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User avatar
zeke
Posts: 15292
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 3:25 am

FredrikHAD wrote:
If you have more info on the RJ85ER I'm all ears.


You can have a look at this is has the range payload curves for all 3 models overlaid.

"Range (at 8 tonnes)
SR 1,000 nm
SR 1,500 nm
ER 2,000 nm"

https://theloadstar.co.uk/wp-content/up ... ochure.pdf

This article suggests Citijet operated 3xRJ85ERs. It is a regular feature in the industry to "paper downgrade" aircraft to less capability (normally reduced MTOW) to reduce landing fees, airways charges etc.

http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/busine ... -1-1842984
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:51 am

Here are links to each subsection in my blog. Please let me know of any errors or omissions. Thanks, Peter

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... ellin.html
Entire Blog, Table of Contents, Summary, Introduction

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... nscription
ATC Transcription

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... ml#moments
Last Moments

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... l#accuracy
Accuracy of Recorded Data

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... #composite
GNS-X Composite Position

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... l#techperf
Technical Performance Holding

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... l#mapshift
Map Shift?

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... flightplan
Flight Plan

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... l#typecert
RJ85 Type Certificate

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... l#perfdata
RJ85 Performance Data

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... .html#fuel
RJ85 Fuel System

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... tml#FEEDLO
FEED LO LEVEL Warning

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... hydraulics
RJ85 Hydraulics

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... electrical
RJ85 Electrical System

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... htcontrols
RJ85 Flight Controls

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... unications
RJ85 Communication Systems

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... n.html#nav
RJ85 Navigation and Instruments

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... tml#engout
RJ85 All-Engine Out Procedures

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... html#final
Final Maneuvering

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... conclusion
Conclusion

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... html#plots
Plots

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... tml#graphs
Graphs

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... .html#data
Transponder Data
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 7:00 am

zeke wrote:
FredrikHAD wrote:
If you have more info on the RJ85ER I'm all ears.


You can have a look at this is has the range payload curves for all 3 models overlaid.

"Range (at 8 tonnes)
SR 1,000 nm
SR 1,500 nm
ER 2,000 nm"

https://theloadstar.co.uk/wp-content/up ... ochure.pdf

This article suggests Citijet operated 3xRJ85ERs. It is a regular feature in the industry to "paper downgrade" aircraft to less capability (normally reduced MTOW) to reduce landing fees, airways charges etc.

http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/busine ... -1-1842984


I think that the SR 1500 nm range is the equivalent passenger RJ85 with the pannier tanks. The numbers match, anyway. It does not appear that CP2933 had auxiliary tanks. Note that these range figures account for 5% trip fuel, 150 nm alternate and 30 minutes of holding, 1500 feet AGL at the alternate. I don't find any reference to any other aux. fuel tanks that might apply to CP2933.

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... l#perfdata
RJ85 Performance Data

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... .html#fuel
RJ85 Fuel System
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 7:10 am

Avroflyer wrote:
FredrikHAD wrote:
From the article mentioned by flyingphil:

"The RJ85 operates with no fuel (windmilling engines, no APU, no standby generator) by using a battery to power one comm/nav set, standby instruments, and hydraulic power for landing gear extension and braking. ... Flap, spoilers, air brake: are not powered. Plan on flaps up landing.
...
In the descent the airplane was slowed to what appears to be flaps/gear down approach configuration.
...
LMI2933 appears to have been capable to glide to SKRG runway 01 until the point that the flight crew extended flaps and gear. The crew extended flaps and gear prior to flameout and may have been confident in their continued flight worthiness."

Ok, so likely flaps and gear were extended/deployed while on engine power, then a flameout (no more fuel). I assume that flaps cannot be retracted either if there is no power since they cannot be extended, right? That's where the nightmare really started I think. At that point they were really doomed.

"The Cockpit Voice Recorder and the Flight Data Recorder are not powered by EMERG AC/DC and would have stopped functioning when the engines flamed-out."

Seriously? No backup battery in the CVR/FDR themselves?

/Fredrik


No, the CVR and FDR are as you say above powered by the EMERG DC and is therefore powered by the battery,

Gear can be extended without power and without hydraulic pumps being functional due to an hydraulic accumulator which will lock the gear in place and the "free fall" of the gear.

Flap position cannot be altered in case of a total power failure.


The Yellow hydraulic DC Motor pump provides assistance for the lowering/locking of gear and to charge the brake accumulator.

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... hydraulics
RJ85 Hydraulics

The CVR and FDR are on ESS AC. The FDAU is on ESS DC. None are powered on EMERG AC/DC. The source of data for the FDAU are likely off-line anyway. The issue is load on the battery. There is a rule to add 10 minute Remote Independent Power Supply (RIPS) for CVR, but only for newly manufactured aircraft (US, that is) 2010 and on.

http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... n.html#nav
RJ85 Navigation and Instruments
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 15292
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 12:56 pm

lemme wrote:
Here are links to each subsection in my blog. Please let me know of any errors or omissions. Thanks, Peter


Peter

There is a lot of problems with what you have posted, and some of it is alarming given that you claim to be both a FAA avionics DER, Boeing design engineer, and an instrument rated pilot. There are some questionable lapses in general avionics knowledge.

Mode S transponders with extended squitter do transmit position. there are even boxes now for GA aircraft that are a Mode S transponder with inbuilt WAAS receiver like a Garmin GTX-345.
The aircraft according to the ATC flight notification was GNSS equipped with a mode S transponder (SDFGRWY/S), RNAV/RNP approved (PBN/B1C1D1S1S2) .
B1- RNAV 5 all permitted sensors
C1 - RNAV 2 all permitted sensors
D1 - RNAV 1 all permitted sensors
S1 - RNP APCH
S2- RNP ACH with BARO-VNAV

The ATC flight notification is not a flight plan the crew uses for operational purposes, If you are indeed a instrument rated pilot you would not call that document a flight plan, it has no waypoints (just the ATC route), winds, fuel log, weights etc.
There is no requirement to have 5% contingency for the entire route, the industry moved away from that years ago, the flight notification says the last part of the leg was from MQU-MDE (MQU VOR to RNG VOR), that is 65 nm. It is perfectly legal these days to only carry 5% contingency from over or abeam that last en-route alternate, with all due respect, 65 nm would mean something like only 40 kg of fuel required to meet the legal obligations. Medellín to their filed alternate Bogotá is only 116 nm.

We dont know enough about this to make definitive claims, and I have every right to open the possibility up to other explanations, for example a failure of AC bus 1&2 will result in the engines being staved of fuel as the fuel pumps are electric.

You can also have a look at this article that says the RJ is capable of having 4 aux tanks, and range out to 2500 nm. That previous 2007 article I posted said Citijet operated 3xRJ85ERs. http://www.ainonline.com/sites/ainonlin ... eovers.pdf
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
SteinarN
Posts: 178
Joined: Mon Dec 29, 2014 1:26 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 5:38 pm

Zeke

There is a lot of problems with what you have posted regarding versions and range of this aircraft. We all, i assume you also, know that this was a passenger plane carrying passengers, some 60 passengers actually. You, beeing a type rated pilot, should really know that the airplane you link to in post #451 is the freighter version. I really hope you as a captain dont fly your passengers around in freighters.
 
User avatar
SomebodyInTLS
Posts: 1868
Joined: Wed Jun 15, 2016 12:31 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:14 pm

highflier92660 wrote:
someone up the airline's chain-in-command should have stopped [the captain].


Did you miss the fact that the PIC was also a part-owner of this two-aircraft company?
"As with most things related to aircraft design, it's all about the trade-offs and much more nuanced than A.net likes to make out."
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:17 pm

zeke wrote:
lemme wrote:
Here are links to each subsection in my blog. Please let me know of any errors or omissions. Thanks, Peter


Peter

There is a lot of problems with what you have posted, and some of it is alarming given that you claim to be both a FAA avionics DER, Boeing design engineer, and an instrument rated pilot. There are some questionable lapses in general avionics knowledge.

Mode S transponders with extended squitter do transmit position. there are even boxes now for GA aircraft that are a Mode S transponder with inbuilt WAAS receiver like a Garmin GTX-345.
The aircraft according to the ATC flight notification was GNSS equipped with a mode S transponder (SDFGRWY/S), RNAV/RNP approved (PBN/B1C1D1S1S2) .
B1- RNAV 5 all permitted sensors
C1 - RNAV 2 all permitted sensors
D1 - RNAV 1 all permitted sensors
S1 - RNP APCH
S2- RNP ACH with BARO-VNAV

The ATC flight notification is not a flight plan the crew uses for operational purposes, If you are indeed a instrument rated pilot you would not call that document a flight plan, it has no waypoints (just the ATC route), winds, fuel log, weights etc.
There is no requirement to have 5% contingency for the entire route, the industry moved away from that years ago, the flight notification says the last part of the leg was from MQU-MDE (MQU VOR to RNG VOR), that is 65 nm. It is perfectly legal these days to only carry 5% contingency from over or abeam that last en-route alternate, with all due respect, 65 nm would mean something like only 40 kg of fuel required to meet the legal obligations. Medellín to their filed alternate Bogotá is only 116 nm.

