So sad...38 years have passed since American Airlines Flight 191 crashed in Chicago, killing all on board plus 2 on the ground. Here's an interesting yet sad article about the repercussions of this crash:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nati ... story.html

Human factors will always be with us, be it in the front of the aircraft or inside the maintenance hanger, although "doing the right thing" will nearly always work in the hanger, it isn't always the obvious way forward for pilots. No matter how carefully a procedure is written or ingenious a bit of kit may be, a human (or an unforeseen circumstance or interaction) can still find a way to thwart the planned safe outcome, like water on pavement, always able to find its way beneath somehow, some way.

This accident did lead to more research on human factors and its application in the creation and implementation of maintenance procedures as well as fostering a greater expansion of what is known today as "safety culture".

Completely preventable tragedy as most tend to be. I remember a show about this and how the captain wasn't even supposed to be working this flight. It was a last minute change he made with a colleague. R.I.P.

Scarier still is that it could've just as easily been UA or CO, as both were using similar techniques, and both had pylon damage as a result.

AA just drew the unlucky straw. RIP.

That said, IINM, B6 is the only US major to still operate "the Cursed" flight numbers on any route that touches the Lower48.

IINM, WN was otherwise the last one to do so in 2002. Of the four remaining Legacies, AS and UA still have that number, but for decades have restricted it to Alaska and Guam, respectively.

So my question is, who still operates a "Flight 191" to the contiguous states?

I know that B6 has a flight 191 (where the pilot had a psychological episode, and had to be physically restrained)
BA also has a flight 191 (that was struck by lightning on its first flight).
Anyone else?

LAX772LR wrote:

That said, IINM, B6 is the only US major to still operate "the Cursed" flight numbers on any route that touches the Lower48.

IINM, WN was otherwise the last one to do so in 2002. Of the four remaining Legacies, AS and UA still have that number, but for decades have restricted it to Alaska and Guam, respectively.

So my question is, who still operates a "Flight 191" to the contiguous states?

I know that B6 has a flight 191 (where the pilot had a psychological episode, and had to be physically restrained)
BA also has a flight 191 (that was struck by lightning on its first flight).
Anyone else?

Um talk about hijacking a thread. What exactly does that have to do with AA191 besides the flight number? Anyway, indeed tragic and completely preventable. I can't imagine what those passengers felt plummeting to the ground....just awful.

I remember this crash as kid. So sad, so sad. I was shocked to learn later (reading it here on Anet and then researching) that the pilots could have flown out of this if they had advanced throttles instead of retarding them. For a long time it was thought when the engine fell off the aircraft was doomed. Now we learn that was not the case. Again so sad, so sad.

Now how the do the pilots land a DC10 with in operate able flaps on one side is a different story.

A sad summation of what happened and improvements made.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USJ4F7JAFlQ

LAX772LR wrote:

IINM, WN was otherwise the last one to do so in 2002.?

US operated a flight 191 until the flight number harmonization with AA in mid-2013.

Delta continued the flight number 191 until 8/2/85. Different circumstances but that one ended badly as well.

I had a friend who worked for PSA that knew LAX-based F/A James DeHart who was aboard AA191.
He teased her for working for and flying on a "California Puddle Jumper. Come fly with me and work for a real airline."
She had lost friends on PS182 in SAN and within a couple years abruptly quit flying and moved over to the Reservations Dept telling me she felt her "time was up." She has never flown another flight segment to this day. She loves Amtrak and cruise ships!
I was always struck by irony and poignant moments associated with this accident. The young man who had a vivid dream of an American Airlines plane plummeting to the ground "with large buildings in the background", actress Lindsay Wagner having a premonition and foreboding when she was booked on AA191. She abruptly cancelled her reservation at the ticket counter at O'Hare and rebooked her Mother and herself on a later flight. They were still in the terminal when AA191 crashed.
The most telling and chilling coincidence occurred with passenger Judith Wax. She was on AA191 with her husband Sheldon, a Playboy Magazine editor traveling to LAX for a conference. She was the author of a book about reaching middle age and noted she traveled a lot and was very afraid of flying. She dreaded it and was uncomfortable on every flight. That confession and chilling information is on page 191 of her book!
I've never got James DeHart, my friend and Judith Wax out of my mind. What forces and irony brought all these people together for that fateful flight? A tragic event to this day. God speed to those aboard and those who survived the years without loved ones and associates who were on board.

william wrote:

I remember this crash as kid. So sad, so sad. I was shocked to learn later (reading it here on Anet and then researching) that the pilots could have flown out of this if they had advanced throttles instead of retarding them. For a long time it was thought when the engine fell off the aircraft was doomed. Now we learn that was not the case. Again so sad, so sad.

