Now the Air Force will be paying for some portions of the update / replacement of the RVS....
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/air ... 0the%20fix.

par13del wrote:

Now the Air Force will be paying for some portions of the update / replacement of the RVS....
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/air ... 0the%20fix.

Sounds like they are treating the panoramic system as more of an upgrade than a fix. Boeing will pay for the development and surrounding infrastructure, including displays and station redesign. USAF will pay for the production external cameras for each aircraft. That seems like a fair resolution as the improvement in capability will be substantial.

With the boom system, there was an issue of non-usability with some aircraft and some conditions. That obviously is a significant issue and an intolerable deficiency. With the panoramic system, the issue was the range at which aircraft identification could be made. But not an issue for aircraft being able to use the drogue refueling systems. So it may have been tolerable, but at least now will be addressed.

Had a pair fly over as I was digging fossils in western Kansas dragging C-17s. Later they were tanking off each other. Great to see KC-46s in action

The KC-46 has now done the longest endurance tanker flight, 24.2 hours. I'm sort of surprised that we didn't do 36 hour mission tests back in the hot parts of the cold war. What are the longest ferry flight lengths, and say B-52 flights.

https://www.airforcemag.com/kc-46-sets- ... ur-flight/

JayinKitsap wrote:

The KC-46 has now done the longest endurance tanker flight, 24.2 hours. I'm sort of surprised that we didn't do 36 hour mission tests back in the hot parts of the cold war. What are the longest ferry flight lengths, and say B-52 flights.

https://www.airforcemag.com/kc-46-sets- ... ur-flight/

B-1s recently flew a 30 hour mission. https://www.airforcemag.com/b-1-returns ... -to-japan/

Avatar2go wrote:

par13del wrote:

Now the Air Force will be paying for some portions of the update / replacement of the RVS....
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/air ... 0the%20fix.

Sounds like they are treating the panoramic system as more of an upgrade than a fix. Boeing will pay for the development and surrounding infrastructure, including displays and station redesign. USAF will pay for the production external cameras for each aircraft. That seems like a fair resolution as the improvement in capability will be substantial.

With the boom system, there was an issue of non-usability with some aircraft and some conditions. That obviously is a significant issue and an intolerable deficiency. With the panoramic system, the issue was the range at which aircraft identification could be made. But not an issue for aircraft being able to use the drogue refueling systems. So it may have been tolerable, but at least now will be addressed.

Yes, replacing the IR cameras with cameras that also include electro-optical cameras, in addition to processing/display changes, is basically a new system altogether.

The KC-46’s panoramic sensor suite comprises three line replaceable units, or LRUs, which provide video to three panoramic displays used by boom operators to see aircraft flying towards the KC-46. Currently, each LRU has a single long wave infrared camera. The upgraded panoramic suite will add a electro-optical camera to each LRU as well as replace the existing infrared sensor with the same, more modern system that will be used as part of the Remote Vision System, Morrison said.

“The Air Force will purchase the new panoramic sensors to support fleet retrofit and to provide to Boeing, as Government Furnished Equipment, in support of production,” she said. “While the panoramic displays will remain the same, the improved panoramic sensors and the ability to display panoramic imagery on the upgraded primary display will result in significant improvements in capabilities.”

If the upgrades to RVS 2.0 or the panoramic sensor suite do not end up having the intended effect, the Air Force will be responsible for paying for future modifications to the system, as the RVS 2.0 design approved last month is now considered the official design specification for the system.

However, the Air Force believes “the approved RVS 2.0 design, to include the panoramic sensor upgrades, provides the lowest technical risk toward meeting all requirements and resolving deficiencies,” Morrison said.

A picture is worth a thousand words, but the current panoramic system is an absolute PoS and needs to be replaced. You know those old TV sets, where you see the cyclic lines that move from top to bottom? No kidding, that happens on the panoramic. Unbelievable.

Whether they call it a fix or an upgrade is because of contract rules and 'who pays for what?'. But the deeper issue at-play has to do with equipment redundancy and operation according to both FAA and Air Force rules. Boeing says they're delivering to contract and the USAF shakes its head at how deeply Boeing is spec'ing everything exactly "to contract" because of penny-pinching, instead of tailoring to its largest and most important customer. If Boeing put the same energy (read: money) into engineering that they've put into their contract compliance and legal teams, we wouldn't be in this position right now.

JayinKitsap wrote:

The KC-46 has now done the longest endurance tanker flight, 24.2 hours.

https://www.airforcemag.com/kc-46-sets- ... ur-flight/

The KC-10 still holds the record, actually, at 24.5 hours in the mid-80s during an operational Caribbean mission. SAC>AMC

The KC-46 is now approved for dispatch for 97% of receiver aircraft. USAF is also considering a 5% reduction in the tanker fleet, and moving away from the KC-Y competition in favor of extending the KC-46 contract.

Kendall also said the USAF did not adequately review the KC-46 design, leading to extensive modifications in the development process. Also that the fixed-cost contract was not suited to that level of development. He said he'd take the hit for that. This confirms earlier testimony by Ellen Lord before Congress, that the fixed-cost contract was not appropriate for the program and would not be used again in that form.

