Pegasus is stretching its legs even more.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler ... nkers/amp/

The first KC-46A of LOT 7, with tail number 16084, indicating FY 21.

21-46084, KPAE, Everett Modification Center, 7 December 2022


Original uploaded by Matt Cawby at twitter, see : https://twitter.com/mattcawby/status/16 ... 0929105920

Aircraft data : L/N 1282 C/N xxxxxx B767-2C 21-46084 USAF KC-46A (VH084) Lot 7, #01/15, tail 16084

Next already assembled KC-46A's are :
L/N 1284 C/N xxxxxx B767-2C 21-46085 USAF KC-46A (VH085) Lot 7, #02/15, tail 16085
L/N 1286 C/N xxxxxx B767-2C 21-46086 USAF KC-46A (VH086) Lot 7, #03/15, tail 16086
L/N 1288 C/N xxxxxx B767-2C 21-46087 USAF KC-46A (VH087) Lot 7, #04/15, tail 16087
L/N 1290 JASDF KC-46A (VH403)

The KC-46 RVS 2.0 is undergoing it's first operational testing, with USAF and press attending a demonstration. Here is an article that presents many of the system details, as well as sample imagery.

Over the summer, Boeing and the Air Force outfitted a KC-46 with the new cameras that will be used as part of the RVS 2.0 sensor suite while at the same time retaining its legacy cameras, Burns said. It then flew that tanker from the Pacific Northwest down to California, giving a split-screen comparison between imagery from the old and new camera suite.

“Everyone really wanted to stress those cameras and see what they look like. And as you can see looking at the baseline system and the new RVS 2.0 cameras, the dynamic range of these cameras is phenomenal,” he said as the video played for reporters. Burns pointed to footage where blown-out imagery from RVS 1.0 looks crisp and clear with the new camera suite. “They’re able to adapt to that changing environment,” he said.

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/12/aft ... -the-code/

bobinthecar wrote:

Incident refuelling an F15

Old news

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your ... ghter-jet/

I assume the F-15 was in a position to divert

INFINITI329 wrote:

bobinthecar wrote:

Incident refuelling an F15

Old news

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your ... ghter-jet/

I assume the F-15 was in a position to divert

You (almost) never do “tank or swim”. There’s always a divert. The HH-60s do, or did, have a process to approve a refueling without a divert plan for high priority missions. I think the Perfect Storm rescue was one.

LyleLanley wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

Even acknowledging all this, though, the article is complementary of the KC-46 from all perspectives, including boomers. It has a significant flaw in the RVS and that is not disputed by anyone. But overall, the aircraft is a major improvement.

Boeing disputed that the RVS was flawed for years. But at least there's hope: with 1.5 the cameras will be digitally aligned versus toed-in. Supposedly this will greatly reduce eye-strain. I would've thought an upgraded IMU to get our full AR envelope back would be included in 1.5, but nothing yet. Time will tell if it makes it with 2.0 or remains truncated.

If I may point out, many of the boomers who are complimentary are former 135 bubbas (including the guys from the article), whose previous aircraft - apart from cockpit displays and engines - was straight outta the stone age. It's understandable why they'd be impressed by the ability to make fire, but also important for context to what they say. Read what they're happy with in the article: ALAS and an autopilot that doesn't try to kill them or their receivers. Former KC-10 folks are less impressed, as this is stuff we've had since day one, before the A-team and ALF were on tv. 40 years later, 'pong' technology like that still impresses the 135 guys. We can do better. I just want to see what I'm doing without having to scroll between 15 different day scenes and 5 night scenes and have others tell me it's great.

Stitch wrote:

An atomic bomb is quieter than a KC-135R.

Do not believe I have heard a KC-10, but I could believe the KC-46A is quieter since it has one less engine, if nothing else.

Ha! You've never heard a KC-135A, I presume! Those babies were so loud, they had to put metal rings (band aids) on the outside of the aft fuselage to keep the insanely high engine noise from ripping the fuselage apart. They're still there, by the way. THAT is loud. The R models are truly whisper jets.

The KC-46 is a little quieter than the KC-10, but nowhere near as quiet as a KC-135R. Engine noise has more to do with bypass ratio and other design aspects than # of engines.

As a DAL friend said about going to MD-80 school: the DC-9 bubbas thought it was the Starship Enterprise, while the B757 guys wondered how it ever got certified. When we got the FMS-800 in the C-5, couldn’t believe it—a memory stick, no more typing lat/long coordinates out of the FLIP pages.

