aerolimani wrote:

ckfred wrote:

If it's raining hard or below freezing, I might grab my coat. You never know how long who might have to stand in the grass or on the runway before a bus arrives.

One should always put their shoes back on when descent begins. Some passengers suffered frost-bitten feet when that AC A320 touched down short of the runway in Halifax. Or, better yet… just don't take them off, and if you suffer swollen feet, buy a pair of compression socks for your next flight.

And don't take your shoes off before takeoff. I see quite a few passengers doing that. They might well regret it if there was an accident on takeoff and the passengers found themselves evacuating without shoes, possibly having to walk through sharp and/or burning debris in their socks or bare feet. It's unlikely they'd even find their shoes in the event of a takeoff accident..

I've always thought they should include the instruction not to remove shoes before takeoff and to put them back on before landing in the safety briefing. I guess women (mainly) in high-heels would be the losers since they do usually include instructions on the safety card to remove high-heel shoes before evacuating down the slides since they could perforate the slide.

Take a look at the undercarriage in this video:

https://twitter.com/AirCrashMayday/stat ... 2277060608


Doesn't it look like a stream of fire, literally pouring out of the pylon? Could it be that the disk rupture went through the fuel lines there, and basically the fuel tanks drained ablaze?

Aftermath:

What disappoints me is that in an age were smartphones take incredible photos and video we still get shitty quality from passengers in an emergency situation. Come on guys, step it up!

Is that plane still at that same location?

wstakl wrote:

What disappoints me is that in an age were smartphones take incredible photos and video we still get shitty quality from passengers in an emergency situation. Come on guys, step it up!

That made me laugh. I mean, what's the rush?! Stage your shot, orient your camera, make sure the lighting is correct. Multiple takes if you need it. I mean, it's potentially valuable footage. Don't you want top dollar?

Viscount724 wrote:

aerolimani wrote:

ckfred wrote:

If it's raining hard or below freezing, I might grab my coat. You never know how long who might have to stand in the grass or on the runway before a bus arrives.

One should always put their shoes back on when descent begins. Some passengers suffered frost-bitten feet when that AC A320 touched down short of the runway in Halifax. Or, better yet… just don't take them off, and if you suffer swollen feet, buy a pair of compression socks for your next flight.

And don't take your shoes off before takeoff. I see quite a few passengers doing that. They might well regret it if there was an accident on takeoff and the passengers found themselves evacuating without shoes, possibly having to walk through sharp and/or burning debris in their socks or bare feet. It's unlikely they'd even find their shoes in the event of a takeoff accident..

I've always thought they should include the instruction not to remove shoes before takeoff and to put them back on before landing in the safety briefing. I guess women (mainly) in high-heels would be the losers since they do usually include instructions on the safety card to remove high-heel shoes before evacuating down the slides since they could perforate the slide.

Yep, I always take them off after the 10,000 ft ding, and put them on during initial descent. Leaving them on the whole flight isn't an option for me on longer flights. Compression socks don't work.

I'm no expert, but in looking at the picture taken from the starboard side, I'm thinking this is a hull loss. Besides having to replace the starboard wing, there is a lot of skin that is seriously scorched and would need to be replaced. Any sort of wiring, duct work, hoses, and hydraulic lines from the wing to the tail that is inside the starboard side of the fuselage would have to be inspected.

This plane is only 13 years old and probably had 6 to 10 years of service life at AA left before the engine fire. My understanding is that by the end of 2017, only the 25 763s with the new J cabin will be flying, and 8 of those will retire in 2018. It seems to me that rather than rehab this plane, probably slightly revising the retirement schedule would be prudent in terms of time and money.

Holy shit. Since it was going to MIA, the CFT must have been empty or near empty. With full tanks, you think this would have been a major human catastrophe?

tjerome wrote:

Is that plane still at that same location?

No it is in a hanger. I took off on 28R yesterday and they have laid down new asphalt where the fire occurred.

