I'm super curious. How many helos on the carrier, how many distributed throught the escorts, and how many stay ashore?

Well according to the original poster 19 on the carrier itself which is a testament to the screwed up state of the Navy, see below. Pretty much every escort has room for two in the hanger though they rarely if ever sail with more than one.In a perfect world That 8 ship squadron of 60s would be cut to two or four. There would be more tankers, a dedicated ASW/Tanker airplane ala S-3, and the F/A squadrons would all have at least 12 planes each.

1 Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks
1 Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks

bobinthecar wrote:

Why would you have a 20 billion dollar asset putting itself at risk to get close enough to a bunch of gunboats so that your Sierras can do battle? As for its other roles sure, CSAR, evac and VERTREP is useful but Im not sure you would need all that many of them.
I suppose since the carrier has the room for them its okay but these birds could just as easily be based on escorts with hangers as most of those ship with only a single helo.

bobinthecar wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

I'm super curious. How many helos on the carrier, how many distributed throught the escorts, and how many stay ashore?

Well according to the original poster 19 on the carrier itself which is a testament to the screwed up state of the Navy, see below. Pretty much every escort has room for two in the hanger though they rarely if ever sail with more than one.In a perfect world That 8 ship squadron of 60s would be cut to two or four. There would be more tankers, a dedicated ASW/Tanker airplane ala S-3, and the F/A squadrons would all have at least 12 planes each.

1 Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks
1 Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks

Y'all aren't reading my words.

When HSMs and HSCs deploy to a Carrier- their birds are then spread throughout the CBG.

CGs, and DDGs with hangars routinely get two each- 'least that's how it used to be- why would they change?
Supply ships- same. Maybe... depends on if the ship is a USS, or a USNS.... that's another topic for another day.
Once in an op area- many of the Sierras from the Carrier would go ashore, maybe a few Romeos would as well.


I find myself wondering just how big you think an H-60 is.
When folded up- two of our birds fit in the space one legacy Hornet would take... two and a half for each Super Bug.
It's worth noting- S-3s also used very little space when folded up.
But the story was the same- two of ours to one of theirs.....



StudeDave

kitplane01 wrote:

Question: Is there room on the carrier to operate another 10 fast jets? It's the same boats as 1993!

I don't see why not-- the biggest deck hogs are now gone.
The Super Hornets that "took their place" aren't quite as big.
With all those lovely A-6s gone- even more space.

You do have a few more helos, and those monstrosities, errr, uh Ospreys to deal with, but one would hope they spend as much time ashore as the CAG, and/or Battle Group Commander deems necessary. But when you get down to it- the same is/was done with the C-2s as well.
You see- being on a VRC Det is sorta the same as being in a VP squadron...... good duty when (if?) you can get it.....




StudeDave....

studedave wrote:

bobinthecar wrote:

Why would you have a 20 billion dollar asset putting itself at risk to get close enough to a bunch of gunboats so that your Sierras can do battle? As for its other roles sure, CSAR, evac and VERTREP is useful but Im not sure you would need all that many of them.
I suppose since the carrier has the room for them its okay but these birds could just as easily be based on escorts with hangers as most of those ship with only a single helo.

bobinthecar wrote:

Well according to the original poster 19 on the carrier itself which is a testament to the screwed up state of the Navy, see below. Pretty much every escort has room for two in the hanger though they rarely if ever sail with more than one.In a perfect world That 8 ship squadron of 60s would be cut to two or four. There would be more tankers, a dedicated ASW/Tanker airplane ala S-3, and the F/A squadrons would all have at least 12 planes each.

Y'all aren't reading my words.

I was reading your words. And I'm interested. I was curious if you had any numbers on how many we aboard the carrier, how many were on the escorts (two per ship with hanger?) and how many ashore.

STT757 wrote:

texl1649 wrote:

This is all an extremely high amount of cost to get a (nearly?) trillion dollar manned asset (carrier battle group), to a thousand miles from china.

The logical/non-emotional option would be to move to a more distributed/less vulnerable asset. What CVN ‘power’ needs to really be projected in the western pacific by folks like GWB/Obama/Biden/Trump (21st century US presidents)? Is any of this really going to lower the chances of armed conflict?

The airbases in Guam, Okinawa etc. are going to be targets. Carriers can maneuver and operate just outside the range of Chinese anti-ship missiles while still being able to project power into the conflict zone.

True, but carriers will be targets quite quickly as well. In the age of satellite reconnaissance no CBG is going to be hidden in the open waters. That means they will be just as vulnerable. I'm not sure a CBG can be considered more survivable -- or even more hard to find and target -- than an airbase. I don't want to start another debate about the utility of carriers in the modern theater, but I am curious whether people think carriers in contested seas are somehow less vulnerable than heavily fortified and defended air bases.

Satellites won't be immune from destruction.

kitplane01 wrote:

A Carrier Air Wing in 1993 was
2 fighter squadrons (VF) of 10–12 F-14 Tomcats
2 strike fighter squadrons (VFA) of 12 F/A-18 Hornets
1 medium attack squadron (VA) 10 A-6E SWIP/TRAM intruders
1 tactical electronic warfare squadron (VAQ) of 4–6 EA-6Bs
1 anti-submarine squadron (VS) of 8 S-3A/B Vikings
1 helicopter anti-submarine squadron (HS) of 6 SH-3H Sea Kings
1 Detachment of ES-3A Shadow ELINT aircraft from a fleet air reconnaissance squadron (VQ)
1 detachment of C-2A Greyhound aircraft for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD)
------
About 83 aircraft including 63 fast jets

A modern Carrier Air Wing is
4 Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons, with twelve F/A-18E/F Super Hornets each
1 Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, made up of five EA-18G Growlers.
1 Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron, with four E-2C Hawkeyes or five E-2D "Advanced" Hawkeyes
1 Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks
1 Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks
1 Fleet Logistics Support (VRC) Squadron Detachment of two C-2A Greyhounds;
-------------------------
About 74 aircraft including 52 fast jets

Question: Is there room on the carrier to operate another 10 fast jets? It's the same boats as 1993!