This also confirms the disparity that occurred between what Boeing offered/USAF accepted, and what USAF really wanted, from the KC-46. Due to the fixed cost contract, that meant that Boeing absorbed almost all the development cost for changes requested by USAF. That's been obvious for some time, but it's good to see the USAF be open and honest about it. That tempers much of the contract criticism of Boeing.

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/06 ... its-fleet/

https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/ke ... -46-design
(paywall)

LyleLanley wrote:

A picture is worth a thousand words, but the current panoramic system is an absolute PoS and needs to be replaced. You know those old TV sets, where you see the cyclic lines that move from top to bottom? No kidding, that happens on the panoramic. Unbelievable.

Whether they call it a fix or an upgrade is because of contract rules and 'who pays for what?'. But the deeper issue at-play has to do with equipment redundancy and operation according to both FAA and Air Force rules. Boeing says they're delivering to contract and the USAF shakes its head at how deeply Boeing is spec'ing everything exactly "to contract" because of penny-pinching, instead of tailoring to its largest and most important customer. If Boeing put the same energy (read: money) into engineering that they've put into their contract compliance and legal teams, we wouldn't be in this position right now.

The cyclic lines are due to differences in scan rates between the display and the recording device. They are not apparent to the naked eye.

Also the issue has nothing whatever to do with penny-pinching. In fact the opposite, Boeing has paid for every major design change except the boom force adjustment, which was a USAF error.

In the article referenced in the above comment, the USAF talks about why program issues occurred and the unsuitability of the fixed-cost contract. The true driver was differing expectations between Boeing and the USAF, about what the KC-46 was to be, based on lack of adequate design review. Both Boeing and USAF played a role in that.

Avatar2go wrote:

The cyclic lines are due to differences in scan rates between the display and the recording device. They are not apparent to the naked eye.

Also the issue has nothing whatever to do with penny-pinching. In fact the opposite, Boeing has paid for every major design change except the boom force adjustment, which was a USAF error.

In the article referenced in the above comment, the USAF talks about why program issues occurred and the unsuitability of the fixed-cost contract. The true driver was differing expectations between Boeing and the USAF, about what the KC-46 was to be, based on lack of adequate design review. Both Boeing and USAF played a role in that.

As a current and qualified KC-46 boom operator, the lines are visible to the naked eye. I’m not speaking of wearing the shades, either. I’d take a video of it, but that wouldn’t really help

We’re just gonna have to disagree with our apparently different definitions of penny-pinching, but my contention is that if Boeing hadn’t gone cheap-spec on everything aft of the cockpit; I.e. RVS, pano, and other issues, the 46 would be in much better shape and wouldn’t still be years from IOC. Penny wise and pound foolish. Just like some other notable Boeing programs of late… It’s not all Boeing’s fault, but to say a world-leading corporation like Boeing was outmaneuvered by a bunch of AF blue suiters is wishful thinking and indicative of denial.

LyleLanley wrote:

As a current and qualified KC-46 boom operator, the lines are visible to the naked eye. I’m not speaking of wearing the shades, either. I’d take a video of it, but that wouldn’t really help

We’re just gonna have to disagree with our apparently different definitions of penny-pinching, but my contention is that if Boeing hadn’t gone cheap-spec on everything aft of the cockpit; I.e. RVS, pano, and other issues, the 46 would be in much better shape and wouldn’t still be years from IOC. Penny wise and pound foolish. Just like some other notable Boeing programs of late… It’s not all Boeing’s fault, but to say a world-leading corporation like Boeing was outmaneuvered by a bunch of AF blue suiters is wishful thinking and indicative of denial.

If you are a KC-46 boom operator, I'm surprised that you would say this. I've taken a tour of the aircraft and spoken to that crew at length. While they acknowledged that the vision system has acuity issues, they also said the aircraft is a major improvement over the KC-135 that it replaces. And that they can handle the boom pretty well in most cases, except some lighting conditions.

That would seem to be borne out by it now being approved for 97% of the fleet, with the existing system. In fact everything they told and showed me has proven to be accurate, in terms of the progress it has made. The displays were not active while I was on board, but they didn't mention any issue with them, nor have I read or heard anything about what you are claiming, as a defect. The USAF has said the panoramic display issue is similar to the boom in that it's a matter of resolution & acuity, due to the camera systems being dated.

As far as Boeing being outmaneuvered by the USAF, please note that's not what I said. The fact admitted now by the USAF, by multiple individuals and in multiple venues, is that they did not have a good understanding of the amount of development work involved from the KC-767 to the KC-46. The KC-767 was built for foreign service, but most of the design was still commercial spec and not US mil-spec. That made the contract unsuitable for the project, and the number of changes they would request.

That too is borne out by the documented development changes that were requested by the USAF, which were a large part of the delay. The vision system is really only a small part of that. It's the most prominently reported because of the disagreement it caused, but it was only the last in a long line of major changes. All of which were paid for by Boeing as required in the contract.

Except for the boom connection force issue, which was a USAF error in specification. General Von Ovost said that she would have liked to have contract leverage to negotiate for changes, but even the boom force required special actions to get around the original contract. And now with the panoramic system, Boeing and USAF have agreed to split the cost. So don't think it was all on Boeing.

