DocLightning wrote:

D L X wrote:

Aftermath:

They might want to inspect that starboard wing spar. It looks like it might be a little bit warped.

It's amazing that you can zoom in on the engine and clearly see the disc exit location. That's a big hole!

VirginFlyer wrote:

2175301 wrote:

Can someone provide more complete industry data just to provide a realistic comparison?

Ok, so going back to the source I used (which I must note I then added 4 incidents to from a separate Google Search) https://aviation-safety.net/database/db ... Event=ACEU

There are 62 incidents listed there. Of those, 5 are Pratt & Whitney radial engines, which are somewhat irrelevant to the discussion at hand.

Here's the breakdown for the remaining 57 turbine engine uncontained failures, with details of where the failure originated if specified:

• Alison - 1 uncontained failure
  
• Model 250 - 1 uncontained failure in 2000 (unspecified)
  
  
• Garrett - 5 uncontained failures
  
• TFE731 - 1 uncontained failure in 1990 (fan disc failure)
• TPE331 - 4 uncontained failures between 1987 and 2015 (1 turbine stator failure, 1 turbine assembly retention guide vane failure, 1 unspecified, 1 turbine rotor failure)
  
  
• General Electric - 15 uncontainted failures
  
• CF6 - 13 uncontained failures between 1981 and 2016 (1 low pressure turbine disc failure (due to bolts failing due to foreign object interference after reassembly), 5 high pressure turbine disc failures, 1 fan disc failure, 1 high pressure turbine blade failure (due to exceeding life limits), 2 high pressure compressor spool failures, 1 fan shaft failure (due to an air duct failing and interfering with it), 1 low pressure turbine anti-rotation nozzle lock failure, 1 unspecified)
• CF700 - 1 uncontained failure in 1995 (massive ingestion of birds)
• GE90 - 1 uncontained failure in 2015 (high pressure compressor spool failure)
  
  
• Ivchenko - 3 uncontainted failures
  
• Al-20 - 2 uncontained failures in 1970 and 1974 (1 compressor disc failure, 1 unspecified)
• Al-24 - 1 uncontained failure in 1973 (unspecified)
  
  
• Kuznetsov - 1 uncontained failure
  
• NK-8 - 1 uncontained failure in 1984 (low pressure compressor disc failure)
  
  
• Lycoming - 1 uncontained failure
  
• ALF 502 - 1 uncontained failure in 1987 (turbine bearing failure due to maintenance failure leading to loss of blades)
  
  
• Pratt & Whitney - 15 uncontained failures
  
• JT3D/TF33 - 4 uncontained failures between 1965 and 1984 (1 turbine disc failure, 1 fan disc failure, 2 unspecified)
• JT4A - 2 uncontained failures in 1965 and 1981 (1 maintenance related, 1 unspecified)
• JT8D - 7 uncontained failures between 1985 and 1998 (1 low pressure turbine disc failure, 1 combustor failure, 1 spacer failure in the high pressure compressor, 3 high pressure compressor disc failures (2 of which maintenance related), 1 compressor fan hub failure)
• JT9D - 2 uncontained failures in 1995 and 1998 (1 turbine hub failure, 1 unspecified)
  
  
• Pratt & Whitney Canada - 1 uncontained failure
  
• PT6 - 1 uncontained failure in 1991 (unspecified, but attributed to maintenance)
  
  
• Rolls-Royce - 11 uncontained failures
  
• Avon - 2 uncontained failures in 1976 and 1983 (both compressor disc failures)
• Dart - 2 uncontained failures in 1979 and 2001 (1 low pressure impeller failure, 1 high pressure turbine disc failure)
• RB211 - 2 uncontained failures in 1981 and 1994 (1 unspecified, 1 intermediate compressor disc failure)
• Spey - 1 uncontained failure in 1988 (low pressure turbine disc failure)
• Tay - 1 uncontainted failure in 2001 (unspecified)
• Trent - 1 uncontained failure in 2010 (intermediate turbine disc failure)
• Tyne - 2 uncontained failures in 1988 and 2002 (both unspecified)
  
  
• Soloviev - 4 uncontained failures
  
• D-20 - 1 uncontained failure in 1973 (unspecified)
• D-30 - 3 uncontained failures between 1987 and 2008 (1 low pressure turbine shaft failure, 1 unspecified, 1 turbine main gear failure due to exceeding service life)

It should be noted the list does not appear to be completely exhaustive - I found 4 more CF6 failures and 1 more RR Dart failure which were not listed - so please take it with that pro-viso. To make comparisons useful we would need more information too about numbers of engines in service, and numbers of hours/cycles being run.