This aircraft is about thirteen years old and engines remain on the wing for thousands of hours with only a horoscope completed at prescribed time intervals which can not check for minor cracks or manufacture defects that can creep and lead to an ultimate failure. Engines are getting to reliable and remain on the wing for years at a time only to be removed for hot section checks and replacement of the fuel burner cans.
My question is how long was the engine on the wing and when was it last overhauled?
A new wing could be installed as long as the fuselage did not suffer any structural damage from the heat of the fire did not compromise it and the insurance carrier and American Airlines think the aircraft is worth the cost and effort return this aircraft to service. It would not be the first aircraft to have a wing replaced.

NWAROOSTER wrote:

This aircraft is about thirteen years old and engines remain on the wing for thousands of hours with only a horoscope completed at prescribed time intervals

I think we've identified the maintenance problem right here! They probably checked the wrong astrological sign.

VirginFlyer wrote:

You're saying there are less than 100 767 flights daily?

No, but it appears I need new glasses! I read it as hundreds OF thousands.

I think if you really dig you will find lots more CF6 disc failures, I think there was one on take off from San Paolo some years ago.

ikramerica wrote:

wstakl wrote:

What disappoints me is that in an age were smartphones take incredible photos and video we still get shitty quality from passengers in an emergency situation. Come on guys, step it up!

That made me laugh. I mean, what's the rush?! Stage your shot, orient your camera, make sure the lighting is correct. Multiple takes if you need it. I mean, it's potentially valuable footage. Don't you want top dollar?

I mean, is it too much to ask for horizontal video?

md94 wrote:

tjerome wrote:

Is that plane still at that same location?

No it is in a hanger. I took off on 28R yesterday and they have laid down new asphalt where the fire occurred.

Wait I'm confused here. What do you mean laid down new asphalt? This is a runway, not someone's driveway haha. They really did all the runway repairs they needed to already? Or did it only need to be cleaned up?

litz wrote:

Re: GE failures .... the 777 failures aren't a CF6 engine ... that's a GE90.

There seem to have been four major uncontained disc failures on the CF6 (of various variants) ... UA232, the engine test/run-up on the AA 767 at LAX, the engine test/run-up on the USAir 767 in PHL, and now this one ...

Unless, I'm mistaken, all of these were in the HPT section, right?

Now think about the sheer number of CF6 engines that have been, or are still, in service world wide, and the number of flights those have taken throughout history. That's a failure percentage down near statistical zero.

Not quite. In addition to the four events you mention, here are a few more uncontained failures involving the CF6 which I was able to find at https://aviation-safety.net/database/ev ... Event=ACEU as well as other sources:

An Air Florida DC-10-30 N101TV had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 3 low pressure turbine disc fractured during the take off run at Miami, USA on22 September 1981 - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 19810922-2

An Air France A300B4 F-BVGK had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 1 high pressure turbine disc fractured during the take off run at San'a, Yemen on 18 March 1982 - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 19820317-0

A Garuda Indonesia DC-10-30 PK-GIE had an uncontained engine failure after a blade (which had exceeded the recommended number of cycles) in the 1st stage high pressure turbine separated during the take off run at Fukuoka, Japan on 13 June 1996 - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 19960613-0

A Canadian Airlines 767-300 C-FCTA had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 3-9 high pressure compressor spool fractured during the take off run at Beijing, China on 6 September 1997 - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 19970906-1

An Atlas Air 747-200 N534MC had an uncontained engine failure after interference from a failed part led to the fan shaft breaking on climb out from Guyaquil, Ecuador on 2 April 2000 (ok, this is not really a direct failure of the high kinetic energy equipment like what we're discussing) - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 20000402-0

A Continental Airlines DC-10-30 N39081 had an uncontained engine failure after a stress rupture of the 2nd-stage low pressure turbine anti-rotation nozzle locks during the take off run at Newark, USA on 25 April 2000 - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 20000425-2