That doesn't excuse Boeing for other obvious flaws in the program, such as FOD and the cargo latches, and other relatively minor problems. As I said, there were issues on both sides. But the aircraft is converging towards a good solution, judging by what the crew told me, public defense of the program by USAF, and the motion away from a new bid for KC-Y.

From the age of the vision system and your description of the lines, I'm guessing that the video is from an interlaced analog camera, which alternately scans every other line, such that each frame is a half image, which are then overlaid at half the scan rate, to form the complete image.

That was not considered a defect, it's just how analog cameras work. Modern digital cameras are able to capture the complete image in one frame, processing the frame as a single image instead of a series of alternating lines. That requires significant memory and digital processing, which was at one time quite expensive, but almost trivially cheap today. Any new cell phone probably has a vastly superior camera to the analog standard. So obviously a huge improvement.

Avatar2go wrote:

General Von Ovost said that she would have liked to have contract leverage to negotiate for changes, but even the boom force required special actions to get around the original contract.

Shocked that a general seems to think that a fixed price contract is only there to protect the tax payors from the possible corruption of Boeing, the special actions are required to protect the tax payors and Boeing from the possible corruption of the Air Force and its partners who would choose to go outside of what they represented to the people that they needed / wanted and was thus funded. Anyone ever hear the tax payors being blamed for not putting up enough money?
Fixed price contracts unfortunately are needed because corruption does not care which side of the political or economic divide one resides on....

par13del wrote:

Shocked that a general seems to think that a fixed price contract is only there to protect the tax payors from the possible corruption of Boeing, the special actions are required to protect the tax payors and Boeing from the possible corruption of the Air Force and its partners who would choose to go outside of what they represented to the people that they needed / wanted and was thus funded. Anyone ever hear the tax payers being blamed for not putting up enough money?
Fixed price contracts unfortunately are needed because corruption does not care which side of the political or economic divide one resides on....

I believe their position is that the fixed price contract is not appropriate for projects that involve substantial development. But is still appropriate for production.

If the development involves substantial changes requested by the customer, then it's appropriate for a coat-sharing model to be used. Also appropriate for there to be incentives for meeting cost and schedule goals, or to solve specific technical problems that arise as a result of customer demand. But once development is complete, the customer should not be liable for cost overruns or increases that occur in production.

Hence in her Congressional testimony, Lord said they were investigating hybrid contracts for future use, with variable terms for the different phases of the contract.

The issue in the case of the KC-46 contract, was not anticipating how much development would actually be required. That creates the situation where the government either accepts a product that is not what they want, or the vendor absorbs the additional costs, since there is no mechanism for the government to pay for changes (the special actions). That ends up being adversarial, as one side or the other has to lose. Instead of both sides working together to get the desired result.

Avatar2go wrote:

par13del wrote:

Shocked that a general seems to think that a fixed price contract is only there to protect the tax payors from the possible corruption of Boeing, the special actions are required to protect the tax payors and Boeing from the possible corruption of the Air Force and its partners who would choose to go outside of what they represented to the people that they needed / wanted and was thus funded. Anyone ever hear the tax payers being blamed for not putting up enough money?
Fixed price contracts unfortunately are needed because corruption does not care which side of the political or economic divide one resides on....

I believe their position is that the fixed price contract is not appropriate for projects that involve substantial development. But is still appropriate for production.

On that I think most will agree, however with the KC-46, the Air Force were the one's who stated they wanted an off-the-shelf product, they were the ones who wanted an a/c already in service, so really, does it make sense to try to make an off-the-shelf a/c as customized as a new build? My opinion, they wanted a new build but knew that the congress would never go for it, so they first came up with the initial no bid, got stumped by the corruption already in place, then screwed up the second, by the time the third was accepted they decided to customize the hell out of it resulting in cost that may at the end of the day resemble the cost of a new build with a product less than half of the potential efficiencies of a new build. Other than aerodynamics, the major efficiencies of a new build would have been down to the engines, taking bets that if they increase the buy they will ultimately down the road re-engine the KC-46.

I should also add, the KC-46 will ultimately be put to good use by the Air Force, I just think we now have a mindset in some quarters in the military that everything has to be at the pointy edge, when they flew tankers up to the forward edge in Iraq that might have "emboldened" that mindset.
Its a support a/c and not CAS, so other than nuclear hardening - which one may say, may say, is no longer required for the ENTIRE fleet - how much more customization from a commercial cargo a/c do you need, and no I do not mean the required tanker equipment.

For the KC-46, much of the cost was driven by the requirement for redundancy in equipment and EWIS, to enhance survivability. That was multiplied by the requirement for certification to civilian transport standards. So you start with an already compliant airliner, modify it to mil-spec, then have to recertify everything you altered, to make it compliant again.

Then you also had Cobham, who were unfamiliar with the maze of FAA civilian certification, and struggled to get their wing pod system certified. That was supposed to happen last fall, not sure if it did or if they are still working on it. That issue spilled over into the wing certification as well, in terms of fuel line routing. The KC-46 is the first US civilian certified military transport, that is also a hardened tanker.