We dont know enough about this to make definitive claims, and I have every right to open the possibility up to other explanations, for example a failure of AC bus 1&2 will result in the engines being staved of fuel as the fuel pumps are electric.

You can also have a look at this article that says the RJ is capable of having 4 aux tanks, and range out to 2500 nm. That previous 2007 article I posted said Citijet operated 3xRJ85ERs. http://www.ainonline.com/sites/ainonlin ... eovers.pdf

Hi,

No worries on the confusion on terminology. I was trying to distinguish Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance from ADS-B 1090 Extended Squitter. I have revised my blog to clarify this a bit better. The point I was making was squawk in response to 1030 interrogation (elementary/enhanced) does not include position. ADS-B 1090ES of course does include position, and it is sent without regard to SSR interrogation.

I have concluded there is a puzzle of why the ADS-B data shows LMI2933 holding well south of RNG VOR. I do not believe this reflects inertial drift or initialization error - the magnitude of the error is too great. It is even more puzzling if LMI2933 was navigating with reference to GNSS. I readily concede this point needs more information to resolve. I will dwell on your assertions a bit more.

I included the "flight plan" page just to showcase the estimated time enroute and endurance. I am sorry for any confusion you may have taken. I appreciate your point that the information presented was incomplete.

My comment about 5% contingency was simply to point out the underlying assumptions BAE systems was using to compute the graph on their freighter brochure. I have a link to a passenger brochure in my blog which elaborates more on these points. In any case, I did some high level fuel calculations just to get a ball park feeling. I don't have this airplane performance manual. I stated outright in my blog these were just rudimentary.

I introduce and finish my blog emphasizing that the information is very incomplete and it may be inaccurate. I respect the investigation process and am awaiting more information to understand what actually happened.

on your point of fuel starvation (not exhaustion), I was wondering why you thought the left and right Yellow Hydraulic Standby fuel pumps would not operate if the electric fuel pumps failed. Also, what about the Standby electric generator, also hydraulic powered? And finally, if fuel was available, what about the APU? The RJ85 seems to have a lot of redundancy that may have offered continued serviceability if fuel was available. In any case, the formal investigation will offer an answer to these questions.

I did look at your freighter references, but frankly they did not offer any new or useful information. maybe I am missing something. I can find zero references that anything other than pannier tanks were offered as on option when CP2933 was originally manufactured. If it had them, then the fuel exhaustion is also puzzling.

Can I just say your tone to me is a bit aggressive. You did not need to attack me or my credibility. I have assembled a lot of information as a voluntary effort because of my personal curiosity. In my haste (having put together over 100 pages and countless charts and graphs), I surely make mistakes and have misunderstandings. I am openly sharing and interacting to gather any corrections. I don't understand your comments about your rights to asset an alternative scenario. In fact, I applaud your exploring other paths, and I welcome hearing your findings.

Peter Lemme
 
Boomerang63
Posts: 5
Joined: Fri Dec 02, 2016 1:03 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 9:38 pm

LH526 wrote:
Looking at CP-2933s flight history, there were plenty of flights in the last months and weeks pushing the boundaries of Endurance:

11 Nov Belo Horizonte (CNF) Buenos Aires (EZE) CP2933 4:04
04 Nov Medellin Santa Cruz (VVI) CP2933 4:33
8 Oct Cochabamba (CBB) Medellin (MDE) CP2933 4:27


I would be interested in details of the above flights. I did some analysis with the known data of Lamia Crash flight.
28 Nov 22h13 - 02h56 was 4:43 to flame out and transmitter lost travelling 1594nm (10nm before the runway) plus the 2 holding patterns. It was 21 min longer as the given airframe max endurance at MTOW with MaxFuel and MaxPossPayLoad namely the filed 4h22min.
After a while I dare to say, that I had understand the Payload vs Range diagrams. Like Longhauler mentioned earlier range in nm is no term used in fuel management but rather in sales. So the diagrams should have Payload vs flighttime. And after this tragic flight we know, that max flighttime of an RJ85 @ MTOW until flameout is 4:43
The covered distance during this flighttime is heavily dependent on headwind/tailwind situations.

Reducing Payload to [email protected] incl baggage (=4800kg) would have extended flight time by approx 13% (+38min) according to the slope of the diagram
Optimizing Flight level, not enganging autothrottle in windy situation, optimizing speed to 99% SAR according to the varying weight of the plane could safe another 15min at least
All this could have led to a specific endurance (with given weights and strategies) of 5:36min passing by SKBO with a remaining flightcapacity of approx "60min" to file and fly this flight successfully without fearing sanctions. 30min for alt and 30min for hold, without contingency.

There were so many mistakes made:
    Taking all passengers at VVI not saying NO to journalists
    Knowing there can be so much that this flight might not succeed - heavy headwind, traffic, ...
    Doing nothing to safe fuel actively during the flight
    Maybe his last option to refuel closed, when there was heavy traffic around SKBO - at least 6-8 planes waiting to land
    Having FEED LO LEVEL warnings indicating that fuel is running out and seeing the decining fuel quantity all the time, without declaring emergency (accepting punishment vs crash)
    Then do not declare emergency at the last possible point, when ATC commanded him into first wait - maybe he didnt flame out at his Nov Flight reaching exactly this time of 4h33min with not even warnings
    Or immediately in the first hold, when inner engines 2+3 probably went down, only talking about "fuel problem"
    Turning into the second hold, and immediately starting unauthorised approach !
I'm so sad thinking about that occasion.
 
matto
Posts: 6
Joined: Wed Apr 07, 2010 10:13 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 9:57 pm

zeke wrote:
You can also have a look at this article that says the RJ is capable of having 4 aux tanks, and range out to 2500 nm. That previous 2007 article I posted said Citijet operated 3xRJ85ERs. http://www.ainonline.com/sites/ainonlin ... eovers.pdf


CP-2933 was one of the ex-Mesaba Avro RJ85s referred to in the 2007 article and not one of the 3 RJ85ERs.
 
Boomerang63
Posts: 5
Joined: Fri Dec 02, 2016 1:03 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 10:08 pm

lemme wrote:
I can find zero references that anything other than pannier tanks were offered as on option when CP2933 was originally manufactured. If it had them, then the fuel exhaustion is also puzzling.

Can I just say your tone to me is a bit aggressive. You did not need to attack me or my credibility. I have assembled a lot of information as a voluntary effort because of my personal curiosity. In my haste (having put together over 100 pages and countless charts and graphs), I surely make mistakes and have misunderstandings. I am openly sharing and interacting to gather any corrections. I don't understand your comments about your rights to asset an alternative scenario. In fact, I applaud your exploring other paths, and I welcome hearing your findings.

Peter Lemme


Hi Peter

Thank you for your information. I'm interested in all sorts of aviation things and as curious as you, but I am no pilot. Not until now.
Investigation might be a bit difficult in Bolivia. I would like to see the refill bill after the 6th Nov flight, but maybe we will never find out details.

Pannier tanks: If this plane would have had any aux tanks, I think somebody would have said it already, because it would be very important for the whole case.
But 4:36 until flameout - I dont think so, there were no aux tanks installed.

Maybe it would be possible, that fuel reserves will be transmitted automatically to ATC who could automatically prioritize planes at low fuel.

Michael
 
chimborazo
Posts: 321
Joined: Sun Sep 25, 2011 7:51 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 10:15 pm

Interesting thoughts on auto-priority with ATC in a low fuel situation. But not necessary as there are already two redundant low-fuel warning systems... The Pilots. Unfortunately and sadly for the victims, there was a dual failure in those systems on this flight.
 
GRZ-AIR
Posts: 541
Joined: Sat Apr 14, 2001 3:02 am

Re: BREAKING: Plane missing in Colombia

Mon Dec 12, 2016 11:41 pm

wjcandee wrote:
DFW789ER wrote:

No different than professional sports teams in the U.S. flying charters. The players aren't going to pay for a flight. In most cases, players are not even allowed to fly separately from the team.