USAF has awarded Production lot 8 as of 21 AUG 22 bringing the number on order to 109 for the USAF. Other contracts to date have awarded 4 for Israel and 5 for Japan. So 70 remain for future lots from the 179 plane program of record. Lot 8 roughly prices out at $147.6M each, the Israel contract priced at $ 231.9M. Reporters always look at the original contract for about $5B and note that Boeing has written off around $ 5B along with it - what a huge loss - well yes a lot of money. But the production lots are on the order of $ 16B beyond this original order. Lot 8 was change P00215, what juicy amounts are in the prior 214 changes. The 70 remaining planes is 5.8 years at 12 per year.

The Jan 22 GAO report to Congress on the KC-46, lots of good stuff inside.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104530.pdf

If the need is to order about 12 aircraft a year thru the KC-Y program for the next 15 years the KC-Y plane needs to be certified within 5 years. If there is little difference between the KC-46 and KC-Y Boeing could have the KC-Y certified in that time (Boeing has been known to have a lot of own goals so who knows). Even if awarded now, Lockmart would be hard pressed to have a FAA certified aircraft in 5 years, it took Boeing almost a century <LOL>.

Let's leave aside the capabilities argument for now, lets look at the AF's hand in this game of poker.

1. Is the AF trying to get all of the deficiencies resolved and the Full Rate Production milestone so they have a better handle of the risks and the actual capabilities before extending the program of record past 179.

2. Can the AF extend on a sole source buy a program of record if not in Full Rate Production? I think the F-35 is caught in a similar wicket but their program of record is far, far off. What are the rules on allowing extensions, I know it is done the F-15EX is a great example, it worked for Boeing but the GE engine award was protested, GE won the subsequent competition because PW needed to cover certification costs for its engines, while GE was already on the Qatar order.

3. In the FARs around Construction, there are very specific rules on a sole source negotiation. Additional units will be priced at the prior unit cost x defined multipliers. For example if Boeing's unit price is $150M each in 2015 dollars the next soul source contract might only allow $ 159M + 10% + contract inflation factors. But that is locking in for Boeing its 10% underbid (my speculation) into the next program, a big savings for the Government. In this soul source case Boeing would have lower margins locked in - had they not underbid they would have normal margins in the next round.

4. If the AF competes Boeing knows all of their costs up front, pretty easy to price. The LMXT is not a full fledged design, yes there are a lot of A330 tanker craft produced, but what about the AF communications, the FAA certification, EMI shielding, etc that was known at KC-X bid time, but Boeing got these pieces now designed, but LM & Airbus didn't. Plus LMXT has a barn full of certification costs with only the Cobham wing pods being FAA certified (well it will be some day!). Boeing has little to certify if the current KC-46 meets specs. With the R&D cost hurdle for LM, this competition is Boeing's to lose, that is if the AF doesn't really want to change horses. Boeing could easily recover the $5B excess cert costs.

5. If there are big spec changes, say for modern engines - Boeing has the GEnX from the 748 for the neo engine, Airbus would go with the T7000 of the A339, but has that one run the gauntlet yet in terms of entry into AF service? New coms, drone tankering, added weapons, new roles Boeing has at least equal footing with LM.

6. Both the B767 and the A330 are in their twilight of their production. Boeing knows these factors, it can make 15/yr work for production. Would Airbus want A330 production, except for the FAL being in the US, to run for 20 more years at 15 per year. Ten years out it us unlikely there would be further civilian orders.

27 JAN 23 was a good day for Boeing, Lot 9 is ordered. 15 planes @ $2,255,625,408

https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/ ... /3281107//

Brings the KC-46 order total to 124 of the 179 total. Not sure how many have been delivered thus far.

Avatar2go wrote:

Brings the KC-46 order total to 124 of the 179 total. Not sure how many have been delivered thus far.

According to this article, the Air Force has 128 under contract, of which 68 have been delivered and are in use. In addition, Boeing is under contract for 10 additional frames; 6 for Japan, of which 2 have been delivered, and 4 for Israel.

https://www.militarytimes.com/air/2023/ ... re-kc-46s/

firemansparky wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

Brings the KC-46 order total to 124 of the 179 total. Not sure how many have been delivered thus far.

According to this article, the Air Force has 128 under contract, of which 68 have been delivered and are in use. In addition, Boeing is under contract for 10 additional frames; 6 for Japan, of which 2 have been delivered, and 4 for Israel.

https://www.militarytimes.com/air/2023/ ... re-kc-46s/

Thanks for the clarification. I found the Boeing press release which provides the source numbers:

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=131206

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

As a DAL friend said about going to MD-80 school: the DC-9 bubbas thought it was the Starship Enterprise, while the B757 guys wondered how it ever got certified. When we got the FMS-800 in the C-5, couldn’t believe it—a memory stick, no more typing lat/long coordinates out of the FLIP pages.

I believe it. Thankfully my unit converted from the KC-10 so we weren't very starry-eyed, but for many of the guys and gals at Altus it's like going from a '54 Studebaker with no power steering or brakes to an 2010 Camry.

