DIRECTFLT wrote:

A Classic response using percentages...

"A group representing major railroads said last week 99.9% of all hazmat shipments reach their destination without incident and the hazmat accident rate has declined by 55% since 2012."

Buttigieg urges U.S. railroads to boost safety, not oppose reforms

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/buttig ... 023-02-19/

Are you suggesting industry hazmat reporting is unreliable? If so you have to provide alternate figures for comparison and verification.

DIRECTFLT wrote:

A Classic response using percentages...

"A group representing major railroads said last week 99.9% of all hazmat shipments reach their destination without incident and the hazmat accident rate has declined by 55% since 2012."

Buttigieg urges U.S. railroads to boost safety, not oppose reforms

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/buttig ... 023-02-19/

Absolutely classic, just make stats. from air. IIRC, Trump also doing similar stunts. Just pull figures/percentages out of thin air. Doesn't matter whether or not there is truth in it

seb146 wrote:

niagara484 wrote:

seb146 wrote:

IF that were a fact (please provide) why, then, is it not the same in EU or Japan?

How do you know that it isn't the same?

I don't. That's why I was asking people to post links when they make statements.

I actually had shared stats. both from EU and Japan but they were removed, dunno why (trying again).

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistic ... _in_the_EU

Even more stellar stats. from Japan.

https://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/statistics_rail.html

But if lessons are not going to be learned and say we know the best, then nothing can be done. The 'reforms' are codeword for even less regulatory oversight than whatever exists today.

Aaron747 wrote:

DIRECTFLT wrote:

A Classic response using percentages...

"A group representing major railroads said last week 99.9% of all hazmat shipments reach their destination without incident and the hazmat accident rate has declined by 55% since 2012."

Buttigieg urges U.S. railroads to boost safety, not oppose reforms

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/buttig ... 023-02-19/

Are you suggesting industry hazmat reporting is unreliable? If so you have to provide alternate figures for comparison and verification.

No, I wasn't suggesting that hazmat reporting is unreliable. I believe the figures are correct.

Aaron747 wrote:

Are you suggesting industry hazmat reporting is unreliable? If so you have to provide alternate figures for comparison and verification.

It depends on what mode of transportation, to an extent. It's hard to get around HazMat reporting for railroads simply because it's so often bulk quantities that you can't exactly hide.

Other modes? Oh, yeah, there's an underreporting problem.

Could someone explain why, if the safety laws were repealed under the previous administration after railroad companies lobbied the previous administration for repeal, why should Pete Buttigieg be held responsible? Norfolk Southern could have made track improvements, NS could have upgraded train equipment, NS knew the benefits of not derailing a train with hazardous materials but blame Buttigieg?

I will grant that, because he is the head of the Transportation Department, he is not 100% blameless but neither is he fully to blame.

did the rules repealed by the previous administration apply to this particular train? has the current administration re-implemented the rules?

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

hashtagconfused wrote:

did the rules repealed by the previous administration apply to this particular train? has the current administration re-implemented the rules?

Read post 71, this thread.

So does that mean we should just give up and not regulate hazardous materials and not regulate railroads?

BTW, the previous administration had every opportunity to protect these safety measures, even if it did not apply to this particular train/route. And, yet, they didn't. Money is speech. The more money, the louder the speech.

seb146 wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

hashtagconfused wrote:

did the rules repealed by the previous administration apply to this particular train? has the current administration re-implemented the rules?

Read post 71, this thread.

So does that mean we should just give up and not regulate hazardous materials and not regulate railroads?

BTW, the previous administration had every opportunity to protect these safety measures, even if it did not apply to this particular train/route. And, yet, they didn't. Money is speech. The more money, the louder the speech.

In the US, the "easy" solution is to deregulate everything but in the same time pass laws that put full liability on operators. The tiniest link between a damage and the accident is enough to put liability fully on the operator, automatically without way for the operator to push back. He can do what he want but live with the consequences.

Going by the above, it seems that nobody has any solutions. It seems to be an example of 'The American Way' and nothing anybody can do about it. Just like multiple homicides happen due to lack of gun regulation, the same seems to be here, nothing's gonna change, deal with it. What the most will happen is Norfolk declares bankruptcy but for that lot of things would need to be put in court of law and who knows what other changes in law have been done to shield the operators from the consequences and damages from such incidents.

FluidFlow wrote:

seb146 wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

Read post 71, this thread.

So does that mean we should just give up and not regulate hazardous materials and not regulate railroads?

BTW, the previous administration had every opportunity to protect these safety measures, even if it did not apply to this particular train/route. And, yet, they didn't. Money is speech. The more money, the louder the speech.

In the US, the "easy" solution is to deregulate everything but in the same time pass laws that put full liability on operators. The tiniest link between a damage and the accident is enough to put liability fully on the operator, automatically without way for the operator to push back. He can do what he want but live with the consequences.

The company will not take responsibility. They will pass that on to the operator or the locals authorities or the contractors who laid the track or the weather or little Suzy who put a penny on the tracks... anything to absolve the company of responsibility. We need an infrastructure bill passed, like Build Back Better but more, AND we need to hold companies responsible for not upgrading their equipment. Profits always seem to come ahead of people. Companies can make profits, everyone agrees with that. But if they can make money hand over fist, they can certainly make safety improvements.

seb146 wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

seb146 wrote:

So does that mean we should just give up and not regulate hazardous materials and not regulate railroads?

BTW, the previous administration had every opportunity to protect these safety measures, even if it did not apply to this particular train/route. And, yet, they didn't. Money is speech. The more money, the louder the speech.

In the US, the "easy" solution is to deregulate everything but in the same time pass laws that put full liability on operators. The tiniest link between a damage and the accident is enough to put liability fully on the operator, automatically without way for the operator to push back. He can do what he want but live with the consequences.

The company will not take responsibility. They will pass that on to the operator or the locals authorities or the contractors who laid the track or the weather or little Suzy who put a penny on the tracks... anything to absolve the company of responsibility. We need an infrastructure bill passed, like Build Back Better but more, AND we need to hold companies responsible for not upgrading their equipment. Profits always seem to come ahead of people. Companies can make profits, everyone agrees with that. But if they can make money hand over fist, they can certainly make safety improvements.