Well, a little different because the US teams in major sports typically charter from major airlines, well-established charter carriers (e.g. Miami Air) and, in a very few cases, have essentially their own flight departments. At one point, one of the privately-owned transport-category aircraft often chartered by teams was actually crewed under a CMI agreement with somebody surprising, like Atlas, I think. That gives comfort to the companies that insure these guys, and they are mightily-concerned when a whole team is getting on a plane somewhere. When you have very-current pilots with ATPs and airline recurrent training, it's just plain safer, as too many wealthy individuals with small jets or half-assed little charter companies have discovered. A union pilot at a major airline has protections against the client's get-there-itis, a real safety enhancement not present at smaller companies or companies in other places.

And even among US charter carriers, there are differences. The likelihood of a Miami Air or Sun Country 737 landing halfway down the runway at LGA and running off into the arrestor bed are, I'm sorry, just plain lower than at the carrier Pence was using. Currency, procedures, training, resistance to improper influence. All of these are very important. Maybe not today and maybe not tomorrow, but the absence of them stands a decent chance of biting you eventually.


Thank you for that! Excellent writing. You hit the nail on the head.
When I joined A.net it was still free, haha ;).
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 15292
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Tue Dec 13, 2016 1:39 am

SteinarN wrote:

There is a lot of problems with what you have posted regarding versions and range of this aircraft. We all, i assume you also, know that this was a passenger plane carrying passengers, some 60 passengers actually. You, beeing a type rated pilot, should really know that the airplane you link to in post #451 is the freighter version. I really hope you as a captain dont fly your passengers around in freighters.


The freighters are converted passenger airframes, If you have a look at this BAE Systems document in the “Fuel Capacity Improvements” section it gives a good rundown on the various types of additional fuel storage locations and their impact on range performance. https://www.regional-services.com/wp-co ... ations.pdf

lemme wrote:
I have concluded there is a puzzle of why the ADS-B data shows LMI2933 holding well south of RNG VOR. I do not believe this reflects inertial drift or initialization error - the magnitude of the error is too great. It is even more puzzling if LMI2933 was navigating with reference to GNSS. I readily concede this point needs more information to resolve. I will dwell on your assertions a bit more.


There is no requirement to hold only over a VOR, 99% of the times I hold it is not over a navaid. Could the the offset you talk about may simple by part of a parallel sector entry?
lemme wrote:
I included the "flight plan" page just to showcase the estimated time enroute and endurance. I am sorry for any confusion you may have taken. I appreciate your point that the information presented was incomplete.


An ATC flight notification is just that, notifying ATC of your intended route and you aircraft equipment.

lemme wrote:
My comment about 5% contingency was simply to point out the underlying assumptions BAE systems was using to compute the graph on their freighter brochure. I have a link to a passenger brochure in my blog which elaborates more on these points. In any case, I did some high level fuel calculations just to get a ball park feeling. I don't have this airplane performance manual. I stated outright in my blog these were just rudimentary.


The brochure also says that that the AVRO RJ is regularly operated out to 3000 km (“Longer routes, up to 3000km, requiring less than 100 seats are regularly operated with full multi-class service by the AVRO RJ”). The distance from VVI-MDE is 2960 km. The source you are using is telling you it is not only possible, also " regularly operated with full multi-class service". I work with a number of pilots that flew the 146/RJ for National Jet on scheduled flights from PER-CCK, almost identical distance as VVI-MDE. CCK does not have any alternates within 200 nm. The assured me they covered that distance without running out of fuel.

lemme wrote:
on your point of fuel starvation (not exhaustion), I was wondering why you thought the left and right Yellow Hydraulic Standby fuel pumps would not operate if the electric fuel pumps failed. Also, what about the Standby electric generator, also hydraulic powered? And finally, if fuel was available, what about the APU? The RJ85 seems to have a lot of redundancy that may have offered continued serviceability if fuel was available. In any case, the formal investigation will offer an answer to these questions.


Primary hydraulics pressure comes from the engine driven hydraulic pumps. No AC BUS 1&2, no fuel pumps, no fuel pumped to the engines, no engines all you have left is the wind milling to power the hydraulic pressure. I dont speak Spanish so I have to go by the translations that people have posted, but they are broad enough to suggest the "fuel problems" may not mean "no fuel". They apparently also did mention electrical problems, I have demonstrated a way for an electrical problem to result in a fuel problem. For all I know that may have had an electrical problem they were trying to fix, and in the process of fixing it made it worse. This would not be the first 146/RJ to not be able to get the fuel from the tanks to the engines.

There have been many fuel feed issues on the 146/RJ before

"Type Certificate holder BAE Systems advised the Investigation that 45 cases of ice accumulation-related fuel feed failures on Avro RJ aircraft had occurred between October 2005 and February 2010. It was noted that the frequency of such occurrences decreased when operators carried out fuel tank water drain operations more often, provided that the manufacturer-recommended minimum fuel temperatures were also observed during draining. However, they advised being unaware that other operators had also found the use of anti-icing additives to be a good way to prevent FEED LO LEVEL failures when conducting flight operations in cold conditions."

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/RJ85 ... nland_2009

There are many possibilities for this accident to have happened, in my view they are being discarded without items like the fuel uplift receipts, load sheet, and fuel calculations being available.

lemme wrote:
I did look at your freighter references, but frankly they did not offer any new or useful information. maybe I am missing something. I can find zero references that anything other than pannier tanks were offered as on option when CP2933 was originally manufactured. If it had them, then the fuel exhaustion is also puzzling.


I dont know the configuration of this aircraft fuel tanks, I have said on a number of occasions that claims being made that the aircraft ran out of fuel cannot be made purely on a number that has been picked from a brochure, as it does not list all possible RJ configurations.

Image

Green Line = RJ-85 Standard
Blue Line = RJ-85 Standard + Pannier (aux tank)
Olive Line = RJ-85 Standard + Pannier (aux tank) + Rear Bay tank
Red Line = RJ-85 Standard + Pannier (aux tank) + Rear Bay tank + Front Bay tank

From https://www.regional-services.com/wp-co ... ations.pdf
lemme wrote:
Can I just say your tone to me is a bit aggressive. You did not need to attack me or my credibility. I have assembled a lot of information as a voluntary effort because of my personal curiosity. In my haste (having put together over 100 pages and countless charts and graphs), I surely make mistakes and have misunderstandings. I am openly sharing and interacting to gather any corrections. I don't understand your comments about your rights to asset an alternative scenario. In fact, I applaud your exploring other paths, and I welcome hearing your findings.


Were you not the person that said there was no evidence of a RJ85ER, nothing in the TCDS etc ?
You have not claimed to be a 16 yr old enthusiast that has put together a blog, we would all cut them some slack, you have claimed to be an instrument rated pilot (so you should be able to read and understand an IFR ATC flight notification), you also claim to be a FAA DER ( you should know that ADS-B does transmit position information), a person who can certify avionics for the FAA, and a Boeing design engineer. People who do not know any better will take what you posted as gospel because of the qualifications you claimed. The standards people expect from you are much higher, you have failed to live up to them.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
PlanesNTrains
Posts: 9524
Joined: Tue Feb 01, 2005 4:19 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Tue Dec 13, 2016 2:15 am

<Insert awkward whistling sound here...>

Hopefully we get some news soon on the CVR. That would be reassuring to at least know that they are making some progress.
-Dave


MAX’d out on MAX threads. If you are starting a thread, and it’s about the MAX - stop. There’s already a thread that covers it.
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Tue Dec 13, 2016 6:50 am

zeke wrote:
lemme wrote:
on your point of fuel starvation (not exhaustion), I was wondering why you thought the left and right Yellow Hydraulic Standby fuel pumps would not operate if the electric fuel pumps failed. Also, what about the Standby electric generator, also hydraulic powered? And finally, if fuel was available, what about the APU? The RJ85 seems to have a lot of redundancy that may have offered continued serviceability if fuel was available. In any case, the formal investigation will offer an answer to these questions.


Primary hydraulics pressure comes from the engine driven hydraulic pumps. No AC BUS 1&2, no fuel pumps, no fuel pumped to the engines, no engines all you have left is the wind milling to power the hydraulic pressure. I dont speak Spanish so I have to go by the translations that people have posted, but they are broad enough to suggest the "fuel problems" may not mean "no fuel". They apparently also did mention electrical problems, I have demonstrated a way for an electrical problem to result in a fuel problem. For all I know that may have had an electrical problem they were trying to fix, and in the process of fixing it made it worse. This would not be the first 146/RJ to not be able to get the fuel from the tanks to the engines.

...You have not claimed to be a 16 yr old enthusiast that has put together a blog, we would all cut them some slack, ....