In Air Force contracts, what are the limitations on doing a follow on buy sole sourced. I'm looking at whether there are advantages and disadvantages with the KC-46. I know in Construction there are caviots with prior unit pricing that binds the contractor to that prior unit price x a standardized inflation factor. Could the AF bind Boeing into KC-X pricing x the similar escalation they are doing on the current lots in the KC-X contract, rolled over past the program of record which I am sure is important, but it seems like many programs ordered well past the record amount. The C-17 comes to mind. It might be coming with the P-8, they are getting close.

JayinKitsap wrote:

In Air Force contracts, what are the limitations on doing a follow on buy sole sourced. I'm looking at whether there are advantages and disadvantages with the KC-46. I know in Construction there are caviots with prior unit pricing that binds the contractor to that prior unit price x a standardized inflation factor. Could the AF bind Boeing into KC-X pricing x the similar escalation they are doing on the current lots in the KC-X contract, rolled over past the program of record which I am sure is important, but it seems like many programs ordered well past the record amount. The C-17 comes to mind. It might be coming with the P-8, they are getting close.

I don't know if it's possible to bind the previous price, I would think that would be open to negotiation.

But I would think the price will be similar, because the original price included development costs that are now mostly retired. So by getting the KC-Y contract at around the same price as KC-X, Boeing would have a healthy positive margin for that production run, despite taking a loss on the first run.

Also they have steadily written down the losses in the KC-X program, rather than letting them accumulate. So those losses are largely retired along with the development risk.

I'm sure the USAF knows this too, so it would be interesting to see if they exert downward pressure. One thing they will do for sure, is separately fund any development, outside of fixed cost production. Neither wants a repeat of the previous contract.

I believe it is in the legislations for all government contracts.

The supplier have to provide financial data on the build so the government can see if there is excess price gouging. Boeing can't just overcharge the government for the next tranche. If they find out that it may cost more per frame, the government will allow it as long as Boeing can show justification.

Typically for military programs, the supplier expect this. They will squeeze efficiency on rhe production side and work on making money on the sustainment and upgrade side.

This is especially true for C3 and EW programs like the P-8. The learning curve for the program has leveled at the tail end. The price have dropped significantly since the LRIP frames but future frames cost will probably not fluctuate much.

They will make money on sustainment and upgrades like the recent Increment 3 Block II upgrade.


bt

On the KC-10 thread it mentioned the Cobham WARP pods for the wing drogue's. Has Cobham finally got their FAA certification? It's been years since this issue surfaced

JayinKitsap wrote:

On the KC-10 thread it mentioned the Cobham WARP pods for the wing drogue's. Has Cobham finally got their FAA certification? It's been years since this issue surfaced

There has been no public confirmation that the WARP civil certification is complete. Only reports that certification was due in 2021. I check for this periodically and have not seen anything, including in the Federal Register where FAA publishes it's rulings.

So my best guess is no.

Add to that now, civil certification of the new panoramic cameras, which is expected to take at least 2 years.

JayinKitsap wrote:

On the KC-10 thread it mentioned the Cobham WARP pods for the wing drogue's. Has Cobham finally got their FAA certification? It's been years since this issue surfaced

Cobham Mission System, the division of Cobham that produces the RP-910E-75 Wing Aerial Refueling Pod (WARP) and FR-600-84MDR Centerline Drogue System (CDS) for the KC-46A has been sold to Eaton in June 2021.
The question remains: was WARPS already FAA certified by Cobham before the acquisition or will it have to be certified by Eaton !

See : https://www.cobhammissionsystems.com/ai ... t/docview/
And : https://www.eaton.com/us/en-us/company/ ... tems-.html

FAA STC data base :

STC ST00157MC, issued to Boeing for the KC-46 (767-2C) aerial refuelling system (boom, centerline drogue and AROS (not warps !!) , date of issuance : Sept 4 2028, latest revision date : June 4 2019.

Nothing about WARPS !

747classic wrote:

date of issuance : Sept 4 2028

I presume that's a typo and should be 2018.

The last information about the WARP's, was that the deployable RAT was the hold-up, since they were not designed to the civilian RAT standards. The centerline drogue system doesn't have a RAT and so was certified, although it still took multiple years.

Revelation wrote:

747classic wrote:

date of issuance : Sept 4 2028

I presume that's a typo and should be 2018.

2018 is correct
I saw my typo after 29 minutes, but just too late to correct.

A Dreamlifter is bringing the 100th KC-46A 41 section to Everett on February 20,

A ceremony was held at Spirit Aerosystems for the delivery of the 100th KC-46A fwd (41) section at February 17th.



