it's helpful to remember that SpaceX faced a parachute redesign on Dragon, due to asymmetrical inflation. That was a showstopper, and a far more severe problem than Boeing is facing.

The truth is that in complex systems, there is always the potential for design error. The purpose of certification is to flush out any problems that have crept into the design. So finding this stuff is the certification process working as it should.