The U.S. Air Force has confirmed that it is still not using its fleet of KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers to support combat operations, and will not for the foreseeable future except in response to "emergency need." This is despite the service recently touting that these aircraft can now "support 97 percent of the daily Joint Force air refueling demands" as part of what it calls an Interim Capability Release plan intended to help move the long-troubled jets toward a truly operational state.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/k ... hole-story

I assume every effort is made to get the KC46A fully operational and to keep this process out of the new tanker selection process, handle it as two separate topics.

keesje wrote:

The U.S. Air Force has confirmed that it is still not using its fleet of KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers to support combat operations, and will not for the foreseeable future except in response to "emergency need." This is despite the service recently touting that these aircraft can now "support 97 percent of the daily Joint Force air refueling demands" as part of what it calls an Interim Capability Release plan intended to help move the long-troubled jets toward a truly operational state.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/k ... hole-story

I assume every effort is made to get the KC46A fully operational and to keep this process out of the new tanker selection process, handle it as two separate topics.

The combat theater exclusion policy is well understood, despite the continued efforts of The War Zone to twist it into something else.

Boeing had said from the outset that the KC-46 RVS vision issues were limited to a small subset of operational conditions. That has now been proved out by the USAF ICR dispatch approvals for 97% of the fleet, with more to join in future. The approvals include restrictions to avoid those conditions, which are easily accommodated outside of combat.

In combat theaters, it might not be possible to avoid the prohibited conditions, so that creates an unnecessary risk, when other assets are able to fulfill those needs. That is the rational for the combat restrictions. They don't apply to the cases of exercise or training missions, which are allowed in combat theaters. The reasoning is the same for those cases.

It's because the KC-46 role is being expanded, that the need for a KC-Y competition is being questioned. The expanding role is the cause, not the effect.

Reading that article, it sounds more like it is lack of familiarity with the platform that is driving the decision more than the KC-46A can't refuel a combat sortie (since they have proven the frame can refuel a non-combat sortie).

IMO, LMXT will not see the light of day. The USAF does not appear to have the budget (or at least the budget appetite) to develop a new and more expensive tanker program now that the KC-46A is finally approaching the finish line for full operational capability.

I expect that the US DOD has the ability to scan the frame for "bugs" (I mean they have found them in other things) so even if the Chinese government did plant them into the frame prior to hand-over, they would be detected and does China want that diplomatic headache?

IMO, they do not.

keesje wrote:

The U.S. Air Force has confirmed that it is still not using its fleet of KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers to support combat operations, and will not for the foreseeable future except in response to "emergency need." This is despite the service recently touting that these aircraft can now "support 97 percent of the daily Joint Force air refueling demands" as part of what it calls an Interim Capability Release plan intended to help move the long-troubled jets toward a truly operational state.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/k ... hole-story

I assume every effort is made to get the KC46A fully operational and to keep this process out of the new tanker selection process, handle it as two separate topics.

(Summary) In 2020, the KC-46 was not used for any refueling missions. In 2021, It was allowed to support transport missions, including the ferrying for several types of fighter jets. It is not allowed to support combnat missions, nor are there any plans to do so in the foreseeable future.

(Quotes)
"in 2020 ... that the service was not using the KC-46A for routine combat or non-combat aerial refueling missions"

"In May 2021, the KC-46A was not cleared to operationally support any USTRANSCOM missions..."

"On May 31, 2022... approved... the KC-46As, which the service currently has 59 of in inventory. This authorizes "daily task-able operational use" of these tankers to refuel more Air Force, as well as U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, "during U.S. Transportation Command-tasked missions."

"The U.S. Air Force has confirmed that it is still not using its fleet of KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers to support combat operations, and will not for the foreseeable future except in response to "emergency need."

The "foreseeable" part is TWZ being disingenuous, as they know the new RVS is being rolled out next year, and will begin factory integration the following year.

Also "emergency need" just means lack of availability of another refueling asset. The KC-46 could step in at any time. As the USAF officials said, you will see them operating in combat theaters during exercises and training, but won't be dispatched there for routine operations.

Avatar2go wrote:

Also "emergency need" just means lack of availability of another refueling asset. The KC-46 could step in at any time. As the USAF officials said, you will see them operating in combat theaters during exercises and training, but won't be dispatched there for routine operations.

Another way to interperate the quote, especially in the context of the other information in the article: We will not use these planes for combat training. No exorcise will plan on using these planes for combat training. Emergencies do come up, and you will see these planes used in those cases from time to time. But only in very limited situations.

Avatar2go wrote:

The "foreseeable" part is TWZ being disingenuous, as they know the new RVS is being rolled out next year, and will begin factory integration the following year.

I believe they spoke to exactly that issue, complete with quote from the USAF officer.

"Whatever the case, the KC-46A remains years away from reaching an official IOC, which will come after the redesigned RVS is determined to be adequate and is actually integrated onto a sufficient number of tankers. As it stands now, that's not expected to occur until at least some time in 2024 at the earliest. It remains unclear when the service may feel comfortable using these tankers to support combat operations when it doesn't absolutely have to.