Original uploaded by SpiritAerosystems at twitter, see : https://twitter.com/SpiritAero/status/1 ... 3555473409

Aircraft data : L/N 1312 C/N xxxxxx B767-2C 21-46096 USAF KC-46A (VH096) Lot 7, #13/15, tail 16096 (KC-46A number 100)

Note : The other four (4) are KC-46A aircraft, built for the JASDF.

It sounds like the USAF is finally quite satisfied with RVS 2.0.

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/02 ... on-system/

So, that's nice.

According the article :

RVS 2.0 was originally to be released in March 2024. But in October 2022, the Air Force announced a delay of 19 months, largely due to supply chain issues among Boeing subcontractors. Under the current timeline, RVS 2.0 will now arrive in October 2025, at which point testing and Federal Aviation Administration certifications will have ended, then system installation will begin on the Pegasus fleet.

Since the digital age it seems normal , that you can start/loose a few wars, before a modification to your military aircraft has been certified and installed.

Question : Since when are military sub-systems FAA certified ?

The 767-2C airframe is indeed FAA certified, but can only be civil used after removal /deactivation of all military sub systems, according the FAA Type Certificate.

747classic wrote:

Question : Since when are military sub-systems FAA certified ?

Not sure about the Military Sub-system, but the original Wedgetail was certified via FAA and Austrailian regulatory agency as rhe USAF was not involved. Back in the 2000?

Fast forward to the new US E-7 configuration, I believe the FAA and USAF will be involved this time. The FAA certification is not necessarily the functionality of the military equipment but rather how the equipment impacts the flight characteristics of the airplane systems.

bt

bikerthai wrote:

747classic wrote:

Question : Since when are military sub-systems FAA certified ?

Not sure about the Military Sub-system, but the original Wedgetail was certified via FAA and Austrailian regulatory agency as rhe USAF was not involved. Back in the 2000?

Fast forward to the new US E-7 configuration, I believe the FAA and USAF will be involved this time. The FAA certification is not necessarily the functionality of the military equipment but rather how the equipment impacts the flight characteristics of the airplane systems.

bt

So once again, the US Air Force is going to get an off the shelf product but make massive changes which will result in the FAA certification starting from scratch? Unless the radar housing is changed, the flight characteristics of the a/c will not change regardless of the updated / customized / improved whatever they call the necessary changes the Air Force requires. However, to add my caveat, if they decide to install multiple million dollar toilet seats which increase the weight and more importantly affect the center of gravity of the a/c also requiring additional flight control software changes, then yeah, this should be another boondoggle which Boeing will catch and should go online in 20 years when the replacement goes out to RFP.

par13del wrote:

then yeah, this should be another boondoggle which Boeing will catch and should go online in 20 years when the replacement goes out to RFP.

Doesn't look like the aircraft flight characteristics will change. There is significant changes to the mission computing suite.

Boondoggle? Maybe not for 20 years as BCA would want to close out the NG line asap.

Futher discussion can be had in the E-7 thread.

bt

texl1649 wrote:

It sounds like the USAF is finally quite satisfied with RVS 2.0.

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/02 ... on-system/

So, that's nice.

Should be noted as well, that the system they are getting today, would not have been remotely feasible when development began. The industry has advanced at an incredible rate. It's truly cutting edge, and better than any other existing system.

I suspect once Boeing gave up on staying within their budget defined by the fixed cost contract, they turned instead to providing the best solution possible. Which was the right and logical thing to do, given the life of the KC-46 fleet, which is really just beginning

As far as the FAA certification issues, it has to do with safety. The panoramic cameras selected by the Air Force did not have civilian certification, so they must meet all the criteria for fault tree analysis. No failure mode can contribute to an unsafe condition on the aircraft, so no overheating, shorts, arcing, flames, etc.

The aerodynamic component is probably pretty minor, in comparison to documenting the electronic's resistance to pressure, temperature, vibration, impact, and other environmental extremes. They must fail only in a benign manner, that poses no threat.

Most people don't realize how extensive the certification requirements and review process are, for all commercial aircraft components. A year is nothing in that context. But that's why air safety has improved so significantly.

There are several jets that were assumed to be 2021 models that are actually USAF 2011 serials. From what I gather, the contract for the FY11 models had to be delivered by a certain date, so with the original builds not in any shape to be accepted by the USAF, they reserialed the following as 2011's instead of 2018s.
18-46057 is 11-46057 McGuire
18-46058 is 11-46058 Seymour-Johnson
18-46059 is 11-46059 Altus
18-46060 is 11-46060 McGuire

To add to the fun, several 2019 models were reserialized as 2015 models
19-46066 is 15-46066 Seymour-Johnson
19-46067 is 15-46067 McConnell
19-46068 is 15-46068 Seymour-Johnson
19-46069 is 15-46069 McGuire
19-46070 is 15-46070 McGuire

The last 19 model is 19-46071 and is correct

For some stupid reason to put the cherry on top of everything...
15-46007 is now 19-46007.