A Varig 767-200 PP-VNN had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 3-9 high pressure compressor spool fractured during the take off run at São Paulo, Brazil on 7 June 2000 - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 20000607-1

An Air New Zealand 767-200 ZK-NBC had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 1 HPT disc fractured on climb out from Brisbane, Australia on 8 December 2002 - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 20021208-1

A Phuket Airlines 747-300 HS-VAC had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 3 LPT disc fractured on climb out from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 4 July 2008 - https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=74533

An Arrow Air DC-10-30 N526MD had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 3 LPT disc fractured on climb out from Manaus, Brazil on 26 March 2009 - https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=59031

A Jett8 Cargo 747-200F 9V-JEB had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 3 LPT disc fractured on climb out from Singapore on 17 December 2009 - https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=74534

An ACT Airlines A300B4 TC-ACE had an uncontained engine failure after the stage 3 LPT disc fractured during the take off run in Bahrain on 10 April 2010

These four incidents above led to urgent safety recommendations from the NTSB: http://avherald.com/h?article=42c44df6

A Phuket Airlines 747-300 HS-VAC (yes, the same one as above!) had an uncontained engine failure (no further details of the origin sorry) on climb out from Cairo, Egypt, on 17 July 2010 - https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 20100717-0

So all up that's another 13 uncontained failures, 10 of which involved the failure of discs or shafts.

V/F

Well, ok then ... that's quite a few more ... still a statistically small number compared to the total number of engines/flights across the years.

It does show this was hardly as unique as it first seemed ...

trnswrld wrote:

md94 wrote:

tjerome wrote:

Is that plane still at that same location?

No it is in a hanger. I took off on 28R yesterday and they have laid down new asphalt where the fire occurred.

Wait I'm confused here. What do you mean laid down new asphalt? This is a runway, not someone's driveway haha. They really did all the runway repairs they needed to already? Or did it only need to be cleaned up?

The heat from the fire likely damaged the runway surface. I'm sure one of the biggest airports in the world is capable of performing minor repairs to its runways.

NWAROOSTER wrote:

A new wing could be installed as long as the fuselage did not suffer any structural damage from the heat of the fire did not compromise it and the insurance carrier and American Airlines think the aircraft is worth the cost and effort return this aircraft to service. It would not be the first aircraft to have a wing replaced.

Has this ever been done on an modern airliner as large as a 767 though? I've seen MD-80/DC-9 series, but never a widebody.

http://aviationweek.com/commercial-avia ... f6-failure (firewall) says:

Although CF6 engines have previously suffered uncontained failures, the Chicago event is the first to involve a second-stage HP turbine. GE says no previous airworthiness directives have been issued in relation to this CF6-80C2B6 stage, which was manufactured in Germany by MTU using material from GE. Previous uncontained CF6 events have largely been related to failures of the first-stage HP turbine or low-pressure spool.

and

Regardless of the NTSB finding, it is likely the American incident will refocus industry attention on the safety issues surrounding the continued operation of aging engines. The CF6 engine event is the latest in a string of three to occur in a little over a year to GE or joint-venture company powerplants with significant high cycle times. The uncontained failure of a GE90 HP compressor on a British Airways 777-200ER at Las Vegas McCarran International Airport on Sept. 8, 2015, occurred on an engine that dated from 1995, while the uncontained failure of a CFM56-7B fan blade caused by metal fatigue on a Southwest Airlines 737-300 over the Gulf of Mexico on Aug. 27 took place on one of the earliest engines to enter service.

The CF6 on this aircraft was described as containing “very high-cycle discs.”.

It makes one wonder if the industry isn't having problems predicting these kinds of failures.

The shattered disc could have just as easily traveled through the cabin and killed a few people.

It was just good luck that the disc traveled outboard of the aircraft.

litz wrote:

Re: GE failures .... the 777 failures aren't a CF6 engine ... that's a GE90.