V/F

Thank you V/F. This provides a more balanced picture even if we don't know the total number of engines in service and total hours. Bottom line, while overall rare - such failures seem to have occurred in most of the major Mfr's.

Have a great day,

GE alerts airlines about engine part after American Airlines fire (Reuters)

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-airplane-letter-idUSKBN1300UB

Selected excerpts:

"The manufacturer has identified a 'limited number' of parts closely related to one used by American that had a 'material anomaly,' according to the letter sent on Friday."

"All but one of the parts are now out of service, GE said in the letter. It added that it was working with the single airline with an aircraft still equipped with the part to ensure its removal from service."

"U.S. investigators have yet to assign blame for last week's incident. However, they said on Friday that a so-called stage 2 disk in the engine showed what appeared to be cracking."

"The disk's corrupted material likely indicated a manufacturing defect, either by the parts or metal maker, said Jim Hall, a former NTSB chairman."

Not the place I expected to find this, but GCMap has a summary of a 1998 NTSB report on uncontained LPT failures:
http://www.gcmap.com/featured/20101108

CF6-50: 25 uncontainted LPT failures
CF6-80: 6 uncontainted LPT failures
JT8D: 55 uncontainted LPT failures
JT9D: 64 uncontainted LPT failures

Keep in mind that this is an 18 year old report, and the summary is only a handful of engines. No Rolls Royce, no PW2000, no V2500, no CFM56, etc. Don't try to read too much about modern engines from a report that includes the 727 engine.

Also, the cited source link to the NTSB has changed, so it would take a little digging to get more info.

coolian2 wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

They always break into three pieces when they go.

Better than "safety" glass then...It could break outside your house, you could be in bed and it'd still be in your underpants.

Off topic, but sooooo true. Ask anyone that owns a pinball machine. When that tempered glass goes POOF, it's truly a sight to see.

litz wrote:

coolian2 wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

They always break into three pieces when they go.

Better than "safety" glass then...It could break outside your house, you could be in bed and it'd still be in your underpants.

Off topic, but sooooo true. Ask anyone that owns a pinball machine. When that tempered glass goes POOF, it's truly a sight to see.

Or a pro basketball backboard.

litz wrote:

coolian2 wrote:

RickNRoll wrote:

They always break into three pieces when they go.

Better than "safety" glass then...It could break outside your house, you could be in bed and it'd still be in your underpants.

Off topic, but sooooo true. Ask anyone that owns a pinball machine. When that tempered glass goes POOF, it's truly a sight to see.

You don't need a pinball machine. Just have your car broken into.

Based on the METAR WX data at time of takeoff, calc. press./temp/density, and calc. total fuel and takeoff weight for the KORD to KMIA flight route with 161 passengers and typical associated baggage and cargo loading, yields an approximate V1=123-124 IAS and Vr=130-131 IAS. It appears that the R engine failure reported as at 124 IAS was near V1.

Based on the KORD Rwy28R N5 intersection takeoff, ASD distance predictions by calc. would (assuming TO thrust with 59C derate) be comparable to the actual flight ASD distance of around 6,265 ft. and the ASD margin prediction by calc. would be comparable to the actual flight ASD margin of around 3,775 ft. (T.O. from N5 intersection). Don’t know what AAL383 actually used for TO thrust derate nor what the actual cargo load was, but in any event based on the flight route and typical cargo loading IMO there was a comfortable and safe AAL383 planned ASD margin based on an N5 intersection takeoff.

IMO the AAL383 crew handled the situation well and should be commended for the quick and proper responses to the serious engine failure and expedient and safe stopping and subsequent evacuation with minimal passenger injuries.

The starboard side of that 763 has way more heat damage then the BA 777 in LAS.
then of course, the starbaord wing melted like a candlestick.

Has there been a formal declaration that this is a hull loss?
I can't imagine that jet being repaired

The 2006 767 incident wasn't as burned on the fuselage, and it was written off (mind you, there was the gash in the belly all the way across the bottom, in that one) ...

And it didn't have a destroyed wing, either.

If this were a B-52 or a B2 or something where money was no object, I could see it being fixed ... but honestly, you gotta think the cost of a repair here would well exceed the value of the airframe, if not the cost of a new/replacement airframe.