1) On the issue of aux fuel tanks. The data on the freighter marketing brochure reflects the RJ85 with (blue) and without pannier (green) tanks. The data suggests it had no pannier tank. Nor is there any information to suggest it has other auxiliary tanks. I appreciate your assurances from your colleagues, yet I cannot see how this is possible to be done with this payload, at these altitudes and have legal reserves, even with pannier tanks. I recently added an analysis from Avherald that suggests a legal plan would have needed 35% more fuel than can be carried normally - I had concluded more like 15%. But in both cases the pannier tanks would not be enough. We all are awaiting further insights from the accident investigation to clarify this point and it seems pointless to dwell on it anymore.

2) I noted the fuel icing issues in my blog, as it revealed some of the procedures related to FEED LO LEVEL warning; perhaps you overlooked it.

3) I have read a version of the RJ85 FCOM Vol 1 over and over on the issue of fuel starvation. Your assertion is that with the failure of AC BUS 1 and AC BUS 2, that the electric fuel pumps fail. That this dual failure would lead to fuel starvation and flameout, with no option to recover.

This is what I gather, but I welcome additional commentary and corrections. BAE Systems thought about this a lot.

Each wing has a main, inner feed, outer feed, and surge tank. Let's leave aside the center/aux tanks and any need to transfer fuel to the main wing tanks- that this was completed successfully.

There are four inner feed tank compartment jet pumps and two outer feed tank compartment jet pumps. The four inner feed tank compartment jet pumps take motive force from either the inner AC electric motive pump or the standby motive pump (Yellow hydraulics).

Fuel from the inner tanks can spill over and fill the outer tanks in the event that the outer tank pumps are not available. There is a valve to permit cross-feed (inner to outer) as well.

Each feed tank operate with about 272 kg of fuel. The jet pumps keep the feed tanks (inner and outer) full of fuel and in the jet pump well.

Each engine takes fuel from a dedicated feed tank. Each engine can take fuel through gravity feed, but normally it is (low) pressurized by the jet pumps.

The inner and outer electric motive pumps run on opposite AC Bus between each wing.

There are valves to permit cross feed to the other wing.

There are three warnings.

FEED LO LEVEL - a feed tank is below it's normally full level - an engine has at least 23 minutes of service with a full feed tank. There is a dedicated feed tank gage.
pump LO PRESS - a motive pump is not working
FUEL LO PRESS - an engine is not getting any fuel.

If AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 2 were to fail, then each inner feed tank jet pump would be driven from the standby motive pumps (off of yellow hydraulics). If we are losing AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 2 and Yellow Hydraulics, we have three failures.

I agree that the AC electric motive pumps are tied to AC BUS 1 and AC BUS 2, and that they are each lost with the loss of its bus. The Hydraulic Standby Generator only supplies ESS AC and would not drive the electric motive pumps (as I incorrectly suggested earlier).

However, the APU can supply either AC BUS 1 or AC BUS 2, offering another backup to the electric motive pumps.

Once a failure occurs that causes a feed tank to drain, the crew have over 20 minutes of powered flight to come up with a configuration to recover feed tank levels.
There is no single failure that takes out both AC buses.

A dual engine failure plus a failure of Yellow hydraulics would not offer a way to pump fuel to the APU.

I think it takes three engine failures from different causes.

However, if the APU is started before the third failure powering one of the two AC busses, then the electric motive pumps on one side can get fuel flowing again, giving a fourth reversion option.

4) I appreciate that LMI2933 may have elected to hold south of the VOR, but it is odd. It will be very interesting when we get more info to confirm where the airplane actually was.

5) I am sorry I am such a disappointment to you. All I can do is assure you I am the person I profess to be.

I am 58, I have spent 35 years in the industry, I have degrees in Aero/Astro and Elec Eng/Comp Science from MIT. I readily admit I have spent more than half my career on communications, leaving some aspects of aviation a bit dated. I read a lot to compensate. Airplanes are complex, and no one knows everything, yet we can all try and collectively figure it out.

I am trying as best I can to gather all the information, and that I appreciate any help or advice. My blog is a collection of all the bits and pieces I found, tied together as best I can. I had to assemble a lot of information to try and make sense of what the data says, and not everything is available, and not everything makes sense. As more information becomes available, it will be easier to align the threads. If there are errors, I will correct them. If there are gaps, I will fill them. These bulletin boards are frustrating because information is spread all over - that is what drove me to putting together the blog.

I have stated profusely that my report is about having a look at how well the addition of ADS-B data, a form of telemetry, can be in air-safety investigations.

Can you back down just a bit and just offer technical commentary minus the personal jabs?

Peter Lemme
 
F9Animal
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Tue Dec 13, 2016 5:22 pm

PlanesNTrains wrote:
<Insert awkward whistling sound here...>

Hopefully we get some news soon on the CVR. That would be reassuring to at least know that they are making some progress.


Will the CVR still work when electrical fails? Or, do they run on batteries for a certain amount of time? If the question has been asked or answered, please excuse me. I honestly don't have the time to comb through almost 500 posts on my phone.

Also, what is the status of this particular airline? How many planes do they have in their fleet? I read the Captain was a part owner?

So, it appears to be a case of very poor judgment, and likely preventable. Again, I am sure this has already been answered. Had the pilot declared an emergency instead of going into a holding pattern..... Is it likely the plane would have made it? Based on the circle, they might have just barely made it? Could you imagine after making the runway, the plane would have probably needed to be towed to the terminal! That just boggles my mind!

I also wonder if sports teams have or are considering bringing on something like a travel specialist? Like someone that has dispatch experience? If the team had known the situation they faced before boarding, I am certain they would have refused to board that plane! :(
I Am A Different Animal!!
 
F9Animal
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Tue Dec 13, 2016 5:47 pm

imoretti wrote:
More published news out of Bolivia:

In an El Deber article, one of the survivors, Erwin Tumiri (the flight’s mechanic) is interviewed. He offers a good deal of insight into the pre-flight fueling including these comments (all my translations…).

Early in the interview, he notes that “I'm not sure that it will be the fuel [at fault]. I can say that it is, but we must wait still for the investigations and according to this we will judge.”

Asked if he knows how much fuel the plane carried, he replies, “Yes, I knew.”

In the case of the flight to Medellin, “I filled the fuel to full, well reloaded.”

Enough to arrive? “I coordinated this with the dispatcher. If the dispatcher tells me so many liters, I do this. In this case he told me ‘fill it” and I did it. Later I told YPFP [the state-owned fuel provider] to make a receipt to Cobija. But during the flight Angel, the flight engineer, told me that it wouldn’t be to Cobija, rather to Medellin.”

The receipt for Cobija was to refuel? “Yes. But it was night and all that, they already knew that the airport in Cobija doesn’t operate in night hours.”

Did it surprise you that they won’t refuel in Cobija? Didn’t it cause you alarm? “Yes, but they are in charge of their own administration, of their own money. From their heads come the orders. I must carry them out. My function is to check that the plane is in good condition and that it is filled with all that it needs to be filled: lubricants, oils, fuel.”

Is it the first time that they didn’t refuel, in an intermediate point, before arriving at the final destination? "The fuel filling depends on the dispatcher and the engineer who tell me how much. That day we ‘filled it’, but yes, we made the [incorrect] receipt. (YPFB) gave us paper for Cobija, at the request also of the engineer who told me to do that. The receipts were already made to Cobija. Later, at the moment of departure, I asked him if we were going to Cobija and he told me no, that we were going direct. That’s what Angel [the engineer] told me.”

http://www.eldeber.com.bo/bolivia/prend ... intio.html

El Deber reports LaMia’s latest financial statements filed in early October with the country’s commercial registry, Fundempresa, shows assets of $16,516. The same records show the company had $21,551 at startup. How the company was able to register with the government with such low value is an emerging question, in addition to whether it carried any/enough insurance.

http://www.eldeber.com.bo/bolivia/lamia ... s-114.html

It is likely that the investigation(s) of the accident, as it is international in nature and will include both Colombia and Brazil, at least, will reveal much of how aviation (and business in general) is conducted in Bolivia.

Meanwhile, it’s also being reported that the Aasana functionary who interacted with the LaMia dispatcher on the flight plan, Celia Castedo, is now in Corumbá, Brazil, seeking “refuge” (asylum?) due to death threats in Bolivia.

http://www.la-razon.com/economia/Report ... 38718.html

I anticipate that she will be received by Brazil with a great deal of empathy… and interest.