There seem to have been four major uncontained disc failures on the CF6 (of various variants) ... UA232, the engine test/run-up on the AA 767 at LAX, the engine test/run-up on the USAir 767 in PHL, and now this one ...

Unless, I'm mistaken, all of these were in the HPT section, right?

Now think about the sheer number of CF6 engines that have been, or are still, in service world wide, and the number of flights those have taken throughout history. That's a failure percentage down near statistical zero.

UA232 was the fan disc... but all the others were HPT IIRC.

The T2 disk that came apart had never been a point of failure in the past.

Here's an informative piece from today's Seattle Times:
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/bo ... stigators/

NTSB report at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases ... 61104.aspx has some pretty pics:

Location of the fragments:



The fragments:



I like how they left the grass on the parts.

As above, the shattered disc could have just as easily traveled through the cabin and killed a few people.

It was just good luck that the disc traveled outboard of the aircraft.

salttee wrote:

The T2 disk that came apart had never been a point of failure in the past.

Sounds familiar:

Revelation wrote:

http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/probe-continues-american-cf6-failure (firewall) says:

Although CF6 engines have previously suffered uncontained failures, the Chicago event is the first to involve a second-stage HP turbine. GE says no previous airworthiness directives have been issued in relation to this CF6-80C2B6 stage, which was manufactured in Germany by MTU using material from GE. Previous uncontained CF6 events have largely been related to failures of the first-stage HP turbine or low-pressure spool.

There's a first time for everything.

salttee wrote:

Here's an informative piece from today's Seattle Times:
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/bo ... stigators/

Thanks for the link.

“The risk will be eliminated,” said John Goglia, a former National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) member with more than 40 years’ experience in the aviation-safety industry. “Will it be eliminated before the next one? That’s the real question. Everything relies upon the timeliness of the system to correct itself.”

No idea how Mr. Goglia can make such a statement.

Subsequently, GE redesigned the first-stage disk to take more stress, adjusting the shape and the composition of the sophisticated nickel alloy.

So the previous AD made them beef up the 1st stage disc but not the 2nd.

As GE trawls through the records, it will identify other parts made from the same billet of metal the broken disk was made from.

Company investigators will then inspect other engines of similar age, with parts of similar provenance, for microscopic cracks.

If such cracks are found, the FAA will demand replacement of the disks and also review routine engine-maintenance practices to ensure such cracks are detected in future.

It'll be interesting to see if any of the other parts from the same billet are going to be OK or not.

Revelation wrote:

I like how they left the grass on the parts.

It's a practical matter. If you start removing stuff just to take a clean picture before you've developed a plan for all the different inspections you intend to perform, you may alter the evidence. The evidence can be really subtle - traces of corrosive contamination you might mistakenly wash off, for example, or minute marks that indicate the start of a fatigue crack that you could scratch through while trying to scrape grit away.

Revelation wrote:

As above, the shattered disc could have just as easily traveled through the cabin and killed a few people.

Yes. That has happened before. It's one of the many ways a disc failure can turn deadly, which is why disc every disc failure is serious.

Revelation wrote:

“The risk will be eliminated,” said John Goglia, a former National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) member with more than 40 years’ experience in the aviation-safety industry. “Will it be eliminated before the next one? That’s the real question. Everything relies upon the timeliness of the system to correct itself.”

No idea how Mr. Goglia can make such a statement.

His statement is not a prediction, but a commitment to ensure the risk gets eliminated. Eliminating the risk is effectively an imperative. Disc failures can too easily lead to a fatal accident to leave a cause undetermined.

Revelation wrote:

[

Subsequently, GE redesigned the first-stage disk to take more stress, adjusting the shape and the composition of the sophisticated nickel alloy.

So the previous AD made them beef up the 1st stage disc but not the 2nd.

Each disc is different - size, loads, temperatures. The rationalization for the changing the first does not apply to the 2nd. It may be useful information for a review of the design of the second, but if that review doesn't raise new concerns, there's no reason to make changes to the 2nd.