As I said, the only "regulation" has to be, that the company is first and foremost responsible. For companies the law has to change to guilty until proven innocent. That's the only change there needs to be. No other regulation would be needed. Because in that instance they would have to prove that they did everything possible to ensure safety first.

Now if they run on bad tracks they would be at fault because they did not check if the tracks are ok. It would be their responsibility to make sure the tracks are safe. And so on... regulation is not needed only liability has to be clarified. I tell you if companies know that they are by default liable and have to prove that they did everything to prevent an accident, there will be way less.

Look at GDPR laws: Companies are liable for the loss of information and fines are spoken if the company can not prove they protected the data with appropriate measures. If you lose data you are guilty and then you have to prove it was not your fault that its gone.

That's the only thing needed with regard to regulation.

FluidFlow wrote:

seb146 wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

In the US, the "easy" solution is to deregulate everything but in the same time pass laws that put full liability on operators. The tiniest link between a damage and the accident is enough to put liability fully on the operator, automatically without way for the operator to push back. He can do what he want but live with the consequences.

The company will not take responsibility. They will pass that on to the operator or the locals authorities or the contractors who laid the track or the weather or little Suzy who put a penny on the tracks... anything to absolve the company of responsibility. We need an infrastructure bill passed, like Build Back Better but more, AND we need to hold companies responsible for not upgrading their equipment. Profits always seem to come ahead of people. Companies can make profits, everyone agrees with that. But if they can make money hand over fist, they can certainly make safety improvements.

As I said, the only "regulation" has to be, that the company is first and foremost responsible. For companies the law has to change to guilty until proven innocent. That's the only change there needs to be. No other regulation would be needed. Because in that instance they would have to prove that they did everything possible to ensure safety first.

Now if they run on bad tracks they would be at fault because they did not check if the tracks are ok. It would be their responsibility to make sure the tracks are safe. And so on... regulation is not needed only liability has to be clarified. I tell you if companies know that they are by default liable and have to prove that they did everything to prevent an accident, there will be way less.

Look at GDPR laws: Companies are liable for the loss of information and fines are spoken if the company can not prove they protected the data with appropriate measures. If you lose data you are guilty and then you have to prove it was not your fault that its gone.

That's the only thing needed with regard to regulation.

That would be good but they won't let it pass. At the same time they may jack up prices using this excuse of 'regulation' or 'liability' whatever we call it. Companies and their lobbyists know what to do. Why would they want to have accountability? Haven't we learned anything from 2008 ???

Train that derailed in Ohio highlights cost-cutting strategy in rail industry

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ohio-train ... palestine/

DIRECTFLT wrote:

Train that derailed in Ohio highlights cost-cutting strategy in rail industry

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ohio-train ... palestine/

This is very much in-line to the 2005 Amagasaki derailment that happened in Japan. The differences were, there were passengers, about 100+ passengers while the rest were injured -

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amagasaki_derailment

Public was angry and for the first time outspoken. Did change a few things in Japanese Rail culture, especially for safety and their records show that.

pune wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

seb146 wrote:

The company will not take responsibility. They will pass that on to the operator or the locals authorities or the contractors who laid the track or the weather or little Suzy who put a penny on the tracks... anything to absolve the company of responsibility. We need an infrastructure bill passed, like Build Back Better but more, AND we need to hold companies responsible for not upgrading their equipment. Profits always seem to come ahead of people. Companies can make profits, everyone agrees with that. But if they can make money hand over fist, they can certainly make safety improvements.

As I said, the only "regulation" has to be, that the company is first and foremost responsible. For companies the law has to change to guilty until proven innocent. That's the only change there needs to be. No other regulation would be needed. Because in that instance they would have to prove that they did everything possible to ensure safety first.

Now if they run on bad tracks they would be at fault because they did not check if the tracks are ok. It would be their responsibility to make sure the tracks are safe. And so on... regulation is not needed only liability has to be clarified. I tell you if companies know that they are by default liable and have to prove that they did everything to prevent an accident, there will be way less.

Look at GDPR laws: Companies are liable for the loss of information and fines are spoken if the company can not prove they protected the data with appropriate measures. If you lose data you are guilty and then you have to prove it was not your fault that its gone.

That's the only thing needed with regard to regulation.

That would be good but they won't let it pass. At the same time they may jack up prices using this excuse of 'regulation' or 'liability' whatever we call it. Companies and their lobbyists know what to do. Why would they want to have accountability? Haven't we learned anything from 2008 ???

Actually they did, there can always be a discussion if it went far enough or if it went too far, but they did learn and actually did implement additional regulation: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm

FluidFlow wrote:

pune wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

As I said, the only "regulation" has to be, that the company is first and foremost responsible. For companies the law has to change to guilty until proven innocent. That's the only change there needs to be. No other regulation would be needed. Because in that instance they would have to prove that they did everything possible to ensure safety first.

Now if they run on bad tracks they would be at fault because they did not check if the tracks are ok. It would be their responsibility to make sure the tracks are safe. And so on... regulation is not needed only liability has to be clarified. I tell you if companies know that they are by default liable and have to prove that they did everything to prevent an accident, there will be way less.

Look at GDPR laws: Companies are liable for the loss of information and fines are spoken if the company can not prove they protected the data with appropriate measures. If you lose data you are guilty and then you have to prove it was not your fault that its gone.

That's the only thing needed with regard to regulation.

That would be good but they won't let it pass. At the same time they may jack up prices using this excuse of 'regulation' or 'liability' whatever we call it. Companies and their lobbyists know what to do. Why would they want to have accountability? Haven't we learned anything from 2008 ???

Actually they did, there can always be a discussion if it went far enough or if it went too far, but they did learn and actually did implement additional regulation: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm

That's just one side of the equation that you are stating and even that has actually made banking more expensive, Accountability is still zero. Whether in India or any other countries. This post from scmp does shed light on what I wanna say -

https://www.scmp.com/business/article/2 ... raders-and

And I understand the hesitancy when using a Chinese source but what they are saying is not wrong at all. The derivatives market where the actual issue started has ballooned out of all proportion. No guarantees that it won't fail again. Also the Dodd-Frank Act is much, much weaker legislation vis-a-vis the Glass-Steagall legislation that it has repealed.