“Until that visual system is upgraded, AMC does not have a plan to declare this aircraft fully operationally capable,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Ryan Samuelson, the KC-46 Cross-Functional Team lead

kitplane01 wrote:

keesje wrote:

The U.S. Air Force has confirmed that it is still not using its fleet of KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers to support combat operations, and will not for the foreseeable future except in response to "emergency need." This is despite the service recently touting that these aircraft can now "support 97 percent of the daily Joint Force air refueling demands" as part of what it calls an Interim Capability Release plan intended to help move the long-troubled jets toward a truly operational state.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/k ... hole-story

I assume every effort is made to get the KC46A fully operational and to keep this process out of the new tanker selection process, handle it as two separate topics.

(Summary) In 2020, the KC-46 was not used for any refueling missions. In 2021, It was allowed to support transport missions, including the ferrying for several types of fighter jets. It is not allowed to support combnat missions, nor are there any plans to do so in the foreseeable future.

(Quotes)
"in 2020 ... that the service was not using the KC-46A for routine combat or non-combat aerial refueling missions"

"In May 2021, the KC-46A was not cleared to operationally support any USTRANSCOM missions..."

"On May 31, 2022... approved... the KC-46As, which the service currently has 59 of in inventory. This authorizes "daily task-able operational use" of these tankers to refuel more Air Force, as well as U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, "during U.S. Transportation Command-tasked missions."

"The U.S. Air Force has confirmed that it is still not using its fleet of KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers to support combat operations, and will not for the foreseeable future except in response to "emergency need."

Imagine how bad things would be if Boeing didn't have all those decades of tanker experience.

kitplane01 wrote:

[quote="Avatar2go]

I believe they spoke to exactly that issue, complete with quote from the USAF officer.

"Whatever the case, the KC-46A remains years away from reaching an official IOC, which will come after the redesigned RVS is determined to be adequate and is actually integrated onto a sufficient number of tankers. As it stands now, that's not expected to occur until at least some time in 2024 at the earliest. It remains unclear when the service may feel comfortable using these tankers to support combat operations when it doesn't absolutely have to.

“Until that visual system is upgraded, AMC does not have a plan to declare this aircraft fully operationally capable,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Ryan Samuelson, the KC-46 Cross-Functional Team lead[/quote][/quote]

To be clear, the USAF also said that we will see the KC-46 operating in combat theaters. In fact we have just seen that in an exercise in Spain. KC-46 fly around the world, as part of exercises and training. They absolutely can step in if needed.

TWZ always has defense programs that serve as whipping boys. The F-35 was one for a long time, but has now deployed successfully. Also the Ford, which is about to deploy. And the KC-46, which is probably 2 years out from full deployment, with a significantly upgraded state-of-the-art vision system that is automation-ready.

The purpose of this article was to throw shade on progress the program has made over the last year. That progress has dispelled the notion that the KC-46 is not capable. It has a well-understood limitation and is in need of an upgrade, which is in the pipeline. So the article emphasizes the restrictions that remain, which were never disputed. It's part of a long standing practice at TWZ, as I mentioned.

scbriml wrote:

Imagine how bad things would be if Boeing didn't have all those decades of tanker experience.

As many here have tried to explain, the KC-46 is not the KC-135, it's significantly more advanced, as requested by the USAF. The decades of experience with the KC-135 won't overlap very much with the KC-46. All the systems are different, airframe is different, boom is different, fuel system is different, avionics are different, certification is different, hardening is different, defenses are different.

Avatar2go wrote:

scbriml wrote:

Imagine how bad things would be if Boeing didn't have all those decades of tanker experience.

As many here have tried to explain, the KC-46 is not the KC-135, it's significantly more advanced, as requested by the USAF. The decades of experience with the KC-135 won't overlap very much with the KC-46. All the systems are different, airframe is different, boom is different, fuel system is different, avionics are different, certification is different, hardening is different, defenses are different.

Development started 11 years ago.
First flight was 8 years ago.
First delivered to the air force 3 years ago.
Might be cleared for combat operations in another 3 years "at the earliest".

kitplane01 wrote:

Development started 11 years ago.
First flight was 8 years ago.
First delivered to the air force 3 years ago.
Might be cleared for combat operations in another 3 years "at the earliest".

Yes, all true except the 3 years, which is more like 2 years, although it will take time to retrofit the existing fleet to achieve full compliance. But mainly due to changes requested by the USAF. Redundancy and EWIS, two boom redesigns, civilian certification, and RVS redesign. All of which distinguish the KC-46 from the KC-767, which is serving well with other air forces.

This is not to blame the USAF, they know what they want and need. It's just unfortunate that they weren't on the same page with Boeing initially, and as a result the contract did not accommodate the development that was needed, and has now taken place. Both sides played a role and have some fault in that, and both sides have acknowledged it should have been done differently.

scbriml wrote:

Imagine how bad things would be if Boeing didn't have all those decades of tanker experience.

I believe pretty much every issue encountered with the KC-46A has been due to systems not made by Boeing with the exception of the wiring issues. And if Boeing had actually had the Defense side of the company perform that in San Antonio, as was the original plan before they decided to let the Commercial guys do it in Everett because it was cheaper, that might not have happened.

