johns624 wrote:I'd think that supplying anything in less than battalion size (42-56 tanks) would be a waste.
Not a waste, but not enough to make a significant difference. A platoon or company can provide fire support to take out discrete targets, or conduct or support advance an offensive to the current defensive line, but generally not go further, because the lead element in an attack often takes losses that make it difficult to press forward after taking the initial objective. Part of the force also typically has to remain at the initial objective to conduct clearing of the breakthrough area and protect the flanks of the element pushing the breakthrough forward.
I believe a company of tanks (with infantry and artillery support, of course) would find it very challenging to achieve a breakthrough in any given location. A battalion or brigade is more likely going to be able to engage and overcome a current defensive line and have enough in reserves to then immediately carry out a meaningful advance while the rest perform clearing and protect the flanks.
art wrote:
Trading off range and accuracy for explosive yield on a weapon like the RPG strikes me as one of the less significant examples of innovation. I gather the soldiers in question serve in an irregular unit that may not have many resources, so they're forced to improvise. More interesting is the fact that there are Chechens fighting on Ukraine's side.
As far as other types of innovation: You have likely seen some of the variety of modifications done to civilian drones. Somewhere out there is even a video of a drone being crashed into another one to take it down. I've also seen pickups or light to medium commercial trucks modified for launching artillery rockets or to mount a variety of other weapons like Zu-23-2 anti-aircraft guns or SPG-9 recoiless guns. I remember one small manufacturer early in the war rigging up powered pan and tilt mounts to create a basic remote weapon station for putting light machine guns on pickups.
And of course, Ukraine likes to multiply the explosive effect of the modest 200 pound warhead on their GMLRS rockets by combining them with Russian ammunition depots. Very impressive innovation.
alberchico wrote:https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1614711789891235841?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1614711789891235841%7Ctwgr%5E6e32d3ede1678429bc646fbe21e269b632dc9b87%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.redditmedia.com%2Fmediaembed%2F10ctqan%3Fresponsive%3Dtrueis_nightmode%3Dfalse
How realistic is this assessment, that Putin will try to recreate the same 3 front strategy of Feb but on a much larger scale ? I just don't see any offense from Belarus aimed to capture Kiev succeeding, because this time Ukraine will be better prepared. Also, because NATO will be closely observing any large movements of soldiers or weapons, the chances of the Russians having the element of surprise are almost zero.
Also, there seems to be persistent rumors coming from Ukraine about Putin launching another massive wave of mobilization to draft 500k additional men into the army for a spring offensive sometime this month. How likely is that ?
The key point you should take from that post is Russia is trying to rebuild its forces and learn the necessary lessons from last year's failures. They remain a major threat, and the slower and more reserved Ukraine's western supporters are in the material aid and training the provide, the bigger the risk that Russia will reverse their fortunes.
With that said, my opinion is Mr. Shusko is discussing a credible risk, but exaggerating it by stating to be the likely course of action, and by supposing that potential future mobilization waves translate almost immediately into 500,000 trained and equipped combat soldiers being ready for battle in the next couple of months. For a better take, I recommend reading ISW's daily update from yesterday. Instead of their usual brief on the battlefield situation around Ukraine, they focused more on the discussion of potential Russian courses of action in Ukraine in the medium term.
They consider a another offensive across the Belorussian border plausible, but not likely as they do not so far see signs of the long term preparations necessary to conduct a large, sustained operation in that theater. In contrast, the preparations for the initial invasion in Februrary, which were not sufficient to support sustained operations, were being monitored even in the summer of 2021, and by fall of that year, were being recognized as potentially precursors for a Russian invasion.
I will note that the ISW did not in late 2021 consider the full scale invasion that actually occurred likely, but they pointed out the preparations were being made that could either be for such an invasion initially, or as followup to a Donbass-region attack, or simply to deter NATO responses to a Donbass-region attack. Russia actually ended up pursuing the maximalist end of the courses of action the ISW considered. Even in hindsight of that maximalist reality, I consider this to have been a good analysis of the prospects at that time, even down to details like the challenges of advancing past the northern Ukraine marshes and through the Chernobyl contaminated zone. In light of ISW's continuing good coverage, I continue to give their analysis a high level of credibility.
Dec. 1, 2021 ISW Forecast - Putin's Likely Course of Action in UkraineHere is yesterday's update, a shorter, simpler, but still well detailed current analysis of Russia's potential courses of actions:
Jan.15, 2023 ISW Russian Campaign AssessmentIt does appear Russia is preparing for an expanded mobilization. It is unclear whether and how large of an additional mobilization they will attempt, due to the risk of domestic backlash, and their limited ability to train, equip, and organize the mobilized personnel into effective units.
Also keep in mind that while Russia threw a lot of mobilized troops into the war over the last couple of months with abysmal preparation in order to stabilize the situation, they also kept quite a few in Russia for actual training. I don't know of a source for good figures, but offhand discussions seem to estimate about half. The talk of a potential spring offensive by Russia would coincide with those presumably 150,000 troops having completed training. Further waves of mobilization would be intended to sustain the war effort later into the year.