Now how the do the pilots land a DC10 with in operate able flaps on one side is a different story.

A sad summation of what happened and improvements made.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USJ4F7JAFlQ

It wasn't the flaps. It was the slats on one side re-stowed by loss of hydraulic pressure and force of air against them. The wind stalled at the low airspeed they were at and the airplane rolled.

If they had sufficient airspeed, they could have put in aileron inputs that could have counteracted the asymmetrical lift. My understanding also is the pilots could have saved the airplane if they had thought to increase speed rather than following the recommended engine failure flying speed.

My understanding is also that this wouldn't happen in a modern day Boeing airplane. When the departing engine severed the Hydraulic lines, the leading edge slats on that side were blown back into the stowed position. In a current airplane, there would be a check valve that would have prevented immediate loss of Hydraulic pressure to the slats.

I remember it well.

I had flown into O'Hare earlier in the day. I am not a nervous flier (I've got about 2 million miles under my belt), but that day I felt unnecessarily nevous the entire way from DFW to ORD. That afternoon I was sitting in an east facing hotel room about 3 miles from O'Hare looking down at traffic headed west on the Kennedy, and saw a parade of fire trucks. My reaction was " there must have been a crash." So I walked to a west facing window and saw that massive plume of black smoke.

Ironically, the other time in my life that I felt unnecessarily nervous on a flight was on another DFW to ORD flight -- the day the Delta L1011 went down.

LAX772LR wrote:

BA also has a flight 191 (that was struck by lightning on its first flight).

I'm not sure that's actually true. Close, maybe, but I've sort of changed my mind about it over the years.

There is nothing wrong with mentioning that several horrific accidents shared the same ill fated flight numbers. It's a weird curiosity that people have noticed.
I was very young so I don't remember this accident but I know about it. There is that terrible picture of the plane crashing that will live forever online. Have you all seen it?
We should all be aware how safe air travel is now compared to the olden days, which were not very long ago really.
The 80's and 90's had some really bad accidents.
The accidents I remember the most were DL191 in DFW and AI flight 182 blowing up, and of course PA 103.

I was in high school when the crash happened. For a few years after that day, I was nervous about flying on a DC-10.
I remember my mother flew somewhere and came home with a big 3 page full color glossy brochure about the DC-10 that AA had published. I believe that it was published when they first took delivery of the aircraft, but before the Chicago crash. It was a beautiful piece of artwork.

Comair 191, or Delta 5191, crashed in Lexington.
PrinAir 191 crashed in 1972 in Puerto Rico.

BoeingGuy wrote:

william wrote:

I remember this crash as kid. So sad, so sad. I was shocked to learn later (reading it here on Anet and then researching) that the pilots could have flown out of this if they had advanced throttles instead of retarding them. For a long time it was thought when the engine fell off the aircraft was doomed. Now we learn that was not the case. Again so sad, so sad.

Now how the do the pilots land a DC10 with in operate able flaps on one side is a different story.

A sad summation of what happened and improvements made.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USJ4F7JAFlQ

It wasn't the flaps. It was the slats on one side re-stowed by loss of hydraulic pressure and force of air against them. The wind stalled at the low airspeed they were at and the airplane rolled.

If they had sufficient airspeed, they could have put in aileron inputs that could have counteracted the asymmetrical lift. My understanding also is the pilots could have saved the airplane if they had thought to increase speed rather than following the recommended engine failure flying speed.

My understanding is also that this wouldn't happen in a modern day Boeing airplane. When the departing engine severed the Hydraulic lines, the leading edge slats on that side were blown back into the stowed position. In a current airplane, there would be a check valve that would have prevented immediate loss of Hydraulic pressure to the slats.

Please correct me if I am wrong but I have a similar memory. AA had opted out of the stall stick shaker option for the first officer seat (UA and CO opted to have that option). The first officer was at the controls and so didn't know the plane was in a stall, hence pulling back on the throttles. If AA had a stick shaker option, and the FO knew he was in a stall, was there a chance they could have flown out of this?