Wow!!! Does this even fall into terrible CRM? Didn't he have a responsibility to speak up and tell the dispatcher and crew the dangers? I would have demanded to be let off of the plane if I knew this situation! To me, I think this individual holds an enormous amount of responsibility! Notice how he shifts responsibility to the crew instead?
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lemme
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Tue Dec 13, 2016 6:15 pm

F9Animal wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:
<Insert awkward whistling sound here...>

Hopefully we get some news soon on the CVR. That would be reassuring to at least know that they are making some progress.


Will the CVR still work when electrical fails? Or, do they run on batteries for a certain amount of time? If the question :(


From the info I have, the CVR and DFDR operate on ESS AC. The FDAU runs on ESS DC. There is an industry mandate for a 10 minute Remote Independent Power Supply (RIPS) for new aircraft since 2010. I believe the recordings stopped with flameout.
 
rg787
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Tue Dec 13, 2016 6:37 pm

14 days after the accident and the thread first post still has the country's name spelled wrong...
 
lemme
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Tue Dec 13, 2016 7:43 pm

Aviation is loathe to repeat catastrophic history. The whole point of air safety investigation is to be sure we learn and fix. In 2010 a City Jet RJ85 was inbound to Zurich and had to divert to Basel due to weather. Upon arriving at Basel, the crew ended up declaring an emergency for fear that traffic ahead would delay their ability to land above minimum required fuel. Here are the highlights from the report.

https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2010/ei-w10 ... 617.en.pdf

From the report:

At 17 h 26 min 16, while the BAe146 was 1.8 NM from the runway threshold, the crew of the A319 not having taken off, the tower controller told them : “stop immediately, hold position, repeat, stop immediately, a BAe 46 on go-around“. Then he asked the crew of the BAe to make a go-around. The latter refused because they did not have enough fuel and requested that the A319 vacate the runway.

Note: At this time and according to the airline’s analysis, the quantity of fuel remaining was estimated at 1,400 kg. The nal reserve is de ned as 850 kg.

At 17 h 26 min 36, the controller ordered a go-around, which the crew performed.

At 17 h 26 min 58, the crew stated: “we are declaring a fuel emergency now we request priority vectors for landing“.

The tower controller contacted the approach controller by telephone. They decided to have the airplane climb to 6,000 ft on the extended runway centreline and to “make it as short as possible “. The tower controller asked the crew to climb to 6,000 ft and to change frequency.

At 17 h 28 min 23, the crew of the BAe 146 contacted approach control: “Mayday Mayday Mayday, City 108X, declaring fuel emergency, request priority landing“.

After ensuring that they had the runway in sight, the approach controller offered the crew of the BAe 146 a visual approach, which was accepted.

At 17 h 34, the crew landed.

On the ground, the quantity of fuel remaining was 1,220 kg.

Regulatory requirements for air traffic control
The definition of minimum fuel is not integrated in the French regulations (Decree of 3 March 2006 modified in relation to the rules of the air and to air traffic control services (RDA).

This definition is however mentioned in ICAO Doc 4444 (15th edition, 2007) – Procedures for air navigation services– Air Traffic Management – chapter 1 definitions:
Minimum fuel. The term used to describe a situation in which an aircraft’s fuel supply has reached a state where little or no delay can be accepted.
Note: This is not an emergency situation but merely indicates that an emergency situation is possible, should any undue delay occur.
A national DSNA instruction dated 6 July 2004 reminds air traffic control organisations of the requirements relating to a minimum fuel situation or to an emergency situation.

This DSNA instruction was distributed locally to controllers at Basel-Mulhouse- Freiburg in the form of a service memo dated 8 September 2004, and concludes with: “this information does not thus lead to the granting of any type of priority“.

Regulatory requirements for public transport operators
ˆThe EU OPS regulations state in paragraph OPS 1.375 part b) 3) that:
“The commander shall declare an emergency when calculated usable fuel on landing, at the nearest adequate aerodrome where a safe landing can be performed, is less than final reserve fuel.“
An emergency situation can be transmitted either by an urgency “PAN PAN“ message or by a distress “MAYDAY“ message.

Airline’s Operations Manual
The airline’s operations manual (Part A) states:
“A fuel emergency exists when it is estimated to have reduced to an amount where an approach and landing should be commenced without delay. The amount of fuel remaining at this stage is 850 kg.
In the case of the RJ this equates to the OPS minimum reserve fuel, which is sufficient fuel for holding for 30 min at 1,500 ft.
A Mayday shall be declared if it is estimated that the aircraft will land with less than the OPS minimum reserve fuel.
This fuel is not to be considered as a separate requirement in the fuel planning process.
The 850 kg is useable fuel and may be consumed as part of the arrival procedure at any aerodrome.
When it is estimated that the fuel remaining upon landing will be reduced to an amount of 1,200 kg or less then the Commander shall declare a PAN.
This fuel is not to be considered as a separate requirement in the fuel planning process.
The 1,200 kg is useable fuel and may be consumed as part of the arrival procedure at any aerodrome. The requirement that crews declare a PAN or Mayday ensures crews benefit from the priority ATC will place on an aircraft declaring such emergency.“

CONCLUSIONS
The incident was due to the late communication by the crew to the Air Traffic controller of their low fuel situation and their emergency situation. This led to the controller being unaware of the emergency situation.

The following element contributed to the event:
The lack of an appropriate “minimum fuel“ procedure associated with the remaining flying time.

Notion of minimum fuel
The notion of minimum fuel defined by ICAO allows a crew to describe to the air traffic services a potentially critical situation during a diversion while avoiding the declaration of a distress or emergency situation.

This notion of minimum fuel is not defined in the European regulation.

In its report on the serious incident on 28 August 1999 at Paris Charles de Gaulle (95) to the Boeing 737-528 registered F-GJNF operated by Air France, the BEA had already recommended that the DGAC define the “Minimum fuel“ callout. In answer to this recommendation the DGAC considered that: “The minimum fuel callout is a source of confusion. This callout does not lead to any action by ATC, so the crew must then declare a distress situation as soon as the quantity of fuel planned for the landing is lower than the final reserve“.

In the light of this event, the BEA recommends that:
€the DGAC and EASA implement the “minimum fuel” message already defined by ICAO, with the associated procedures. [Recommendation FRAN‐2012‐026].
 
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AirlineCritic
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Wed Dec 14, 2016 12:56 am

First, thank you Peter for your contributions. I for one appreciate them a lot, and find your humble tone and willingness to learn very productive.

Second, I think the discussions have focused a lot on the details of the crew's failures and how it was handled by others while they were in the air. Of course, the crew's failures are an assumption at this stage, it is of course possible that Zeke is on to something, though I have to say it is maybe less likely than pilot error.

But the crews failures and actions in the air are one thing. If the assumptions hold, however, we have a far more serious situation here, a culture of gross violations that has lasted for a long time.

This accident should not be ruled as a mere pilot error -- it is also indicative of a systemic issue. Why are our procedures such that such behaviour cannot be caught, either pre- or post-flight? Why do we allow operations where a single person's failures can lead to this kind of behaviour?

There is plenty to look at in terms of the airline certification, flight plan submission, incident reporting, and overseeing of the aviation business. And I fear this is not an isolated incident, but rather something where we should do a better job at tracking multiple carriers, in different countries.
 
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Wed Dec 14, 2016 5:57 am

lemme wrote:
F9Animal wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:
<Insert awkward whistling sound here...>

Hopefully we get some news soon on the CVR. That would be reassuring to at least know that they are making some progress.


Will the CVR still work when electrical fails? Or, do they run on batteries for a certain amount of time? If the question :(


From the info I have, the CVR and DFDR operate on ESS AC. The FDAU runs on ESS DC. There is an industry mandate for a 10 minute Remote Independent Power Supply (RIPS) for new aircraft since 2010. I believe the recordings stopped with flameout.


I'm not nearly as concerned (personally) with hearing their final horrifying moments. I want to hear if they had been discussing it at some point prior, such as after bypassing Bogota or something. Just curious if there's a smoking gun of sorts in there that would either implicate or exonerate the flight crew.
-Dave


MAX’d out on MAX threads. If you are starting a thread, and it’s about the MAX - stop. There’s already a thread that covers it.
 
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zeke
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Wed Dec 14, 2016 9:35 am

lemme wrote:
The data suggests it had no pannier tank. Nor is there any information to suggest it has other auxiliary tanks.


No “data” has been made public. Everything has been speculation and guessing on your part.

lemme wrote:
I appreciate your assurances from your colleagues, yet I cannot see how this is possible to be done with this payload, at these altitudes and have legal reserves, even with pannier tanks.


Your brochure states in black and white that the RJ is regularly operated up to 3000 km, which is slightly more than this route segment.I also provided this link with various options on range/payload and fuel tanks available. https://www.regional-services.com/wp-co ... ations.pdf

lemme wrote:
I recently added an analysis from Avherald that suggests a legal plan would have needed 35% more fuel than can be carried normally - I had concluded more like 15%. But in both cases the pannier tanks would not be enough.