And again, all of the above was done by lobbyists and still continuing. Meanwhile mortgage rates are higher than ever before.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/realest ... r-AA17GwWA

pune wrote:

And again, all of the above was done by lobbyists and still continuing. Meanwhile mortgage rates are higher than ever before.

Lobbyist do not vote for bills nor run for re-election, are we giving the legislators a pass whether local, state or federal and in so doing removing any liability away from them and passing it on to others?

par13del wrote:

pune wrote:

And again, all of the above was done by lobbyists and still continuing. Meanwhile mortgage rates are higher than ever before.

Lobbyist do not vote for bills nor run for re-election, are we giving the legislators a pass whether local, state or federal and in so doing removing any liability away from them and passing it on to others?

As far as the dodd-frank bill this alone tells what the lobbyists did -

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ar ... ill/59137/

How is Dodd-Frank remotely on-topic? Or is Norfolk Southern now being blamed for higher mortgage rates?

Nothing like derailing one’s own thread…

FluidFlow wrote:

seb146 wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

In the US, the "easy" solution is to deregulate everything but in the same time pass laws that put full liability on operators. The tiniest link between a damage and the accident is enough to put liability fully on the operator, automatically without way for the operator to push back. He can do what he want but live with the consequences.

The company will not take responsibility. They will pass that on to the operator or the locals authorities or the contractors who laid the track or the weather or little Suzy who put a penny on the tracks... anything to absolve the company of responsibility. We need an infrastructure bill passed, like Build Back Better but more, AND we need to hold companies responsible for not upgrading their equipment. Profits always seem to come ahead of people. Companies can make profits, everyone agrees with that. But if they can make money hand over fist, they can certainly make safety improvements.

As I said, the only "regulation" has to be, that the company is first and foremost responsible. For companies the law has to change to guilty until proven innocent. That's the only change there needs to be. No other regulation would be needed. Because in that instance they would have to prove that they did everything possible to ensure safety first.

But NS had every opportunity to make safety improvements but they did not. Now, NS are blaming the lead on the train. NS are not taking responsibility but, rather, passing that on to one person on the train. That is how corporations work.

seb146 wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

seb146 wrote:

The company will not take responsibility. They will pass that on to the operator or the locals authorities or the contractors who laid the track or the weather or little Suzy who put a penny on the tracks... anything to absolve the company of responsibility. We need an infrastructure bill passed, like Build Back Better but more, AND we need to hold companies responsible for not upgrading their equipment. Profits always seem to come ahead of people. Companies can make profits, everyone agrees with that. But if they can make money hand over fist, they can certainly make safety improvements.

As I said, the only "regulation" has to be, that the company is first and foremost responsible. For companies the law has to change to guilty until proven innocent. That's the only change there needs to be. No other regulation would be needed. Because in that instance they would have to prove that they did everything possible to ensure safety first.

But NS had every opportunity to make safety improvements but they did not. Now, NS are blaming the lead on the train. NS are not taking responsibility but, rather, passing that on to one person on the train. That is how corporations work.

Thank you exactly my point. The same thing was done by another corporation in the 2013 Railway fire, another company, tried to pass on responsibility, then declared bankruptcy when it was proved in court that they were the negligent party.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HNpcwmIyuH0

Had shared this above. It is almost a repeat of the same thing. The only difference is in that case it was gas, in this it was vinyl Chloride. Otherwise, story is the same..

The NTSB released the preliminary report on the Ohio train derailment. A rapid onset wheel bearing failure overheated an axle, which also failed and derailed the cars.

The railroad operates fault detectors trackside to monitor bearing problems, and the train had passed 3 of these on its trip. The first showed normal bearing temp, the second was elevated but well within bounds, the third was critical. Receiving the critical report via telemetry, the engineers immediately braked the train to a stop, but the derailment had already occurred.

Unfortunate timing on the detection. It will be interesting to learn what caused the bearing to fail that rapidly. It's usually a slower process.

NTSB said that the braking system was not an issue, and that improved electronically regulated brakes would not have prevented the derailment. There's been a regulatory battle over train brakes since the Obama administration.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Doc ... Prelim.pdf

I didn't know about these detectors. You have to admit having detectors like that on the tracks every now and then (with a complicated set up to get the info back to the train) is a bit strange in the days we live in, surely detectors could be fitted to every axle on the train itself.

Also even with the current setup instead of having either a safe temperature, or an unsafe one, a rapid rise between two measurements should trigger an alarm.

Aesma wrote:

I didn't know about these detectors. You have to admit having detectors like that on the tracks every now and then (with a complicated set up to get the info back to the train) is a bit strange in the days we live in, surely detectors could be fitted to every axle on the train itself.

Also even with the current setup instead of having either a safe temperature, or an unsafe one, a rapid rise between two measurements should trigger an alarm.

Electrically activated brakes are in the works, and I suspect that, as with autos, a variety of sensors will likely be included.


later edit: Here is a link via Seattle Times to a Bloomberg article on RRs fighting successful to continue unsafe operations. There lobbying arms are formidable, and Trump went along with all of it.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/r ... erailment/

Aesma wrote:

I didn't know about these detectors. You have to admit having detectors like that on the tracks every now and then (with a complicated set up to get the info back to the train) is a bit strange in the days we live in, surely detectors could be fitted to every axle on the train itself.

Also even with the current setup instead of having either a safe temperature, or an unsafe one, a rapid rise between two measurements should trigger an alarm.

It's definitely feasible, but perhaps not practical. A train could have easily have 2000 axles with 4000 sensors. So if one or two aren't working, does the train have to stop?

The trackside detectors are a reasonable solution that has been effective. Possibly the frequency could be increased from the current 10 to 20 mile separation.

As far as the alert limits, those are laid out in the report:

• Between 170°F and 200°F, warm bearing (non-critical); stop and inspect
• A difference between bearings on the same axle greater than or equal to 115°F (non-critical); stop and inspect
• Greater than 200°F (critical); set out railcar

In this case, none of these was triggered by the bearing until the third detector, so the bearing issue developed in the span of 19 miles. The recorded temperatures were 38F, 103F, and 253F, above ambient. The first two were perfectly normal.