Now I am not sure if KC-45 had the exact same third-party components like the RVS, WARPS and such that KC-46A has, but if they did, then we may very well have seen many of these same problems and then the Boeing Boosters would be saying "See! This is what happens when you award a contract to a company without decades of tanker experience!"

Stitch wrote:

"See! This is what happens when you award a contract to a company without decades of tanker experience!"

Personally, I feel that is just PR from all sides. At there time of the contract, actually Boeing people with tanker experience is pretty slim. Other than those who support the existing fleet, the pool of designers with tanker experience probably would not make a difference.

The argument does not hold up in light of of the P-8A program. How much experience did they have with maritime patrol? There were lots of experience ported over from E-7 which help. But I feel the how the NAVY structured the program and the effective management of that program has more to do with its success than prior MMA experience.

bt

As Prime Contractor, Boeing is the one responsible for bringing all the various sub-contractors together to deliver a finished product. And they have clearly done a very poor job of that with the KC-46A program. But I agree with bikerthai that it had been decades since Boeing delivered the KC-767s to Italy and Japan and a fair bit of that "institutional knowledge" was gone by the time KC-X was formally awarded to Boeing and the KC-46A was a fairly different tanker than the original KC-767 proposed back in 2002.

And if the original 2002 lease deal had gone through, chances are that the program would have delivered successfully, even if the USAF would not have gotten as whizz-bang a platform as the KC-46A.

So what I am saying is, that it is all John McCain's fault.

(And no, I am not really saying that.)

I thought it might be interesting to compare the two programs. I've started their timelines at program start.

KC-46
Development started 11 years ago.
First flight took 3 years after program start
First delivery to the air force took 8 years after program start
Might be cleared for combat operations in 14 years after program start "at the earliest".

A330 MRTT
Development started 18 years ago
First flight took 3 years after program start
First delivery (to the Australian air force) took 7 years after program start
Clear for all operations took 7 years after program start

kitplane01 wrote:

I thought it might be interesting to compare the two programs. I've started their timelines at program start.

KC-46
Development started 11 years ago.
First flight took 3 years after program start
First delivery to the air force took 8 years after program start
Might be cleared for combat operations in 14 years after program start "at the earliest".

A330 MRTT
Development started 18 years ago
First flight took 3 years after program start
First delivery (to the Australian air force) took 7 years after program start
Clear for all operations took 7 years after program start

Some caveats to this analysis. First, most of the technology for the A330 version was derived from the A310 version. Which is somewhat similar to the KC-767 & KC-46 development.

Second, the A330 MRTT was not fully cleared for Australian operations until 2014, because it too had teething problems. So that is 10 years after program start.

Third, many of the features of the KC-46 did not appear in the A330 MRTT until the "New Standard" aircraft, which first flew in 2016, and were not delivered for 2 more years, as an evolution of the earlier aircraft. It was also in this time frame that the UK modified a few of their Voyagers for civilian transport certification, similar to the KC-46. So if those are included to get a common basis of comparison, 14 years total.

Lastly would point out that the KC-46 production rate is higher and has already matched the A330 MRTT production, meaning that airframes are being built while the testing and teething problems are being worked out (concurrency). So it will take longer to retrofit the existing aircraft because there are far more of them to modify.

Avatar2go wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

I thought it might be interesting to compare the two programs. I've started their timelines at program start.

KC-46
Development started 11 years ago.
First flight took 3 years after program start
First delivery to the air force took 8 years after program start
Might be cleared for combat operations in 14 years after program start "at the earliest".

A330 MRTT
Development started 18 years ago
First flight took 3 years after program start
First delivery (to the Australian air force) took 7 years after program start
Clear for all operations took 7 years after program start

Second, the A330 MRTT was not fully cleared for Australian operations until 2014, because it too had teething problems. So that is 10 years after program start.

I thoguht I was reasonably informed, but I've not read this. Can you provide a link .. something that tells about this. The obvious to me google searches find nothing. I'm totally willing to be educated.

Avatar2go wrote:

Third, many of the features of the KC-46 did not appear in the A330 MRTT until the "New Standard" aircraft, which first flew in 2016, and were not delivered for 2 more years, as an evolution of the earlier aircraft. It was also in this time frame that the UK modified a few of their Voyagers for civilian transport certification, similar to the KC-46. So if those are included to get a common basis of comparison, 14 years total.

If you are referring to this, it reads like a rather standard PIP, and not a revolution in performance. "Dubbed MRTT Enhanced and planned to be flight tested from late 2015, the enhancements include improved aerodynamics, engine performance improvement packages, and avionics introduced on commercial A330s in recent years, plus a new mission planning system and software updates for the refuelling boom."

Avatar2go wrote:

Lastly would point out that the KC-46 production rate is higher and has already matched the A330 MRTT production, meaning that airframes are being built while the testing and teething problems are being worked out (concurrency). So it will take longer to retrofit the existing aircraft because there are far more of them to modify.

I would not look at things this way. Write Airbus a check, and they will sell you as many MRTTs as you want. The KC-46 has won one contract (plus three airframes for Japan), and that was with the one air force that owns more than 1/2 the worlds air refuelers. Discusing why would rehash old political discussions. But Airbus could easily crank the production rate .. just write a check.