Revelation wrote:

As above, the shattered disc could have just as easily traveled through the cabin and killed a few people.

It was just good luck that the disc traveled outboard of the aircraft.

Is it a function of the rotation direction? If it had been engine #1 (to the left of the fuselage) would it likely have gone in the direction of the fuselage?

quiet1 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

As above, the shattered disc could have just as easily traveled through the cabin and killed a few people.

It was just good luck that the disc traveled outboard of the aircraft.

Is it a function of the rotation direction? If it had been engine #1 (to the left of the fuselage) would it likely have gone in the direction of the fuselage?

Its a function of luck really. A piece went through the right wing, over the fuselage, and through the roof of a UPS facility on the opposite side of the aircraft from the engine. There is a relatively small arc where it could've gone through the fuselage. In the unlucky event that a part like this travels in that arc and makes it through the wing you very well could have a fuselage penetration.

So the NTSB claims they found signs of metal fatigue in the broken disk.

Revelation wrote:

NTSB report at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases ... 61104.aspx has some pretty pics:

Location of the fragments:

Mind blowing.

As above, the shattered disc could have just as easily traveled through the cabin and killed a few people.

It was just good luck that the disc traveled outboard of the aircraft.

Maybe I'm mistaking but aren't engines designed in a way the disk exits the engine away from the cabin?

You have no control over the tangential direction the disk parts will take once they fracture. At this point pure ballistics take over. There may be heavier shielding in the arc towards the cabin but I don't think there is. Given the energy these things have it would need to be substantial (read heavy) to be effective.

iamlucky13 wrote:

Revelation wrote:

“The risk will be eliminated,” said John Goglia, a former National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) member with more than 40 years’ experience in the aviation-safety industry. “Will it be eliminated before the next one? That’s the real question. Everything relies upon the timeliness of the system to correct itself.”

No idea how Mr. Goglia can make such a statement.

His statement is not a prediction, but a commitment to ensure the risk gets eliminated. Eliminating the risk is effectively an imperative. Disc failures can too easily lead to a fatal accident to leave a cause undetermined.

Sorry, but in plain English the statement is a guarantee, one that IMHO cannot be made. IMHO in this case risk can be reduced but never eliminated. It's just unethical to say that it will be eliminated. This case itself shows it has not been eliminated, and the BA incident at LAS shows even more modern engines like GE90 still have similar issues.

Regarding Goglia's statement, I think you can read it as a commitment. But, overall, I'm getting the feeling that the claim "engines are designed such that there should never, and I truly mean never, be a disk failure. That is because it is not possible to contain such a failure" (as noted by 2175301) is empirically speaking a failed goal. Disk failures are very rare, have fortunately recently not caused loss of life (e.g., the A380 and B767 incidents). But they *do* happen.

So I tend to agree with Revelation that Goglia should not make a blanket promise. And the industry might be better off recognising reality when decades of data shows that these types of accidents do happen.

It's interesting that the life limit of the HPT 2nd stage disk is quoted as 15,000 cycles for flight engines but only ~6,500 cycles (iirc) for industrial (LM6000) units.

AirlineCritic wrote:

Regarding Goglia's statement, I think you can read it as a commitment. But, overall, I'm getting the feeling that the claim "engines are designed such that there should never, and I truly mean never, be a disk failure. That is because it is not possible to contain such a failure" (as noted by 2175301) is empirically speaking a failed goal. Disk failures are very rare, have fortunately recently not caused loss of life (e.g., the A380 and B767 incidents). But they *do* happen.

So I tend to agree with Revelation that Goglia should not make a blanket promise. And the industry might be better off recognising reality when decades of data shows that these types of accidents do happen.