Source is AMC Maintenance Database to verify these serials. I was skeptical when I heard a guy at Seymour-Johnson talking about it being a 2011 tail, but he was right!

Galaxy5007 wrote:

There are several jets that were assumed to be 2021 models that are actually USAF 2011 serials. From what I gather, the contract for the FY11 models had to be delivered by a certain date, so with the original builds not in any shape to be accepted by the USAF, they reserialed the following as 2011's instead of 2018s.
18-46057 is 11-46057 McGuire
18-46058 is 11-46058 Seymour-Johnson
18-46059 is 11-46059 Altus
18-46060 is 11-46060 McGuire

To add to the fun, several 2019 models were reserialized as 2015 models
19-46066 is 15-46066 Seymour-Johnson
19-46067 is 15-46067 McConnell
19-46068 is 15-46068 Seymour-Johnson
19-46069 is 15-46069 McGuire
19-46070 is 15-46070 McGuire

The last 19 model is 19-46071 and is correct

For some stupid reason to put the cherry on top of everything...
15-46007 is now 19-46007.

Source is AMC Maintenance Database to verify these serials. I was skeptical when I heard a guy at Seymour-Johnson talking about it being a 2011 tail, but he was right!

This is going to give me such a headache the next time I go photographing these things at Red Flag...

One of the early builts (15-46010 ), from the LRIP #1 batch, made her first (B1) flight at 01 March 2023 with callsign BOE10, see : https://flightaware.com/live/flight/BOE ... /KPAE/KPAE
The B1 flight was cut short due flight control issues (flaps ?) and a high speed landing was made.

N2007L, KPAE, March 01th 2013




Original uploaded by Matt Cawby at twitter, see : https://twitter.com/mattcawby/status/16 ... 6457680896

Aircraft data : L/N 1104 C/N 41859 B767-2LKC 15-46010 USAF KC-46A (VH010) LRIP 1, #6/7, N2007L, tail 56010

Air Force looking to cancel KC-Y competition, order 75 additional KC-46 on top of initial 179 on contract with Boeing: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/usaf- ... th-future/

Under this plan, the Air Force will focus efforts on a low-visibility tanker over traditional tanker aircraft. I think the follow on amount is too low to continue to recapitalize the 135 fleet, while the new work to procure a stealth tanker is too slow to provide what the Air Force needs in a timely manner, or provide something to adequately substitute the tanking capacity of the KC-10, but this sounds like the most politically palatable option the Air Force can come up with without threatening program schedule even more.

Makes sense, to me. The KC-46A is already in service and is continuing to mature as a platform and with the anti-air environment only becoming more deadly, moving to a Low Observable next generation tanker platform sounds like a prudent option. And if that program lags, the USAF can always just add more KC-46A in the interim.

RobertoMugabe wrote:

I think the follow on amount is too low to continue to recapitalize the 135 fleet,

The article mentioned the requirement for 150 KC-Y tankers. So the 75 may just be this lot buy with additional lot(s) to come.

bt

RobertoMugabe wrote:

Air Force looking to cancel KC-Y competition, order 75 additional KC-46 on top of initial 179 on contract with Boeing: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/usaf- ... th-future/

Under this plan, the Air Force will focus efforts on a low-visibility tanker over traditional tanker aircraft. I think the follow on amount is too low to continue to recapitalize the 135 fleet, while the new work to procure a stealth tanker is too slow to provide what the Air Force needs in a timely manner, or provide something to adequately substitute the tanking capacity of the KC-10, but this sounds like the most politically palatable option the Air Force can come up with without threatening program schedule even more.

Interesting how this seems to kill off the idea that LM would be making A330 MRTTs in Alabama:

Hunter said the Air Force consulted with Boeing and Lockheed Martin on when they could deliver new tankers after Boeing finishes its current contract for 179 KC-46s. Boeing could produce an uprated KC-46 by 2032 and Lockheed could provide an “LMXT” tanker, based on the Airbus A330, by 2034. By that time, USAF doesn’t want to be buying traditional tankers anymore, Hunter said.

I think most of the posters to our LMXT thread were presuming it could be made a product a lot sooner than 2034, but I think they probably didn't understand how hard it is to meet USAF requirements.

All this while Boeing continues to foobar the KC-46 program, showing why a bit of diversity in the supply chain might not be a bad idea:

A fresh quality issue with the center fuel tank of the 767 freighter and KC-46 tanker is bedeviling Boeing, illustrating the ongoing fragility inside its supply chain and adding to the list of production obstacles standing in the way of reaching a regular jetliner delivery tempo.