And there are plenty of 763's to pick from, if you want a used one.

litz wrote:

And there are plenty of 763's to pick from, if you want a used one.

Why stop with "used".... The 767 line is still open and I am sure that Boeing would be willing to supply new ones...

Have a great day,

Escape Chaos on Fiery American Airlines Jet Detailed by NTSB in a 500 page report.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... rlines-jet

The NTSB Final report on AA Flight 383 has not yet been issued.

The 500 pages of documents represent the conclusion of the evidence gathering phase of the safety board's investigation.

Investigators have not yet determined what caused the blaze.

It took at least a minute from the time the plane stopped until the copilot reported shutting off fuel to the engines, according to a transcript of the cockpit’s voice recorder. Pilots told investigators that it took a long time to depressurize the cabin, which was required in the evacuation checklist before shutting off the engine and ordering an evacuation. The captain described the checklist as “cumbersome.”

Flight attendants said they couldn't reach the cockpit by phone and made the decision themselves to evacuate.

A flight attendant told the NTSB: "The cabin began filling with smoke and she was concerned the airplane was heavy with fuel and could possibly become engulfed in flames."

The flight crew also told safety officials several passengers complicated the evacuation by refused to leave their luggage behind.

The American flight had accelerated to 154 miles (248 kilometers) per hour before the pilots began applying the brakes, according to NTSB. It came to a stop about 25 seconds later. Fire crews arrived on scene and started applying foam to the burning jet fuel within 2 minutes and 51 seconds of being notified of the emergency, NTSB said.

The NTSB officials are now reviewing the evidence collected as they determine a cause of the engine fire and possibly make future safety recommendations.

This is certainly one way to retire a 767 ...

Glad everyone is okay.

DIRECTFLT wrote:

Escape Chaos on Fiery American Airlines Jet Detailed by NTSB in a 500 page report.
It took at least a minute from the time the plane stopped until the copilot reported shutting off fuel to the engines, according to a transcript of the cockpit’s voice recorder. Pilots told investigators that it took a long time to depressurize the cabin, which was required in the evacuation checklist before shutting off the engine and ordering an evacuation. The captain described the checklist as “cumbersome.”

Flight attendants said they couldn't reach the cockpit by phone and made the decision themselves to evacuate.

The article states the evacuation (door open) started 20 sec after coming to a stop at this time the cabin would have been instantaneously depressurized (which would I assume show in the cockpit). It took 40 seconds after this (according to the article) to cut the fuel to shut-off the engine. The article also states that passengers were blow over the runway as the engine was still on.

Not optimal.

devron wrote:

The article states the evacuation (door open) started 20 sec after coming to a stop at this time the cabin would have been instantaneously depressurized (which would I assume show in the cockpit). It took 40 seconds after this (according to the article) to cut the fuel to shut-off the engine. The article also states that passengers were blow over the runway as the engine was still on.

Not optimal.

I suspect the NTSB will be recommending changes to the evacuation checklist: maybe skip the cabin depressurization step (which the captain said took a long time) if the evac has already started (there's a DOOR EICAS message to indicate that).

Summary from pilot interview:

When asked for a clarification on the “cumbersome” portion of the evacuation checklist, he explained that it took at least one minute to go through the checklist. They had to make sure the airplane was depressurized. The airplane pressurizes to about 0.8 differential during takeoff; which was a small amount of pressure that it did not hamper the evacuation. He could understand, at night, the need to leave one engine running for the lights, then announce over the PA to evacuate and do the evacuation alarm.
When asked how they are trained to conduct an emergency evacuation, he stated that they were trained by running the checklist and then get out of the cockpit. He was to go through the cabin to make sure all of the passengers and crew had deplaned, and then go down a slide. He felt that had he had the presence of mind to remember, he could have grabbed the paperwork, which included the number of passengers. Once outside the airplane, they were to assist with the evacuation. Completing the checklists took them “so long” that after he and the first officer exited the cockpit the number 1 flight attendant was telling them that the passengers were off and that they need to get off the airplane.