Thanks for your affirmation. Personally I feel such a statement is akin to the statement that the Titanic is unsinkable. I hope Goglia doesn't live to regret his statement.

couple of good pics here.
http://blog.seattlepi.com/flyinglessons ... 83-photos/

cougar15 wrote:

couple of good pics here.
http://blog.seattlepi.com/flyinglessons ... 83-photos/

Now that is a picture! You aren't supposed to be able to look into the engine from the outside!

dakota123 wrote:

It's interesting that the life limit of the HPT 2nd stage disk is quoted as 15,000 cycles for flight engines but only ~6,500 cycles (iirc) for industrial (LM6000) units.

Could be explained by different operating temperatures, speeds, etc. I would imagine fewer cycles over a given operating time in an industrial setup also. Lots of factors used to come up with a fatigue life limit.

Different load profiles as well.

Do all AA 763s have this engine?

9w748capt wrote:

Do all AA 763s have this engine?

Yes.

KarelXWB wrote:

So the NTSB claims they found signs of metal fatigue in the broken disk.

Revelation wrote:

NTSB report at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases ... 61104.aspx has some pretty pics:

Location of the fragments:

Mind blowing.

As above, the shattered disc could have just as easily traveled through the cabin and killed a few people.

It was just good luck that the disc traveled outboard of the aircraft.

Maybe I'm mistaking but aren't engines designed in a way the disk exits the engine away from the cabin?

Unfortunately they are not designed to exit away from the cabin, so far its all been down to luck. They are designed not to fail, but like all things there is always the exception where things either get missed or a new previuosly unknown cause occurs.

2175301 wrote:

As a comparison: We have above a list of disc failures in the history of this engine, and also several cited examples of disc failures in GE90 engines.

Is there a similar list for Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney engines. I doubt that this issue is solely a GE issue; but, anyone reading this thread might get that impression.

Can someone provide more complete industry data just to provide a realistic comparison?

Have a great day,

RR had the QF32 , incident, however that was not a fault in the disc.
In brief, a oil pipe frackture leading to an oil fire which meant a bearing seized, a shaft snapped and the disc spun up way beyond its designed speeds till the forces ripped it apart.

They always break into three pieces when they go.

2175301 wrote:

As a comparison: We have above a list of disc failures in the history of this engine, and also several cited examples of disc failures in GE90 engines.

Is there a similar list for Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney engines. I doubt that this issue is solely a GE issue; but, anyone reading this thread might get that impression.

Can someone provide more complete industry data just to provide a realistic comparison?

Have a great day,

Unless someone knows better, I only know of two Disc failures for RR. The fundemental difference is that both were not faults with the disc. The. CF6 has had disc failures that were directly attributable to the disc. That either a design or manufacturing problem. Both fixable.

Any similar history with PW engines ?

Rolls Royce took a lot of heat after the QF32 incident. Their reputation was badly damaged by intense media scrutiny and stock prices were sent tumbling. I am incredibly curious as to why GE is not subject to the same kind of attention - especially since this is a relatively common* and concerning event.

*Common is used here in the context of airplane parts failures. Not as in "happens all the time".

RickNRoll wrote:

They always break into three pieces when they go.

Better than "safety" glass then...It could break outside your house, you could be in bed and it'd still be in your underpants.

2175301 wrote:

As a comparison: We have above a list of disc failures in the history of this engine, and also several cited examples of disc failures in GE90 engines.

Is there a similar list for Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney engines. I doubt that this issue is solely a GE issue; but, anyone reading this thread might get that impression.

Can someone provide more complete industry data just to provide a realistic comparison?

Have a great day,

Ok, so going back to the source I used (which I must note I then added 4 incidents to from a separate Google Search) https://aviation-safety.net/database/db ... Event=ACEU

There are 62 incidents listed there. Of those, 5 are Pratt & Whitney radial engines, which are somewhat irrelevant to the discussion at hand.