Nothing but your speculation, as I pointed out above you didn’t even know the flight planning fuel requirements for contingency fuel. I know people who operated 146/RJs on the PER-CCK route 3 times a week. Given those flights were operated by National Jet on behalf of Qantas I have every confidence that the aircraft was more the capable of that range.

lemme wrote:
I have read a version of the RJ85 FCOM Vol 1 over and over on the issue of fuel starvation. Your assertion is that with the failure of AC BUS 1 and AC BUS 2, that the electric fuel pumps fail. That this dual failure would lead to fuel starvation and flameout, with no option to recover.


All large jet aircraft I have flown have an all engine flameout procedure published, the general idea is always to establish the aircraft in a glide to get enough air into the engines to facilitate an windmill start. The decision has to be made, do you try and glide to the runway, or do you accelerate to facilitate a windmill start. On top of that terrain to the south is significant, do you accelerate towards terrain to start the engines ?

Image

I have not flown the 146/RJ, but the other quads I have flown the 744 and A340, the 744 APU could not be started in flight, the A340 could (and had its own APU battery). APUs have start envelopes, one would need to look at the density height the aircraft was at to see if was in the start envelope. I don’t know if the 146/RJ has a separate APU battery, if not starting the APU drains your only emergency battery that is powering your AC and DC emergency bus. Without engines, you are also without pressurization.
Dealing with multiple cascading failures is what being a captain is all about, prioritizing what is important.

lemme wrote:
If AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 2 were to fail, then each inner feed tank jet pump would be driven from the standby motive pumps (off of yellow hydraulics). If we are losing AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 2 and Yellow Hydraulics, we have three failures.


My friends that have flown the type tell me it is not an unforeseen failure, Bae had an all engines flameout procedure. They also tell me that the loss of AC BUS 1&2 was not unforeseen, they said the aircraft had a STBY GEN switch on the overhead panel which would automatically come on in the event of loss of AC BUS 1&2.

lemme wrote:
However, the APU can supply either AC BUS 1 or AC BUS 2, offering another backup to the electric motive pumps.


What is the start envelope of the APU ? What battery starts it ? What does the procedure say to do ?

lemme wrote:
Once a failure occurs that causes a feed tank to drain, the crew have over 20 minutes of powered flight to come up with a configuration to recover feed tank levels.


What about a change in attitude like a turn in a hold ? Does your statement only hold true for straight and level flight ? Where in the tank is the fuel taken from ?

lemme wrote:
There is no single failure that takes out both AC buses.


Yet my fiends who have flown the aircraft tell me the “STBY GEN” switch is left in an automatic position to automatically power the AC bus in the event of the loss of AC BUS 1&2. You are making a lot of assumptions all the time, it is perfectly legal on every transport category jet I have flown to dispatch with one generator inoperative under the MEL. It would only take a failure of the other generator than to have a loss of both AC BUS 1&2. It would only take one engine then to rollback for all of the electric fuel pumps to stop working.

lemme wrote:
I appreciate that LMI2933 may have elected to hold south of the VOR, but it is odd. It will be very interesting when we get more info to confirm where the airplane actually was.


The aircraft was filed as RNAV equipped, I would suggest they would have done the RNAV transition onto the ILS. The hold on the RNAV transition is at the GEMLI waypoint, not the VOR.

Image
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
lemme
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Wed Dec 14, 2016 5:25 pm

zeke wrote:
I have not flown the 146/RJ, but the other quads I have flown the 744 and A340, the 744 APU could not be started in flight, the A340 could (and had its own APU battery). APUs have start envelopes, one would need to look at the density height the aircraft was at to see if was in the start envelope. I don’t know if the 146/RJ has a separate APU battery, if not starting the APU drains your only emergency battery that is powering your AC and DC emergency bus. Without engines, you are also without pressurization.
Dealing with multiple cascading failures is what being a captain is all about, prioritizing what is important.


From the FCOM, the APU can be started from TR#1 or battery, inflight. I don't have the flight envelope available. I was suggesting the APU could be started as a precautionary measure if one of the engine generators went off line. TR#1 is the only option from AC, so if it fails, you must use the battery. The hope is the APU will start and battery state becomes less of a concern once it powers up.

zeke wrote:
My friends that have flown the type tell me it is not an unforeseen failure, Bae had an all engines flameout procedure. They also tell me that the loss of AC BUS 1&2 was not unforeseen, they said the aircraft had a STBY GEN switch on the overhead panel which would automatically come on in the event of loss of AC BUS 1&2.


Ask your friends how the STBY GEN powers AC BUS 1 or AC BUS 2. From the FCOM, the STBY GEN only power ESS AC, which will not drive the motive fuel pumps.

zeke wrote:
What about a change in attitude like a turn in a hold ? Does your statement only hold true for straight and level flight ? Where in the tank is the fuel taken from ?


Each feed tank is baffled by ribs to prevent cross-flow (above the appropriate weir line. By the geometry, the inner feed tank will drain a bit faster than the outer (the initial draw will come from the inner tank until the level drops below the weir line. There are scavenge pumps, only the inner pumps would operate on the standby hydraulic motive pump. If no motive flow, then none of the scavenge pumps would operate. Not sure how much is left unusable.

zeke wrote:
Yet my fiends who have flown the aircraft tell me the “STBY GEN” switch is left in an automatic position to automatically power the AC bus in the event of the loss of AC BUS 1&2. You are making a lot of assumptions all the time, it is perfectly legal on every transport category jet I have flown to dispatch with one generator inoperative under the MEL. It would only take a failure of the other generator than to have a loss of both AC BUS 1&2. It would only take one engine then to rollback for all of the electric fuel pumps to stop working.


From the FCOM (there are no assumptions in this statement), the STBY GEN only powers ESS AC - it is not capable of powering either AC BUS 1 or AC BUS 2.

If departing with one generator INOP, on MMEL, then the loss of the second generator would leave the fuel pumps operating on the standby hydraulic motive flow, and battery power would be available to start the APU, assuming within the start envelope.

Cascading failures are the recipe for catastrophe. Your scenario requires three independent failures, which would be a bad day for anyone with loss of both AC generators (engines #1, #4) and some other failure rendering the standby hydraulic motive fuel pump inop (#2 engine, yellow hydraulics, standby pump)

zeke wrote:
The aircraft was filed as RNAV equipped, I would suggest they would have done the RNAV transition onto the ILS. The hold on the RNAV transition is at the GEMLI waypoint, not the VOR.


BRILLIANT! I had focused on the LOC/ILS approach charts and had overlooked the RNAV procedure. This resolves the puzzle - there was no map shift, all makes sense. THANK YOU!!!
 
matto
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Wed Dec 14, 2016 6:07 pm

Is it possible the HSI/CDI switched automatically from RNAV/GPS to VLOC/ILS on initial approach to GEMLI. Then in order to fly the holding pattern the CDI was manually switched back to GPS and the pilots forgot to switch it back again. The GPS would then be giving the distance to the next waypoint and not the runway as they might have been expecting (using the VLOC/ILS). Of course they would be lacking any glidescope information at this point which ought to have alerted them but they may have figured they weren't receiving glidescope information because of their altitude (approach altitude is 12000' and their rate of descent might back this up).
 
lemme
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Thu Dec 15, 2016 9:35 am

LMI2933 seems to have been holding at GEMLI prior to a planned RNAV approach, indeed!. They started down under power. Last ADS-B report was at 15,500 feet near GEMLI, over 3,000 feet above the final approach. It appears they had extended gear and flaps in anticipation of continued flight worthiness. They crossed through the final glide-path at about 10,500 feet about 3 nm south of the FAP (KUNGU) at 9,700 feet and crashed near the RNG VOR. With the loss of power is the loss of RNAV (EFIS, FMS). The crew would have the option to use ILS, LOC, or VOR radio navigation tuned manually, and make mention of LOC.

The crew's actions while under power on their final descent seem reasonable if assuming that they don't flameout.

In hindsight, with the Feed tanks on fumes, the crew may have had an option to descend flaps up gear up. Once they configured for landing and by diving to capture the glide path, they lost any option to make it. There is no option to raise flaps and gear once all power is lost.