Video also caught the bearing shooting out sparks just before the derailment, so that is a catastrophic failure that is grinding metal. Roller bearings usually don't fail like that, within a short period (25 minutes).

After hearing the NTSB press conference on February 23rd, this child of a railroad signal maintainer, who knows the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) rules quite well to this day, has made up his mind about who is ultimately at fault for the mess at East Palestine, Ohio USA.

The train crew heard three separate audible, automated defect detectors' warnings over their two-way radio, but ignored them. The first warning occurred about 30 miles from the derailment site in the form of a defect detector warning that an axle of car 23, a hopper carrying plastic pellets, was 38° F. above ambient temperature. That was within the FRA rules for acceptable axle temperatures. The next defect detector, about ten miles further, warned that that car's axle temperature was 103° F. above ambient temperature, which was still within FRA rules for acceptable limits. However, by this point, the plastic cargo of car 23 had started on fire. Approximately 10 miles further, the final defect detector issued a must-comply warning that the axle temperature was 253° F. above ambient temperature. At that point, FRA rules required that the train crew immediately stop and walk back and visually inspect car 23's hot bearing. But, they didn't stop. They continued on with the car 23 axle and hopper car full on plastic continuing to burn in flames.

Then, a few miles further, when they applied the train brakes in the heart of East Palestine to slow their train to distance it from one ahead of them, the affected axle on a now-blazing car 23 broke, causing a derailment in the middle of East Palestine, Ohio. The train crew, which includes an engineer, conductor, and a trainee, is 100% at fault for the derailment and the aftermath. If you really want to narrow that down further, a conductor is ultimately in charge of the operation of a freight train. The engineer, essentially, is "just" in charge of driving the locomotives.

EstherLouise wrote:

After hearing the NTSB press conference on February 23rd, this child of a railroad signal maintainer, who knows the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) rules quite well to this day, has made up his mind about who is ultimately at fault for the mess at East Palestine, Ohio USA.

The train crew heard three separate audible, automated defect detectors' warnings over their two-way radio, but ignored them. The first warning occurred about 30 miles from the derailment site in the form of a defect detector warning that an axle of car 23, a hopper carrying plastic pellets, was 38° F. above ambient temperature. That was within the FRA rules for acceptable axle temperatures. The next defect detector, about ten miles further, warned that that car's axle temperature was 103° F. above ambient temperature, which was still within FRA rules for acceptable limits. However, by this point, the plastic cargo of car 23 had started on fire. Approximately 10 miles further, the final defect detector issued a must-comply warning that the axle temperature was 253° F. above ambient temperature. At that point, FRA rules required that the train crew immediately stop and walk back and visually inspect car 23's hot bearing. But, they didn't stop. They continued on with the car 23 axle and hopper car full on plastic continuing to burn in flames.

Then, a few miles further, when they applied the train brakes in the heart of East Palestine to slow their train to distance it from one ahead of them, the affected axle on a now-blazing car 23 broke, causing a derailment in the middle of East Palestine, Ohio. The train crew, which includes an engineer, conductor, and a trainee, is 100% at fault for the derailment and the aftermath. If you really want to narrow that down further, a conductor is ultimately in charge of the operation of a freight train. The engineer, essentially, is "just" in charge of driving the locomotives.

Not sure where you are getting this information, but the NTSB said that there is no reason at present to believe the crew did anything wrong. They applied the brake immediately on the warning, and as I'm sure you know, it takes miles to stop a train. In that time, the car caught fire and derailed, taking others with it.

This is a catastrophic bearing failure, which is actually fairly rare. The NTSB will get to the bottom of why it happened.

EstherLouise wrote:

After hearing the NTSB press conference on February 23rd, this child of a railroad signal maintainer, who knows the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) rules quite well to this day, has made up his mind about who is ultimately at fault for the mess at East Palestine, Ohio USA.

The train crew heard three separate audible, automated defect detectors' warnings over their two-way radio, but ignored them. The first warning occurred about 30 miles from the derailment site in the form of a defect detector warning that an axle of car 23, a hopper carrying plastic pellets, was 38° F. above ambient temperature. That was within the FRA rules for acceptable axle temperatures. The next defect detector, about ten miles further, warned that that car's axle temperature was 103° F. above ambient temperature, which was still within FRA rules for acceptable limits. However, by this point, the plastic cargo of car 23 had started on fire. Approximately 10 miles further, the final defect detector issued a must-comply warning that the axle temperature was 253° F. above ambient temperature. At that point, FRA rules required that the train crew immediately stop and walk back and visually inspect car 23's hot bearing. But, they didn't stop. They continued on with the car 23 axle and hopper car full on plastic continuing to burn in flames.

Then, a few miles further, when they applied the train brakes in the heart of East Palestine to slow their train to distance it from one ahead of them, the affected axle on a now-blazing car 23 broke, causing a derailment in the middle of East Palestine, Ohio. The train crew, which includes an engineer, conductor, and a trainee, is 100% at fault for the derailment and the aftermath. If you really want to narrow that down further, a conductor is ultimately in charge of the operation of a freight train. The engineer, essentially, is "just" in charge of driving the locomotives.

Human factor wise, the crew blew it, but that is only a piece of the puzzle.
Why did the crew ignore the first two warnings? They were within error tollerance. Did they not see a troubling trend? Is it a regular occurance?

It is obvious that at the third detector things were way out of hand, but that means someone wasn't able to see the car at all. Why?

What lessons will be taken from here? Do we need more regulations and monitoring on these Hazardous Chemical transports?

casinterest wrote:

Human factor wise, the crew blew it, but that is only a piece of the puzzle.
Why did the crew ignore the first two warnings? They were within error tollerance. Did they not see a troubling trend? Is it a regular occurance?

It is obvious that at the third detector things were way out of hand, but that means someone wasn't able to see the car at all. Why?

What lessons will be taken from here? Do we need more regulations and monitoring on these Hazardous Chemical transports?

Casinterest, please read the NTSB report. The allegations made by EstherLouise are not correct.