There is indeed room for additional jets. Having the funding or leadership to actually fight and make that possible is the issue.

The Air Wing of today is far more accurate and efficient than the Air Wing of the 80s/90s. It falls short though in capability of range and performance. If you compare an Air Wing of today vs what could have been....(2) F-14D Tomcat Squadrons, (2) F-35 squadrons and (1) squadron of A-6F/Gs and EA-6 platforms, you begin to see how we are lacking in so many ways.

muralir wrote:

STT757 wrote:

texl1649 wrote:

This is all an extremely high amount of cost to get a (nearly?) trillion dollar manned asset (carrier battle group), to a thousand miles from china.

The logical/non-emotional option would be to move to a more distributed/less vulnerable asset. What CVN ‘power’ needs to really be projected in the western pacific by folks like GWB/Obama/Biden/Trump (21st century US presidents)? Is any of this really going to lower the chances of armed conflict?

The airbases in Guam, Okinawa etc. are going to be targets. Carriers can maneuver and operate just outside the range of Chinese anti-ship missiles while still being able to project power into the conflict zone.

True, but carriers will be targets quite quickly as well. In the age of satellite reconnaissance no CBG is going to be hidden in the open waters. That means they will be just as vulnerable. I'm not sure a CBG can be considered more survivable -- or even more hard to find and target -- than an airbase. I don't want to start another debate about the utility of carriers in the modern theater, but I am curious whether people think carriers in contested seas are somehow less vulnerable than heavily fortified and defended air bases.

The Soviets had more satellite recon and air recon assets, and the USN routinely operated carrier groups off the Soviet coast, without being detected. See an example of a story here:

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.php

CX747 wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

A Carrier Air Wing in 1993 was
2 fighter squadrons (VF) of 10–12 F-14 Tomcats
2 strike fighter squadrons (VFA) of 12 F/A-18 Hornets
1 medium attack squadron (VA) 10 A-6E SWIP/TRAM intruders
1 tactical electronic warfare squadron (VAQ) of 4–6 EA-6Bs
1 anti-submarine squadron (VS) of 8 S-3A/B Vikings
1 helicopter anti-submarine squadron (HS) of 6 SH-3H Sea Kings
1 Detachment of ES-3A Shadow ELINT aircraft from a fleet air reconnaissance squadron (VQ)
1 detachment of C-2A Greyhound aircraft for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD)
------
About 83 aircraft including 63 fast jets

A modern Carrier Air Wing is
4 Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons, with twelve F/A-18E/F Super Hornets each
1 Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, made up of five EA-18G Growlers.
1 Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron, with four E-2C Hawkeyes or five E-2D "Advanced" Hawkeyes
1 Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks
1 Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks
1 Fleet Logistics Support (VRC) Squadron Detachment of two C-2A Greyhounds;
-------------------------
About 74 aircraft including 52 fast jets

Question: Is there room on the carrier to operate another 10 fast jets? It's the same boats as 1993!

There is indeed room for additional jets. Having the funding or leadership to actually fight and make that possible is the issue.

The Air Wing of today is far more accurate and efficient than the Air Wing of the 80s/90s. It falls short though in capability of range and performance. If you compare an Air Wing of today vs what could have been....(2) F-14D Tomcat Squadrons, (2) F-35 squadrons and (1) squadron of A-6F/Gs and EA-6 platforms, you begin to see how we are lacking in so many ways.

In short, though there are less aircraft, they can generate more sorties per day because they have more room on the carrier to efficiently handle aircraft on the deck.

On top of that, Hornets require less maintenance time than the old F-14 and Intruders, so their readiness is higher. Range is a bit of an issue, but with the introduction of the F-35C, the USN sees the return of a longer range strike asset as part of the carrier arsenal.

ThePointblank wrote:

In short, though there are less aircraft, they can generate more sorties per day because they have more room on the carrier to efficiently handle aircraft on the deck.

On top of that, Hornets require less maintenance time than the old F-14 and Intruders, so their readiness is higher. Range is a bit of an issue, but with the introduction of the F-35C, the USN sees the return of a longer range strike asset as part of the carrier arsenal.

To be clear

1) Putting more airplanes on the boat will reduce sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

2) In the 1970s to 1990s. there were too many planes on the boat if the goal was maximum sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

I don't understand how #2 can be true. Would not the sailers of that day (who were just as smart as we are) have noticed and solved this problem by reducing airwing size?

kitplane01 wrote:

ThePointblank wrote:

In short, though there are less aircraft, they can generate more sorties per day because they have more room on the carrier to efficiently handle aircraft on the deck.

On top of that, Hornets require less maintenance time than the old F-14 and Intruders, so their readiness is higher. Range is a bit of an issue, but with the introduction of the F-35C, the USN sees the return of a longer range strike asset as part of the carrier arsenal.

To be clear

1) Putting more airplanes on the boat will reduce sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

2) In the 1970s to 1990s. there were too many planes on the boat if the goal was maximum sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

I don't understand how #2 can be true. Would not the sailers of that day (who were just as smart as we are) have noticed and solved this problem by reducing airwing size?

One of the major reasons why there were so many aircraft on a carrier is the low operational readiness of certain aircraft types. Take the F-14 as an example.

The F-14 was not known for having a very good operational readiness because of it's complexity and various technical issues; many of the F-14's operational still had the TF30 engine which was a horrible mismatch between the aircraft and engine, the variable sweep wing system frequently broke down and pissed hydraulic fluid everywhere, etc.

Even during the heyday of the F-14 of the 1980's, in an operational squadron over the course of an average year, you were lucky to have half the F-14's operational or serviceable, and for every flight hour, you needed 40+ maintenance hours on the ground, either in preventative maintenance, or fixing something that broke. Thus, in order to keep enough aircraft available for operations, you needed a lot of aircraft on a carrier just so you can get enough operational aircraft available. The F-14D while improving various aspects of the aircraft, never really resolved the maintenance and operational readiness issues to something more reasonable.