United787 wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

william wrote:

I remember this crash as kid. So sad, so sad. I was shocked to learn later (reading it here on Anet and then researching) that the pilots could have flown out of this if they had advanced throttles instead of retarding them. For a long time it was thought when the engine fell off the aircraft was doomed. Now we learn that was not the case. Again so sad, so sad.

Now how the do the pilots land a DC10 with in operate able flaps on one side is a different story.

A sad summation of what happened and improvements made.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USJ4F7JAFlQ

It wasn't the flaps. It was the slats on one side re-stowed by loss of hydraulic pressure and force of air against them. The wind stalled at the low airspeed they were at and the airplane rolled.

If they had sufficient airspeed, they could have put in aileron inputs that could have counteracted the asymmetrical lift. My understanding also is the pilots could have saved the airplane if they had thought to increase speed rather than following the recommended engine failure flying speed.

My understanding is also that this wouldn't happen in a modern day Boeing airplane. When the departing engine severed the Hydraulic lines, the leading edge slats on that side were blown back into the stowed position. In a current airplane, there would be a check valve that would have prevented immediate loss of Hydraulic pressure to the slats.

Please correct me if I am wrong but I have a similar memory. AA had opted out of the stall stick shaker option for the first officer seat (UA and CO opted to have that option). The first officer was at the controls and so didn't know the plane was in a stall, hence pulling back on the throttles. If AA had a stick shaker option, and the FO knew he was in a stall, was there a chance they could have flown out of this?

Most likely, yes.

william wrote:

Most likely, yes.

So, if this was UA or CO, and they had the same thing happen due to the same poor maintenance practices, the outcome might have been different...

Coulda shoulda woulda, doesn't matter so much now...

Growing up in Chicago, I remember this crash well, I was only 6 but wow it left an impression...

Has anyone come across any of the 'lingering spirits' from the crash?

Even IF there had been indications of unwanted slat retraction, even IF there were audio/visual warnings of unwanted slat retraction, the flight crew had no time or altitude to react fast enough to avert the inevitable. Nearly every gong,bell and whistle was already going off. Check valves would have made a difference. The crew flew by the book.

It was their time.

I remember this accident well, also other DC10 in the 70s. I don't know if its really fair, but the DC10 seems to have gotten a bad rep over the years. I was discussing the Concorde crash in 2000 recently, somebody snarkily said - what a surprise metal from a DC10 caused the accident. Figures.

The Death Cruiser in industry slang

GF

United787 wrote:

Please correct me if I am wrong but I have a similar memory. AA had opted out of the stall stick shaker option for the first officer seat (UA and CO opted to have that option). The first officer was at the controls and so didn't know the plane was in a stall, hence pulling back on the throttles. If AA had a stick shaker option, and the FO knew he was in a stall, was there a chance they could have flown out of this?

This aircraft had a stick shaker (stall warning) mounted on the captain's side. But, it "shakes" both sides. (They are connected, you know).

Even though the F/O may have been the pilot flying, he still would have been aware had the stick shaker activated on either side. However, the issue was the electrical source for the stick shaker and that was Generator 1, which was lost with the engine. Gen 1, was also the electrical source for the flap/slat indicator, which would have indicated that the slats on the left side had retracted.

As a result, the electrical source for the stall warning system was changed to the battery bus or essential bus on most aircraft. Another solution was to provide two electrical sources to two stick shakers, either which would alert both pilots. (This is how our DC-10s were equipped).

TransAm wrote:

I remember this accident well, also other DC10 in the 70s. I don't know if its really fair, but the DC10 seems to have gotten a bad rep over the years. I was discussing the Concorde crash in 2000 recently, somebody snarkily said - what a surprise metal from a DC10 caused the accident. Figures.

It is quite fair that the DC-10 earned the reputation it got. The worst design flaws were:

- baggage door design
- unlocked slats making asymmetric rollback possible
- engine #2 failure to cut all three hydraulic lines to tail control.

No new airliner design with those flaws would ever be allowed to raise its nose wheel from the runway today. Some of it was corrected on the DC-10 over time, and It was corrected on the MD-11.

The DC-10 baggage door fault initiated improvements for all wide body airliners. An explosive underfloor decompression made the cabin floor collapse on all wide bodies of that era. It was corrected in various ways on DC-10 and all other wide body types in service.

But DC-10 isn't responsible for the Concorde accident. The strip fell off due to sloppy maintenance. It did not fall off a DC-10 due to DC-10 design, but due to sloppy maintenance. The strip could have fallen from any plane type which had been maintained the same way.