Avatar2go wrote:

casinterest wrote:

Human factor wise, the crew blew it, but that is only a piece of the puzzle.
Why did the crew ignore the first two warnings? They were within error tollerance. Did they not see a troubling trend? Is it a regular occurance?

It is obvious that at the third detector things were way out of hand, but that means someone wasn't able to see the car at all. Why?

What lessons will be taken from here? Do we need more regulations and monitoring on these Hazardous Chemical transports?

Casinterest, please read the NTSB report. The allegations made by EstherLouise are not correct.

The crew still blew it. Increasing temperatures are still a high warning. The heat an intensity sparking increases should be part of a common sense response.
Yes the manual says don't do anything, but yet 100 above ambient is a high warning, especially if you have not been braking.
There is a lot to look into on this derailment, but the crew blew some important signs. They may get out of it due to "procedure" , but they had a hot axle that caused a fire. I would have at least been looking and curious after that 2nd warning.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Aesma wrote:

I didn't know about these detectors. You have to admit having detectors like that on the tracks every now and then (with a complicated set up to get the info back to the train) is a bit strange in the days we live in, surely detectors could be fitted to every axle on the train itself.

Also even with the current setup instead of having either a safe temperature, or an unsafe one, a rapid rise between two measurements should trigger an alarm.

Electrically activated brakes are in the works, and I suspect that, as with autos, a variety of sensors will likely be included.


later edit: Here is a link via Seattle Times to a Bloomberg article on RRs fighting successful to continue unsafe operations. There lobbying arms are formidable, and Trump went along with all of it.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/r ... erailment/

There's a paywall on that article but I suspect it's mentioning the ECP brakes that some commented on earlier in this thread. It's using the same air brake system that's currently fitted to all locomotives/cars but instead of the drop in air pressure propagating through the train to apply the brakes (with some delay), a signal to reduce the brake pipe pressure is sent via a new trainline cable so that the brakes will apply at roughly the same time (far less delay). That said, I'll point out again that ECP brakes have generally been limited to unit trains, such as a coal train traveling from mine to power plant or an oil train going from the oil fields to a refinery. To my knowledge there's been far less research on their benefit for mixed freight such as the train that derailed. Interestingly the NTSB apparently has come out and said that they would have made no difference in this particular accident. I'm not at all surprised by that statement.

Track-side Detectors: these warning devices have been installed and operating along N. American railroads for decades. You have detectors for things like dragging equipment, load impact from wheels with flat spots (that bang-bang-bang noise you might hear from a passing freight car), and in this case, a hot box detector. "Hot box" dates from the days when railroad equipment used friction bearings instead of roller bearings; they've been banned from use for many years. "Telemetry" to the train is a bit of a misnomer. Right after a train has passed it, the detector will generate an audio message transmitted on the radio frequency in use on that rail line. Anyone on that channel (train crews, dispatcher, maintenance personnel, etc) will hear the broadcast, which goes something like: "Defect Detector, Mile Post 70.3. No Defects. Total axles: 476." Many spit out other data including ambient temperature, which track the train was on, etc. If a defect is suspected, the detector broadcasts a message to stop the train and identifying the axle in question to check. For a railroad enthusiast with a radio scanner, the detectors are a great way to alert you if a train is near your location.

Right now, I don't believe that many (if any) of these scanners also transmit their data to the railroad's "back office" systems. They certainly don't send it to the locomotives. It's kept internal to the unit unless someone comes along to download the logs as you would do following a derailment.

However, given the billions the railroads have spent over the past decade upgrading their communications networks, it's possible that we might see this added functionality of sending data from all of the detectors to a central source. You could then conceivably monitor a string of detectors along a section of track in the back office and watch for anomalous increases in temperature from one to the next, perhaps capturing the information fast enough in real-time to send a warning before failure. Now this is just some conjecture on my part. But I can say with certainty the industry is increasingly interested in data analytics and its potential benefits in both safety and efficiency.

niagara484

casinterest wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

casinterest wrote:

Human factor wise, the crew blew it, but that is only a piece of the puzzle.
Why did the crew ignore the first two warnings? They were within error tollerance. Did they not see a troubling trend? Is it a regular occurance?

It is obvious that at the third detector things were way out of hand, but that means someone wasn't able to see the car at all. Why?

What lessons will be taken from here? Do we need more regulations and monitoring on these Hazardous Chemical transports?

Casinterest, please read the NTSB report. The allegations made by EstherLouise are not correct.

The crew still blew it. Increasing temperatures are still a high warning. The heat an intensity sparking increases should be part of a common sense response.
Yes the manual says don't do anything, but yet 100 above ambient is a high warning, especially if you have not been braking.
There is a lot to look into on this derailment, but the crew blew some important signs. They may get out of it due to "procedure" , but they had a hot axle that caused a fire. I would have at least been looking and curious after that 2nd warning.

They were never warned the bearing temperature was increasing. A hot box detector isn't going to say "high(er) bearing temperature detected." It will broadcast either "No Defects" if the temperatures are still within bounds or the message to stop the train if the temperature exceeds limits.

The crew IS NOT AT FAULT.

niagara484

niagara484 wrote:

casinterest wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

Casinterest, please read the NTSB report. The allegations made by EstherLouise are not correct.

The crew still blew it. Increasing temperatures are still a high warning. The heat an intensity sparking increases should be part of a common sense response.
Yes the manual says don't do anything, but yet 100 above ambient is a high warning, especially if you have not been braking.
There is a lot to look into on this derailment, but the crew blew some important signs. They may get out of it due to "procedure" , but they had a hot axle that caused a fire. I would have at least been looking and curious after that 2nd warning.

They were never warned the bearing temperature was increasing. A hot box detector isn't going to say "high(er) bearing temperature detected." It will broadcast either "No Defects" if the temperatures are still within bounds or the message to stop the train if the temperature exceeds limits.

