It's worth remembering that AA's large presence in BOS is mostly due to the merger with US, and US had a very large and loyal customer base not just in Boston but also in New England.
I do not believe that is an accurate appraisal. AA's large presence at BOS is due to the historically strong presence, and "very large and loyal customer base," that both
USAirways had in BOS before the merger. For Massport's FY2013
, the last full fiscal year prior to the merger, AA and USAirways at BOS were separated by barely 25,000 total passengers for the entire year, meaning USAirways boarded less than 69 additional people per day
on average. The two airlines were remarkably close in size at BOS, even by 2013 after AA's dramatic reductions for the prior decade, and both still had substantial, loyal followings in the region. It may have seemed
like USAirways was so much larger than pre-merger AA at BOS for the same reason that it may well seem
like Delta is getting so much larger than post-merger AA at BOS. Namely, pre-merger AA's BOS operation then, like post-merger AA's BOS operation increasingly is now, was very concentrated on hubs - but at very
What I don't get is why AA does the slow draw down. These routes are profitable but not aligned with the strategy? Institutional inertia? Why not just get rid of all except for the hub flying?
Until the CRJs are done away with, and/or until another competitor shows up to crash the yield party, why walk away from the money?
I also wonder what the "hub only" flying does to their corporate contracts. For example, not offering BOS-SFO has long been a glaring gap.
I know. I still cannot believe it - it continues to baffle me that AA stays out of this market which is such a stunningly, glaringly obvious gap in AA's network. I get that AA is all about hubs these days, and frankly I think that is quite possibly the right strategy. But even AA is still selectively opportunistic in certain instances, like RDU-LHR and FLL-PAP, where it makes sense. And I continue to find it remarkable that AA has not jumped into the BOS-SFO market. As I've said numerous times, I have to think BOS-SFO must be among the largest business O&D market in the U.S. without AA nonstops. I'm hoping that with changes going on at and with Alaska, AA may finally
decide it's worth throwing a few daily flights on this route.
Ditto - AA has some large hubs that are not served by DL. CLT, DCA, DFW, PHL, ORD, PHX - now on paper it looks like only 6 but these are some very large hubs that DL does not serve. B6 serves all these destinations that DL does not serve. In retrospect, B6 mostly serves most of the DL hubs with the exception of MSP, CVG. I personally believe with AA dropping the non-hub routes - PIT, MDT, SYR, ROC and sprinkled Caribbean destinations - won't dent much of their market share as their large hubs are quite good enough to handle the might.
I agree. In addition, their partners like JL, CX, BA, IB, QR, give them an international presence like no other domestic carrier at BOS.
Indeed. There's no denying that AA's network breadth out of BOS, overall, is no match for Delta or certainly JetBlue. But I do think this sometimes leads to overlooking the advantages AA does still have at its disposal, like its extensive capacity to its hubs which, of course, happen to be among the largest and most important business O&D markets in the U.S. But in addition to that, another huge advantage AA has is the international coverage it can offer a corporate customer thanks to jointly selling JV partner flights nonstop to major hubs in both Europe and Asia. I have no doubt that there are corporate accounts in BOS that AA is able to keep thanks largely to BA and JAL. The seasonal MAD nonstop, plus nonstops to the Gulf and HKG with frequent flyer partners, can only help further.