But there are similarities between the DC-10 and the Concorde. Both had design failures which made serious, but predictable failures escalate into a domino effect of fatal failures.

The lost strip should have caused a tire explosion on the Concorde, and some dents and bruces. Period. But it did cause a tire explosion, a tank rupture, a fire, and a double engine rollback. No airliner, on which a tire explosion can initiate a catastrophic domino effect, will be certified to fly today.

I actually flew out of ORD a day or two after the crash. Flew AA to FRA. I think it was a DC10 too.

prebennorholm wrote:

The lost strip should have caused a tire explosion on the Concorde, and some dents and bruces. Period. But it did cause a tire explosion, a tank rupture, a fire, and a double engine rollback. No airliner, on which a tire explosion can initiate a catastrophic domino effect, will be certified to fly today.

Do we really know a tire can cause a catastrophic domino effect until it has already done so? I would think if this had been known in advance, the problem would have been corrected. Just speculating here.

A few days before this tragedy I flew from IAD-LAX on an AA DC-10 with my family. We stayed in Los Angeles for a few days, and then flew to Phoenix to see my grandparents. When we got to PHX my grandmother told us what happened.

Indy wrote:

I actually flew out of ORD a day or two after the crash. Flew AA to FRA. I think it was a DC10 too.

American did not start flying ORD-FRA until 1985.

ord wrote:

Indy wrote:

I actually flew out of ORD a day or two after the crash. Flew AA to FRA. I think it was a DC10 too.

American did not start flying ORD-FRA until 1985.

Could it have been DUS? As far as I remember those were the only two German airports I flew to back then. I did CGN once but that was from JFK and I don't remember the airline. I know it was 1979 because we moved to Florida in 1980.

Also, is it possible it may have been a charter flight? I remember my mom and my grandparents doing some charter related bookings back in the day.

Indy wrote:

I actually flew out of ORD a day or two after the crash. Flew AA to FRA. I think it was a DC10 too.

AA did not begin flying to FRA until the Spring of 1985, 6 years after the crash of 191. You could not have flown an AA DC-10 to FRA a day or two after the crash.

LAX772LR wrote:

That said, IINM, B6 is the only US major to still operate "the Cursed" flight numbers on any route that touches the Lower48.

IINM, WN was otherwise the last one to do so in 2002. Of the four remaining Legacies, AS and UA still have that number, but for decades have restricted it to Alaska and Guam, respectively.

So my question is, who still operates a "Flight 191" to the contiguous states?

I know that B6 has a flight 191 (where the pilot had a psychological episode, and had to be physically restrained)
BA also has a flight 191 (that was struck by lightning on its first flight).
Anyone else?

Yes. Delta 191. That plane was coming into KORD/O'Hare. hit a microburst,landing on the grass later smashing into the wall!

Indy wrote:

ord wrote:

Indy wrote:

I actually flew out of ORD a day or two after the crash. Flew AA to FRA. I think it was a DC10 too.

American did not start flying ORD-FRA until 1985.

Could it have been DUS? As far as I remember those were the only two German airports I flew to back then. I did CGN once but that was from JFK and I don't remember the airline. I know it was 1979 because we moved to Florida in 1980.

Also, is it possible it may have been a charter flight? I remember my mom and my grandparents doing some charter related bookings back in the day.

American did not fly to Germany at all until 1985, and the charter operation at the time was flown with 707s and the occasional 747. AA's dedicated charter fleet consisted of several all-coach 707s. The 747s were used on charters to Las Vegas, generally.

PI4EVER wrote:

I had a friend who worked for PSA that knew LAX-based F/A James DeHart who was aboard AA191.
He teased her for working for and flying on a "California Puddle Jumper. Come fly with me and work for a real airline."
She had lost friends on PS182 in SAN and within a couple years abruptly quit flying and moved over to the Reservations Dept telling me she felt her "time was up." She has never flown another flight segment to this day. She loves Amtrak and cruise ships!
I was always struck by irony and poignant moments associated with this accident. The young man who had a vivid dream of an American Airlines plane plummeting to the ground "with large buildings in the background", actress Lindsay Wagner having a premonition and foreboding when she was booked on AA191. She abruptly cancelled her reservation at the ticket counter at O'Hare and rebooked her Mother and herself on a later flight. They were still in the terminal when AA191 crashed.
The most telling and chilling coincidence occurred with passenger Judith Wax. She was on AA191 with her husband Sheldon, a Playboy Magazine editor traveling to LAX for a conference. She was the author of a book about reaching middle age and noted she traveled a lot and was very afraid of flying. She dreaded it and was uncomfortable on every flight. That confession and chilling information is on page 191 of her book!
I've never got James DeHart, my friend and Judith Wax out of my mind. What forces and irony brought all these people together for that fateful flight? A tragic event to this day. God speed to those aboard and those who survived the years without loved ones and associates who were on board.