Also interesting:

When asked if there was anything he could recall that may need to be improved, he stated that the biggest thing he could think of was that neither he nor the first officer called the engine failure. He learned from videos of the evacuation that the left engine was still running when the flight attendants popped the slides. Had he had the situation awareness when he heard the commotion, he would have shut down the left engine sooner.
When asked if a camera showing the exterior of the airplane would have helped them with their situational awareness of what was occurring outside, he stated that it would have. He further explained that from the cockpit they could not see their wings or the engines. Had they been able to assess the situation it may have changed their decision, especially if they would have known how large the fire was. He also stated that the front flight attendants could not see the engines either, even though they were to assess the situation before opening the doors. After they came to a stop, the front flight attendants, when they began the evacuation, had opened the R1 door and deployed the slide. However, since the fire was right there they blocked the exit and redirected the passengers. In the cockpit, they did not receive any fire indications at first as the fire loops were located in the engine cowls and the fire was “outside” the engine.

Another problem clear from the documents released: a flight attendant tried to use a phone to contact the cockpit, but didn't know how to dial it. Turns out AA's 763ER fleet has two types of phones (new/old) that work totally differently, and their training center is only equipped with the old ones.

mrpippy wrote:

Another problem clear from the documents released: a flight attendant tried to use a phone to contact the cockpit, but didn't know how to dial it. Turns out AA's 763ER fleet has two types of phones (new/old) that work totally differently, and their training center is only equipped with the old ones.

A training oversight, that can easily be corrected.

DIRECTFLT wrote:

mrpippy wrote:

Another problem clear from the documents released: a flight attendant tried to use a phone to contact the cockpit, but didn't know how to dial it. Turns out AA's 763ER fleet has two types of phones (new/old) that work totally differently, and their training center is only equipped with the old ones.

A training oversight, that can easily be corrected.

You make it sound so simple. That's a PATHETIC oversight of safety training. The 763 fleet has been in the AA fleet for years. No excuse.

mrpippy wrote:

devron wrote:

The article states the evacuation (door open) started 20 sec after coming to a stop at this time the cabin would have been instantaneously depressurized (which would I assume show in the cockpit). It took 40 seconds after this (according to the article) to cut the fuel to shut-off the engine. The article also states that passengers were blow over the runway as the engine was still on.

Not optimal.

I suspect the NTSB will be recommending changes to the evacuation checklist: maybe skip the cabin depressurization step (which the captain said took a long time) if the evac has already started (there's a DOOR EICAS message to indicate that).

No reason to change the checklist just because the crew didn't know what they were doing. Once you have determined there will be an evacuation, doing the first 4 steps (Parking Brake, Cabin altitude mode selector, Cabin altitude manual control, Fuel control switches) should take about 10 seconds, 15 at tops once you start the checklist. You don't have to wait for the cabin to depressurize, you just need to confirm that you have driven the outflow valve full open which it would have been close to anyway. And there is nothing that tells you to delay shutting engines down to keep the lights on at night -- that's what emergency lighting is for. Follow the checklist -- don't adlib.

n7371f wrote:

DIRECTFLT wrote:

mrpippy wrote:

Another problem clear from the documents released: a flight attendant tried to use a phone to contact the cockpit, but didn't know how to dial it. Turns out AA's 763ER fleet has two types of phones (new/old) that work totally differently, and their training center is only equipped with the old ones.

A training oversight, that can easily be corrected.

You make it sound so simple. That's a PATHETIC oversight of safety training. The 763 fleet has been in the AA fleet for years. No excuse.

Are you a flight attendant at AA?
What's pathetic here is your ignorant assumption that the flight attendant had set foot on a 767 since her recurrent drills. Some 30 year seniority flight attendants have shared with me how they've never been in the 777! And the only contact they have with it is its door and evacuation drills once a year!

What is bad is the training.

Either. Have phone whose operation is same/similar or train crews on both models.

Perhaps a system should be considered where the overhead bins lock automatically in an evacuation situation to prevent people blocking pathways by trying to save their bags.

https://www.google.com/amp/www.nydailyn ... e-1.895472

Is there a chance this could have happened, where a flight attendant was sucked out of the plane when doors were opened before the cabin had depressurized? That plane was already airborne before returning to Miami, but the references to this plane and depressurization had me wondering.

There are a lot of inherent and very dangerous risks with a Flight Attendant initiated evacuation. That is why first order of business is to contact the cockpit and seek direction.

It is very disturbing that American could have had a scenario where contact with the cockpit was not possible due to lack of knowledge of the (working) handset itself!

Rookie87 wrote:

n7371f wrote:

DIRECTFLT wrote:

A training oversight, that can easily be corrected.

You make it sound so simple. That's a PATHETIC oversight of safety training. The 763 fleet has been in the AA fleet for years. No excuse.