The crew IS NOT AT FAULT.

niagara484

Ok,. I missed that part. my understanding was that the hot box detectors were sent to the crew each time with thetemperature issues If they weren't. then this is an area where train safety needs to improve. There was a serious issue on that wheelset that was missed for 30 miles, and caused a serious problem.

casinterest wrote:

The crew still blew it. Increasing temperatures are still a high warning. The heat an intensity sparking increases should be part of a common sense response.
Yes the manual says don't do anything, but yet 100 above ambient is a high warning, especially if you have not been braking.
There is a lot to look into on this derailment, but the crew blew some important signs. They may get out of it due to "procedure" , but they had a hot axle that caused a fire. I would have at least been looking and curious after that 2nd warning.

Sorry, but this is really not a correct interpretation of what occurred. Niagara has explained the reality.

Also as an engineer, with long experience dealing with these bearings, 100F temperature rise wouldn't be a concern. We would typically see 130F to 150F in our applications. The bearing lubricants are designed for those temperatures. Above 200F would be a concern, and a possible indicator of early wear or improper lubrication.

The manufacture maximum rating for our tapered roller bearings was 120C rise (248F), but we also knew that would mean shortened life.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Aesma wrote:

I didn't know about these detectors. You have to admit having detectors like that on the tracks every now and then (with a complicated set up to get the info back to the train) is a bit strange in the days we live in, surely detectors could be fitted to every axle on the train itself.

Also even with the current setup instead of having either a safe temperature, or an unsafe one, a rapid rise between two measurements should trigger an alarm.

Electrically activated brakes are in the works, and I suspect that, as with autos, a variety of sensors will likely be included.


later edit: Here is a link via Seattle Times to a Bloomberg article on RRs fighting successful to continue unsafe operations. There lobbying arms are formidable, and Trump went along with all of it.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/r ... erailment/

This is good IF the railway companies let it happen.

Avatar2go wrote:

casinterest wrote:

The crew still blew it. Increasing temperatures are still a high warning. The heat an intensity sparking increases should be part of a common sense response.
Yes the manual says don't do anything, but yet 100 above ambient is a high warning, especially if you have not been braking.
There is a lot to look into on this derailment, but the crew blew some important signs. They may get out of it due to "procedure" , but they had a hot axle that caused a fire. I would have at least been looking and curious after that 2nd warning.

Sorry, but this is really not a correct interpretation of what occurred. Niagara has explained the reality.

Also as an engineer, with long experience dealing with these bearings, 100F temperature rise wouldn't be a concern. We would typically see 130F to 150F in our applications. The bearing lubricants are designed for those temperatures. Above 200F would be a concern, and a possible indicator of early wear or improper lubrication.

The manufacture maximum rating for our tapered roller bearings was 120C rise (248F), but we also knew that would mean shortened life.

But these bearings weren't in a vaccum. If you have 80 cars, and one axle is screeching out of 160, you should have an indication.

Yes there are costs for this indication, but as we can see, the cost of a disaster is much worse.

casinterest wrote:

But these bearings weren't in a vaccum. If you have 80 cars, and one axle is screeching out of 160, you should have an indication.

Yes there are costs for this indication, but as we can see, the cost of a disaster is much worse.

One of the alert criteria is 115F difference across the axle, which is reasonable. That was obviously not triggered at 38F or 103F.

The real question here, is why the bearing overheated in a span of 20 miles and 25 minutes. Something is really wrong to cause that to happen. Possibly a manufacturing defect or quality control issue. Or the bearing was somehow physically damaged. Or it ran dry of lubricant, or the wrong lubricant was applied.

It's has to be something like that. I'm sure the manufacturer will want to understand this as well.

casinterest wrote:

If you have 80 cars, and one axle is screeching out of 160...

The very large majority of rail cars, at least in North America, have 4 axles. So an 80 car train would have 320 axles.

Maybe we should leave the assignment of blame to experts who actually know how rolling stock is constructed, how that rolling stock is maintained and inspected, how sensors monitor that rolling stock, what data is collected and how it is transmitted and to whom, etc., etc.

So far posters have blamed the (greedy) CEO, the one man crew (which now appears to have been three), Pete Buttigieg, Donald Trump, Congress, the lack of paid sick leave for Union members, the Dodd-Frank Bill, and probably my neighbor’s dog.

Meanwhile, the government set up a health clinic and I hear from someone on the scene that townspeople having been showing up claiming their years-long arthritis and emphysema and whatnot was caused by the accident.

QF7 wrote:

casinterest wrote:

If you have 80 cars, and one axle is screeching out of 160...

The very large majority of rail cars, at least in North America, have 4 axles. So an 80 car train would have 320 axles.

Maybe we should leave the assignment of blame to experts who actually know how rolling stock is constructed, how that rolling stock is maintained and inspected, how sensors monitor that rolling stock, what data is collected and how it is transmitted and to whom, etc., etc.

So far posters have blamed the (greedy) CEO, the one man crew (which now appears to have been three), Pete Buttigieg, Donald Trump, Congress, the lack of paid sick leave for Union members, the Dodd-Frank Bill, and probably my neighbor’s dog.

Meanwhile, the government set up a health clinic and I hear from someone on the scene that townspeople having been showing up claiming their years-long arthritis and emphysema and whatnot was caused by the accident.

Iti s not about assignment of blame, but rather looking at the chain.
Just chalking it up to a bad bearing or two doesn't alleviate the items that could have prevented it.

There were sensors warning of issues. Could the information have been better presented.
Waiting for a binary decision on a system that is measuring a highly positive rise in gauge measurements over time and distance is probably not the best way to present info. Especially when it is too late to prevent a disaster.

casinterest wrote:

Iti s not about assignment of blame, but rather looking at the chain.
Just chalking it up to a bad bearing or two doesn't alleviate the items that could have prevented it.

There were sensors warning of issues. Could the information have been better presented.
Waiting for a binary decision on a system that is measuring a highly positive rise in gauge measurements over time and distance is probably not the best way to present info. Especially when it is too late to prevent a disaster.

I think the critical thing to understand is that the sensors are set up for the typical and common failure modes of bearings and railcar trucks. Whatever this was, was an exceptional case. This bearing quickly went from normal operating temp to grinding metal.

Trying to imagine how that can happen. The bearing is composed of inner and outer races, a series of rollers, and a cage retainer for the rollers. It also contains a seal for lubricants.