On top of that, a lot of the carrier aircraft back them were single mission; a F-14 could do air superiority, but could not engage ground targets. The A-6 and A-7's, while competent strike aircraft, could not conduct air superiority. And if your mission heavily leans towards one over the other, well that's half your air wing that can't do the mission.

The introduction of multirole aircraft onto the carrier air wing, in the form of the F/A-18 Hornet and later the F/A-18 Super Hornet meant that a lot of types could be consolidated into one airframe that could do it all; a Hornet could conduct a strike mission while being able to self-escort, eliminating the need for another type to provide the escort. If you needed all of your Hornets to provide air superiority or strike, not an issue; you could load up all of your Hornets accordingly, and (going back to the earlier point about availability) can count on having most of your Hornets operationally available on the carrier deck.

In short, you could really consolidate the aircraft types on a carrier, which means there is more space on a carrier; the carrier deck and hangar are busy places, with aircraft and weapons being moved around. The less you need to move aircraft and weapons around, and the less interference waiting for say, an aircraft to be moved before weapons can be moved means an more operationally efficient flight deck.

ThePointblank wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

ThePointblank wrote:

In short, though there are less aircraft, they can generate more sorties per day because they have more room on the carrier to efficiently handle aircraft on the deck.

On top of that, Hornets require less maintenance time than the old F-14 and Intruders, so their readiness is higher. Range is a bit of an issue, but with the introduction of the F-35C, the USN sees the return of a longer range strike asset as part of the carrier arsenal.

To be clear

1) Putting more airplanes on the boat will reduce sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

2) In the 1970s to 1990s. there were too many planes on the boat if the goal was maximum sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

I don't understand how #2 can be true. Would not the sailers of that day (who were just as smart as we are) have noticed and solved this problem by reducing airwing size?

One of the major reasons why there were so many aircraft on a carrier is the low operational readiness of certain aircraft types. Take the F-14 as an example.

The F-14 was not known for having a very good operational readiness because of it's complexity and various technical issues; many of the F-14's operational still had the TF30 engine which was a horrible mismatch between the aircraft and engine, the variable sweep wing system frequently broke down and pissed hydraulic fluid everywhere, etc.

Even during the heyday of the F-14 of the 1980's, in an operational squadron over the course of an average year, you were lucky to have half the F-14's operational or serviceable, and for every flight hour, you needed 40+ maintenance hours on the ground, either in preventative maintenance, or fixing something that broke. Thus, in order to keep enough aircraft available for operations, you needed a lot of aircraft on a carrier just so you can get enough operational aircraft available. The F-14D while improving various aspects of the aircraft, never really resolved the maintenance and operational readiness issues to something more reasonable.

On top of that, a lot of the carrier aircraft back them were single mission; a F-14 could do air superiority, but could not engage ground targets. The A-6 and A-7's, while competent strike aircraft, could not conduct air superiority. And if your mission heavily leans towards one over the other, well that's half your air wing that can't do the mission.

The introduction of multirole aircraft onto the carrier air wing, in the form of the F/A-18 Hornet and later the F/A-18 Super Hornet meant that a lot of types could be consolidated into one airframe that could do it all; a Hornet could conduct a strike mission while being able to self-escort, eliminating the need for another type to provide the escort. If you needed all of your Hornets to provide air superiority or strike, not an issue; you could load up all of your Hornets accordingly, and (going back to the earlier point about availability) can count on having most of your Hornets operationally available on the carrier deck.

In short, you could really consolidate the aircraft types on a carrier, which means there is more space on a carrier; the carrier deck and hangar are busy places, with aircraft and weapons being moved around. The less you need to move aircraft and weapons around, and the less interference waiting for say, an aircraft to be moved before weapons can be moved means an more operationally efficient flight deck.

I think I knew all of tht (althought I don't mind the review).

But if the goal was maximum sorties per day, was the aircraft carrier of the 1970s->1990s overcrowded?

kitplane01 wrote:

ThePointblank wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

To be clear

1) Putting more airplanes on the boat will reduce sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

2) In the 1970s to 1990s. there were too many planes on the boat if the goal was maximum sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

I don't understand how #2 can be true. Would not the sailers of that day (who were just as smart as we are) have noticed and solved this problem by reducing airwing size?

One of the major reasons why there were so many aircraft on a carrier is the low operational readiness of certain aircraft types. Take the F-14 as an example.

The F-14 was not known for having a very good operational readiness because of it's complexity and various technical issues; many of the F-14's operational still had the TF30 engine which was a horrible mismatch between the aircraft and engine, the variable sweep wing system frequently broke down and pissed hydraulic fluid everywhere, etc.

Even during the heyday of the F-14 of the 1980's, in an operational squadron over the course of an average year, you were lucky to have half the F-14's operational or serviceable, and for every flight hour, you needed 40+ maintenance hours on the ground, either in preventative maintenance, or fixing something that broke. Thus, in order to keep enough aircraft available for operations, you needed a lot of aircraft on a carrier just so you can get enough operational aircraft available. The F-14D while improving various aspects of the aircraft, never really resolved the maintenance and operational readiness issues to something more reasonable.

On top of that, a lot of the carrier aircraft back them were single mission; a F-14 could do air superiority, but could not engage ground targets. The A-6 and A-7's, while competent strike aircraft, could not conduct air superiority. And if your mission heavily leans towards one over the other, well that's half your air wing that can't do the mission.

The introduction of multirole aircraft onto the carrier air wing, in the form of the F/A-18 Hornet and later the F/A-18 Super Hornet meant that a lot of types could be consolidated into one airframe that could do it all; a Hornet could conduct a strike mission while being able to self-escort, eliminating the need for another type to provide the escort. If you needed all of your Hornets to provide air superiority or strike, not an issue; you could load up all of your Hornets accordingly, and (going back to the earlier point about availability) can count on having most of your Hornets operationally available on the carrier deck.

