This went into a very personal/ego driven discussion somehow (?), but the XL was clearly capable of being further developed per the links I provided above, including for USN purposes. Whatever, Vought obviously did a lot of the early work (and was a naval aviation expert at that point as was the case with Grumman/McD), and the -16N I posted as a response to someone asking about adversary USN role for the -16.
The very first take off/flight showed it could handle lower speed rotation, and more work could/would be done (reason for citing the excerpt). Canards/modified planform could also have been done for a serious ‘super bug’ competitor/derivative. The -16 and the -18 competed with each other from their respective conceptions through to the present day (see: India etc). There were other negatives too, though I still profess/believe a ‘compromise’ of sorts between the 1602 and the XL and the F-2 (JASDF) wings might/could have worked well;
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/03/we- ... t-carrier/The XL is an intriguing what-if that certainly could have been superior to the Super Eagle in service but as per the designer the USAF wanted the -15 to stay in production. Sometimes politics matter, inarguably, in procurement decisions of all sorts.
The V-1602 was the greatest departure from the F-16A. With the heavier GE F101 engine, the V-1602 also had a redesigned and reconfigured wing, and the fuselage was widened behind the wing to the same width as the leading edge extensions ahead of it. Wing area was 399 sq.ft., with a span of 38 ft. 11 in., and the aircraft was 53 ft. 11 in. overall length.
The Navy, however, favored the Northrop/McDonnell Douglas development of the twin-engined YF-17. It didn’t want the V-1600, nor any of the other proposals based on the F-16. Most accounts state that a primary reason for rejection of the F-16 was that the Navy preferred its aircraft to have two engines, because of the added over-water safety factor. Some say the Navy thought there was more growth potential in a scaled-up YF-17, and that it had superior range to the F-16. Others have brought up the fact that the F-16’s jet intake was just above the nosewheel, posing a greater than usual hazard for the catapult crew, but apparently these were not the only reasons, or the most important.
In his book Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation, former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. James L. Holloway explained how he fought for the F/A-18 the Navy preferred. Holloway wrote that he had already fought members of Congress who wanted to force the F-16 on the Navy: “I had testified that the Navy wasn’t interested in a fighter that could only get on and off of a carrier by means of a crane, no matter how little it costs.”
Holloway appealed directly to Schlesinger for a meeting to explain the Navy’s position. The admiral was told he could bring only two other people to the meeting because of the size of the room, but when he walked into Schlesinger’s office that day in April 1975 he found more than a dozen people from OSD, who proceeded to argue at length for their preferred F-16-based choice.
When Holloway’s turn finally came, he explained first that “… naval test analyses indicated the F-16 would bang the tailpipe on the deck with unacceptable frequency,” during carrier landings, and even a cursory look at the geometry of the main gear lends credence to those analyses. OSD personnel countered with the claim that the problem could be solved with faster landing speeds and better pilot technique (preach that to the naval aviator landing on a dark and stormy night, with the deck pitching 20 feet or more), and then went on to make even more lengthy arguments for the F-16.
Holloway, however, had saved his best argument for last.
“I pointed out that the F-16 carried only AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and they were clear-air-mass missiles. In clouds, a radar missile like the AIM-7 Sparrow III was required. This capability, with the necessary radar guidance system and heavier pylons, had been incorporated into the F-18 design, but the F-16 would not accommodate an all-weather missile system without extensive redesign and added weight.” The V-1600’s increased size and weight, even in a paper proposal, clearly demonstrated this.
https://forums.spacebattles.com/threads ... -that-wasn’t.343069/
Of course, the -16’s would get Sparrows/AMRAAMs but that was the end of it. Ultimately, I think it’s good the USN didn’t muck up the -16 early on, though again I think the cost for the Super Hornet, which is really a new aircraft vs. the classics, warranted a different outcome potentially (be it a Tomcat 21 or some sort of F-16 derivative).