The supplier, which changed ownership from Triumph Group to Daher last year, disclosed to Boeing that cleaning and paint adhesion testing had not been followed before the center wing tank structure was shipped to Boeing for final assembly of the 767 variants, according to two people familiar with the issue.

While not considered an immediate safety concern, improperly painted and primed fuel tank structure can flake off and clog fuel filters and gum up the system that feeds the aircraft’s engines.

Ref: https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-prod ... nter-tank/

Revelation wrote:

A fresh quality issue with the center fuel tank of the 767 freighter and KC-46 tanker is bedeviling Boeing, illustrating the ongoing fragility inside its supply chain and adding to the list of production obstacles standing in the way of reaching a regular jetliner delivery tempo.

The supplier, which changed ownership from Triumph Group to Daher last year, disclosed to Boeing that cleaning and paint adhesion testing had not been followed before the center wing tank structure was shipped to Boeing for final assembly of the 767 variants, according to two people familiar with the issue.

While not considered an immediate safety concern, improperly painted and primed fuel tank structure can flake off and clog fuel filters and gum up the system that feeds the aircraft’s engines.

Ref: https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-prod ... nter-tank/

This kinda stuff is just incomprehensible. It is not like Daher is a small component manufacturer operating out of some warehouse. It is hard to understand how essential production processes, including real time monitoring and quality control, can be so poorly executed for such high value contracts.

stratable wrote:

This kinda stuff is just incomprehensible. It is not like Daher is a small component manufacturer operating out of some warehouse. It is hard to understand how essential production processes, including real time monitoring and quality control, can be so poorly executed for such high value contracts.

Here's a scenario that is easy to comprehend. As these company ramp up from the COVID slow down and begin to hire new workers again, FUBAR happens because of insufficient training or just by human nature, Bubba decides to take a short cut.

Expect more of these types off issue as Boeing and others around the supply change hire thousands of new workers to ramp up production.

bt

bikerthai wrote:

stratable wrote:

This kinda stuff is just incomprehensible. It is not like Daher is a small component manufacturer operating out of some warehouse. It is hard to understand how essential production processes, including real time monitoring and quality control, can be so poorly executed for such high value contracts.

Here's a scenario that is easy to comprehend. As these company ramp up from the COVID slow down and begin to hire new workers again, FUBAR happens because of insufficient training or just by human nature, Bubba decides to take a short cut.

Expect more of these types off issue as Boeing and others around the supply change hire thousands of new workers to ramp up production.

bt

But Boeing will be more involved in this kind of ramp up issues, because production was not only reduced due COVID, but also due all isues with the 737MAX, 787, etc.
The experience drain issue will be more prone in US based companies ( just trow them out, together with the experience, we will hire new, cheaper ones later. ).
In Europe a lot of experienced workers kept their jobs during COVID, due government support and tighter lay-off procedures.

747classic wrote:

bikerthai wrote:

stratable wrote:

This kinda stuff is just incomprehensible. It is not like Daher is a small component manufacturer operating out of some warehouse. It is hard to understand how essential production processes, including real time monitoring and quality control, can be so poorly executed for such high value contracts.

Here's a scenario that is easy to comprehend. As these company ramp up from the COVID slow down and begin to hire new workers again, FUBAR happens because of insufficient training or just by human nature, Bubba decides to take a short cut.

Expect more of these types off issue as Boeing and others around the supply change hire thousands of new workers to ramp up production.

bt

But Boeing will be more involved in this kind of ramp up issues, because production was not only reduced due COVID, but also due all isues with the 737MAX, 787, etc.
The experience drain issue will be more prone in US based companies ( just trow them out, together with the experience, we will hire new, cheaper ones later. ).
In Europe a lot of experienced workers kept their jobs during COVID, due government support and tighter lay-off procedures.

My point is that in certain industries and for certain applications of your product you do not get to make these excuses. Like essential medical equipment, military equipment needs to work.
Now we have seen low availability rates across all militaries. But especially for a military product fresh off the assembly line you do not get to make these errors. I am wondering what options Congress (?) has here to force Boeing into compliance (given that this is not the first major issue with the KC46). Or what Congress could be stipulating for future contracts, maybe having two separate manufacturing lines for essential equipment like this (at the expense of cost efficiency)?

stratable wrote:

I am wondering what options Congress (?) has here to force Boeing into compliance

There is already a law to prevent government entity from having non-competitive bid. Single source is allowed with the appropriate justifications. However this law does not prevent competing companies to no-bid.

Once a contract is signed enforcement is through the contract and compliance is usually adhered to because of potential for future work.

bt

stratable wrote:

I am wondering what options Congress (?) has here to force Boeing into compliance (given that this is not the first major issue with the KC46).