In short, you could really consolidate the aircraft types on a carrier, which means there is more space on a carrier; the carrier deck and hangar are busy places, with aircraft and weapons being moved around. The less you need to move aircraft and weapons around, and the less interference waiting for say, an aircraft to be moved before weapons can be moved means an more operationally efficient flight deck.

I think I knew all of tht (althought I don't mind the review).

But if the goal was maximum sorties per day, was the aircraft carrier of the 1970s->1990s overcrowded?

I remember reading a RAND report that compared US carrier sortie generation rate between various USN carriers during Gulf War I. In general, for the same size of carrier, the carrier with a smaller air wing had a notably higher sortie generation rate per day during the conflict.

Out of curiosity anyone know why carrier air wing is abbreviated CVW?

Elshad wrote:

Out of curiosity anyone know why carrier air wing is abbreviated CVW?

My guess would be because "CV" is the US designation for "Carrier" and then "W" for "wing."

From Wiki: In the United States Navy, these consist of ships commissioned with hull classification symbols CV (aircraft carrier), CVA (attack aircraft carrier), CVB (large aircraft carrier), CVL (light aircraft carrier), CVN (aircraft carrier (nuclear propulsion))

STT757 wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

STT757 wrote:

In a combat zone like the South China Sea the Navy needs longer range reach, to keep them out of range of missile threats.

I dunno. Seems like missile range is ever-increasing, and that eventually there will be no useful station out of missile range.

In order to be effective in the vast distances in the increasingly dangerous Western Pacific, aircraft would notionally have to operate more than 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier to keep out of range of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles like the DF-21 and DF-26, analyst Bryan Clark told USNI News in 2020.

The next step for the Navy is to bring an unmanned aerial refueling aircraft to operate further from the carrier to extend the range of the existing airwing. The first operational MQ-25A Stingray aerial refueling UAVs are set to deploy aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-73) by 2026, Vice Adm. Kevin Whitesell said in A

https://news.usni.org/2022/07/13/several-uavs-under-development-for-next-generation-carrier-air-wing

enter the block 4 with a new engine

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/9-r ... ew-engine/

The goals for the adaptive engine test program were to prove a three-stream architecture that improves engine fuel efficiency by 25 percent, increases thrust by 10 percent and significantly improves thermal management (cooling). Pratt and General Electric (GE) were selected to build AETP prototypes. While Pratt’s XA101 is still under development, GE’s XA100 has completed testing and has proven to increase fuel efficiency by 25 percent (enabling 30 percent greater range) and increase thrust by 10 percent to 20 percent (delivering 20 percent more acceleration than the F135). The XA100 provides twice the cooling capacity, and its ceramic matrix composite turbine blades can withstand 500 degrees Fahrenheit—more heat than the F135 engine.

Pratt’s XA101 also shows great promise, and there is every reason to believe that at the end of its testing, the Air Force will have two great options for a next-generation engine. While developing AETP’s technology was essential for the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) family of systems, it will also support every Block 4 upgrade currently envisioned for the F-35 — and that weapons system desperately needs an injection of competition.

bajs11 wrote:

STT757 wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

I dunno. Seems like missile range is ever-increasing, and that eventually there will be no useful station out of missile range.

In order to be effective in the vast distances in the increasingly dangerous Western Pacific, aircraft would notionally have to operate more than 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier to keep out of range of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles like the DF-21 and DF-26, analyst Bryan Clark told USNI News in 2020.

The next step for the Navy is to bring an unmanned aerial refueling aircraft to operate further from the carrier to extend the range of the existing airwing. The first operational MQ-25A Stingray aerial refueling UAVs are set to deploy aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-73) by 2026, Vice Adm. Kevin Whitesell said in A

https://news.usni.org/2022/07/13/several-uavs-under-development-for-next-generation-carrier-air-wing

enter the block 4 with a new engine

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/9-r ... ew-engine/

The goals for the adaptive engine test program were to prove a three-stream architecture that improves engine fuel efficiency by 25 percent, increases thrust by 10 percent and significantly improves thermal management (cooling). Pratt and General Electric (GE) were selected to build AETP prototypes. While Pratt’s XA101 is still under development, GE’s XA100 has completed testing and has proven to increase fuel efficiency by 25 percent (enabling 30 percent greater range) and increase thrust by 10 percent to 20 percent (delivering 20 percent more acceleration than the F135). The XA100 provides twice the cooling capacity, and its ceramic matrix composite turbine blades can withstand 500 degrees Fahrenheit—more heat than the F135 engine.

Pratt’s XA101 also shows great promise, and there is every reason to believe that at the end of its testing, the Air Force will have two great options for a next-generation engine. While developing AETP’s technology was essential for the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) family of systems, it will also support every Block 4 upgrade currently envisioned for the F-35 — and that weapons system desperately needs an injection of competition.

The new engine would need to fit into the CVM-22.

bobinthecar wrote:

If I had to guess I would say it would grow slightly and there would be some adjustments. Later blocks of the F/A-18 are extremely advanced and vastly underrated planes. Their one and only drawback is lack of range. F-35C has the range and will probably have even more range in the future if any of the engine upgrades planned are executed. They are the A-6E of the modern wing but since the F-18 lacks range there needs to be more of them. Kind of like the air wings of the 80s and 90s. There would be squadrons of both F-14s and F/A-18s. "Heavy" and "light" fighters so to speak. Or even wings of the 60s and 70s that had squadrons of A6 and A7's as heavy and light bombers.

Anyway to get to the point, yes. They are looking to increase the number of F-35s, Growlers, and MQ-25s. In my opinion They should get rid of or reduce the number of MH-60S as they are basically SAR and logistics assets and replace them with a platform that could take the place of the S-3s in tanking and long range ASW.