Chilling, indeed.

One minor correction: Jim DeHart was SAN-based. 8 of the 10 flight attendants were SAN-based, and the remaining 2 were LAX-based. Another chilling fact: Shortly before, Jim DeHart was robbed; attacked and left for dead on the side of the road. He had just returned to work when he was killed on 191. I have always heard nice things about him.

Two of the flight attendants were returning mothers who had just gotten their jobs back after being forced to resign for marriage and pregnancy years before.

The SAN base was small and close. The loss of these flight attendants was devastating. One of my friends received his long-awaited transfer to SAN as a result of the manning shortage caused by the loss of 191. He said it was a horrible entry into the base. Nobody blamed the transfers, of course, but their presence was a constant reminder of their lost friends on 191.

LordPlanes wrote:

LAX772LR wrote:

That said, IINM, B6 is the only US major to still operate "the Cursed" flight numbers on any route that touches the Lower48.

IINM, WN was otherwise the last one to do so in 2002. Of the four remaining Legacies, AS and UA still have that number, but for decades have restricted it to Alaska and Guam, respectively.

So my question is, who still operates a "Flight 191" to the contiguous states?

I know that B6 has a flight 191 (where the pilot had a psychological episode, and had to be physically restrained)
BA also has a flight 191 (that was struck by lightning on its first flight).
Anyone else?

Yes. Delta 191. That plane was coming into KORD/O'Hare. hit a microburst,landing on the grass later smashing into the wall!

It was DFW not ORD

millionsofmiles wrote:

Indy wrote:

ord wrote:

American did not start flying ORD-FRA until 1985.

Could it have been DUS? As far as I remember those were the only two German airports I flew to back then. I did CGN once but that was from JFK and I don't remember the airline. I know it was 1979 because we moved to Florida in 1980.

Also, is it possible it may have been a charter flight? I remember my mom and my grandparents doing some charter related bookings back in the day.

American did not fly to Germany at all until 1985, and the charter operation at the time was flown with 707s and the occasional 747. AA's dedicated charter fleet consisted of several all-coach 707s. The 747s were used on charters to Las Vegas, generally.

Might it have been an LH DC10? Two facts I am certain of is that it was a day or two after the crash and it was a DC10. I thought it was AA but if it wasn't AA then it was LH for certain. It was one of those two airlines. Not sure if it was charter or not.

longhauler wrote:

United787 wrote:

Please correct me if I am wrong but I have a similar memory. AA had opted out of the stall stick shaker option for the first officer seat (UA and CO opted to have that option). The first officer was at the controls and so didn't know the plane was in a stall, hence pulling back on the throttles. If AA had a stick shaker option, and the FO knew he was in a stall, was there a chance they could have flown out of this?

This aircraft had a stick shaker (stall warning) mounted on the captain's side. But, it "shakes" both sides. (They are connected, you know).

Even though the F/O may have been the pilot flying, he still would have been aware had the stick shaker activated on either side. However, the issue was the electrical source for the stick shaker and that was Generator 1, which was lost with the engine. Gen 1, was also the electrical source for the flap/slat indicator, which would have indicated that the slats on the left side had retracted.

As a result, the electrical source for the stall warning system was changed to the battery bus or essential bus on most aircraft. Another solution was to provide two electrical sources to two stick shakers, either which would alert both pilots. (This is how our DC-10s were equipped).

Not exactly the stick shaker was only on the captain side AA did not elect to take the dual stick shaker option so when the left engine departed the airplane and took out the left bus there was no way to activate any stick shaker. So they did not know they were in a stall condition. Add to that AA procedures for pilots at the time was in an engine failure it was to trade altitude for airspeed for obstacle avoidance. If the crew knew what they were dealing with they could have lowered the nose to avoid the stall on the one wing but the crew was dealing with how they were trained at the time ( which proved to be wrong) as was the maintenance procedure to replace the engine (also wrong). As this shows is how a chain of events can come together to cause a disaster.

prebennorholm wrote:

But DC-10 isn't responsible for the Concorde accident. The strip fell off due to sloppy maintenance. It did not fall off a DC-10 due to DC-10 design, but due to sloppy maintenance. The strip could have fallen from any plane type which had been maintained the same way.