Are you a flight attendant at AA?
What's pathetic here is your ignorant assumption that the flight attendant had set foot on a 767 since her recurrent drills. Some 30 year seniority flight attendants have shared with me how they've never been in the 777! And the only contact they have with it is its door and evacuation drills once a year!

Wait whaaaaa? A flight attendant not knowing how to operate equipment necessary to contact the cockpit in an emergency situation is not an acceptable scenario.

gwrudolph wrote:

Rookie87 wrote:

n7371f wrote:

You make it sound so simple. That's a PATHETIC oversight of safety training. The 763 fleet has been in the AA fleet for years. No excuse.

Are you a flight attendant at AA?
What's pathetic here is your ignorant assumption that the flight attendant had set foot on a 767 since her recurrent drills. Some 30 year seniority flight attendants have shared with me how they've never been in the 777! And the only contact they have with it is its door and evacuation drills once a year!

Wait whaaaaa? A flight attendant not knowing how to operate equipment necessary to contact the cockpit in an emergency situation is not an acceptable scenario.

What part of being unfamiliar with a piece of equipment don't you get? You honestly think all the phones are the same? Who's to say he or she only works on the 737 and got called or reassigned to work this trip? Yes she should know how the phone works however, calling out "unacceptable", "pathetic" is beyond ignorant. You get on a plane you haven't seen in a while and have the engines blow up on you and tell me how acceptable your reaction will be. Some of you posters on how can be so judgmental about others without taking a second to put yourselves in other people's shoes. Stop and think

Rookie87 wrote:

gwrudolph wrote:

Rookie87 wrote:

Are you a flight attendant at AA?
What's pathetic here is your ignorant assumption that the flight attendant had set foot on a 767 since her recurrent drills. Some 30 year seniority flight attendants have shared with me how they've never been in the 777! And the only contact they have with it is its door and evacuation drills once a year!

Wait whaaaaa? A flight attendant not knowing how to operate equipment necessary to contact the cockpit in an emergency situation is not an acceptable scenario.

What part of being unfamiliar with a piece of equipment don't you get? You honestly think all the phones are the same? Who's to say he or she only works on the 737 and got called or reassigned to work this trip? Yes she should know how the phone works however, calling out "unacceptable", "pathetic" is beyond ignorant. You get on a plane you haven't seen in a while and have the engines blow up on you and tell me how acceptable your reaction will be. Some of you posters on how can be so judgmental about others without taking a second to put yourselves in other people's shoes. Stop and think

I guess it is pretty naïve of me to think that it would be a good idea for the flight attendant to be able to contact the cockpit before commencing an emergency evacuation and/or to let them know the extent of the fire and/or smoke entering the cabin.

You seem, for some reason, to be taking comment posters as almost a direct attack against the flight attendant. I think, as a few of us have stated, that it could be a training or inconsistency in equipment problem . . . or it could be the individual.

For what it's worth, in the 90's, I was a gate agent in a larger station for a larger airline. At that time (not sure who does what these days), we had to open door on arrival, make a final announcement prior to closing the door, and close the door. In my location, we operated four Boeing types and two Douglas types. Based on aircraft generational differences, there were five completely different door types and four completely different PA types. Somehow, despite certain fleets not coming into the station on a consistent basis, we managed to figure out how to use the equipment necessary to perform our jobs. I might also add that we'd occasionally have international diversions of completely different types and managed . . .

I'll bet the final investigation and recommendations don't summarily dismiss the fact that the flight attendant alleges she could not contact the cockpit (and therefore, initiated it without doing so) and something normal when an airline has multiple fleet types.

gwrudolph wrote:

Rookie87 wrote:

gwrudolph wrote:

Wait whaaaaa? A flight attendant not knowing how to operate equipment necessary to contact the cockpit in an emergency situation is not an acceptable scenario.

What part of being unfamiliar with a piece of equipment don't you get? You honestly think all the phones are the same? Who's to say he or she only works on the 737 and got called or reassigned to work this trip? Yes she should know how the phone works however, calling out "unacceptable", "pathetic" is beyond ignorant. You get on a plane you haven't seen in a while and have the engines blow up on you and tell me how acceptable your reaction will be. Some of you posters on how can be so judgmental about others without taking a second to put yourselves in other people's shoes. Stop and think

I guess it is pretty naïve of me to think that it would be a good idea for the flight attendant to be able to contact the cockpit before commencing an emergency evacuation and/or to let them know the extent of the fire and/or smoke entering the cabin.