Once assembled, it exists in a confined space. It can't easily be displaced or become misaligned, and the normal progression of wear is very gradual. It can seize if it gets too hot or is not properly lubricated, but even that usually results in the bearings being "wiped" (the rollers get dragged around the races without spinning). Even a wiped bearing usually takes time to fail, if properly lubricated.

So one scenario might be that a seal failed, the lubricant became overheated and ran out, leaving the bearing dry. It then wiped and eventually ground metal. But even that takes some time.

Another would be an internal bearing failure, for example if the surface temper of the bearing was broken in previous runs, such that it lost hardness, and then it flaked or powderized. The metal shavings then mix with the lubricant and the bearing wears rapidly and may seize.

The NTSB will find out, whether it was a defect or maintenance issue, or some combination.

Avatar2go wrote:

casinterest wrote:

Iti s not about assignment of blame, but rather looking at the chain.
Just chalking it up to a bad bearing or two doesn't alleviate the items that could have prevented it.

There were sensors warning of issues. Could the information have been better presented.
Waiting for a binary decision on a system that is measuring a highly positive rise in gauge measurements over time and distance is probably not the best way to present info. Especially when it is too late to prevent a disaster.

I think the critical thing to understand is that the sensors are set up for the typical and common failure modes of bearings and railcar trucks. Whatever this was, was an exceptional case. This bearing quickly went from normal operating temp to grinding metal.

Trying to imagine how that can happen. The bearing is composed of inner and outer races, a series of rollers, and a cage retainer for the rollers. It also contains a seal for lubricants.

Once assembled, it exists in a confined space. It can't easily be displaced or become misaligned, and the normal progression of wear is very gradual. It can seize if it gets too hot or is not properly lubricated, but even that usually results in the bearings being "wiped" (the rollers get dragged around the races without spinning). Even a wiped bearing usually takes time to fail, if properly lubricated.

So one scenario might be that a seal failed, the lubricant became overheated and ran out, leaving the bearing dry. It then wiped and eventually ground metal. But even that takes some time.

Another would be an internal bearing failure, for example if the surface temper of the bearing was broken in previous runs, such that it lost hardness, and then it flaked or powderized. The metal shavings then mix with the lubricant and the bearing wears rapidly and may seize.

The NTSB will find out, whether it was a defect or maintenance issue, or some combination.

I am sure it was something, maybe even bad luck on the track with loading a load. Either way, it seems there are a lot of ways the issue could have been identified in the 30+ miles it was intensifying over.

casinterest wrote:

I am sure it was something, maybe even bad luck on the track with loading a load. Either way, it seems there are a lot of ways the issue could have been identified in the 30+ miles it was intensifying over.

Technically the failure ocurred over the span of 19 miles, or about 25 minutes, since the second reading was within normal bounds. That is an extremely brief failure period. The only thing that would have caught it, as the NTSB pointed out, is another detector located in that span. That's something they will consider.

As far as gradient detection, gradients can occur for other reasons, and are not necessarily an indicator of impending failure. You'd have to look at the circumstances, compare axles, etc.

It helps to understand that railroads have billions of data points to characterize the behavior of bearings, under all conditions. My university had a continuous contract to test and study railroad bearings in a physical simulator. The research and analysis never stops. There are lifelong experts in this field. I'm sure most would consider this an anomalous event.

Avatar2go wrote:

I'm sure most would consider this an anomalous event.

Right. Since we are technically on an aviation discussion board consider the hundreds of aircraft that cross the Atlantic and Pacific and Indian oceans each day. Every now and then something happens to one of the engines and the flight has no choice but to continue on the one remaining engine. Now granted there are more sensors and warnings and indicators to the engineers - I mean pilots - but the fact is an anomalous event has occurred and must to be dealt with. The industry and regulators have decided that the risk is so low that the extra safety margin of one or two additional engines is no longer warranted.

Now the question is, can engineering, regulations, staffing, reduce the probability of anomalous events to zero? Maybe. But the cost of eliminating the final .00001% of failure risk might be huge. People are already complaining about the cost of a dozen eggs. Do they really want to pay $10 a dozen for their eggs if it means no train will ever derail? (Ok, I know few eggs are transported by rail but trying to put it in perspective.)

QF7 wrote:

Avatar2go wrote:

I'm sure most would consider this an anomalous event.

Right. Since we are technically on an aviation discussion board consider the hundreds of aircraft that cross the Atlantic and Pacific and Indian oceans each day. Every now and then something happens to one of the engines and the flight has no choice but to continue on the one remaining engine. Now granted there are more sensors and warnings and indicators to the engineers - I mean pilots - but the fact is an anomalous event has occurred and must to be dealt with. The industry and regulators have decided that the risk is so low that the extra safety margin of one or two additional engines is no longer warranted.

Now the question is, can engineering, regulations, staffing, reduce the probability of anomalous events to zero? Maybe. But the cost of eliminating the final .00001% of failure risk might be huge. People are already complaining about the cost of a dozen eggs. Do they really want to pay $10 a dozen for their eggs if it means no train will ever derail? (Ok, I know few eggs are transported by rail but trying to put it in perspective.)

Agreed, there is always a cost/benefit analysis for safety regulation. The absolute safest train never leaves the station. So statistical data are used to evaluate the probability of accident avoidance, and weighs this against the cost of implementation.

Unfortunately, these analyses are somewhat subjective, so they can be weighted in either direction. And thus they erupt into lobbying, political, and legal battles. Which does nothing to clarify the issue.

It happened in the airline industry with fuel tank inerting. As the number of incidents rose, a stronger case could be made, and now we have it.

Also with blowout preventers, the Deepwater Horizon incident revealed to the world that a preventer can prevent a blowout, but not stop one once in progress. Regulation to require full stop capability was proposed, but defeated based on the rarity of such events, and the very high cost of the capability.

The ECP train braking is another case. I think it will eventually be adopted, as the technology improves and the cost comes down. It makes good sense, and the argument will improve over time.

In this derailment, it's not clear yet if the train would have stopped in time with ECP brakes, to prevent the derailment. If it would have, that will strengthen the case for it. But we do know that the train would not have had ECP brakes anyway, under the proposed regulation.