Sure, but the fact that the strip was made out of a material that the aircraft had never been certified to have in that position, left CO wayyyy open to liability, with the ensuing results.

LordPlanes wrote:

LAX772LR wrote:

So my question is, who still operates a "Flight 191" to the contiguous states?

Yes. Delta 191. That plane was coming into KORD/O'Hare. hit a microburst,landing on the grass later smashing into the wall!

The question clearly asks who still ops that flight number; DL hasn't in more than 30yrs.
That, and the aircraft was going into DFW, not ORD.

stratosphere wrote:

Not exactly the stick shaker was only on the captain side AA did not elect to take the dual stick shaker option so when the left engine departed the airplane and took out the left bus there was no way to activate any stick shaker.

Exactly. The issue was not that the only stick shaker was on the Captain side and the F/O was flying (as some people have stated). The issue was that there was only one stick shaker and it had only one electrical source. The result of this accident would have occurred regardless of who was flying.

You also correctly state that the PF flew the correct profile following an engine failure, as taught at the time.

Apart from the obvious reminder to maintain aircraft the way the manufacturer intended, two other things changed as a result of this accident ...

One was that the stall warning system should have more than one electrical source or be hard wired directly to the battery bus. Another is that the profile following an engine failure changed, and thus flight director pitch direction changed. That is, now if the failure occurs higher than V2, then the higher speed is maintained. At the time of this accident the flight director would direct the pilot back to V2.

Hydraulic issues also were noted. Unlike Boeing and Lockheed, McDD's system would allow all hydrualic fluid to escape the system. Much like United 232, this accident would not have happened in a 747 or an L1011.

Let us not forget the factor that was the trigger for the loss of AA191 - improper maintenance procedures when removing the wing engines that damaged the attachment points of the engine. The short cut procedure, not only used by AA but also a few other airlines. was determined rather quickly and caused a grounding of almost all DC-10's, especially at airlines that used the improper procedure, and examination of all of the mounting points, replacement as needed and most important, ending any use of the shortcut procedure. From there other changes were made to reduce risks from a hydraulic failure in that area of the airplane.

United787 wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

william wrote:

I remember this crash as kid. So sad, so sad. I was shocked to learn later (reading it here on Anet and then researching) that the pilots could have flown out of this if they had advanced throttles instead of retarding them. For a long time it was thought when the engine fell off the aircraft was doomed. Now we learn that was not the case. Again so sad, so sad.

Now how the do the pilots land a DC10 with in operate able flaps on one side is a different story.

A sad summation of what happened and improvements made.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USJ4F7JAFlQ

It wasn't the flaps. It was the slats on one side re-stowed by loss of hydraulic pressure and force of air against them. The wind stalled at the low airspeed they were at and the airplane rolled.

If they had sufficient airspeed, they could have put in aileron inputs that could have counteracted the asymmetrical lift. My understanding also is the pilots could have saved the airplane if they had thought to increase speed rather than following the recommended engine failure flying speed.

My understanding is also that this wouldn't happen in a modern day Boeing airplane. When the departing engine severed the Hydraulic lines, the leading edge slats on that side were blown back into the stowed position. In a current airplane, there would be a check valve that would have prevented immediate loss of Hydraulic pressure to the slats.

Please correct me if I am wrong but I have a similar memory. AA had opted out of the stall stick shaker option for the first officer seat (UA and CO opted to have that option). The first officer was at the controls and so didn't know the plane was in a stall, hence pulling back on the throttles. If AA had a stick shaker option, and the FO knew he was in a stall, was there a chance they could have flown out of this?

Why would the stall stick shaker be sold as an option?

Mayday111 wrote:

United787 wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

It wasn't the flaps. It was the slats on one side re-stowed by loss of hydraulic pressure and force of air against them. The wind stalled at the low airspeed they were at and the airplane rolled.

If they had sufficient airspeed, they could have put in aileron inputs that could have counteracted the asymmetrical lift. My understanding also is the pilots could have saved the airplane if they had thought to increase speed rather than following the recommended engine failure flying speed.