None, really. I mean they can stop funding the KC-46A program, but that's not going to happen.

stratable wrote:

Or what Congress could be stipulating for future contracts, maybe having two separate manufacturing lines for essential equipment like this (at the expense of cost efficiency)?

If Congress wants to fund the infrastructure, sure. As S. R. Hadden said in the film Contact - "Why have one when you can have two for twice the price?"

So the inside of then tank is flaking.. the tank components are all finished with Zinc Chromate before assembly, all fasteners are installed with wet zinc chromate, then when the center section is complete the whole thing is cleaned and another coat of zinc chromate is applied inside and out for military and inside only for commercial the exterior getting SRF instead. at least that is what the specs were in my day.

But if the error means they skipped the alodine further up stream there could be other problems, like leaking around the fasteners over time.

bikerthai wrote:

RobertoMugabe wrote:

I think the follow on amount is too low to continue to recapitalize the 135 fleet,

The article mentioned the requirement for 150 KC-Y tankers. So the 75 may just be this lot buy with additional lot(s) to come.

bt

I think they realized they would have a production gap between KC-46 and KC-Y, which would ultimately lower tanker numbers due to attrition. So they do this 75 buy of existing KC-46 to prevent that. It also buys more time for the remainder of KC-Y to be finalized. But they said that KC-Y will also now include less development, as they focus those efforts on KC-Z.

Avatar2go wrote:

I think they realized they would have a production gap between KC-46 and KC-Y, which would ultimately lower tanker numbers due to attrition. So they do this 75 buy of existing KC-46 to prevent that. It also buys more time for the remainder of KC-Y to be finalized. But they said that KC-Y will also now include less development, as they focus those efforts on KC-Z.

Fine, yet https://www.airandspaceforces.com/hunte ... th-future/ says:

“We have come to the determination that the kind of KC-X, -Y, -Z strategy that was established in the 2009-2010 timeframe is no longer fit for … meeting the air refueling needs of the joint force in the 2030s and beyond,” Hunter told reporters at the AFA Warfare Symposium.

I take them at their word, and no longer am thinking in terms of XYZ. They now use the ‘five-year KC-135 recapitalization effort' verbiage.

They now say that having a competition will result in a production gap, i.e. there won't be a competition because no one wants that production gap and the KC-46 will get the remaining orders for "traditional tankers" i.e the "KC-135 recapitalization".

KC-Y was thought of as a 150 aircraft purchase. They are saying they want to keep it to 75 for now and evaluate later via "analysis of alternatives" if they will buy the remaining 75 or if the "accelerated" NGAS "future, survivable" tanker is a viable option or not.

Personally, I have a hard time seeing this other than Boeing getting contracts for another 150 KC-46s. TFA says the current contract's last year is FY27. A bump of 75 tankers at 15/year is another five years till FY32. Therefore the all-new survivable tanker would need to be a reality in FY33. I mean it took Boeing eight years from selection to first delivery of KC-46, and they started with a plane that was already flying and had served as a tanker before. It seems far more likely NGAS won't be a thing by FY33 and they'll sign for another 75 running out till FY38. They will still be able to point at the need to retire KC-135s regardless of the status of NGAS.

Revelation wrote:

Fine, yet https://www.airandspaceforces.com/hunte ... th-future/ says:

“We have come to the determination that the kind of KC-X, -Y, -Z strategy that was established in the 2009-2010 timeframe is no longer fit for … meeting the air refueling needs of the joint force in the 2030s and beyond,” Hunter told reporters at the AFA Warfare Symposium.

I take them at their word, and no longer am thinking in terms of XYZ. They now use the ‘five-year KC-135 recapitalization effort' verbiage.

They now say that having a competition will result in a production gap, i.e. there won't be a competition because no one wants that production gap and the KC-46 will get the remaining orders for "traditional tankers" i.e the "KC-135 recapitalization".

KC-Y was thought of as a 150 aircraft purchase. They are saying they want to keep it to 75 for now and evaluate later via "analysis of alternatives" if they will buy the remaining 75 or if the "accelerated" NGAS "future, survivable" tanker is a viable option or not.

Personally, I have a hard time seeing this other than Boeing getting contracts for another 150 KC-46s. TFA says the current contract's last year is FY27. A bump of 75 tankers at 15/year is another five years till FY32. Therefore the all-new survivable tanker would need to be a reality in FY33. I mean it took Boeing eight years from selection to first delivery of KC-46, and they started with a plane that was already flying and had served as a tanker before. It seems far more likely NGAS won't be a thing by FY33 and they'll sign for another 75 running out till FY38. They will still be able to point at the need to retire KC-135s regardless of the status of NGAS.