When ABS first came available for cars I remember thinking its got to be too expensive, too maintenance prone, and not all that effective. LOL - wrong on all accounts. I am expecting notable improvements in RR braking, as well as reducing derailments. There have already been a lot of improvements in the last 25 years.

So many technologies around us have become commonplace and inexpensive we simply do not notice them anymore. My first two cars were a Datsun 210 and a 1970 Olds Delta 88. No air bags, no anti-lock breaks, no middle of the window break light, minimal seat belts, the Datsun had 2/60 air conditioning. My Toyota Corolla now has so many safety features and standard equipment compared to those first cars of mine.

All those companies pass that cost on to us. And there are still accidents. But, the mortality rate has gone down. It will never be zero. Just like with rail and air travel and sea travel. The rate will never be zero. But, there are technologies that can lessen that number. Why not use them?

seb146 wrote:

So many technologies around us have become commonplace and inexpensive we simply do not notice them anymore. My first two cars were a Datsun 210 and a 1970 Olds Delta 88. No air bags, no anti-lock breaks, no middle of the window break light, minimal seat belts, the Datsun had 2/60 air conditioning. My Toyota Corolla now has so many safety features and standard equipment compared to those first cars of mine.

All those companies pass that cost on to us. And there are still accidents. But, the mortality rate has gone down. It will never be zero. Just like with rail and air travel and sea travel. The rate will never be zero. But, there are technologies that can lessen that number. Why not use them?

Exactly and that is the point. Now we know, thanks to the news shared above that ECP Brakes are one part of the solution, there is and was another part that is better, studier rail cars whom they have prolonged to change to 2039. I am sure even if incidents happen and there is no big backlash they may even take it 2050.

The whole idea of safety is that even if an 'anomalous' situation arises the impact would have been far severe. If the studier type of cars, would that have meant less spillage in the environment, probably yes.

We shouldn't forget that there have been reports that the inspection have been cursory and instead of buying equipment they simply repaired part of an engine. Most accidents if we in accident reconstruction whether it was the Challenger disaster or the 737 or any of the other major, many of the decisions were structural issues not taken care of for years and in those particular instances, the swiss holes align and you have a disaster.

There is another aspect that was hinted at but as of now we don't kow. Whether the cars were overloaded to an extent ??? If so, that would also explain why that axle suffered. We also do know that speed restrictions were not followed and better, heavier rails would also have prevented some of the disaster.

I don't envy the NTSB board work that is cut out to them, and they have tried not to have blowback to the company. But defining safety issues and sharing recommendations is probably the most they can do which the Rail companies would probably ignore.

pune wrote:

seb146 wrote:

So many technologies around us have become commonplace and inexpensive we simply do not notice them anymore. My first two cars were a Datsun 210 and a 1970 Olds Delta 88. No air bags, no anti-lock breaks, no middle of the window break light, minimal seat belts, the Datsun had 2/60 air conditioning. My Toyota Corolla now has so many safety features and standard equipment compared to those first cars of mine.

All those companies pass that cost on to us. And there are still accidents. But, the mortality rate has gone down. It will never be zero. Just like with rail and air travel and sea travel. The rate will never be zero. But, there are technologies that can lessen that number. Why not use them?

Exactly and that is the point. Now we know, thanks to the news shared above that ECP Brakes are one part of the solution, there is and was another part that is better, studier rail cars whom they have prolonged to change to 2039. I am sure even if incidents happen and there is no big backlash they may even take it 2050.

The whole idea of safety is that even if an 'anomalous' situation arises the impact would have been far severe. If the studier type of cars, would that have meant less spillage in the environment, probably yes.

We shouldn't forget that there have been reports that the inspection have been cursory and instead of buying equipment they simply repaired part of an engine. Most accidents if we in accident reconstruction whether it was the Challenger disaster or the 737 or any of the other major, many of the decisions were structural issues not taken care of for years and in those particular instances, the swiss holes align and you have a disaster.

There is another aspect that was hinted at but as of now we don't kow. Whether the cars were overloaded to an extent ??? If so, that would also explain why that axle suffered. We also do know that speed restrictions were not followed and better, heavier rails would also have prevented some of the disaster.

I don't envy the NTSB board work that is cut out to them, and they have tried not to have blowback to the company. But defining safety issues and sharing recommendations is probably the most they can do which the Rail companies would probably ignore.

Pune, please, just stop. Seriously. Stop making up stuff.

First of all, if you want to talk about the Lac-Mégantic disaster 10 years ago, consider starting another thread. What happened there isn't relevant here.

Inspections: there have been no such reports of "cursory inspections" of the derailed Norfolk Southern train. The train originated in Madison, Illinois in a freight yard run by a different railroad (TRRA). Along its route it would have passed through Decatur, Illinois; Ft. Wayne, Indiana; and Bellevue, Ohio, all locations with major Norfolk Southern facilities where cars may have been switched in/out of the train and where equipment inspections would potentially be performed. The consist (list of cars) will be reviewed as part of the NTSB investigation to determine the origin of every car.

"Stronger" freight cars: the Department of Transportation and Association of American Railroads have been working together for a number of years on improvements in tank car designs. But design and testing takes time; even if a new standard has been established, it will take additional years to replace existing cars with new equipment. The few remaining North American car builders don't have the capacity to churn out hundreds of thousands of new freight cars overnight.

Overloaded cars: there has been no such hint unless it was by nutjobs. On most North American main lines, freight cars have a max weight of 286,000 lbs (empty weight plus cargo) but you can go over a bit without any issue. In fact, in recent years the railroads have been improving the tracks on many of their busiest lines to support 315,000 lbs freight cars. Some lighter-density rail lines still retain an older max weight limit of 263,000 lbs but the NS Ft. Wayne Line is anything but light density.

By the same token, we do not know that "better, heavier" rail would have made any difference here. I'd love to know where that one came from.

Speed Restrictions: the NTSB has not indicated that any speed restrictions were in effect for this train. Max speed limit on this line for freight trains is 50 mph (79 mph for Amtrak passenger trains) and at the time of the derailment the train was going 47 mph. So as of now there is no evidence that "speed restrictions were not followed."

niagara484