I don't believe the MRTT ever needed an upgrade to do it's basic mission. The KC-46 does.

Avatar2go wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

I thought it might be interesting to compare the two programs. I've started their timelines at program start.

KC-46
Development started 11 years ago.
First flight took 3 years after program start
First delivery to the air force took 8 years after program start
Might be cleared for combat operations in 14 years after program start "at the earliest".

A330 MRTT
Development started 18 years ago
First flight took 3 years after program start
First delivery (to the Australian air force) took 7 years after program start
Clear for all operations took 7 years after program start

Some caveats to this analysis. First, most of the technology for the A330 version was derived from the A310 version. Which is somewhat similar to the KC-767 & KC-46 development.

Second, the A330 MRTT was not fully cleared for Australian operations until 2014, because it too had teething problems. So that is 10 years after program start.

Third, many of the features of the KC-46 did not appear in the A330 MRTT until the "New Standard" aircraft, which first flew in 2016, and were not delivered for 2 more years, as an evolution of the earlier aircraft. It was also in this time frame that the UK modified a few of their Voyagers for civilian transport certification, similar to the KC-46. So if those are included to get a common basis of comparison, 14 years total.

Lastly would point out that the KC-46 production rate is higher and has already matched the A330 MRTT production, meaning that airframes are being built while the testing and teething problems are being worked out (concurrency). So it will take longer to retrofit the existing aircraft because there are far more of them to modify.

Considering all available information, would you agree the MRTT has had an easier development than the KC-46?

I consider them both to be comparable in quality and capability, in final form, but due to large difference in size, they are optimized for different missions. That is the true discriminator.

In July 2013, RAAF announced there would be a delay in full operational capability of their RAAF A330, after problems with the boom emerged. Those were not fully worked out until March 2017. However the drogue system was fully operational by 2014, and the boom was operational in testing. Which was a somewhat similar situation to the current KC-46.

https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/min ... c-30a-mrtt

So as far as development path, the MRTT was quicker to drogue operation, but they both have had boom issues that delayed full operational capability.

Several of the MRTT customers didn't require the boom, having only drogue aircraft, so those customers came online with fewer delays and problems. That was never an option for the KC-46, for which the boom is the primary refueling instrument.

One big difference between the MRTT and the KC-46 is the in-line production of the militarized frame. It was this in-line production which lead to the decision of BCA control of the wiring design (or mis-design) that contributed to some of the delay.

The KC-45 would have also had in-line production of a militarized frame and a brand new FAI in Alabama. Who knows how many additional years it would add to the KC-45 if all went well vs. the MRTT. Maybe one or two?

bt

Avatar2go wrote:

I consider them both to be comparable in quality and capability, in final form, but due to large difference in size, they are optimized for different missions. That is the true discriminator.

If "in final form" means "once it works" then that's an uninteresting observation.

I believe that today the A330 MRTT is fully operational in all it's missions, and the KC-46 is not.

And yes, there is a size difference.

Does anyone know the price difference between a KC-46 and an MRTT? Price does matter!

kitplane01 wrote:

I believe that today the A330 MRTT is fully operational in all it's missions, and the KC-46 is not.

The KC-767 also works.

The contest was with the KC-45 not the MRTT. I would admit that Airbus may have the advantage in the remote vision arena, but . . .

bt

kitplane01 wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

I consider them both to be comparable in quality and capability, in final form, but due to large difference in size, they are optimized for different missions. That is the true discriminator.

If "in final form" means "once it works" then that's an uninteresting observation.

I believe that today the A330 MRTT is fully operational in all it's missions, and the KC-46 is not.

And yes, there is a size difference.

Does anyone know the price difference between a KC-46 and an MRTT? Price does matter!

As you acknowledged, the A330 MRTT began in 2004,which was 18 years ago, and achieved full operational capability in 2017, so that is a period of 13 years. The KC-46 began in 2011, which was 11 years ago, and will reach full operational capability in 2025 (if one includes the modified boom), so that will be 14 years. So I don't see a substantial difference. Both aircraft had developmental issues.

The cost of an A330 MRTT is $300M for a new aircraft, about $240M for a used aircraft conversion. The US full contract cost for a new KC-46, including development, is also about $240M. The unit cost for a new KC-46 is estimated to be around $180M.(from Japan procurement). The Israeli cost for the KC-46 was $300M, but includes a broad parts, support equipment, and services package.

Well another series of the MRTT being far better than the KC-46. Yes, Boeing screwed the pooch and needed to write off billions. Lot 7 in early 2021 was 2.124 billion for 15 aircraft results in a unit cost (probably pretty bare) of $141.6M each. Many of the issues with the design was the required EMP hardening and getting the WARPS FAA certified which Cobham totally botched, but these WARPS were also going onto the A330 design so this would have hit both of the designs, Cobham still has not finished up with the WARPS, one of the big remaining items.

Boeing was stupid to argue for 5 years on behalf of their subcontractor for the Remote Vision System. It was a low bid crappy system from the get go, Boeing fighting for years on this cost Boeing years, goodwill, and billions. If they had a spec of intelligence RVS 2.0 adoption should have been years ago.