It's more an evolution, I think. KC-Z was always meant to be a radical departure from the traditional tanker concept. But they have a dilemma in the time it will take to reach production. So KC-Y is being redefined. It was always meant as a filler or bridge effort. Now it is becoming partly, and perhaps fully, an extension of KC-X.

Avatar2go wrote:

It's more an evolution, I think. KC-Z was always meant to be a radical departure from the traditional tanker concept. But they have a dilemma in the time it will take to reach production. So KC-Y is being redefined. It was always meant as a filler or bridge effort. Now it is becoming partly, and perhaps fully, an extension of KC-X.

Yes, all good points.

My real question is, was this ever a chance for A330MRTT to get back into the game, as so many seemed to hope it was? You can make a good case that it should be after Boeing's ongoing foobars on KC-46. OTOH, Airbus itself said it was out after the KC-46 award. OTOH, LM came back in later. You can IMO make a good case that having two suppliers rather than one is a good idea. I still feel A330 is probably too much tanker for the job, but maybe losing KC-10 should make it easier to justify something bigger than KC-46? Yet now things are lining up for Boeing to get 179+75 orders and probably another 75 too.

My cynical side feels the fix was in right from the start and the only outcome was going to be Boeing getting all the business, and events are tracking right along that path so it's hard to shake that feeling.

Revelation wrote:

My real question is, was this ever a chance for A330MRTT to get back into the game, as so many seemed to hope it was?

I tend to think "no". The USAF really wants to retire the KC-10A fleet so they don't seem to feel they need a "heavy" tanker when they can just use additional KC-46A assets to drag the KC-46A assets that are dragging the fighters, bombers and transports.

As to the arguments that it would not be ordered because it is a "foreign" product, it has a shedload of US-sourced product in it and would have been assembled and outfitted in the US so it's as much the "home team" option as the KC-46A, IMO.

Revelation wrote:

(One) can make a good case that it should be after Boeing's ongoing foobars on KC-46.

Boeing and its suppliers stuffing up KC-46 so much might be giving the USAF concerns that LM could potentially do the same with LMXT since it will likely source much of its mission-specific content from those same suppliers. I would expect it to use the same RVS 2.0 system, boom and drogues and the Cobham WASPs that have been giving KC-46 headaches. And LM's project management has not exactly been stellar, either.

Revelation wrote:

My cynical side feels the fix was in right from the start and the only outcome was going to be Boeing getting all the business, and events are tracking right along that path so it's hard to shake that feeling.

In terms of the KC-Y RFP, yeah, I could see it, but more due to just "going with the devil you know" than worrying about both "the devil you know" AND "the devil you do not know".

Revelation wrote:

My real question is, was this ever a chance for A330MRTT to get back into the game, as so many seemed to hope it was? You can make a good case that it should be after Boeing's ongoing foobars on KC-46. OTOH, Airbus itself said it was out after the KC-46 award. OTOH, LM came back in later. You can IMO make a good case that having two suppliers rather than one is a good idea. I still feel A330 is probably too much tanker for the job, but maybe losing KC-10 should make it easier to justify something bigger than KC-46? Yet now things are lining up for Boeing to get 179+75 orders and probably another 75 too.

My cynical side feels the fix was in right from the start and the only outcome was going to be Boeing getting all the business, and events are tracking right along that path so it's hard to shake that feeling.

I would say rather that many unrelated factors have combined in favor of the KC-46. Emergence from the development tale of woe. Interim approval to allow routine dispatch for 97% of the fleet. The structure of the fixed cost contract, which ensures production economy of scale savings go to the USAF, and not Boeing. The strengthening conviction of USAF that the KC-46 is right-sized for the majority of their operations. And now the desire to accelerate into NGAS due to Chinese advancement.

Except for the contract, none of those factors was really assured ahead of time. The LMXT was always going to be the tougher sell. It's still a possibility if Congress pushes for a competition.

I've said this many times, but I think it's still difficult for some to accept that the MRTT could be the optimal solution for most smaller militaries, but not for the US with a large distributed air force, requiring hundreds of tankers. It's just a different logistics problem. But it seems counterintuitive that the large tanker best fits the small force, while the small tanker (in numbers) best fits the larger force.

Avatar2go wrote:

I've said this many times, but I think it's still difficult for some to accept that the MRTT could be the optimal solution for most smaller militaries, but not for the US with a large distributed air force, requiring hundreds of tankers. It's just a different logistics problem. But it seems counterintuitive that the large tanker best fits the small force, while the small tanker (in numbers) best fits the larger force.

This is what we used to refer to as the "booms in the air" issue when this topic was being discussed here in the early 2000s. To many of us, it seemed obvious that KC-46 was the fastest/cheapest path to the most booms in the air. What we didn't see was Boeing stepping all over its dingus.