Here's the breakdown for the remaining 57 turbine engine uncontained failures, with details of where the failure originated if specified:

• Alison - 1 uncontained failure
  
• Model 250 - 1 uncontained failure in 2000 (unspecified)
  
  
• Garrett - 5 uncontained failures
  
• TFE731 - 1 uncontained failure in 1990 (fan disc failure)
• TPE331 - 4 uncontained failures between 1987 and 2015 (1 turbine stator failure, 1 turbine assembly retention guide vane failure, 1 unspecified, 1 turbine rotor failure)
  
  
• General Electric - 15 uncontainted failures
  
• CF6 - 13 uncontained failures between 1981 and 2016 (1 low pressure turbine disc failure (due to bolts failing due to foreign object interference after reassembly), 5 high pressure turbine disc failures, 1 fan disc failure, 1 high pressure turbine blade failure (due to exceeding life limits), 2 high pressure compressor spool failures, 1 fan shaft failure (due to an air duct failing and interfering with it), 1 low pressure turbine anti-rotation nozzle lock failure, 1 unspecified)
• CF700 - 1 uncontained failure in 1995 (massive ingestion of birds)
• GE90 - 1 uncontained failure in 2015 (high pressure compressor spool failure)
  
  
• Ivchenko - 3 uncontainted failures
  
• Al-20 - 2 uncontained failures in 1970 and 1974 (1 compressor disc failure, 1 unspecified)
• Al-24 - 1 uncontained failure in 1973 (unspecified)
  
  
• Kuznetsov - 1 uncontained failure
  
• NK-8 - 1 uncontained failure in 1984 (low pressure compressor disc failure)
  
  
• Lycoming - 1 uncontained failure
  
• ALF 502 - 1 uncontained failure in 1987 (turbine bearing failure due to maintenance failure leading to loss of blades)
  
  
• Pratt & Whitney - 15 uncontained failures
  
• JT3D/TF33 - 4 uncontained failures between 1965 and 1984 (1 turbine disc failure, 1 fan disc failure, 2 unspecified)
• JT4A - 2 uncontained failures in 1965 and 1981 (1 maintenance related, 1 unspecified)
• JT8D - 7 uncontained failures between 1985 and 1998 (1 low pressure turbine disc failure, 1 combustor failure, 1 spacer failure in the high pressure compressor, 3 high pressure compressor disc failures (2 of which maintenance related), 1 compressor fan hub failure)
• JT9D - 2 uncontained failures in 1995 and 1998 (1 turbine hub failure, 1 unspecified)
  
  
• Pratt & Whitney Canada - 1 uncontained failure
  
• PT6 - 1 uncontained failure in 1991 (unspecified, but attributed to maintenance)
  
  
• Rolls-Royce - 11 uncontained failures
  
• Avon - 2 uncontained failures in 1976 and 1983 (both compressor disc failures)
• Dart - 2 uncontained failures in 1979 and 2001 (1 low pressure impeller failure, 1 high pressure turbine disc failure)
• RB211 - 2 uncontained failures in 1981 and 1994 (1 unspecified, 1 intermediate compressor disc failure)
• Spey - 1 uncontained failure in 1988 (low pressure turbine disc failure)
• Tay - 1 uncontainted failure in 2001 (unspecified)
• Trent - 1 uncontained failure in 2010 (intermediate turbine disc failure)
• Tyne - 2 uncontained failures in 1988 and 2002 (both unspecified)
  
  
• Soloviev - 4 uncontained failures
  
• D-20 - 1 uncontained failure in 1973 (unspecified)
• D-30 - 3 uncontained failures between 1987 and 2008 (1 low pressure turbine shaft failure, 1 unspecified, 1 turbine main gear failure due to exceeding service life)

It should be noted the list does not appear to be completely exhaustive - I found 4 more CF6 failures and 1 more RR Dart failure which were not listed - so please take it with that pro-viso. To make comparisons useful we would need more information too about numbers of engines in service, and numbers of hours/cycles being run.

V/F

D L X wrote:

Aftermath:

They might want to inspect that starboard wing spar. It looks like it might be a little bit warped.