You seem, for some reason, to be taking comment posters as almost a direct attack against the flight attendant. I think, as a few of us have stated, that it could be a training or inconsistency in equipment problem . . . or it could be the individual.

For what it's worth, in the 90's, I was a gate agent in a larger station for a larger airline. At that time (not sure who does what these days), we had to open door on arrival, make a final announcement prior to closing the door, and close the door. In my location, we operated four Boeing types and two Douglas types. Based on aircraft generational differences, there were five completely different door types and four completely different PA types. Somehow, despite certain fleets not coming into the station on a consistent basis, we managed to figure out how to use the equipment necessary to perform our jobs. I might also add that we'd occasionally have international diversions of completely different types and managed . . .

I'll bet the final investigation and recommendations don't summarily dismiss the fact that the flight attendant alleges she could not contact the cockpit (and therefore, initiated it without doing so) and something normal when an airline has multiple fleet types.

Calling someone pathetic when you could never imagine yourself in that situation is pretty low. I don't take it as a personal attack, I'm commenting on the use of the word "pathetic". Comparing being an agent to a flight attendant? How often do you honestly believe a flight attendant uses the same type of phone on a MD80 series, 737, 757, 767, 777 (200/300), 787, A319(321) on a daily basis compared to an agent? You specifically use the same phones multiple times in a day, ask a flight attendant how many times they specifically make a PA or even call any other flight attendant? They very well may never have to based on the position they are working every month. No thought process is used by you, period. The only one used is "because I do xyz in a different situation I find someone else stupid because they can't do abc in a different situation "
A wing was on FIRE, death was right over her shoulder. No compassion, no empathy, just judgement.

The issue here is that some of you act like you're the most intelligent people in any given situation and because you flip burgers you can comment on how to bake a soufflé.

Work on your reading comprehension champ. He said it was a pathetic training oversight (and frankly, it is). He never called the FA pathetic.

Calm down until you learn to read.

Tbh it is a really bad oversight of training. That difference could be life or death. Copa used to train pilots on the 732 with a different gyro switch from the one on some planes, and then when an ADI failed the pilots switched it to the faulty one instead of the other, functioning one. And then Copa 201 happened. What would happen if an FA was trained to a completely different PA than the one on a plane that is then involved in an accident? And he/she doesn't think to evacuate when they can't reach the cockpit?

Since it seems to be challenging to have an unemotional discussion regarding the evacuation, perhaps I'll switch topics a bit . . . Does anyone know the status of N345AN? I see her still sitting over on the AA hangar apron all wrapped up. How long do they typically have to wait before commencing repairs or [in this case] dismantling? Does anyone know when the process will start?

KarelXWB wrote:

So the NTSB claims they found signs of metal fatigue in the broken disk.

Revelation wrote:

NTSB report at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases ... 61104.aspx has some pretty pics:

Location of the fragments:

Mind blowing.

As above, the shattered disc could have just as easily traveled through the cabin and killed a few people.

It was just good luck that the disc traveled outboard of the aircraft.

Maybe I'm mistaking but aren't engines designed in a way the disk exits the engine away from the cabin?

Whilst I think our designers and engineers are really good. The release of disc fragments is random, they do however appear in the main to fragment into 3 main parts.
QF32, disc missed the fuselage by 0.26 of a degree.

It would be unfathomable to let a pilot operate a flight on a type that they were unfamiliar with, why is it permissible for a FA to work a flight on a type that they aren't familiar with? Communication with the flight deck is a pretty important component of keeping the passengers safe in the event of an incident. I realize this might complicate operations, but communication is a safety concern for goodness sake.

There has been at least one incident where the flight deck lost control of an engine and it remained at full power (A340 at Toulouse during a ground test gone wrong); had there been such a failure here AND without the ability to communicate with the flight deck, it's possible passengers would have went down the slides and either into the engine (instant death) or blown away by the exhaust (potential death).

Is it too "red tape" to think that a flight attendant should have completed training for all safety equipment aboard the aircraft type they are operating?

More than just that A340 ....

the World DC-10 that ran off the end of the runway broke the whole cockpit off ... the #2 engine kept running, with no way to shut it down.

(IIRC, someone climbed up into the wreckage and manipulated control cables to do so)

Also, QF32, due to wire harness damage, couldn't shut down #1. they snuffed that one with (lots of) firefighting foam.