See this for the current thinking within the Navy on the subject. https://news.usni.org/2022/03/24/a-gene ... ghter-gaps

Before his death I recall Senator McCain discussing the need for lighter escort carriers at various Senate Armed Services Committee meetings. Something that is basically an adaption of an existing LHA or a commercial vessel to accommodate the MH-60s, CMV-22s and perhaps some MQ-8s and can keep up with the Carrier Battle Groups. This would free up room for additional F-18s, F-35s, EA-18Gs and UAVs.

STT757 wrote:

bajs11 wrote:

STT757 wrote:

In order to be effective in the vast distances in the increasingly dangerous Western Pacific, aircraft would notionally have to operate more than 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier to keep out of range of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles like the DF-21 and DF-26, analyst Bryan Clark told USNI News in 2020.

The next step for the Navy is to bring an unmanned aerial refueling aircraft to operate further from the carrier to extend the range of the existing airwing. The first operational MQ-25A Stingray aerial refueling UAVs are set to deploy aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-73) by 2026, Vice Adm. Kevin Whitesell said in A

https://news.usni.org/2022/07/13/several-uavs-under-development-for-next-generation-carrier-air-wing

enter the block 4 with a new engine

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/9-r ... ew-engine/

The goals for the adaptive engine test program were to prove a three-stream architecture that improves engine fuel efficiency by 25 percent, increases thrust by 10 percent and significantly improves thermal management (cooling). Pratt and General Electric (GE) were selected to build AETP prototypes. While Pratt’s XA101 is still under development, GE’s XA100 has completed testing and has proven to increase fuel efficiency by 25 percent (enabling 30 percent greater range) and increase thrust by 10 percent to 20 percent (delivering 20 percent more acceleration than the F135). The XA100 provides twice the cooling capacity, and its ceramic matrix composite turbine blades can withstand 500 degrees Fahrenheit—more heat than the F135 engine.

Pratt’s XA101 also shows great promise, and there is every reason to believe that at the end of its testing, the Air Force will have two great options for a next-generation engine. While developing AETP’s technology was essential for the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) family of systems, it will also support every Block 4 upgrade currently envisioned for the F-35 — and that weapons system desperately needs an injection of competition.

The new engine would need to fit into the CVM-22.

A CVM-22 can sling load the engine if need be, and since the new engines are supposed to be drop in replacements for the existing F135 engine, they should still fit.

STT757 wrote:

Before his death I recall Senator McCain discussing the need for lighter escort carriers at various Senate Armed Services Committee meetings. Something that is basically an adaption of an existing LHA or a commercial vessel to accommodate the MH-60s, CMV-22s and perhaps some MQ-8s and can keep up with the Carrier Battle Groups. This would free up room for additional F-18s, F-35s, EA-18Gs and UAVs.

Which of those ships can keep up with a CBG? There's a reason that ARGs are separate formations.

studedave wrote:

bobinthecar wrote:

In my opinion They should get rid of or reduce the number of MH-60S as they are basically SAR and logistics assets and replace them with a platform that could take the place of the S-3s in tanking and long range ASW.

An MH-60S does much more than SAR and logistics.
https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/MH-60S-Seahawk

It's also a safe bet that during a deployment- few of them (and many of the MH-60Rs) are even onboard.
They'd be on the other ships in the Battle Group, or sent ashore.
Just like is done with the VRC Det.

But yes- as for ASW- there's only so much those MH-60Rs can do, and only so much support P-8s can provide.
The S-3s wore many hats. Retiring them without replacement was bad


StudeDave
USN (retired)

Northrop Grumman planning production MQ-8C Fire Scout ASW capability

https://www.naval-technology.com/analysis/fire-scout-asw/

In a real-world operation, Redman said a Fire Scout UAS would be able to carry a payload of up to 40 sonobuoys which when combined with the systems 12-hour flight duration and 100-mile range would allow for it to conduct long-duration searches.

Redman added that Northrop Grumman was currently working to install Leonardo’s Osprey 30 Radar onto the Fire Scout meaning that the UAS could be launching sonobuoys to monitor the subsurface environment, while also building a surface picture for a ship. Using Fire Scout for ASW operations would also have the added benefit of freeing up a ship’s crewed helicopter for other operations.

A MQ-8C ASW platform, which can be launched from the escort destroyers, Cruiser and eventually Frigates combined with a potential MQ-25 ASW platform is the ideal replacement for the S-3. Both can loiter over the search areas for hours longer than the S-3 or SH-60s.

kitplane01 wrote:

ThePointblank wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

To be clear

1) Putting more airplanes on the boat will reduce sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

2) In the 1970s to 1990s. there were too many planes on the boat if the goal was maximum sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

I don't understand how #2 can be true. Would not the sailers of that day (who were just as smart as we are) have noticed and solved this problem by reducing airwing size?

One of the major reasons why there were so many aircraft on a carrier is the low operational readiness of certain aircraft types. Take the F-14 as an example.

The F-14 was not known for having a very good operational readiness because of it's complexity and various technical issues; many of the F-14's operational still had the TF30 engine which was a horrible mismatch between the aircraft and engine, the variable sweep wing system frequently broke down and pissed hydraulic fluid everywhere, etc.

Even during the heyday of the F-14 of the 1980's, in an operational squadron over the course of an average year, you were lucky to have half the F-14's operational or serviceable, and for every flight hour, you needed 40+ maintenance hours on the ground, either in preventative maintenance, or fixing something that broke. Thus, in order to keep enough aircraft available for operations, you needed a lot of aircraft on a carrier just so you can get enough operational aircraft available. The F-14D while improving various aspects of the aircraft, never really resolved the maintenance and operational readiness issues to something more reasonable.

On top of that, a lot of the carrier aircraft back them were single mission; a F-14 could do air superiority, but could not engage ground targets. The A-6 and A-7's, while competent strike aircraft, could not conduct air superiority. And if your mission heavily leans towards one over the other, well that's half your air wing that can't do the mission.