Revised my blog to reflect the RNAV approach, thanks for the help.
http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... ellin.html
 
lemme
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Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Thu Dec 15, 2016 9:57 am

matto wrote:
Is it possible the HSI/CDI switched automatically from RNAV/GPS to VLOC/ILS on initial approach to GEMLI. Then in order to fly the holding pattern the CDI was manually switched back to GPS and the pilots forgot to switch it back again. The GPS would then be giving the distance to the next waypoint and not the runway as they might have been expecting (using the VLOC/ILS). Of course they would be lacking any glidescope information at this point which ought to have alerted them but they may have figured they weren't receiving glidescope information because of their altitude (approach altitude is 12000' and their rate of descent might back this up).

An FMS is the only option for VNAV. In that configuration, the GPS antenna is directly connected to an embedded receiver inside each GNS-XLS/GNLU. The FMS/EFIS is lost on EMERG AC/DC power. I think they were setup for the RNAV approach. When power was lost, they had to fly by reference to LOC on the standby attitude indicator, which was aligned with their approach, but may not have been tuned and identified when power was lost. At that point they were close to GEMLI, but over 3,000 above the approach point.

They crossed through the approach path a couple of miles short of the FAP KUNGU, at about 10,500.
 
Boeingphan
Posts: 232
Joined: Fri Apr 01, 2016 10:29 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Thu Dec 15, 2016 12:07 pm

Peter and Zeke thank you both for some great insight. While I'm nothing more than an aviation enthusiast the depth of knowledge on both ends is remarkable. This is why I keep reading the message boards to gain a better understanding of flight and or procedures. Thanks for the input and if you could just tone down the unwarranted personal attacks that would be great. You both are clearly an asset to the boards and strong arming anyone from allowing them their own viewpoint would be a disservice to the rest of the readers. Thanks again and happy (and kind) postings moving forward.
 
ErichHartmann
Posts: 5
Joined: Thu Dec 15, 2016 1:40 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Thu Dec 15, 2016 3:17 pm

Boeingphan wrote:
Peter and Zeke thank you both for some great insight. While I'm nothing more than an aviation enthusiast the depth of knowledge on both ends is remarkable. This is why I keep reading the message boards to gain a better understanding of flight and or procedures. Thanks for the input and if you could just tone down the unwarranted personal attacks that would be great. You both are clearly an asset to the boards and strong arming anyone from allowing them their own viewpoint would be a disservice to the rest of the readers. Thanks again and happy (and kind) postings moving forward.


Sorry, but this forum is a place where serious matters are being discussed and it is for adults, I am not sure what you're referring to by "unwarranted personal attacks" . In life there are always situations where people will disagree in an assertive or vigorous manner, therefore your call for "happy and kind postings moving forward" is a bit far fetched. Rigorous scrutiny and rigorous debate is what is required, especially where serious matters are being debated/discussed.
I have been following these forums for a great deal of time, and as far as I am concerned Zeke is the type of person who questions things that have been asserted in this forum with his great aeronautical and technical knowledge from a factual viewpoint. I don't see why he has to be "kind" if someone is posting up information that he knows is not correct. I respect the opinions of people like Zeke, Mandala499, Pihero, and a few other posters, their contributions are invaluable.

If there are any moderators available can we ask the original poster to edit their original post to reflect the correct & factual information? The country is called Colombia, not "Columbia", and the plane was transporting Brazilian Serie A side Chapecoense, not the Brazilian national team.
 
CNorman
Posts: 1
Joined: Thu Dec 15, 2016 3:53 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Thu Dec 15, 2016 4:04 pm

Does anyone have a clue as to why no information has been released about status of the CVR and FDR? When can we expect to hear something on these?
 
rrlopes
Posts: 68
Joined: Mon Jun 01, 2009 7:37 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Thu Dec 15, 2016 6:26 pm

chimborazo wrote:
Interesting thoughts on auto-priority with ATC in a low fuel situation. But not necessary as there are already two redundant low-fuel warning systems... The Pilots. Unfortunately and sadly for the victims, there was a dual failure in those systems on this flight.


Humans are very unreliable systems unfortunately, as tragically evidenced by this crash and many others.
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 15292
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Fri Dec 16, 2016 2:41 pm

lemme wrote:
If departing with one generator INOP, on MMEL, then the loss of the second generator would leave the fuel pumps operating on the standby hydraulic motive flow, and battery power would be available to start the APU, assuming within the start envelope.


I am informed the STBY pumps only transfer fuel within the tanks, they do not feed the engines.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
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zeke
Posts: 15292
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Fri Dec 16, 2016 2:43 pm

CNorman wrote:
Does anyone have a clue as to why no information has been released about status of the CVR and FDR? When can we expect to hear something on these?


Preliminary factual statements normally come out month after the event.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
Boeingphan
Posts: 232
Joined: Fri Apr 01, 2016 10:29 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Fri Dec 16, 2016 4:53 pm

ErichHartmann wrote:
Boeingphan wrote:
Peter and Zeke thank you both for some great insight. While I'm nothing more than an aviation enthusiast the depth of knowledge on both ends is remarkable. This is why I keep reading the message boards to gain a better understanding of flight and or procedures. Thanks for the input and if you could just tone down the unwarranted personal attacks that would be great. You both are clearly an asset to the boards and strong arming anyone from allowing them their own viewpoint would be a disservice to the rest of the readers. Thanks again and happy (and kind) postings moving forward.


Sorry, but this forum is a place where serious matters are being discussed and it is for adults, I am not sure what you're referring to by "unwarranted personal attacks" . In life there are always situations where people will disagree in an assertive or vigorous manner, therefore your call for "happy and kind postings moving forward" is a bit far fetched. Rigorous scrutiny and rigorous debate is what is required, especially where serious matters are being debated/discussed.
I have been following these forums for a great deal of time, and as far as I am concerned Zeke is the type of person who questions things that have been asserted in this forum with his great aeronautical and technical knowledge from a factual viewpoint. I don't see why he has to be "kind" if someone is posting up information that he knows is not correct. I respect the opinions of people like Zeke, Mandala499, Pihero, and a few other posters, their contributions are invaluable.

If there are any moderators available can we ask the original poster to edit their original post to reflect the correct & factual information? The country is called Colombia, not "Columbia", and the plane was transporting Brazilian Serie A side Chapecoense, not the Brazilian national team.



I'm fine with most Erich but when someone blasts an MIT grad and aero engineer and calls them a failure I think perhaps they've stepped over the line.
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Fri Dec 16, 2016 11:30 pm

There are versions of the ATC transcript recording that have been edited and are not reflective of real-time, beware. I have annotated MSL altitude versus UTC time with the transmissions from LMI2933. The information correlates well with the ADS-B reports.

Added to the blog entry
http://www.satcom.guru/2016/12/lmi2933- ... ellin.html

Image

Image
Last edited by lemme on Fri Dec 16, 2016 11:52 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Fri Dec 16, 2016 11:37 pm

zeke wrote:
lemme wrote:
If departing with one generator INOP, on MMEL, then the loss of the second generator would leave the fuel pumps operating on the standby hydraulic motive flow, and battery power would be available to start the APU, assuming within the start envelope.


I am informed the STBY pumps only transfer fuel within the tanks, they do not feed the engines.

Image

Image
 
User avatar
zeke
Posts: 15292
Joined: Thu Dec 14, 2006 1:42 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Sat Dec 17, 2016 7:55 am

How does that change your previous statements that the hydraulic pump runs the engine ?

What flight sim program are those diagrams from ? Hint the Bae manuals are black and white.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Sat Dec 17, 2016 8:38 am

zeke wrote:
How does that change your previous statements that the hydraulic pump runs the engine ?

What flight sim program are those diagrams from ? Hint the Bae manuals are black and white.

I have stated that the hydraulic motive pump can operate the inner feed tank fuel pumps, keeping both the inner and outer feed tanks full from the main wing tanks. There is no issue with gravity flow to each engine (low pressure flow). The hydraulic motive pump (standby) starts when the electric pumps fail, and thus would start from a full feed tank position.

I have an unauthorized copy (2009) of FCOM Vol 1 Book 1 and Book 2. I can't offer any explanation for your assertion that this in not a legitimate BAE Systems manual, other than to attest I have read its 2,020 pages several times and find no example where this is not a valid manual. Whether it strictly applies to CP2933 remains to be seen.

If it is from a simulator, I want one!

I don't have the rest of the volumes. please send an email to peter @ satcom . guru if anyone can help, thanks.