I suspect the AF contracts people did some math, if they award a sole source to Boeing for the KC-Y there are a whole host of FAR clauses that limit the contract unit costs fromthe KC-X, basically just by inflation. If they rebid, Boeing could reprice as they saw fit knowing they are already certified but the LM A330 version needs to cover their certification costs. This is likely a $20M or more increase pssible compared to the sole source. No wonder the AF seems to have shelved the rebid.

If only had Boeing executed the KC-46 like they did with the P-8A.

JayinKitsap wrote:

If only had Boeing executed the KC-46 like they did with the P-8A.

If only the Air Force had performed their duties like the Navy......
It takes two hands to clap.

Avatar2go wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

I consider them both to be comparable in quality and capability, in final form, but due to large difference in size, they are optimized for different missions. That is the true discriminator.

If "in final form" means "once it works" then that's an uninteresting observation.

I believe that today the A330 MRTT is fully operational in all it's missions, and the KC-46 is not.

And yes, there is a size difference.

Does anyone know the price difference between a KC-46 and an MRTT? Price does matter!

As you acknowledged, the A330 MRTT began in 2004,which was 18 years ago, and achieved full operational capability in 2017, so that is a period of 13 years. The KC-46 began in 2011, which was 11 years ago, and will reach full operational capability in 2025 (if one includes the modified boom), so that will be 14 years. So I don't see a substantial difference. Both aircraft had developmental issues.

The cost of an A330 MRTT is $300M for a new aircraft, about $240M for a used aircraft conversion. The US full contract cost for a new KC-46, including development, is also about $240M. The unit cost for a new KC-46 is estimated to be around $180M.(from Japan procurement). The Israeli cost for the KC-46 was $300M, but includes a broad parts, support equipment, and services package.

Why do you think the airbus a 330 MRTT did not attain full operational capability until 2017? And why do you think the plane had any operational deficiencies before 2017

kitplane01 wrote:

Why do you think the airbus a 330 MRTT did not attain full operational capability until 2017? And why do you think the plane had any operational deficiencies before 2017

I posted the link to the Australian Defense Ministry statement above.

Avatar2go wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

Why do you think the airbus a 330 MRTT did not attain full operational capability until 2017? And why do you think the plane had any operational deficiencies before 2017

I posted the link to the Australian Defense Ministry statement above.

I read that. It does not say the airplane had any deficiency. It reads like the squadron has moved from IOC in 2014 to full OC in 2017. That they completed training and procedures. I see no reason the believe the plane had significant deficiencies in 2014.

kitplane01 wrote:

I read that. It does not say the airplane had any deficiency. It reads like the squadron has moved from IOC in 2014 to full OC in 2017. That they completed training and procedures. I see no reason the believe the plane had significant deficiencies in 2014.

Sorry, you had said you researched this and I explained earlier, so didn't think you needed the earlier references.

Here is the history of the Australian program:

The prototype aircraft (MRTT#1) was accepted on 29 December 2011 following refurbishment to remove the extensive suite of flight test instrumentation, repair structural damage, install retrofit modifications, and to complete the interior fit out. In accordance with the commercial settlement, MRTT#1 was handed back to Airbus Defence and Space for use during 2012 for testing of modifications to the military avionics and boom refuelling systems.

Commencement of qualification flight testing was delayed due to additional inspections and repairs to MRTT#1 to correct quality and maintenance deficiencies. Flight testing of the military avionics was completed in October 2012, with ongoing technical investigation of two functions.

Certification of modifications to the boom refuelling system was further delayed due to completion of investigation into the in-flight loss of boom incident in September 2012 on a United Arab Emirates Air Force aircraft being operated by Airbus Defence and Space. Certification (safety) flight testing was completed February 2013.

Qualification (contract compliance) flight testing commenced in March 2013 but was unable to be completed prior to induction of the test aircraft into heavy maintenance in July 2013 due to a number of test anomalies. Flight test resumed in November 2013 with certification and qualification flight test to be conducted through 2014. Completion of boom testing is planned for July 2014.

The ARBS Qualification flight test program was successfully completed in July 2014 with Contractual acceptance of the ARBS achieved in December 2014. FMR is currently forecast for May 2016, 39 months behind the original planned date.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source= ... NFsGTuugW6

In March 2015, the A330 MRTT was taken off the "Concern" list with boom problems addressed, and boom operations beginning to be phased in. That process continued until 2017 when it was fully approved for boom operations, which took a year longer than expected (roughly 50 months behind the original schedule defined in 2008).

https://www.flightglobal.com/australia- ... 72.article

Avatar2go wrote:

scbriml wrote:

Imagine how bad things would be if Boeing didn't have all those decades of tanker experience.

As many here have tried to explain, the KC-46 is not the KC-135, it's significantly more advanced, as requested by the USAF. The decades of experience with the KC-135 won't overlap very much with the KC-46. All the systems are different, airframe is different, boom is different, fuel system is different, avionics are different, certification is different, hardening is different, defenses are different.

Your user profile indicates you weren't hear during "tanker wars", when Boeing's tanker experience was touted by many as a major factor in why they should be awarded the contract.

It also shouldn't be forgotten or ignored that Boeing had already delivered 767-based tankers to Italy and Japan.