The introduction of multirole aircraft onto the carrier air wing, in the form of the F/A-18 Hornet and later the F/A-18 Super Hornet meant that a lot of types could be consolidated into one airframe that could do it all; a Hornet could conduct a strike mission while being able to self-escort, eliminating the need for another type to provide the escort. If you needed all of your Hornets to provide air superiority or strike, not an issue; you could load up all of your Hornets accordingly, and (going back to the earlier point about availability) can count on having most of your Hornets operationally available on the carrier deck.

In short, you could really consolidate the aircraft types on a carrier, which means there is more space on a carrier; the carrier deck and hangar are busy places, with aircraft and weapons being moved around. The less you need to move aircraft and weapons around, and the less interference waiting for say, an aircraft to be moved before weapons can be moved means an more operationally efficient flight deck.

I think I knew all of tht (althought I don't mind the review).

But if the goal was maximum sorties per day, was the aircraft carrier of the 1970s->1990s overcrowded?

No, but the hangar deck was crowded.

ThePointblank wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

ThePointblank wrote:

In short, though there are less aircraft, they can generate more sorties per day because they have more room on the carrier to efficiently handle aircraft on the deck.

On top of that, Hornets require less maintenance time than the old F-14 and Intruders, so their readiness is higher. Range is a bit of an issue, but with the introduction of the F-35C, the USN sees the return of a longer range strike asset as part of the carrier arsenal.

To be clear

1) Putting more airplanes on the boat will reduce sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

2) In the 1970s to 1990s. there were too many planes on the boat if the goal was maximum sorties-per-day, because of overcrowding?

I don't understand how #2 can be true. Would not the sailers of that day (who were just as smart as we are) have noticed and solved this problem by reducing airwing size?

One of the major reasons why there were so many aircraft on a carrier is the low operational readiness of certain aircraft types. Take the F-14 as an example.

The F-14 was not known for having a very good operational readiness because of it's complexity and various technical issues; many of the F-14's operational still had the TF30 engine which was a horrible mismatch between the aircraft and engine, the variable sweep wing system frequently broke down and pissed hydraulic fluid everywhere, etc.

Even during the heyday of the F-14 of the 1980's, in an operational squadron over the course of an average year, you were lucky to have half the F-14's operational or serviceable, and for every flight hour, you needed 40+ maintenance hours on the ground, either in preventative maintenance, or fixing something that broke. Thus, in order to keep enough aircraft available for operations, you needed a lot of aircraft on a carrier just so you can get enough operational aircraft available. The F-14D while improving various aspects of the aircraft, never really resolved the maintenance and operational readiness issues to something more reasonable.

On top of that, a lot of the carrier aircraft back them were single mission; a F-14 could do air superiority, but could not engage ground targets. The A-6 and A-7's, while competent strike aircraft, could not conduct air superiority. And if your mission heavily leans towards one over the other, well that's half your air wing that can't do the mission.

The introduction of multirole aircraft onto the carrier air wing, in the form of the F/A-18 Hornet and later the F/A-18 Super Hornet meant that a lot of types could be consolidated into one airframe that could do it all; a Hornet could conduct a strike mission while being able to self-escort, eliminating the need for another type to provide the escort. If you needed all of your Hornets to provide air superiority or strike, not an issue; you could load up all of your Hornets accordingly, and (going back to the earlier point about availability) can count on having most of your Hornets operationally available on the carrier deck.

In short, you could really consolidate the aircraft types on a carrier, which means there is more space on a carrier; the carrier deck and hangar are busy places, with aircraft and weapons being moved around. The less you need to move aircraft and weapons around, and the less interference waiting for say, an aircraft to be moved before weapons can be moved means an more operationally efficient flight deck.

Tomcat not known for operational readiness?!?! Yes, the TF-30s were an issue but the jet was not a hangar queen. The GE engines made that airframe a beast. It was and still is superior to the Super Hornet. If the USN had updated the tech in the Tomcat, they would be in a much better place. The Hornet had no legs, no speed, little carry ability and an abysmal bring back to deck capability. It was cheap and that's it. When the mid 90s came calling, the USN was put in a hard place. They should have/could have made other moves but failed. The Blue Water Navy is now a Brown Water Navy at best.

I'm sorry but I actually spit my drink out of my mouth when you stated the F-35C brings back range. F-35 and range in the same sentence is hilarious. Sure Fat Amy had fantastic tech but come off it. Give me a Super Tomcat 21 vs Fat Amy and I'll blow the doors off the crossbreed USAF/USN/USMC self described wonder child. The F-35 is wicked smart but it's my Mudhen that's lugging 6-9 JDAMs/GBUs to the fight, with superior range, loiter time, an extra grey matter and 2 more Mark 1 Eyeballs.

Also, fun fact...The Navy had to change its entire launch cycle when the Hornet showed up. The jet didn't have the legs to play nearly as long as the Tomcat/Intruder/Corsair. The first move to mediocrity was WALLA, we just reduce the play time so the Hornet looks equal!!!

The Super Hornet is an ok jet with nice tech. It has served us well but it is nothing to write home about. Some improvements are getting us BACK to where we were with 1972 Fiscal Year F-14As. That's a MASSIVE ISSUE. We can't turn back the clock but to say we are in a "better" place than an Air Wing with (2) F-14 Tomcat 21 Squadrons, (2) F-35C Squadrons and (1) A-6F/G is plain wrong. The whole "Hornets Can Do Everything" mantra was pure and simple a lack of fiscal resources and squandering of different potential capabilities. It has put us in a heck of a hole. One that many men are working on solving with the NGAD right now.

I'm sorry but I actually spit my drink out of my mouth when you stated the F-35C brings back range. F-35 and range in the same sentence is hilarious.

F-35C Combat radius 670 nautical miles (all on internal fuel)

F-14D Combat radius 500 nautical miles Hi-med-Hi (certain death for non stealth in contested airspace) or 380 nmi Hi-low-Hi.