Image
 
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flyingphil
Posts: 313
Joined: Wed May 16, 2007 2:56 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Sun Dec 18, 2016 3:55 pm

"Pilot in Colombia plane tragedy that killed most of Brazilian football team 'was not trained properly'"
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12 ... g_share_em
As I suspected there are further revelations regarding the Captain and his lack of flying experience... apparently falsified information was submitted to allow him to obtain a Commercial license.
[also a quick note of thanks for all the technical information that has been posted here]
 
SteinarN
Posts: 178
Joined: Mon Dec 29, 2014 1:26 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Sun Dec 18, 2016 4:08 pm

flyingphil wrote:
"Pilot in Colombia plane tragedy that killed most of Brazilian football team 'was not trained properly'"
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12 ... g_share_em
As I suspected there are further revelations regarding the Captain and his lack of flying experience... apparently falsified information was submitted to allow him to obtain a Commercial license.
[also a quick note of thanks for all the technical information that has been posted here]



Despite some members here obviously not liking the work some other members have done to try to solve some of the puzles... Maybe they feel their pilot profession is threatened... I can only agree in what you say about providing technical information, regardless of any potential inaccuracies it might contain.

So, please keep up the good work :-)
 
User avatar
AirlineCritic
Posts: 1771
Joined: Sat Mar 14, 2009 1:07 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Sun Dec 18, 2016 4:34 pm

SteinarN wrote:
So, please keep up the good work :-)


:checkmark:
 
PlanesNTrains
Posts: 9524
Joined: Tue Feb 01, 2005 4:19 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Sun Dec 18, 2016 9:29 pm

SteinarN wrote:
flyingphil wrote:
"Pilot in Colombia plane tragedy that killed most of Brazilian football team 'was not trained properly'"
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12 ... g_share_em
As I suspected there are further revelations regarding the Captain and his lack of flying experience... apparently falsified information was submitted to allow him to obtain a Commercial license.
[also a quick note of thanks for all the technical information that has been posted here]



Despite some members here obviously not liking the work some other members have done to try to solve some of the puzles... Maybe they feel their pilot profession is threatened... I can only agree in what you say about providing technical information, regardless of any potential inaccuracies it might contain.

So, please keep up the good work :-)


Unless we are ok with people being unintentionally misinformed or mislead, I think there needs to be room for correction. Perhaps it can be handled better at times, but that doesn't mean that they are against the information. Instead, I think some are more concerned about a narrow viewpoint being perpetuated without a broader understanding of what else might have taken place or contributed. :-)
-Dave


MAX’d out on MAX threads. If you are starting a thread, and it’s about the MAX - stop. There’s already a thread that covers it.
 
User avatar
Schweigend
Posts: 532
Joined: Sun Jun 06, 2010 8:47 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Wed Dec 21, 2016 6:34 am

It was incompetence that led to fuel starvation. The pilot and the Airline are now said to be responsible for the crash....

Reported in Deutsche Welle:

Bolivian airline held responsible for Chapecoense soccer team crash in Colombia

The Bolivian airline and pilot have been held responsible for the crash in Colombia which killed 71 people, including most of Brazil's Chapecoense Real soccer team. Rules on fuel reserves may have been disregarded.


Colombia's civil aviation safety chief has said the plane disregarded international rules on fuel reserves.


Full article here (in English):

http://www.dw.com/en/bolivian-airline-h ... a-36852857
 
djm18
Posts: 104
Joined: Mon Feb 24, 2014 6:19 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Thu Dec 22, 2016 5:20 pm

I do not know this publication but there is little basis for this conclusion without even a preliminary report from the flight investigators. What evidence is this based on? CNN had a similar headline yesterday which is bothersome to say the least...

CNN Headline 12/21 "Bolivia: Human error caused crash that killed soccer team"

We all very well know how irresponsible this is but then again we also very well know CNN's place in the world of journalism.
 
User avatar
AirlineCritic
Posts: 1771
Joined: Sat Mar 14, 2009 1:07 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Thu Dec 22, 2016 6:10 pm

I think there's a difference though between a mistake/error and criminal negligence ... or even wilfully endangering lives for the sake of saving a few pesos.

And I dislike almost all news articles or claimed analysis results that say only one particular factor lead to an accident. For instance, let assume the primary cause of this accident was malicious or reckless behaviour by an individual. Shouldn't we also look at the system and ask if our checkpoints and procedures are sufficiently good to catch that kind of behaviour, at least when it occurs on a regular basis?
 
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flyingturtle
Posts: 5909
Joined: Mon Oct 31, 2011 1:39 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 26, 2016 2:58 pm

The accident has happened on November, 28th. Under the ICAO rules, a preliminary report should be issued one month after the accident, and the final one one year after the accident. (If the investigation can't be closed, a prelim report should be issued every year.)

I look forward to get a deeper understanding of this crazy flight.

David
Reading accident reports is what calms me down
 
Winterapfel
Posts: 28
Joined: Wed Feb 25, 2009 4:35 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 26, 2016 4:31 pm

https://twitter.com/AviationSafety/stat ... 6317103104

Live: Aerocivil press conference with investigation update of the LaMia crash near Medellin #Chapecoense :
https://t.co/m6tOIjOfMB
 
User avatar
flyingturtle
Posts: 5909
Joined: Mon Oct 31, 2011 1:39 pm

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 26, 2016 6:03 pm

With my bit of Spanish I understand, I listen to the press conference. And I saw this comment on the avherald page:

Just saw the preliminary report on this.

The crew knew they had almost no fuel to reach Medellin. They pondered landing in Leticia and Bogota but did not do so.

And most importantly it seems that the CVR was not working after they started entering Colombian airspace. Methinks someone inside the Flight deck shut the CVR down.

If this is not pilot suicide its the worst case of negligence in the history of commercial aviation.


And yes, the plane was also... overweight. :stretch:

http://www.infobae.com/america/america- ... o-de-peso/

David
Last edited by flyingturtle on Mon Dec 26, 2016 6:32 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Reading accident reports is what calms me down
 
lemme
Posts: 26
Joined: Mon Dec 12, 2016 6:31 am

Re: LAMIA RJ85 crashes in Colombia

Mon Dec 26, 2016 6:31 pm

http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/aviao ... acao.ghtml

A Lamia plane that crashed carrying the Chapecoense football team delegation on November 28, leaving 71 dead, traveled with fuel at the limit and with excess weight, revealed on Monday (26) the Civil Aeronautics of Colombia (Aerocivil ) In a preliminary report on the accident.
Rescue team works after Chapecoense crash (Photo: Jaime Saldarriaga / Reuters) Rescue team works after Chapecoense flight crash (Photo: Jaime Saldarriaga / Reuters)
Rescue team works after Chapecoense flight accident (Photo: Jaime Saldarriaga / Reuters)

According to the entity's Secretary of Air Safety, Colonel Fredy Bonilla, the recordings of the cockpit show that the pilot and the co-pilot talked about the possibility of calling in Leticia (Colombia) or Bogota "because the plane was at the limit of fuel "But they did not.
"They were aware that the fuel they had was not adequate or sufficient," said Bonilla, adding that during the flight the pilot, Miguel Quiroga, "decided to stop in Bogota, but later changed his mind and went straight to Rionegro. "
In addition to the lack of fuel, the investigation found that the Lamia aircraft carried a heavier weight than allowed: 500 kg more than the maximum. But, according to Bonilla, "this finding is not a priority factor for the accident itself."
Most of the audio recordings presented in Bogotá were extracted from the black boxes that were examined in London by the handset manufacturers, model RJ85, specified Bonilla.
According to the investigation, in the flight plan presented by the pilot at the Santa Cruz de la Sierra airport (Bolivia), the autonomy of the aircraft was four hours and 22 minutes, exactly the same as the time of the flight, when it should have fuel for a longer route Long. "It should take an hour and 30 minutes more [fuel] than the flight time," said Bonilla.
The plane also had to have a second alternative airport in its flight plan, but only registered the one of Bogota, according to the investigation.
Another irregularity found is that the plane was allegedly not certified to fly above 29,000 feet, and in the flight plan submitted to Bolivia it was noted that it would fly at 30,000 feet. Approval of this flight plan, therefore, was not correct, Bonilla said.
Severity was not reported
The report also reveals that when the pilot asked the control tower of the José María Córdova airport to allow him to land, he did not report the seriousness of his situation nor that two of his four engines had stopped working.
"At that point they had two engines shut down and the crew did not report their situation, which was critical, and continued reporting in a normal way" to the control tower, he explained.
Shortly after, with a third motor already turned off, you hear in the audios as the tower asks if they need any additional ground service for a possible emergency, and the pilot says no.
Four minutes before the accident, the fourth engine switched off and a total electrical fault occurred, which the pilot informed by a primary system, since the rest had been disconnected due to lack of power.
In his last conversation, the pilot asked for "vectors" as he descended without permission to land. The tower then asked him for his altitude and he said he was still 8.2 miles (13.1 km) from the runway, but there was no response because of the impact of the plane, which hit 230 miles per hour.
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