My understanding is also that this wouldn't happen in a modern day Boeing airplane. When the departing engine severed the Hydraulic lines, the leading edge slats on that side were blown back into the stowed position. In a current airplane, there would be a check valve that would have prevented immediate loss of Hydraulic pressure to the slats.

Please correct me if I am wrong but I have a similar memory. AA had opted out of the stall stick shaker option for the first officer seat (UA and CO opted to have that option). The first officer was at the controls and so didn't know the plane was in a stall, hence pulling back on the throttles. If AA had a stick shaker option, and the FO knew he was in a stall, was there a chance they could have flown out of this?

Why would the stall stick shaker be sold as an option?

I can’t speak for the DC-10 but it’s a FAR requirement to have a stall warning system on the airplane so I’m dubious that it was optional.

BoeingGuy wrote:

Mayday111 wrote:

United787 wrote:

Please correct me if I am wrong but I have a similar memory. AA had opted out of the stall stick shaker option for the first officer seat (UA and CO opted to have that option). The first officer was at the controls and so didn't know the plane was in a stall, hence pulling back on the throttles. If AA had a stick shaker option, and the FO knew he was in a stall, was there a chance they could have flown out of this?

Why would the stall stick shaker be sold as an option?

I can’t speak for the DC-10 but it’s a FAR requirement to have a stall warning system on the airplane so I’m dubious that it was optional.

I should've been more clear. From what I read on the forum, I concluded that the airplane only had the stick shaker on the captain's control column. My question is, why was it an option to have the stick shaker on only the captain's control column?

Mayday111 wrote:

I should've been more clear. From what I read on the forum, I concluded that the airplane only had the stick shaker on the captain's control column. My question is, why was it an option to have the stick shaker on only the captain's control column?

Standard equipment on captain side, optional on first officer side. Why didn't AA order it for the right side? Money you would think. Believe the first DC10s they bought were only $14 million and guess they felt one stick shaker was enough.





Sent from my SM-N920T using Tapatalk

At the time the DC-10 was certified it was sufficient to have only one stick-shaker (remembering that as the controls columns are linked it will be felt in both) and AA requested the FO's shaker be an option.

As longhauler points out, while the second shaker would obviously have been desirable, the main deficiency was that the single stick-shaker had only one power source and that power source happened to be one that in that case had not only failed but had actively ceased to be attached to the aircraft. This same source is the one that powered the slat disagreement warning system too.

Had the second shaker been on the same power bus it too would also not have functioned (I've never read, now I think about it, how the second shaker was powered on aircraft that were so equipped before AA191).

The single-shaker configuration ceased to be offered in response to the crash and FAA Airworthiness Directive 80-30-10 mandated the installation on all DC-10s within 210 days of 21 Feb 1980 a shaker for the FO, in addition to two auto-throttle and speed control computers with slat position inputs on top of those previously required.

71Zulu wrote:

Why didn't AA order it for the right side? Money you would think.

I know it's not relevant to AA191 but it was also at AA's behest that MDD went with the electrically-actuated rear cargo door latching system instead of the hydraulic design they'd originally prepared, as the electric system was slightly lighter and required less maintenance less often.

ltbewr wrote:

Let us not forget the factor that was the trigger for the loss of AA191 - improper maintenance procedures when removing the wing engines that damaged the attachment points of the engine. The short cut procedure, not only used by AA but also a few other airlines. was determined rather quickly and caused a grounding of almost all DC-10's, especially at airlines that used the improper procedure, and examination of all of the mounting points, replacement as needed and most important, ending any use of the shortcut procedure. From there other changes were made to reduce risks from a hydraulic failure in that area of the airplane.

During my training as a DC10 F/E , I was working at KLM/TD, when the DC10 fleet was grounded.
Our team performed multiple pylon/attachment points inspections at out DC10-30 fleet at regular intervals during the grounding and after the grounding was lifted.
Only some minor pylon damage was found at our fleet (and almost all damage was traced back to assembly/production inaccuracies at the factory, also mentioned in the NTSB report..