F-18E Combat radius 390nmi Hi-low-hi.

Max G is comparable, climb rate is comparable. Maneuverability in terms of nose authority, turn and roll F-18 hands down. Acceleration and top speed F-14D. Ease of operation, economy and readiness F-18. Superior sensors F-18. I could go on. F-14 was a great plane in it's day, but it's time came and went. Would a Super F-14 been a good plane absolutely. Would it have been affordable. Absolutely not. The F-18 is plenty good.

Keep on spitting.

CX747 wrote:

The Super Hornet is an ok jet with nice tech. It has served us well but it is nothing to write home about. Some improvements are getting us BACK to where we were with 1972 Fiscal Year F-14As. That's a MASSIVE ISSUE. We can't turn back the clock but to say we are in a "better" place than an Air Wing with (2) F-14 Tomcat 21 Squadrons, (2) F-35C Squadrons and (1) A-6F/G is plain wrong. The whole "Hornets Can Do Everything" mantra was pure and simple a lack of fiscal resources and squandering of different potential capabilities. It has put us in a heck of a hole. One that many men are working on solving with the NGAD right now.

Real world aircraft are much better than imaginary ones.

I feel like we spend a lot of time talking about the aircraft of the Air wing and not enough talking about weapons systems today vs. what a Air wing was fielding in 1993.

Long Range Anti Ship Missiles (LRASM) from F-18s and F-35Cs

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/long-range-anti-ship-missile.html

JASSM

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/jassm.html

Connectivity to control UAV's and high altitude air launched torpedoes.

https://www.aviation24.be/manufacturers/boeing/boeing-defense/boeing-and-u-s-navy-demonstrate-manned-unmanned-teaming-with-f-a-18-super-hornet-flight-tests/

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/navy-p-8-poseidon-can-now-drop-winged-torpedos-in-combat

Infrared search and track (IRST) :

Even amid electronic attack or heavy RF and infrared countermeasures, IRST provides autonomous, tracking data that increases pilot reaction time, and enhances survivability by enabling first-look, first-shoot capability, Lockheed Martin officials say.

https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/14285789/infrared-sensors-avionics

It is also true munitions and sensors have come a long way as well.

JASSM-XR has a range of 1200 miles. Standoff smart munitions effectively extend an aircraft's range and even though they cost over a million dollars each they can be used to break down the door to allow follow up strikes with less capable weapons.

Super hypothetical question: 3 Nimitz's with the 1993 air wing go up against 1 Nimitz with the 2020 air wing. Both start 700 nm apart in the open ocean, with known positions. Who wins?

(Yes, I know both sides would have escorts, and time travel is difficult and .... etc. Now answer the question in the spirit it was intended!)

kitplane01 wrote:

Super hypothetical question: 3 Nimitz's with the 1993 air wing go up against 1 Nimitz with the 2020 air wing. Both start 700 nm apart in the open ocean, with known positions. Who wins?

Lucky the Super Hornets can carry 10 AMRAAM each. There will be 100 Tomcats in the ocean in the first hour.

I'd expect a 100:1 kill ratio. The Growlers would make all of the 1993 radars unusable. A couple F-14's might reach visual range as the Super Hornets might struggle to coordinate such a large AMRAAM attack.

I'd think you'd need 10 of the 1994 air wings to beat a single 2000 air wing most of the time. As that would exceed the number of missiles.

RJMAZ wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

Super hypothetical question: 3 Nimitz's with the 1993 air wing go up against 1 Nimitz with the 2020 air wing. Both start 700 nm apart in the open ocean, with known positions. Who wins?

Lucky the Super Hornets can carry 10 AMRAAM each. There will be 100 Tomcats in the ocean in the first hour.

I'd expect a 100:1 kill ratio. The Growlers would make all of the 1993 radars unusable. A couple F-14's might reach visual range as the Super Hornets might struggle to coordinate such a large AMRAAM attack.

I'd think you'd need 10 of the 1994 air wings to beat a single 2000 air wing most of the time. As that would exceed the number of missiles.

I hope you are joking. While I do think the modern air wing taken as a whole is superior to the 1993 air wing it's not that superior. Further the ASW component of the 93 air wing is much more superior so your single carrier may well get sunk by an LA class sub.

Further what happens when you have three carriers attacking from three different directions.

bobinthecar wrote:

RJMAZ wrote:

kitplane01 wrote:

Super hypothetical question: 3 Nimitz's with the 1993 air wing go up against 1 Nimitz with the 2020 air wing. Both start 700 nm apart in the open ocean, with known positions. Who wins?

Lucky the Super Hornets can carry 10 AMRAAM each. There will be 100 Tomcats in the ocean in the first hour.

I'd expect a 100:1 kill ratio. The Growlers would make all of the 1993 radars unusable. A couple F-14's might reach visual range as the Super Hornets might struggle to coordinate such a large AMRAAM attack.

I'd think you'd need 10 of the 1994 air wings to beat a single 2000 air wing most of the time. As that would exceed the number of missiles.

I hope you are joking. While I do think the modern air wing taken as a whole is superior to the 1993 air wing it's not that superior. Further the ASW component of the 93 air wing is much more superior so your single carrier may well get sunk by an LA class sub.

Further what happens when you have three carriers attacking from three different directions.

So describe what you think happens.

Note: Three 1993 air wings have 189 fast jets, and a 2020 air wing has 48 non-growler F-18s. That's just under 4 to 1.

Question: A Pheonix cannot fire based on a position from a E-2? In 1993??

Question: Can an F-14 target an incoming missile, in 1993?

I don't see much dogfighting. If the F-14s can a get a lock for their Phoenix missiles at long range despite jamming from the Growlers and the reduced radar cross section of the F-18s compared to what they had in 1993, a lot of F-18s go down quickly. But I bet that doesn't happen, and it's AMRAMs at long range for the close fought win.

