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afterburner33 wrote:That is interesting, not least because it's happening so late in the life of the aircraft.
On a related note, does anyone know why the airliner style 767-300 winglets weren't fitted to the KC-46?
afterburner33 wrote:That is interesting, not least because it's happening so late in the life of the aircraft.
On a related note, does anyone know why the airliner style 767-300 winglets weren't fitted to the KC-46?
747classic wrote:For a lot of detailed USAF winglet info :
Assessment of Wingtip Modifications to Increase the Fuel Efficiency of Air Force Aircraft (2007)
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
See : https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/11839/chapter/1
Especially interesting are chapters 3 and 4 !!
Avatar2go wrote:afterburner33 wrote:That is interesting, not least because it's happening so late in the life of the aircraft.
On a related note, does anyone know why the airliner style 767-300 winglets weren't fitted to the KC-46?
For the KC-46, the radar warning receivers are built into the wingtips.
sovietjet wrote:That's kind of silly, as I'm sure it's not such a huge engineering challenge to have both the RWR and the winglets at the same time. Like for example putting those either in the winglet or at the base of the winglet. To me it's yet another failure of the KC-46 system. The latest and greatest tanker couldn't find a way to incorporate winglets. The USAF logic is stunning - "we don't need them on our new tanker, but we do need them on the old tanker which will be replaced by the new tanker!"
Spacepope wrote:Well now, this was an unexpected development.
Active winglets are to be fir to the KC-135 fleet, with some possibly in service toll FY 2050...
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/k ... g-winglets
744SPX wrote:Spacepope wrote:Well now, this was an unexpected development.
Active winglets are to be fir to the KC-135 fleet, with some possibly in service toll FY 2050...
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/k ... g-winglets
As with winglets, aircraft engine upgrades are another item that the Air Force and Navy simply refuse to incorporate unless they are forced to. When/if they do, it gets dragged out for decades.
Been the status quo since the mid-70's
GalaxyFlyer wrote:744SPX wrote:Spacepope wrote:Well now, this was an unexpected development.
Active winglets are to be fir to the KC-135 fleet, with some possibly in service toll FY 2050...
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/k ... g-winglets
As with winglets, aircraft engine upgrades are another item that the Air Force and Navy simply refuse to incorporate unless they are forced to. When/if they do, it gets dragged out for decades.
Been the status quo since the mid-70's
That’s not true, it’s more a matter of defense procurement rules and Congress. The KC-135 and C-5 re-engine programs were dragged out over decades due to budget priorities from Congress and competition from other programs. The services would like nothing more than speeding up these lines—Congress and budget gets in the way.
GalaxyFlyer wrote:744SPX wrote:Spacepope wrote:Well now, this was an unexpected development.
Active winglets are to be fir to the KC-135 fleet, with some possibly in service toll FY 2050...
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/k ... g-winglets
As with winglets, aircraft engine upgrades are another item that the Air Force and Navy simply refuse to incorporate unless they are forced to. When/if they do, it gets dragged out for decades.
Been the status quo since the mid-70's
That’s not true, it’s more a matter of defense procurement rules and Congress. The KC-135 and C-5 re-engine programs were dragged out over decades due to budget priorities from Congress and competition from other programs. The services would like nothing more than speeding up these lines—Congress and budget gets in the way.
747classic wrote:This whole idea of adding winglets to an aircraft, with relative low utilisation at the very, very end of its career, is IMHO the result of non-technical skilled politicians and below par skilled decision making bras.
The same is valid for the KC-46A design requirements :
- no winglet from the start for obscure reasons, now winglets may be installed later ?
- no T/R's for weight / maintenance saving, resulting in expensive non standard PW4062 cowlings and less safety for the (expendable) flight crew.
- selecting PW4062 engines , while the GE CF6-80C2B6F/B7F is the engine of choice for all civil 767 operators for the last 5-10 years. Also the KC767's are GE powered, so the combination airframe /engine / warps was already certified. PW seems to have a lot of lobby power inside the DOD. and politicial decision makers..
- The constant change in requirements for the KC-46A or not properly described requirements.
LightningZ71 wrote:It feels like, to me, that the Air Force is both bowing to the realities that they are now facing with the "pivot to the pacific" and having slightly loser purse strings in congress to support it. Supporting any sort of military activity in the pacific will push the refueling assets to their limits and produce a massive drain on both fuel reserves and on the money to keep them full. This suddenly makes ANY investment in increasing the capabilities of their existing tankers an important and reasonable expenditure. For the tempo of operations any conflict will require, you are talking about tens of thousands of gallons of fuel saved by the presence of the winglets in any given month. That's a big deal. It was never as important in most past conflicts as the vast majority of missions involved only regional operations with lower flight times and the ability to keep tankers relatively near enemy airspace. In the pacific, missions will be considerably longer, with tankers flying farther to get on station.
Every little bit will help.
747classic wrote:LightningZ71 wrote:It feels like, to me, that the Air Force is both bowing to the realities that they are now facing with the "pivot to the pacific" and having slightly loser purse strings in congress to support it. Supporting any sort of military activity in the pacific will push the refueling assets to their limits and produce a massive drain on both fuel reserves and on the money to keep them full. This suddenly makes ANY investment in increasing the capabilities of their existing tankers an important and reasonable expenditure. For the tempo of operations any conflict will require, you are talking about tens of thousands of gallons of fuel saved by the presence of the winglets in any given month. That's a big deal. It was never as important in most past conflicts as the vast majority of missions involved only regional operations with lower flight times and the ability to keep tankers relatively near enemy airspace. In the pacific, missions will be considerably longer, with tankers flying farther to get on station.
Every little bit will help.
If you need more range, not retiring the KC10's until the next tanker arrives would be the perfect "pivot to the pacific" solution.
Max Q wrote:747classic wrote:LightningZ71 wrote:It feels like, to me, that the Air Force is both bowing to the realities that they are now facing with the "pivot to the pacific" and having slightly loser purse strings in congress to support it. Supporting any sort of military activity in the pacific will push the refueling assets to their limits and produce a massive drain on both fuel reserves and on the money to keep them full. This suddenly makes ANY investment in increasing the capabilities of their existing tankers an important and reasonable expenditure. For the tempo of operations any conflict will require, you are talking about tens of thousands of gallons of fuel saved by the presence of the winglets in any given month. That's a big deal. It was never as important in most past conflicts as the vast majority of missions involved only regional operations with lower flight times and the ability to keep tankers relatively near enemy airspace. In the pacific, missions will be considerably longer, with tankers flying farther to get on station.
Every little bit will help.
If you need more range, not retiring the KC10's until the next tanker arrives would be the perfect "pivot to the pacific" solution.
That certainly makes the most sense which seems to be why it’s not happening
Avatar2go wrote:Max Q wrote:747classic wrote:
If you need more range, not retiring the KC10's until the next tanker arrives would be the perfect "pivot to the pacific" solution.
That certainly makes the most sense which seems to be why it’s not happening
It makes the most sense if you restrict the evaluation criteria to range alone. But the reality is that the USAF cannot do that. They have to maintain the fleet in a state of readiness, which entails many forms of costs. When all of that is considered, alongside the alternative capabilities they have with the KC-46, it doesn't make sense.