AFAIK only a few United States major carriers were using the short cut procedure. (removal /installation of engine & pylon as a single unit)
In the NTSB report the following arlines are mentioned : American, Continental and United.
American and Continental used the most inaccurate method by forklift. United used a overhead crane, with no major damage observed.
United States carriers had removed and reinstalled a total of 175 pylon and engine assemblies. Eighty-eight of these operations involved the lowering and raising of the pylon and engine as a single unit. Of these 88, 12 were lowered and raised with an overhead crane. The remaining 76 were lowered and raised with a forklift. The nine situations wherein impact damage was sustained and cracks found involved the use of the forklift

747classic wrote:

ltbewr wrote:

Let us not forget the factor that was the trigger for the loss of AA191 - improper maintenance procedures when removing the wing engines that damaged the attachment points of the engine. The short cut procedure, not only used by AA but also a few other airlines. was determined rather quickly and caused a grounding of almost all DC-10's, especially at airlines that used the improper procedure, and examination of all of the mounting points, replacement as needed and most important, ending any use of the shortcut procedure. From there other changes were made to reduce risks from a hydraulic failure in that area of the airplane.

During my training as a DC10 F/E , I was working at KLM/TD, when the DC10 fleet was grounded.
Our team performed multiple pylon/attachment points inspections at out DC10-30 fleet at regular intervals during the grounding and after the grounding was lifted.
Only some minor pylon damage was found at our fleet (and almost all damage was traced back to assembly/production inaccuracies at the factory, also mentioned in the NTSB report..

AFAIK only a few United States major carriers were using the short cut procedure. (removal /installation of engine & pylon as a single unit)
In the NTSB report the following arlines are mentioned : American, Continental and United.
American and Continental used the most inaccurate method by forklift. United used a overhead crane, with no major damage observed.
United States carriers had removed and reinstalled a total of 175 pylon and engine assemblies. Eighty-eight of these operations involved the lowering and raising of the pylon and engine as a single unit. Of these 88, 12 were lowered and raised with an overhead crane. The remaining 76 were lowered and raised with a forklift. The nine situations wherein impact damage was sustained and cracks found involved the use of the forklift

In the post AA crash investigation, several UA aircraft were found to have severely damaged pylons. One UA DC-10 had a pylon so weakened that a mechanic was able to move it by hand. This discovery was what caused the DC-10 to be grounded; the FAA was concerned that there might be other DC-10s with engines literally hanging by a thread, like the damaged UA DC-10's engine was.

stratosphere wrote:

longhauler wrote:

United787 wrote:

Please correct me if I am wrong but I have a similar memory. AA had opted out of the stall stick shaker option for the first officer seat (UA and CO opted to have that option). The first officer was at the controls and so didn't know the plane was in a stall, hence pulling back on the throttles. If AA had a stick shaker option, and the FO knew he was in a stall, was there a chance they could have flown out of this?

This aircraft had a stick shaker (stall warning) mounted on the captain's side. But, it "shakes" both sides. (They are connected, you know).

Even though the F/O may have been the pilot flying, he still would have been aware had the stick shaker activated on either side. However, the issue was the electrical source for the stick shaker and that was Generator 1, which was lost with the engine. Gen 1, was also the electrical source for the flap/slat indicator, which would have indicated that the slats on the left side had retracted.

As a result, the electrical source for the stall warning system was changed to the battery bus or essential bus on most aircraft. Another solution was to provide two electrical sources to two stick shakers, either which would alert both pilots. (This is how our DC-10s were equipped).

Not exactly the stick shaker was only on the captain side AA did not elect to take the dual stick shaker option so when the left engine departed the airplane and took out the left bus there was no way to activate any stick shaker. So they did not know they were in a stall condition. Add to that AA procedures for pilots at the time was in an engine failure it was to trade altitude for airspeed for obstacle avoidance. If the crew knew what they were dealing with they could have lowered the nose to avoid the stall on the one wing but the crew was dealing with how they were trained at the time ( which proved to be wrong) as was the maintenance procedure to replace the engine (also wrong). As this shows is how a chain of events can come together to cause a disaster.

The procedure remains in place. Lose thrust from an engine you maintain airspeed between V2 and V2+15 until you are at your obstacle clearance altitude (OSA) and then retract the flaps. Cant remember how high they were during the event but it seems they didn't have much of either...airspeed or altitude. Since my time at AA 3-4 years later there has always been a Severe Damage/Separation checklist. Curious if the separation part was there prior although engine/struts are designed to do just that. Never flew the DC10 or any three engine aircraft (except the B727 as FE) but losing one of three engines was supposably a non event. Definitely a horrible nightmarish scene on photo. Cant imagine witnessing it in person...absolutely surreal.

[threeid][/threeid]

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

The Death Cruiser in industry slang

GF

Although the MD11 had a better saftey record, I did hear it once reffered to as a mega death 11.