I don't think the 2020 air wing commander will load 10 AMRAMS per F-18. I bet he saves some space for close range missiles, and some space for fuel tanks. Still, if each 2020 F-18 downs four 1993 aircraft, that's a win. And four seems to be about a maximum effort, everything goes right, sort of score. And if things don't go just right, the F-18s have some dogfighting after all, against F-14s.

kitplane01 wrote:

I don't think the 2020 air wing commander will load 10 AMRAMS per F-18. I bet he saves some space for close range missiles, and some space for fuel tanks.

Yeah. A 10-AMRAAM load out for a time traveling Nimitz class aircraft carrier Airwing fighting three other Nimitz carriers for god knows what reason would be pretty unrealistic.

kitplane01 wrote:

Question: A Pheonix cannot fire based on a position from a E-2? In 1993??

No. The E-2C and Phoenix seeker would be blind due to Growlers.

kitplane01 wrote:

Question: Can an F-14 target an incoming missile, in 1993?

No. The F-14 would be blind due to Growlers.

kitplane01 wrote:

I don't think the 2020 air wing commander will load 10 AMRAMS per F-18. I bet he saves some space for close range missiles, and some space for fuel tanks.

Every Super Hornet would definitely be launching with 10 AMRAAMa, pair of sidewinders and centreline tank. Starting 700nm apart they would be meeting half way so there is no need for wing tanks. The Super Hornets would target multiple F-14, rapidly fire all 10 AMRAAM and then return straight back to the carrier.

A few carriers in 2020 also had a full squadron of 10 F-35C. This would probably increase the kill ratio far beyond 100:1. I would have a single F-35C 10-20nm in front of 4 Super Hornets and 1 Growler. The Growler then hides the Super Hornets and the F-35C in clear skies provides all the target information for the 40+ AMRAAM missiles. The F-35C stealth, LPI radar and Growler nearby would make them near invisible.

After the first wave of fighters take off the E-2 and anti-sub assets will then take off. The ships travel at 30 knots so there is plenty of time for all the Super Hornets to land and then re-arm again.

kitplane01 wrote:

Still, if each 2020 F-18 downs four 1993 aircraft, that's a win. And four seems to be about a maximum effort, everything goes right, sort of score.

Laughable. There would be 400 missiles in the first wave from the 2020 air wing. That is 2 missiles for every 1993 jet.

bobinthecar wrote:

I hope you are joking. While I do think the modern air wing taken as a whole is superior to the 1993 air wing it's not that superior.

No joke. 27 years of improvements. You can ask any military pilot when their aircraft got an avionics and radar upgrade what would the kill ratio be against the original jet. They would all say greater than 10:1.

27 years is more than two of these steps. 10x10 is 100:1.

bobinthecar wrote:

Further the ASW component of the 93 air wing is much more superior so your single carrier may well get sunk by an LA class sub.

The modern carrier has MH-60R and active sonar. But I think the comparison was meant to be aircraft only.

bobinthecar wrote:

Further what happens when you have three carriers attacking from three different directions.

If the starting positions are known then it makes sense for the 2020 carrier group to sail towards the biggest gap at full speed. This could give an extra 24 hours until the LA subs could target the 2020 carrier. All of the 1993 surface ships would be at the bottom of the ocean by that point.

But you could indeed cherry pick the scenario where the 1993 side wins. Say the 1993 carriers and surface ships are at 12 o'clock, 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock. Then all of the 1993 subs are invisible at 9 o'clock. The 2020 carrier would probably sail right into the 1993 subs.

RJMAZ wrote:

Every Super Hornet would definitely be launching with 10 AMRAAMa, pair of sidewinders and centreline tank. Starting 700nm apart they would be meeting half way so there is no need for wing tanks. The Super Hornets would target multiple F-14, rapidly fire all 10 AMRAAM and then return straight back to the carrier.

What happens if the 1993 air wing (1) keeps some planes in reserve or (2) just launches a CAP and waits. Every 2020 aircraft launches, returnes, and while being refueled get blown up on the deck as the second wave of 1993 aircraft attack.

I think there are ways for the 1993 air wings to win, especially of they are clever or take risks. Basically, if the 2020 air wing launches a strike the 1993 air wings need to be in the air to defend. But if the 2020 air wing launches an all out defense, the 1993 should wait for the refuelling period and strike.

People in 1993 were clever and smart too. But they would be really really hepled if you could get them some 2020 NATOP manuals, and access to wikipedia and youtube (classified info would of course be even better).

kitplane01 wrote:

What happens if the 1993 air wing (1) keeps some planes in reserve or (2) just launches a CAP and waits. Every 2020 aircraft launches, returnes, and while being refueled get blown up on the deck as the second wave of 1993 aircraft attack.

That would probably turn out even worse for the 1993 force. The 2020 carrier would now have 4-5 E-2D in position.

You must remember launching 40 fighter jets from one carrier would take a full hour. They wont all run out of fuel at the same time. The first Super Hornets would already be 300nm from the carrier before the last Super Hornet was in the air.

Fighters also burn way less fuel when they fly slower. If no 1993 fighters were detected after 1 hour then the Super Hornets would just slow down to the max endurance speed. The Super Hornets launched last would then have more than enough endurance to cover while the first Super Hornets returned to refuel.

2 hours later the E-2D's would have located all of the 1993 ships. The Super Hornets will then go into a traditional combat air patrol. 20 aircraft on station. 10 in transit. 10 being refueled. The three 1993 carriers wouldn't be able to launch F-14's fast enough to saturate 20 Super Hornets with 200 AMRAAM missiles.

If nothing comes up after 3 hours then the 2020 force would probably shift towards taking out all the 1993 ships.

700nm would take a submarine 20 hours to travel at 35 knots. So I would think all of the 1993 carriers would be disabled by the 10 hour mark. Then it's time to start sub hunting..The 1993 Los Angeles subs would be all alone while the 2020 Virginia's would have anti sub helicopters in their side. I highly doubt a single Virginia sub would be lost.